Metaphysical Realities: Fundamental Axioms on

Existence

Alexander Daniels

March 7, 2016
0.1 Introduction to Fundamental Propositions
and Axioms
Definition 1. A thing is an object or element that exists in some space (A
universe or sub-universe in which a thing exists).

Definition 2. A space is the set of parameters (and their distinct observable

– which includes non-physically observable– values) for which the existence of a
particular thing is noted.

It would be safe to say that:

Axiom 1. The universe in its entirety, i.e. all of its constituents and groupings
of constituents are things.

Every time an object is observed or perceived it is uniquely determined -

which agrees with the quantum mechanical view found in physics, or a statis-
ticians view of the world. Although one would not want to list the potentially
endless variety of states and nuances of states, I will not limit such a list and
will generalize this idea and state it abstractly.

Proposition 1. (Proposition 1) All things are complex - i.e., irreducible and

sovereign.

Definition 3. (Irreducible) A thing is irreducible if all reconstructions of that

thing are incomplete.

Incomplete, as it is used here, can be synonymous with distinct. In other

words, all reconstructions are distinct. Moreover, since a construction is the
existence of a thing at a particular moment in time, a reconstruction could
be an observation of a thing at a later time, a simulation (like in a dream),
emulation, or recreation. Hence, if the value of any parameter or number of
parameters which describe a space changes, a recreation must result, no matter
how similar the noted existence is to the former in the initial space. Let us now
define the concept of sovereignty.

Definition 4. (Sovereignty) A thing may be associated with or correspond to

more than one classification.

Uniqueness - in a metaphysical sense - means one may construct a one-to-one

map from a highly detailed or abstract notion (a complete thing or identity to
a more concrete and measurable one (which exists in an another space, usually
physical space) called an object. That is, for any given identity or notion, there
is only one (measurable) equivalent. Yet, that which is sovereign is a one-to-
many map from an abstract notion or identity to many objects or classifications.

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Both uniqueness and sovereignty has, as their subject, an identity but differ in
the amount of objects that may inherit that identity.
These differing manifestations are called classifications. In other words, the
most complete existence is the most inclusive one. Hence, I say that for a
(complete) thing, it exists apart from every classification or grouping yet also
exists (in a lesser incomplete way) for every grouping or classification. The most
inclusive set has a count of infinity, and I will avoid any dealings with such a set
– surely, a complete existence is quite unlike our finite one. The universe itself is
the most complete thing along with the most complete existence(like the notion
of God). If we, by some process, project or simplify this ’most complete’ identity
to a lower space? The resulting object is a called a model. The completeness
of this model is related to the completeness of the space in which it is created.
In other words,(in this highly simplified case) if the space in which it exists is
the most inclusive space, then that projection is equivalent to the identity. I
summarize this and extend this idea to any ’thing’ in the following theorem:

Theorem 1. If a thing is projected unto (or recreated on) another space , and
such a space is the most inclusive space, then that projection is equivalent to
that thing.

Hence a mental state m is more complete than a physical state p if it can

be shown that the physical state lacks a certain essence or property. This
necessarily means that mental perception of a thing is more complete than the
physical object itself! Although this may sound absurd, it is plausible to think
of the mental perception of a thing as containing more information about the
thing than the thing itself. For I can always assign additional meaning to the
object even when the object, by means of some observation cannot empirically
validate this meaning. It is this property of the mental state that weakens
our ability to claim that the conception (or perception) of a physical object of
multiple people corresponds to only one physical object. However, this fact also
allows us to avoid being tricked by a liar, as elaborated on in a future example.
There can only be one instance or copy of a thing if theorem 1 holds true.
However, if we believe that it is possible to have multiple copies that are equiva-
lent or indistinguishable, then this theorem must be modified. Still, every copy
must be distinguishable in some way - for perfectly overlapping existences re-
duce to one unique existence. We say then that a copy behaves like a ’mirroring
phantom’ - another instance that differs only by a simple transformation of the
value of the parameters of that space (like linear translation). Hence, if I can
distinguish between two things,there are two distinct things. That is, no mat-
ter how similar two or more things may be, if I can distinguish between the
two, they are necessarily different. Although this might seem like it invites a
‘categorical fallacy’, it does not have to. Now consider two examples before I
introduce a simplified notation which shall further elucidate this theorem.

Consider the example of the university once more. If I cannot grasp that,
after a through tour, that the university which you speak of is equivalent to

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that which I toured, I simply have a differing (or false) conception of what
the university is. Even so, my false conception of what ”unversity” means is
different from your correct conception of it. Although we are, for all practical
purposes, referring to the same thing, we cannot agree upon it. Since this leads
to no contradiction in either of our minds (see footnote 1), we could still be
referring to the same object. Now, what if you lie and take me to a different
university altogether and claim that it is your university. If I spot the lie and
disagree with you, my conception may now be, in actuality, equivalent to yours,
given your awareness of your own lie and my knowledge of the truth. In this
case, we could again be referring to the same thing. Now, if I do not spot your
lie, and avoid making a categorical mistake by agreeing with you, I still do not
have a proper understanding of your university, unless you are unaware of you
own lie. We must note that in both cases, could should be the strongest level
of assertion we can make about the equivalence of the thing we both conceive
of. This must be true regardless of our tendency to believe another is being
truthful or our tendency to simplify our conversations by immediately assuming
we must be referring to the same object if our language agrees.
Now suppose I am staring at a physical object which you are also staring
at from a different location at the same exact time, it seems clear that it is
easy to explain which object that is. However, if you try to direct me to the
object by replicating your own movements, I will never be directed to the object
unless the directions that are given are invariant with respect to you and I. For
example, if the object lies in the center of a circle and we stand on the edges
of that circle, the instruction ”walk x feet towards the object” will direct both
of us to the object. Hence, the parameter ”distance from the object” does not
change in value if you and I switch perceptions. Therefore, assuming all else
remains the same, we must both be observing the same object. Now, suppose
I attach the meaning ”mouse” to the object, while you attach the meaning
”rat” to it. Whether or not a meaning represents a truth or a falsehood, my
conception of the thing is immediately different from your conception of it. It
follows that we now refer to a different object, although had we not assigned this
meaning, our conceptions would be equivalent. This, however, does not lead to
a contradiction.1 Your conception is simply a unique conception which exists
apart from the object itself. Hence, if our conceptions differ, we necessarily force
into being the existence of two objects (or things, even if the description is false)
than the existence of the object which arises from the fruit of our agreement. It
is as if by agreement, we eliminate all other existences of an object. This implies
that if the description of all people agree for a given object, than there must
only be one object! If there is more than one description, than we must conceive
1 There is an additional reason why this does not lead to a problem. Note that my personal

ability to distinguish between things is the only attribute which allows me to make this claim.
Hence, your claim that the object is a ”rat” is not sufficient in itself to make me distinguish
between it from the ”mouse”. Since this also remains true for you, neither of us can distinguish
the one object into two, and we still both only see one object despite our arguing. Therefore,
the only time one needs to entertain the argument which follows, or the idea that we are
observing two different things, is when both you and I consider both perspectives equally
valid

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of several new objects for each differing description. Hence, our understanding
of the world can only be simplified by the simplification of our understanding.
As long as your claim forces no distinction in my mind, we can still be referring
to the same thing. Note that this does not deny the existence of the simpler
description of the ‘true’ object (if there is one). It is only that since we can
conceive of it differently, the existence of our novel conception eliminates all
symmetry, potentially forcing us to dream up a false distinction when there is
none. Still, even in an individual’s falsehood, if they can distinguish between
things, than the things must be distinct.2

2 More correctly, they are distinct if we both consider both distinctions equally valid. Please

see the previous footnote for more detail.