TORTS Bar Qs
TORTS Bar Qs
Mr and Mrs R own a burned-out building, the firewall of which collapsed and destroyed the shop
occupied by the family of Mr and Mrs S, which resulted in injuries to said couple and the death of their
daughter. Mr and Mrs S had been warned by Mr & Mrs R to vacate the shop in view of its proximity to
the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
Mr & Mrs S filed against Mr and Mrs R an action for recovery of damages the former suffered as a
result of the collapse of the firewall. In defense, Mr and Mrs R rely on the doctrine of last clear chance
alleging that Mr and Mrs S had the last clear chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the
former’s warning to vacate the shop, and therefore Mr and Mrs R’s prior negligence should be
disregarded.
If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? State your reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would decide in favor of Mr & Mrs S. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs (Art 2190 Civil Code)
As regards the defense of “last clear chance,” the same is not tenable because according to the SC in one
case (De Roy v. CA L-80718, Jan. 29, 1988, 157 S 757) the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to
instances covered by Art 2190 of the Civil Code.
Further, in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v.s IAC (G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987, 148 SCRA 353), the
Supreme Court held that the role of the common law “last clear chance” doctrine in relation to Article
2179 of the Civil Code is merely to mitigate damages within the context of contributory negligence.
Damages (1994)
On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of Pl,000,000.00 from his friend Raffy. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for Interest. The note was due on January 5, 1993 but
before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of spite, deliberately defaulted in paying
the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Raffy may recover the amount of the promissory note of P1 million, together with interest at the
legal rate from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. In addition, however, inasmuch as the
debtor is in bad faith, he is liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation. (Art. 2201(2). NCC).
2) Yes, under Article 2220, NCC moral damages are recoverable in case of breach of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
3) Nominal damages may not be recoverable in this case because Raffy may already be indemnified of
his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. NOMINAL DAMAGES are adjudicated
only in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him. (Article 2231. Civil Code)
4) Raffy may ask for, but would most likely not be awarded temperate damages, for the reason that
his actual damages may already be compensated upon proof thereof with the promissory note.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES may be awarded only when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. (Article 2224,
Civil Code)
5) Yes, under paragraph 2, Article 2208 of the Civil Code, considering that Nonoy’s act or omission has
compelled Raffy to litigate to protect his interests. Furthermore. attorneys’ fees may be awarded by the
court when it is just and equitable. (Article 2208(110) Civil Code).
On her third month of pregnancy, Rosemarie, married to Boy, for reasons known only to her, and without
informing Boy, went to the clinic of X, a known abortionist, who for a fee, removed and expelled the
fetus from her womb, Boy learned of the abortion six (6) months later.
Availing of that portion of Section 12 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution which reads;
The State x xx shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception,
“xxx” which he claims confers a civil personality on the unborn from the moment of conception.
Boy filed a case for damages against the abortionist, praying therein that the latter be ordered to pay
him: (a) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the fetus, (b) P100.000.00 as moral damages for the
mental anguish and anxiety he suffered, (c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, (d) P20,000.00 as
nominal damages, and (e) P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
May actual damages be also recovered? If so, what facts should be alleged and proved?
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, provided that the pecuniary loss suffered should be substantiated and duly proved.
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular accident due to
the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim damages from the bus company
for the death of their unborn child? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life of the
unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet considered a person and the law allows
indemnity only for loss of life of person. The mother, however may recover damages for the bodily injury
she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal organ. The parents may
also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them, e.g., moral damages for mental
anguish that attended the loss of the unborn child. Since there is gross negligence, exemplary damages
can also be recovered. (Gelus v.CA, 2 SCRA 801 [1961])
Johnny Maton’s conviction for homicide was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and in addition, although
the prosecution had not appealed at all. The appellate court increased the indemnity for death from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. On his appeal to the Supreme Court, among the other things Johnny Maton
brought to the high court’s attention, was the increase of indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals
despite the clear fact that the People had not appealed from the appellate court’s judgment.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) In Abejam v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that even if the issue of damages were not
raised by the appellant in the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals in its findings increased the
damages, the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals.
b) No, the contention of the accused is not correct because upon appeal to the Appellate Court, the
court acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as civil. Since the conviction of homicide
had been appealed, there is no finality in the amount of indemnity because the civil liability arising from
the crime and the judgment on the crime has not yet become final
c) Yes. Since the civil indemnity is an award in the civil action arising from the criminal offense, the rule
that a party cannot be granted affirmative relief unless he himself has appealed should apply. Therefore,
it was error for the Court of Appeals to have expanded the indemnity since the judgment on the civil
liability had become final.
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d) No. Courts can review matters not assigned as errors. (Hydro Resource vs. CA . 204 SCRA 309).
As a result of a collision between the taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B, X, a
passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action against both drivers.
May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
drivers to be absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the civil action is based on a quasi-delict the taxicab owners may raise the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver; if the action against
them is based on culpa contractual or civil liability arising from a crime, they cannot raise the defense.
As a result of a collision between the taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B, X, a
passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action against both drivers.
Is it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil action for damages against both taxicab owners
before he can file a civil action for damages against them? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the separate civil action is to recover damages arising from the criminal act, reservation is
necessary. If the civil action against the taxicab owners is based on culpa contractual, or on quasi-delict,
there is no need for reservation.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, such reservation is not necessary. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the New Civil Code are no longer “deemed instituted”, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action (Section 3, Rule 111, Ibid). The failure
to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the New Civil Code (Casupanan v. Laroya G.R. No.
145391, August 26, 2002).
A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city road, suddenly
gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and bumped a car in front of it, causing
severed damage to the care and serious injuries to its passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time
of the incident. The car owner and the injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused
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by Diego’s negligence. In their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain
speed and that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing the
van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego contend that the
sudden malfunction of the van’s brake system is a fortuitous even and that, therefore, they are exempt
from any liability.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the presence of such
defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. The failure to maintain the
vehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.
DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers’ club of FX Airlines. In Hongkong, the
couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which they had bought tickets. On checking in,
however, they were told they were upgraded by computer to First Class for the flight to Manila because
the Business Section was overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in First Class. They said
they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They felt humiliated, embarrassed and
vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the
upgrade. Thus they gave in, but during the transfer of luggage DT suffered pain in his arm and wrist.
After arrival in Manila, they demanded an apology from FX’s management as well as indemnity payment.
When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million pesos in damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their objections, to First
Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage. However, although there is a breach of
contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual damages only for such pecuniary losses suffered by them as a
result of such breach. There seems to be no showing that they incurred such pecuniary loss. There is no
showing that the pain in DT’s arm and wrist resulted directly from the carrier’s acts complained of.
Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages. Moreover, DT could have avoided the alleged injury by
requesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer as a matter of duty on their part. There is also no
basis to award moral damages for such breach of contract because the facts of the problem do not show
bad faith or fraud on the part of the airline. (Cathay Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [2003]). However,
they may recover moral damages if the cause of action is based on Article 21 of the Civil Code for the
humiliation and embarrassment they felt when the stewardess threatened to offload them if they did
not avail of the upgrade.
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Liability; Airline Company; Non-Performance of an Obligation (2005)
Dr. and Mrs. Almeda are prominent citizens of the country and are frequent travelers abroad. In 1996,
they booked round-trip business class tickets for the Manila-Hong Kong- Manila route of the Pinoy
Airlines, where they are holders of Gold Mabalos Class Frequent Flier cards. On their return flight, Pinoy
Airlines upgraded their tickets to first class without their consent and, inspite of their protestations to be
allowed to remain in the business class so that they could be with their friends, they were told that the
business class was already fully booked, and that they were given priority in upgrading because they
are elite members/holders of Gold Mabalos Class cards. Since they were embarrassed at the
discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced to take the flight at the first class section apart
from their friends who were in the business class. Upon their return to Manila, they demanded a written
apology from Pinoy Airlines. When it went unheeded, the couple sued Pinoy Airlines for breach of
contract claiming moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper. Article 2201 of the Civil Code entitles the person to recover damages which
may be attributed to non-performance of an obligation. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
77011, July 24, 1990), when an airline issues ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, a
contract of carriage arises and the passenger expects that he would fly on that day. When the airline
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seat in case all of
them would show up. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused the confirmed seat, said
passenger is entitled to moral damages.
In the given problem, spouses Almeda had a booked roundtrip business class ticket with Pinoy Airlines.
When their tickets were upgraded to first class without their consent, Pinoy Airlines breached the
contract. As ruled in Zulueta v. Pan American (G.R. No. L-28589, January 8,1973), in case of overbooking,
airline is in bad faith. Therefore, spouses Almeda are entitled to damages.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action may or may not prosper. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. Moral damages predicated upon a breach
of contract of carriage are recoverable only in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or
where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger. (Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 60501, March 5, 1993) Where there is no showing that the airline acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
contract of carriage which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the
liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.
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In the instant case, if the involuntary upgrading of the Almedas’ seat accommodation was not attended
by fraud or bad faith, the award of moral damages has no leg to stand on.
Thus, spouses would not also be entitled to exemplary damages. It is a requisite in the grant of
exemplary damages that the act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner. (Morris v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127957, February 21, 2001)
Moreover, to be entitled thereto, the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or
compensatory damages. (Art. 2234, Civil Code) Since the Almedas are not entitled to any of these
damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. Where the awards for moral and
exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorney’s fees be eliminated. (Orosa v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 111080, April 5, 2000; Morris v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127957, February 21,
2001) The most that can be adjudged in their favor for Pinoy Airlines’ breach of contract is an award for
nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code. (Cathay Pacific Airways v. Sps. Daniel & Maria
Luisa Vasquez, G.R. No. 150843, March 14, 2003)
However, if spouses Almeda could prove that there was bad faith on the part of Pinoy Airlines when it
breached the contract of carriage, it could be liable for moral, exemplary as well as attorney’s fees.
a) When would an employer’s liability for damage, caused by an employee in the performance of his
assigned tasks, be primary and when would it be subsidiary in nature?
b) Would the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee be available
to the employer in both instances?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The employer’s liability for damage based on culpa aquiliana under Art, 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code is primary; while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary.
(b) The defense of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee under Article 2180
of the Civil Code is available only to those primarily liable thereunder, but not to those subsidiarily liable
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (Yumul vs. Juliano, 72 Phil. 94).
Marcial, who does not know how to drive, has always been driven by Ben, his driver of ten years whom
he had chosen carefully and has never figured in a vehicular mishap. One day, Marcial was riding at the
back seat of his Mercedes Benz being driven along EDSA by Ben. Absorbed in reading a book,
Marcial did not notice that they were approaching the corner of Quezon Avenue, when the traffic light
had just turned yellow. Ben suddenly stepped on the gas to cross the intersection before the traffic light
could turn red. But, too late. Midway in the intersection, the traffic light changed, and a Jeepney full of
passengers suddenly crossed the car’s path. A collision between the two vehicles was inevitable. As a
result, several jeepney passengers were seriously injured. A suit for damages based on culpa
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aquiliana was filed against Marcial and Ben, seeking to hold them jointly and severally liable for such
injuries.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marcial may not be liable because under Art. 2184, NCC, the owner who is in the vehicle is not liable
with the driver if by the exercise of due diligence he could have prevented the injury. The law does not
require the owner to supervise the driver every minute that he was driving. Only when through his
negligence, the owner has lost an opportunity to prevent the accident would he be liable (Caedo v. Yu
Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410 citing Chapman v. Underwood ang Manlangit v. Mauler, 250 SCRA 560). In this
case, the fact that the owner was absorbed in reading a book does not conclusively show that he lost the
opportunity to prevent the accident through his negligence.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Marcial should be held liable. Art. 2164. NCC makes an owner of a motor vehicle solidarily liable
with the driver if, being in the vehicle at the time of the mishap, he could have prevented it by the
exercise of due diligence. The traffic conditions along EDSA at any time of day or night are such as to
require the observance of utmost care and total alertness in view of the large number of vehicles
running at great speed. Marcial was negligent in that he rendered himself oblivious to the traffic hazards
by reading a book instead of focusing his attention on the road and supervising the manner in which his
car was being driven. Thus he failed to prevent his driver from attempting to beat the traffic light at the
junction of Quezon Avenue and EDSA, which Marcial, without being a driver himself could have easily
perceived as a reckless course of conduct.
A Gallant driven by John and owned by Art, and a Corolla driven by its owner, Gina, collided somewhere
along Adriatico Street. As a result of the accident, Gina had a concussion. Subsequently. Gina brought an
action for damages against John and Art. There is no doubt that the collision is due to John’s negligence.
Can Art, who was in the vehicle at the time of the accident, be held solidarily liable with his driver, John?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Art may be held solidary liable with John, if it was proven that the former could have
prevented the misfortune with the use of due diligence. Article 2184 of the Civil Code states: “In motor
mishaps, the owner is solidary liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune, x x x”
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Liability; owner who was in the vehicle (2002)
Does the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing damage to a third party affect his liability for
his driver’s negligence? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is made solidarily liable with his driver if he (the owner) was in
the vehicle and could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the mishap. (Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 26
SCRA 410 [1968]).
Ortillo contracts Fabricato, Inc. to supply and install tile materials in a building he is donating to his
province. Ortillo pays 50% of the contract price as per agreement. It is also agreed that the balance
would be payable periodically after every 10% performance until completed. After performing about
93% of the contract, for which it has been paid an additional 40% as per agreement, Fabricato, Inc. did
not complete the project due to its sudden cessation of operations. Instead, Fabricato, Inc. demands
payment of the last 10% of the contract despite its non-completion of the project. Ortillo refuses to pay,
invoking the stipulation that payment of the last amount 10% shall be upon completion. Fabricato, Inc.
brings suit for the entire 10%. Plus damages, Ortillo counters with claims for (a) moral damages for
Fabricato, Inc.’s unfounded suit which has damaged his reputation as a philanthropist and respect
businessman in his community, and (b) attorney’s fees.
A. Does Ortillo have a legal basis for his claim for moral damages?
B. How about his claim for attorney’s fees, having hired a lawyer to defend him?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. There is no legal basis to Ortillo’s claim for moral damages. It does not fall under the coverage of
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
B. Ortillo is entitled to attorney’s fees because Fabricato’s complaint is a case of malicious prosecution
or a clearly unfounded civil action. (Art. 2208 [4] and [11], NCC).
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in the cases specified therein
several of which are enumerated below.
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Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral damages. Explain.
c) Immorality or dishonesty
d) Illegal search
e) Malicious prosecution
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Immorality and dishonesty, per se, are not among those cases enumerated in
Article 2219 which can be the basis of an action for moral damages. The law specifically mentions
adultery or concubinage, etc. but not any and every immoral act.
Quasi-Delict (1992)
As the result of a collision between a public service passenger bus and a cargo truck owned by D, X
sustained physical injuries and Y died. Both X and Y were passengers of the bus. Both drivers were at
fault, and so X and Z, the only heir and legitimate child of the deceased Y, sued the owners of both
vehicles.a) May the owner of the bus raise the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family?
d) May Z claim moral damages from both defendants? Give reasons for all your answers.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No. The owner of the bus cannot raise the defense because the carrier’s liability is based on breach
of contract.
(b) Yes. D can raise the defense because his liability is based on a quasi-delict.
(c) Because X suffered physical injuries, X can claim moral damages against D, but as against the owner
of the bus. X can claim moral damages only if X proves reckless negligence of the carrier amounting to
fraud.
(d) Z can claim moral damages against both defendants because the rules on damages arising from
death due to a quasi-delict are also applicable to death of a passenger caused by breach of contract
by a common carrier (Arts. 1755, 1756, 1764, 2206 and 2219, Civil Code).
Quasi-Delict (2005)
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Under the law on quasi-delict, aside from the persons who caused injury to persons, who else are liable
under the following circumstances:
a) When a 7-year old boy injures his playmate while playing with his father’s rifle. Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The parents of the 7-year old boy who caused injury to his playmate are liable under Article 219 of the
Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code since they exercise parental authority over the
person of the boy. (Tamargo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85044, June 3,1992; Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-
24803, May 26, 1977)
b) When a domestic helper, while haggling for a lower price with a fish vendor in the course of buying
food stuffs for her employer’s family, slaps the fish vendor, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Employer of the domestic helper who slapped a fish vendor. Under Article 2180, par. 5 of the Civil
Code, “employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.”
c) A carpenter in a construction company accidentally hits the right foot of his co-worker with a
hammer. Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The owner of the construction company. Article 2180, paragraph 4 states that “the owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.”
d) A 15-year old high school student stabs his classmate who is his rival for a girl while they were
going out of the classroom after their class. Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The school, teacher and administrator as they exercise special parental authority. (Art. 2180, par. 7 in
relation to Art. 218 and Art. 219 of the Family Code)
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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The defense that might be available to them is the observance of a good father of the family to prevent
the damage. (Last par., Art. 2180, Civil Code)
Rosa was leasing an apartment in the city. Because of the Rent Control Law, her landlord could not
increase the rental as much as he wanted to, nor terminate her lease as long as she was paying her rent.
In order to force her to leave the premises, the landlord stopped making repairs on the apartment, and
caused the water and electricity services to be disconnected. The difficulty of living without
electricity and running water resulted in Rosa’s suffering a nervous breakdown. She sued the landlord for
actual and moral damages.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, based on quasi-delict under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code (Articles 19, 20
and 21) because the act committed by the lessor is contrary to morals. Moral damages are
recoverable under Article 2219 (10) in relation to Article 21. Although the action is based on quasi-delict
and not on contract, actual damages may be recovered if the lessee is able to prove the losses and
expenses she suffered.
Tony bought a Ford Expedition from a car dealer in Muntinlupa City. As payment, Tony issued a
check drawn against his current account with Premium Bank. Since he has a good reputation, the car
dealer allowed him to immediately drive home the vehicle merely on his assurance that his check is
sufficiently funded. When the car dealer deposited the check, it was dishonored on the ground of
“Account Closed.” After an investigation, it was found that an employee of the bank misplaced Tony’s
account ledger. Thus, the bank erroneously assumed that his account no longer exists. Later it turned out
that Tony’s account has more than sufficient funds to cover the check. The dealer however, immediately
filed an action for recovery of possession of the vehicle against Tony for which he was terribly
humiliated and embarrassed. Does Tony have a cause of action against Premium Bank? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Tony may file an action against Premium Bank for damages under Art. 2176. Even if there exists a
contractual relationship between Tony and Premium Bank, an action for quasi-delict may nonetheless
prosper. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort. There is a fiduciary relationship between the bank and the depositor, imposing utmost diligence in
managing the accounts of the depositor. The dishonor of the check adversely affected the credit standing
of Tony, hence, he is entitled to damages (Singson v. BPI, G.R. No. L-24932, June 27, 1968; American
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Express International, Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 72383, November 9, 1988; Consolidated Bank and Trust v. CA,
G.R.No. L-70766, November 9,1998).
Romano was bumped by a minivan owned by the Solomon School of Practical Arts (SSPA). The minivan
was driven by Peter, a student assistant whose assignment was to clean the school passageways daily
one hour before and one hour after regular classes, in exchange for free tuition. Peter was able to drive
the school vehicle after persuading the regular driver, Paul, to turn over the wheel to him (Peter).
Romano suffered serious physical injuries. The accident happened at night when only one headlight
of the vehicle was functioning and Peter only had a student driver’s permit.
As a consequence, Peter was convicted in the criminal case. Thereafter, Romano sued for damages
against Peter and SSPA.
a) Will the action for damages against Peter and SSPA prosper?
b) Will your answer be the same if, Paul, the regular driver, was impleaded as party defendant for
allowing Peter to drive the minivan without a regular driver’s license.
c) Is the exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter and Paul a material issue to
be resolved in this case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes. It will prosper (Art, 2180) because at the time he drove the vehicle, he was not performing his
assigned tasks as provided for by Art. 2180. With respect to SSPA, it is not liable for the acts of Peter
because the latter was not an employee as held by Supreme Court in Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA
(190 SCRA 485). Peter belongs to a special category of students who render service to the school in
exchange for free tuition fees.
B. I would maintain the same answer because the incident did not occur while the employee was in the
performance of his duty as such employee. The incident occurred at night time, and in any case, there
was no indication in the problem that he was performing his duties as a driver.
C. In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered as employee, the exercise of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of peter would not be a material issue since the conviction of Peter would
result in a subsidiary liability where the defense would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since the basis of subsidiary liability is the pater familias rule under Art. 2180, the
defense of selection and supervision of the employee would be a valid defense.
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After working overtime up to midnight, Alberto, an executive of an insurance company drove a
company vehicle to a favorite Videoke bar where he had some drinks and sang some songs with friends
to “unwind”. At 2:00 a.m., he drove home, but in doing so, he bumped a tricycle, resulting in the death of
its driver. May the insurance company be held liable for the negligent act of Alberto? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The insurance company is not liable because when the accident occurred, Alberto was not acting
within the assigned tasks of his employment.
It is true that under Art. 2180 (par. 5), employers are liable for damages caused by their employees who
were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. However, the mere fact that Alberto was using a
service vehicle of the employer at the time of the injurious accident does not necessarily mean that he
was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment. In Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez Jr.
(321 SCRA 393[1999]). the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the fact that the employee did
some overtime work for the company, the former was, nevertheless, engaged in his own affairs or
carrying out a personal purpose when he went to a restaurant at 2:00 a.m. after coming out from work.
The time of the accident (also 2:00 a. m.) was outside normal working hours.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The doctrine of VICARIOUS LIABILITY is that which renders a person liable for the negligence of
others for whose acts or omission the law makes him responsible on the theory that they are under his
control and supervision.
OJ was employed as professional driver of MM Transit bus owned by Mr. BT. In the course of his work,
OJ hit a pedestrian who was seriously injured and later died in the hospital as a result of the accident.
The victim’s heirs sued the driver and the owner of the bus for damages.
Is there a presumption in this case that Mr. BT, the owner, had been negligent? If so, is the presumption
absolute or not? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. However, such presumption is
rebuttable. The liability of the employer shall cease when they prove that they observed the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage (Article 2180, Civil Code).
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When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family (Metro Manila Transit v. CA, 223 SCRA 521
[1993]; Delsan Transport Lines v, C&t A Construction, 412 SCRA 524 2003). Likewise, if the driver is
charged and convicted in a criminal case for criminal negligence, BT is subsidiarily liable for the damages
arising from the criminal act.
Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for P1 Million. Benjamin took the vehicle but did not register the sale
with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son Carlos, a minor who did not have a driver’s
license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal in a bakery. On the way, Carlos driving in a reckless manner,
sideswiped Dennis, then riding a bicycle. As a result, he suffered serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a
criminal complaint against Carlos for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
1. Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father Benjamin for damages based
on quasi-delict? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, Dennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father for
damages based on quasi-delict there being an act or omission causing damage to another without
contractual obligation. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, what is
deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
act or omission punished by law. An action based on quasi-delict is no longer deemed instituted and may
be filed separately [Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Criminal Procedure].
2. Assuming Dennis’ action is tenable, can Benjamin raise the defense that he is not liable because the
vehicle is not registered in his name? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that the vehicle is not registered in his name. His liability,
vicarious in character, is based on Article 2180 because he is the father of a minor who caused damage
due to negligence. While the suit will prosper against the registered owner, it is the actual owner of the
private vehicle who is ultimately liable (See Duavit v. CA, G.R. No. L-29759, May 18, 1989).The purpose of
car registration is to reduce difficulty in identifying the party liable in case of accidents (Villanueva v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 144274, September 14, 2004).
Silvestre leased a car from Avis-Rent-A-Car Co. at the Mactan International Airport. No sooner had
he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he bumped an FX taxi owned and
driven by Victor, causing damage to the latter in the amount of P100,000.00. Victor filed an action for
damages against both Silvestre and Avis, based on quasi-delict. Avis filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint against it on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Resolve the motion.
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QUESTION: 2003
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular accident due to
the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim damages from the bus company
for the death of theirunborn child? Explain. 5%
ANSWER:
Yes, they can recover damages from the bus company, however, only damages arising from the
injuries suffered by the wife for the loss of her fetus being part of her internal organ due the accident
there being gross negligent on the part of the bus driver and for moral damages being accounted for her
mental anguish that attended the loss of her unborn child. But only such damages may be awarded by
the court, no actual damages may be allowed because an unborn child, according to the law, is not yet
considered a person, and the law only allows indemnity only to loss of life of a person.
QUESTION:
As a result of a collision between the taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B, X, a
passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action against both drivers.
May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
drivers to be absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason. 5%
ANSWER:
If the action is against them is based on damges arising from quasi-delict, they may raise such
defense of having exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees. However, if the action is based on culpa contractual and delict, they cannot raise such
defense.
QUESTION:
As a result of a collision between the taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B, X, a
passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action against both drivers. Is
it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil action for damages against both taxicab owners
before he can file a civil action for damages against them? Why
ANSWER:
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It will depend on the circumstances, if the separate civil action is to recover damages arising
from the criminal act, it will need reservation. However, if such separate civil action is to recover
damages based on culpa contractual or quasi-delict, no reservation is necessary.
QUESTION:
Johny Maton’s conviction for homicide was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and, in addition,
although the prosecution had not appealed at all, the appellate court increased the indemnity for death
from P30,0000 to P50,0000. On his appealto the Supreme Court, among the other things Johnt Maton
brought to the high court’s attention, was the increase of indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals
despite the clear fact that the People had not appealed from the appellate court’s decisions.
ANSWER:
No, such contention is not correct, because upon appeal to the appallate court, the court
acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as civil. Since the conviction of homicide had
been appealed, there is no finality in the amount of indemnity because the civil liability arising from the
crime and judgement on the crime has not yet become final.
QUESTION:
Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed to deliver the antique Mercedes Benz
car Dino had purchased from Ben, which was by agreement due for delivery on December 31, 1993.
Ben, in his answer to Dino’s complaint, said Dino’s claim has no basis for the suit, because as the car was
being driven to be delivered to Dino on January 1,1994, a reckless truck driver had rammed into
Mercedez Benz. The Trial court dismissed Dino’s complaint, saying Ben’s obligation had, indeed, been
extinguished by force majeure.
ANSWER:
No, the trial court is incorrect. Loss of a thing due to a fortuitous event with regard to its
delivery may only be accounted for in cases where the debtor is not yet in default during such delivery
and during such fortuitous event . Thus, in the case involved, Dino, being in default already when the car
was being delivered, cannot be absolved due to fortuitous event.
QUESTION:
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During a brawl in a basketball game, A attacks B with a bottle and causes physical injuries. If B
files a civil case against A for damages and during its pendency a criminal case was filed against A, should
the civil case be suspended meanwhile? Explain.
ANSWER:
No, because according to law, civil action for damages arising from physical injuries is an
independent civil action and is entirely separate and distinct from those which arise from the criminal
action.
QUESTION:
If a criminal case is filed first, may the civil case be filed during the pendency of the criminal case
or later, even without reservation?
ANSWER:
Yes, the civil case may be filed during the pendency of the criminal action, because such action is
an independent civil action.
QUESTIONS:
Does Article 33 of the Civil Code on separate civil action for damages arising from injuries require
that there be a reservation in the criminal case to file a separate civil action?
ANSWER:
No, because such action for damages are separate and distinct from the criminal action and may
proceed independently from criminal action. Such is a substantive right and cannot be rendered
nugatory by the Rules of Court.
(PS. There are no Torts and Damages Bar questions during 1985)
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