1.

People v Chua, March 10, 2010

FACTS:

Appellant was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and for five counts of Estafa in violation of Article 38 (a) of the the
New Labor Code of the Philippines, in relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) thereof, as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA
8042.

Appellant denied the charges.Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of
Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng, she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that Josie,
who is her godmother, was an agent.

Admitting having receivedP80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she issued but denying receiving any amount
from King, she claimed that she turned over the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the
money to Marilyn Calueng whose present whereabouts she did not know.

The RTC convicted appellant of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTCs decision holding that appellants defense that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money which was
ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to prove the existence of an employment relationship
between her and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden Gate and the extent of her involvement therein.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of illegal recrtuitment?

HELD:

The appeal is denied.

LABOR LAW

The term recruitment and placement is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippinesas any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged inrecruitment and placement.
On the other hand, illegal recruitment is defined under Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that anyrecruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with anexpiredlicense,shall be deemedillegal and punishable under Article 39 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.And illegal recruitment is deemed committed inlarge scale if committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group.

Thus forillegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused
undertook arecruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in therecruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the
accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group.

In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from January to October 2002, was initially
authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad.Per the certification from the POEA,Golden Gates license only expired on
February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.

Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the
fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad.In the absence of any evidence that the
complainants were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not be interfered with by
the Court.
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less an employee to beheld liable for
illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.

Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the recruitment business of Golden Gate that does not free
her of liability either.Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum,not malum in se. Intent is thus
immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such offense.

3. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship Management, May 30, 2011

FACTS:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its
principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the
General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 8 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on 6 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap,
along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the
payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment
of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made. He then filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before
the Labor Arbiter.

The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by
respondents. The NLRC affirmed the decision but held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months,
petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner however
questions the award of wages and assails Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Is the 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 violative of substantive due process?

RULING:

Yes.

The Court declared in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime that the clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and
ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits
of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the
same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.

5. Trans Action Overseas Corporation v. DOLE Secretary, September 5, 1997

13. Sameer Overseas Placement v. Cabille, August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and

placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract
for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co.
Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed
to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
“prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to
July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC
against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision.
CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of
the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to
illegal dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term
of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It

“confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No.
8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law
that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic
Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in
the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022
amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.

14. Sunace International Management Service v. NLRC, January 25, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan Divina A.

Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1,
1997. The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet
Crown International Co., Ltd.

After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese
employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on February
4, 2000.

Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the
employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was underpaid

Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . ANSWER TO COMPLAINANT'S
POSITION PAPER" alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was without its knowledge and
consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a
Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document
was annexed to said

The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more years
was without its knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina be attributable to Sunace

HELD:

No, the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina is not attributable to Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot
be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year employment extension.

Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship
with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and separate employment contract in
Taiwan.
15. Saudia Airlines v. Rebesencio, January 14, 2015

The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal dismissal of
the respondents?

16. Maersk Filipinas v. Avestruz, February 18, 2015

17. IPAMS v. De Vera, March 7, 2016

18. Dohle v. Gargallo, August 17, 2016

petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against respondents before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
that: (a) he accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum... he has
remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite major surgery... his permanent
total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician... espondents countered
that the fit-to-work findings of the company-designated physicians must prevail over that of
petitioner's independent doctor
Respondents further averred that the filing of the disability claim was premature since
petitioner was still undergoing medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period at the
time the complaint was filed.
The Labor Arbiter (LA)... and the NLRC... gave more credence to the medical report of
petitioner's independent doctor and, thus, granted petitioner's disability claim
However, the CA disagreed
It ruled that the claim was premature
Issues:
Who’s medical findings should prevail
Ruling:
The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the
Company.
If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated
physician's assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them.Thus, while
petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of
whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure.
Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to
declare that the company-designated doctor's certification is the final determination that
must prevail.