BILL O F RIGHTS: PRO TEC TIO N AGAINST ABUSE O F PO WER

• There are certain areas of a person’s life that governmental power cannot touch.
o Thus, government becomes the delicate art of balancing the power of government and the
freedom of the governed.
• Three great inherent government powers: Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain, and Power of
Taxation.
o Constitution can only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among various
government agencies.
o Guarantees are self-implementing.

DUE PRO C ESS C LAUSE

Art 3, Sec 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

• There is a hierarchy of rights. Human rights have primacy over property rights. All rights are guaranteed,
but some rights take precedence over others.
o PBM Employees v. PBM: Employees were terminated because of pushing through with a strike
against harrassment when the company said that they could not miss the first two shifts. Property
and property rights can be lost through prescription, but human rights are imprescriptible.
• There is always a presumption of validity for statues and laws. For a statute to be declared invalid, there
must be clear and strong evidence that shows such intrusions of the state against the fundamental right.
o Ermita-Malate Hotel Assoc v. City of Manila: Petitioners challenged the validity of an ordinance
requiring additional customer forms and prohibiting hotels and motels from accepting guests
below 18 years old. The ordinance was enacted to minimize illicit practices offensive to public
morals and liberty must be justifiably limited for order and common good.
• Reach of protection touches all persons, be they citizens or aliens, natural or corporate (Yick Wo v.
Hopkins). Legal or Illegal.
o Smith Bell Co. v. Natividad: SBC was not issued a vessel registration because majority of the
stockholders were not citizens. While SBC is entitled to protection afforded by due process and
equal protection, the state is entitled to appropriate the use of its waters to citizens. It is a decision
that favors public policy.
o Villegas v. HuiChiong: Manila Mayor issued an ordinance requiring aliens to secure a work permit
and pay tax before they can engage in business. This denies them of their basic right to engage in
livelihood without due process of law.

• The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be alive or to the
security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to a good life.
• According to the constitution, human life begins upon conception and not when the fleshed embryo
implants itself on the mother’s uterine wall (fertilization). (When does life begin?)
• The Court’s position is that when life begins is a medical issue and not a judicial question, but there is no
question that the right to life is protected by the Constitution. (Imbong v. Ochoa)
• Procedures such as salpingectomy (removal of fallopian tubes) performed on feeble-minded individuals
are allowed because society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. (Buck
v. Bell)
• Why is it necessary to define what the right to life is? All killings are illegal, we should know what is
expected of the government to protect.
• Teodoro v. Manalo: Right to life, liberty and security necessitates a quality of life in which each person has
a right to not live in fear that his person or property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
o The state has an obligation to free the citizenry from this threat (right to security).

Obligations of State Parties under the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights
1. Ensure the protection of individuals against violation of Covenant rights, which may be committed not
only by its agents, but also by private persons and entities.
2. Provide victims with effective remedy, including initiation and pursuit of criminal investigation and
consequential prosecution (Pestano v. GRP-HRC)
• State party’s failure to take appropriate measures to punish, investigate, or redress a violation
results in a breach of obligation.
3. Pay appropriate compensation
4. Take measures to ensure that such violations do not recur in the future (Gadian v. Ibrado)

Writ of Amparo
A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof on activists and
journalists. (Burgos v. Arroyo)
• Gadian v. Ibrado: What is the point of the writ if the one who is supposed to enforce it is the
one making threats to her security?
• Response of the Court to The Alston Report
• Limited scope. Minnesota Protocol: In many countries throughout the world, extra-legal,
arbitrary and summary executions take place undocumented and undetected. These
executions include: (a) political assassinations; (b) deaths resulting from torture or ill-treatment
in prison or detention; (c) death resulting from enforced "disappearances"; (d) deaths resulting
from the excessive use of force by law-enforcement personnel; (e) executions without due
process; and (f) acts of genocide.

• The preservation of liberty is a major preoccupation of the Philippine political system.

• Civil liberty means that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. (Rubi v. Mindoro)

• Property rights in land include the use, lease, and disposition for lawful purposes. State legislation
withholding from aliens the right to own land cannot be said to be capricious or amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or property. (Terrace v. Thompson)

• What are excluded by due process? Public Office, Licenses

o State has the power to impose qualifications / screening on overseas workers for the general
welfare of the state (JMM Promotion v. CA)
o Public office is not a property right by a public trust or agency. It is not a property envisioned in
the due process clause. The term “office” may refer to any office being currently held by an
official, not just one where he is being charged. (Libanan v. Sandiganbayan)
§ But officials may not be taken out of office without due process of law. (Crespo v. Nueva
Ecija)
 o Cockpit licenses are not a vested right, is a privilege that can be withdrawn. (Pedro v. Rizal)
However, pronouncements that say that licenses are not protected property but mere privilges
cannot be taken as a sweeping declaration that revocation of licenses never requires opportunity
for hearing.

THREE ASPEC TS O F DUE PRO C ESS: PO LIC E PO WER

• “The most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs.”
• “That inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society.”
• “The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statues, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.”
o Scope changes depending on public needs
o There is presumption of validity, but subject to the supervision of the Courts.

Test of Valid Exercise of Police Power

Concurrence of:
1. Lawful subject – the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the state
2. Lawful method – must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose; must not be
unduly oppressive
*There must be legal basis to deprive people of their rights, and the deprivation must not be done
arbitrarily

• State has the power to regulate businesses (language on receipt) to prevent the fraud or deceit of
customers. The very foundation of police power is the control of private interests for public welfare.
(Kwongsing v. City of Manila)
• However, accounting books (internal documentation) need not be kept in mandatory languages, as it
prejudices certain Nationalities. There is no valid state interest in keeping accounting books in uniform
languages. (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad)
• For those in public office:
o The power of suspension pendent lite must not be exercised for an unreasonable length of time.
Preventive suspension shall not exceed 60 days. (Layno v. Sandiganbayan)
o Preventive suspension shall be imposed when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent committed acts complained of, and when evidence of culpability is strong. (Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan)

Art 3, Sec 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

• Rule: Non-payment of a tax (except poll tax) may be a subject of criminal prosecution and punishment.
The accused cannot invoke the prohibition against imprisonment for debt as taxes are not considered
debts.
• Limitations on power to tax:
1. Taxation cannot be confiscatory and destructive.
 Exception: When it is used validly as an implement of police power
2. Revenues derived from taxes must be devoted to a public purpose.
• General rule on procedure: Previous notice and hearing are not required before a law prescribing fixed or
specific taxes may be enacted. Exception: When the tax to be collected is based on the value of the
taxable property, the taxpayer is entitled to be notified of the assessment proceedings and to be heard
therein in the correct valuation to be given the property.

THREE ASPEC TS O F DUE PRO C ESS: IMPARTIAL C O URT (PRO C EDURAL)

“…the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial.”

• Contemplates fairness in a proceeding that may result in loss of life, liberty, or property.
• Mode of procedure which government agencies must follow.
• At the heart of it is the need for notice and a genuine opportunity to be heard.
o Exceptions:
§ Summary abatement of nuisance per se.
§ Conclusive presumption barring the admission of contrary evidence.
§ Distraint of properties for tax delinquency.
§ Preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges.
• Two purposes
o Minimizes errors in depravation of rights.
o Gives the person a sense of rational participation in a decision that can affect his destiny and thus
enhances his dignity.

Requisites of procedural due process (Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca)

1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative cases (Ang Tibay v. CIR)
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial – a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion;
5. The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issued involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
• There are cases where notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of an administrative action
(Philcomsat v. Alcuaz). When the administrative body acts in the exercise of (1) executive, (2)
administrative), or (3) legislative functions.
o Exception: Where a public administrative body acts (1) in a quasi-judicial matter, and (2) its acts are
particular and immediate rather than general and prospective.
o Roque: What is affected is one’s right to property, a private right which the state must be careful to
infringe.
• The contractual obligation of a school to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course a
student has enrolled for is recognized. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or
fails to maintain the required academic standards of the school, the student forfeits his rights and courts
are not at liberty to reverse the discretion of university authorities. Due prosed in administrative
proceedings requires the consideration of evidence presented and the existence of the evidence to
support the decision. (Ateneo v. CA)

• The cold neutrality of an IMPARTIAL JUDGE (impartial court) is the indispensible imperative of due
process. Due process = rudiments of fair play (Javier v. Comelec)
o Supporters of Javier were killed during BP elections. Pacificador was a suspect, but was proclaimed
winner. Javier filed suit arguing that Pacificador was not proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc.
Javier was killed. Held: Pacificador must be proclaimed en banc. It would be irrational if a
COMELEC division would have more power than en banc. En banc should be the sole judge of all
contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications.
• People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor.
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. An impartial trial means that the court will not
take orders from the president. (Galman v. Sandiganbayan)
• “In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be OTHER than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise,
there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.” (Rivera v. Civil Service)

Standard in imposing disciplinary sanction by an academic institution (Alcuaz v. PSBA)

1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf.
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Note: Proceedings may be summary. They do not entail the proceedings and actions prescribed in
judicial proceedings.

• In reversing Alcuaz, the court held that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract (not semestral, but for the duration of the entire course). It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State
of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. Certainly, excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to
possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of
the basic tenets of fair play. (Non v. Judge Dames)
 • Social justice – the role of the government that makes financial assistance an obligation of the state.
o Problem: The law immediately allows the state to terminate giving aid to the poor people and
it's the poor people who have to show cause why their benefits should not be terminated.
• Only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.
Welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care, thus
termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits. The fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard. (Goldberg v. Kelly)
• Due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it
must afford “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case” before the
termination becomes effective. (Bell v. Burson)
• Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence (more than a mere scintilla or
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise). (UP v. Ligot-Telan)

• In contesting the Anti-Plunder Law, the court held that what is required to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. The burden to do so still remains with the
prosecution, and what is needed is to prove a number of acts sufficient to form a combination of series
which would constitute a pattern, not the existence of a pattern itself. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
• Procedural due process only requires that a party be given opportunity or right to be heard. In Reyes
v. Comelec, petitioner's right to due process was not violated; she had 5 days to go the SC and obtain
a restraining order. Instead she tried to secure a proclamation of her position. Petitioner was given
opportunity to argue her case. She had time to adduce evidence, which she did not use.

THREE ASPEC TS O F DUE PRO C ESS: JURISDIC TIO N

When jurisdiction is acquired

In actions in personam:
1. Defendant’s voluntary appearance, or
2. Service of summons upon him – may be effected personally, by substituted service, or by publication
In actions in rem or quasi-in rem:
1. Jurisdiction of the Court is derived from the power it may exercise over the property. (Jurisdiction over
the owner is not essential. Notice of publication is sufficient.)

• The minimum requirements for due process – notice and hearing (Ynot v. IAC) Immediate confiscation
of property by the Police without hearing is unconstitutional.
• Forms of media enjoy a special protection under the due process and freedom of expression clauses.
In Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, the shutting down of a radio station because of allegations of inciting
sedition violates the due process clause.

Art 3, Sec 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

• Long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan is violative of the
constitutional right to due process. (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan)
• Sending notice of termination of employment knowingly to the wrong address and termination
without hearing violate an employee’s right to due process. (Gonzales v. SCS)

O LD SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO C ESS: PRO TEC TIO N O F PRO PERTY RIGHTS

• Old definition of due process: right to property, right to own and increase one’s property (foundation
of American constitution)
• The constitutionality of a statute must be determined by its natural effect when in operation and not
by its proclaimed purpose. A New York bakers statute limiting work hours in unreasonable because
there are no overriding interests that the state needs to protect. The right to contract should prevail,
and labor contracts are principally undertakings that the state should not interfere with. (Lochner v.
New York)
• Standing rule: employment contracts are imbued with public interest. In Pakistan International Airlines
v. Ople, the court held that stipulations in labor contracts should be pursuant to the labor code and
other Philippine laws.
• Without overriding public interest, the taking of property is unlawful. (NDC and Garix v. Phil. Veterans)
• For statutes to be void for vagueness, there must be a lack of comprehensible standards. Statutes are
constitutional when men of common intelligence can guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. (People v. Nazario)
• THERE MUST ALWAYS BE A LAWFUL SUBJECT AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE ORDINANCE.
• Requiring all motorists to have an early warning device in their vehicles is a valid exercise of police
power. Possible abuse by manufacturers is not a compelling reason to invalidate the law. (Agustin v.
Edu)

NEW SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO C ESS: PRO TEC TIO N FO R LIBERTY INTERESTS IN PRIVAC Y

• Court: Wiretapping is not a violation of due process because there was no physical taking. (Olmstead
v US)
o Dissent: The right to be let alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. (Brandeis)
• Surgical procedures to prevent criminals from having children is unconstitutional because marriage
and procreation are part of the basic civil rights of man and are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. Sterilization is an irreversible procedure which deprives one of a basic liberty
forever. (Skinner v. Oklahoma)
• The prohibition against the use of contraceptives is an unconstitutional infringement of the right of
marital privacy. The 1st amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion. Zone of privacy is created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees; the concept of
liberty embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is not expressly mentioned in the
constitution. (Griswold v. Connecticut)

Requirements of valid State intrusion into persons’ fundamental rights:

1. Compelling State interest
“Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.” (Bates v. Little Rock)
2. Necessary connection between the means and ends
“The law must be shown necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy.” (McLaughlin v. Florida)
• If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. (Eisenstatd v. Baird)
• The right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. The privacy right involved, however, is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation. Upon approximately the end of the first trimester, the State
may regulate the abortion procedure so as to protect the health of the mother. Upon the fetus’
viability, the State may intervene so as to protect the fetal life. (Roe v. Wade)

• In Bowers v. Hardwick, The court held that law is constantly based on morality. Illegal conduct is not
always immunized whenever it occurs in the home. If respondent's submission is limited to the
voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes
even though they are committed in the home. The statute was upheld because it is a valid exercise of
police power to regulate deviant behavior.
• Can legislature legislate to regulate morality even if it violates a guaranteed right in the Bill of Rights?
NO, there is no valid state interest.
o Lawrence v. Texas: It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty,
which the government may not enter. This court acknowledges that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons. LIBERTY IS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION

Do we have the right to Privacy in the Philippines? What cases will you cite to support your opinion?

• DOMA violates the EPC because it “singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty” and “imposes a disability on the class by
refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper.” The liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws. The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples is an
unjust exclusion. (US v. Windsor)

• Drug testing policies in schools are constitutional. Students who engage in exctra-curricular activities
should have a lower expectation of privacy and the interest to prevent drug use is valid and overriding,
especially when circumstances call for it. (Board of Education v. Earls)
• But a national ID system is unconstitutional because it is overbroad – it does not specify what
biometric information will be taken from citizens and whether data encoding is limited to biometric
information. The government has no roving authority to store and retrieve information; it invites
misuse of information. Remember: Individuals do not like to be inquired upon. (Ople v. Torres, citing
Eisenstatd v. Baird), see test below.
• An Executive Order to streamline ID systems is constitutional provided that if narrowly limits the
information to be collected and provides for information confidentiality. (Bayan Muna v. Ermita)
• Companies have a valid interest in protecting their trade secrets and right to reasonable returns that
they can prohibit their employees from marrying employees of competitors. (Duncan Assoc. v. Glaxo)
• The State cannot deprive persons of their liberty based on a vague statute.
o David v. Arroyo: Dispersal and warrantless arrests during a state of emergency are
unconstitutional; there was no clear and present danger.
The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
1. Whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy
2. Whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable
*Factual circumstances determine reasonableness. Other factors, though, such as customs, physical
surroundings, and practices of a particular activity may create or diminish this expectation.

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN PRO PERTY

Art 3, Sec 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Elements of expropriation
1. Taking of a private property
2. For public use
3. Upon payment of just compensation

Requisites of a valid taking (Republic v. Castelvi)

1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entry must be fore more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

• Just compensation: it is the equivalent of the value of the property at the time of the taking.
o When is just compensation determined? From the time of filing of the complaint.
o Who has power and authority to determine just compensation in eminent domain cases? The
Court. Determination of just compensation is a judicial function (EPZA v. Dulay) The market
value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court’s judgment in
expropriation proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain provisions
of the Constitution to deny to a property owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation
made by the local assessor is wrong or prejudiced. (Manotok v. NHA)
o How is just compensation determined? Price or value a the time it was taken from the owner
and appropriated by the government. (NPC v. CA)

Concept of public use

1. Direct benefit to the general public
2. Indirect public benefit or advantage

• Police power is only valid if: (1) there is an interest of general public (2) the means used is not duly
unoppressive. The final arbiter to determine whether a law is a valid exercise of police power are the
courts.
o "Rights of property are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent
them from being injurious and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish by law may
think necessary and expedient.” (US v. Toribio)
 • Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not disassociated from the general public
welfare of the public and can therefore be regulated by police power. (Churchill v. Rafferty)
• Taking does not have to be physical. (Republic v. PLDT) If the use of airspace affects the use of the
land then there is taking. (US v. Causby)
• Even if eminent domain is an inherent power of the state, government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose what private property will be taken. (De Knecht v. Bautista) Expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by RP not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also
by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. (Republic v. De Knecht)
• If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then that property shall be returned when
the purpose is abandoned or terminated. (MCIAA v. Tudtud)

RA 8974: Villar Law on the Zoning Value of Land

Art 3, Sec 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Art 3, Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

• Just compensation may be made in other forms as long as it embodies certainty of value & payment.
Buying land from hacienderos is not confiscation and the taking is also for a public purpose because it
is social justice to give land to the farmers. (Assoc. of Small Landowners v. Agrarian Reform)
• NHA expropriated land may be used for socialized housing. Urban renewal, redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose. (Sumulong v. Guerrero)
• The taking of private property without payment of just compensation is considered confiscatory and is
not allowed. (City Government v. Judge Ericta)
• CARIDAY?
• RA 7279 Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992

EQUAL PRO TEC TIO N C LAUSE

Art 3, Sec 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Art 2, Sec 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.

Art 2, Sec 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.

Art 9. Citizenship

Art 12, Sec 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

Art 12, Sec 14.2. The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in
cases prescribed by law.

Basic Rationale:
• The rich and the poor will always exist and so does the disparity between them
• The law serves as an equalizer – same rights afforded to the similarly situated
• “Those who have less in life, must have more in law”

• Equal protection is a peculiarly American concept – Started with trading slaves. After the civil war, they
had to ensure that while no literal equality could be had, there would be equality before the law.

• Stare decisis – when a statute is challenged on new grounds or there are changed circumstances.
• Philippine problem: We only apply 1 test that a statute could make distinctions for people similarly
situated:
o Not applicable to the same class
o Not limited to present conditions
o Germane to the purpose of the legislation
• SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION TEST – Statute is presumed constitutional. Should only be used for labor
and other social legislation
• Otherwise, state has to show overwhelming state interest to overcome presumed unconstitutionality.

HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
• Fragante v. City of Honolulu – Constitutional
o A Filipino immigrant to Hawaii, USA was not hired despite being ranked highest in the
qualifying employment test due to his Filipino accent. Court found that he was not
 discriminated on basis of his national origin but on the grounds that he is unable to meet the
oral ability required in the job.
o An action for disparate treatment based on color, race, sex, religion, or origin may be instituted
by a person against an employer by proving the following:
§ His identifiable National Origin
§ His application and qualification for a job
§ He was rejected despite meeting qualifications
§ Position remained open upon rejection
o After a Prima Facie Case is created, burden is upon the STATE to prove that there is a
legitimate and non- discriminatory reason for non- selection.
o “The interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of public services it
performs to employees, is not something we are permitted to ignore.”
• UC v. Bakke – Unconstitutional
o The Special Admissions Program of plaintiff university constituted a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause due to the preference given to the members of a certain race. Classification
does not necessarily ensure that the historical deficit would eventually even out.
o Race may be deemed as a “plus”, but the admissions program should be flexible enough to
consider ALL pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration.
o ROQUE: CAN YOU SUSTAIN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON THE BASIS OF WANTING TO
CORRECT AN INJUSTICE DONE ON A CLASS? CAST BBL IN LIGHT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION.
• Gratz v. Bollinger - Unconstitutional
o The school’s admission policy was found to not being narrowly tailored to meet the desired
interests in diversity. The factor of race, being a ground to award 20 points, becomes a
decisive factor in admissions.
• Grutter v. Bollinger – Constitutional
o The School’s admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. Race is not a
determining factor but a plus. The law school gives substantial weight to other diversity factors
and it does not operate as a quota because percentages differ every year.
o The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in
admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that
flow from a diverse student body.
o Do not acknowledge race, acknowledge a racially diverse student body.
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins – Unconstitutional
o The Court found that the law had arbitrary application wherein the use of fire-operated
machines was prohibited in laundry shops but not in private homes which may also be made of
wood.
• Korematsu v. US – Constitutional
o There is a compelling state interest in restricting the areas the plaintiff may access based from
his Japanese Descent. The court appreciated the circumstance of wartime in stating that the
EO did not violate the EPC.
• Plessy v. Ferguson – Constitutional
o This case involving the segregation of black and white train passengers was decided in 1896.
The court ruled that the law was constitutional because it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based from race or social class.
 o This may (and should) be decided differently today. Court applied substantial distinction test:
(1) Black, (2) Purpose was to maintain harmony, (3) applicable to present and future action. No
modern court would have ruled in this manner.

Test for persuasive justification of a classification (Mississippi Univ. School v. Hogan)

1. Classification must serve a governmental interest and objectives
2. Means employed must be substantially related to attaining those objectives

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
• Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan - Unconstitutional
o Male respondent wanted to enroll in petitioner University’s nursing program. He was denied
admission based solely on his sex.
o The school policy of accepting only women failed the first part of the test of government
interest – State being unable to prove the necessity of such policy.
• Michael M. v. Superior Court – Constitutional
o Statutes that have gender-based classification realistically reflect the fact that sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances.
o State interest: to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies by imposing punishment upon men
who commit an act of sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife, and under 18 years of age.

Test for gender-neutral statute: The two-fold inquiry (Massachusetts v. Feeney)

1. W/N the statutory classification is gender based or not based on the nature of preference
2. W/N the adverse effect of the statute creates unfair gender- based discrimination based on its impact

• Goodridge v. Dept. of Health - Unconstitutional

o The Court applied the test W/N the classification made by the statute discriminating between
heterosexual and homosexual unions serves a legitimate public purpose and outweighs the
harm effected upon those prohibited to undergo civil unions.
o Civil unions are secular in nature and imbued with great public interest with respect to rights
acquired by entering in these unions. Prohibiting same-sex couples preclude them from
enjoying the full spectrum of rights and experience afforded to a citizen.
o Rational Basis: Impartial Law Maker would logically believe that the classification would serve a
legitimate public interest, that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.

RATIONAL BASIS
• Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc – Unconstitutional
o Only the plaintiff was taxed by the ordinance. Failed to meet the requirement that the law must
not only apply to present circumstances but also to future conditions.
o Equal protection applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject legislation, and classification is reasonable where: (a) it
is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, (b) these are germane to the
purpose of the law, (c) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present, and (d) the
classification applies only to those belonging to the same class.
• Dumlao v. COMELEC – Constitutional
 o Classifying who can serve in the government by their age is deemed valid due to the need for
new blood in the government. In addition, there is tendency for double compensation if retired
government employees are still allowed to serve.
• Ichong v. Hernandez – Constitutional
o The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely
requires that those who are situated under like circumstances and conditions are to be treated
alike.
o The prohibition of alien residents to own businesses were deemed to be a valid exercise of
Police Power with respect to the Equal Protection Clause in light of the public interest in retail
trade and the economy.
• Tecson v. COMELEC – Constitutional
o Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone.

FREEDO M O F EXPRESSIO N

Art 3, Sec 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

• Why do we provide for this constitutional guarantee? Freedom of expression guarantees people
access to information so that they know what their government is doing or not doing. It allows the
people to participate in governance in a democracy.
• Freedom of expression is a PRIMORDIAL CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT. In the hierarchy of
rights, there is preference for expression. A democracy will not thrive without an informed citizenry
taking positions on public issues.
• You cannot separate freedom of expression from freedom of religion (INC v. CA, converting others
into your faith)
• What are we protecting? UNPOPULAR SPEECH. They may be unpleasant but they form the
marketplace of ideas. Let all ideas remain in marketplace. People have enough intelligence to
separate the truths from the lies.
• This is the right most likely to be curtailed because the government is afraid of people finding out the
truth.
• A violation of the right results in an automatic presumption of unconstitutionality. The government has
to overcome the presumption by showing clear and present danger that right has to be curtailed.

FREEDO M O F EXPRESSIO N: PRO TEC TED SPEEC H

Protected speech includes:

1. Free speech and free press
2. Freedom of assembly
3. Freedom of petition
4. Freedom of religion
5. Right of association or the right to form associations
6. Right to religious freedom

ASPECTS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint
§ This refers to official governmental restriction on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the government (Chavez v. Gonzales)
§ Exceptions:
o Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous
people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of
unprotected speech.
o Pornography
o False or misleading commercial statement
o Advocacy of imminent lawless action
o Press statement made by persons, for and on behalf of the government, uttered while
in the exercise of their official functions
o Danger to nation security (Chavez v. Gonzales)
§ Guaranty against prior restraint extends to pubications charging official dereliction that amount
to crimes. (Near v. Minnessota)
§ Free press was given the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role to serve the
governed, not the governors, to bare the secrets of government and inform the people. (NYT
v. US)
§ “The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow
of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate
the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the
opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means.” (NYT v.
US)
§ Statutes may be challenged on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion
to an administrative office. Censorship of movies prior to exhibition is unconstitutional.
(Freedman v. Maryland)
§ Chilling effect does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
§ Doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. Cannot be made to do service when
what is involved is a criminal statute. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
§ A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
§ The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech cases.
They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
§ "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
§ Overbreadth principle: Facial Challenge. You question the statute on face, without the need for
enforcement. There is no need for case or actual controversy – the mere existence of the
stature may have a chilling effect on the exercise of the freedom of expression. May only be
used on FOE statutes. Statutes have to be NARROWLY TAILORED – specific as to what you
prohibit and penalize.  
 § Overbreadth and void for vagueness are not the same. Most important difference is
APPLICABILITY. Void for vagueness applies to all statutes and violates due process.  
§ "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" (Broadrick v. Oklahoma)
§ "overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." (Broadrick v. Oklahoma)

2. Freedom from subsequent punishment

§ This is a limitation on the power of the state to impose a punishment after publication or
dissemination (Bernas, 428)
§ Lese majeste: crime of violating majesty or an offense against the dignity of a
reigning sovereign or against a state. (Celdran Pleading)
§ Criticism of the 3 branches no matter how severe is within the protection of free speech unless
the intention and effect becomes seditious. (People v. Perez)
§ CJ Hand on clear and present danger: In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the
evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. (Dennis v. US)
§ “The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” (Dennis v. US)
§ Censoring offensive artworks is a form of prior restraint generally prohibited by the
Constitution, there being no showing that it falls under the limited exceptions where an
expression (e.g., pornography) may be subject to prior restraint. (Imbong v. Mideo Cruz)

Content-based regulation – regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys;
presumptively invalid.
§ State has the burden of showing that it directly advances a substantial government interest and that
the measure is drawn to achieve that interest. These standards ensure not only that the State’s
interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placedon speech but also that the law does not
seek to suppress disfavored message. A law (Vermont statute restricting the sale, disclosure, and use
of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors), which imposes
content- and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, is subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny. (Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.)

Content-neutral regulation – regulation of speech which is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.

SYMBOLIC SPEECH
§ “Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it
exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be
exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.
The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This
provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-
connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not confine the permissible
exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to
supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.” (Tinker v. Des Moines School District)
  

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

§ The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint and may not be conditioned upon the issuance
of a permit or authorization from the government authorities. However, the right must be exercised in
such a way that it will not prejudice the public welfare. (De la Cruz v. CA)

Extent of authority of the state to regulate public assemblies:

1. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights (citizens can participate in the periodic establishment of the government, administration of
public affairs, discipline of abusive public officers). While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized; human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position (PBM Employees v. PBM)
2. To justify limitation on freedom of assembly there must be proof of sufficient weight to satisfy the clear
and present danger test.

§ “The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-­-­‐‑
‑ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
 it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, not injurious to the rights
of the community or society.” (Primicias v. Fugoso)
§ Freedom of assembly is not symbolic speech. It is freedom of expression.
§ If assembly is to be held at a public place, permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly
itself, may be validly required. Power of local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition.
(Primicias v. Fugoso)
§ Regulation of time, place and manner – would it cause an inconvenience to the public? Is there a clear
and present danger to deny assembly?
§ Human rights such as expression, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances are superior to
property rights. Free expression and assembly occupy a preferred position. They are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. (PBM employees v. PBM)
§ “The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. x x x
If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities,
who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably x x x Even if, however,
there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.”
(Malabanan v. Ramento)

Rules on assembly and petition (JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing)

1. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place.
2. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required.
3. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place.
4. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached.
5. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must
be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.

§ “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege of a citizen * * * to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” (JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing)

FREE SPEECH AND SUFFRAGE

§ To what extent can a constitutional commission like the COMELEC, with primary jurisdiction to enact
election laws, level the playing field to allow poorer candidates to compete with richer candidates?
 § The statute unreasonably and arbitrarily restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and constrains the
ability of the candidates to reach out and communicate. “Leveling the playing field” does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of the parties. The Philippine has many islands and many dialects, so if COMELEC were to limit the use
of broadcast media, it would greatly hamper the ability of the candidates to express themselves, which
would constitute a suppression of his physical speech. Suffrage and the concomitant right of the
people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of determining the leaders of the nation
should be accorded primordial importance. They would not be reasonably addressed by the restrictive
manner by which the respondent implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in
broadcast media. (GMA v. COMELEC)
§ Alleging that surveys condition the mind of people and may sway people's votes is not enough to
restrict FOE. The law should be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than it
is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. (SWS v. COMELEC)
§ How can you have public sentiment if there is no public discussion? (Sanidad v. COMELEC)

FREEDO M O F EXPRESSIO N: UNPRO TEC TED SPEEC H

Unprotected speech includes:

1. Obscenity
2. Defamation
3. Infringes upon right of privacy
4. Fighting words
5. Hate speech
6. Seditious speech
7. Advertising
8. Speech in special places
 
PRE-SULLIVAN IN THE PHILIPPINES
§ For a publication containing derogatory information to enjoy immunity, it must be true, fair, made in
good faith and without comment /remarks. (Policarpio v. Manila Times)
§ The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press,
reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words. Daily v. Weekly. (Lopez v. CA)
§ The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public
opinion will be effectively muzzled. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration
of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result
has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. "The doctrine of privileged
communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-
disposed and malignant slanderer. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first,
we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which
may be lost by proof of malice. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words.
Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
 Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. But a privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. (US v. Bustos)

SULLIVAN / ACTUAL MALICE TEST

§ Actual malice test is applicable to defamatory statements made with regard to public officials: “Where
an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant
believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for public office and for the purpose of
enabling such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, and the whole thing is done in good faith
and without malice, the article is privileged, although the principal matters contained in the article may
be untrue in fact and derogatory to the character of the plaintiff; and in such a case the burden is on
the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of the article." (NYT v. Sullivan)
§ “Thus, we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.” (NYT v. Sullivan) - This is why you limit it to actual malice.

Actual malice test

1. Prove actual knowledge of falsity or
2. Prove utter disregard of truth or falsity of the statement

§ Persons involved in matters of public interest are required to prove that the falsehoods against him
were made with actual malice. Reckless conduct=publisher entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication. (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia) Fair and accurate reporting of a matter of public
interest.
§ Sullivan standards apply in criminal cases. (Garrison v. Louisiana)
§ Satire is a defense as it is intended to criticize hilariously. Should actual knowledge include hatred,
malevolence or contempt as “actual malice”? No, even if there is hatred, it still contributes to public
discourse. The nature of the genre is to exaggerate. Exaggeration is not tantamount to knowledge of
falsity.
§ The Sullivan doctrine applies to public figures (Curtis Publishing v. Butts) and the Internet (In Re: IML v.
Utah).

SULLIVAN IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

§ Doctrine of fair comment: While in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts. (Borjal v. CA)

A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication
 those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in
Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications
those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks."

§ Vasquez v. CA: The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in
criminal prosecutions for libel.
§ Actual malice needs to be proven if complainant is public figure. (Guingguing v. CA)
§ Actual malice: knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not
it was true. (Guingguing v. CA)
§ Public Figure: A person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be
included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the
Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person. (Ayer v. Judge Capulong)
§

Three reasons why public figures have lost to some extent their right to privacy:
1. They had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it;
2. Their personalities and their affairs are already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own
private business;
3. The press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest.

§ Freedom of Speech and of Expression: This freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or diffuse them in televisions. Such freedom is
available in our country both to locally-owned and foreign owned motion picture companies. Though
such activity aims to yield monetary profit, it is not disqualified from availing of this freedom. (Ayer v.
Judge Capulong)
§ Right to Privacy: The right to privacy of the right “to be let alone”, like the freedom of expression, is
not an absolute right. This right cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters
that are impressed with public interest. The interest it seeks to protect is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of public concern. (Ayer v. Judge Capulong)

REVERSION TO PRE-SULLIVAN IN THE PHILIPPINES

§ Despite the ruling in Garrison, there are still cases where persons were found to be guilty of hatred.

Elements of Libel
1. It must be defamatory
 2. It must be malicious
3. It must be given publicity
4. The victim must be identifiable.
*Absent one of these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.

§ Although FOE is cherished in a living democracy and is given primacy, it is not absolute. It is a
derogable right, and this is provided for in the ICCPR.
§ Libel is one of the traditional exceptions to FOE. What is non-derogable is the freedom of thought.
§ Under the ICCPR, FOI is not separate from FOE. FOE is already in our constitution and is self-
executory. However, an FOI law is preferred because it gives people recourse and provides for
penalties.
§ Qualified privilege is a specific defense in the RPC.
o Absolute privilege – under no circumstances can they be actionable.
o Qualified privilege - not actionable unless you prove actual malice (adopt Sullivan). Problem is,
in Garrison, we continue to cite malice as ill will, hatred or contempt. Garrison says it’s not right
that you make words actionable if they were uttered in hatred, ill will or contempt. FREE
MARKET OF IDEAS.

§ Fermin v. People: That Fermin had close association with the opponent of complainant was
considered by the Court as proof that she had the motive to make the defamatory imputations.
o While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment
business, media people do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by
indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast, media, or
print about their personal lives.
§ Diaz v. People: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the
imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.

LIBEL IN UNHRC

Three prong test of the ICCPR for allowing restrictions on FOE (not applicable to AmJur)
1. Provided by law
2. Specific grounds
a. For the respect of rights or reputation of others
b. For the protection of national security or of public order or of public health or morals
3. Must conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality

Why is criminal liability for libel in the Philippines inconsistent with ICCPR?
1. Provides for imprisonment
2. Does not recognize truth as a defense
3. Burden of proof is reversed – justifiable motives, good intentions

§ Defamation laws must be drafted with care so they do not stifle freedom of expression. (Adonis v. The
Philippines)
§ Bloggers are entitled to the same free speech protections as a traditional journalist and cannot be
held liable unless he acts with negligence. (Obsidian Finance v. Cox)
SUPREME COURT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ The Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor and reputation
which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the admin of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its
business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. (In Re: Jurado)
o Dissent: Sullivan should still apply in cases concerning contempt of court.
§ The freedom to question the government has been a protected right. The fundamental freedom to
criticize govt includes the right to criticize the court, but it must not go beyond the bounds of
legitimate criticism because it is important to maintain a healthy judiciary. (In re: Macasaet)

FIGHTING WORDS
§ Fighting words – those by which their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite as immediate breach
of the peace. Not protected by FOE because such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, no social value, outweighed by social interests of order and morality. (Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire)
§ T e s t: what men of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight. (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire)
§ Cohen v. California, overturning Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire: Fighting Words are not immediately
curtailed for they are within the ambit of FOE. Doing so would run the risk of suppressing ideas in the
process. Cannot ban just because it is an unpopular view.
§ We no longer recognize fighting words (MVRS v. Islamic Da’wah of the Philippines)
o Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove
that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be.

OBSCENITY
§ Earliest test (Regina v. Hicklin): Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave
and corrupt those minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall.

Prurient Interest Test (Roth v. US)

§ The test for obscene material is whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. This
test provides safeguards adequate to withstand the constitutional infirmity. Obscenity is not within the
area of protected speech and press. Therefore obscenity is unprotected speech.

Miller Test (Miller v. California) – PREVAILING TEST

1. Whether the average person applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable law;
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political or scientific values.

§ Material must not have any redeeming value and only appeals to sexual urges. But who is to say that
the naked body appeals only to prurient interest and nothing else?
 § Content based restriction. Any attempt to curtail obscenity is presumed unconstitutional.
§ In reality, we lack a statutory definition of what is obscene. There are tests, but there is no definition.
Judges try to define, but they are old and already taking Viagra.

§ The test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited: clear and present danger of an
evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Only courts have the power to
declare a material/ publication as obscene. (Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak)

In order for seizure of obscene material to be valid: (Pita v. CA)

1. authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from judge
2. authorities must convince court that materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action
3. judge must determine WoN the same are indeed obscene: question to be resolved on a case-to-case
bases
4. if, in opinion of court, a probable cause exists, court may issue warrant
5. proper suit is brought in the court under the RPC
6. any conviction is subject to appeal

§ Internet is entitled to the "highest protection from governmental intrustion" (same degree required for
print media); Content-based regulation presumed invalid and the government has the burden to
prove of an OVERRIDING State interest. (Reno v. ACLU)
§ A statute that effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and to address one another... is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. (Ashcroft v. ACLU)

§ Content-based prohibitions, enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant potential to be a
repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To guard against that content- based
restrictions on speech: law presumed invalid and that the Government bear the burdern of showing
their constitutionality.

PRIVACY
§ The protection of private life has to be balanced against the freedom of expression. (Hannover v.
Germany)
§ The concept of private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person's name or
a person's picture. Private life includes a person's physical and psychological integrity.
§ There is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within
the scope of "private life."
§ Article 8 of the ICCPR does not merely compel the State to abstain from interference. In addition to
this, there may be possible obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. These
obligations involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the
sphere of the relation of individuals between themselves. That also applies to the protection of a
person's picture against abuse by others.
§ The public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant is and how she behaves
generally in her private life even if she appears in places that cannot always be described as secluded
and despite the fact that she is well-known to the public
§ Where a public figure chooses to make untrue pronouncements about his or her private life, the press
will normally be entitled to put the record straight. (Campbell v. Mirror Group)
 § The mind that has to be examined is of the person who is affected by the publicity.
§ Standard should be: What a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she is placed on
the same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity
§ There is no expectation of privacy on facebook. You can violate school rules while in your own space
on facebook. ( Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College)

ICCPR: OFFENSIVE TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH (EU JURISPRUDENCE)

§ Apply the three prong test
§ Ivanov v. Russia: Ivanov is the owner and publisher of a monthly newspaper which called for the
exclusion of Jews from social life by portraying them as malignant and the source of all evil in Russia.
In his oral submissions at the trial, he also accused them of plotting a conspiracy against the Russian
people. Passed the three prong test.

C HURC H AND STATE: THE WALL O F SEPARATIO N

Art 2, Sec 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Art 3, Sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

Art 6, Sec 29.2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

§ Absolute guarantee that the state will not interfere with the right to believe.
§ The state should never express preference for any religion. Complete neutrality as far as faiths are
concerned.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY

§ State can have activities of religious character as long as (1) purpose is legitimate, (2) there is an
appropriate legislation, and (3) the benefit to the religion is incidental to the original purpose. (Aglipay
v. Ruiz)
§ Religious images, if bought with private funds, and if used for secular purposes, do not contravene the
Constitution. Not every governmental activity which involved the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of anti- establishment clause. The purpose of the fiesta is now
more socio-cultural than it is religious. (Garces v. Estenzo)

Lemon Test
1. Statute must have a secular legislative purpose
2. Principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion
3. Statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion
 § The addition of the phrase “under God” after “one Nation” in the 1954 Amendment of the Pledge of
Allegiance was UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it failed the 2nd prong of the Lemon Test: It gave the
effect of advancing religion to young students who are forced to recite it, while under an
impressionable age. (Newdow v. US Congress)
§ Government may not engage in a practice that has the effect of promoting or endorsing religious
beliefs. The display of the crèche in the county courthouse has this unconstitutional effect. The display
of the menorah in front of the City-County Building, however, does not have this effect, given its
"particular physical setting." (County of Allegheny v. ACLU)

Allen Test: What are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? To withstand the clause, there must be
a secular legislative purpose and the primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.
§ No excessive entanglement between the State and religion. Libraries are source of knowledge, and
the purchase of textbooks is a secular purpose. Ownership of the books remains with the State.

§ The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and State; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. The
government may celebrate religious holidays in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses
religion. Decisions are context-based. (Lynch v. Donnely)
§ The Constitution allows government aid that is religiously neutral / non-ideological, supplied to all
students regardless of the affiliation of the school. (Tilton v. Richardson)

Lynch Test (for religious displays): The government use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the
effect of endorsing religious beliefs
§ Effect – what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display
§ Endorsement – when a message is sent to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.
** The government use of religious symbolism depends on it s context

§ Glassroth v. Moore: Establishment Clause challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a
case-by-case basis with the result turning on the specific facts. Further, the establishment clause
applies not only to the Judeo- Christian faith, but also other religions and even includes non-believers.
§ Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop: It is not for judges to determine whether the inclusion
of a particular architectural feature is “necessary” for a particular religion.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

§ The guarantee that under no circumstance can the state prevent you from believing what you want to
believe. (Article 18, ICCPR)
§ The freedom to believe, teach, and attempt to convert is absolute. This includes:
o The freedom not to believe (Epperson v. Arkansas)
o The freedom to disseminate information about your faith (American Bible Society v. City)
o The freedom to refuse secular organizations against religious belief (Anucension v. NLU)
o The freedom of laymen to exercise civil and political rights (Pamil v. Teleron)
o The freedom from verification of the truth by the Court of a person’s religious doctrine, even if
they just made it up. (US v. Ballard)

§ Acting pursuant to a belief will not be protected anymore under this clause. (Article 19, ICCPR)
 § In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom
of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the
luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech
for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth. (INC
v. CA)
§ What is protected by freedom of expression? UNPOPULAR SPEECH (Boy Scouts v. Dale)
§ "In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom
of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the
luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech
for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth."
(INC v. CA)
§ When you seek to attack, you are expressing to tell people that other religions are wrong and that
they should believe something else. This is fundamental to all religions – the capacity to convert
people.

Compelling State Interest Test: the strictest test; needs to prevail over fundamental right to religious liberty,
because said right is sacred as it is an “appeal to a higher sovereignty.”
1. Has the gov’t action created a burden on the free exercise? Court must look into sincerity (but not
truth) of belief.
2. Is there a compelling state interest to justify the infringement?
3. Are the means to achieve the legitimate state objective the least intrusive?

§ The compelling state interest of protecting the family and marriage as a social institution is not enough
to trump the Jehovah’s Witness belief that a Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, duly ratified the by
their elders, can cure the otherwise bigamous union and regard the union as one between husband
and wife. State failed to show (1) compelling state interest (i.e. interest merely symbolic) and (2) it used
the least intrusive means possible to achieve it (i.e. no evidence was presented). Administrative liability
dismissed. (Estrada v. Escritor)

Good Faith Test: Whether or not the defendants honestly and in good faith believe in the things they solicited
and formed memberships for? If they did, they should not be held liable.
§ The Court, in deciding a case concerning alleged fraud where the “I am Movement” conspired to use
mails to defraud and collect around $3M, held that the issue of the verity of defendant’s religious
doctrines shouldn’t have been submitted to jury. Just because a religious doctrine cannot be proven
does not mean that it is not a religion and not protected by Const. Freedom of thought includes
 freedom of religious belief. Men may believe what they cannot be prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious beliefs or doctrines. (US v. Ballard)

Sincerity Test: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for exemption comes within the statutory definition. This
construction avoids an intent of Congress to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding
others.
§ Plaintiffs who refused to submit to induction in the armed forces, seeking exemption out of their
personal beliefs against war, not particularly subscribing to any religious doctrine, but pertaining to
man’s innate spirituality or alluding to a Supreme Being, were granted exemption. (US v. Seeger)
§ A conscientious objector to the war may be exempted if 1) he conscientiously opposed to war in any
form; 2) the opposition is based on religious training and belief; and 3) the objection is sincere.
(Cassius Clay)

Overriding State Interest: The State interest in universal education does not override the interest of the
protection of the fundamental right to religion. Only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. (Wisconsin v. Yoder)

AC ADEMIC FREEDO M

Art 14, Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and
shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

Art 14, Sec 5.2. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning

§ The right of all citizens to quality education v. academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.
§ Universities are engaged in a continuous quest for the truth.
§ In the academe, you should be studying anything under the sun, to discover the truth, to solve
society's problems
§ Why do we have academic freedom? To search for truth and solutions to the world’s problems without
inhibition.

What is included in the right?

1. Right to choose who you teach
2. Right to choose what you want to study
3. Right to criticize others’ work scientifically
4. The right to be left alone in your quest for truth

§ Academic freedom includes who may teach, what may be taught, how it will be taught and who may
be admitted. (Garcia v. Faculty Admissions)
§ Admission is a privilege, not a right.
§ The right of a student to be enrolled lasts for the entire duration of his course of study. (Isabelo v.
Perpetual Help)
§ Academics MAY NOT BE SUED for things they write, provided that this is done so scientifically (UP v.
CA)
 § Education as a right of all citizens is not to be taken literally, but “all those who qualify under fair,
reasonable and equitable standards”. Thus, admission tests such as the NMAT are constitutional.
(Tablarin v. Guttierrez)
§ Barring a person who took the NMAT thrice to apply again is justifiable, with the state interest for
public health and safety prevailing. Since the road to quality doctors would stem from the quality of
medicine students, the State had the right to regulate admissions. Valid exercise of police power if it
interests the public generally and the means are reasonable and not unduly oppressive. (DECS v. San
Diego)

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN LIBERTY: NO N- IMPAIRMENT O F O BLIGATIO NS AND

C O NTRAC TS

Art 3, Sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

CC Art 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.

Valid exercise of Police Power v Impairment Clause (Home Builders and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell)
To be valid, impairment must:
§ Only refer to the REMEDY and not to a SUBSTANTIVE right. State may postpone the enforcement of a
right but can’t destroy it by making the remedy futile.
§ Propriety of Remedy: Alteration of change must that the new legislation desires must not be burdened
with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing

Test on Constitutionality of Moratorium Statutes.

Period of suspension of the remedy must be:
1. Definite
2. Reasonable

§ Moratorium—postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of

the courts or the legislature. Valid exercise of police power during ECONOMIC EMERGENCY/WAR.
(Rutter v. Esteban)
§ Non-impairment of contracts is limited by the paramount police power. (Caleon v. Agus Development)

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN LIBERTY: INVO LUNTARY SERVITUDE

Art 3, Sec 18.2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.

§ Slavery and involuntary servitude connotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service to another.
(Rubi v. Mindoro)
§ Public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry
(Kaisahan v. Gotamco)

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN LIBERTY: IMPRISO NMENT FO R NO N- PAYMENT O F DEBT

Art 3, Sec 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

§ BP 22 is constitutional. It does not punish the non-payment of debt, but rather it penalizes the
issuance of worthless checks which affect public order. (Lozano v. Martinez)

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN LIBERTY: RIGHT AGAINST SELF- INC RIMINATIO N

Art 3, Sec 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

§ US v. Navarro: If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession
of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure
would be an accusation against himself. In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the
whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used
to obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code.
§ Subjecting the BODY to tests is not a violation of the right against self-incrimination. (Villaflor v.
Summers)
§ The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well
the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact
which the accused has a right to hold secret. Handwriting is an exception, especially in falsification.
(Beltran v. Samson)
§ The right against self- incrimination is to prohibit the extortion of communications. But handwriting,
especially in cases of falsification, is an exception.
§ The right against self-incrimination can be invoked in all other types of suit. It is the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases
in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
§ Right against self- incrimination includes the right not to take the witness stand. (Cabal v. Kapunan)
§ Right against self- incrimination is applicable in all forums where testimony can be used against him.
(Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
§ Compulsion does not only mean force. It can also come from unintentional statements, or from moral
coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. (Galman v. Pamaran)

PRO TEC TED INTERESTS IN LIBERTY: UNLAWFUL SEARC HES AND SIEZURES

Art 3, Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

§ Evidence acquired through unlawful search and seizure inadmissible in court. (Stonehill v. Diokno)
§ A specific offense should be alleged in an application for a warrant.
§ Unauthorized wiretaps constitute a violation of the right to privacy. (Katz v. US)
§ Stop and frisk is valid. (Terry v. Ohio) – not happy with this decision
§ Probable cause must be determined by the best evidence under the circumstances. (Nala v. Barroso)
§ Probable Cause – which amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would
justify a conviction – must be shown before an arrest warrant or search warrant may be issued.
§ The requirement of probable cause applies even to warrantless search and seizure. (People v. Aruta)
 § Judge must see to it that an application for warrant based on fiscal's report must be backed by
supporting documents, otherwise, requirement of personal determination is not met. (Lim v. Felix)
§ Constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure must be liberally construed in
individual's favor. (Alvarez v. CFI)
§ As an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be searched
without a search warrant. (Nolasco v. Pano)
§ No valid warrantless arrest where there is no outward indication that a crime has been, is being, or will
be committed; consequently, no valid search. (People v. Aminudin)
§ Search subsequent to lawful arrest must be limited to the area within the immediate control of the
person arrested. Area of immediate control = area from which he might gain control of a weapon or
destructible evidence. (Chimel v. California)
§ In considering search and seizure and warrants, we must recognize the difference between searching a
house, and searching a ship or moving vehicle, which can be easily moved out of the jurisdiction in
which the warrant is effective. (Papa v. Mago)
§ A vehicle search is constitutional as long as occupants are not subjected to a body search and the
inspection is merely visual. (Aniag v. COMELEC)
§ A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case. (Valmonte v. De Villa)

SC O PE O F C O NSTITUTIO NAL PRO TEC TIO N

Art 4. Citizenship

Who are entitled to constitutional protection?

All natural persons regardless of nationality for as long as they are in the territory of the Philippines.
Corporations are also entitled to constitutional protection.

Who are subject to constitutional prohibitions?

People v Marti: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus,
it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.