Article 267.

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention

Elements:

1. Offender is a private individual;

2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty;
3. The act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present:

a. The kidnapping lasts for more than 3 days;

b. It is committed simulating public authority;
c. Any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or
d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

 If the offender is a public officer, the crime is arbitrary detention. The

public officer must have a duty under the law to detain a person to be
liable for arbitrary detention. If he has no such duty, and he detains a
person, he is liable under this article.
 When the victim is a minor and the accused is one of the parents, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 300 pesos or both
(Article 271, par. 2)
 The essential element of kidnapping is the deprivation of the offended
party’s liberty under any of the four instances enumerated. But when the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, it is not
necessary that one or any of circumstances enumerated be present.
 When the kidnapping is done for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, actual demand for ransom is not necessary, as
long as it can be proven that the kidnapping was done for the purpose of
extorting ransom.
 It is essential in the crime of illegal detention that there be actual
confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party.
 Not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure, as long as he is
deprived, in any manner, of his liberty.
 Detention is illegal when not ordered by competent authority or not
permitted by law.
 Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping with murder – when the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty
(death) shall be imposed.
  Where the victim is taken from one place to another solely for the purpose
of killing him, the crime committed is murder.
 Maximum penalty is imposed in the ff. cases:
o If the purpose of detention is to extort ransom
o When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention
o When the victim is raped
o When the victim is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
 Conspiracy to extort ransom makes all the conspirators liable under this
article, including those who did not take part in the money.

Illegal detention Arbitrary

detention
Committed by a Committed by a
private individual, public officer or
who unlawfully employee, who
deprives a person detains a person
of his liberty without legal
ground
Crime against Crime against the
personal liberty fundamental laws
of the state

People vs. Tomio

A Japanese national named Tomio was arrested after being implicated for possessing
marijuana. Two other Japanese claimed that they paid money for Tomio’s release and
so they held Tomio under their custody, asking for the amount they allegedly advance to
the police.

HELD: Even if the two accused only wanted to recover the money they allegedly
advanced to the police, the crime is still kidnapping because of the essential element of
deprivation of liberty.

People vs. Mercado

The accused held a knife against his girlfriend’s sister for nearly five hours. The victim’s
ordeal ended only after the barangay captain was able to subdue the accused.
HELD: The crime is kidnapping because the victim was actually restrained or deprived
of her liberty, notwithstanding the fact that the accused only wanted the victim to
produce her.

People vs. Del Socorro

Del Socorro grabbed a little girl and brought the child to a doctor, asking for 700 pesos
in return. The doctor gave the child to her spinster aunt.

HELD: The defense that the child voluntarily went with the accused is belied by the fact
that the child openly resisted the abduction and even had to be carried to the jeep.

People vs. Lim

Lim took in two young girls who were loitering in front of her sari-sari store. Lim sent the
younger girl to Cebu while the older girl stayed in the store. Days later, the girls’ father
arrived to bring the two girls back with him.

HELD: There is no kidnapping in this case because the two minors voluntarily entered
Lim’s residence and there was no showing that there was actual confinement or
restriction of the person of the offended party. Both girls were free to go in and out of
the store.

People vs. Padica

A 14-year old boy was brought to a sugarcane plantation, where he was shot and killed
immediately. The accused demanded ransom soon after.

HELD: Where the evident purpose of taking the victim was to kill him, and from the acts
of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was to actually detain or
deprive the victim of his liberty, the subsequent killing of the victim did not constitute the
crime of murder. The demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping
since no deprivation of liberty was involved.

People vs. Luartes

Luartes kidnapped a 3-yr old girl outside Isettan Recto. The girl was in the mall with her
mother, who lost her. Luartes’ defense was that he was merely helping the lost girl find
her mother. He says he had no intention of kidnapping Junichi and that the prosecution
witnesses (police officers) merely misconstrued his actuations.

HELD: If indeed accused-appellant was trying to help the lost child, why then did he
misrepresent himself as her uncle? And, if his intention was only to help the child look
for her mother, why did he have to board a passenger jeepney taking the child with
him?

The essence of kidnapping under Art. 267 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. The crime in this case clearly comes
under par. 4 of Art. 267 of the Penal Code. The detention was committed by Luartes
who was a private individual and the person kidnapped was a three (3)-year old minor.

People vs. Pavillare

Pavillare was convicted of kidnapping an Indian national and sentenced to death. He

argues that he should have been convicted of simple robbery only and not kidnapping
with ransom because the evidence proves that their prime motive was to obtain money
and that the complainant was detained only for two hours.

HELD: The pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping of
the charges for rape is not supported by the evidence. The accused released the
complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money, he
and his companions immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment
of the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant.

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the
crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty
whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. As squarely
expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the
detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the
detention is not material.

People vs. Ballenas

Accused Ballenas pointed a short firearm to Wilma and Consorcia inside their home.
Accused told Wilma to accompany him to Maria his girlfriend. Wilma refused, as they
were about to eat supper. Consorcia also told her daughter, Wilma not to go out
because it was already dark. Accused Ballenas forced Wilma to go out with him.
Because of the abduction, Consorcia sought the help of a neighbor, Andres but to no
avail, as Andres shut the door on her for fear of Ballenas as the latter is known as a
member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit of the NPA.

The following morning, Consorcia reported the abduction of Wilma to her son-in-law
who is a member of the Integrated National Police. She learned from Aurelio that Wilma
was already dead. The police then proceeded to the scene of the incident. Ballenas was
found guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced to Reclusion perpetua.

HELD: BALLENAS committed the crime of forcible abduction with rape on March 20,
1987, before the passage of Republic Act 7659 or the Heinous Crimes Law that took
effect on December 31, 1993. At the time that BALLENAS committed the crime of
forcible abduction with rape, the penalty then applicable was reclusion perpetua to
death. The use by BALLENAS of a firearm in committing the crime, a fact duly alleged
in the information and proven in court, should have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty. However, since the crime took place prior to the implementation of RA
7659, the trial court correctly ruled that the penalty that can be imposed on BALLENAS
is reclusion perpetua. Hence, despite the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, the penalty herein of reclusion perpetua would not be affected. Under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of a crime.

People v. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003)

FACTS: Businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Rejuso,
Tormis, and Cinco to meet with Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada
concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly being sold by the latter. During the
meeting Macapagal told them that someone in his family has just died and that he has
to pick up an elder brother in hence, they had better transact business in the afternoon.
In the afternoon, Alexander’s group and Macapagal, with Teddy and Oteng both
surnamed Silongan, traveled to fetch Macapagal’s brother. Afterwards, the group
returned to Isulan on Macapagal’s orders. At Isulan, Macapagal gave additional
instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the funeral arrangements for his relative
were not yet finished. When the group finally got on their way, Macapagal who was
earlier busy talking over his hand-held radio with someone in the Maguindanaoan
dialect ordered the driver to drive slowly towards the highway. Oteng and his
bodyguards alighted somewhere long the way. As they neared the highway, Macapagal
ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his 3
companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal
and Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. The 4
were taken to a mountain hideout. After much haggling twelve million pesos was
demanded from Alexander for his release, They made Alexander write a letter to his
wife to pay the ransom which was hand-carried by a certain Jafar, alias Dante, and two
of the victims, Tormis and Cinco, who both later managed to escape. No ransom was
obtained so other persons were sent and one of the victims, Rejuso to renegotiate with
Alexander’s wife. No agreement was likewise reached. Seven days later, Alexander
and Rejuso were transferred to the town proper and was guarded them by several men.
When the kidnappers learned that the military was looking for Alexander, they returned
to the mountain hideout and stayed there for two weeks.
At one time, Alexander Saldaña was made to stay at a river hideout where a certain
Commander Kugta held him and sheltered his abductors for at least a week. There,
Alexander saw Macapagal with Manap and other armed men. These men brought
Alexander to different places and was made to write more letters to his family. All in all
appellant was detained for a total of 6 months. Saldaña was later released to the
military in exchange for a relative of one of the abductors who was caught delivering a
ransom note to Alexander’s family.

HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the
victim’s liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused
to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the
prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or
in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for
the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.
There is no mistaking the clear, overwhelming evidence that the appellants abducted
Alexander Saldaña and his companions at gunpoint and deprived them of their freedom.
That the appellants took shifts guarding the victims until only Alexander was left to be
guarded and in transferring Alexander from one hideout to another to prevent him from
being rescued by the military establish that they acted in concert in executing their
common criminal design.

People v. Cortez, 324 SCRA 335 (2000)

FACTS: Mendoza was in her house when accused Cortez, Callos and Betonio, all
armed with bolos, arrived. They were looking for Lolita's cousin, Esminda, and were
threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos, they decided to abduct Lolita to
prevent her from reporting the incident to the police. Accompanied by the other two,
accused Callos pointed his bolo at Lolita's back and dragged her to the mountain. They
brought her to the house of Torral, an uncle of accused Cortez, where Cortez bound her
hand with a belts and thereafter continued their search for Santos. Hours later, PO2
Santos and barangay captain Colarina rescued found Lolita outside the nipa hut of the
Torrals, conversing with Pablo Torral. Lolita told them that the Torrals did not prevent
her from leaving their house. However, she did not attempt to escape for fear that the
accused would make good their threat to kill her. Appellants allege failure to establish
one of the essential elements of the crime, i.e., deprivation of the victim's liberty. They
point out that at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically confined inside the
house as they found her standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress
that Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leaving the
house.
 HELD: For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to
deprive the victim of his liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable
proof. However, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure
to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty
was amply established by evidence. When the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin,
they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and kept her in the house of the Torrals.
Cortez even bound her hands with a belt. Although at the time of the rescue, she was
found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral, she explained that she did not attempt
to leave the premises for fear that the appellants would make good their threats to kill
her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the appellants knew where she
resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for Lolita's cousin
was to kill him on sight. Certainly, fear has been known to render people immobile.
Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats,
are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence which is one of the elements of the
crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.

People v. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002)

FACTS: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was
taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin
of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner Rosita.
Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, but the latter declined, saying he did
not have the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived.
At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could
take Nicole with her to buy barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long
time and because he trusted her, Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left,
Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour has passed but the two failed to return with
Nicole. Edwin, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they could not
find their daughter and Rosita. Nicole’s grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga
asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call
to the PACC Task Force. The next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself
and asked her if she and her husband would give the amount to which the latter
responded in the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should
be delivered to him with a warning that if she will not deliver the money, her daughter
would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash
money, and while being tailed by PACC agents, Mercida proceeded to deliver the
money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and his companion Isidera after
Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where
Rosita’s sister lived.
HELD: The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the accused’s intent to effect the same. And if
the person detained is a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there
is evidence to show that in taking the child, there was deprivation of the child’s liberty
and that it was the intention of the accused to deprive the mother of the child’s custody.
Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private
individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father;
2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived, without
informing her parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and deprived her of
her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4)
he demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions
where and how it should be delivered.

People v. Acbangin, 337 SCRA 454 (2000)

FACTS: Jocelyn brought four-year old Sweet to Niu’s house without the consent
of the child’s father Danilo Acbangin. When Danilo asked Jocelyn about her daughter
who he last saw playing in the latters house, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's
whereabouts. After 2 days, Jocelyn acompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police
officers to Niu's house. The latter voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the
policemen. Sweet was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father and embraced
him.

HELD: In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether
there was actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the
accused to deprive the parents of the custody of the child.
Sweet was deprived of her liberty. True, she was treated well. However, there is still
kidnapping. For there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in
an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Given Sweet's
tender age, when Jocelyn left her in Niu's house, at a distant place in Tondo, Manila,
unknown to her, she deprived Sweet of the freedom to leave the house at will. It is not
necessary that the detention be prolonged.
The intention to deprive Sweet's parents of her custody is indicated by Jocelyn's
hesitation for two days to disclose Sweet's whereabouts and more so by her actual
taking of the child. Jocelyn's motive at this point is not relevant. It is not an element of
the crime.

People v. Pavillare, 329 SCRA 684 (2000)

FACTS: Sukhjinder Singh, an Indian national was on his way back to his parked
motorcycle when three men blocked his way. Pavillare, who was one of them, accused
Singh of having raped the woman inside a Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the
accusation, the three men nevertheless forced him inside the cab and brought him in
Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside
the cab. Singh was beaten up and P100,000.00 was demanded for his release. Singh
told them that he only had P5,000.00 with him. Pavillare then forced him to give the
phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their demand from them. Singh gave
the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and then Pavillare made the call. The
amount of 25,000.00 was agreed upon. An uncle and his cousin Lakhvir arrived in a
motorcycle and together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the
kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The
ransom money was handed to the appellant. He counted the money and then, together
with his cohorts, immediately left the scene. Pavillare argues that he should have been
convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because the evidence
proves that the prime motive of the Pavillare and his companions is to obtain money
and that the complainant was detained only for two hours:
HELD: The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the
nature of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the
victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going
home. As squarely expressed in Article 267 of the RPC the penalty of death is
imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and
the duration of the detention is not material.
Ransom
People v. Castro, 385 SCRA 24
FACTS: Saez was informed by his siblings that Castro called up to say that the
latter wanted to speak with Saez. After taking a quick shower, Saez repaired to
Castro’s residence. Just as Castro opened the gate for Saez, Castro pointed and fired
his 9 mm. handgun at Saez, its bullet whizzing by his right ear. Saez was thrown
against the concrete wall of the house. He was then taken inside the house. Reyes
and Jde los Angeles, joined Castro in mauling Saez. Castro hit Saez with an iron club.
At around nine o’clock in the evening, Castro handed over to him a phone and ordered
him to tell his family to raise twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. Fifteen minutes
later, Castro gave back the phone to Saez and told him to instruct the person on the
other line to bring the money to a place near a hospital. About half an hour later,
another call was placed to follow-up the demand. Turning to de los Angeles and Reyes,
Castro instructed the two to go to the “drop-off point.” Nobody showed up. After an
hour, Saez was ordered to call again, this time to designate another place where the
money was to be delivered. Castro told Saez to have his relatives bring the money to
the vicinity of the Aglipay Church in Caridad. Again, no meeting materialized. Around
midnight, Castro, de los Angeles and Reyes left the house and stayed by the gate
conversing with one another. The victim took the opportunity to flee. He was able to
untie his legs and tackle the stairs towards the second storey. He jumped out through
the window but the noise he created caught the attention of Castro. The latter fired his
gun, hitting the fleeing victim and planting a bullet in his buttocks. His plea for help
alarmed some barangay officials who immediately came to his rescue and brought him
to the nearest hospital
HELD: The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an
individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid
to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment. In People vs. Salimbago, the Court
stressed:
“x x x No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for
ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s
freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is
necessary for the crime to be committed.”

People v. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364

FACTS: While Ed Henderson, the 9-year old son of spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan
was on his way back to the house of his tutor in Chinese language to wait for his father,
accused Tampos, armed with a revolver, chased and overtook the boy. Tampos then
ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcycle parked nearby where appellants Ejandra
and Revilla were waiting. Ejandra covered Ed Henderson's mouth with his hand, pointed
his gun at the boy and warned the latter not to shout. Thereafter, Tampos ordered Ed
Henderson to board the motorcycle, or else, he would be shot. Ed was brought to a
house where one Huera, and Calunod was. Ed Henderson was ordered to write down
his father's telephone number, as well as that of their house and their store. Eddie then
received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had been
kidnapped. Several calls were made and a reduced ransom of P548,000 for the safe
release of Ed Henderson was eventually agreed upon. Eddie was then instructed to
place the money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of a
Church. Eddie did as he was told. He proceeded to the designated place. When
Calunod approached and called Eddie, the latter handed over the plastic bag which
contained the money. Eddie asked Calunod how his son was. Calunod told Eddie not to
worry because the latter would bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the gate of
the church and went home to wait for his son's return. Ed Henderson returned on board
a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting family. Ejandra, Calunod, Tampos and
Revilla were convicted of kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced to suffer the death
penalty.

HELD: Since all the foregoing facts indubitably show that the appellants conspired to
kidnap the victim for ransom, the Court affirmed the conviction of Ejandra, Calunod,
Tampos and Revilla of kidnapping for ransom.
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond
reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused,
which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose
of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by
his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the
victim. Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the
crime to be committed. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its common or
ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration
paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that
releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may
accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim's release. n this case, the
appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the victim.
The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death.

Mandatory Imposition of Death Penalty

People v. Morales, 427 SCRA 765

FACTS: Jefferson Tan was with his siblings, Jessie Anthony and Joanna Tan, his
cousin, Malou and their driver, Cesar on board the family L-300 van. Along the highway,
the vehicle slowed down to steer clear of a damaged portion of the road when Malit
suddenly poked a gun at Cesar. Simultaneously, Morales, Esguerra, and Saldaña
entered the van. Esguerra took the driver's seat and the other two blindfolded the five
victims. Jefferson was eventually sent home to get the 2M ransom which was later
reduced to 1.5M, from his father, Feliciano. Jefferson was instructed to bring the ransom
to a snack center. Feliciano did not allow his son to bring the ransom and explained to
the kidnappers that Jefferson was in shock and could not go. When asked about the
ransom money, he told the caller that he could only give P92,000. The caller agreed.
Later, at the place where the kidnappers instructed Feliciano to go, the latter gave the
money and he was handed the keys to the L-300 van where his children are.

HELD: The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are the
following: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are present. The
imposition of the death penalty is mandatory if the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, appellants cannot escape the penalty
of death, inasmuch as it was sufficiently alleged and indubitably proven that the
kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.

Article 268. Slight illegal detention

Elements:

1. Offender is a private individual;

2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him of his
liberty.
3. The act of kidnapping or detention is illegal;
4. The crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 267.

 The same penalty for slight illegal detention shall be incurred by anyone
who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the crime. (normally, this
is an accomplice but under this article he is treated as co-principal)
 Privileged mitigating circumstance (penalty lower by one degree) – if the
offender:
o Voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within
three days from the commencement of the detention;
o Without having attained the purpose intended; and
o Before the institution of criminal proceedings against him.
 Voluntary release is not a privileged mitigating circumstance if the victim is
woman, because the detention would then be punished under Article 267.
Voluntary release is not mitigating under that article.
Article 269. Unlawful arrest

Elements:

1. Offender arrests or detains another person;

2. The purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities;
3. The arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable
ground therefor.

 Unlawful arrests by public officers should be punished under Article 124, if

the public officer has the legal authority to arrest and detain a person, but
the arrest is without legal ground. If the public officer has no authority to
arrest and detain a person, or if he did not act in his official capacity, he
should be punished for unlawful arrest under this article. Compare with
art. 267
 The motive of the person arresting is controlling. If his purpose is to
deliver to proper authorities, this article applies. Absence of this
motive may be shown by the length of time the victim is detained.
 If the purpose of delivering to proper authorities is not shown, the person
may be liable for other illegal detention (under 267 or 268, depending on
the circumstances of the case)

Unlawful arrest Delay of delivery

of detained
persons
The detention is The detention is
not authorized by for some legal
law ground
Crime is Crime is
committed by committed by
making an arrest failing to deliver
not authorized by such persons to
law the proper judicial
authority within a
certain period of
time
Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor

Elements:

1. Offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether over or under
seven years but less than 21 years of age);
2. He deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.

 What is punished is the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to

restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
 When the crime is committed by the father or mother of the minor, the
penalty is arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 300 pesos or both.

Article 270 Article 267

Offender is The offender is not
entrusted with the entrusted with the
custody of the custody of the
minor minor

People vs. Ty

A mother left her sick child in a clinic and only came back to claim the child five years
later. Unfortunately, the doctors had already entrusted the child to a guardian.

HELD: Two elements must concur in the crime of kidnapping of a minor: (a) the
offender had been entrusted with the custody of the minor; and (b) the offender
DELIBERATELY fails to restore said minor to his parents or legal guardian. In the case
at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure to return the minor as it
was proven that the doctors tried their best to locate the child, even seeking NBI’s
assistance along the way.

People vs. Gutierrez (1991)

Lilia Gutierrez was convicted by the RTC of Manila of the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The minor was Hazel
Elpedes, her 2 and a half-year-old nephew (yup, Hazel’s a guy in this story), whom
Gutierrez allegedly sold to the spouses Felipe for P250 (Lilia claims she did it to spite
her husband, brother of Hazel’s mom, who had abandoned her).
HELD: The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 of the
RPC consists of 2 elements:
 the offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and
 the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or
guardians.

It is clear that Gutierrez admitted the existence of the first element (she asked her in-
laws for permission to take the boy out).

The second element has likewise been established. In the first place, Gutierrez's own
conduct in leading the boy’s father and police to the Felipe residence in Intramuros
indicated her awareness of the probable whereabouts of the child. The logical
conclusion is that she must have been the person responsible for originally leaving the
child with the Felipe spouses. In the second place, the precise motive that Gutierrez
might have had for bringing Hazel Elpedes to the Felipe spouses and leaving him with
them, apparently for an indefinite period, is not an indispensable element of the offense
charged. All that was necessary for the prosecution to prove was that she had
deliberately failed to return the minor to his parents.

People vs. Reyes (1996)

Delia Reyes, maid of the Mohamad spouses, was convicted of kidnapping one of their
daughters, Asnia. After spending 300-grand on a manhunt, Asnia was recovered a
couple of months later. Reyes claims that, while out with Asnia, she ran into her sister
who informed her of their mom’s death; Reyes then allegedly had a friend take Asnia
home while she (Reyes) and her sister went to La Union for their mom’s wake
(basically, she’s blaming somebody else).

HELD: Reyes's negligence is wanton and gross as to amount to a deliberate and willful
scheme to take the child away from her parents. This willfulness is sufficiently
established by the following circumstances: (1) appellant lured Asnia and her sister into
leaving their house; (2) she instructed the two elder sisters to go home but kept the
youngest with her; (3) she and Asnia could not be located despite extensive search by
the authorities and the widespread publicity generated through the television, radio and
print media; (4) the child was found two months later and only after the arrest of
appellant; and (5) appellant harbored ill-feelings against the Mohamads family (she
admitted that, at one point, the Mohamads did not pay her salary for 5 months when she
worked for them in 1989).

People vs. Borromeo (2000)

Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged by her
due to negative attitude problems, kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son. The
next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of kidnapping a
minor for ransom and was sentenced to death.

HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently
established: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or
detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's
liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of
the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person.

IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for
the payment of ransom, both specifically described in the Information, were clearly
established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt.

People v. Borromeo (2000)

FACTS: Borromeo alias "Sonny", a bakery helper of Rowena who had been discharged
by her due to negative attitude problems, kidnapped her 1-year and 7-months old son.
The next day, Sonny demanded a P300,000 ransom. He was convicted of kidnapping a
minor for ransom and was sentenced to death.

HELD: There is no question that the elements of kidnapping for ransom were sufficiently
established: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnapped or
detained the victim and deprived him of his liberty; and, (c) the deprivation of the victim's
liberty was illegal. As provided for in Art. 267 of the RPC as amended, the imposition of
the death penalty is mandatory if the victim is a minor and also, if the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person.
IN CAB, the minority of Kenneth was never disputed. The minority and the demand for
the payment of ransom, both specifically described in the Information, were clearly
established by the State, free of any scintilla of doubt.

People v. Pastrana, 387 SCRA 342

FACTS: Postejo, working as a domestic helper in Canada, has four children namely,
Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola, and 9-year old Willy. Erma was introduced by her sister to
spouses Frias who informed her that their daughter, Pastrana can help process Willy's
travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her son's papers.
In one of the telephone conversations of Erma and Pastrana, the latter informed Erma
that Willy was suffering from acute bronchitis. Erna sent money for the medical
treatment of his son. Pastrana then fetched Willy and Aresola from their residence in
Caloocan and brought them to her apartment. Thought she never brought Willy to a
hospital for treatment, Pastrana kept on demanding money from Erma which include the
amount of P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her apartment allegedly
for Willy's safety, and for additional money for her job application in Singapore. Erna,
however, refused to transmit the amounts demanded by Pastrana and ordered the
return of Willy to their residence in Caloocan. Pastrana deliberately failed to return Willy
for 7 days until the latter disappeared while allegedly playing in front of Pastrana’s
apartment.

HELD: Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody
of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his
parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor
but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something
more than mere negligence — it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, there is no question that
accused-appellant was entrusted with the custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma and her
children trusted accused-appellant that they sent her money for the processing of Willy's
travel documents, and more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. As
to the second element, It was this deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return
custody of Willy to his relatives that gave rise to her culpability under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code. The disappearance of Willy and accused-appellant's inability to
return him to Caloocan by reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was
her willful disobedience to Erma's order that consummated the crime.

People v. Bernardo, 378 SCRA 708

FACTS: While Rosita was undergoing medical check up inside a hospital, her
two daughters waited at the lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old
sister on her lap. Bernardo befriended Roselle and later gave her P3.00 and asked her
to buy ice water. Thereafter, Bernardo took the baby from Roselle. Roselle was not
able to find ice water for sale and on her way back to the hospital, she saw Bernardo
running away with her baby sister. Roselle pulled and pulled Bernardo's skirt to prevent
the latter from getting away. Torres saw Bernardo carrying a child and struggling with
Roselle. Roselle begged Torres to help her because her mother was at the hospital and
the accused was getting her baby sister. Torres took the baby from the Bernardo and
entrusted the baby to his wife. Then he led Bernardo and Roselle to the hospital to look
for Rosita who confirmed that she was the mother of the baby. The RTC convicted
Bernardo of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of
the RPC.

HELD: The essential element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is
that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being
punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the
custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word
deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more
than mere negligence — it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong. When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant
before setting out on an errand for appellant to look for ice water, the first element was
accomplished and when appellant refused to return the baby to Roselle despite her
continuous pleas, the crime was effectively accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial
court's finding that appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor.

Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home

Elements:

1. A minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the home of his
parents or guardians or the person entrusted with his custody;
2. Offender induces said minor to abandon such home.

 The inducement must be actual, committed with criminal intent, and

determined by a will to cause damage.
 It is not necessary that the minor actually abandons his home, as long as
there is inducement.
 The minor should not leave his home of his own free will.
 Father or mother may commit this crime (as well as Article 270), if the
parents are living separately and custody has been given to one of them.

Article 272. Slavery

Elements:

1. Offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being;

2. The purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.

 If the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to some

immoral traffic (prostitution), the penalty is higher.
 Differentiated from kidnapping: If the purpose is to enslave the victim, the
crime is slavery; otherwise the crime is kidnapping or illegal detention.

Article 273. Exploitation of child labor

Elements:

1. Offender retains a minor in his services;

2. It is against the will of the minor;
3. It is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.

 The existence of an indebtedness constitutes no legal justification for

holding a person and depriving him of his freedom to live where he wills.

Article 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt

Elements:

1. Offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household servant or farm
laborer;
2. It is against the debtor’s will;
3. The purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.

Service under Exploitation of

compulsion child labor
Does not Victim must be a
distinguish minor
whether the victim
is a minor or not
The debtor himself The minor is
is the one compelled to
compelled to work render services for
for the offender the supposed debt
of his parent or
guardian
Limited to Service is not
household work or limited
farm labor

Article 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one’s own

victim

Acts punishable:
 1. Failing to render assistance to any person whom the offender finds in an
uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying when he can render such
assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a
more serious offense.

Elements:

a. The place is not inhabited;

b. Accused found there a person wounded or in danger of dying;
c. Accused can render assistance without detriment to himself;
d. Accused fails to render assistance.

2. Failing to help or render assistance to another whom the offender has

accidentally wounded or injured;
3. By failing to deliver a child, under seven years of age, whom the offender has
found abandoned, to the authorities or to his family, or by failing to take him to a
safe place.

 If a person intentionally wounds another and leaves him in an uninhabited

place, he shall not be liable under this article because be did not FIND him
wounded or in danger of dying.
 It is immaterial that the offender did not know that the child is under seven
years.
 The child under seven must be found by the accused in an unsafe place.

Lamera vs. CA

An owner-type jeep driven by Lamera hit and bumped a tricycle, damaging the said
tricycle and injuring the driver and passenger in the process. Two separate
informations were filed, one for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and multiple physical injuries and another one for abandonment of one’s victim.

HELD: The rule on double jeopardy cannot be applied in this case because the two
informations were for separate offenses— the first falls under quasi-offenses while the
second is a crime against security.
Article 276. Abandoning a minor

Elements:

1. Offender has the custody of a child;

2. The child is under seven years of age;
3. He abandons such child;
4. He has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.

Circumstances qualifying the offense:

1. When the death of the minor resulted from such abandonment; or

2. If the life of the minor was in danger because of the abandonment.

 When there is intent to kill, this article does not apply. The purpose in
abandoning the minor must be to avoid the obligation of taking care of
said minor.
 The ruling that intent to kill is presumed from the death of the victim is
applicable only to crimes against persons, and not to crimes against
security, particularly the crime in this article.
 A permanent, conscious and deliberate abandonment is required in this
article. There must be an interruption of the care and protection the minor
needs by reason of his age.
 Parents guilty of abandonment shall be deprived of their parental
authority.

Article 277. Abandonment of minor by the person entrusted with his custody;
indifference of parents

Acts punishable:

1. Delivering a minor to a public institution or other persons without the consent of

the one who entrusted such minor to the care of the offender or, in the absence
of that one, without the consent of the proper authorities;

Elements:
 a. Offender has charge of the rearing or education of a minor;
b. He delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons;
c. The one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to
such act; or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent,
the proper authorities have not consented to it.

2. Neglecting his (offender’s) children by not giving them the education which their
station in life requires and financial condition permits.

Elements:

a. Offender is a parent;
b. He neglects his children by not giving them education;
c. His station in life requires such education and his financial condition permits it.

Article 276 Article 277

The custody of the The custody of the
offender is stated offender is
in general specific, that is, the
custody for the
rearing or
education of the
minor
The minor is under The minor is under
7 years of age 21 years of age
Minor is The minor is
abandoned in such delivered to a
as way as to public institution or
deprive him of the other person
care and
protection that his
tender years need

 Obligation to educate children terminates, if the mother and children

refuse without good reason to live with the accused.
 Failure to give education must be due to deliberate desire to evade such
obligation. If the parents cannot give education because they had no
means to do so, then they will not be liable under this article.
Article 278. Exploitation of minors

Acts punishable:

1. Causing any boy or girl under 16 years of age to perform any dangerous feat of
balancing, physical strength or contortion, the offender being any person;
2. Employing children under 16 years of age who are not the children or
descendants of the offender in exhibitions of acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker,
diver, or wild-animal tamer, the offender being an acrobat, etc., or circus
manager or engaged in a similar calling;
3. Employing any descendant under 12 years of age in dangerous exhibitions
enumerated in the next preceding paragraph, the offender being engaged in any
of the said callings;
4. Delivering a child under 16 years of age gratuitously to any person following any
of the callings enumerated in paragraph 2, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar,
the offender being an ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any
capacity with the care of such child; and
5. Inducing any child under 16 years of age to abandon the home of its ascendants,
guardians, curators or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the
callings mentioned in paragraph 2 or to accompany any habitual vagrant or
beggar, the offender being any person.

Exploitation of Inducing a minor

minors (par. 5) to abandon his
home
Purpose of No such purpose
inducing minor is
to abandon home
is to follow any
person engaged in
any of the callings
of being an
acrobat, gymnast,
etc.
Minor under 16 Minor under 21
years of age years of age

 If the delivery of the child to any person following any of the callings
enumerated, is made in consideration of any price, compensation or
promise, the penalty is higher.
 The offender shall be deprived of parental authority or guardianship.
 Exploitation of minors refers to acts endangering the life or safety of the
minor.
People v. Delantar (2007)

Appellant’s violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as clear as day. The provision
penalizes anyone who engages in or promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution
either by: (1) acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; or (2) inducing a person to be a
client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means; or (3) by taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a
prostitute; or (4) threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or (5) giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefits to the
child with the intent to engage such child in prostitution.

The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to “consent” to what is
being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that
a child who is “a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition” is incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. In fact, the absence
of free consent is conclusively presumed when the woman is below the age of twelve

Navarrete v. People (2007)

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be proven in
addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

“Lascivious conduct” is defined under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of RA
7610 as:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Article 279. Additional penalties for other offenses

 The imposition of the penalties prescribed in the preceding articles shall

not prevent the imposition upon the same person of the penalty provided
for any other felonies defined and punished by the RPC.

Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling

Elements:
1. Offender is a private person;
2. He enters the dwelling of another;
3. Such entrance is against the latter’s will.

Cases to which the provisions of this article is not applicable:

1. When the purpose of the entrance is to prevent serious harm to himself, the
occupant or third persons;
2. When the purpose of the offender in entering is to render some service to
humanity or justice;
3. Anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses while they
are open.

Marzalado v. People, 441 SCRA 595 (2004)

FACTS: The petitioner, Marzalado, argues that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings below, there was
a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he
committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable
under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code— to prevent an imminent
danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter the unit, he did so with the aid of
barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the
flooding of the unit.

HELD: In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be

considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of
possession or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the possession.
As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was
"forcibly opened by the owner (Marzalado) because of the strong water pressure
coming out of the faucet. . . ." As Albano herself admitted, she and her children already
left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence,
nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid
slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further
flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal
intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There
was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is
nothing culpable concerning Marzalado’s, judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the
faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.

 Purpose of the law: to protect and preserve the privacy of one’s dwelling
 If the offender is a public officer or employee, the entrance into the
dwelling against the will of the occupant is violation of domicile.
 Dwelling – place devoted for rest and comfort, as distinguished from
places devoted to business, office etc.
 Dwelling includes a room when occupied by another person (example:
room at a boarding house)
 Against the will – should be against the presumed or express prohibition of
the occupant, not mere lack of consent. There must be opposition on the
part of the owner of the house to the entry of the accused.
 However, presumed or implied prohibition is sufficient (e.g. entrance
during the late hour of the night)
 Prohibition must be existent prior to or at the time of entrance.
 QUALIFIED TRESPASS: If the offense is committed by means of
violence or intimidation, the penalty is higher.
 Violence may be against persons or property, but there are conflicting
views as to this statement.
 The violence or intimidation may take place immediately after the
entrance.
 Proof of express prohibition to enter is not necessary when violence or
intimidation is employed by the offender.
 If there is no overt act of the crime intended to be committed, the crime is
only trespass to dwelling.

Article 281. Other forms of trespass

Elements:

1. Offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of another;

2. The entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited;
 3. The prohibition to enter is manifest;
4. The trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker
thereof.

 Premises signifies a distinct and definite locality. This may include a

room, shop, building or definite area.

Trespass to Other forms of

dwelling trespass
The offender is a The offender is
private person any person
The offender The offender
enters a dwelling enters a closed
house premises or a
fenced estate
The place entered The place entered
is inhabited is uninhabited
The act The act
constituting the constituting the
crime is entering crime is entering
against the will of without securing
the owner the permission of
the owner or
caretaker
Prohibition to enter Prohibition to enter
is express or must be manifest
implied

Article 282. Grave threats

Acts punishable:

1. Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that
of this family of any wrong amounting to a crime and demanding money or
imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and the offender
attained his purpose;

Elements:
 a. The offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latter’s person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter’s
family, of any wrong;
b. Such wrong amounts to a crime;
c. There is a demand for money or that any other condition is
imposed, even though not unlawful;
d. The offender attains his purpose.

2. Making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose;

3. Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or property or that
of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the threat not being subject to
a condition.

 The essence of the crime of threats is intimidation; i.e. the promise of

some future harm or injury.
 Not necessary that the wrong threatened to be inflicted must amount to
any of the crimes against persons, honor or property. Law requires that
the wrong must be UPON the person, honor or property.
 As the crime consists in threatening another with some future harm, it is
not necessary that the offended party was present at the time the threats
were made. It is sufficient that the threats, came to the knowledge of the
offended party.
 The crime of grave threats is consummated as soon as the threats come
to the knowledge of the person threatened.
 Threats made in connection with the commission of other crimes are
absorbed by the latter.
 The offender in grave threats does not demand the delivery on the spot of
the money or other personal property demanded by him. When threats
are made and money is taken on the spot, the crime may be robbery with
intimidation.
 The penalties for the first two types of grave threats depend upon the
penalties for the crimes threatened to be committed. One degree lower if
the purpose is attained, and two degrees lower if the purpose is not
attained.
 If the threat is not subject to a condition, the penalty is fixed at arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
 In the first two types, if the threat is made in writing or thorough a
middleman, the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period.
 The third type of grave threats must be serious and deliberate; the
offender must persist in the idea involved in his threats. The threat should
not be made in the heat of anger, because such is punished under Article
285.
 If the condition is not proved, it is grave threats of the third type.
People vs. Timbol

The accused made several advances towards the offended party. He threatened to kill
the woman’s husband if she did not accede to his advances. He was convicted of acts
of lasciviousness and grave threats.

HELD: The accused should not be convicted of grave threats because such threats
formed part of the intimidation that he employed to succeed in his lewd designs.

Reyes vs. People

A disgruntled employee staged a demonstration in front of the house of the guy who
dismissed him from work. Phrases of this nature were spoken out loud: “Agustin,
putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!”

HELD: All the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282
paragraph 2 are present: (1) the offender threatened another person with the infliction
upon his person of a wrong; (2) the wrong amounted to a crime and (3) the threat was
not subject to a condition.

Article 283. Light threats

Elements:

1. Offender makes a threat to commit a wrong;

2. The wrong does not constitute a crime;
3. There is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even though
not unlawful;
4. Offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his purpose.

 Light threats are committed in the same manner as grave threats, except
that the act threatened to be committed should not be a crime.
 Blackmailing may be punished under this article.
Article 284. Bond for good behavior

In what cases may a person be required to give bail not to molest another?

1. When he threatens another under Article 282.

2. When he threatens another under Article 283.

Bond for good Bond to keep the

behavior peace
Applicable only to Not made
grave threats and applicable to any
light threats particular case
If offender fails to If the offender fails
give bail, he shall to give bond, he
be sentenced to shall be detained
destierro for a period not
exceeding 6
months (if
prosecuted for
grave/less grave
felony) or not
exceeding 30 days
(light felony)
NOT a distinct A distinct penalty
penalty

Article 285. Other light threats

Acts punishable:

1. Threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in a quarrel,

unless it be in lawful self-defense;
2. Orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm constituting a
crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat;
3. Orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

 Under the first type, the subsequent acts of the offender must show that
he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat.
  Threats which are ordinarily grave threats, if made in the heat of anger,
may be other light threats.
 If the threats are directed to a person who is absent and uttered in a
temporary fit of anger, the offense is only other light threats.

Other light Grave threats

threats
(third type)
(second type)
Harm threatened to be committed is a
crime
Threat is not Threat is
deliberate (made deliberate
in the heat of
anger)

Other light Light threats

threats
(third type)
Harm threatened to be committed is not
a crime
There is NO There is demand
demand for for money, or other
money, or other condition imposed
condition imposed

Article 286. Grave coercions

Acts punishable:

1. Preventing another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, from doing

something not prohibited by law;
2. Compelling another, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

Elements

1. A person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that
he compelled him to do something against his will; be it right or wrong;
2. The prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or intimidation;
and
3. The person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the authority of
law or the right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint shall not be made
under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.

 The purpose of the law in penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is to

enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands, and
that our government is one of law, not of men.
 In grave coercion, the act of preventing by force must be made at the time
the offended party was doing or about to do the act to be prevented. If the
act was already done when violence is exerted, the crime is unjust
vexation.
 Instances when the act of preventing another is classified as another
crime:
o A public officer preventing by means of violence or threats the
ceremonies or manifestations of any religion is guilty of
interruption of religious worship (Art. 132)
o Any person who, by force, prevents the meeting of a legislative
body (Art. 143)
o Any person who shall use force or intimidation to prevent any
member of Congress from attending the meetings thereof,
expressing his opinions, or casting his vote (Art. 145)
 Compelling another to do something includes the offender’s act of doing it
himself while subjecting another to his will.
 A person who is in actual possession of a thing, even if he has no right to
that possession, cannot be compelled by means of violence to give up the
possession, even by the owner himself. This will amount to grave
coercion.
 Note however that an owner and actual possessor a property has a right
to use such force was may be reasonably necessary to prevent another
from dispossessing him of his property.
 Instances when the act of compelling is another offense:
o A public officer not authorized by law who compels a person to
change his residence (Art. 127)
o Kidnapping a debtor to compel him to pay his debt (kidnapping for
ransom under Art. 267)
 The crime is not grave coercion when the violence is employed to seize
anything not belonging to the debtor of the offender. This is light coercion
under Article 287.
 Surrounding the victim in a notoriously threatening attitude is sufficient to
constitute intimidation.
 The force or violence must be immediate, actual or imminent.
  The owner of a thing has no right to prevent interference with it when
interference is necessary to avert greater damage.
 There is no grave coercion when the accused acts in good faith in the
performance of duty.
 Coercion is consummated even if the offended party did not accede to the
purpose of the coercion. (MEL – this is doubtful, please check)
 A higher penalty (prision mayor) is imposed if the coercion is committed:
o In violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage;
o To compel another to perform any religious act.

Grave coercion Illegal Detention

There is no clear There must be
deprivation of actual confinement
liberty or restraint on the
person of the
victim

Grave coercion Maltreatment of

(compelling a prisoner
person to
confess/give info)
The offended party The offended party
is NOT a prisoner is a prisoner

Timoner vs. People (1983)

Jose Timoner, the mayor of Daet, ordered the fencing off of stalls which protruded into
the sidewalks of Maharlika highway. The stalls were recommended for closure by the
Municipal Health Officer.

HELD: There is no grave coercion when the restraint was made under authority of law
or in the lawful exercise of a right. Mayor Timoner had the authority under the Civil
Code to abate public nuisances. Also, he was merely implementing the orders of the
municipal health officer and was acting under the authority of a previous decision which
declared one of the stalls as a public nuisance.

Lee vs. CA (1991)

Francis Lee, the branch manager of Pacific Banking Corporation, threatened to file
charges against complainant de Chin, unless she returned all the money equivalent to a
forged Midland National Bank cheque which de Chin deposited in an account in the
Pacific Bank.

HELD: To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the
person shall be borne in mind. De Chin was pregnant, but she was also educated and
familiar with banking procedures. She could not have been easily intimidated by Lee.
Besides, a threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just
or legal, does not vitiate consent. Lee’s threat is not improper because there is nothing
unlawful about the threat to sue. Finally, there is a difference between performing an
act reluctantly, even against one’s good sense and judgment versus performing an act
with no consent at all, such as when a person acts against her will or under a pressure
cannot resist. In this case, de Chin consented to signing the withdrawal slips. She did
so voluntarily, although reluctantly. Hence, there is no coercion.

People vs. Alfeche, Jr. (1992)

Complaint for Usurpation of Real Rights in Property (Art312) in relation to Grave

Coercion (Art286) was filed against accused where it was alleged that he usurped the
possession of the tenants from the land by threatening to kill them if the latter resisted.
This was filed in the RTC. RTC dismissed saying that the penalty under Art312 was
below the jurisdictional amount of the RTC therefore it had no jurisdiction on the
assumption that the grave coercion was absorbed with the usurpation.

HELD: RTC had jurisdiction. Art312 defines a single, special and indivisible crime with
a 2-tiered penalty. The principal one for the usurpation with violence/ intimidation and an
incremental penalty based on the value obtained in addition to the penalty incurred for
the acts of violence and intimidation.

When the usurpation is done with violence or intimidation (in the CAB, grave coercion),
the accused must be prosecuted under Art312 for usurpation and not for the acts of
violence or intimidation under Art286 for grave coercion. But whenever appropriate,
accused may be held liable for the separate acts of violence or intimidation (e.g. grave
coercion). This separate penalty is in addition to the fine based on the gain obtained by
him.

People v. Santos, 378 SCRA 157 (2002)

FACTS: Josephine gave a 1-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable to timely
pay the debt. For the next 4 years, Josephine was unsuccessful in securing payment
from Leonida as the latter stubbornly maintained her having already settled the account.
Josephine, Manny et. al., with the assistance of CIS agents, then brought Leonida to
Baguio City from her house in Pangasinan, in order to surrender her to the custody of
Baguio City authorities where Josephine thought she could rightly seek redress. She
was advised, however, that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City, where
a case could be lodged. The trial court convicted Josephine on the ground that the
deprivation of Leonida of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and although lasting for
less than twenty-four hours, was sufficient to support the charge of kidnapping.

HELD: The circumstances that have surfaced warrant a conviction for grave coercion.
Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another from doing something not
prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be right
or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation.
Its elements are — First, that the offender has prevented another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his will, be
it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of force as would produce intimidation and
control over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has
restrained the will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law.
Where there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved and the offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense
established in evidence, the accused can be convicted of the offense proved.

Article 287. Light coercions

Elements:

1. Offender must be a creditor;

2. He seizes anything belonging to his debtor:
3. The seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence or a display of
material force producing intimidation;
4. The purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment of the debt.

 The seized property must be applied to the PAYMENT of the debt, not
merely as SECURITY for the debt.
 Taking possession of the thing belonging to the debtor, through deceit and
misrepresentation, for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of
the debt, is unjust vexation under the second paragraph of this article.
 Actual physical violence not necessary, grave intimidation is sufficient.

Unjust vexation (other light coercion, second paragraph)

  Includes any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would, however, unjustly annoy or vex an
innocent person. The act must cause annoyance, irritation, vexation,
torment, distress or disturbance.
 There is no violence or intimidation in unjust vexation.
 Examples: kissing a girl (despite her objections, of course!)
 When the first and third elements of grave coercion are present, but the
second element (violence, threats or intimidation) is absent, the crime is
unjust vexation.

People vs. Reyes (1934)

During a pabasa, the appellants started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the
chapel. The noise disrupted the ceremonies and some of the participants even fled,
fearing trouble. The appellants were convicted of Offending Religious Feelings under
Art. 133.

HELD: The construction of a fence even though irritating and vexatious under the
circumstances to those present is not such an act as can be designated as “notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” The appellants’ act was innocent and was
simply to protect private property rights. The circumstances under which the fence was
constructed – late at night, vexing and annoying those who had gathered – indicate that
the crime committed was only unjust vexation.

People vs. Anonuevo (1937)

Teodulo Anonuevo embraced and kissed Rosita Tabia and held her breasts while in
church. He was convicted of abuse against chastity.

HELD: It is error to ascribe the conduct of appellant to lustful designs or purposes in the
absence of clear proof as to his motive. The religious atmosphere and the presence of
many people belie the fact that he acted with lewd designs. He either performed a
bravado (in defiance of alleged threats of Rosita’s boyfriend) or wished merely to force
Rosita to accept him as a lover. He is only guilty of unjust vexation.

Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 (2000)

Ong Chiu Kwan admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and
telephone lines of complainant's business establishment because these lines crossed
his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary
permits or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric,
water and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the
complainant. Thus, petitioner's act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.
Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.

Baleros v. People (2007)

The court wishes to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in an
Information for unjust vexation. Unjust vexation exists even without the element of
restraint or compulsion for the reason that the term is broad enough to include any
human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.

Article 288. Other similar coercions (compulsory purchase of merchandise and

payment of wages by means of tokens)

Acts punishable:

1. Forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permitting the forcing or

compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase merchandise
of commodities of any kind from him;

Elements:

a. Offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or corporation;

b. He or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees;
c. He forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be
forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or from said firm or
corporation.

2. Paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or object
other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless expressly
requested by such laborer or employee.

Elements:
 a. Offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by him by
means of tokens or object;
b. Those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines;
c. Such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid by
means of tokens or objects.

 As a general rule, laborers and employees have the right to

receive just wages in legal tender.
 Inducing an employee to give up part of his wages by force,
stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means is not punished
under the RPC, but under Article 116 of the Labor Code.

Article 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or

labor through violence or threats

Elements:

1. Offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to compel or force the

laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work;
2. The purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or labor,
strike of laborers or lockout of employers.

 The act should not be a more serious offense under the RPC. For
example, if death or other serious physical injuries are caused, the act
should be punished as such and not under this Article.
 Peaceful picketing is not prohibited, it is a valid exercise of freedom of
speech.
 Employing violence or making threat by picketers may make them liable
for coercion.
 Preventing employees from joining any registered labor organization is
punished under the Labor Code, not under the RPC.

Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence

Elements:

1. Offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the exercise of his
official function;
 2. He seizes the papers or letters of another;
3. The purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person;
4. Offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.

 To seize means to place in the control of someone a thing or to give him

the possession thereof. It is not necessary that there be force or violence.
 Prejudice is not an element of the offense.
 When the offender reveals the contents of such paper or letters of another
to a third person, the penalty is higher. Thus, revealing the secret is not
an element of the offense, it only qualifies the offense.
 This article is not applicable to:
o parents, guardians or persons entrusted with the custody of
minors with respect to papers or letters of the children or minors
placed under their care or custody;
o spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.
 Unlawful opening of mail matter by an officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts is punished under the Administrative Code.

Discovering Revealing secrets

secrets
(Art. 230)
(Art. 290)
Offender is a Offender is a
private individual, public officer
or public officer not
in exercise of
official function
The offender The offender
SEIZES the COMES TO
papers or letters KNOW of the
secrets of the
private individual
by reason of his
office. Not
necessary that the
secrets are
contained in
papers/letters
The purpose of the The offender
offender is to reveals such
discover the secrets without
secrets of another, justifiable reason.
revelation to
another is not an
element of the
crime

Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office

Elements:

1. Offender is a manager, employee or servant;

2. He learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity;
3. He reveals such secrets.

 Secrets must be learned by reason of their employment.

 The secrets must be revealed by the offender.
 Prejudice/damage is not necessary under this Article.

Article 292. Revealing of industrial secrets

Elements:

1. Offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a manufacturing or

industrial establishment;
2. The manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the industry which
the offender has learned;
3. Offender reveals such secrets;
4. Prejudice is caused to the owner.

 Secrets must relate to manufacturing processes.

 The act constituting the crime is revealing the secret of the industry of
employer.
 The revelation of the secret might be made after the employee or
workman had ceased to be connected with the establishment.
 Prejudice is an element of the offense.