JAPAN AIRLINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE AGANA, Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,246,936.

irty-Six Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of

MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred sixteen and 31/100
MIRANDA (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and pay attorney’s
fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to
pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which,
FACTS: On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded however, with the exception of lowering the damages awarded affirmed the
JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, trial courts finding,thus:Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is
on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for each of the plaintiffs, the exemplary
Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL damages to P300,000.00 and the attorney’s fees to P100,000.00 plus the
flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights costs.
were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense,
thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day. ISSUE:Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the
hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were
billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day went to the airport to their final destination, even if the delay were caused by force majeure.
take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), HELD: NO.
rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to
Manila was cancelled indefinitely. There is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation
because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from
the Manila-bound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the
June 16, 1991, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due stranded passengers incurred cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable
to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected
that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
their stay in Narita.
Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private exasperating experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they
respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but
from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure
stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad faith
flight No. 741. or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of
a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
On July 25, 1991, the respondents commenced an action for damages
against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. To Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks
support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or
duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all,
Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand,
JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested The reliance of the CA in our decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals is
right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure. misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from the instant
petition. In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened
respondents holding JAL liable for damages ordering the defendant Japan when private respondents was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride
Airlines to pay the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel, not to mention the apparent apathy
Angela Nina Agana the sum of One million Two Hundred forty-six Thousand of the PAL station manager as to the predicament of the stranded
passengers. In light of these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event Consequently, private respondents missed their connecting flight
was accompanied by neglect and malfeasance by the carriers employees, an from Manila to Cebu City, as originally scheduled, since they had to wait for
action for damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private their baggage which arrived the following day, after their pre-scheduled
respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant petition. connecting flight had left. They consequently also missed their other scheduled
connecting flight from Cebu City to Surigao City.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from
any liability. It must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the On June 25, 1988, they departed for Cebu City and therefrom private
United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer respondents had to transfer to PAL Flight 471 for Surigao City. On the way
required to defray private respondents living expenses during their stay in to Surigao City, the pilot announced that they had to return
Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the to Mactan Airport due to some mechanical problem. While at Mactan Airport,
necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available the passengers were provided by PAL with lunch and were booked for the
connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look afternoon flight to Surigao City. However, said flight was also canceled.
after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified
private respondents from transit passengers to new passengers as a result of Since there were no more flights for Surigao City that day, private
which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements respondents asked to be billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel where they usually
themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on stay whenever they happen to be in Cebu City. They were, however, told by
the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an the PAL employees that they could not be accommodated at said hotel
available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of supposedly because it was fully booked. Contrarily, when Dr. Miranda called
June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were the hotel, he was informed that he and his wife could be accommodated there.
advised that they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about Although reluctant at first, PAL eventually agreed to private respondents’
9:00 a.m. the next day. overnight stay at said hotel. Oscar Jereza, PAL duty manager, approved the
corresponding hotel authority with standard meals. It was only after private
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal respondents’ insistence that their meals be ordered a la carte that they were
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been allowed to do so by PAL provided that they sign for their orders.
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not
for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him.The court may award Inasmuch as the shuttle bus had already left by the time private
nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in respondents were ready to go to the hotel, PAL offered them P 150.00 to
Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. include the fare for the return trip to the airport. Dr. Miranda asked for P 150.00
more as he and his wife, along with all of their baggages, could not be
The award of actual, moral and exemplary damages is hereby accommodated in just one taxi, aside from the need for tipping money for hotel
DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to pay each of the private respondents boys. Upon refusal of this simple request, Dr. Miranda then declared that he
nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorneys fees would forego the amenities offered by PAL. Thus, the voucher for P 150.00
of P50,000.00 plus costs. and the authority for the hotel accommodations prepared by PAL were voided
due to private respondents’ decision not to avail themselves thereof.
[G.R. No. 119641. May 17, 1996]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. To aggravate the muddled situation, when private respondents tried to
JOSEFINO MIRANDA and LUISA MIRANDA, respondents. retrieve their baggage, they were told this time that the same were loaded on
another earlier PAL flight to Surigao City. Thus, private respondents proceeded
FACTS: In May, 1988, Dr. Josefino Miranda and his wife, Luisa, who were to the hotel sans their baggage and of which they were deprived for the
residents of Surigao City, went to the United States of America on a regular remainder of their trip. Private respondents were finally able to leave on board
flight of PAL. After a stay of over a month there, they obtained confirmed the first PAL flight to Surigao City only on June 26, 1988. Thereafter, they
bookings from PAL’s San Francisco Office for PAL Flight from San Francisco instituted an action for damages which, after trial as well as on appeal, was
to Manila via Honolulu ; PAL Flight from Manila to Cebu ; and PAL Flight from decided in their favor.Hence this petition.
Cebu to Surigao.
ISSUE: Whether there is bad faith on the part of the PAL to warrant
Accordingly, on June 21, 1988, private respondents boarded PAL Flight the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
in San Francisco with five (5) pieces of baggage. After a stopover at Honolulu,
and upon arrival in Manila, they were told by the PAL personnel that their Petitioner argues that the off-loading of private respondents’ baggage was
baggage consisting of two balikbayan boxes, two pieces of luggage and one due to “weight limitations,”. While admittedly there would be a resulting
fishing rod case were off-loaded at Honolulu, Hawaii due to weight limitations.
inconvenience, the same is outweighed by the paramount concern for the Q: Before a plane departs, your office will see to it the plane loads
safety of the flight. the exact weight limitation insofar as the cargoes (sic) and
passengers are concerned, is that correct?
Petitioner moreover impugns the testimony of PAL’s baggage service
representative, Edgar Mondejar,* that private respondents’ baggage were off- A: Yes.
loaded to give preference to baggage and/or cargo originating from Honolulu.
PAL argues that Mondejar’s knowledge of what transpired in Honolulu was Q: And so with the PR 101 flight starting mainland USA, it complied
merely based on the telex report forwarded to PAL’s Manila station stating that with the weight limitation, passengers and baggages (sic)
the off-loading was due to weight limitations.6 limitation, is that correct?

Petitioner insists that its employees did not lie to private respondents A: Yes.
regarding the want of accommodations at the latter’s hotel of preference. It Q: In other words the trip from the mainland USA started
claimed that it was in accordance with the airline’s policy of housing all affected in Hawaii to off-load cargoes (sic), you complied with the weight
passengers in one location for easy communication and transportation, which limitation and so on?
accommodations in this instance could be provided by Magellan Hotel.
However, upon insistence of the Mirandas on their preference for Cebu Plaza A: Yes.
Hotel, Jeremias Tumulak, PAL’s passenger relations officer, told them that
Q: But you are saying upon arriving in Honolulu certain containers
they could use the office phone and that if they could arrange for such
were off-loaded?
accommodation PAL would shoulder the expenses. This concession, so
petitioner avers, negates any malicious intent on its part. A: Yes.
Crucial to the determination of the propriety of the award of damages in Q: That would be therefore some containers were off-loaded to give
this case is the lower court’s findings on the matter of bad faith, which way to some other containers starting
deserves to be quoted at length: from Honolulu towards Manila?
xxx xxx xxx A: Yes.
Q: In other words Mr. Mondejar, preference was given to cargoes
“In the present case there was a breach of contract committed in bad faith by
(sic) newly loaded at Honolulu instead of the cargoes (sic)
the defendant airlines. As previously noted, plaintiffs had a confirmed booking
already from mainland USA, is that correct?
on PAL Flight PR 101 from San Francisco to Manila. Therefore plaintiffs were
entitled to an assured passage not only for themselves but for their baggage A: Yes.
as well. They had a legal right to rely on this.
“The aforesaid testimony constituted a clear admission in defendant’s evidence
“The evidence showed that plaintiffs’ baggage were properly loaded and of facts amounting to a breach of contract in bad faith. This being so,
stowed in the plane when it left San Francisco for Honolulu. The off-loading or defendant must be held liable in damages for the consequences of its action.” 7
bumping off by defendant airlines of plaintiffs’ baggage to give way to other
passengers or cargo was an arbitrary and oppressive act which clearly The trial court further found that the situation was aggravated by the
amounted to a breach of contract committed in bad faith and with malice. In the following incidents: the poor treatment of the Mirandas by the PAL employees
aforecited case, the Supreme Court defined bad faith as a breach of a known during the stopover at Mactan Airport in Cebu; the cavalier and dubious
duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-enrichment or fraternal response of petitioner’s personnel to the Miranda spouses’ request to be
interest, and not personal ill will, may have been the motive, but it is malice billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel by denying the same allegedly because it was
nevertheless (infra). fully booked, which claim was belied by the fact that Dr. Miranda was easily
able to arrange for accommodations thereat; and, the PAL employees’
Also, the testimony of Edgar Mondejar clearly demonstrated the act of negligent, almost malicious, act of sending off the baggage of private
discrimination perpetrated by defendant on the herein plaintiffs, thus: respondents to Surigao City, while they were still in Cebu, without any
explanation for this gross oversight.8
The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings of the trial court by stating
that –
“As earlier noted, the off-loading of appellees’ baggag(e) was done in bad faith The court a quo debunked petitioner’s arguments by this holding:
because it was not really for the purpose of complying with weight limitations
but to give undue preference to newly-loaded baggag(e) in Honolulu. This was “The defense raised by defendant airlines that it can be held liable only under
followed by another mishandling of said baggag(e) in the twice-cancelled the terms of the Warsaw Convention is of no moment. For it has also been
connecting flight from Cebu to Surigao. Appellees’ sad experience was further held that Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 merely
aggravated by the misconduct of appellant’s personnel in Cebu, who lied to declare the air carriers liable for damages in the cases enumerated therein, if
appellees in denying their request to be billeted at Cebu Plaza Hotel.” 10 the conditions specified are present. Neither the provisions of said articles nor
others regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by air carriers.
The Court has time and again ruled, and it cannot be over-emphasized,
that a contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty This ruling was affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, thus:
and any discourteous conduct on the part of a carrier’s employee toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is
“We are not persuaded. Appellees do not seek payment for loss of any
bad faith.11
baggage. They are claiming damages arising from the discriminatory off-
It is settled that bad faith must be duly proved and not merely presumed. loading of their baggag(e). That cannot be limited by the printed conditions in
The existence of bad faith, being a factual question, and the Supreme Court the tickets and baggage checks. Neither can the Warsaw Convention exclude
not being a trier of facts, the findings thereon of the trial court as well as of the nor regulate the liability for other breaches of contract by air carriers. A
Court of Appeals shall not be disturbed on appeal and are entitled to great recognition of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude the operation of our
weight and respect.12 Said findings are final and conclusive upon the Supreme Civil Code and related laws in determining the extent of liability of common
Court except, inter alia, where the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial carriers in breach of contract of carriage, particularly for willful misconduct of
court are contrary to each other.13 their employees.”24

It is now firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits The congruent finding of both the trial court and respondent court that
predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the there was discriminatory off-loading being a factual question is, as stated
carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith.15 Inattention to and lack of care for the earlier, binding upon and can no longer be passed upon by this Court,
interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, especially in view of and in deference to the affirmance of the same by
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the respondent appellate court.
passenger to an award of moral damages.
In Cathay Pacific case:
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 17 a case which
is virtually on all fours with the present controversy, we stated:
“x x x although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government,
“x x x if the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, said convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the
the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.” instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as
an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares
(2) Whether the express provisions of the contract of carriage and the carrier liable in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations.
pertinent provisions of the Warsaw Convention limiting its liability to However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code
US$20.00 per kilo of baggage is applicable to the case. and pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from
liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract
Petitioner avers that the express provisions on private respondents’
of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the
tickets stipulating that liability for delay in delivery of baggage shall be limited
carrier’semployees is found or established, which is the case before Us. x x x”
to US$20.00 per kilo of baggage delayed, unless the passenger declares a
higher valuation, constitutes the contract of carriage between PAL and private
respondents. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION
vs.
It further contends that these express provisions are in compliance with
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Rules Relating
to International Carrier by Air, to which the Philippines is a signatory. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION
On May 11, 1975, AnacletoViana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz in the selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of
Shipping Corporation, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for damage or injury to anyone including the victim
Manila, having purchased a ticket.
In a decision rendered on April 17, 1980 by the trial court, Aboitiz was ordered
On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers to pay the Vianas for damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to
disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter paid the Vianas.
to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank AnacletoViana disembarked on the third
deck which was on the level with the pier. Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein
they similarly raised the trial court's failure to declare that AnacletoViana acted
After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the with gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence presented in support
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the thereof. In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's motion, that
Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring under the memorandum of agreement the liability of Pioneer as contractor is
Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. automatic for any damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising
from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator
Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers In an order dated October 27, 1982, the trial court absolved Pioneer from
of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a case
said vessel. of negligence against the crane operator which the ruled is never presumed,
aside from the fact that the memorandum of agreement supposedly refers only
While the crane was being operated, AnacletoViana who had already disembarked to Pioneer's liability in case of loss or damage to goods handled by it but not in
from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded the case of personal injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly invoke
in the vessel, went back to the vessel. And it was while he was pointing to the crew the fellow-servant rule simply because its liability stems from a breach of
of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, contract of carriage
pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was brought to the
hospital where he died after 3 days. Aboitiz appealed the to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the
trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
corporation Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. Issue:

Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the Whether Aboitiz is liable for the death of Vianas
vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled Ruling:
the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. It is also averred that since
the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held Yes.
liable under the fellow-servant rule.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
Pioneer, in its answer to the third-party complaint, raised the defenses that passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
Aboitiz had no cause of action against Pioneer considering that Aboitiz is being owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
sued by the Vianas for breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer is not a terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
party; that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, driver Lazardibal, in utter
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before banging said
after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported On the other hand, petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage. transportation company and the supervision of the employees, even as they
add that they are not absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large.
Also, It is not definitely shown that one hour prior to the incident, the victim Further, it was alleged that it was the victim's own carelessness and
had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What negligence which gave rise to the subject incident, hence they prayed for the
is clear to is that at the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had dismissal of the complaint plus an award of damages in their favor by way of a
already docked an hour earlier. In consonance with common shipping counterclaim.
procedure as to the minimum time of one hour allowed for the passengers to In the RTC, the court ruled in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent
disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel and his negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity
when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not
without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only When the case was appealed to the CA, it reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito
one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the
the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only suit
after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim
Issue:Whether Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver
AnacletoViana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his
Lazardibal.
tragic death.

Further, While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still Held: Yes. Dangwa is liable for the negligence of his driver. As ruled by the
petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the court, it is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common
proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a
former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, petitioner has reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board
expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers
petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they
the deceased AnacletoViana was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot are doing so. Also, it held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the
now be heard to claim otherwise. court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the
Hence, Aboitiz is liable, and the CA’s decision affirming the decision of the trial passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation
court is valid. to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991 be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS negligence of the carrier.
FACTS:
Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to In the case, the act of the victim in boarding the same cannot be considered
petitioner corporation (Dangwa) in a reckless and imprudent manner and negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the testimony of
without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons and Virginia Abalos, the bus had "just started" and "was still in slow motion" at the
property, when it ran over its passenger, PedritoCudiamat. However, instead of point where the victim had boarded and was on its platform. The victim, by
stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a RTC Manila ordered SAL to pay respondent ₱ 50k as actual damages, ₱ 250k
passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a as moral damages, ₱ 100k as exemplary damages, ₱ 75k as attorney’s fees
contractual relation. Also, the circumstances under which the driver and the and costs of suit.
conductor failed to bring the gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital
CA affirmed RTC decision.
for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence.
It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized as callous indifference. PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The petitioner assails the award of damages
The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could have forthwith turned contending that it exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law under
at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first the given circumstances. The delay of Flight No. SQ 27
proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a refrigerator, from Frankfurt to Singapore on January 28, 1991 for more than two hours was
despite the serious condition of the victim. due to a fortuitous event and beyond petitioners control. Inclement weather
prevented the petitioners plane coming from Copenhagen, Denmark to arrive
in Frankfurt on time on January 27, 1991. The plane could not take off from the
[G.R. No. 142305. December 10, 2003]
airport as the place was shrouded with fog. This delay caused a snowball
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner, vs. ANDION
FERNANDEZ, respondent. effect whereby the other flights were consequently delayed. The plane carrying
the respondent arrived in Singapore two (2) hours behind schedule. The delay
FACTS: was even compounded when the plane could not travel the normal route which
Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the Philippines and was through the Middle East due to the raging Gulf War at that time. It had to
abroad. At the time of the incident she was availing of an educational grant pass through the restricted Russian airspace which was more congested.
from the Federal Republic of Germany pursuing a Master’s Degree in Music
major in Voice. She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia ISSUE: Whether or not there is breach in the contract of carriage and whether
on Feb. 3-4, 1991. For this purpose, she took an airline ticket from Singapore or not the court is correct in awarding exemplary damages?
Airlines (SAL) FOR THE Frankfurt-Manila-Malaysia route. Respondent had to
pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe and rehearse with the pianist. HELD: YES
SAL issued ticket for Flight SQ 27 leaving Frankfurt on Jan. 27, 1991 for
Singapore with connections to Manila in the morning of Jan. 28, 1991. On Jan. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular
27, 1991 SQ 27 LEFT Frankfurt but arrived two hours late in Singapore on Jan. flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then has
28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had already left. Upon every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If he
deplaning in Singapore, Fernandez approached the transit counter at Changi does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of
Airport and was told by a lady employee that there were no more flights to carriage.[19]
Manila on that day and that she had to stay in Singapore, if she wanted, she
The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest,
could fly to HK but at her own expense. Respondent stayed with a relative in
the law requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as
Singapore for the night. The next day, she was brought back to the airport and
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
approached a counter for immediate booking but was told by a male employee:
cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. [20] In an action for
“Can’t you see I am doing something.” She explained her predicament but was
breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that
told: “It’s your problem, not ours.”
the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove
is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the
The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight
carrier
to Malaysia on Jan. 29, 1991 through the efforts of her mother and a travel
agency in Manila. Her mother had to travel to Malaysia with the wardrobe In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the respondent carried a confirmed
which caused them to incur expenses of ₱ 50,000. ticket for the two-legged trip from Frankfurt to Manila: 1) Frankfurt-Singapore;
As a result of this incident, the respondents performance before the Royal and 2) Singapore-Manila. In her contract of carriage with the petitioner, the
Family of Malaysia was below par. Because of the rude and unkind treatment respondent certainly expected that she would fly to Manila on Flight No. SQ 72
she received from the petitioners personnel in Singapore, the respondent was on January 28, 1991. Since the petitioner did not transport the respondent as
engulfed with fear, anxiety, humiliation and embarrassment causing her to covenanted by it on said terms, the petitioner clearly breached its contract of
suffer mental fatigue and skin rashes. She was thereby carriage with the respondent. The respondent had every right to sue the
petitioner for this breach. The defense that the delay was due to fortuitous around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident resulted in
events and beyond petitioners control is unavailing. the death of 28-year-old Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers.
Indeed, in the instant case, petitioner was not without recourse to enable
Respondent’s contention:
it to fulfill its obligation to transport the respondent safely as scheduled as far
as human care and foresight can provide to her destination. Tagged as a
premiere airline as it claims to be and with the complexities of air travel, it was The Tumboys asserted that violation of the contract of carriage
certainly well-equipped to be able to foresee and deal with such situation. The between them and the Yobidos was brought about by the drivers failure
petitioners indifference and negligence by its absence and insensitivity was to exercise the diligence required of the carrier in transporting
exposed by the trial court. passengers safely to their place of destination. According to Leny
Tumboy, the bus left Mangagoy at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon. The
The petitioners diligence in communicating to its passengers the
consequences of the delay in their flights was wanting. winding road it traversed was not cemented and was wet due to the rain;
it was rough with crushed rocks. The bus which was full of passengers
We are convinced that the petitioner acted in bad faith. Bad faith means a had cargoes on top. Since it was running fast, she cautioned the driver to
breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. Self-
slow down but he merely stared at her through the mirror. At around 3:30
enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill will, may well have been
the motive; but it is malice nevertheless.[26] Bad faith was imputed by the trial p.m., in Trento, she heard something explode and immediately, the bus
court when it found that the petitioners employees at the Singapore airport did fell into a ravine.
not accord the respondent the attention and treatment allegedly warranted
under the circumstances. The lady employee at the counter was unkind and of Plaintiff’s contention:
no help to her. The respondent further alleged that without her threats of suing
the company, she was not allowed to use the companys phone to make long The Yobidos tried to establish that the accident was due to a
distance calls to her mother in Manila. The male employee at the counter fortuitous event. Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the
where it says: Immediate Attention to Passengers with Immediate Booking was incident happened, testified that the 42-seater bus was not full as there
rude to her when he curtly retorted that he was busy attending to other were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat. He
passengers in line. The trial court concluded that this inattentiveness and
added that the bus was running at a speed of 60 to 50 and that it was
rudeness of petitioners personnel to respondents plight was gross enough
amounting to bad faith. This is a finding that is generally binding upon the going slow because of the zigzag road. He affirmed that the left front tire
Court which we find no reason to disturb. that exploded was a brand new tire that he mounted on the bus on April
21, 1988 or only five (5) days before the incident. The Yobido Liner
Article 2232 of the Civil Code provides that in a contractual or quasi- secretary, Minerva Fernando, bought the new Goodyear tire from Davao
contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or Toyo Parts on April 20, 1988 and she was present when it was mounted
malevolent manner. In this case, petitioners employees acted in a wanton, on the bus by Salce. She stated that all driver applicants in Yobido Liner
oppressive or malevolent manner. The award of exemplary damages is, underwent actual driving tests before they were employed. Defendant
therefore, warranted in this case. Cresencio Yobido underwent such test and submitted his professional
drivers license and clearances from the barangay, the fiscal and the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. police.

ISSUE: Whether the Yobidos are liable

ALBERTA AND CRESENCIO YOBIDO vs. CA AND TUMBOY
HELD: YES.
FACTS:
RATIONALE:
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children
named Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Article 1755 provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop Road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria, safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the they will blow up the plane. The negotiations lasted for three days and it was
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This only on the third day that the passengers were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich
disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had and 1/10 cup of PAL water. On the same day, relatives of the hijackers were
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 755 and 1756
allowed to board the plane but immediately after they alighted therefrom, a
of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a
battle between the military and the hijackers ensued, culminating in the
fortuitous event. Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of
liberation of the surviving crew and passengers, the death of 10 passengers
fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages
sought by the passenger. and 3 hijackers, and the capture of the 3 others.

Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt but his wife suffered injuries and was
may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors hospitalized for 2 days. Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped unhurt but
involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that Mrs.Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which
it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly she was hospitalized and operated on. Elma de Guzman died because of that
mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and
battle.
used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the
conclusion that it could not explode within five days use. Be that as it
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages demanding from PAL actual
may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the
damages for hospital and medical expenses and the value of lost personal
automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito
that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. belongings, moral damages, attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The trial
court dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages sustained in the
premises were attributed to force majeure. Hence, this petition.

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in

Respondent Airline averred that in the performance of its obligation to
case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier
safely transport passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, it
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury
resulting from an accident. has exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard
to all circumstances, but the security checks and measures and surveillance
precautions in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and
FRANKLIN GACAL V PAL
frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered
solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
FACTS: Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon, Bonifacio S. Anislag and his
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
wife, Mansueta, and the late Elma de Guzman, boarded a PAL flight to Manila
from the Davao Airport. Commander Zapata, and five other armed members of
ISSUE: Whether or not PAL is liable for damages.
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), all passengers of the same flight,
hijacked the aircraft ten minutes after take-off. The hijackers directed the pilot HELD: No.
to fly to Libya but upon the pilot’s explanation of the fuel limitations, they
In order to constitute a casofortuito that would exempt from liability under Art
directed the aircraft to land at Sabah. With the same explanation, they relented
1174 of the civil code, it is necessary that the following elements must occur:
and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport, Zamboanga City for (a) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent of human will;
refueling.At the runway of the Zamboanga Airport, the aircraft was met by two (b) the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the plane. The such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of
rebels demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the President of
the injury to the creditor.
PAL as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and 6 armalites, otherwise
Applying the above guidelines, the failure to transport the petitioners safely
from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged buy the MNLF
without connection to the private respondent, hence, independent of will of
PAL or its passengers.

Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But
the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military
take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the
inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international
flights.

The events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligation in a normal
manner and it cannot be faulted for negligence on the duty performed by the
military. The existence of force majeure has been established thus exempting
PAL from payment of damages.