CASE #1 Florencio opposed the petition alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS vs administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that:

MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO 1. that he was not a Manungas;
G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011 2. that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas;
3. that he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate; and
FACTS: 4. that he was in fact a debtor of the estate having been found liable to
Engracia for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil
Spouses Engracia Manungas (Engracia or brevity)and Florentino Manungas Case No. 5196-96.
(Florentino for brevity) did not begot a child. Thus, they adopted Samuel David Avila 5. that the RTC issued an Order appointing Florencio as the special
(Avila for brevity) on August 12, 1968. Florentino died intestate on May 29, 1977, administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. And survived by his wife Sarah Abarte
Vda. de Manungas. Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction arguing that:
Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate proceedings of 1. Florencio’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas
Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. She stated therein that was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but which relation
there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino except for herself, Avila ceased upon Engracia’s death, concluding that her appointment as special
and a Ramon Manungas (Ramon for brevity) whom she acknowledged as the natural administrator was without basis.
son of Florentino. Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and 2. Florenciowas not fit to become a special administrator having already been
Participation renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia’s
of Engracia. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate property as her judicial guardian.
proceedings of Florentino distributing the properties to surviving heirs, Engracia and 3. Florencio is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia while he is the
Ramon. The RTC appointed Florencio Parreño (Forencio or brevity), the niece of illegitimate son of Florentino.
Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
aunt. Thus, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its
earlier appointment of Florencio as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while
Engracia through Forencio, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado for brevity) and Milagros Pacifico
(Milagros for brevity) for illegal detainer and damages with the MTC in Panabo City. Hence, Forencio and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA ruled
Spouses Salinas, in their Answer to the complaint, claimed that Diosdado is the that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment
illegitimate son of Florentino. The answer was filed beyond the reglementary period of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado
and thus, was not considered by the MTC and issued a summary judgment ordering instead. The CA further reinstated Florencioas the special administrator of the estate.
the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to Engracia. Spouses Thuss, Diosdaado filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
Salinas appealed the MTC decision to the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed
in toto the Decision of the MTC. Thus,Spouses Salinas filed a petition to the SC ISSUE:
which was denied for having been filed out of time. Whether or not the CA committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of Diosdado as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration Florencia as special administrator?
over the Estate of Engracia (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC,
Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao with the allegation that he, being an illegitimate son RULING:
of Florentino, is an heir of Engracia. Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto for brevity) and

1
No. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino does not mean that estate of the deceased claiming a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of
he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of the Revised Rules of Court but which was later on denied.
Manungas. Appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the
court. However, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the ISSUE: WON Mrs. Gurrea can be appointed as administratrix.
directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to
reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a RULING:
regular administrator is appointed as stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
NO, the said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or
Further, evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand, intestate." None of these conditions is in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos
Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that
who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate he has died intestate. The said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof,
of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. Furthermore, he has not refused
administration of the decedent’s estate. the trust, but has also expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as
executor, and upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties
The subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia while the estate of thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
Florentino was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the
terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the
Florentino, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino, is still not an heir of probate court and is not appealable.
Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas.
In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. CASE #4

CASE #2 G.R. No. 92999 October 11, 1990

PIJUAN VS. VDA. DE GURREA
GR NO. L-21917
Mendiola vs Mendiola
November 29, 1966
FACTS:
FACTS: The petitioner and private respondents in this case are the surviving heirs of
the late Carlos Mendiola.The petitioner filed for the probate of the will of his
Manuela Ruiz (Mrs. Gurrea) and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain. Then Carlos
abandoned her, took their son, Teodoro, and went to the Philippines, where he lived father.The RTC allowed the probate of the will and issued the letters testamentary in
maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children. Carlos died leaving a favor of the petitioner who was declared executor of the estate of the deceased in the
document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo will. However,the private respondents filed a motion for the removal of the executor
Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. for the reasons that petitioner failed to pay the estate tax,failed to render an
Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings at the CFI, for the probate of said will. Pijuan accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law. Furthermore, he
was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without involved the heirs in a transaction with Villarica Pawnshop which, because of
bond. Among others, Mrs. Gurrea moved for her appointment as administratrix of the petitioner's failure to honor his part of the bargain, resulted in the filing of a suit by
Villarica against the heirs.The RTC granted the motion.CA affirmed.

2
ISSUE: WON the removal of the petitioner as executor is proper appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and
which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for
RULING: purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any
YES. Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings to support the paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video
allegations against the petitioner.The removal of the petitioner is in accordance with recording, court reporter’s notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials,
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court that if an executor or whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all
to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these evidence it has received in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course
rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and
discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged
resign. with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions
of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent,
suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public.
CASE #5
ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES 496 SCRA 282(2006) CASE #6
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
FACTS: CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
the Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of G.R. No. 156407
Manila. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition January 15, 2014
was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of
Roberto. For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the FACTS:
records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilado‘s Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate survived by his second wife and five
counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating children, and his two children from his first marriage.Thelma (child from first
that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or marriage) filed in the RTC of Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed (Emigdio’s second wife) as the administrator of the estate, which the court granted.
before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow
them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate indicating
the record of the Hilado‘s case contending that these records are public, and which that at the time of his death, Emigdio had left no real propertied but only personal
the public can freely access. properties.Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory claiming that Emigdio had
owned real properties that were excluded from the inventory.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper
RTC ordered Teresita to re-do the inventory of properties. Motion for
RULING:
Reconsideration was denied. CA directed the exclusion of certain properties in the
The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment inventory which are subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of
or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and Assignment to Mervin Realty.
pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon,

3
ISSUES: or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
1. WON certiorari is the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
RTC. estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
2. WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion orders must be respected as part of the regular performance o f its judicial
of the properties in the estate of the decedent. duty.
RULING:

1. Yes. The orders of the RTC denying Teresita’s Motion for Reconsideration
and denying her Motion for Reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and
the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at CASE #7
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings. SANTERO ET AL VS. COURT OF FIRSTINSTANCE OF CAVITEG.R. No. L-61700,
September 14, 1987153 SCRA 728, Paras
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. FACTS:
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not children with Felixberta Pacursa namely; Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided Petitioners). He also had four children with Answelma Diaz namely; Victor, Rodrigo,
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on Anselmina and Miguel (herein Private Respondents). These children are all natural
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain childrensince neither of their mothers, was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the Santero died. During the pendency of the administration proceedings before the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect Court of First Instance (CFI) Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero,
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court questioning the
otherwise, it is final. Decision of CFI Cavite granting allowance in the amount of Php2,000.00 to the
Private Respondents. This includes the tuition fees, clothing materials and
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory Petitioners opposed said Decision on the ground that private respondents were no
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of longer studying. They also averred that Private Respondents already attained the
discretion. age of majority. They further averred that all of them, except for Miguel, are gainfully
employed and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said
2. No. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on said petitioner, the Private
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority Respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI Cavite which included
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, Juanita, Estelita and Perdrio, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo
the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy Santero with Anselma Diza, praying that a sum of Php6,000.00 be given to each of
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was

4
granted by the CFI – Cavite. Later on, the said court issued an amended order and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. On April 12,
directing Anselma Diaz, mother of Private Respondents, to submit a clarification or 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
explanation as to the additional children included in the said motion. She said in her
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent
clarification that her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for
for support and the three children were then of age should have been included since the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters
all her children have the right to allowance as advance payment of their shares in the testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the ISSUE:
opposition of the petitioners.
Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a r e e n t i t l e d the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from
t o allowance? the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the
release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the
RULING: estate to the executor of the will.

Yes, the Private Respondents are entitled to allowances as advances RULING:

from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
Being of age, gainfullyemployed, or married should not be regarded a s funds of the decedent’s estate. The law in Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules
t h e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r t o t h e i r r i g h t t o allowance under of Court clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to
A r t i c l e s 2 9 0 a n d 1 8 8 o f t h e New Civil Code. Moreover, what the said the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
court did was just to f o l l o w t h e p r e c e d e n t o f t h e c o u r t
w h i c h granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private 2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations has been
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending upon the availability made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
of funds as granted by the court in several orders. to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs. It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order
the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate.
The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the
intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. In the case at bar,
CASE #8
petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as
The Estate of Ruiz vs. CA
his father’s will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime
G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996
as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as
to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate,
FACTS:
the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond 3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
three granddaughters.The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the

5
 payment of the debts and expenses of administration as Section 3 of Rule 84 deceased not disposed of by his will. And lease has been considered as an act of
of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides. He cannot unilaterally administration.
assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof
without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal The court further cited that Article 1878 of the Civil Code which states that special
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, powers of attorneys is necessary in a lease contract of real property for more than a
the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, year, is not a limitation to the right of a judicial administrator. Furthermore, the said
all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, article only applies to law on agency and not to judicial administrator.
propriety and justness.
A judicial administrator is appointed by the court and is required to file a bond. This
CASE #9 is not true in the case of an agent who is only answerable to his principal. The
protection given by the law to the principal stems from the fact that control by the
MOISES SAN DIEGO VS. ADELO NOMBRE & PEDRO ESCANLAR principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator
G.R. NO. L-19265 are subject to specific provisions of the law and orders of the appointing court.
MAY 29, 1964

FACTS:
On May 1, 1960, Adelo Nombre, a judicial administrator, leased one of the properties
of the intestate estate (a fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar for Php3,000.00 each year in a
three-year term, without however, securing authority from the court. On January 17,
1961, Nombre was removed as an administrator and Sofronio Campillanos was
appointed in his stead.

On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking authority to execute a lease
contract for the same fishpond in favor of Moises San Diego. Nombre opposed the
motion pointing out that a valid lease contract in favor of Escanlar is in existence
unless declared void in a separate action.
CASE #10
ISSUE:
ILUMINADA DE GALA-SISON, As Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the
Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease a property of the estate without late Generoso de Gala, petitioner,
prior judicial authority and approval. vs.
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
RULING: and SOCORRO MANALO, respondents.
The contract of lease in favor of Escanlar is valid. The Rules of court provides that an
FACTS:
executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as
the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the Respondent JudgeMadela of CFI Quezonissued orders requiring petitioner-
debts and the expenses of administration and shall administer the estate of the administratrix to deposit the amount in her possession with a reputable banking
institution. Petitioner filed an amended inventory in compliance with the order but

6
refused to deposit the amount in her possession on the manifestation that advances ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Bongbong Marcos correct?
and allowances must be made to her as heir and her compensation as administrator.
RTC found no merit in her contention. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N Court may award compensation as administrator to herein respondent RULING:

RULING: No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are
already final and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax
Section 7 of Rule 85 states that a judicial administrator is entitled by way of remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
compensationfor the time actually and necesarilly employed byy him as administrator National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate
or commission upon the value of estate as comes into his possession and finally from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and
disposed by him. The administrator may be allowed a greater or additional sum is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by
where the estate is large and settlement has been attended with difficulty. The the government.
amount of his fee in special cases is a matter of judicial discretion. The petitioner’s The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over
claim in herein case however are not chargeable against the estate. the deceased's estate is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate
taxes. On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement
court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the
CASE #12
decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the
MARCOS II vs. CA
estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
273 SCRA 47
that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's
GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997
contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection
of the estate tax.
FACTS: On the issue of prescription, the omission to file an estate tax return, and the
subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to
Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to the petitioner's cause, as under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case of failure to file a return,
grant CIR's petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the the tax may be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the omission, and any tax
payment of his tax delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within 3 years (now 5
family was assessed by the BIR after it failed to file estate tax returns. However the years) following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had
assessment were not protested administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting the
late president so that they became final and unappealable after the period for filing of validity of the said assessment, there is no reason why the BIR cannot continue with
opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that the properties could not be levied to the collection of the said tax.
cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate with the court, and
settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the
probate court or until the probate proceedings are terminated. Petitioner also pointed CASE #13
out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's Notices of Levy on the GR 134100
Marcos properties were issued beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and ALIPIO VS JARING
void.

7
FACTS Dominador Danan died intestate. On November 13, 1973, the court issued an order
directing all persons having money claims against the estate to file them within six
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, months after the date of the first publication of the order which was December 10,
Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years. He subleased
1973. On June 12, 1974, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug Manalansan filed a
the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita
contingent claim.
Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of
rent was payable in two installments. The first installment was duly paid, but of the On July 11, 1974, the administratrix filed an answer to the contingent claim. The court
second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid allowed the claim to be heard without prejudice to the right of the administratrix to
balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
present rebuttal evidence. Atty. Navarro, who represented the Manalansans, asked
their obligation, so the private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the
that the presentation of the exhibits be made during the next hearing wherein the
collection of the said amount before the RTC.
administratrix shall be given the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her Accordingly, the court set the next hearing to October 3, 1974, but was reset to
husband had passed away and that she can’t be impleaded based on Rule 3, 21 of November 18, 1974, at the request of the administratrix.
the 1964 Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion and ruled in favor of private
respondent. On appeal, CA affirmed lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition. It was only on January 8, 1981, that the administratrix filed an Opposition to
Contingent Claim against Estate. There the administratrix questioned the jurisdiction
ISSUE:
of the court to entertain the claim
WON creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding
for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership Issue: WON the court can take cognizance of a claim filed against the Estate when
said claim was filed outside the period.
RULING:
Ruling:
NO. SC held that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an
ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the The contingent claim was filed two days beyond the six-month period stipulated in the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the order which directed all persons having money claims against the estate to file them.
settlement of estate of the decedent. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal However, it is to be noted that the claim was filed on June 12, 1974, whereas the
partnership was automatically dissolvedand debts chargeable against it are to be timeliness of its filing was raised only on January 8, 1981, in the Opposition to the
paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 that, Contingent Claim against Estate. In the interregnum the administratrix had
‘When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community acquiesced to the entertainment of the claim by filing an answer thereto on July 11,
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof 1974, and again by asking for postponement of the October 3, 1974, hearing wherein
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses she was to present her rebuttal evidence. She is not only estopped by her conduct
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
but laches also bar her claim.
proceedings of either.’
CASE #16 Moreover, Rule 86, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court gives the probate court discretion to
allow claims presented beyond the period previously fixed provided that they are filed
Danan vs. Buencamino within one month from the expiration of such period but in no case beyond the date of
entry of the order of distribution. The contingent claim of the Manalansans was filed
GR No. l-57205, December 14,1981
within both periods.
Facts:

8
 NO. Strongholds’ liability under the performance bond was not automatically
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
CASE #17 extinguished the obligation. Obligation are transmissible to the heirs, except when the
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC transmission is prevented by law, the stipulation of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons
VS. themselves are extinguished by death.
REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money
claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently,
G.R. NO. 147561, JUNE 22, 2006
those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s
FACTS: action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

Republic Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) entered into a contract with Jose D. In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his
Santos, Jr. the Proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS) for the construction of roadways contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or
and a drainage system in asahi’s compound in Pasig City. Asahi was to pay JDS Php by provisions of law,. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those
5,300,000.00 for the construction, which was supposed to be completed by JDS obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense
within 240 days. To guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance
undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bong of Php 795,000.00. JDS executed bond. Consequently, stronghold as surety cannot use his death to escape its
solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc the Performance Bond. During the monetary obligation under its performance bond.
Construction, Asahi called the attention of JDS to the alarmingly slow pace of the
CASE #19
construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within
the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS. G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989
Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Asahi extrajudicially
rescinded the contract. Because of the rescission, Asahi had to hire another ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and as Administratrix
contractor to finish the project, incurring an additional P3,256,874.00. Asahi sent a of the Estate of Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, RENE
letter to SICI filing its claim under the performance bond, but the letter went ECHAUS,petitioner,
unheeded. Asahi eventually filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold for vs.
damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. had already died and JDS Construction was HON. RAMON BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
PHILIPPINECOMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as Administrator of the
no longer at its registered address, with its whereabouts unknown.
Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges, AVELINA A. MAGNO, as
In its defense, On July 10, 1991, Stronghold maintains that Asahi’s money claims Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges,respondents.
against it and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
Facts:
ISSUE: Whether or not the Strongholds’ liability under the performance bond was Petitioner in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the intestate estate of
automatically extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. her deceased father, filed a complaint against Charles Newton Hodges praying for an
accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share
RULING: in the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses.

9
However, during the course of the trial, C.N. Hodges died; no motion to dismiss was
filed by his counselthus thetrial continued and the trial court ordered the substitution
CASE #21
of private respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as
administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party defendant. GUILAS vs. CFI OF PAMPANGA
Meanwhile, a petition for the settlement of the estate of C.N. Hodges was filed. The G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972
trial court found for petitioner ordering PCIB to pay her and later on issued an order
granting the writ of execution. Said writ was, however, not enforced because the Facts:
petitioner instead opted to file a motion in the settlement of the estate of C. N. Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was married to Alejandro
Hodges. Private respondent Magno filed a petition for relief of judgment and a motion Lopez y Siongco. They had no children. Jacinta executed a will instituting her
husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor.
to intervene on the civil case which was eventually denied on the ground that she
Petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas,
was not a party to the case. Petitioner then prayed for the resolution of her previous
was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and
motion. However, respondent Judge Blanco ruled that he cannot yet resolved and Alejandro. After adopting legally Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not
holding in abeyance its resolution due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued by execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
the Supreme Court enjoining him from hearing the special proceedings of the testate In an order in Testate Proceedings, the aforementioned will was admitted to
estate of the deceased. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus seeking to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed
set aside the order of respondent judge and to order PCIB to pay the judgement executor without bond by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Accordingly,
credit in the civil case. The petitioner contends that the judgement in the civil case is Alejandro took his oath of office as executor.
already final and executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez and
under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was
recognized and two Lots that said to be Jacinta's paraphernal property, both situated
Issue: in Bacolor Pampanga —were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free
WON a motion in the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodgesis the proper from all liens, encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez,
remedy to enforce payment instead of carrying out the writ of execution. binding himself to free the said two parcels from such liens, encumbrances and
charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of other parcels of lands,
RULING: as well as personal properties were allotted to Don Alejandro who assumed all the
mortgage liens on the estate.
Yes.While the judgment in the civil case has become final and executory, The lower court approved the said project of partition.
execution is not the proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul
procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased the project of partition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of
person is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to
court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof. In the case ofDomingo submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita
v. Garlitos, the Court ruled that he legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition
the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of
properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the Court and such said lots and its produce.
jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the heirs Alejandro opposed the separate petition alleging the testate proceedings had
entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the
legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of a court judgment, executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and
to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure
pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid. of the estate. The parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said

10
petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has been FACTS:
finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the ground that the parties
Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance
themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares
rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of the
until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally
property of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was
settled and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower
court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the latter. On July 17,
Issue: WON the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs,
1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon,
and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings,
assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution with
determines the termination of the probate proceedings
preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the
above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land
Ruling:
should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned,
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She
entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by
further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. On January 1987, the
itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano; Siguiong vs.
lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as
Tecson). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
co-owner with a share in the partition of the property The petitioner filed an appeal
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong
before the CA assailing the decision of the lower court whether or not the trial court
vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does
may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the
not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
partition of the property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party
prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The
defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final and executory.
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings,
or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been ISSUE:
closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final and
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court executor judgment of partition is a motion to quash said judgment?
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz,; Roman RULING:
Catholic vs. Agustines).
Sec. 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as, which secures No. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby
for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
possession", re-states the doctrines. erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The
only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
CASE #25 where the judgment is void." Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which
NUÑAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS substantially affects a final and executor judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose." In the case at bar,
G.R. No. 94005 the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and executory.
April 6, 1993 Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently,
any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon

11
Martin would be in excess of his authority. The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition saying that courts are not
an independent suit against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for authorized to declare that a person is presumed to be dead.
her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove
their respective claims. On March 1972, The trial court ordered the ff:

(A) the land in the name of Dominga Garcia as well as the rentals thereon, shall
escheat and the same are assigned to the City of Davao for the benefit of
public schools and public charitable institutions and centers in the said city.
(B) Ramon Pizarro shall make an accounting of the income he collected from
himself and those who are occupying the land from the time he took
possession of it in 1936 when his aunt Cornelia Pizarro died until the City of
Davao takes possession of the property and shall deliver the same to the
CASE #26 city.
(C) Ramon Pizarro shall likewise deliver to the City of Davao the owner's
duplicate of TCT
VICENTE TAN, petitioner vs. CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.
(G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988)
Ramon Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals . He passed away on June
1975. On August,1975, a certain Luis Tan, claiming to be the missing son of
FACTS:
Dominga Garcia, filed a motion for intervention in the Court of Appeals. The City of
Davao opposed the motion. The Court of Appeals disallowed said motion for
Spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted Dominga Garcia who intervention because the trial had long been terminated, and the intervention, if
married Tan Seng with whom she had three (3) children, named Vicenta, Mariano, allowed, would unduly delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
and Luis . In 1923, Dominga and her (3) three children emigrated to Canton, China. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Vicenta Tan
In less than a year, Tan Seng followed his family to China. and/or her attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro appealed by Petition for certiorari to the
According to petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left a SC.
1,966-square-meter lot on Claveria Street, Davao, registered in her name. Since her
departure for China with her family, neither she, nor any of her family has returned to
ISSUES:
the Philippines to claim the lot.
1. WON the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition; and
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro,
2. WON the CA erred in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed
occupied a part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals from persons
dead.
occupying the land. Another nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, informed the
Solicitor General about the property. The City Fiscal and NBI agents investigated
regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia and her family.
RULING:
On September 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI of Davao,
Branch I to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor. Alleging Dominga
The Court find no merit in the petition for review.
Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga left no heir
entitled to inherit her estate, the same should be escheated pursuant to Rule 92 of
the Rules of Court. (1) With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General, may file the escheat petition under Sec.

12
 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Court ruled that the Direct evidence proving that Dominga Garcia, her husband and her children
case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on are in fact dead, is not necessary. It may be presumed under Article 390 of the New
September 1962, when the applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Civil Code which provides: ART. 390. After an absence of (7) seven years, it being
Rules of Court which provided: unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead
Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.—When a person dies for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of (10) ten years ...
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines,
leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same, the The Court of Appeals found that the City of Davao was able to prove the
municipality or city where the deceased last resided, if he resided in facts from which the presumption arises. It said: “ Its evidence preponderantly shows
the Philippines, or the municipality or city in which he had estate if he that Dominga Garcia and her family left the Philippines. Since then nothing had been
resided out of the Philippines, may file a petition in the court of first heard about them. It is not known whether all or any of them is still alive. No heir,
instance of the province setting forth the facts, and praying that the devisee or any other person entitled to the estate of Dominga Garcia claimed the
estate of the deceased be declared escheated. same except Luis Tan whose status as alleged heir has still to be proven in the
proper court”.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta Tan and
Ramon Pizarro earlier because Vicenta was never a party in the escheat These factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme
proceedings. Vicenta Tan, was never served with summons extra-territorially under Court. They may not be disturbed in this petition for review where only legal
Sec 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial court, she questions may be raised (Sec. 2, Rule 45). WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
never submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Every action must be prosecuted and error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is denied for lack
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court); of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ramon Pizarro, the alleged administrator of Dominga Garcia's property, was not a
real party in interest. He had no personality to oppose the escheat petition. CASE #28

(2) The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that G.R. No. L-45460 February 25, 1938
Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead in the escheat
proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate. Indeed, THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-
while a petition instituted for the sole purpose of securing a judicial appellants,
declaration that a person is presumptively dead cannot be entertained if that
were the only question or matter involved in the case, the courts are not vs.
barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an incident of, or COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
in connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of such absentee. Thus ruled this Court in In re Szatraw 81 Phil 461: FACTS:

... This presumption ... may arise and be invoked in a case, either in The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the
an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose,
submitted for-decision to, competent court. Independently of such an claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon
action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under
proceeding. (Emphasis added.) a contract legally entered with Colegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case.

13
Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention no ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested
of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore, the lower party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is
court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro. untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon
this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.
ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheat should be dismissed?
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene
RULING: YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.
Rule 91), the essential facts which should be alleged in the petition, which are
jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction upon the CFI are: CASE #29

1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will, Rivero vs CA

2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof, GR no. 141273

3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and May 17, 2005

4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where Facts:
deceased has his last residence or in case he should have no residence in
the country, the municipality where the property is situated. In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against
defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sisters entered a
if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property compromised agreement with plaintiff whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as
situated in the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it the illegitimate son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of
may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such their deceased father. RTC granted the compromised agreement.
case, it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased
had his last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies where they are Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment of
situated. judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA
directed Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a uncle. In her reply, she question assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate
deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement.
any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a special proceeding. The
proceeding should be commenced by a petition and not by a complaint. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the
compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were exploring the
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now sec 1 to 3 possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.CA ruled in favor of the
of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person defendants, hence a petition.
alleging to have a direct right or Interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition Issue:
for escheat. W/N the compromise regarding filiation is valid?
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to RULING:
the remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is

14
NO. The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane On 17 January 1931 upon application of the corporation, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., a
is null and void. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise loan and building association, granted it a loan of P1,000,000 for the purpose of
upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the erecting a concrete building in lieu of the wooden building standing thereon.
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the This loan was secured by a first mortgage registered on the certificate.
court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement
of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane, however, is ineffectual, because under On 11 February 1932 an additional loan of P300,000 was obtained by the corporation
the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by from El Hogar Filipino, Inc. secured by a mortgage on the same property. The period
of the first mortgage of P1,000,000 was extended.
any brother, sister or relative.
On 17 November 1942, Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the transfer of her right, share
and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc.
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment annulling the order of the
CASE #30 probate court that had granted authority to the guardian of the Plaintiff to transfer her
ward’s right, share interest in the parcel of land to Tavera-Luna, Inc. and the transfer
G.R. No. L-5893. February 28, 1956
thereof pursuant thereto.
Pardo de Tavera vs. El Hogar
ISSUES:
FACTS:
A parcel of land containing an area of 2,784 square meters as described in transfer 1. Whether or not Carmen is barred by the statute of limitations because she
certificate of title No. 36234 issued on 6 September 1930 by the office of the Register become of age.
of Deeds of Manila and was registered in the name of Andres Luna de Pardo de 2. Whether El Hogar Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for value and in good faith.
Tavera, single;raryCarlos Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen Ramirez; aryGonzales;
ryMaria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3 years of age, single; Roberto Pardo RULING:
de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of age, single; ryand Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez
Manzano, 11 years of age, single (Exhibit B). The point that the Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations is no longer
The co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, urged, because the Plaintiff became of age and released from guardianship on 19
Inc. for the purpose of building a modern structure on the parcel of land and to that November 1940 (Exhibit N-1 and 0- 1) and the action was brought on 17 November
end they also agreed to accept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in 1942, or within the period provided for in section 579, Act No. 190, which says:
exchange for their respective shares in the parcel of land and building erected No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be
thereon to be transferred to the corporation (Exhibit D-2). On 12 August 1930 the maintained by the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is
duly appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, commenced within three years next after the termination of the guardianship, or,
mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate court (Special Proceeding No. when a legal disability to sue exists by reason of minority or otherwise, at the time
34154) praying for the approval of the agreement referred to (Exhibit D-2) and when the cause of action accrues, within three years next after the removal of such
seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the disability.
share of the minor in the property (Exhibit D-1). On 28 August 1930 the probate court
approved the agreement in so far as the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Even if the loan was granted when the certificate of title was still in the name of
Manzano was concerned and authorized the guardian to accept the shares of stock the Plaintiff and her co-owners, the fact that the loan was applied for by an entity that
of the corporation in exchange for the share of the minor in the property (Exhibit E-1). was in the process of organization and by the same persons who were the registered

15
owners of the property, the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the order of the Castro vs Gregorio
probate court granting authority to the guardian to make the transfer of the share of GR No 188801
her ward in the property and was not bound to inquire further to find out whether 15 October 2014
there were irregularities committed or defects or vices that would render the order
null and void. Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
CASE #33 which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
Feliciano Francisco v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Pelagio Francisco Rs’ decree of adoption.
G. R. No. L-57438, January 3, 1984
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
Guerrero, J.: separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Atty. Castro’s alleged
homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who
Facts: succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and
Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of incompetent Estefania San
Pedro. On August 1974, private respondent Pelagio, first cousin of Estefania On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
petitioned the court for the removal of the petitioner and for his appointment. One of Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro
the grounds raised was the failure of the petitioner to submit the inventory of the alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio
estate of his ward and delay to render accounting. Further, the lower court ordered (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
the retirement of the petitioner on the ground of old age. The CA affirmed the
Welfare Officer of the Trial Court the petition was granted.
decision, hence this petition.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that
Issue: Jose had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36
year; that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while
Whether or not the petitioner can be removed as the guardian on the ground
Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to
of old age?
the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne
RULING: knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often
In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s
financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence, why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct as well as the probability of his,
being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period. CA held that while no notice was given by the Trial Court to Rosario and Joanne of
Considering that petitioner, is already 76 at the time of the decision, the advanced the adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and
age made him unfit to continue the guardianship. This finds support in the delay of legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.”
the accounting and inventory made by the petitioner. While age alone is not a control
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
criterion in the determination of his fitness, it may be a factor for consideration.
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of
CASE #35

16
judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since
required in an action for annulment of judgment. her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

Issues: The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10
years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No.
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
the adopter is required? legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
RULING: enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
was obtained through extrinsic fraud. proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other CASE #36
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
during the trial.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity GARCIA
to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under Facts:
fraudulent circumstances.

2. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of Herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his Astorga Garcia. He is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, thus,
he prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, surname. The trial court rendered a decision changing the name of the minor to
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a motion praying that Stephanie
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name but was dismissed by the court. Hence this petition.
joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario Issue:
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to

17
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name
natural mother as her middle name? "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." A sad turn of events came many years
later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
RULING: the decree of adoption before the RTC of Naga City. Prior to the institution of the
case, R.A. No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The
Yes, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate adoption. Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be no cause of action in view of the provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated,
maintained. by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the
Also, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the regime of then Article 348of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code.
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname Issue:
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7 Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and Ruling:
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence,
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble No. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
and compassionate objectives of the law. time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been
filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no Court had become vested. the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be
reason why she should not be allowed to do so. resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. It was
months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already
CASE #37
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements,
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree,
having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer
Facts: could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to
set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules
At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after
of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
to file a petition for adoption. An order granting the petition was issued that made all It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the

18
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely police officer. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition, hence this petition for
created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating
to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption ISSUE:
decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given
by statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised. WON a writ of habeas shall be issued.

RULING:
CASE #38
G.R. No. 182497 No. The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. The objective of the writ is to
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
vs. cannot be issued. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive
Custody. Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551, clearly
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention.
QUIMSON, Respondents This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of
illegal detention or restraint of liberty. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
FACTS: assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted
for.
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the CASE #41
identified the perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the
MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008
conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. Police Senior Superintendent Guinto,
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.
cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. The City Prosecutor of vs.
Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for
other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the recommendation of the Manila City’s FACTS:
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for This is a petition for review of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2,
the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC, which ordered the 2005 of the C.A. where the petition for habeas corpus was denied.
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents
averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process
done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state
of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. Herein petitioner filed for habeas

19
corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted
ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the
legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her
liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was RULING:
not her legal guardian. Petition Denied.
Thus, in a resolution, the C.A. denied his petition. Petitioner moved for The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition.Petitioner claims that, in which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person
determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either
itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over
and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s
of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of
According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant
be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In
unlawful deprivation of liberty. this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia
and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was CASE #42
petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as
petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004
household needs.
FACTS:

Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as administrator of the properties of Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had
Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain
payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the
of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that
Maximo. Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in
Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued
estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health,
a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another
respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia. She willingly went with them.
petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it
respondents’ action. did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The
ISSUE:
judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

20
 Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a
ISSUE: petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals.
W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing. They initially agreed that
over such petitions. petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner,
however, had a change of heart and decided to file a memorandum alleging that
RULING: respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons.
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
The reasoning of CA can’t be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997) family
petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy corpus filed by respondent. Ca assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of respondent.
since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and Hence this petition.
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children. ISSUE:

W/N Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
CASE #43
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family
G.R. No. 159374 courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions

July 12, 2007 RULING:

FELIPE N. MADRIAN, petitioner
YES.
Vs
The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, respondent courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
FACTS:
Note that after petitioner moved out of their Paranaque residence on May 18, 2002,
he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions.
Herein parties married each other on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque City. Their union was
blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002,
petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction
Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. precisely addressed:

Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up “The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue
writs of habeas corpus will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like

21
[respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only of identification.A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
in their respective territorial jurisdictions.” name are controlled by statutes.
RA 9048 governs the change of first name.It vests the power and authority to
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal consul general concerned. Under the law, jurisdiction over applications for change of
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. RA
when they passed RA 8369. 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The

CASE #44
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
vs. continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
FACTS:
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in he transformed himself into through surgery.
the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
principle of justice and equality. reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals public interest.
alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration.
Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Petition is dismissed.

ISSUE:
CASE #45
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex G.R. No. 166676
reassignment.
September 12, 2008
RULING: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner

NO. Versus

22
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for

Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of
Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name
“Jennifer Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses
both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral
hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that
for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding
the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented
in courtincluding the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to
the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Courtadded
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

23