Tony Kern presented his model of airmanship in 1996 2 as a framework for clarifying the

skills and attributes that constitute airmanship. Kern defines airmanship as based on
three broad levels: principles, knowledge, and outcomes. These can be further divided
into smaller sub-topics. In this article, we will examine those sub-topics, and discuss
their contribution to aviation safety. In most cases we will do so by referring to past
occurrences.

(Image embedded from Airline Command on 22 December 2009)

The airmanship model resembles the Parthenon, the famous Greek temple (although any
modern construction will also suffix as a representation). By using the Parthenon, Kern
represents airmanship as based on a solid foundation of discipline, skill and proficiency,
from where five pillars of knowledge rise -knowledge of oneself, the aircraft, the team, the
environment and the risks- to support the ultimate and more visible outcomes of
situational awareness and judgment while operating the aircraft.

The Bedrock Principles

Discipline

In aviation, rules and regulations represent an aggregate of operational wisdom, and

operating outside of them may prove a dangerous bet. Flight discipline is, thus, the ability
to adhere to these rules in the operation of an aircraft (Kern, 19962).

Aviation accident reports are littered with tales of pilots ignoring rules or not obeying
operating procedures. But if there is one good example of the destructive potential that
lack of flight discipline has, it is the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Bud Holland of the United
States Air Force. In the period between 1991 and 1994, Holland had repeatedly and
deliberately exceeded the operating limitations of the B-52 with regards bank and pitch
angles. On one occasion, the forceful intervention of a co-pilot averted certain disaster
when Holland was performing an extremely low level flyover of a ridge during a
photography session. Yet these violations were not effectively discouraged by senior Air
Force personnel. Holland’s reputation had become such that many Air Force pilots refused
to fly with him. More worryingly, there were others who had chosen to emulate his actions
(Kern, 19993). All it came to a sudden conclusion on June 24th 1994, when Holland,
commanding a B-52 Bomber during an airshow practice, crashed the aircraft into the
ground. Such was the predictability of the outcome of Holland’s behaviour that one of his
colleagues anonymously stated that “you could see it, hear it, feel it, and smell it coming.
We were all just trying to be somewhere else when it happened” (Kern, 1996, p. 36 2).

While Holland may have excelled in traditional piloting skills - those ‘stick and rudder’
handling skills -, his judgment for the deployment of these skills was wanting. In this case
the very first bedrock principle of the airmanship model - discipline - was weak.

Skill

Skills can be thought of as the tools of a pilot’s trade, skills such as the ability to hold an
altitude or heading accurately, the ability to handle an aircraft in a gusty crosswind, or the
ability to recall checklists and emergency procedures.

A private pilot’s licence test largely determines whether the applicant has acquired a
particular set of basic skills or not. They must demonstrate their skills at manoeuvres such
as climbing and descending, turning, and holding altitudes and headings accurately.
Recognition and recovery from unusual situations, such as stalls and spiral dives, are also
tested to ensure that the applicant has the basic ‘tools’ to keep themselves and their
passengers safe (CAA-NZ, 20071). This, however, is just the start. The PPL is often
referred to as a ‘licence to learn’ and, indeed, it simply represents achievement of the
most basic levels of piloting skill: that of being able to operate an aircraft safely. The
acquisition of skill should continue throughout a pilot’s career, as a continuous process
(Kern, 19962).

Proficiency

If skills are tools, proficiency is the keeping of those tools in good condition. Proficiency
ensures that whenever the ‘tool’ is required it will be able to be used as intended.

A pilot exercising good judgment will never intentionally get into a situation where his skill
is pushed to the limit. Occasions will arise, however, where despite the best planning and
the best application of judgment, the unexpected happens. In these occasions a pilot must
apply the skills that he possesses at the proficiency level he has developed them. The
possession of high levels of skill and proficiency could well mean the difference between
ending with a successful outcome and becoming another statistic. With good judgment,
experience and lots of luck, a pilot’s skill will never be truly tested. But if either the
judgment, experience or luck runs out, it is skill and proficiency that will make the
difference to the outcome.

The Pillars of Knowledge

The pillars of knowledge stand on top of the bedrock principles, and are necessary to
support the capstone outcomes. The model suggests that these pillars of knowledge are of
equal importance to the outcomes and thus have an equal role to play.

Knowledge of Self

Most student pilots around the world are introduced to the ‘IMSAFE’ model at a very early
stage of their training. It serves as a useful method for pilots to assess their current
physical and emotional condition, and it has been recognized as an effective tool in
reducing aviation accidents (Stripe, Best, Cole-Harding, Fifield & Talebdoost, 2006 4). The
model serves to bring to the pilot’s attention factors which may affect his ability to safely
operate the aircraft:

 Illness - Do I have any symptoms?

 Medication - Have I been taking prescription or over-the counter drugs?
 Stress - Am I under psychological pressure from the job? Do I have money,
health, or family problems?
 Alcohol - Have I been drinking within 8 hours? Within 24 hours?
 Fatigue - Am I tired and not adequately rested?
 Eating - Have I eaten enough of the proper foods to keep adequately nourished
during the entire flight?

Knowledge of the Aircraft

General Charles “Chuck” Yeager, the first pilot to travel faster than the speed of sound in
level flight, strongly advocates pilots having an in-depth knowledge of the aircraft that
they are flying: “You've got to understand systems. Even in today's airplanes, you have to
understand systems. The better you understand them, the better off you are in case an
emergency arises” (Interview: Chuck, 1991).

The crash of British Midlands Flight 092, a 737-400, is often quoted as an example of how
unfamiliarity with an aircraft’s systems can have dire consequences. During the flight the
crew became aware of a smell of smoke and an engine vibration. The cabin crew had also
observed flames coming from the left engine. The first officer also said that he monitored
the engine instruments and, when asked by the commander which engine was causing the
trouble, he said ‘IT'S THE LE … IT'S THE RIGHT ONE.’, to which the commander responded
by saying ‘OKAY, THROTTLE IT BACK’ (“Aircraft Accident”, 1990). In making the decision
which engine to shut down, the crew disregarded the input of the vibration monitoring
instruments. This was due to the pilots’ belief that the monitoring system was unreliable,
as indeed was the case on many aircraft. However, the unreliability of vibration monitoring
was an issue that had been addressed in the development of the 747-300, and on this
-400 aircraft the vibration monitors were considered reliable. Throttling back the
functioning right engine did have the effect of removing both the vibration and the smell of
smoke, which further convinced the crew that they had taken the correct action. In reality,
they had shut down their only functioning engine, which had the side-effect of masking the
symptoms from the failing left engine (“Aircraft Accident”, 1990). The aircraft crashed just
short of the runway after the left engine finally failed completely and efforts to restart the
right engine were unsuccessful. 47 passengers were killed, and a further 74 people
received serious injuries in the crash.

Knowledge of the Team

One of the most often quoted aviation incidents is that of United 232, a DC-10 which
suffered complete hydraulic failure, causing loss of aileron and elevator control. Despite
this, the crew were able to fly the aircraft to an airport, and very nearly succeeded in
landing successfully. On touchdown the right wing clipped the runway, and the aircraft
broke up. However, 185 people survived the accident, which is remarkable given the total
lack of control the crew were faced with.

The likelihood of totally hydraulic loss had been calculated as being so remote that no
contingency plan existed. As such, the crew were left with very little in the way of
resources to deal with the situation. Captain Al Haynes, the pilot in command of United
232, has often spoken about the events of that day, and attributed the fact that they were
able to land the aircraft partly successfully to the fact that they were working together as a
team. Augmenting this effort was a DC-10 instructor pilot that happened to be travelling
as a passenger on the flight.

We had 103 years of flying experience there in the cockpit, trying to get that airplane on
the ground, not one minute of which we had actually practiced – any one of us. So why
would I know more about getting that airplane on the ground under those conditions than
the other three? So if I hadn't used CLR [Command Leadership Resource Training], if we
had not let everybody put their input in, it's a cinch we wouldn't have made it (Haynes,
1991).

Knowledge of the Environment

According to Kern (19962), the Environment in the context of aviation can be further
broken down into three smaller subheadings, which themselves can be further divided:

 The Physical Environment

 The Regulatory Environment
 The Organizational Environment
As an example of how a lack of understanding of physical factors caused the crash of a
Boeing 707 on Mt. Fuji in Japan, let us examine the case of BOAC Flight 911. After
departing from Tokyo International Airport just before 2 p.m. on the afternoon of March
4th, 1966, the wide-body Boeing was performing a visual departure via Mt. Fuji, a route
that had been requested, possibly to give the passengers a better view of the mountain as
they departed for Hong Kong ("Accident Description", n.d.).
However, on the downwind side of Mt Fuji, the aircraft encountered turbulence severe
enough to cause the aircraft to lose control and break up, causing the deaths of all 124
passengers and crew. What the pilots had failed to recognize was the presence of
mountain waves: a phenomena that can occur on the downwind side of a mountain or
range of hills with certain wind velocities. The tell-tale sign of mountain waves is the
formation of lenticular cloud – this was visible in satellite photos taken shortly before the
crash, but had not been recognized by the crew. However, lenticular clouds will not always
form when mountain waves are present: the key is to consider the direction and speed of
wind flow and the likely position of any turbulence.

Knowledge of Risk

The act of boarding an aircraft and taking to the skies carries with it an inherent degree of
risk. Indeed, even in going through our daily lives, we routinely take risks. If you took no
risk, you would most likely spend your entire life at home. Simply stated, risk is required
to get things done (Kern, 1996, p. 199).

What is called for is a reasonable balance between the risks of getting something done,
and the benefit. Is there an alternative that will make the task safer, yet not unduly
disrupt the task? An appreciation of risk involves thinking of “what if” scenarios, and
minimizing the damage that could occur if such a scenario occurred. It’s the reason that
we buckle our seatbelts, or look both ways before crossing the road.

Consider the case of John F. Kennedy Jr, who died along with his wife and sister-in-law
when the aircraft that he was piloting crashed into the sea en-route to Martha’s Vineyard.
The flight was conducted at night, and over a large body of water. The pilot did not hold an
instrument rating, and was relatively inexperienced. At the time of the accident, the
aircraft was descending towards the ground out of control at a rate of 4,700 feet per
minute. The probable cause determined by the NTSB was “the pilot's failure to maintain
control of the airplane during a descent over water at night, which was a result of spatial
disorientation” (“Accident report”, 2000). Crossing large bodies of water at night in single-
engine airplanes could be potentially hazardous, not only from the standpoint of landing
(ditching) in the water, but also because with little or no lighting the horizon blends with
the water, in which case, depth perception and orientation become difficult. During poor
visibility conditions over water, the horizon will become obscure, and may result in a loss
of orientation. Even on clear nights, the stars may be reflected on the water surface, which
could appear as a continuous array of lights, thus making the horizon difficult to identify
("FAA airplane", 2004, p. 10-6). Given this, let us examine the track of the airplane taken
from Essex County Airport towards Martha’s Vineyard. The aircraft made a more-or-less
direct track towards its destination, which resulted in travelling a long way offshore, at
night, with questionable visual references.

Examining this in hindsight suggests that a less risky course of action would have been to
track along the coast and then turn towards Martha’s Vineyard once past Rhode Island.
This would have kept the aircraft within gliding distance of the shore should an engine
failure occur, and for the majority of the trip would have provided a clear visual reference
(the coast line) providing a better aid to orientation. For the short over-water leg that
would be required, the risk could have been minimized by gaining as much altitude as
possible prior to crossing the water, thus providing the greatest gliding distance should an
engine failure occur. Flying at altitude also gives more time to troubleshoot and attempt to
regain control if required, as well as minimising the risk of collision with terrain.

The Capstone Outcomes

The capstone outcomes are built on the bedrock principles and are supported by the pillars
of knowledge. As such, the model suggests that all supporting structures must be in place
before being able to exercise judgement or gain situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

Situational awareness is “the accurate perception of what is going on with you - and your
crew, wingman, lead, student, instructor, etc -, the aircraft and the surrounding world,
both now and in the near future” (Kern, 1996, p. 2332). As such, it is apparent that loss of
situational awareness is a major contributor to aviation accidents as it covers such a wide
range of scenarios: fuel starvation, controlled flight into terrain, continued VFR flight into
IMC conditions, spatial and geographical disorientation… Situational Awareness is the
primary resource available to the next capstone outcome: judgment.

Judgement

Judgement sits at the pinnacle of the Airmanship model. As with Situational Awareness, it
is wholly dependent on the layers beneath it in order to function correctly. With the
importance of good decision-making to aviation, volumes has been written on the subject,
and a very succinct summary has been made by a NASA-Ames Research Centre
psychologist, Judith Orasanu, whose method has been discussed by Kern (19962).

The first objective that must be achieved is gaining a solid understanding of exactly what
the problem is, using the model shown below:
  Step One: What is the nature of the problem? Answering this question
accurately will call upon the aviator’s Situational Awareness, but more specifically
the Pillars of Knowledge applicable to the problem at hand. For example, a pilot
flying at night whose aircraft suddenly develops a rough running engine will very
quickly be calling upon his knowledge of the aircraft, environment and resources
available in order to avoid disaster.
 Step Two: How much time do I have to work the problem? Some problems
require immediate action: an onboard fire for example, while others may be
restricted only by the amount of fuel or daylight available. It is timely to mention
the tendency for pilots that are troubleshooting a problem to neglect to perform
the most basic of duties: flying the aircraft. It may well be that the undercarriage
light that isn’t indicating seems the most urgent of issues: however, letting
Situational Awareness slip and neglecting to fly the aircraft can let a much more
dangerous situation take him unawares, such as Controlled Flight Into Terrain.
 Step Three: What are the risks associated with this problem? Again calling
on the pilot’s Situational Awareness and knowledge, an assessment must be made
of the potential outcome: ranging from mild embarrassment to life-threatening
(Kern, 19962).

Having assessed the situation, the next objective is to create options, and then decide
which to pursue. This creation of options calls upon the Airmanship Model: a better
knowledge of the environment, the team, the aircraft etc. will provide a better, more
thorough basis for sound decision-making.

However, Kern lists several potential pitfalls regarding decision-making, including the
following:

 Strength of an Idea: If the person suggesting a solution is seen as more

experienced, or the problem is extremely time-limited, a solution is more likely to
be accepted even if it is wrong. Sometimes known as ‘Captain-itis’
 Seeking a perfect solution: There may not be a solution available that satisfies
every requirement. Rather than seeking perfection, emphasis should be on the
‘best possible solution’.
 Hidden Agendas: Is judgement being clouded by another agenda: the desire to
arrive at the planned destination rather than divert, for example?

Conclusion
So what is Airmanship? As a summary of the model, it could be said that a pilot with good
Airmanship has a solid skill-set to call upon: both routine procedures and emergency
actions. These skills are well practiced and have been recently revised. They have the
discipline to operate within the limits of the aircraft and of the rules, but will have their
own more rigorous standards that they strive for. This discipline extends almost to a
pedantic level – if an instruction was given to fly at 3,500’, then a pilot with good
airmanship will not accept that flying at 3,480’ is ‘close enough’.

The pilot with good Airmanship knows his aircraft well: both its limitations and capabilities,
and uses this knowledge to assist in his decision making. They are well studied in
meteorology, knowledge of airspace requirements and regulatory limitations. They have an
objective and accurate view of their own limitations and capabilities, and those of the team
around him, and apply this knowledge conservatively. Airmanship dictates that a pilot does
not take unnecessary risks, and will actively seek methods of removing risk where
possible. A pilot with good Airmanship is aware of what is going on around him in all
respects: the environment, the aircraft, the team and himself. He possesses a clear idea of
potential hazards, and has given thought to ‘what-if’ scenarios. Finally, he takes into
account all of the factors listed above when making decisions.

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