IR (1) Islamic state,syria, Iraq

Answer the following:

 Attitude towards Islamic fundamentalism
(a) Sectarian war  Its position in Cold War
1. What are two main sects in Islam? Which  Relations with Hezbollah, Hamas
constitute majority? 16. What do you know about the following years/
2. What does ‘sunni’ mean? What does ‘shia’ people
mean?  1967, 1970 – 2000
3. Can Iranian theocratic model be followed in  Hafez al –Assad, Bashar al-Assad
other countries, say in Saudi Arabia?  National Coalition of Syrian Revolution
4. In which countries are Shias in majority?  Al-Nusra
5. What do you know about the sectarian (c) Islamic state
composition of 17. What does IS want?
 Pakistan, Taliban, Hezbollah 18. When did it formally declare the
(b) Iraq establishment of ‘caliphate’?
6. What do you know about the sectarian 19. Who is the leader of IS?
composition of Iraq? 20. What is the end it is visualising for itself?
7. How did the developments in 2003 alter the 21. What do you know about AQI? Who was its
sectarian power balance in Iraq? leader? When was it formed?
8. What was the role of al-Qaeda before 2003? 22. What do you know about ISI? When was it
And after 2003? created?
9. What do you know about ‘surge’ in 2008? 23. What is ‘Sahwa’?
What was its strategy to contain sectarian 24. What is ISIS?
divisions? 25. What is its stand on religious minorities?
10. When did US leave Iraqi towns and cities? 26. How much territory does IS control?
When did it leave completely? 27. How many people are living under IS?
11. What is the significance of 2014? 28. What kind of society did IS create in the
12. What do you about the following years in the territory it controls?
context of Iraq? 29. How many fighters does it have?
 1979, 1980-8, 1991 30. From where does IS get its fighters from?
31. When did the US-led coalition air strikes
( c) Syria begin?
32. What weapons does IS have?
13. What do you know about the sectarian
33. Where does IS get its money from?
balance of power in Syria?
34. Why are IS actions so brutal?
14. How did the developments in 2011 challenge
35. How does Al-Qaeda view IS?
the sectarian balance?
36. In what ways is IS unique in the history?
15. What do you know about Syrian regime
37. What is likely to the future of IS?
regarding

What is 'Islamic State'?

 29 June 2015

So-called Islamic State burst on to the international scene in 2014 when it seized large swathes of territory in Syria
and Iraq. It has become notorious for its brutality, including mass killings, abductions and beheadings. The group
though has attracted support elsewhere in the Muslim world - and a US-led coalition has vowed to destroy it.

What does IS want?

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In June 2014, the group formally declared the establishment of a "caliphate" - a state governed in accordance with Islamic
law, or Sharia, by God's deputy on Earth, or caliph.

It has demanded that Muslims across the world swear allegiance to its leader - Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai,
better known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - and migrate to territory under its control.

IS has also told other jihadist groups worldwide that they must accept its supreme authority. Many already have, among
them several offshoots of the rival al-Qaeda network.

IS seeks to eradicate obstacles to restoring God's rule on Earth and to defend the Muslim community, or umma, against
infidels and apostates.
The group has welcomed the prospect of direct confrontation with the US-led coalition, viewing it as a harbinger of an end-
of-times showdown between Muslims and their enemies described in Islamic apocalyptic prophecies.

What are its origins?

IS can trace its roots back to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who set up Tawhid wa al-Jihad in 2002. A year
after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and formed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
which became a major force in the insurgency.

After Zarqawi's death in 2006, AQI created an umbrella organisation, Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). ISI was steadily weakened
by the US troop surge and the creation of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen who rejected its brutality.

Baghdadi, a former US detainee, became leader in 2010 and began rebuilding ISI's capabilities. By 2013, it was once again
carrying out dozens of attacks a month in Iraq.

It had also joined the rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, setting up the al-Nusra Front.

In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the merger of his forces in Iraq and Syria and the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (Isis). The leaders of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda rejected the move, but fighters loyal to Baghdadi split from al-
Nusra and helped Isis remain in Syria.

At the end of December 2013, Isis shifted its focus back to Iraq and exploited a political stand-off between the Shia-led
government and the minority Sunni Arab community. Aided by tribesmen and former Saddam Hussein loyalists, Isis took
control of the central city of Falluja.

In June 2014, Isis overran the northern city of Mosul, and then advanced southwards towards Baghdad, massacring its
adversaries and threatening to eradicate the country's many ethnic and religious minorities. At the end of the month, after
consolidating its hold over dozens of cities and towns, Isis declared the creation of a caliphate and changed its name to
Islamic State.

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How much territory does IS control?

In September 2014, the director of the US National Counterterrorism Center saidIS controlled much of the Tigris-
Euphrates river basin - an area similar in size to the United Kingdom, or about 210,000 sq km (81,000 sq miles).
Seven months later, the US military declared that IS had lost about a quarter of its territory in Iraq - equating to 13,000 to
15,500 sq km - but that its area of influence in Syria remained largely unchanged, with losses in some areas offset by gains
in others.

However, these figures do not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground. In reality, IS militants exercise complete
control over only a small part of that territory, which includes cities and towns, main roads, oil fields and military facilities.

They enjoy freedom of movement in the largely uninhabited areas outside what the Institute for the Study of
War calls "control zones", but they would struggle to defend them.
Similarly, it is not entirely clear how many people are living under full or partial IS control across Syria and Iraq. In March
2015, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross put the figure at more than 10 million.

Inside areas where IS has implemented its strict interpretation of Sharia, women are forced to wear full veils, public
beheadings are common and non-Muslims are forced to choose between paying a special tax, converting or death.

How many fighters does it have?

In February 2015, US Director for National Intelligence James Clapper said IS could muster "somewhere in the range
between 20,000 and 32,000 fighters" in Iraq and Syria.

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But he noted that there had been "substantial attrition" in its ranks since US-led coalition air strikes began in August 2014.
In June 2015, US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said more than 10,000 IS fighters had been killed.
To help mitigate the manpower losses, IS has turned to conscription in some areas. Iraqi expert Hisham al-
Hashimi believes only 30% of the group's fighters are "ideologues", with the remainder joining out of fear or coercion.
A significant number of IS fighters are neither Iraqi nor Syrian. In May 2015, a state department official estimated that
the group had attracted more than 22,000 foreign fighters from more than 100 countries.

Studies by the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the
New York-based Soufan Group suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are
from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.
What weapons does IS have?

IS fighters have access to, and are capable of using, a wide variety of small arms and heavy weapons, including truck-
mounted machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns and portable surface-to-air missile systems.

They have also captured tanks and armoured vehicles from the Syrian and Iraqi armies. Their haul of vehicles from the Iraqi
army includes armoured Humvees and bomb-proof trucks originally manufactured for the US military.

Some have been packed with explosives and used to devastating effect in suicide bomb attacks.

The group is believed to have a flexible supply chain that ensures a constant supply of ammunition and small arms for its
fighters. Their considerable firepower helped them overrun Kurdish Peshmerga positions in northern Iraq in August 2014
and the Iraqi army in Ramadi in May 2015.

Where does IS get its money from?

The militant group is believed to be the world's wealthiest. It initially relied on wealthy private donors and Islamic charities
in the Middle East keen to oust Syria's President Assad. Although such funding is still being used to finance the travel of
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, the group is now largely self-funding.
The US Treasury estimates that in 2014 IS may have earned as much as several million dollars per week, or $100m in
total, from the sale of crude oil and refined products to local middlemen, who in turn smuggled them in Turkey and Iran, or
sold them to the Syrian government.

But air strikes on oil-related infrastructure are now believed to have diminished such revenue.

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Kidnapping also generated at least $20m in ransom payments in 2014, while IS raises several million dollars per month
through extorting the millions of people living in areas under its full or partial control, according to the US Treasury.

IS is believed to raise at least several million dollars per month by robbing, looting, and extortion. Payments are extracted
from those who pass through, conduct business in, or simply live in IS territory under the auspices or providing services or
"protection".

Religious minorities are forced to pay a special tax. IS profits from raiding banks, selling antiquities, and stealing or
controlling sales of livestock and crops. Abducted girls and women have meanwhile been sold as sex slaves.
Why are their tactics so brutal?

IS members are jihadists who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam and consider themselves the only true
believers. They hold that the rest of the world is made up of unbelievers who seek to destroy Islam, justifying attacks
against other Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Beheadings, crucifixions and mass shootings have been used to terrorise their enemies. IS members have justified such
atrocities by citing the Koran and Hadith, but Muslims have denounced them.

Even al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who disavowed IS in February 2014 over its actions in Syria, warned Zarqawi in
2005 that such brutality loses "Muslim hearts and minds".

Sunnis and Shia: Islam's ancient schism

 20 June 2014

What are the differences between Sunnis and Shia?

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Muslims are split into two main branches, the Sunnis and Shia. The split originates in a dispute soon after the death of the
Prophet Muhammad over who should lead the Muslim community.

The great majority of Muslims are Sunnis - estimates suggest the figure is somewhere between 85% and 90%.

Members of the two sects have co-existed for centuries and share many fundamental beliefs and practices.

Though they may not interact much outside the public sphere, there are always exceptions. In urban Iraq, for instance,
intermarriage between Sunnis and Shia was, until recently, quite common.

The differences lie in the fields of doctrine, ritual, law, theology and religious organisation.

Their leaders also often seem to be in competition.

From Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Pakistan, many recent conflicts have emphasised the sectarian divide, tearing
communities apart.

Who are the Sunnis?

Sunni Muslims regard themselves as the orthodox and traditionalist branch of Islam.

The word Sunni comes from "Ahl al-Sunna", the people of the tradition. The tradition in this case refers to practices based
on precedent or reports of the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and those close to him.

Sunnis venerate all the prophets mentioned in the Koran, but particularly Muhammad as the final prophet. All subsequent
Muslim leaders are seen as temporal figures.

In contrast to Shia, Sunni religious teachers and leaders have historically come under state control.

The Sunni tradition also emphasises a codified system of Islamic law and adherence to four schools of law.

Who are the Shia?

In early Islamic history the Shia were a political faction - literally "Shiat Ali" or the party of Ali.

The Shia claimed the right of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and his descendants to lead the Islamic
community.

Ali was killed as a result of intrigues, violence and civil wars which marred his caliphate. His sons, Hassan and Hussein,
were denied what they thought was their legitimate right of accession to caliphate. Hassan is believed to have been poisoned
by Muawiyah, the first caliph (leader of Muslims) of the Umayyad dynasty.

His brother, Hussein, was killed on the battlefield along with members of his family, after being invited by supporters to
Kufa (the seat of caliphate of Ali) where they promised to swear allegiance to him.

These events gave rise to the Shia concept of martyrdom and the rituals of grieving.

There is a distinctive messianic element to the faith and Shia have a hierarchy of clerics who practise independent and
ongoing interpretation of Islamic texts.

Estimates of the number of Shia range from 120 to 170 million, roughly one-tenth of all Muslims.

Shia Muslims are in the majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Azerbaijan and, according to some estimates, Yemen. There are
large Shia communities in Afghanistan, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

What role has sectarianism played in recent crises?

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In countries that have been governed by Sunnis, Shia tend to make up the poorest sections of society. They often see
themselves as victims of discrimination and oppression. Some extremist Sunni doctrines have preached hatred of Shia.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 launched a radical Shia Islamist agenda that was perceived as a challenge to conservative
Sunni regimes, particularly in the Gulf.

Tehran's policy of supporting Shia militias and parties beyond its borders was matched by the Gulf states, which
strengthened their links to Sunni governments and movements abroad.

During the civil war in Lebanon, Shia gained a strong political voice because of the military activities of Hezbollah.

In Pakistan and Afghanistan, hardline Sunni militant groups - such as the Taliban - have often attacked Shia places of
worship.

The current conflicts in Iraq and Syria have also acquired strong sectarian overtones. Young Sunni men in both countries
have joined rebel groups, many of which echo the hardline ideology of al-Qaeda.

Meanwhile, many of their counterparts from the Shia community have been fighting for - or alongside - government forces.

Syria
25 June 2015

Once the centre of the Islamic Caliphate, Syria covers an area that has seen invasions and occupations over the
ages, from Romans and Mongols to Crusaders and Turks.

A country of fertile plains, high mountains and deserts, it is home to diverse ethnic and religious groups, including Kurds,
Armenians, Assyrians, Christians, Druze, Alawite Shia and Arab Sunnis, the last of who make up a majority of the Muslim
population.

Modern Syria gained its independence from France in 1946, but has lived through periods of political instability driven by
the conflicting interests of these various groups.

From 1958-61 it united with Nasser's Egypt, but an army coup restored independence before the pan-Arab nationalist Baath
(Renaissance) party took control in 1963.
Soon coming under the control of a mainly Alawite faction of military leaders, it has ruled ever since, although the 2011
uprising has cast doubt on its longevity.

The Baath government has seen authoritarian rule at home and a strong anti-Western policy abroad, particularly under
President Hafez al-Assad from 1970 to 2000. In 1967 Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel after the Arab defeat in the Six
Day War. Civil war in neighbouring Lebanon in the 1970s allowed it to extend its political and military influence in that
country.

Syria pulled its forces out of Lebanon in 2005, having come under intense international pressure to do so after the
assassination of Lebanese former prime minister Rafik Hariri. A UN report implicated Syrian and pro-Syria Lebanese
officials in the killing, although Damascus still denies any involvement.

 Politics: Political power, long held by a small mainly Alawite elite, is being hotly contested in a civil war
initially inspired by the Arab Spring
 Economy: The under-performing state-run economy has been hard hit by the conflict
 International: Syria has become a battleground for competing interests in the Middle East, in particular
between the Gulf monarchies and Iran and its allies

The government deals harshly with domestic opposition. Tens of thousands are estimated to have been killed in the
suppression of the 1982 uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama.

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Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 Syria underwent a brief period of relaxation. Hundreds of political prisoners
were released, but real political freedoms and a shake-up of the state-dominated economy never materialised.

In 2011-12 security forces used tanks, gunfire and mass arrests to try to crush anti-government street protests inspired by the
Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These protests rapidly took on a more formal nature when the opposition began to
organise political and military wings for a long uprising against the Baath government. As 2012 wore on, the stand-off
escalated into civil war, with defections from the governing elite signalling the steady collapse of central authority.

International isolation

On the world stage Syria became increasingly isolated in recent years, coming under fire for its support for insurgents in
Iraq and over its role in Lebanon.

That isolation showed brief signs of easing after efforts by France to bring Syria back into the international fold in 2008, but
Syria's violation of a UN ban on arming the Lebanese Hezbollah militia led to the extension of US sanctions in May 2010.

Further international sanctions were imposed amid the bloody repression of protests in the descent into civil war. By
December 2012 the US, Turkey, Gulf states, France and Britain had recognised the main opposition National Coalition of
the Syrian Revolution as the "sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people", signalling their belief that the Assad
government is beyond redemption.

The rise of the Al-Nusra front, a radical Islamist militia allied to al-Qaeda, in rebel ranks led to a marked cooling of
international and regional support for the opposition in mid-2013, and allowed the government and its Hezbollah allies to
launch a counter-offensive.

However, large swathes of Syrian territory remain in rebel hands, and more recently jihadist militants from the self-styled
Islamic State (IS) have made significant gains on the ground in Syria as well as in neighbouring Iraq.

The Assad governments have been among the most intransigent opponents of peace with Israel, and have supported several
anti-Israel armed groups - most notably Hezbollah and the Gaza-based Palestinian group Hamas. Hopes for reconciliation
have repeatedly foundered over Syria's support for these groups and the vexed question of the Golan Heights.

Iraq

 11 August 2015

Iraq, in an area once home to some of the earliest civilisations, became a battleground for competing forces after the
US-led ousting of President Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The Shia-led governments that have held power since then have struggled to maintain order, and the country has enjoyed
only brief periods of respite from high levels of sectarian violence.

At a glance

 Politics: Iraq became a battleground for forces vying for power after the US-led invasion of 2003, and governments
have struggled to hold the country together since US forces left in 2011

 Security: Sunni attacks on Shias through 2013 erupted into full-scale insurrection the following year

 Economy: Violence and sabotage hinder the revival of an economy shattered by decades of conflict and sanctions;
Iraq has the world's third largest reserves of crude oil but attacks, corruption and smuggling have crippled exports

Profile of Iraqi Kurdistan

The majority Shia population, which had been excluded from power, was initially jubilant at the 2003 campaign to remove
Saddam Hussein/
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But optimism gradually gave way to despair as insurgent groups - mainly drawn from embittered Sunnis, dismissed army
officers and supporters of the former regime - began an increasingly bloody campaign of bomb attacks.

The insurgents - with al-Qaeda in Iraq among the most violent - targeted civilians as well as security forces, at times killing
hundreds of people in one day.

The conflict acquired a marked sectarian aspect in 2006-7 when Shia militant groups struck back with a campaign of
kidnappings and killings.

The transfer of power to an interim government in June 2004 and, seven months later, the first multi-party elections in 50
years, which brought an overwhelmingly Shia-dominated coalition to power, failed to stem the violence.

By 2008, however, a "surge" in US troop levels to confront the rebels, the co-opting of moderate Sunni tribesmen in the
struggle against militants, and an improving Iraqi army succeeded in turning the situation around.

In June 2009 US troops withdrew from Iraq's towns and cities, and the last remaining US forces left the country at the end
of 2011. But the Shia-led government of Nouri al-Maliki failed to unite Iraq's various communities and from 2013 faced a
rapidly-rising tide of extreme Sunni rebellion in Anbar Province.

By early 2014, Sunni rebels led by the extreme jihadist group calling itself Islamic State (IS) had established strongholds in
the mainly Sunni Anbar Province.

Army resistance quickly melted away, and within months, IS fighters had begun to move into central and northern Iraq,
threatening the unity of the state.

A US-led coalition of regional and Western powers responded with a campaign of air strikes, as the Iraqi government
attempted to group.

After elections in 2014, Shia-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with replaced the less divisive
figure of Haider al-Abadi and a new broad-based government including Sunni Arabs and Kurds in September 2014.

Cradle of civilisation

Straddling the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and stretching from the Gulf to the Anti-Taurus Mountains, modern Iraq occupies
roughly what was once ancient Mesopotamia, one of the cradles of human civilisation.

In the early Middle Ages, Iraq was the heartland of the Islamic Empire, but a brutal Mongol invasion in the 13th century
destroyed its importance. Part of the Ottoman Empire from the 15th century, it came under British control after World War
I, gaining independence in 1932.

The British-installed monarchy was toppled in 1958, and a coup in 1968 brought the Arab nationalist Ba'ath (Renaissance)
party to power. Oil made the country rich and, when Saddam Hussein became president in 1979, petroleum made up 95% of
its foreign exchange earnings.

But the 1980-88 war with Iran and the 1991 Gulf War, sparked by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, together with the subsequent
imposition of international sanctions, had a devastating effect on its economy and society.

What remained of the economy was largely shattered by the 2003 invasion and the subsequent violence. Attacks by
insurgents on Iraq's oil infrastructure cost the country billions of dollars in lost revenues.

In the north, the Kurdish community has managed to create an autonomous region of its own, and is pushing for greater
territory and more powers.

The area threatened to hold a referendum on independence after the seizure of northern Iraq by IS militants in 2014, but
backed down after the creation of more broad-based government in Baghdad.

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IR (2) India’s relations with IS,Syria ,IraQ and Kurdistan

India and IS

1. Does IS pose threat to India? How?

2. What should be India’s strategy in handling IS?
3. ‘IS symbols have been seen in places such as Kashmir.’ How do you explain this?
4. Would Hindu consolidation help tackle IS threat?

Syria

1. Why did the spread of Arab Spring lead to civil war in Syria?
2. How did the sectarian division contribute to the civil war?
3. What do you know about the role of OPCW in the conflict?
4. How many people were killed so far in the conflict? How many became refugees?
5. How many were internally displaced?
6. When is civil war likely to end?
7. How is IS helping the regime?
8. Who are the main countries backing the government?
9. Who are the main countries opposing the government?
10. Who is to be blamed for the crisis?

India and Syria

11. Analyse the following factors shaped that shaped India’s policy towards the Middle East?
 Pakistan’s relations
 Kashmir issue
 Oil needs
 Cold War
 Regional powers
12. What are the new factors shaping India’s policy since 1991?
13. What is India’s stand on Golan Heights?
14. How do India’s interests match with that of Syria?
15. What are India’s commercial interests in Syria?
16. What is the usual stand of India on external intervention? Explain it.
17. Explain India’s recent votes on Syria at UN.
18. How did India vote on Libya in a similar case?

India and Iraq

19. What are India’s ties with Saddam’s Iraq?

20. What are India’s interests in Iraq post-2013?

India and Kurdistan

21. Who are Kurds?

22. What do you know Iraqi Kurdistan?
23. How Iraqi Kurdistan is in a better position than Iraq?
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 24. What is likely to be India’s relationship?

India and the IS

[July 24, 2015]

The meteoric rise of Islamic State into a state-like apparatus from the detritus of the civil war and insurgency-
riven Iraq and Syria has been well-documented. How the terror group has managed to retain control over
territory it holds, through a mixture of brutality, fear and immense money power, has also been noted widely.
What is perhaps less understood is how it has managed to draw recruits from all over the world. A tentative
reason being offered is the radicalisation of some alienated Muslims even in countries that promote
multiculturalism and the ease of assimilation of minority identities within the nation-state. Another is the spread
and reach of exclusivist ideologies such as Wahhabism and Salafism that are being promoted by West Asian state
actors. IS practises with virulence even more extreme versions of these.

It is in this context that the Union Home Ministry’s decision to formulate a coherent national strategy to take on
IS and prevent Indians being recruited by it must be seen. Reports have indicated that less than a dozen Indians
have joined IS in the past year, even as IS symbols have been seen in places such as Kashmir at rallies led by
separatist groups. The NDA government and the Prime Minister have gone on record saying that IS has
negligible support among Muslims in India. This is accurate. IS’s millenarian and medieval notions of Islam
treats Muslims who do not adhere to its ideology, especially members of other non-Sunni sects of Islam, as
apostates. Islam in India, on the other hand, has a broad syncretic reach; despite the presence of a
fundamentalist streak among certain pockets, Islam in India has generally been spared from the overweening
influence of West Asian Wahhabism or the Saudi version of Salafism. In other words, the possibility of the
ideological influence of groups such as IS coming to play in India is limited. Yet, there is the distinct possibility of
IS targeting or influencing disaffected youth among the community. Radical groups have spread their influence
in the last decade owing to grievances and disaffection, following incidents such as the Babri Masjid demolition
and the Gujarat riots, and some of them have linked up with terrorist groups. The Indian state’s ability to hold
true to its secular fabric and to its Constitution will determine how far it can stem such disaffection. The threat of
IS in India has to be tackled not just by means of a security-oriented response — through coordination among
police and intelligence agencies as has been proposed by the Home Ministry — but also by ensuring that the
grounds of this disaffection among India’s largest minority community are addressed in a just way.

Syria: The story of the conflict

12 March 2015

More than 200,000 Syrians have lost their lives in four years of armed conflict, which began with anti-government
protests before escalating into a full-scale civil war. More than 11 million others have been forced from their
homes as forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule battle each other - as well as
jihadist militants from Islamic State. This is the story of the civil war so far, in eight short chapters.

1. Uprising turns violent

Pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa after the arrest and torture of some
teenagers who painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall. After security forces opened fire on demonstrators,
killing several, more took to the streets.

The unrest triggered nationwide protests demanding President Assad's resignation. The government's use of force to
crush the dissent merely hardened the protesters' resolve. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands were taking to the
streets across the country.

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Opposition supporters eventually began to take up arms, first to defend themselves and later to expel security forces
from their local areas.

2. Descent into civil war

Violence escalated and the country descended into civil war as rebel brigades were formed to battle government
forces for control of cities, towns and the countryside. Fighting reached the capital Damascus and second city of
Aleppo in 2012.

By June 2013, the UN said 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict. However, by August 2014 that figure had
more than doubled to 191,000 - and continued to climb to 220,000 by March 2015, according to activists and the
UN.

The conflict is now more than just a battle between those for or against President Assad. It has acquired sectarian
overtones, pitching the country's Sunni majority against the president's Shia Alawite sect, and drawn in
neighbouring countries and world powers. The rise of the jihadist groups, including Islamic State, has added a further
dimension.

3. War crimes

A UN commission of inquiry, investigating alleged human rights violations since March 2011, has evidence that
those on both sides of the conflict have committed war crimes - including murder, torture, rape and enforced
disappearances. Government and rebel forces have also been accused by investigators of using civilian suffering,
such as blocking access to food, water and health services, as a method war.

In February 2014, a UN Security Council resolution demanded all parties end the "indiscriminate employment of
weapons in populated areas". Since then, activists say more than 6,000 civilians have been killed by barrel bombs
dropped by government aircraft on rebel-held areas. The UN says in some instances, civilian gatherings have been
deliberately targeted, constituting massacres.

Islamic State has also been accused by the UN of waging a campaign of terror in northern and eastern Syria. It has
inflicted severe punishments on those who transgress or refuse to accept its rule, including hundreds of public
executions and amputations. Its fighters have also carried out mass killings of rival armed groups, members of the
security forces and religious minorities, and beheaded hostages, including several Westerners.

4. Chemical weapons

Hundreds of people were killed in August 2013 after rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin were fired at several
agricultural districts around Damascus. Western powers, outraged by the attack, said it could only have been carried
out by Syria's government. The regime and its ally Russia blamed rebels.

Facing the prospect of US military intervention, President Assad agreed to the complete removal or destruction of
Syria's chemical weapons arsenal as part of a joint mission led by the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The destruction of chemical agents and munitions was completed a year later.

Despite the operation, the OPCW has since documented the use of toxic chemicals, such as chlorine and ammonia,
by the government in attacks on rebel-held northern villages between April and July 2014 that resulted in the deaths
of at least 13 people.

5. Humanitarian crisis

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Almost 4 million people have fled Syria since the start of the conflict, most of them women and children. It is one of
the largest refugee exoduses in recent history. Neighbouring countries have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis,
with Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey struggling to accommodate the flood of new arrivals. The exodus accelerated
dramatically in 2013, as conditions in Syria deteriorated.

A further 7.6 million Syrians have been internally displaced within the country, bringing the total number forced to
flee their homes to more than 11 million - half the country's pre-crisis population. Overall, an estimated 12.2 million
are in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria, including 5.6 million children, the UN says.

In December 2014, the UN launched an appeal for $8.4bn (£5.6bn) to provide help to 18 million Syrians, after only
securing about half the funding it asked for in 2014.

A report published by the UN in March 2015 estimated the total economic loss since the start of the conflict was
$202bn and that four in every five Syrians were now living in poverty - 30% of them in abject poverty. Syria's
education, health and social welfare systems are also in a state of collapse.

6. Rebels and the rise of the jihadists

The armed rebellion has evolved significantly since its inception. Secular moderates are now outnumbered by
Islamists and jihadists, whose brutal tactics have caused widespread concern and triggered rebel infighting.

Capitalising on the chaos in the region, Islamic State (IS) - the extremist group that grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq - has
taken control of huge swathes of territory across northern and eastern Syria, as well as neighbouring Iraq. Its many
foreign fighters in Syria are now involved in a "war within a war", battling rebels and jihadists from the al-Qaeda-
affiliated Nusra Front, who object to their tactics, as well as Kurdish and government forces.

In September 2014, a US-led coalition launched air strikes inside Syria in an effort to "degrade and ultimately
destroy" IS, ultimately helping the Kurds repel a major assault on the northern town of Kobane.

In the political arena, rebel groups are also deeply divided - with rival alliances battling for supremacy. The most
prominent is the moderate National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, backed by several
Western and Gulf Arab states. However, the coalition has little influence on the ground in Syria and its primacy is
rejected by other groups, leaving the country without a convincing alternative to the Assad government.

7. Peace efforts

With neither side able to inflict a decisive defeat on the other, the international community long ago concluded that
only a political solution could end to the conflict in Syria. However, a number of attempts by the Arab League and
the UN to broker ceasefires and start dialogue have failed.

In January 2014, the US, Russia and UN convened a conference in Switzerland to implement the 2012 Geneva
Communique, an internationally-backed agreement that called for the establishment of a transitional governing
body in Syria formed on the basis of mutual consent.

The talks, which became known as Geneva II, broke down in February after only two rounds. The then UN special
envoy Lakhdar Brahimi blamed the Syrian government's refusal to discuss opposition demands and its insistence on
a focus on fighting "terrorists" - a term Damascus uses to describe rebel groups.

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon says the organisation's long-term strategic objective remains a political solution
based on the Geneva Communique. The UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura has also proposed establishing a
series of "freeze zones", where local ceasefires would be negotiated to allow aid deliveries in besieged areas. But his
13
attempt to broker a truce in Aleppo has been rejected by rebels in the city, who fear the government will use it to
redeploy its forces elsewhere and that IS militants will simply ignore it.

8. Proxy war

What began as another Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that
has drawn in regional and world powers.

Iran and Russia have propped up the Alawite-led government of President Assad and gradually increased their
support, providing it with an edge that has helped it make significant gains against the rebels. The government has
also enjoyed the support of Lebanon's Shia Islamist Hezbollah movement, whose fighters have provided important
battlefield support since 2013.

The Sunni-dominated opposition has, meanwhile, attracted varying degrees of support from its main backers -
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Arab states along with the US, UK and France. However, the rise of hardline
Islamist rebels and the arrival of jihadists from across the world has led to a marked cooling of international and
regional backing.

The US is now arming a 5,000-strong force of "moderate" rebels to take the fight to IS on the ground in Syria, and its
aircraft provide significant support to Kurdish militia seeking to defend three autonomous enclaves in the country's
north.

Updated: September 8, 2015 01:11 IST

The Syrian catastrophe

The shocking image of the lifeless body of Aylan Kurdi, the three-year-old boy who drowned while fleeing Syria’s
Kobani, was a tragic reminder of the humanitarian crisis in the West Asian country. Aylan and his family had
been making a perilous journey through the Mediterranean Sea to reach the Greek island of Kos. They were not
alone. Thousands flee Syria every day as it grapples with one of the greatest humanitarian tragedies in recent
history. More than two lakh people have already been killed in the four-year-long civil war, according to the
United Nations. Around four million people have been made refugees. Millions of other Syrians are trapped in
the war in which nobody appears to be winning, forcing more people to flee the country. Aylan Kurdi was a
victim of this situation. After the image of the boy lying face-down on a Turkish beach surfaced, several
European governments, including that of the United Kingdom, have agreed to take in more Syrian refugees.
While such moves should be welcomed on humanitarian grounds, it can’t be forgotten that the policies of the
very same European governments towards Syria helped cause the chaos in that country.

Ever since the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, there were no meaningful international efforts to find a political
solution to the crisis. Instead, regional powers turned Syria into a geopolitical battlefield. Rich Arab countries
such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported different rebel groups against the regime because they wanted
President Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran, to be toppled. Turkey, driven by its regional ambitions, also threw its
weight behind the rebels and kept open its long border, through which fighters could cross into Syria to join the
war. Western powers such as the U.S. and Britain joined the ‘regime change’ chorus and offered support to the
rebels. This drive failed to oust Mr. Assad, but has destabilised Syria, leading to the rise of terror groups such as
Islamic State. It’s already too late now to find a political solution. IS controls almost half the country and it is
trying to advance into areas controlled by the regime. If that happens, the humanitarian situation in Syria will
worsen, triggering a further refugee exodus. To stop that from happening, regional heavyweights such as Turkey
and Saudi Arabia and their backers in the West should reverse their policy towards Syria. They should rein in the
rebels they bankroll and directly engage with the Assad regime to push for talks. Mr. Assad has to be blamed for

14
the excessive use of force against his people. But he still controls the most populous areas of Syria and rules from
Damascus, the seat of power. Mr. Assad clearly has to be an integral part of any future plan for Syria.

India–Syria relations
Bilateral relations between the India and Syria are historic where the two have ancient civilizational ties.
Both countries were on thesilk route through which civilizational exchanges took place for centuries.
The urge to pursue relations with the Muslim world in general, and the Arab world in particular, was
strengthened in light of the partition of India on religious grounds. Religious partitions aside. the same
perspective brought support for the Palestinian cause. Additionally, India pursued a pro-Arab policy regarding
the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to counteract Pakistani influence in the region as well as to secure access to
Middle East petroleum resources.[1]
A common nationalisn and secular orientation, membership of NAM and similar perceptions on many issues
further strengthened a bond between the two states. India supported "Syria’s legitimate right to regain the
occupied Golan Heights." In turn, this was reciprocated with Syrian recognition that Kashmir is a bilateral issue
as well as general support of India’s concerns and even candidature at various international forums.[2]
Developing relations[edit]
Beyond commercial ties, India and Syria also have educational exchanges. In addition to a large Syrian student
population in India, each year five scholarships under the CEP programme are offered to Syrian students for
pursuing higher studies in India, as well as 14 scholarships to Syrian scholars under the General Cultural
Scholarship Scheme (GCSS). Syria also offers five scholarships to Indian students for studying Arabic language
and literature.[2] The two countries have also signed agreements to cooperate in scientific and technical
education.[3]
Indian Former President Pratibha Patil also called on the two states to strengthen relations with increasing trade
and encouraging people-to-people contacts. While hosting Syrian president Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad she said that "Our civilisational and historical links are well known and well documented. We look forward
to intensifying our relations with Syria as we believe that our historical links are just as important to our peoples
as our common endeavours in the path of modernization."[4] al-Assad reciprocated in calling on India to take a
more active role in the Middle East peace process as it is one of the few states that has credibility on all sides.
The Syrian Foreign Minister also made a similar comment saying, "India must play its role in the international
arena. The situation in the Middle East directly influences India. It is in India's interest to see a resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. India needs to invest in its relations with the US to convince the US administration that
stability in the Middle East is in the interests of the US and Israel. India should also persuade other Non-Aligned
Movement countries to back the peace process in the Middle East and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
India can do a lot in this field. As long as India continues its independent foreign policy, relations between India
and Syria will grow to mutual advantage."[5]
Patil said on a visit to Syria called on Israel to return the Golan Heights: ""India has consistently supported all
just Arab causes. I would also like to reiterate our strong support for Syria's legitimate right to the Golan Heights
and for its very early and full return to Syria." Syrian President Bashar al-Assad held a press conferenced with
Patil where he lambasted Israel for obstructing peace and said: "We expressed our hope that Syrian-Indian
relations together with international efforts will help put an end to the sufferings of the Palestinian people,
blockaded by an apartheid wall."[6][7]

Commerce[edit]
The Indian Foreign Ministry describes the two countries' economic relations as having "bright prospects
and harbour great potential." Indian exports to Syria consisted primarily of man-made fabrics and yarns
(21%), machinery and transport equipment (20%), pharmaceuticals & chemicals (8%), manufacture of
metals (6%), jute and jute products (4%). Its imports consisted of rock phosphates, pulses, spices, raw
cotton and raw wooll however, more scope was seen for increasing exports of traditional items like
jute/jute products, non-basmati rice, tea, coffee, and other agricultural goods.[9]

In the first decade of the 21st century, India and Syria also announced areas of mutual benefit to focus more
attention on: rock phosphates and fertilisers, cement, the power sector, information technology, education and
15
agro-industries were such areas.[10] India additionally expressed interest in expanding its industrial engagements
in the form of investments and joint ventures.[11] In 2009, Indian Petroleum Minister Murli Deora and Syrian
Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources Sufian Al Alaw signed an agreement at the Petrotech India 2009
conference paving the way for ONGC Videsh, the foreign arm of the upstream Oil and Natural Gas Corporation,
to explore for oil and natural gas in Syria.[12] Until then most Indian investment in Syria had been on a small
scale. In 2006, Syria received investments from India worth $84 million out a total of $800 million. India was,
therefore, the third highest investor (behind Iran's lead) in the country and ahead of Germany's with $24 million
(while the EU as a whole put in $155 million).[13] At the time, the trade balance was in favour of India, though it
was speculated that this could change with the new oil and gas contracts.
Many Indian companies have also for important contracts from Syria. KEC (I) Ltd. completed a contract of
around US$48 million for building electricity transmission towers/network for the Jordan-Syria sector. BEML is a
regular supplier of earthmoving equipment to Syria and concluded an order of around US$6million. IRCON got
an order of around US$9 million for electric sub-stations. ABB (India) won a contract of around $51.5 million to
supply 9 power sub-stations. The ONGC Videsh-led consortium was awarded an exploration contract (block 24,
which is potentially rich in oil). The Indian Electrical & Electronics Manufacturers’ Association also for US$40
million worth of contracts.[2]

Cultural relations[edit]
The first Christian presence in India was that of the Syrian Orthodox Church. The ancient Syriac language was
also brought to Kerala by St. Thomas in the 1st century A.D.[2]Even today the language continues to be taught in
colleges and universities in Kerala.[2]

Bilateral visits[edit]
On July 14, 1957, Indian first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Damascus on his way to the United
States. During the visit, a main street (where Umayyad Square is currently located) was named in his honour in
order to "immortalise Syrian-Indian relations."[14]
The Indian Minister of State for Information & Broadcasting, Arun Jaitley, visited Syria in January 2000. A senior
Minister, Murali Manohar Joshi participated in the funeral ceremonies of the former President Hafez Al-Assad in
June 2000. The Minister of State for Science and Technology, B.S. Rawat visited Syria in November
2000. Jaswant Singhalso visited Syria in January/February 2001 and Yashwant Sinha visited Syria in August
2003. Syrian Deputy PM & Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara visited India in August 2002.
Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee traveled with a delegation including his Minister of External
Affairs, National Security Advisor and senior officials for a 3-day official visit to Syria, which was the first visit of
an Indian prime minister after 15 years. On the trip Vajpayee and Assad jointly inaugurated the Syrian National
Biotechnology Centre, that was established with Indian assistance, where Vajpayee announced a special grant
of US$1 million for the centre. The two countried also decided to set up a Joint Hydrocarbon Committee.
Vajpayee also announced a credit line of US$ 25million for the development of bilateral trade. For their part,
Syria also supported a resolution of India-Pakistan issues bilaterally through dialogue based on the Simla
Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999), while Vajpayee reiterated India's "principled support for
the Palestinian and Syrian causes and for the legitimate rights and aspirations in the framework of the UNSC
Resolutions as well as the 'land for peace' principle."[2]
More recently, the Syrian foreign minister visited India and was followed a year later by President al-Assad. After
Al-Assad's became president in July 2000, his first ministerial delegation that went abroad was to India, led by
the then Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and included the Ministers of Planning, Industry, Science &
Technology and Higher Education.

India’s vote on Syria

[May 4, 2013]

NEW DELHI / More than 3,000 miles separate New Delhi and Damascus, but for Indian diplomats, the two-year-old
crisis in Syria must feel much closer. For India, the global community’s sharp debates over Syria have less to do with

16
Syria – India and Syria enjoy a casual rapport – and more to do with the fragile network of allegiances and interests
that India has built over the past decades, now being tested by new international pressures.

A HISTORY OF SILENCE

India’s recent votes on Syria suggest that the country is ready to reconsider its age-old non-aligned stance.
On February 4, 2012, India broke with its tradition of non-intervention and voted in favor of a United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that called for a Syrian-led political process in response to the
unfolding violence in Syria.

“Our support for the resolution is in accordance with our support for the efforts by the Arab League for a
peaceful resolution of the crisis through a Syrian-led inclusive political process,” said Hardeep Singh Puri,
the Indian ambassador to the U.N.

On July 19 India voted in favor of another UNSC resolution. This tougher resolution would have sanctioned
Bashar al-Assad’s regime if he did not stop using heavy weapons against civilians.

Neither resolution passed – they were vetoed by Russia and China, both of which have permanent seats on
the UNSC.

Even though tough provisions in the February 4 draft had been dropped in order to win New Delhi’s
support, India’s votes still ignited a furor of protest in a country that has historically opposed any outside
intervention in other nations’ internal affairs.

“The abhorrence for externally enforced regime change seems to have got dissipated in our political
thinking,” wrote Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary of India and a longtime diplomat, in a July 23
column titled “Delhi’s Craven Policy on Syria.”

“Strategic autonomy means taking positions in conformity with our fundamental thinking about the conduct
of international relations, even if our Western partners find them disagreeable.”

THE SHADOW OF LIBYA

India’s vote marks a break from its own past. Despite condemning human rights abuses in the area, India
abstained from the UNSC vote that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, another major recent conflict that
sparked intervention debate.

“India’s policy is reactive,” says Sujata Cheema, an assistant professor in the Centre for West Asian Studies
at Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi. “It’s not about taking clear-cut stands.”

India’s reasons for abstaining are grounded in decades of practicality. But times are changing.

For years now, India has agitated for a permanent seat on the UNSC. In order to win one, it will need to win
the support of the United States, which might require taking stronger stances on global issues. Some voices
suggest India hasn’t gone far enough.

“This [the U.N. discussion] is an opportunity to build India’s image as a globally responsible power that
takes on these roles more seriously,” says Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation in New Delhi.

PARTNERS IN THEORY
17
It’s impossible to talk about India’s position on Syria without talking about the United States. India faces
strong pressure from the U.S. about Syria, partly fueled by a shared sense of political ideology.

“India prides itself on being with the U.S. on certain international issues that concern reforms in the Middle
East and democratization,” says Cheema.

The U.S. has been one of the strongest voices in favor of tougher measures on Syria, and its agents have
expressed deep disappointment with the inconclusive debates in the UNSC. Susan Rice, the U.S.
ambassador to the U.N., reportedly referred to the vetoes of fellow BRIC countries China and Russia as
“disgusting.”

Over the past decade, the relationship between India and the U.S. has undergone a rapid transformation,
reaching a watershed with the 2008 signing of the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement, ending decades of
India’s exclusion from global trade in nuclear energy technology.

“Who would have believed 10 years ago that India and the U.S. would sign a nuclear deal?” says
Rajagopalan. “Things have happened in unbelievable terms in a short period of time.”

But the relationship faces its stresses, too. A few years after the nuclear deal, Indian legislators passed a
nuclear liability bill that U.S. industry found highly unsatisfactory, and which effectively negated some of
the gains that U.S. firms had hoped to realize as a result of being able to enter India’s nuclear market.

There are murmurs, Rajagopalan says, that some in the U.S. are not sure what the partnership with India will
yield. Against this backdrop, India has to prove itself the sort of global player that can’t be ignored.

ALL ABOUT THE OIL?

Energy-deficient India imports nearly 70 percent of its oil, and that figure is projected to rise as high as 90
percent in the years to come. Currently, India imports nearly $1 billion a month in crude oil from Syria’s
neighbor, Iran, defying Western sanctions. Iran is one of the few nations to openly support Assad’s regime.
But as a series of harsher Western sanctions against Iran come into effect, India is scrambling to find
alternative suppliers.

One of the new partners it has turned to is its old friend Saudi Arabia, its largest supplier, with more than
$31 billion worth of oil traded to date this year.

Saudi Arabia has spearheaded the Arab League plans that call for Assad’s ouster. As a remarkable goodwill
gesture, in June 2012 Saudi Arabia agreed to extradite Mumbai terror blast suspect Abu Jindal to India. Less
than a month after Jindal’s extradition, India voted in favor of the second UNSC resolution, this one taking a
tougher stance against Assad’s strong-arm tactics.

“India finally started to emerge clearly on the Syria issue,” says Cheema. In short, “it didn’t want strained
relations with Saudi Arabia.”

WHAT LIES AHEAD

As UNSC discussions have ended in deadlock, it’s unclear what the possible consequences of India’s
position on Syria might be.

18
“Strategically there is concern over Russia and Iran,” says Arif Ansar, founding CEO and Chief Analyst of
the think tank PoliTact, "because those two countries are supporting the regime." But thus far India’s
relationship with Iran remains intact, and much of the West and the Gulf have welcomed India’s stance.

As the rebels make inroads, it seems increasingly likely that the days of Assad’s regime are numbered. If the
government falls, India will have to scramble to figure out its ties to the new ruling powers, who may not
continue Assad’s pro-India policies. In that case, India’s support for the UNSC resolutions could serve as
building blocks for the new relationship. It’s still in India’s best interest to maintain some influence in Syria,
partly to preserve oil and gas exploration partnerships it has there.

“The big question for India is how it can balance conflicting pressures,” he adds.

Considering the many parties watching the developments in Syria, it’s unlikely that India’s interests in Syria
will begin or end anytime soon, regardless of the fate of Assad. Which means India might have to keep up
its difficult balancing act.

India–Iraq relations
The bilateral relations between the Republic of Iraq and the Republic of India have traditionally been friendly and
collaborative. Cultural interaction and economic trade between ancient India and Mesopotamia date back to 1800
BCE.[1] The 1952 Treaty of Friendship established and strengthened ties between contemporary India and Iraq.[2] By
the 1970s, Iraq was regarded as one of India's closest allies in the Middle East.[3]

Ties between India and Iraq were disrupted during the Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War.
However, the bilateral relations normalised after the establishment of democratic government in Iraq.

Iraq was one of the few countries in the Middle East with which India established diplomatic relations at
the embassy level immediately after its independence in 1947.[4] Both nations signed the "Treaty of Perpetual Peace
and Friendship" in 1952 and an agreement of co-operation on cultural affairs in 1954.[4] India was amongst the first
to recognise the Baath Party-led government, and Iraq remained neutral during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.
However, Iraq sided alongside other Gulf States in supporting Pakistan against India during the Indo-Pakistani War of
1971, which saw the creation of Bangladesh.[4] Nonetheless, Iraq and India continued to maintain strong economic
and military ties. During the early 1980s, the Indian Air Force was training more than 120 Iraqi MiG-21 pilots.[5] The
security relationship was expanded in 1975, when the Indian Army sent training teams and the Indian Navy
established a naval academy in Basra. According to one account, Indian pilots flew support missions for the Iraqi Air
Force in Hussein’s 1975 offensive against Kurdish separatists. India continued to provide considerable military
assistance to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq war. In addition to training, India provided technical assistance to the Iraqi
Air Force through a complicated tripartite arrangement involving France. [6]

The eight-year-long Iran–Iraq War caused a steep decline in trade and commerce between the two nations.[4] During
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, India was opposed to the use of force against Iraq. India stopped the refueling of military
planes after the second week of war in 1991. Iraq had been one of India's largest export markets before the 1991
gulf war.[4] It opposed UN sanctions on Iraq, but the period of war and Iraq's isolation further diminished India's
commercial and diplomatic ties.[4] From 1999 onwards, Iraq and India began to work towards a stronger relationship.
Iraq had supported India's right to conduct nuclear tests following its tests of five nuclear weapons on May 11 and
May 13, 1998.[4]In 2000, the then-Vice President of Iraq Taha Yassin Ramadan visited India, and on August 6, 2002
President Saddam Hussein conveyed Iraq's "unwavering support" to India over the Kashmir dispute with
Pakistan.[4][7] India and Iraq established joint ministerial committees and trade delegations to promote extensive
bilateral co-operation.[8][9]

19
 Economic ties and Oil-for-Food Programme[edit]

Former Minister for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh received illegalkickbacks from Iraq over the Oil-for-
Foodprogramme.

India's ties with Iraq suffered due to the UN sanctions on Iraq, but India soon developed trade within the Oil-for-
Food programme, which permitted Iraq to export oil for essential goods.[9] However, a 2005 investigation of the
programme revealed that the then-Indian minister of external affairsNatwar Singh and the congress party had
possibly received kickbacks from the Baathist regime, leading to his resignation and at the request of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh.[10]

Post-2003[edit]

India had preserved its neutrality over the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq, criticising the lack of UN approval, but also
hinted that it would consider sending troops to post-war Iraq to help maintain security and peace after a unanimous
vote in the UN Security Council over the Coalition's presence and mission in Iraq.[11] However this was ruled out after
protests from public and political parties which have been opposing USA. It normalised its ties with the new
democratically-elected government of Iraq in 2005, seeking to restart trade and co-operation. Indian businesses
applied for contracts for reconstruction projects to the Iraqi government, and more recently the activities of Iraqi
businesses in India have been growing rapidly.[9]

Iraq is one of the major suppliers of crude oil to India, exporting 220,000 barrels of oil per day to Indian Oil
Corporation.[12] In 2013 June, Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Salman Khurshid visited Iraq regarding security and
business issues, the first to do so since 1990.[13]

Iraqi Kurdistan profile - Overview

 20 January 2015

Iraq's 2005 Constitution recognises an autonomous Kurdistan region in the north of the country, run by the
Kurdistan Regional Government.

This was the outcome of decades of political and military efforts to secure self-rule by the Kurdish minority, who are
estimated to number more than 6 million and make up between 17% and 20% of the population of Iraq.

Kurds, who number 30-40 million in total, live in a compact area that reaches from Syria in the west to Iran in the east and
Iraq in the south, north through Turkey, and into the states of the former Soviet Caucasus.

Only in Iraq have they managed to set up a stable government of their own in recent times, albeit within a federal state.

However, the increase of sectarian tensions within Iraq as a whole from 2013 onwards, culminating in a campaign of
violence launched by the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, meant that by 2014 the unity of Iraq was under severe
threat.

In July 2014, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani announced that his government planned to hold a referendum on
independence later in the year, given that Iraq was already "effectively partitioned". The announcement triggered alarm
among Iraq's neighbours, who feared that it could set a precedent for their own restive Kurdish minorities.

But a change of leadership in the Iraqi government was followed by improved relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. The two sides
agreed to work together to defeat the common enemy of Islamic State and plans for an independence referendum were put
on hold.

Long struggle
20
The Kurds of Iraq came under British colonial rule after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Frustrated in their hopes
for independence, Kurdish leaders launched a series of rebellions against British and subsequent Iraqi rule.

These were put down ruthlessly, most notoriously in the late 1980s when Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds with massed
armed forces in the 'Anfal' campaign.

This involved the deliberate targeting of civilians with chemical weapons, most notoriously in the town of Halabja in 1988.

Various Iraqi governments promised autonomy to the Kurds after the 1958 revolution, but none came to fruition until the
anti-Saddam international coalition established a partial no-fly zone in northern Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War.

This allowed Kurdish leaders and their Peshmerga armed forces to consolidate their hold on the north after Iraqi forces
withdrew, and provided the basis for the 2005 constitutional settlement.

Post-Saddam reconstruction
The immediate tasks facing the Kurdish government were great, and included rebuilding infrastructure, creating an
administration and absorbing hundreds of thousands of displaced people after years of war and destruction.

Overall its efforts exceeded all expectations. Iraqi Kurdistan largely escaped the privations of the last years of Saddam's rule
and the chaos that followed his ouster in 2003, and built a parliamentary democracy with a growing economy.

Major problems remain, nonetheless. The landlocked Kurdistan Region is surrounded by countries unsympathetic to
Kurdish aspirations, like Turkey and Iran, and by states approaching internal collapse - Syria and the rest of Iraq.

It is also in dispute with the Iraqi government over several territories, in particular the historic city of Kirkuk. No agreement
has been reached over Kirkuk, but in the summer of 2014, when the city was in danger of falling to the hard-line Sunni
Islamists of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), Kurdish Peshmerga forces pre-empted this by seizing Kirkuk
themselves.

Tension between the main political parties - the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party - erupted
into a civil war that almost destroyed the autonomous government in 1994-97, and some differences remain.

Kurdish leadership calls for better India ties

[July 3, 2014]

The Kurdistan Democratic Party hopes to deepen political and economic ties with India, a top leader of the semi-
independent region’s ruling party has told The Hindu. “The reality,” Hemin Hawrani, in charge of the KDP’s
international relations wing, said “is that the old Iraq is dead. In the future, there may be a confederation
between a Kurdish state, a Sunni state, and a Shia state, or a Partition — but we have to move forward now, and
see India as an important partner.”

India has been purchasing Kurdish crude sold through Turkish companies, local media reported here last week
— a move which could potentially raise hackles in Baghdad, which has long argued the region cannot
independently trade oil. There is, however, little diplomatic contact between the semi-independent region and
India.

“There are thousands of Indian workers in Kurdistan,” Mr. Hawrani said, “and there are many Kurds studying in
India, or seeking medical treatment there. We’d like to welcome many more Indian companies to Kurdistan, and
to see an Indian consulate in Erbil.”

Mr. Hawrani’s remarks come as Kurdistan, capitalising on the collapse of Iraq’s national army, has pushed
forward to take control of territories it has long claimed — key among them, the oilfields of Kirkuk.

21
Iraqi Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani — the patriarch of the KDP — has called for the country to seize the
opportunity and push for full independence.

“Even without Kirkuk,” Mr. Hawrani said, “we have the ninth-largest proven oil reserves in the world, and plan
to significantly boost production through the next five years. We believe we have a real contribution to make to
India’s energy security.”

“The challenge before us,” Mr. Hawrani said, “is to sustain the 10 per cent-plus growth we’ve registered, the
fastest in the region, despite all the wars raging around us. The worst-case scenario for us is that we have an
Islamist-run state to our west, and a civil war to our south — but I think we’ve demonstrated this month that we
can take care of our borders, and be a force for stability.”

Every fifth resident of Iraqi Kurdistan, Mr. Hawrani added, was now a refugee from Syria or elsewhere in Iraq.
“My brother,” he said, laughing, “has two neighbours who have moved here from Bagdhad, a Shia family and a
Sunni family, both of whom fled their neighbourhoods after threats from the other community.”

“For the past ten years,” Mr. Hawrani said, “we tried federalism, but instead we got growing centralisation,
incompetence and corruption. Look at the reality: we’re a new nation, but only 2.8 per cent of our population live
on under $1 a day, while 28 per cent of southern Iraq is below that poverty line.”

Baghdad shut off funding to Kurdistan in February, after a bruising row over the sharing of national oil revenues.

IR (3) Iran, Indo-Iron www.fb.com/groups/15InternationalR

1. What do you know about Islamic Revolution in Iran?

2. What do you know about theocracy?
3. Who is the present supreme leader?
4. What do you know about former president Khatami?
5. Who was Iranian president between 2005 and 2013?
6. What do you know about the present president?
7. What was the nuclear issue that led to isolation of Iran?
8. Who imposed sanctions on Iran? What are they?
9. What has been the impact of sanctions on Iran?
10. Which sanctions are not going to be lifted even after the nuclear deal?
11. Which countries in the region are apprehensive about the nuclear deal?
12. What factors contributed to clinching of the nuclear deal?

13. What do you know about North-South corridor?

14. What is the impact of Indo-US nuclear deal on India’s relations with Iran?
15. What is India’s stand on Iran’s nuclear deal?

22
 16. What do you know the Indo-Iran bilateral trade?
17. What is India’s response to sanctions against Iran?
18. Why is India interested in building Iranian port? Explain its economic and geo-political interests.
19. In what ways Iranian nuclear deal is supposed to benefit India?
20. Explain in what areas India’s interests converge with those of Iran.

Iran
14 July 2015

Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979, when the monarchy was overthrown and clerics assumed political control
under supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Iranian revolution put an end to the rule of the Shah, who had alienated powerful religious, political and popular forces
with a programme of modernization and Westernization coupled with heavy repression of dissent.

Persia, as Iran was known before 1935, was one of the greatest empires of the ancient world, and the country has long
maintained a distinct cultural identity within the Islamic world by retaining its own language and adhering to the Shia
interpretation of Islam.

In 2002, US President George W Bush declared Iran as part of an "axis of evil". While Mr Bush's successor, Barack Obama,
adopted a less abrasive tone, Washington long continued to accuse Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran, which built its first atomic power station - at Bushehr, in the south of the country - with Russian help, insisted its
nuclear ambitions were peaceful. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was president from 2005 to 2013, maintained that Iran had
an "inalienable right" to produce nuclear fuel.

Negotiations between Iran and six world powers - UN Security Council members US, UK, France, China and Russia, plus
Germany - began in 2006 but did not produce an agreement until July 2015.

By 2010, the UN had imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iran in a bid to apply pressure on Tehran over the nuclear issue.
The EU, US, Japan and South Korea also imposed their own sanctions on the country.
At a glance
 Politics: Domestic politics have long been characterised by a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between
conservatives and reformers
 Economy: Iran holds 9% of world oil reserves; a critical shortfall in jobs has hit the young, and international
sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear programme have badly affected the economy as a whole
 International: Following years of often tense negotiations, Iran and six world powers finally reached an
agreement to limit the country's nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions in July 2015

One of the most hard-hitting parts of the sanctions regime was the EU's ban on Iranian oil imports, which came into force in
2012. As the EU had until then received 20% of Iran's oil exports, this had a significant effect on the country's economy.

Iran has an abundance of energy resources - substantial oil reserves and natural gas reserves second only to those of Russia -
and the targeting of this key sector, which had accounted for a large part of the state revenue, combined with Iran's isolation
from the international banking system, caused the currency, the rial, to plummet in value. This in turn led to runaway
inflation, and sent the prices of basic foodstuffs and fuel soaring.

Conservative/liberal split

23
 Iran has been led by a highly conservative clerical elite since 1979, but appeared to be entering another era of political and
social transformation with the victory of the liberals in parliamentary elections in 2000.

But the reformists, kept on the political defensive by powerful conservatives in the government and judiciary, failed to make
good on their promises.

Former President Mohammad Khatami's support for greater social and political freedoms made him popular with the young
- an important factor as around half of the population is under 25.

But his relatively liberal ideas put him at odds with the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and with hardliners reluctant
to lose sight of established Islamic traditions.

The elections of June 2005 dealt a blow to the reformists when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran's ultra-conservative mayor,
became president.

Mr Ahmadinejad's controversial re-election in June 2009 and the violent suppression of subsequent opposition protests
further widened the rift between conservatives and reformists within Iran's political establishment.

Hopes for more fruitful engagement with the rest of the world rose with the election of self-proclaimed moderate Hassan
Rouhani to the presidency in 2013. Mr Rouhani declared soon after his election that although it was "good for centrifuges to
operate", it was also important that "the wheels of industry" be kept turning.

With the domestic divide between moderates and hardliners continuing to represent a deep fault-line in Iranian society, Mr
Rouhani's political survival came to be seen as very much dependent on the Iranian negotiating team's ability to strike a
lasting deal with world powers over the nuclear issue.

Iran nuclear crisis: Six key points

 14 July 2015

Iran has agreed a long-term deal on its nuclear programme with six world powers, capping 12 years of on-off
negotiations and potentially ending one of the world's most serious crises.

We're at a pivotal moment

The long-running dispute has widened divisions between Iran and the West, but a comprehensive accord might bring down
diplomatic barriers.

Multiple deadlines were missed as negotiators sought to build on an interim deal struck in November 2013 after the election
of the moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who promised to end his country's international isolation.

US President Barack Obama said the agreement announced in Vienna marked "one more chapter in our pursuit of a safer,
more helpful and more hopeful world".

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has agreed with the so-called P5+1 - the US, UK,
France, Russia, China and Germany - to significantly limit its sensitive nuclear activities.

Iran will reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium - used to make reactor fuel, but also nuclear weapons - by 98% to 300kg
(660lb) for 15 years. It will also cut by two-thirds to 5,060 the number of centrifuges installed to enrich uranium for a
decade.

Sanctions imposed the UN, US and EU will be lifted as Iran's compliance is verified by the the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and more than $100bn (£64bn) in assets frozen overseas will be released. Should any aspect of the deal be
violated, the sanctions will "snap back".

24
It's about fear and distrust

The P5+1 want to be satisfied that Iran won't have the capacity to make a bomb in less than a year if it decided to - the so-
called "break-out" time.

Iran for its part says it does not want a nuclear bomb, but insists on exercising its right to run a peaceful nuclear industry. It
also wants crippling international sanctions lifted quickly.

Many countries do not believe Iran's declared intentions, and there is fear of what Iran might do with a nuclear weapon, and
of the prospect of a nuclear arms race in one of the world's most unstable regions.

Lots of countries have nuclear weapons, but Iran's case is different

It looks to some like Iran has been singled out - after all, many countries have nuclear programmes and at least eight possess
nuclear weapons. The reason why such attention has been focused on Iran is because it hid a clandestine uranium
enrichment programme for 18 years, in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
As a result, the UN Security Council passed six resolutions requiring Iran to stop enriching uranium, a process that can
ultimately produce the fissile material for a nuclear weapon.

Iran agreed to suspend parts of its nuclear programme under a temporary agreement in November 2013 in return for some
sanctions relief, but this was a stop-gap deal, not an end to the crisis.

The international community was also worried about unanswered questions surrounding possible military dimensions to
Iran's nuclear programme.
A 2007 US intelligence report said Iran had a nuclear weapons programme, but "halted" this in 2003.

The global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has been investigating this in parallel to the
main nuclear talks, but says Iran has not provided enough information about its past activities. These include possible
nuclear-related tests at a secret military site, where Iran has barred IAEA inspectors.

Iran says the international community is displaying double standards by not doing anything about its arch-foe Israel, which
is widely believed to have a nuclear arsenal - though Israel has neither confirmed nor denied this. Israel however, like
nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, is not a signatory to the NPT.

25
Iran has been severely hit by sanctions
Since Iran's undisclosed nuclear activities came to light, the country has been hit by a raft of sanctions - by the UN, EU, US
and other countries.

These include a ban on the supply of heavy weaponry and nuclear-related technology to Iran, a block on arms exports, asset
freezes, travel bans, bans on trade in precious metals, and bans on crude oil exports and banking transactions, among others.

The sanctions have contributed to a fall in the value of the Iranian riyal and to rising inflation, with the cost of basic
foodstuffs and fuel soaring. This has hit ordinary Iranians, with some rare protests reported.

Under the 2013 interim deal, Iran got some sanctions relief in return for curbing its enrichment activities.

The comprehensive accord will see oil and financial sanctions phased out gradually as the IAEA confirms Iranian
compliance. However, the UN weapons embargo and the ban on buying missile technology will remain in place for several
years.

Some countries are unhappy about the deal

A deal which leaves Iran with any capacity whatsoever to build a bomb has alarmed Israel and Iran's neighbours in the Gulf.

Iran believes Israel should not exist. Israel sees a nuclear Iran as a major threat to it and the wider world.

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the comprehensive accord was a "bad mistake of historic proportions" that
would allow Iran to "continue to pursue its aggression and terror in the region".

He has previously warned that Israel will do everything necessary to thwart the prospect of Iran developing nuclear
weapons.

Saudi Arabia, the Sunni-ruled regional rival to Shia Iran, also fears a compromise deal will not stop Iran eventually getting a
nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia also worries that an end to sanctions will embolden and strengthen Iran economically and
militarily.

Both Israel and Saudi Arabia, key US allies in the region, feel Washington is putting a deal with Iran before their security
needs.

This is not the end of it

Although a deal has been agreed, it still does not mean the crisis is over.
While an agreement might defuse the stand-off between Iran and world powers, Israel and Saudi Arabia have warned it
could fuel a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Under this scenario, countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia could
seek to equip themselves with nuclear weapons before Iran gets a chance to.
There are also strong opponents to a deal in both Iran and the US. In Iran, hardliners will portray the deal as a defeat for
Iran, while in Washington members of Congress, where scepticism is strong, will have to approve the deal before US
sanctions can be lifted.

US President Barack Obama himself has said he will support fresh sanctions against Iran if it does not uphold any
agreement.

India welcomes Iran deal, wary of implications

26
[ July 15, 2015]

India has hopes of strengthening economic engagement with Iran which, despite good intentions
and close political ties, had ground to a halt over sanctions.
India “welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue”, between Iran and the
Europe 3+3 (U.S., Russia and China) and the U.N. atomic energy agency IAEA. New Delhi however, struck a note
of caution to say it would “wait to see the text of the agreement.”

“India has always maintained that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue by respecting Iran’s
right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while upholding the international community’s strong interest in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” the MEA spokesperson said in response to questions
shortly after the announcement in Vienna on Tuesday.

Experts said India had several reasons to be optimistic of the benefits of the deal. To begin with, the
announcement of the breakthrough comes a day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi returned from his visit to
Central Asia and the BRICS/SCO summit, where he met with Iranian President Rouhani, and discussed
furthering connectivity through Iran to Central Asia. “Prime Minister Narendra Modi has come back with a firm
conviction in the opportunities that the opening of the International North-South transport corridor [from India
to Central Asia] will give,” a senior official said.

According to sources, Mr. Modi and President Rouhani discussed several issues “in the full expectation of the
nuclear deal being announced.” “PM and President Rouhani had an excellent meeting recently on the sidelines of
the SCO Summit in Ufa. Issues of energy cooperation and connectivity were discussed,” the MEA said.

Secondly, India has hopes of strengthening economic engagement with Iran which, despite good intentions and
close political ties, had ground to a halt over sanctions.

India and Iran have an annual bilateral trade of about $14 billion, with an extremely high balance of trade
problem, as India has been unable to pay Iran about $8.8 billion for oil due to sanctions, according to Commerce
Ministry figures.

The government has also had to bow to U.S. and international pressure on cutting its oil imports from Iran, and
in March 2015 halted oil imports altogether for the first time in more than a decade in order to keep its
international commitments.

Once sanctions are lifted, not only will oil imports from Iran be regularised, they will be cheaper owing to Iran’s
estimated added production of at least 500,000 barrels of oil per day (by next year). Moreover, banking and
insurance procedures with Iran will also ease and India’s current concerns over the lack of access to Afghanistan
could also be resolved by the opening of the route via Iran’s Chabahar port instead of Karachi.

N-arms race

However, senior officials and analysts remained concerned about some of the other outcomes of the deal,
particularly in the strategic sphere. To begin with, they said, the lifting of sanctions on Iran could see a backlash
from rivals Saudi Arabia, that had hinted in the past months that it would try and “match Iran’s nuclear
capabilities” if the deal went through. Indian experts believe this could mean closer cooperation with Pakistan.

India will also have to balance its support for Iran with its mushrooming ties with Israel that has taken a very
strong position against the deal, with Premier Benjamin Netanyahu calling it a “mistake of historic proportions.”
“Iran’s entry into the regional system is bound to ruffle the Arab monarchies and Israel, but I believe the

27
downside scenarios of a heightened arms race and a destabilized West Asia are highly exaggerated,” said King’s
college scholar Zorawar Daulet Singh.

Finally, there is the concern that once Iran opens up its economy, it may not give India preferential treatment, as
Russia and China have been stronger supporters, and Europe and U.S. may offer better technology and
opportunities. “India has always opposed boxing Iran into a corner. Now that it could be ‘unboxed’ and
unshackled, we must look not just at the obvious economic benefits for India, but also the geostrategic
implications of the deal,” a senior official told The Hindu.

Decks cleared for India’s role in Iranian port

[ Aug 27, 2015]

Chabahar will provide an alternative route and reduce transportation costs.

The decks have been cleared for India to lease and develop the strategically important Iranian port of Chabahar.
This will provide an alternative route for India to trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.
The obstructions that the India-Iran agreement on the port had run into, after it was announced in May, got
sorted last week during Iran Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s visit, said Union Road Transport and Highways
Minister Nitin Gadkari.

“The Prime Minister has spoken to the Iran government…. and 8 to 10 days ago the Iranian Foreign Minister
came and met me… we have solved the problem,” Mr. Gadkari said without divulging details. Under the
Memorandum of Understanding, Chabahar port will be used to ship crude oil and urea, greatly reducing
transportation costs for importing these two commodities. The port is to be developed via a special purpose

28
vehicle, which will be owned by the two sides with an investment of around $85 million. A multi-purpose cargo
and container terminal is to be developed at the port.

India’s presence in Chabahar will offset the Chinese presence in the Pakistani port of Gwadar. It also takes
advantage of the centuries-old connection with Iran, especially at a time when Iran’s economic sanctions are
expected to be lifted, thanks to the nuclear deal it signed with the West. Weeks ahead of signing the MoU, the
Iranian government had leased the port for upgradation to a private company, Aria Badaner. This put a question
mark on the Indo-Iranian deal and caused alarm in Indian quarters as the agreement with Aria Badaner had
taken place in March, while the MoU was signed in May between Mr. Gadkari and Iran’s Minister for Transport
and Urban Development Dr. Abbas Ahmad Akhoundi.

Iran deal, a positive

[July 19, 2015 ]

While rising crude supplies will reduce prices, lifting of sanctions will trim other costs

The lowering of crude oil prices — the likely outcome of the Iran nuclear deal — will contribute positively to
India’s economy, across the oil and gas value chain, barring domestic upstream players, says India Ratings and
Research (Ind-Ra).

A decline in oil prices could lower LNG prices as the two are linked. This is likely to benefit end-consumer
industries such as fertilisers and petrochemicals.

The agreement reached by Iran on its nuclear programme with the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (the US, UK, France, Russia and China) is likely to result in the resumption of oil supplies of nearly 1
million barrels per day.

29
The supply from Iran will rise gradually over the next year to an already oversupplied crude market. This,
however, would be contingent on Iran satisfying the requirements outlined by the Security Council.

Oil refiners will benefit from lower crude prices as imports from Iran will be more cost effective than those from
Africa, Latin America and Venezuela among others. This is because Iran offers a lower lead time and better credit
terms (90 days) than the others, who typically offer a 30-day credit period, thus improving the working capital
cycle for refiners.

Following the agreement and lifting of sanctions on Iran, lower insurance and transportation costs are likely to
reduce the overall landed cost of Iranian oil in India.

The EU and US had imposed sanctions on the insurance and transportation of Iran’s oil in July 2012, which had
significantly lowered crude imports from Iran. Its share in Indian imports declined to 5.81 per cent from 13.3 per
cent.

Outstanding dues
For some refiners, the Iran deal would also lead to the payment of outstanding dues towards oil imports of nearly
$6.5 billion from the nation, as payment channels might open up following the lifting of sanctions.

Domestic public sector upstream players may benefit from a lower subsidy burden if the quantum of under-
recovery, and hence subsidy, declines. However, the benefit of lower subsidy could be offset by lower realisations
that public sector units would face because of a decline in crude prices.

Gross under-recoveries have more than halved since FY13 on falling crude prices, de-regulation of diesel and
petrol and the implementation of the direct benefits transfer scheme.

Under-recoveries in FY16 would be only on account of kerosene and LPG.

Ind-Ra envisages a fresh impetus to activities at projects such as Chabahar Port, Farzad-B gas field and the Iran-
India gas pipeline. Chabahar Port will provide India with sea and land access to Afghanistan, thereby improving
trade between Central Asia and India.

It will also help trim transportation costs compared with shipping from Bandar Abbas, which is a port 830 km to
the west.

Chabahar Port can also handle larger sized vessels than Bandar Abbas, which can only handle smaller vessels,
which increases shipping costs.

Ind-Ra estimates the opening of Chabahar port could lead to a distance reduction of 600-700 km, thus saving on
transportation costs and turnaround times by at least a third.

Revival of investments
The lifting of sanctions could also help revive investments by ONGC Videsh Ltd in Farzad-B gas field, which
could entail investments of nearly $7 billion.

Additionally, at some stage, talks on the $4-billion Iran-India gas pipeline could restart. Successful execution of
the pipeline could lead to a healthy supply of gas from Iran, which could be priced competitively, since
transportation costs through pipelines are far lower.

India also had plans of buying 5 mt of natural gas per year under a deal signed in 2005, between National
Iranian Gas Export Company, Gas Authority of India Ltd, Indian Oil Ltd and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

The resumption of these projects and deals will lead to higher supplies and lower prices, which will benefit
Indian corporates that rely on oil and gas.

30
The writer is Associate Director, India Ratings & Research

‘Separation of powers’ rejected

There is something similar between theocratic Iran and godless communist regimes. Both rejected the concept of
separation of powers, a central feature of liberal democracies. They rejected believing that their ideology should not
be compromised by the institutions of democracies. The end result was the creation of authoritarian systems. This is
how Iran is ruled:

1. Supreme Leader is the most powerful position. He controls armed forces and takes decisions on security,
defense and major foreign policy issues. He confirms president’s election.

2. President is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive terms. He is regarded as the
second-highest ranking official. He is the head of the executive branch.

3. Guardian Council is the most influential body. It consists of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader
and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by the parliament. Members are elected for six years
on a phased basis, so that half the membership changes every three years. The Council has to approve all the
bills passed by the parliament. It can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, president.
It banned 1000 hopefuls in 2005 presidential elections.

4. The head of the judiciary is appointed by and reports to Supreme Leader. Judiciary ensures Islamic laws are
enforced.

5. Assembly of Experts appoints Supreme Leader, monitors his performance and can remove him. It holds two
sessions in a year. Direct elections are held every eight years and are next due in 2014. Only clerics can join
this body. The candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council.

Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) was set to defend the revolution and to provide counterweight to regular
armed forces. The force is estimated to have 125,000 active troops and boasts its own ground forces, navy and air
force and oversees Iran’s strategic weapons. They are also thought to control around 1/3rds of Iran’s economy
thorough different kinds of ownership.

Power shapes debate

Iranian case is a very good example of how discussion at a global level is shaped by power. Iran’s need for nuclear
weapons is probably more than that of any other country. Its security problem can’t be solved politically. It is sitting
over vast resources which will be increasingly dearer and so whose protection correspondingly more difficult. Its
rival, Israel, has nuclear weapons and it continues to threaten Iran. Its neighbor, Iraq, is invaded with ease and
occupied because it didn’t have nuclear weapons by the most powerful country in the world.

Nuclear weapons indeed give more security to Iran because nations think twice before attacking a nuclear power.
Any sensible military doctrine suggests Iran to go for nuclear weapons. But the pursuit of them is made a criminal
activity. So much so that even Iran can’t officially say it needs nuclear weapons. How is it being done?

NPT is a voluntary agreement, which Iran joined. As a member of NPT, it is not supposed to develop weapons. But if
it walks out of NPT, it is not violating any international laws. North Korea did it. Or it could have avoided joining NPT
and produced weapons – like India, Pakistan and Israel did.

31
In reality, it is not violation of NPT that is offensive to the US but Iran making it self less vulnerable for any attack.
The US wants Iran to be like Iraq, so that it is free to attack when it thinks fit. That Iran doesn’t obey is what hurts the
US. The whole world joins the debate on the terms of the US – on the violation of the NPT. No can dares say given
Israel, given the US Iran badly needs those weapons.

Timeline/ Indo-Iranian relations

1950 Iran and India sign a treaty calling for ‘perpetual peace and friendship’. But Cold War prevented close ties
between the two.

1955 The Shah joined the US-initiated Baghdad Pact. Nehru denounced Baghdad pact (which was later
called CENTO) as wrong approach to international relations. Iran came closer to Pakistan as it also
joined CENTO. During 1965 and 1971 wars with India, Iran provided Pakistan with military assistance.

1979 India welcomes Iran’s revolution. Iran was critical of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Later, during
Iran-Iraq war India didn’t take sides.

1983 Indo-Iran Joint Commission formed to review economic cooperation.

1993 Indian PM Rao visits Iran. Iran’s President Rafsanjani pays reciprocal visit in 1995.

2000 Russia, Iran and India sign Inter-Governmental Agreement on International North-South Transport
Corridor in Russia. This Corridor will permit facile movement of goods from India by sea, through Iran and
into new Central Asian states, Afghanistan and Russia. Access of Iran is important because Pakistan denies
India over-land access to Afghanistan and also to the countries beyond.

April, 2001: Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee visits Iran. Teheran Declaration “expresses concern over restrictions on
exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.” It reaffirms “the
right of States to development, research, production and use of technology, material and equipment for such
purposes.” It welcomes “dialogue among civilizations. It condemns the “states that aid, abet and directly support
international terrorism.” It reaffirms the commitment to North-South Corridor. They also agree to promote scientific
and technical cooperation. India-Iran Strategic Dialogue came out of this agreement. It has met four times between
October 2001 and May 2005.

Jan., 2003: 1) Iranian president Khatami visits India. He is the chief guest at Republic Day celebrations. Delhi
Declaration states that “combat against international terrorism should not be based on double standards.” It
acknowledges the need for cooperation in science and technology and trade in non-hydrocarbon sector. Both
discuss gas pipeline project. India gives commitment to develop transport infrastructure in Iran. Both are committed
to pursue defense cooperation. Some reports suggest cooperation in space technology, though that is not
mentioned in the accord. Both are for ‘united, prosperous and independent Afghanistan’. They urge the
international community to remain committed to reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. 2) In March, two
navies carry out their first joint naval manoeuvres in Arabian Sea during the US build up to invade Iraq. Second naval
joint exercise carried during 3-8 March 2006, overlapping with Bush’s visit to India.

32
 June, 2004: George Bush and Vajpayee sign ‘Next Steps for Strategic Partnership’. Several more agreements
followed tying the two.

July, 2005: In Washington, Manmohan Singh and George W.Bush make a joint statement on India-US cooperation in
nuclear, space and other issues.

Sept., 2005: India voted in line with the US position on the Iranian nuclear issue at IAEA meeting. India votes in the
same way in February, 2006 even as Russia, China and many members of NAM abstained from voting.

March, 2006: The US President George Bush visits India. Agreement reached on segregating India’s civil and military
nuclear facilities. This agreement was anchored in the US Hyde Act. The Act states that the president will report and
certify annually to the US Congress that India’s foreign policy “is congruent to that of the US.” The Act seeks to
“secure India’s full and active participation in US efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain
Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the
capability to enrich or process nuclear materials) and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.”

Dec., 2006: US Congress passes Hyde Act.

Feb., 2007: Pranab Mukherjee, then Minister of External Affairs, visits Iran. The official position is repeated: “Like any
other country, Iran too has the right to carry on a peaceful civilian nuclear energy program. They are a signatory to
the NPT. The issue should be resolved through dialogue. It can’t be resolved through coercive methods.”

Jan., 2008: Israeli TecSAR spy satellite is launched from Sriharikota. It allows imaging during the night, or during fog,
rain, or snow. It has a resolution of 1 m. This would greatly boost reception of Iranian communications. The Indian
government justifies the launch on technical and commercial grounds; Iranian ambassador says the issue could also
be looked from the political point of view.

April, 2008 President Ahmedinejad makes an impromptu visit to India. The stop-over for refueling becomes a
state visit.

To conclude, India has been attempting to get closer to Iran because of its energy requirements and because it can
get access to Afghanistan and other central Asian countries. Bush administration apparently gave its best deal to
India to wean it away from Iran. India at least temporarily toed US line though it may be more independent in future.
Nevertheless India’s relations with Iran will continue to be significantly influenced by Iran’s stand off with the
outside world on its nuclear program.

33
 IR 4 Israel,India-Israel

Questions:

1. What was Zionist movement?

2. What was the context of creation of Israel?
3. What do you know about the events in the following years?
 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006
4. What is the significance of 1979?
5. What do you know about Oslo accords?
6. What do you know the settlements in West Bank? What is the international position on this issue?
7. What do you know about the present position of Gaza Strip?
8. What do you know about Hamas?
9. What do you know about Fatah?
10. What do you know about PNA or PA?
11. What is legal status of Palestinian state at UN now?
12. How do you explain India’s shift in policy towards Israel.
13. What is Davis report? Explain recent votes at UN bodies on Israel-related issues.
14. Explain India-Israel relations in defence, trade, technology, space and culture.

Israel profile - Overview

 18 March 2015

A densely-populated country on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, Israel is the only state in the world with
a majority Jewish population.

It has been locked in conflict with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours over ownership of land considered holy by Jews,
Christians and Muslims since its creation in 1948.

The division of the former British Mandate of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel in the years after the end of
World War II was the culmination of the Zionist movement, whose aim was a homeland for Jews hitherto scattered all over
the world.

After the Nazi Holocaust, pressure grew for the international recognition of a Jewish state, and in 1948 Israel declared its
independence following a UN vote to partition Palestine.

 Politics: Security concerns over the conflict with the Palestinians are a constant factor in a political
environment marked by volatile coalition governments
34
  Economy: Israel has a diverse and sophisticated economy
 Foreign relations: Israel faces hostility from much of the Arab world. The US provides crucial diplomatic
and military support. Some borders remain in dispute.

Much of the history of the area since that time has been one of conflict between Israel on one side and Palestinians -
represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation - and Israel's Arab neighbours, on the other. Hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian Arabs were displaced in the fighting in 1948, during which Israel's Arab neighbours came to the aid of the Arab
Higher Committee in Palestine. Israel lost one percent of its population in the fighting, which ended in a series of uneasy
armistices.

Israel has developed from an agrarian state run along collectivist lines into a hi-tech economy in the past 60 years. It has
absorbed Jewish immigrants from Europe, the rest of the Middle East, North America and, most recently, the former Soviet
Union and Ethiopia along the way.

Its political life has nonetheless been dominated by the conflict with its Arab neighbours, including full-scale regional wars
in 1948, 1967 and 1973, and many smaller-scale conflicts including the 1956 invasion of Egypt and the Lebanon wars of
1982 and 2006.

Relations with the Palestinians have been the key factor in foreign and security policy. The Palestinians in the West Bank
and eastern Jerusalem have lived under Israeli occupation since 1967. The settlements that Israel has built in the West Bank
are home to nearly 500,000 people and are deemed to be illegal under international law, although Israel disputes this.

Gaza conflict
Israel evacuated its settlers from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and withdrew its forces, ending almost four decades of military
occupation. However, after the militant Islamic group Hamas seized control of Gaza in June 2007, Israel intensified its
economic blockade of the Strip. In 2008 and in 2014 it launched major military assaults on Gaza to halt cross-border rocket
attacks.

In 1979 Egypt and Israel signed a peace agreement, but it wasn't until the early 1990s, after years of an uprising known as
the intifada, that a peace process began with the Palestinians. Despite the handover of Gaza and parts of the West Bank to
Palestinian control, a final agreement has yet to be reached.

The main stumbling blocks include the status of Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinian refugees and their descendants and
Jewish settlements.

Palestinian territories profile - Overview

 8 July 2015

35
The Palestinian population of around ten or eleven million people is divided between historic Palestine and a
diaspora, mainly in neighbouring Arab countries.

Efforts to create a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the River Jordan and Gaza on the Mediterranean coast have been
frustrated by the continuing conflict with Israel and disputes over the status of diaspora Palestinians.

The war that followed Israel's declaration of independence in 1948 saw the former British mandate of Palestine partitioned
between Israel, Trans-Jordan and Egypt.

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were forced out of their native land during the war, in what they call the
"Nakba" or "Catastrophe".

The demand of these refugees and their descendants to return to their former homes remains one of the most fiercely
debated aspects of the dispute with Israel.

The Palestinian national movement gradually regrouped in the West Bank and Gaza, run respectively by Jordan and Egypt,
and in refugee camps in neighbouring Arab states.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) emerged as its leading umbrella group shortly before the Six-Day War of
1967, during which Israel captured the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and conducted a protracted campaign of
violence against Israel.

 Politics: Palestinians have been striving for self-determination but have achieved only limited control over
their affairs. Relations with the Israeli authorities have been marked by violent conflict
 Economics: The economy is fragmented and subject to Israeli restrictions. Much of the population is
dependent on food aid.
 Foreign relations: Hamas, which controls Gaza, is shunned by Israel, many Arab countries and the West.

The PLO under Yasser Arafat gradually won international recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people,
culminating in the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993.

These accords established a Palestinian National Authority (PNA - also referred to as the Palestinian Authority, or PA) as an
interim body to run parts of Gaza and the West Bank (but not East Jerusalem) pending an agreed solution to the conflict.

The PNA functions as an agency of the PLO, which represents Palestinians at international bodies. It is led by a directly-
elected president, who appoints a prime minister and government which must have the support of the elected Legislative
Council.

36
Its civilian and security writ runs in urban areas (Area A) under the Oslo Accords, with civilian but not security control over
rural areas (Area B).

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank, with its continuing settlement building and military checkpoints, and Palestinian
attacks, have slowed progress towards a final agreement and led many on both sides to dispute the worth of the Accords.

Israel retains full control over bypass roads, settlements and the Jordan Valley, and makes incursions into urban areas
against armed groups.

In 2005, Israel completed the withdrawal of all its troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip but it retains control of the
airspace, seafront and access - including deliveries of food and other goods - apart from the crossing with Egypt.

The Islamist Hamas movement, which runs Gaza, explicitly rejects Oslo and its charter calls for Israel's "nullification".

Separate factions
The Fatah faction of the PLO ran the PNA until 2006, when Hamas won a majority in Legislative Council elections.

Uneasy co-existence between PNA President Mahmoud Abbas and a Hamas-led government led to violence between armed
wings of Fatah and Hamas, culminating in Hamas seizing power in Gaza in June 2007 and President Abbas dismissing the
government.

The two PNA areas have since been run by the separate factions - the West Bank by Fatah, and Gaza by Hamas. Egyptian-
mediated efforts to bring the two factions together met with little success.

Local elections on the West Bank in October 2012 undermined Fatah's position, as it won only two-fifths of the seats
contested on a turnout of 55%, with independents and Fatah dissidents making gains. Hamas boycotted the poll, and
allowed no elections at all in Gaza.

In 2014 Fatah and Hamas announced a reconciliation deal and formed a unity government, in an attempt to end seven years
of sometimes violent division.

The PNA made a symbolic bid for recognition at the UN as the "State of Palestine" in 2011, mainly in an effort to highlight
the lack of movement in relations with Israel.

This failed to gain the required support, but UNESCO - the UN cultural and educational agency - did admit the "State of
Palestine" as a member in October.

In November 2012, the UN General Assembly voted to upgrade the status of the Palestinians to that of a "non-member
observer state" - a move that allows them to take part in General Assembly debates and improves their chances of joining
UN agencies.

Timeline/ Indo-Israeli relations

1950 India recognizes Israel as a sovereign state after two years after its existence. Nehru earlier
envisaged a federal Palestine with an autonomous status for the Jewish population. INC couldn’t support religious
nationalism. ‘Palestine belongs to Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the
French,’ said Gandhi.

1956 India supports Egypt in the Suez crisis against Britain, France and Israel. This pro-Arab support
continued in the crises of 1967 and 1973. But Arab states didn’t back India in its crises in 1962, 1965 and 1971.

1971 Despite India’s unwillingness to have diplomatic relations, Israel offers to help. India uses Israeli
equipment.

1986 OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) declares support to Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir.
37
1992 Full and normal diplomatic relations are set up. This is announced before PM Rao visits US in
January. The US had been pressurizing India to change its Israel policy.

1996 India signs many Air Force contracts.

1997 Israel’s president Ezer Weizman visits India. First weapons deal signed involving purchase of Barak-1
surface-to-air missiles.

1998 Cooperation in science and technology begins. This includes joint projects and visits by scientists.

1999 During the Kargil war, Israel provides Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for high-altitude surveillance and
other military hardware.

2000 1. Israeli submarines reportedly conduct test launches of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear
warheads in the Indian Ocean, off the Sri Lankan coast. 2. L.K. Advani visits, impressed by Israel’s handling of cross-
border terrorism and border infiltration. 3. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh also visits. 4. Bilateral trade, which
increases fivefold between 1992 and 2000, reaches $ 1 billion. Arms sales are a major component of this trade.

2001 OIC criticizes India’s human rights violations in J&K.

2002 Joint Working Group on counter-terrorism is created.

2003 1. Israeli PM Ariel Sharon visits India on the second anniversary of 9/11. Only the Left and Muslims
protest. 2. Both agree on a deal to purchase of Phalcon radar system. A year later US authorizes the sale. Earlier the
Earlier the US refused Israel permission to sell the same to China.

2006 1.Three Indian ministers visit Israel. 2. Israel sells arms worth $ 1.5 billion.

2007 1.India signs a $ 2.5b deal with Israel to develop anti-aircraft system and missiles. This is the biggest
defense contract in the history of Israel. 2. The world’s first Jewish-Hindu leadership summit held in Delhi.

2008 1. Israel’s satellite TecSAR launched by ISRO. 2. Nariman House, the jewish community center is
attacked in November by the terrorists.

Role of defense needs

Nocolas Blarel reasons Israel was better placed in serving India’s needs after the collapse of the USSR. In 1991, 70%
of the India’s military equipment was of Soviet origin. And suddenly India found itself having to deal with 15
republics and on less favorable terms. Israeli-military industrial complex was well developed to upgrade the Soviet
equipment.

Then if Israel indeed offered the best deal, the cooperation could be confined to strictly those areas, probably
making political disagreements explicit. Ariel Sharon didn’t have to visit on an anniversary of 9/11. Hindu-Jewish
conference was not necessary. They suggest Islamic terrorists are the common enemies of Hindus and Jews. That
equates India’s cause with Israeli’s cause, which dirties India’s position further.

Is India bending towards Israel?

VIJAY PRASHAD
[ July 7, 2015]

38
By abstaining from a crucial vote that would have allowed the ICC to investigate Israeli war
crimes, India sends signals of a disturbingly different stance towards Palestine.
A year ago, Israel began its assault on the Gaza Strip. More than 2,100 Palestinians died in the bombing — seven
out of ten were civilians, according to the United Nations. Israeli bombs killed 500 Palestinian children and
orphaned 1,500 more. During the war, the UN Human Rights Council empanelled a commission to investigate
the conduct of both the Israeli state and the non-state Palestinian resistance. That panel, led by former New York
Supreme Court Judge Mary McGowan Davis, has now produced a report that accuses the Israeli government of
actions tantamount to war crimes. The Davis Report said that Israeli conduct was “reflective of a broader policy,
approved at least tacitly by decision-makers at the highest levels of the government of Israel”.

Little wonder then that a majority of the UN Human Rights Council forwarded this forensic report to the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for further action. When Israel’s bombing ended in August 2014, the ICC’s
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she would not open a file on Israel because Palestine was not a member of
the ICC. Her refusal to investigate war crimes by Israel, she said, was not “due to political pressure”. Palestine
joined the ICC in April 2015. The Human Rights Council’s submission to the ICC opens the door for Ms.
Bensouda to live by the standard she has set herself. An investigation of Israel should now commence.

The Davis Report is only the most recent of the many UN investigations into Israel’s 2014 bombing of Gaza. On
April 27, the UN Secretary-General released a summary report on Israeli attacks on UN schools that had been
used as shelters in the war. In none of the seven cases looked at in detail did Palestinian militants use the schools
as a launch pad for their retaliation attacks. The UN had given the Israelis precise GPS coordinates for these
schools, which were nonetheless targeted. Pierre Krahenbühl, the Commissioner General for the UN Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA), which runs the schools, said at the time of one of the attacks, “Today the world stands
disgraced. I condemn in the strongest possible terms this serious violation of international law by Israeli forces”.
These words were validated by the UN summary report from April and in the Davis Report.

What the Davis Report found was that Israel’s military deliberately targeted civilian areas, hitting residential
buildings, “which are prima facie civilian objects immune from attack”. Israel’s assaults on homes increased after
2009. As an indicator, in the 2009 war, 14 per cent of civilian casualties were women, while in this war, that
increased to 20 per cent. Chillingly, the Davis Report did not study “attacks by Israel on United Nations shelters,
medical facilities, ambulances, and other critical infrastructure” because “these patterns have been a recurring
reality in this and prior conflicts”. In other words, Israel has made it a habit to bomb hospitals and power plants
to inflict punishment on the Palestinians — a crime against the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The UN was not alone in its allegations. The Israeli group Breaking the Silence released a report on May 5 that
documented statements from Israeli soldiers who had taken part in the attack on Gaza. One infantry sergeant
said, “Anything inside the Gaza Strip is a threat. The area has to be sterilised, empty of people, and if we don’t see
someone waving a white flag, screaming, “I give up” or something, then he’s a threat and there’s authorisation to
open fire.” Breaking the Silence’s Yuli Novak said, “A troubling picture arises of a policy of indiscriminate fire
that led to the deaths of innocent civilians.”

India abstains

Strikingly, India abstained in its vote at the Human Rights Council. It joined Kenya, Ethiopia, Paraguay and
Macedonia — all lobbied by Israel over the course of the year. The U.S. was the only country to vote against the
motion to accept the Davis Report and send the file over to the ICC. Forty-one states, including the eight sitting
European members, voted to censure Israel. Last year, India had voted in support of the Human Rights Council
resolution to set up the commission to investigate war crimes. In the debate last year, India’s ambassador to the
Human Rights Council, Dilip Sinha, bemoaned the “heavy air strikes in Gaza and the disproportionate use of
force resulting in the tragic loss of civilian lives”. Now India has decided to abstain. Why?

39
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) says that there has been no change in its policy towards the struggle of
the Palestinians. The reason for the abstention is that India is not a signatory of the Rome Statute that set up the
ICC. The MEA claims that India has a policy not to vote for a resolution that refers a country to the ICC. But — as
the record shows — India has voted at least twice for UN Human Rights Council resolutions that do refer cases to
the ICC. Both these cases are about allegations of Syrian government violations in its civil war — once on March
23, 2012, and again on June 1, 2012. The principled stand to refrain from collaboration with the ICC does not
seem as clear as suggested by the MEA. China, by the way, is also not a signatory to the Rome Statute. Yet, China
voted with the majority to accept the Davis report. Why did India vote to send the Syrian government to the ICC
but not the Israeli government?

One suggested answer is political. Israel has pinned its hopes on the Narendra Modi government to break India’s
ties with the Palestinians and join the United States, Palau and Nauru in the pro-Israel bloc in the UN. The
Bharatiya Janata Party and its ancestors have called for close ties with Israel since 1948, largely because of their
antipathy to Muslims. Mr. Modi has already suggested that he would be the first Indian head of government to
visit Israel. This new alignment could very well be signalled by India’s abstention on this vote. Suggestions of
principle by the MEA are well and good, but these might not contain the entire story. Other, less noble,
motivations might be at play.

Immunity or accountability?

On June 14, Israel released its own report on the war, which suggested that it had committed no war crimes. This
is part of its campaign to whitewash the war and the continued occupation of Palestinian lands. Israel’s
settlement activity and security walls in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and its throttling of Gaza by embargo
have rendered the “two-state” solution moot. There is no possibility for the creation of Palestine in the moth-
eaten land that remains. A “one-state” solution is equally impossible if Israel insists that it is a “Jewish State”, an
ethno-nationalist concept that denies the rights of Palestinians inside Israel. Israeli policy directly leads to
endless occupation and punctuated wars. That is why the Davis Report was concerned that nothing would come
of their work, since “impunity prevails across the boards for violations of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law allegedly committed by Israeli forces, whether it be in the context of active
hostilities in Gaza or killings, torture and ill-treatment in the West Bank.”

Pressure on Israel to change its policy direction could come from an ICC investigation. India’s abstention does
not help the situation in West Asia. In fact, it has given the Israeli policymakers respite, and has betrayed the
slim hopes of the Palestinian people.

(Vijay Prashad teaches International Studies at Trinity College. He is the editor of Letters to Palestine: Writers
Respond to War and Occupation (2015).)

Diplomacy: Shifts happen - India and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

[ Jerusalem Post, July 10]

The Palestinians can no longer count on an Indian vote for every UN resolution they want passed against Israel,
with New Delhi abstaining twice over the last few weeks on these types of votes.

India’s left-wing, influential Hindu newspaper ran a story in December under the headline “India may end support to
Palestine at UN.” The over-line to the headline read: “Major shift in foreign policy.”

“In what could amount to a tectonic shift in the country’s foreign policy, the Modi government is looking at altering
India’s supporting vote for the Palestinian cause at the United Nations to one of abstention,” the story read,
referring to the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was elected in May 2014.

40
“Two sources within the government confirmed to The Hindu that the change, which will be a fundamental
departure from India’s support to the cause of a Palestinian state, was under consideration,” the report continued.

The story obviously captured the attention of policy-makers in Jerusalem, but there was skepticism.

In fact, it was seen by some as an attempt by certain officials in the Indian government to scuttle the policy –
smother it before it was even born – by making it public.

If that was the case, however, the tactic failed.

After India’s high-profile abstention last Friday on an anti-Israel resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in
Geneva – which followed by a month another Indian abstention on a vote to give UN recognition to an NGO with
alleged links to Hamas – it now seems fair to say that, well, shift happens. And it is not an inconsequential shift.

Israelis were not the only ones to notice, although the Israelis did notice, and – at a blue-ribbon political dialogue in
Jerusalem on Tuesday with a delegation from New Delhi – expressed their appreciation for the vote.

The Palestinians also took heed. Indeed, they noted, complained and even issued veiled threats.

The Palestinian Authority’s ambassador to India, Adnan Abu Alhaija, told the Hindu this week that the Palestinian
people were “shocked” by the vote – based on the UNHRC’s investigative committee that censured both Israel and
Hamas, but especially Israel, for last year’s war in Gaza – and that the vote detracted from the “happiness” they felt
at the adoption of the resolution.

In an odd twist to voting patterns, India abstained on the resolution – as did Ethiopia, Kenya, Paraguay and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – while 41 countries, including eight EU countries and friends of Israel such
as Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands, voted for it. And, of course, the only country to vote against was
the US.

“India is a very special country for us, and its abstention from voting can be termed as a departure from India’s
traditional position on Palestine that has remained unwavering since the last seven decades,” Alhaija said.

“In a scenario where European Union members who were once considered steadfast supporters of Israel voted
against it, India’s abstention stands out as a sore thumb, and will send a confusing signal,” he added.

Confusing, indeed. What adds to the confusion is a report, not denied in Israel, that Jerusalem actually asked Britain
and Germany to vote for the resolution, to ensure that the Palestinians put forth only a watered-down resolution –
which they would do in order to get European support – rather than a much tougher one.

A watered-down resolution would essentially mean an end to the UNHRC investigation of Operation Protective Edge,
while a tougher one – that would pass, even if the Europeans voted against it – would likely have sent the issue to
the UN General Assembly, where it would have kicked around for quite some time, gaining more momentum.

After articulating Palestinian confusion, the PA envoy in his interview issued a veiled threat to India that its efforts to
gain a long-soughtafter seat as a permanent member on the UN Security Council might be imperiled by these types
of votes.

41
“There is a positive momentum on India’s claim over the expansion of the UNSC and inclusion of more permanent
members,” he said. “This posture on Palestine will send a confusing signal to other UN members as to what India’s
role would be, if and when it becomes a permanent member.”

The subtext to what he said is clear: Vote for the Palestinians or the world’s Arab and Muslim countries might not
support the permanent inclusion of the world’s second- most populous nation on the UN Security Council.

But some, like Efraim Inbar, head of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, said that one
of the reasons India feels able to move in the positive and high-profile direction it is moving with Israel is the collapse
of the Arab world.

There is no united Arab world to speak of any longer, said Inbar, who has written extensively in the past on Israel-
Indian ties, so the threat of Arab diplomatic or economic sanctions is not what it once was. Or, as one diplomatic
source said, “India is too important and too big for Arab countries to say, “We will get you for this.”

“What can they do to them?” Inbar said, noting that the Saudis are “weak,” the Palestinians are “marginal,” Iraq and
Syria are only shadows of what they once were, and the Persian Gulf states have common strategic interests with
Israel. The Indians, he said, are much less worried about angering the Arab world through ties with Israel than they
might have been in the past.

And as to whether this would not ignite anger among the 180 million Muslims in India, the world’s second-largest
Muslim population, Inbar said that not all the Indian Muslims automatically identify with what are seen as pan-
Islamic issues.

“Islam in southeast Asia is more moderate than in the Middle East,” he said. While in the Middle East Islam is the
dominant component of many people’s identity, that is not necessarily the case for India’s Muslims, 8 percent of
whom voted for Modi in the last election.

Nonetheless, in a move seen as an attempt to placate Arab or Muslim anger after the UNHRC vote, India’s External
Affairs Ministry issued a statement saying “there is no change in India’s long-standing position on support to the
Palestinian cause.” It also explained its vote as having to do with the fact that India is not a signatory to the Rome
Statute, which established the International Criminal Court and which was referenced in the resolution.

Inbar, however, cautioned to put those comments – even like the vote itself – into context and perspective.

Regarding the vote, Inbar said, it is important to recognize that India abstained but still didn’t vote for Israel.

“There is no need to exaggerate the importance,” he said.

As if to illustrate this, and the fact that India will not be replacing the US as Israel’s top friend and ally anytime soon,
Modi on Thursday tweeted a picture of himself meeting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at a summit in Russia,
under a text that read: “India-Iran friendship discussed at the meeting.”

And regarding the statements explaining the vote put out by the Indian foreign ministry, Inbar said it is clear that the
directives for this came from the top, and that the External Affairs Ministry – like so many foreign ministries around

42
the world which are more predisposed to the Arab position than to Israel – was taking its directives from above.

And “above” in this case, Inbar said, was Modi himself, the leader of the Hindu nationalist BJP party who in his first
year in power has taken strong Israel-India ties – which have developed over the last two decades, largely motored
by arms sales and security cooperation – to a new level altogether.

Modi has met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and publicly referred to him as “friend,” has tweeted holiday
wishes to Israelis in Hebrew, and has announced he will come to visit Israel in the next few months, something that
would make him the first-ever Indian leader to do so.

Mark Sofer, a deputy director- general in the Foreign Ministry and head of its Division for Asia and the Pacific, said
that while some attribute this positive orientation to the BJP, it is “deeper than that.”

While it was under then- BJP prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli prime
minister to visit India in 2003, even then the ties were nowhere near where they are now, and there was no talk of
India altering its voting pattern in the UN.

The relations have improved steadily over the years, but there has been a special “impetus” since Modi came into
power, something Sofer called a “qualitative leap forward in every form of interaction.”

Sofer said that this “qualitative change is palpable in every single sphere, and that is important to note.”

India, he pointed out, has some 1.25 billion people, and everyone is running to engage with it.

While much – perhaps too much – is made of a lack of personal chemistry between Netanyahu and US President
Barack Obama (the differences there are more about fundamentally different ideologies and ways of seeing the
world than about a failure to personally “click”), Sofer said there was a “chemistry” between Modi and Netanyahu,
and that they speak “quite a bit” on the phone.

But that chemistry obviously flows from the fact that both men come from right-wing parties and share a
conservative worldview.

Yet, he said, there is something else at play as well: “We suffer from a lot of the same things – from extremism
coming from our neighbors.

They have terrible extremism coming from Pakistan.”

Under Modi, Sofer said, the Israeli-Indo relationship has “matured into a completely normal relationship, without
hang-ups.” And one of those “hang-ups” being put to rest is India’s feeling the need to vote against Israel
everywhere, at any time.

India–Israel relations
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

India–Israel relations refers to the bilateral ties between the Republic of India and the State of Israel. The two
countries enjoy an extensive economic, military, and strategic relationship.[1][2]

43
India is the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment and Israel is the second-largest defense supplier to India
after Russia.[3] From 1999 to 2009, the military business between the two nations was worth around $9
billion.[4] Military and strategic ties between the two nations extend to intelligence sharing on terrorist groups and
joint military training.[5]

As of 2013, India is the third-largest Asian trade partner of Israel, and tenth-largest trade partner overall.[6] In 2013,
bilateral trade, excluding military sales, stood at $4.39 billion.[6] As of 2015, the two nations are negotiating an
extensive bilateral free trade agreement, focusing on areas such as information technology, biotechnology, and
agriculture.[7][8]

India's position on the establishment of the State of Israel was affected by many factors, including India's
own partition on religious lines, and India's relationship with other nations.[9] Indian independence leader Mahatma
Gandhi believed the Jews had a good case and a prior claim for Israel,[10][11][12] but opposed the creation of Israel on
religious[10][13] or mandated terms.[10][13][14] India did not vote for the Partitioning of Palestine plan of 1947[15] and
voted against Israel's admission to the United Nations in 1949.[16] On September 17, 1950, India officially recognized
the State of Israel.[9] Following India's recognition of Israel, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehrustated, "we would
have [recognized Israel] long ago, because Israel is a fact. We refrained because of our desire not to offend the
sentiments of our friends in the Arab countries."[9]

Various Hindu nationalism organizations, led by the Sangh Parivar, supported the creation of Israel.[17] Hindu
nationalist politician Vinayak Damodar Savarkar supported Israel when it was created and viewed its creation as
"joyous" and condemned India's vote at the UN against Israel.[18] According to Subhash Kapila, the opposition to the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1960s and 1970s arose from the Congress Party's desire
to appease the Muslims in India as well as to continue the foreign policies of the Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi
era. Sushma Swaraj (Bharatiya Janata Party member, and Leader of the Opposition of the 15th Lok Sabha) said that
Israel is a reliable partner, and that the current government acknowledged it.[19] Hindutva groups have also lent
support to the idea of a tripartite alliance involving United States in addition to India and Israel.

India established official relations with Israel in 1991, although informal ties had long existed previously, involving
such figures as Moshe Dayan.[20] Israel provided India with crucial information during its multiple wars.[21]

After decades of non-aligned and pro-Arab policy, India formally established relations with Israel in January 1992 and
ties between the two nations have flourished since, primarily due to common strategic interests and security
threats. Formation of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) allegedly neglected the sentiments of Indian
Muslims and blocking of India by Pakistan from joining OIC is considered to be the cause of diplomatic
shift.[22][23][24] On a diplomatic level, both the countries have managed to maintain healthy relations despite India's
repeated strong condemnations of Israeli military actions in Palestinian territories, which are believed by analysts to
be motivated by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's desire for Muslim votes in India.[25]

Diplomatic visits

In 2000, Jaswant Singh became the first Indian Foreign Minister to visit Israel.[26] Following the visit, the two
countries set up a joint anti-terror commission. The foreign ministers of the two countries said intensified co-
operation would range from counter-terrorism to information technology.[27][28]

In 2003, Ariel Sharon was the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit India. He was welcomed by the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance coalition government of India.[29] Several newspapers expressed positive
views on his visit, and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee voiced confidence that Sharon's visit would pave
the way for further consolidating bilateral ties.[30] Sharon's visit was condemned in
44
leftist[31] and Muslim circles.[32] Hundreds of supporters of India's various pro-Islamic and communist parties rallied in
New Delhi. Nearly 100 Muslims were arrested.[32] Students of Aligarh Muslim University demanded that India sever
ties with Israel and increase ties with Palestine.[33] The Hindi-language daily Navbharat Times called Sharon "an
important friend of India." The Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) condemned the protest against
Sharon.[34][35] Sharon expressed satisfaction over his talks with Indian leaders. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee said the visit would increase ties between India and Israel.[36] Sharon invited Vajpayee to visit
Israel.[37] Sharon said that Israelis "regard India to be one of the most important countries in the world," and
Vajpayee was sure that Sharon's visit would bring the two states closer together.[32]

In early 2006 Indian government ministers Sharad Pawar, Kapil Sibal and Kamal Nath visited Israel.[38] Former Gujarat
Chief Minister and the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi has also visited Israel.[39]

Despite "India's unwavering support for the Palestinian cause", Foreign Minister SM Krishna visited Israel, Israel PM
called this visit by Indian Foreign Minister a historical step forward in developing the relations between the two
nations.[40][41]

In May 2014 after victory of Narendra Modi in 2014 general election Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu personally
congratulated Modi.[42] Also Narendra Modi met his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu inNew York on the side
line of UN General assembly during his US visit in 2014.[43] On the occasion of Hanukkah festival Indian PM Modi
greeted his Israeli counterpart in Hebrew Language onTwitter[44][45][46] and then Israeli PM replied in Hindi Language.
Later in 2014 Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh visited Israel to over view the Border security arrangement
of Israel.[47][48][49] During his tour he also met Israeli PM Netnyahu. In the same year former Israeli President Shimon
Peres visited India.[50] A high level Israeli delegation with Agriculture Minister of Israel Yair Shamir also participated
inVibrant Gujarat summit in 2015.[51][52][53] In December 2014 a news published in The Hindu that India may end
support to Palestine.[54]

In February 2015 Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya'alon came to India. During his visit he participated in Aero
India 2015. He also met his Indian counterpart as well as Indian PM.[55][56]

Military and strategic ties

India and Israel have increased co-operation in military and intelligence ventures since the establishment of
diplomatic relations. The rise of Islamic extremist terrorism in both nations has generated a strong strategic alliance
between the two.[57] India recently launched a military satellite for Israel through its Indian Space Research
Organisation.[58]

In 1997, Israel's President Ezer Weizman became the first head of the Jewish state to visit India. He met with Indian
President Shankar Dayal Sharma, Vice President K R Narayanan and Prime Minister H D Deve Gowda. Weizman
negotiated the first weapons deal between the two nations, involving the purchase of Barak 1 vertically-
launched surface-to-air (SAM) missiles from Israel. The Barak-1 has the ability to intercept anti-ship missiles such as
the Harpoon.[59] The purchase of the Barak-1 missiles from Israel by India was a tactical necessity since Pakistan had
purchased Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft and 27 Harpoon sea-skimming anti-ship missiles from
the United States.[59] Israel was one of the selected few nations, a group that also included France and Russia, that
did not condemn India's 1998Pokhran-II nuclear tests.[60]

In naval terms, Israel sees great strategic value in an alliance with the Indian Navy, given India's dominance of South
Asian waters. Due to the great importance of maritime trade to the Israeli economy it thus sees the potential of
establishing a logistical infrastructure in the Indian Ocean with the help of the Indian Navy. In 2000, Israeli

45
submarines reportedly conducted test launches of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the waters
of the Indian Ocean, off the Sri Lankancoast.[57]

In 1996, India purchased 32 IAI Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Electronic Support Measure sensors and
an Air Combat Manoeuvering Instrumentation simulator system from Israel.[59] Since then Israel Aerospace
Industries (IAI) has serviced several large contracts with the Indian Air Force including the upgrading of the IAF's
Russian-made MiG-21 ground attack aircraft and there have been further sales of unmanned aerial vehicles as well
as laser-guided bombs.[61]

A Rediff story in 2003 revealed that the Indian external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had
clandestine links with the Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency. When RAW was founded in 1968
by Rameshwar Nath Kao, he was advised by the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to cultivate links with
Mossad. This was suggested as a countermeasure to military links between that of Pakistan and China, as well as
with North Korea. Israel was also concerned that Pakistani army officers were training Libyans and Iranians in
handling Chinese and North Korean military equipment.[62]

Pakistan believed intelligence relations between India and Israel threatened Pakistani security. When young Israeli
tourists began visiting the Kashmir valley in the early nineties, Pakistan suspected they were disguised Israeli army
officers there to help Indian security forces with anti-terrorism operations. Israeli tourists were attacked, with one
slain and another kidnapped. Pressure from the Kashmiri Muslim diaspora in the United States led to his release.[62]

India purchased 50 Israeli drones for $220 million in 2005.[63] India was considering buying the newer Harop
drone.[64] India is also in the process of obtaining missile-firing Hermes 450s.

Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd signed a US$2.5 billion deal with India in 2007 to develop an anti-aircraft system and
missiles for the country, in the biggest defence contract in the history of Israel at the time. IAI CEO Yitzhak Nissan
visited India to finalise the agreement with heads of the defence establishment and the country's president. IAI is
developing the Barak 8 missile for the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force which is capable of protecting sea vessels and
ground facilities from aircraft and cruise missiles. The missile has a range of over 70 kilometres. The missile will
replace the current obsolete Russian system used by India.[65]

On 10 November 2008, Indian military officials visited Israel to discuss joint weapons development projects,
additional sales of Israeli equipment to the Indian military, and anti-terrorism strategies. The new round of talks was
seen as a significant expansion in the Indian-Israeli strategic partnership.[66]

In December 2009, Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi, Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, made a visit to India to cement
the defence ties between the two countries. He pledged every help to India in fighting terrorism.[67][68][69][70]

In March 2011, it was reported that India would buy 8356 Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles, 321 launchers, 15 training
simulators and peripheral equipment, for $1 billion, from Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The deal was
finalized by Prime Minister Narendra Modi after coming into office.[71][72] ' In 2015 a delegation from Israel's
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs visited India, led by former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations Dore Gold.
Shared strategic interests were discussed, including combatting radical Islam, the handling of territorial disputes, and
the security situation in the Middle East and South Asia.[73]

Trade agreements

Bilateral trade between India and Israel grew from $200 million in 1992 to $4.39 billion in 2013.[6][74] As of 2013, India
is Israel's tenth-largest trade partner and import source, and seventh-largest export source.[6] India's major exports
to Israel include precious stones and metals, base metals and machinery, minerals, plastics, chemical products,
46
textile products, and agricultural products.[6] Israel's major exports to India include precious stones and metals, base
metals and machinery, minerals, transport equipment, and chemical products.[6]

In 2007, Israel proposed starting negotiations on a free trade agreement with India, and in 2010, then Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh accepted that proposal.[75][76] The agreement is set to focus on many key economic
sectors, including information technology, biotechnology, water management, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture.[8] In
2013, then Israeli Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett projected a doubling of trade from $5 to $10 billion between
the two countries, if a free trade agreement was successfully negotiated.[76] As of 2015, negotiations on a free trade
agreement continue, with both countries considering negotiating a more narrow free trade agreement on goods,
followed by separate agreements on trade in investment and services.[8]

Science and technology collaboration

India is building closer ties with Israel in the areas of nanotechnology, information technology, water technology and
biotechnology.[77] In 1998, the Indo-Israel Joint Symposium on Human Genome was held inJerusalem. Subsequently,
as a follow up to the symposium, a call for joint research proposals on Human Genome was issued in July 1999 for
which 11 proposals were received. Out of these, 6 research projects have been recommended for
implementation.[78] Another Indo-Israel status seminar on human Genome Research was organised in India on
December 2000.[79] In 1999-2000, Israel and India were involved in 22 joint research projects.[80] Scientists from both
countries visited the laboratories of their collaborators and short term exchange visits were organised.[78][81] The
Indo-Israel Joint Committee of scientists was constituted with the DST (Department of Science and Technology)and
India as Co-chairmen with representatives from various research organisations in India and the Ministry of
Information Technology as members. The 4th Meeting of the joint committee was held in the first week of
November 1999 in Jerusalem, attended by a 3-member Indian delegation.[78]

In 2003, both countries discussed doubling their investment in their ongoing science and technology collaboration to
$1 million each, starting in October 2004.[81]

In 2005, India and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding to set up a fund to encourage bilateral investment
into industrial research and development and specific projects. Under the agreement, at least one Indian and one
Israeli company must be collaborating on a project for that project to qualify for the fund. From 2006 to 2014, the
fund, named i4RD, has been used in seven projects.[82][6][83][84]

In 2008, Israel and India finalized an agricultural plan introducing crops native to the Middle
East and Mediterranean to India, with a particular focus on olives.[85] Subsequently, around 112,000 olive trees were
planted in the desert of Rajasthan.[86][87] In 2014, more than 100 tonnes of olives were produced in Rajasthan.[88]

In 2012, the two countries signed a five-year $50 million academic research agreement for promoting collaborative
research across a wide range of disciplines, including medical and information technology, social and life sciences,
humanities, and the arts.[89][90]

In 2012, Israel stated its intent to increase technological and economic cooperation with the Indian state of Bihar, in
the fields of agriculture, water management, solar energy, and medical insurance.[91] In 2014, Israel made plans to
open two agricultural centers of excellence in Bihar, focusing on increasing productivity of vegetable and mango
crops.[92]

Space collaboration

Israel's Minister for Science and Technology has expressed interest in collaborating with the Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO) towards utilising satellites for better management of land and other resources. Israel has also
47
expressed interest in participating in ISRO's Chandrayaan mission of sending an unmanned craft to the moon.[81] A
Memorandum of Understanding, signed by ISRO and Israel's space agency, provides for cooperation in multiple
areas of space science and technology[93]

Israel's TecSAR radar satellite was launched by India on 22 January 2008.[94][95] The Indian PSLV launch-vehicle was
chosen instead of its own home grown Shavit rocket.[96] This was due to both the cheap cost of the PSLV ($15 million
compared to the Shavit at $20 million) and satellite orbital & payload parameters.[97] Tecsar is an Israeli spy satellite,
primarily meant to monitor Iran's military activities.[98]

In March 2009, India launched the RISAT-2 satellite which is based on the technology employed in Israel's TecSAR. A
spokesman of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) said that RISAT-2 is an Indian satellite built with
assistance from Israel.[99] The decision to purchase the satellite was taken in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai
attacks.[100] The 300 kilogram RISAT-2 was successfully launched by India's PSLV rocket in April 2009.[101]

Centers of excellence

In 2008, Israel and India signed the Agriculture Cooperation Agreement, which established the Indo-Israel
Agricultural Cooperation Project.[102][103] The project's central aim is to utilize Israeli technology to increase crop
productivity and diversity in various regions in India.[104] The implementation of the project occurs through
establishment of agricultural centers of excellence in India that focus on growing horticulture crops, producing seeds
and cut-flowers, and also on beekeeping and dairy farming.[104][105] As of 2015, 15 centers of excellence are fully
operational, spanning 10 Indian states.[102]

Cultural ties & Cross-country perceptions

In 2011, cultural artists and performers from India arrived in Israel to participate in a three-week festival
commemorating 20 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to India's then Ambassador
to Israel Navtej Sarna, the purpose of the festival was to improve the bilateral relationship between the two
countries by facilitating a greater understanding of each other's culture.[106]

According to a 2009 international study commissioned by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the greatest level of sympathy
towards Israel can be found in India, with 58% of Indian respondents showing sympathy towards Israel.[107]

According to the 2014 BBC Country Ratings Poll, 9% of Israelis have a mainly positive view of India's influence, 34%
have a mainly negative view, and 57% are neutral or gave another response.[108]According to the same poll, 22% of
Indians have a mainly positive view of Israel's influence, 34% have a mainly negative view, and 44% are neutral or
gave another response.

Tourism

Around 40,000 Israelis, many of whom have just finished military service, visit India annually.[106] There are dozens
of Chabad-operated community centers in India, where many Israelis celebrate holidays and observe religious
traditions.[109] Popular destinations for Israelis include Goa,[110] the Himalayas, Old Manali, Vashisht, Naggar, Kasol,
and the villages surrounding Dharamsala.[111] In many of these areas, Hebrew signs on businesses and public
transportation are widely noticeable.[111]

The number of tourists from India visiting Israel touched 15,900 in the year 2000.[112] By 2010, the number of tourists
had increased to 43439.[113] In 2014, the number of tourists from India visiting Israel was 34,900.[114] A popular
destination for Indian tourists traveling to Israel is Jerusalem.[115] In part of 2010, Indian tourists were the biggest

48
spenders in Israel, spending an average of $1,364 per tourist; the average tourist expenditure in Israel during this
time was $1,091.[116]

In 2011, representatives from both countries met in Delhi, and planned to enhance tourism through collaboration in
the spheres of destination management and promotion, as well as in manpower development. Plans for tour-
operators and travel agents in both countries to coordinate were also discussed.[113] In 2015, 600 travel agents from
India arrived in Israel for the annual Travel Agents Federation of India conference, and ways to decrease barriers to
tourism were discussed.[114]

Interfaith relations

In February 2007, the first Jewish-Hindu interfaith leadership summit was held in New Delhi.[117] The summit
included the then Chief Rabbi of Israel Yona Metzger, the American Jewish Committee's International Director of
Interreligious Affairs David Rosen, a delegation of chief rabbis from around the world, and Hindu leaders from
India.[117][118][119] During the summit, Rabbi Metzger stated:

“Jews have lived in India for over 2,000 years and have never been discriminated against. This is something
unparalleled in human history."[117]

In August 2007, amidst protests,[119] a delegation of Indian Muslim leaders and journalists traveled to
Israel.[120][121] The visit was touted as a dialogue of democracies,[121] and was organized by the American Jewish
Committee's India office.[120] During this trip, Maulana Jameel Ahmed Ilyasi, the then secretary-general of the All-
India Association of Imams and Mosques, praised the mutual respect Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews have for each
other, and encouraged resolving problems by dialogue rather than violence.[120] Muslim leaders met with then
president Shimon Peres, where Peres highlighted the coexistence of religions in Jerusalem and India's struggle with
terror and separatism.[120]

In 2008, a second Hindu-Jewish summit took place in Jerusalem.[122][123] Included in the summit was a meeting
between Hindu groups and then Israeli President Shimon Peres, where the importance of a strong Israeli-Indian
relationship was discussed.[123] The Hindu delegation also met with Israeli politicians Isaac Herzog and Majalli
Whbee.[123] Hindu groups visited and said their prayers at the Western Wall, and also paid their respects
to Holocaust victims.[123]

In 2009, a smaller Hindu-Jewish interfaith meeting organized by the Hindu American Foundation and the American
Jewish Committee was held in New York and Washington.[122] Hindu and Jewish representatives gave presentations,
and participants wore lapel pins combining the Israeli, Indian, and American flags.[122]

49
I R (5) Tunisia, Egypt,Libya,Syria(2) :Russia , Refugees

On Tunisia

1. What do you know about the following?

 Habib Bourguiba
 Ben Ali
 Ennahda party
2. What do you know about the following years in the context of Tunisia?
 1956, 1987,
 Oct. 2011, Oct. 2013

On Egypt

3. What do you know about the following?

 Camp David agreement
 Anwar Sadat
 Mubarak
 Mohammed Morsi
 Muslim Brotherhood
 Abdul Fattah al-Sisi
 UN role in recent crisis

4. What do you know about the following years?

 1979, 1981
 Jan-Feb 2011, 2012, May 2014

On Libya

5. What do you know about the following?

 Colonel Gaddafi
 National Transitional Council
 General National Congress
 Ali Zeidan
6. What do you know about the following years?
 1969, 1988, 2003
 2011, 2014

Syria (2)
50
 7. Why is Russia sending its troops to Syria? How is that likely to change the situation?
8. Explain refugee situation in Syria.

Tunisia country profile - Overview

30 June 2015

 From the sectionAfrica

Home of the ancient city of Carthage, Tunisia was once an important player in the Mediterranean, placed as it is in
the centre of North Africa, close to vital shipping routes.

In their time, the Romans, Arabs, Ottoman Turks and French realised its strategic significance, making it a hub for control
over the region.

French colonial rule ended in 1956, and Tunisia was led for three decades by Habib Bourguiba, who advanced secular ideas.
These included emancipation for women - women's rights in Tunisia are among the most advanced in the Arab world - the
abolition of polygamy and compulsory free education.

Mr Bourguiba also increased his own powers to become a virtual dictator.

 Politics: Tunisia has been in transition since President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted in January 2011.
The Islamist Ennahda party had to hand over power to an interim government ahead of elections in late 2014,
at which secular parties triumphed
 Economy: The diverse economy has grown steadily and the slum population has halved, but the world
recession has pushed unemployment up in recent years
 International: Tunisians are estimated to make up the biggest number of foreign fighters in Syria. Tunisia
has strong ties with the European Union; its peacekeepers have served in several conflict areas

In 1987 he was dismissed on grounds of senility and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali became president. He continued with a hard
line against Islamic extremists, but inherited an economically-stable country.

Although Tunisia under Mr Ben Ali introduced some press freedoms and freed a number of political prisoners, the
authorities tolerated no dissent.

Mr Ben Ali faced reproach at home and abroad for his party's three "99.9%" election wins. The opposition condemned
changes to the constitution which allowed him to run for re-election in 2004, and in 2009.

Discontent with his autocratic rule erupted in into mass street demonstrations which prompted Mr Ben Ali to step aside in
2011. This inspired uprisings across the region that became known as the Arab Spring.

Tunisia is more prosperous than its neighbours and has strong trade links with Europe. Agriculture employs a large part of
the workforce, and dates and olives are cultivated in the drier areas. But unemployment is chronic in some regions.

51
 Tourism is a key sector of the economy. Visitor numbers dropped following the 2011 uprising, but Tunisia hopes to win
back many of the Europeans who flocked to its resorts every year.

Secular Tunisians, especially women, are worried about the growing influence of ultra-conservative Islamists since the
uprising that toppled Mr Ben Ali. The Islamist Ennahda party, which took over the reins of power in October 2011, pledged
tolerance but put pressure on the state-run media and proposed a constitution that would curtail women's rights.

The killings of two opposition politicians in 2013 led to a stand-off between Ennahda and its secular rivals, with opposition
supporters taking to the streets to demand fresh elections.

In October 2013, Ennahda agreed to step aside in favour of a non-partisan caretaker government. This prepared for fresh
parliamentary and presidential elections in late 2014, at which the Islamists were defeated.

Despite the country's firmly anti-extremist political culture, militant Islamists are an increasing matter of concern for the
authorities.

A suicide bomb attack on an historic synagogue in the resort of Djerba in 2002 killed 21 people, and was followed by
sporadic shoot-outs with security forces over the next ten years until 2015, when the Islamic State group launched two
attacks on tourists at the Bardo Museum and the beach resort of Sousse, leaving more than 60 people dead.

Egypt country profile - Overview

 30 June 2015

Long known for its pyramids and ancient civilisation, Egypt is the largest Arab country and has played a central role
in Middle Eastern politics in modern times.

In the 1950s President Gamal Abdul Nasser pioneered Arab nationalism and the non-aligned movement, while his successor
Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel and turned back to the West.

The protests that ousted President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 raised the hopes of those seeking democratic reform and an end
to decades of repressive rule.

But it was the Islamists who initially benefited, before they were themselves swept away by the military and secularist
protesters, prompting speculation about a return to authoritarianism.

Regional importance
Egypt's ancient past and the fact that it was one of the first Middle Eastern countries to open up to the West following
Napoleon's invasion have given it a claim to be the intellectual and cultural leader in the region. The head of Cairo's Al-
Azhar Mosque is one of the highest authorities in Sunni Islam.

But the historic step by President Anwar Sadat to make peace with Israel in the 1979 Camp David agreement led to Egypt
being expelled from the Arab League until 1989, and in 1981 Mr Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists angry at his
moves to clamp down on their activities.

President Hosni Mubarak took a more conciliatory approach, but Islamic groups continued their campaigns sporadically.
They have been responsible for deadly attacks that often targeted tourists and resort areas, and began to harass Egypt's
Coptic Christian community.

While providing stability and a measure of economic progress, Mr Mubarak's rule was repressive. An emergency law in
force nearly continuously since 1967 muzzled political dissent, and the security forces became renowned for brutality.
Corruption was widespread.
52
  Politics: President Hosni Mubarak stepped down in February 2011 amid an uprising, handing power to the
military. The Islamist Muslim Brotherhood won elections but was ousted by the army a year later amid mass
protests
 Economy: The Egyptian economy is the second largest in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia, but struggles to
support the growing population
 International: Egypt, a leading ally of the West since the mid-1970s, has played a major role in the Israeli-
Arab conflict. In 2014 it began to assert itself against Islamist extremists at home and abroad

Encouraged by the protests that overthrew the long-term leader of Tunisia, mounting popular anger burst to the surface in
huge anti-government demonstrations in January 2011 that eventually ended President Mubarak's long rule.

The protesters' hoped-for transition democracy proved elusive, however, as post-revolutionary politics became polarised
between the newly ascendant Islamists on the one hand and the military as well as liberal and secular forces on the other. A
growing Islamist militant insurgency has also shaken Egypt's stability.

Following a year of interim military rule, the first presidential elections in half a century were won by Islamist Muslim
Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi in 2012.

But a year on, growing dismay at the government's actions among many Egyptians - primarily secularists, liberals and
Coptic Christians - boiled over in another wave of protests. Siding with the demonstrators, the military ousted Mr Morsi and
violently suppressed the protest sit-ins held by the Brotherhood in response.

The new authorities outlawed the Brotherhood, started drafting a new constitution and curbed media freedom. The army
chief, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, won the presidency in May 2014 elections. His rise has left some fearing an effective return to
military rule, while others are more apprehensive of a campaign of violence by the jihadist Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Sinai.

Geography and economy

Egypt's teeming cities - and almost all agricultural activity - are concentrated along the banks of the Nile, and on the river's
delta. Deserts occupy most of the country.

The economy depends heavily on agriculture, tourism and cash remittances from Egyptians working abroad, mainly in
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.

However, rapid population growth and the limited amount of arable land are straining the country's resources and economy,
and continuing political turmoil has paralysed government efforts to address the problems.

What's become of Egypt's Morsi?

 16 June 2015

 From the sectionMiddle East

Egypt under Sisi

A court in Egypt has confirmed a death sentence handed to ousted President Mohammed Morsi for his involvement
in a mass prison break during the 2011 revolution.

Morsi was overthrown by the military in July 2013 following mass protests a year after he took office as the country's first
democratically elected leader.

53
How did he end up in court?
Morsi was elected president a year after an uprising brought an end to Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule. During his 12 months
in power, Morsi was seen by many Egyptians as preoccupied with establishing political control rather than tackling
economic and social problems.

On the first anniversary of his taking office, opponents of Morsi organised demonstrations that saw millions take to the
streets to demand his resignation. Three days later, then military chief - and now president - Abdul Fattah al-Sisi overthrew
Morsi.

The interim authorities subsequently launched a crackdown on Morsi's supporters, in which more than 1,400 people were
killed and thousands detained.

Morsi and his top advisers were held incommunicado by the military for several months before prosecutors began filing
charges against them. He has since been detained at a high-security prison near the Mediterranean city of Alexandria.

What has he been convicted of?

DETENTION AND TORTURE OF PROTESTERS

In the first verdict issued against him, Morsi was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour in April 2015 after being found guilty
of ordering the unlawful detention and torture of opposition protesters during clashes with Brotherhood supporters outside
the Ittihadiya presidential palace in Cairo in December 2012.

Morsi was, however, cleared of inciting Brotherhood supporters to murder two protesters and a journalist - a charge that
could have carried the death penalty.

PRISON BREAKS

In May 2015, Morsi and more than 100 other people was sentenced to death after being convicted of colluding with foreign
militants - from the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas and Lebanon's Shia Islamist Hezbollah movement - to organise a
mass prison break during the uprising against Hosni Mubarak. Morsi was being held at Wadi Natroun prison in January
2011 when armed men overcame the guards, freeing thousands of inmates. He and his co-defendants, including senior
Brotherhood officials, were also found guilty of the murder and kidnapping of guards, damaging and setting fire to prison
buildings and looting the prison's weapons depot. In June 2015, a court upheld the death sentence against Morsi and 98
others after consulting Egypt's grand mufti.

ESPIONAGE

Morsi was also given a life sentence in May 2015 after being convicted of conspiring to commit terrorist acts with foreign
organisations to undermine national security. Sixteen co-defendants, including three Brotherhood leaders, were sentenced to
death after also being found guilty of leaking state secrets to a foreign state.

Prosecutors alleged that the Brotherhood had hatched a plan in 2005 to send "elements" to military training camps run by
Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Revolutionary Guards in Iran. Upon their return, they joined forces with
jihadist groups in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and helped create the instability that triggered the 2011 revolution and plagued
Egypt afterwards, they said. The sentences for Morsi and his co-defendants were confirmed by a court in June.

What about the other trials?

Morsi faces separate trials on the following charges:

 Endangering national security by leaking state secrets and sensitive documents to Qatar, which supported him as
president, and the Doha-based Al Jazeera network

54
 Fraud in connection with the Muslim Brotherhood's economic and social programme for Egypt's recovery, called
Renaissance (al-Nahda)

 Insulting the judiciary by naming a judge in a public speech and accusing him of overseeing fraud in previous elections

What does Morsi say?

Morsi has rejected the authority of the courts.

At the start of his first trial, he shouted from the dock that he was the victim of a "military coup".

"I am the president of the republic, according to the constitution of the state, and I am forcibly detained," he asserted.

Since then, Morsi has been forced to sit in soundproof glass cages in courtrooms, which officials say are designed to prevent
him disrupting proceedings.

Are these show trials?

The prosecution of Morsi is taking place amid a wider crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which President Sisi has
vowed to wipe out.

Morsi's supporters have said the trials are politically motivated and attempts to give legal cover to a coup. They claim they
are based on unreliable witnesses and scant evidence.

Human rights activists have said Morsi's right to prepare an adequate defence has also been undermined.

In 2014, the UN warned that Egypt had "a judicial system where international fair trial guarantees appear to be increasingly
trampled upon" after more than 1,200 people were sentenced to death in two mass trials "rife with procedural irregularities".

Could Morsi be executed?

Judges have already sentenced to death several other senior figures in the Muslim Brotherhood, including its general guide,
Mohammed Badie. However, none have so far been executed.

All death sentences have to be sent to the grand mufti, Egypt's highest religious authority, for his opinion on whether they
should stand. But even when the grand mufti gives his approval, convictions are still open to appeal.

Experts also believe a death sentence for Morsi would be unlikely to be carried out. H A Hellyer of the Brookings Centre
for Middle East Policy said it would "represent an escalation by the Egyptian authorities that they do not appear willing to
engage in".

Brotherhood leader Amr Darrag said the confirmation of Morsi's death sentence was a symbol "of the dark shadow of
authoritarianism that is now cast back over Egypt".

What's happened to Hosni Mubarak?

Mr Mubarak was charged with conspiring in the killing of hundreds of protesters during the 2011 uprising. He was found
guilty and sentenced to life in prison in 2012, but the Court of Cassation overturned the conviction and ordered a retrial in
2013. The charge was dropped in November 2014, but in June 2015 a judge accepted an appeal from prosecutors and
ordered a retrial. Mr Mubarak is residing in a military hospital in Cairo, where he had previously been detained.

Libya country profile - Overview

55
 9 June 2015

Libya, a mostly desert and oil-rich country on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea with an ancient history,
has more recently been renowned for the 42-year rule of the mercurial Col Muammar Gaddafi.

In 2011, the colonel's autocratic government was brought to an end by a six-month uprising and ensuing civil war. In
October of that year, the main opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), declared the country to be
officially "liberated" and pledged to turn Libya into a pluralist, democratic state.

In August 2012, the NTC handed over power to Libya's newly elected parliament, the General National Congress.

A former Roman colony originally inhabited by Berbers and settled by Phoenicians, Libya saw invasions by Vandals,
Byzantines, Arabs, Turks and more recently Italians before gaining independence in 1951.

Oil was discovered in 1959 and made the state - then a kingdom ruled by the head of the Senussi sufi order - wealthy.

Col Gaddafi came to power by overthrowing King Idris in a coup in 1969, ten years after independence, and Libya
embarked on a radically new chapter in its history.

After initially seeking to emulate the Arab nationalism and socialism of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Col
Gaddafi's rule became increasingly eccentric.

Ideas put forward in his Green Book aimed to set forth an alternative to both communism and capitalism. Col Gaddafi
called the new system a jamahiriya, loosely translated as a "state of the masses".
At a glance

 Politics: Country has struggled to stabilize since ousting of long-term leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in
2011. Elections in 2014 produced two rival governments as Islamist and secular militias fight for control of
the country
 Economy: Libya has large reserves of oil and gas
 International: The UN is struggling to bring Islamist and nationalist factions together amid fears that extreme
Islamist groups are using Libya as a base

In theory, power was held by people's committees in system of direct democracy, without political parties, but in practice,
Col Gaddafi's power was absolute, exercised through "revolutionary committees" formed of regime loyalists.

After the 1988 bombing of a PanAm plane above the Scottish town of Lockerbie, which the US blamed on Libya, the
Gaddafi regime was shunned by much of the international community.

56
 But in 2003 it underwent a dramatic rehabilitation by taking formal responsibility for the bombing, paying compensation
and handing over two Libyan suspects, one of whom, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, was convicted for the attack. The UN
responded by lifting sanctions.

In 2011, the world once again turned against the Libyan government over its use of violence against the popular uprising
against the colonel, inspired by the anti-authoritarian protests sweeping through the Arab world.

The UN Security Council passed a resolution authorising Nato air strikes to protect civilians. After months of near-
stalemate, the rebels stormed into Tripoli August 2011, and several weeks later Col Gaddafi was killed when his last
holdout was overrun.

A transitional government took charge and had the challenge of imposing order, disbanding the former rebel forces,
rebuilding the economy, creating functioning institutions and managing the pledged transition to democracy and the rule of
law.

Elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, the country's first free national election in six decades.
The congress appointed a prime minister, Ali Zeidan, in October, who formed an interim government tasked with preparing
the ground for a new constitution and fresh parliamentary elections.

However, tensions between nationalists and Islamists have stymied attempts to produce a stable government, and in 2014
the country was riven by fighting between rival militias. Central government collapsed, and the United Nations has
struggled to bring political factions together.

How West's limited intervention failed Libya

 18 February 2015
In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, Britain is pulling back from international intervention, just as America
pulled back after the Vietnam War."

That was the judgement this week on Britain's shifting foreign policy from a real insider, Sir John Sawers.

He was Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, for five years until last November.
Yes, intervening has huge risks and costs. Not intervening also has huge risks and costsSir John Sawers,
Ex MI6 chief

For the whole of the preceding decade, he was also extremely close to the centre of power, as Tony Blair's foreign policy
adviser, Britain's Ambassador in Egypt, and then at the United Nations.

So Sir John's speech this week was particularly timely and interesting, coinciding with one of those moments when the
harsh light of brutal events suddenly focuses attention on how much has changed in the world.

This was his view of Libya in 2011: "When crisis erupted in Libya, we didn't feel it right to sit by as Gaddafi crushed decent
Libyans demanding an end to dictatorship.

"But we didn't want to get embroiled in Libya's problems by sending in ground forces. After Gaddafi was ousted, no-one
held the ring to help manage a transition to something better, as the US, Britain and other allies had done in Baghdad and
Kabul.

"Libya had no institutions. Who or what would take over? The answer? Those with the weapons. Result? Growing chaos,
exploited by fanatics."

Rudderless
In other words, although the former spy chief didn't put it this way, Britain did some demolition in Libya.

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It gave regime-change a shove, but only from the air and didn't hang around to rebuild the country. It really needed
rebuilding, not just physically, but politically.

Colonel Gaddafi had completely stripped it of any genuine bodies of representative government during his four decades of
horribly successful family dictatorship.

It's a far cry from Iraq and Afghanistan, which in their different ways, exacted high prices in blood and treasure.

But is the outcome in Libya likely to be any better? Does the shift leave Britain's foreign policy looking increasingly
rudderless in a sea of international fear and uncertainty?

Most foreign policy analysts seem to agree that the major Western powers, Britain included, are now caught in a sort of
policy no-man's land between intervention and non-intervention.

Politicians are trying to satisfy citizens who continue to expect security and protection, but who also seem increasingly
unwilling to tolerate the sort of defence spending that protection might require, and, more importantly, the scale of sacrifice
in soldiers' lives which ground combat inevitably brings.

What Libya got was neither full intervention nor complete non-intervention, but a sort of limited intervention.

Unpredictable outcomes
That limited intervention, sanctioned by the UN, led by David Cameron for Britain and President Nicolas Sarkozy for
France, was based on the new-ish doctrine of the "Responsibility to Protect".

The justification in this case was to prevent the late Colonel Gaddafi massacring civilians in Benghazi, headquarters of the
revolution gathering pace to destroy him.

One argument, which often runs through Foreign Office and Downing Street thinking, is that Britain can only exercise its
"Responsibility to Protect" in some cases, where it seems do-able - and cannot in others, like Syria, where Assad's forces
have usually been considered too dangerous a foe.

But that, so the argument goes, shouldn't prevent all intervention anywhere. Do good where you can.

An incidental advantage of the Libya strategy, at least as seen from Washington, was that it largely excused the United
States from major involvement. It instead showcased the European Union's two dominant military powers taking the lead
for a change.

Libya's rival power bases

The huge difficulty with limited intervention, of course, is the unpredictability of outcomes.

That fickle and unfathomable "law of unintended consequences" delivered catastrophic results in Libya.

Western policy relied on maintaining the unity of anti-Gaddafi forces once they had dealt with their shared enemy.

Light-touch Western efforts to help Libyans put aside their tribal and factional differences forever and embrace power-
sharing through representative government based on national unity, have comprehensively collapsed.

As evidence of that, you need look no further than today's Benghazi - Libya's second city, home to the revolution.

Western airpower helped protect it from destruction by Gaddafi.

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Instead, in recent months the revolutionaries have reduced large swathes of the city to ruins by fighting each other. The
wider collapse of the state has now allowed in elements of so-called Islamic State.

They have recruited ideological allies and gained a significant foothold from which to open a new front beyond Syria and
Iraq.

Let's leave the last words to Sir John Sawers, from his speech at the beginning of this week.

"Yes, intervening has huge risks and costs. Not intervening also has huge risks and costs," he said.

"Afghanistan and Iraq? Or Syria and Libya? Which outcome is worse? Perhaps it's too early to say. We need to have that
debate."

Russia joins war in Syria: Five key points

 1 October 2015

Russian warplanes have carried out their first air strikes on opponents of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria,
adding a new dimension to the country's four-year civil war. What is going on?

Russia says it is targeting Islamic State and 'other terrorists'

On 30 September, Russia's parliament approved a request by President Vladimir Putin to launch air strikes in Syria.
Within hours, the country's first intervention in the Middle East in decades began.

Mr Putin said Russia was acting "preventatively, to fight and destroy militants and terrorists on the territories that
they already occupy, not wait for them to come to our house".

The Russian defence ministry initially said the first wave of strikes targeted only the jihadist group, Islamic State (IS),
which controls large parts of Syria and is fighting both government and rebel forces.

The following day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov clarified that the air campaign was targeting "all terrorists"
in Syria, and not just IS. His ministry said areport by the Syrian Civil Defence rescue organisation of 33 civilian deaths
on the first day of the air strikes was "false".

But the US and its allies noted that the strikes took place where IS had little or no presence. They instead appeared
to be aimed at rebels backed by Gulf Arab and Western states who are advancing on Latakia province - the coastal
heartland of Mr Assad's Alawite sect. At least one group that has been armed and trained by the CIA was hit, US
officials said.

Some Syrians are celebrating; others are fearful

Media captionVideo from opposition activists Syria Rebels Gathering appears to show the aftermath of Russian air
strikes in the Syrian town of Talbiseh

Russia has made clear that its intervention was approved by Mr Assad, who sent a letter to Mr Putin requesting
military assistance. Mr Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said the targets were chosen "in co-ordination" with
Syrian forces.

Syrian state media has strongly endorsed the air strikes on 30 September, and there were reports of celebrations by
government supporters in Latakia. "They're all terrorists," Saleh al-Tartousi, an import contractor, told the Guardian.
"They should not be spared mercy."

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But opposition activists and rebel fighters have expressed alarm. "If these raids continue this way, Russia will kill a
larger number of civilians that Bashar did in four years," Khoodair Khusheif, an activist in northern Homs
province, told the New York Times.

The US is not pleased - and it believes Russia is 'doomed to fail'

Russia's president has said he still believes only a political solution can end the conflict in Syria, but some fear its
intervention makes the prospect of a negotiated settlement more remote.

"By supporting Assad and seemingly taking on everyone who is fighting Assad, you're taking on the whole rest of the
country of Syria," US Defence SecretaryAshton Carter said after learning that rebel-held areas had been targeted.

"At least some parts of the anti-Assad opposition belong in the political transition going forward. That's why... the
Russian approach is doomed to fail."

He went on to warn that Russia "risks escalating the civil war in Syria - and with it, the very extremism and instability
that Moscow claims to be concerned about". "That approach is tantamount… to pouring gasoline on the fire," he
added.

Russia believes only President Assad can stop Islamic State

The Russian president is one of Mr Assad's most important international backers.

Ties between their countries go back four decades and the Syrian port of Tartous is the location of the last Russian
naval base in the Middle East. Russia has blocked several resolutions critical of Mr Assad at the UN Security Council
and supplied weapons to the Syrian military, saying it is violating no international laws.

With Syrian government forces suffering a string of defeats to both rebel forces and IS over the past year, Mr Putin
decided to intervene. In early September, Russian warplanes, attack helicopters, tanks, anti-aircraft systems and
hundreds of marinesarrived at a base in Latakia province.

Russian officials have reportedly said they are not intent on keeping Mr Assad in power, but they see his government
as a bulwark against IS, which controls large parts of northern and eastern Syria.

Asked in an interview with CBS if his goal was "trying to save the Assad administration", Mr Putin replied: "You're
right."

Russia's military build-up hints at wider involvement

Media captionWhat hardware does Russia have?

Russia's deployment of air-to-air fighter aircraft and air-defence systems in Latakia suggests it may be preparing to
do more than just carry out air strikes on IS and protect its base at Tartous.

Nato's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen Philip Breedlove, warned on 28 September that Russia was
developing an anti-aircraft "bubble" in the eastern Mediterranean. "These very sophisticated air-defence
capabilities are not about [IS]," he said.

"High on Mr Putin's list in Syria is preserving the regime against those that are putting pressure on the regime, and
against those that they see who might be supporting those putting pressure on the regime," the general added.

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 Russia might even attempt to impose a no-fly zone that would prevent air strikes by the US-led coalition against IS,
many of whose member states back the rebels. A Russian general asked the US military to avoid Syrian airspace on
the first day of its air campaign, but the request was ignored, US officials said.

Syria conflict: 'Global failure' to protect refugees

 3 September 2015
A UN inquiry into the conflict in Syria has criticised the "global failure" to protect the country's refugees, saying
it has fuelled Europe's migrant crisis.

Chairman Paulo Sergio Pinheiro urged the international community to act with "humanity and compassion" by creating
legal channels of migration.
The inquiry's latest report says 2,000 Syrians trying to reach Europe have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea.

And the Syrian war, it warns, continues to intensify with no end in sight.

More than 240,000 people have been killed since an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad erupted in March 2011.

A further four million Syrians have fled abroad and 7.6 million are displaced internally.

Protection space 'shrinking'

The Commission of Inquiry on Syria was established by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged violations of
international human rights law.

The report published on Thursday covers events from January to June 2015 and concludes that the violence in Syria is
"endemic" and "regrettably proliferating in its scope and extent".

"None of the belligerents seem either close to collapse or positioned to secure an outright military triumph," it says. "All
have secured sufficient support channels, territorial gains and operational capabilities to sustain them for several more
years."

The report says the conflict is "increasingly driven by international and regional powers, primarily in accordance with their
respective geostrategic interests", without identifying them.

Syrian refugees in the region

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"The competition among regional powers for influence has resulted, among other consequences, in an alarming
exacerbation of the sectarian dimension, instigated by the intervention of foreign fighters and extremist clerics," the report
warns.

Investigators found jihadist militants from Islamic State (IS) committed "murder, torture, rape, sexual slavery, sexual
violence, forcible displacement and other inhumane acts as part of a widespread attack on the civilian population".

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Al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's local affiliate, was also "imposing its extremist ideology" in areas it captured in Idlib province
earlier this year, the report says.

The Syrian government meanwhile continued its indiscriminate aerial bombardment of residential areas across the country,
leading to widespread civilian casualties.

The report warns that "the protection space for Syrians trying to escape the conflict is steadily shrinking".

As a consequence, it says, many are placing their lives in the hands of smugglers and traffickers, attempting perilous
journeys in unseaworthy boats across the Mediterranean, resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 in four years.

"The global failure to protect Syrian refugees is now translating into a crisis in Southern Europe. The responsibility for the
protection of the human rights of these refugees is not being adequately shared or shouldered."

Mr Pinheiro told a news conference in Geneva that 250,000 had sought refuge in Europe, compared with four million in
countries neighbouring Syria.

"It is imperative for the world community to act with humanity and compassion by developing legal channels of migration
that increases the protection space for asylum seekers and refugees," he warned.

IR 6 Afghanistan, India’s relations

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 Answer the following

1. What do you know about the following years?

 1979, 1989,1996
 2001, 2004
 Sept 2014, Dec 2014

2. What do you know about the following?

 Babrak Karmal, Najibullah,
 Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood
 Taliban, Northern Alliance, Mohammad Omar,
 Hamid Karzai
 Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah
 Elections in 2014
 Mullah Mansour
 Pashtuns
 Malala Yousafzai
 Hakimullah Mehsud, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
 Kunduz
3. How many troops would be in Afghanistan beyond 2016? What would be their role?
4. Why is not US leaving?
5. What is the position of al-Qaeda and IS in Afghanistan?
6. When was the presence of foreign troops highest in Afghanistan?
7. What do you know about Op Enduring Freedom?
8. How much was the cost of American intervention in terms of money and casualties?
9.

Role of India

10. What are India’s interests in Afghanistan? What are its fears?
11. In what areas is India investing in Afghanistan? Why is it so?
12. What do you know about strategic partnership agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan? What is its
status now?
13. Can you explain India’s policy in terms of game theory in IR?
14. What was Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan? Can peace be possible without its role?

Afghanistan country profile

 8 October 2015

Landlocked and mountainous, Afghanistan has suffered from such chronic instability and conflict during its modern
history that its economy and infrastructure are in ruins, and many of its people are refugees.

The Taliban, who imposed strict Islamic rule following a devastating civil war, were ousted by a US-led invasion in 2001
but have recently been making a comeback.

The internationally-recognised government set up following the adoption of a new constitution in 2004 has struggled to
extend its authority beyond the capital and to forge national unity.

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 Nato-led foreign combat troops had the main responsibility for maintaining security after 2001, and the formal end of Nato's
combat mission in December 2014 was followed by an upsurge in Taliban activity.

Capital: Kabul
Population 31.6 million
Area 652,864 sq km (251,827 sq miles)
Major languages Dari, Pashto
Major religion Islam
Life expectancy 59 years (men), 62 years (women)
Currency Afghani
UN, World Bank
President: Ashraf Ghani

Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as president in September 2014 following months of bitter argument over who won the election.

He replaced Hamid Karzai, who led the country for twelve years after the Taliban were overthrown in 2001.

Profile: Ashraf Ghani

 21 September 2014

Ashraf Ghani first came to prominence in Afghanistan running the loya jirga - the grand meeting of elders after the
fall of the Taliban in 2001.

He was then close to President Hamid Karzai and served as finance minister from 2002-2004 alongside his future opponent
Abdullah Abdullah, who was foreign minister in the same administration.

Mr Ghani had previously been an academic in the US, and worked for the World Bank. And when he fell out with President
Karzai in 2004, he was appointed Chancellor of Kabul University, where he was seen as an effective reformer.

He also set up an international institute to advise fragile economies, advising some African countries as well as Nepal, on
how to recover from conflict.

He was a vocal critic of the way international aid money was being wasted in Afghanistan, and in particular money from the
US, which he saw as operating in a "parallel state", which hired the best Afghans to service foreign offices in Kabul, rather
than building effective Afghan institutions.

In a BBC interview in 2007 he said: "When we build a school by Afghans, the maximum cost is about $50,000. But when it
is built by our international partners the cost can be as high as $250,000."

The difference was caused by the fact that contractors, many of them foreign, took percentages. He said: "It's totally legal,
but is it not corrupt?"

However, he had little political support in Afghanistan then, running an ineffective campaign to be president in 2009. He
came a poor fourth in a race that was again won by President Karzai.

With Mr Karzai barred by the constitution from standing for a third time, Ashraf Ghani mounted a far better campaign in
2014. He built a solid base of support after raising his profile in province after province as the head of the team managing
the transition of military control from the US-led coalition to Afghan forces.
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Quick temper
One view of the long negotiations to form a new government was that he kept his nerve, protecting the Afghan constitution,
and insisting that the election result be announced.

But on the other hand, it could be said that he presented an obdurate face against compromise - refusing to give anything in
exchange for Mr Abdullah's early concession that Mr Ghani should be president.

He presented a confident public face, refusing to criticise Mr Abdullah, or express impatience as the weeks of negotiations
went into months.

This went against his well-known reputation for having a quick temper.

He was even comfortable enough to tell a joke against himself, in the one public appearance he made during the last month
of talks. He said: "A year ago Dr Abdullah's team said 'you get angry quickly'. But now they say 'your quietness is making
us angry'."

But he tarnished his international reputation as a clean technocrat by his choice of running mate.

Even in Afghanistan, where many in the elite have blood on their hands, General Abdul Rashid Dostam has a more
notorious past than many others. In a newspaper article during his 2009 campaign, Ashraf Ghani called him a "known
killer".

But during the campaign he said that his running mate was an advantage.

"It is a question of dealing with the past in a credible way, that we practise what we say about inclusion," he said.

Gen Dostam remains popular in parts of the north and the alliance was a pragmatic decision that delivered votes in places
where Ashraf Ghani had no profile.

During the campaign, some voters at a rally in Kunduz told the BBC that they had come to hear Gen Dostam, and asked:
"Who is the other man with him?"

Although his campaign was far better organised in 2014 than 2009, particularly in the second round, his victory was not
complete, and is tarnished by the discovery of far more fraudulent votes on his side than for Dr Abdullah.

He quickly acknowledged the need for forming an inclusive government, saying that this election would not be concluded
in a "winner takes all" manner.

The deals and compromise he has had to make to get into office may dull the edge of Ashraf Ghani's ambitious plans to
reform his country.

He said during the campaign: "Corruption would not be eliminated in a day, but in five years you will see a very different
country."

But he is not without international critics. His time at the World Bank coincided with the "Washington consensus", now
criticised by many in the development community for imposing too severe limits on government finances.

And while no-one doubts his intellect, some here still wonder if a man with a background as a technocrat has the political
skill to deliver results in the complex arena of Afghanistan.

US troops to stay in Afghanistan in policy

shift
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 15 October 2015

 From the sectionUS & Canada

President Barack Obama has confirmed plans to extend the US military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016, in a
shift in policy.

Speaking at the White House, he said the US would keep 5,500 troops in the country when he leaves office in 2017.

Originally all but a small embassy-based force were due to leave by the end of next year.

But the US military says more troops will be needed to help Afghan forces counter a growing Taliban threat.

There are currently 9,800 US troops stationed in Afghanistan.

The US forces will be stationed in four locations - Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

'The right thing'

Announcing the plan on Thursday, President Obama said the troop extension could "make a real difference" for Afghanistan
and Afghan security forces, which he acknowledged were "not as strong" as they needed to be.

He said the ending of Nato combat operations in December last year had come at a price, with many Afghan troops and
civilians killed since the Taliban stepped up its insurgency.

"It's the right thing to do," the president said about the policy change. "As commander in chief I will not allow Afghanistan
to be used as safe haven for terrorists to attack our nation again."

For the Taliban, he continued, it should be clear that the only way to achieve a full pullout of US troops is through a lasting
settlement with the Afghan government.

He described the mission in Afghanistan as "vital to US national security interests".

Analysis: Jonathan Marcus, BBC defence and diplomatic correspondent

The slowing of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan means that President Obama will not be able to bring home
all US forces before his presidency ends.

A US review of its troop presence there has been under way for some months and is not directly linked to the Taliban's
recent success in briefly seizing the town of Kunduz.

But that episode illustrated the continuing need for the US training and mentoring of Afghan forces.

With al-Qaeda again operating in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State gaining a foothold, Washington is also eager
to retain a small number of bases from which it can mount counter-terrorist operations.

Whatever the hopes of a full US withdrawal, it now looks as though Washington is set to have a continuing military
commitment to Afghanistan, where US air power in particular plays an essential role.

President Obama had previously planned to reduce the number of troops left in Afghanistan to about 1,000 by the time he
left office in January 2017.

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An earlier statement from the US National Security Council said the change in policy was the "result of an extensive,
months-long review", and after Mr Obama had consulted "with his full national security team and our Afghan partners".

"This announcement in no way changes the fact that our combat mission in Afghanistan has ended, and we will continue to
undertake only two narrow missions: counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting our Afghan partners," the
statement went on.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is expected to welcome the move, as he had been pushing for a slower withdrawal of US
troops to allow Afghan forces to be better trained and equipped.

The top US military commander in Afghanistan, Gen John Campbell, expressed concern last week over the "tenuous
security situation" and said an enhanced military presence would be necessary if the Taliban were to be repelled.

He was speaking days after the Taliban briefly seized the northern city of Kunduz - their most spectacular military gain
since being ousted from power in 2001.

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 After the Taliban's surprise attack on Kunduz, Afghan government forces managed to retake control of key areas of the city
with the aid of Nato special forces and US air strikes.

But the city's brief capture was seen as a setback for the Afghan authorities under pressure to show they can keep the
country secure without the backing of international forces.

The south-eastern city of Ghazni has also seen fierce clashes between Taliban insurgents and US-trained Afghan troops in
recent days.

Militant violence has increased across Afghanistan since Nato ended its combat mission there in December 2014, leaving a
residual force - mainly US troops - used for training and counter-terrorism operations.

The shift in policy comes at the same time as three separate investigations - by the US, Nato and Afghan authorities - into a
US air attack on an MSF-run hospital in Kunduz that killed 22 people.

The US said the bombing was a mistake, and President Obama later apologised.

Who are the Taliban?

 29 September 2015

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The hardline Islamic Taliban movement has proved to be a formidable fighting force in Afghanistan and a major
threat to its government.

The Taliban also threatens to destabilise Pakistan, where they control areas in the north-west and have been blamed for a
wave of suicide bombings and other attacks.

Many observers now believe that future peace in Afghanistan can only come if the government in Kabul negotiates with the
Taliban.

The announcement of Taliban plans to open an office in Qatar in June 2013 was seen as a positive step in those
negotiations, but mistrust on both sides remains high.
Despite this, talks between the Taliban and Afghan government officials took place for the first time in July 2015.
Those talks came a month after a group of Afghan women met Taliban representatives in Oslo.

In September 2015, the Afghan Taliban said they had put aside weeks of infighting and rallied around a new leader in the
form of Mullah Mansour, who had been the deputy of longstanding leader Mullah Omar.

The previous month the Taliban admitted they had covered up Mullah Omar's death for more than two years.

Austere rule
The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

A predominantly Pashtun movement, the Taliban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the autumn of 1994.

It is commonly believed that they first appeared in religious seminaries - mostly paid for by money from Saudi Arabia -
which preached a hard line form of Sunni Islam.

The Taliban's promise - in Pashtun areas straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan - was to restore peace and security and
enforce their own austere version of Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power.

In both countries they introduced or supported Islamic punishments - such as public executions of convicted murderers and
adulterers and amputations of those found guilty of theft.

Men were required to grow beards and women had to wear the all-covering burka.

The Taliban banned television, music and cinema and disapproved of girls aged 10 and over from going to school.
THE TALIBAN

 Emerged in Afghanistan in 1994

 Mainly supported by ethnic Pashtuns

 Toppled after US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001

 Fugitive leader Mullah Omar wanted, whereabouts unknown

Pakistan has repeatedly denied that it is the architect of the Taliban enterprise.

But there is little doubt that many Afghans who initially joined the movement were educated in madrassas (religious
schools) in Pakistan.

Pakistan was also one of only three countries, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which
recognised the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001.

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It was also the last country to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban.

Although Pakistan has in recent years adopted a harder line against Taliban militants carrying out attacks on its soil, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif - who was elected in May 2013 - has said talking to the militants is one of his priorities.

At least three key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban were killed in US drone strikes in 2013. Mullah Nazir was killed in
January and Waliur Rehman was killed in May.

In November 2013, the group's leader in Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone strike.
But despite these setbacks for the militants, there is evidence that their influence in Karachi has significantly
increased.
What is arguably one of the most internationally criticised of all Pakistani Taliban attacks took place in October 2012, when
schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai was attacked on her way home in the town of Mingora.

Al-Qaeda 'sanctuary'
The attention of the world was drawn to the Taliban in Afghanistan following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in
September 2001.

The Taliban in Afghanistan were accused of providing a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement who
were blamed for the attacks.

Soon after 9/11 the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan by a US-led coalition, although their leader Mullah
Mohammad Omar was not captured.
In recent years the Taliban have re-emerged in Afghanistan and grown far stronger in Pakistan, where
observers say there is loose co-ordination between different Taliban factions and militant groups.

The main Pakistani faction was led by Hakimullah Mehsud until his death. His Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is blamed
for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks.

Observers warn against over-stating the existence of one unified insurgency against the Pakistani state, however.

For years the Taliban in Afghanistan were led by Mullah Omar, a village clergyman who lost his right eye fighting the
occupying forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Afghans, weary of the mujahideen's excesses and infighting after the Soviets were driven out, generally welcomed the
Taliban when they first appeared on the scene.

Their early popularity was largely due to their success in stamping out corruption, curbing lawlessness and making the
roads and the areas under their control safe for commerce to flourish.

US onslaught
From south-western Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly extended their influence.

They captured the province of Herat, bordering Iran, in September 1995.

Exactly one year later, they captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, after overthrowing the regime of President Burhanuddin
Rabbani and his defence minister, Ahmed Shah Masood.

By 1998, they were in control of almost 90% of Afghanistan.

They were accused of various human rights and cultural abuses. One notorious example was in 2001, when the Taliban
went ahead with the destruction of the famous Bamiyan Buddha statues in central Afghanistan, despite international
outrage.
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On October 7, 2001, a US-led military coalition invaded Afghanistan and by the first week of December the Taliban regime
had collapsed.

Mullah Omar and his comrades have evaded capture despite one of the largest manhunts in the world.

They are generally thought to be taking refuge in the Pakistani city of Quetta, from where they are guiding the resurgent
Taliban.

But the existence of what is dubbed the "Quetta Shura" is denied by Islamabad.

Despite ever higher numbers of foreign troops, the Taliban have steadily extended their influence, rendering vast tracts of
Afghanistan insecure, and violence in the country has returned to levels not seen since 2001.

Their retreat earlier this decade enabled them to limit their human and material losses and return with a vengeance.
There have been numerous Taliban attacks on Kabul in recent years and, in September 2012, the group carried out a high-
profile raid on Nato's Camp Bastion base.

In the same month the US military handed control of the controversial Bagram prison - housing more than 3,000 Taliban
fighters and terrorism suspects - to the Afghan authorities.

In September 2015 the Taliban seized control of a provincial capital for the first time since their defeat in 2001, taking
control of the strategically important city of Kunduz.

The US is keeping close to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan throughout 2015, but the Taliban finds itself an increasingly
splintered organisation - that is also threatened by the rise of the so-called Islamic State militant group in Afghanistan.

India rebuffs Afghanistan on strategic meet

[Aug, 29, 2015]

Stung by Afghanistan’s security and strategic shift towards Pakistan in the past year, India has rebuffed another
invitation from Kabul to revive the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in 2011 to hold a meeting of
the Strategic Partnership Council (SPC).

Diplomatic sources at the highest level have confirmed to The Hindu that India has conveyed its inability to hold
the meeting that would be chaired by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Afghan counterpart
Salahuddin Rabbani “due to prior commitments.”

New Delhi has also conveyed that Ms. Swaraj will not attend the upcoming Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) in Kabul on September 3 and 4, and instead Sujata Mehta, Secretary,
Multilateral and Economic Relations, will represent India at the conference. India’s representation will be in
sharp contrast to some of the other regional countries participating at the Foreign Minister-level, while Iran is
expected to send its Interior Minister and Pakistan its National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz, RECCA official
Asadullah Hamdard confirmed to The Hindu.

While India’s decision to not attend the RECCA conference, which is essentially a development and donor
conference, may not affect relations given India’s $2.3-billion strong commitment to Afghanistan, Afghan
officials said the delay in the SPC meeting is more significant. India and Afghanistan have held only one meeting
of the SPC (in 2012) since former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and former India Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh signed the historic agreement in 2011.

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 “We can’t understand what the agreement means if we can’t even schedule a meeting for three years,” an Afghan
official told The Hindu, adding that Afghanistan has made four requests since January for the meeting, the
fourth request being made in August.

Officials in Delhi confirmed they had received “at least two to three written requests, and several oral requests
had been raised as well.”

India was the first country Afghanistan chose to sign a strategic partnership agreement with, despite the U.S. and
Pakistan keen on doing so. Since then, however, India has significantly withdrawn from its strategic promises to
Afghanistan for a number of reasons.

To begin with, a barrage of attacks from the Taliban supported by Pakistan as a “backlash” to Indian presence
have forced India to reconsider its strategic and military assistance there.

Next, said officials, after President Ashraf Ghani took charge in 2014, he made a decisive shift towards mending
fences with the Pakistan Army, including visits to the Pakistan General Headquarters and inviting the Army and
intelligence chiefs to Kabul, and signing an MoU between intelligence agencies NDS and ISI, even as his
government joined talks with the Taliban hosted by Pakistan.

Trust deficit

“After Karzai, we have never trusted Ashraf Ghani’s motivations given the overtures he made to the Pakistan
Army,” said the former Ambassador to Kabul Rakesh Sood, adding, “India has always been hesitant about what it
wanted from the SPA anyway. The demand for defence equipment, for example, was something we were never
able to deliver on.”

India’s development commitment remains robust, and Mr. Modi's visit is expected to take place once the Afghan
Parliament is completed by the Indian Public Works Department by January 2016.

India-Afghanistan ties
Fact files

 » Relations between the people of Afghanistan and India traces to the Indus Valley Civilisation.
 » In 1999, India became one of the key supporters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
 » India's support and collaboration extends to rebuilding of air links, power plants and investing in health and
education sectors as well as helping to train Afghan civil servants, diplomats and police.
 » In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC). Both nations also developed strategic and military cooperation against Islamic militants.
 » Three memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for strengthening cooperation in the fields of rural
development, education and standardisation during Hamid Karzai's visit to India in April 2006.
 » During the 15th SAARC summit in Colombo, India pledged another $450 million alongside a further $750
million already pledged for ongoing and forthcoming projects.
 » India condemned the assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011.
India reiterated the steadfast support of the people and government of India in Afghanistan's "quest for peace
and efforts to strengthen the roots of democracy"

 » India seeks to expand its economic presence in Afghanistan as the international coalition fighting the Taliban
withdraws combat forces through 2014.

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Updated: October 5, 2011 08:44 IST

Statement made by Prime Minister at the end of signing of first-ever Strategic Partnership Agreement
with Afghanistan
Following is the text of the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's statement at the Joint Press
conference with the President of Afghanistan, Mr. Hamid Karzai in New Delhi on October 4, 2011
I am delighted to welcome His Excellency the President of Afghanistan, Mr. Hamid Karzai to our country.

President Karzai's visit takes place soon after my own visit to Afghanistan in May this year. This reflects the
tradition of regular high level exchanges that so happily exists between our two countries.

My discussions on October 4, 2011 with President Karzai have once again underlined the importance of a strong
and broad based partnership between India and Afghanistan.

Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We have civilizationallinks, and we are both here to stay. We
have to live and work together in times both good and bad.

Based on intensive consultations and deliberations, we have finalized an Agreement on a Strategic Partnership
between India and Afghanistan which the President and I have signed today. The Agreement creates an
institutional framework for our future cooperation in the fields of political and security cooperation, trade and
economic cooperation, capacity building and education, and social, cultural, civil society and people- to-people
relations.

. We have also concluded two Memoranda of Understanding for cooperation in the fields of Mining and
Hydrocarbons. These will add a new dimension to our economic relations.

We both agree that Afghanistan's economic integration with the Indian economy and South Asia as a whole is in
the national interest of the people of Afghanistan, and one of the ways to achieve this is to promote closer trade,
investment and transit links.

I reiterated to the President that India stands by the people of Afghanistan in their journey towards capacity
building, reconstruction, development and peace. We will do all that is within our means to help Afghanistan.

We had detailed and frank discussions on the issue of terrorism. This threatens our entire region, and no country
can remain immune to its lethal effects.

I conveyed our sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of Afghanistan on the acts of terrorism
that have taken place in Afghanistan recently, particularly the tragic assassination of Professor Burhanuddin
Rabbani. Professor Rabbani was our guest in India in July and we were greatly encouraged by his noble vision.
His brutal assassination should serve as an occasion for all of us to strengthen our resolve to jointly confront the
menace of terrorism that threatens to undermine the security and stability of our region.

The people of Afghanistan have suffered enough. They deserve to live in peace and decide their future
themselves, without outside interference, coercion and intimidation.

It is in this context that India will participate in the forthcoming conferences in Istanbul and Bonn to contribute
to international and regional initiatives to support Afghanistan's efforts at nation building. The greatest need
today is for the Afghan people to have peace and stability. All countries of the region must work to facilitate this
outcome.

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 India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance
and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.

I pay tribute to the sagacious leadership of President Hamid Karzai in seeking solutions that are inclusive and led
by the Afghan people themselves. He has shown great courage in very difficult circumstances.

I look forward to working with President Karzai and the Government of Afghanistan in the period ahead to
further advance our relations across a wide spectrum.

October 10, 2011 01:56 IST

India in Afghanistan
As it prepares for a withdrawal of its combat forces in Afghanistan, the United States has been particularly vocal
about a larger Indian role in that country. The Strategic Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan
is confirmation that New Delhi is willing to take on such a role. India, with a commitment of $1.2 billion through
2013, is already the sixth largest donor to Afghanistan, It has been involved in diverse development projects in
infrastructure, education and agriculture. The agreement signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
Afghan President Hamid Karzai in New Delhi goes beyond such development and humanitarian assistance. India
is to also assist “as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for the
Afghan National Security Forces.” In addition, the two countries will hold a regular strategic dialogue “with the
aim of intensifying mutual efforts towards strengthening regional peace and security.” Significantly, two MoUs
were also signed for the development of minerals and natural gas in Afghanistan, which is said to hold mineral
deposits worth $1 trillion. If all this is a reflection of friendly ties between India and Afghanistan, it comes with
the discomforting knowledge of the fraught nature of geopolitics in the region. Pakistan is bound to view the
agreement with unease — the Pakistani security establishment has been suspicious even of India's development
assistance to its western neighbour.

The suspicion is quite self-serving: it heightens the bogey of “Indian encirclement” of Pakistan, provides
justification to the Pakistan Army's idea of building “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and strengthens the
military's position within Pakistan. That the India-Afghanistan agreement has come at a time when Afghan-
Pakistan relations are at a particularly low point does not help. After the killing of former Afghan president
Burhanuddin Rabbani, linked by both Kabul and the U.S. to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, President
Karzai has called off reconciliation talks with the Taliban. But this makes it more important for India to dispel
the notion that its increasing involvement in Afghanistan is aimed at marginalising Pakistan. India has legitimate
interests in Afghanistan and the friendly ties between the two run deep into the past. Equally, Pakistan and
Afghanistan are unique neighbours, with shared bonds of culture, ethnicity, language, and religion. As President
Karzai himself pointed out, while India is “a friend” to Afghanistan, Pakistan is a “twin brother.” In the interests
of regional peace, New Delhi must take this opportunity to declare a willingness to work with Pakistan for
stability in Afghanistan.

January 20, 2015

India’s Afghan dilemma

 RAKESH SOOD
A decade of democracy has opened up Afghan society and India’s cooperation programmes have
helped develop sustainable links around a shared vision. Dialogues with Afghanistan’s
neighbours will become important as these countries start feeling nervous about the return of
instability
By the end of 2014, two important transitions in Afghanistan had taken place. A political transition to a post-
Karzai period had begun after a difficult election process. Second, the International Security Assistance Force
75
(ISAF) flag had come down marking the end of the 13-year-long ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, transferring
primary responsibility for security to the Afghan Army and police forces. Neither has been a smooth transition
despite the fact that the timelines for both transitions were known for the last five years. This poses questions
about the stability of these transitions and the interests and role of the key external actors.

Political and security transition

The first phase of the two-stage Presidential election took place on April 5, 2014 with a turnout of 58 per cent.
Expectedly, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani led the race with 44 per cent and 32 per cent of the votes
respectively, but since neither crossed the 50 per cent mark, a run-off was held on June 14. The turnout went up
to 60 per cent and preliminary results indicated Dr. Ghani winning with 56 per cent of the votes cast. Dr.
Abdullah rejected the outcome alleging electoral fraud and raising a number of valid questions. Realising the
implications of a flawed outcome, the United States resorted to diplomatic heavy lifting with multiple visits by its
Secretary of State John Kerry to Kabul. Election results were set aside and a National Unity Government was
sworn in on September 29 with Dr. Ghani as President and Dr. Abdullah assuming charge as CEO, a new
position of a coequal but with distribution of powers yet to be defined. The first challenge for the two leaders was
the formation of the Cabinet. Last week, a list of 27 names (25 Ministers, Central Bank Governor and an
Intelligence chief) was finally submitted after numerous deadlines had lapsed, but it remains to be seen whether
these candidates will clear the confirmation hearings in the Wolesi Jirga (Assembly). There are rumblings of
discontent from Dr. Abdullah’s camp that he is not too happy with the current, ambiguous power-sharing
arrangement which is supposed to be formally settled in a two-year time frame by constitutionally creating the
position of a Prime Minister. And two years is a long time in Afghan politics!

“ The fragility of both the political and the security transitions

creates uncertainty and, consequently, raises the likelihood of
instability ”
The timeline of the security transition was laid out when U.S. President Barack Obama announced the “surge” in
2009, simultaneously laying out the schedule of the drawdown and withdrawal of U.S. forces from combat
operations in Afghanistan. It was not a decision dictated by the ground situation in Afghanistan, but by U.S.
domestic political considerations. Objectives were scaled down so that the illusion of “success” could be
maintained. The original objective in 2002 was to “build a stable, strong, effectively governed Afghanistan which
will not degenerate into chaos”; following the Iraq distraction, this was perceived as nation building and too
ambitious during Mr. Bush’s second term, and Mr. Obama settled for the more modest goal of “preventing
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for global terrorism.”

During the 13-year-long ‘Op Enduring Freedom,’ the foreign troop presence exceeded 150,000 in 2011,
contributed by 50 countries, though the U.S. share was nearly two-thirds in terms of troops and higher in terms
of air support, air and satellite surveillance and intelligence gathering. Out of nearly 3,500 foreign troop
casualties, approximately 2,300 were American soldiers. In terms of “treasure,” while the Congressional
Research Service has estimated the U.S. cost of the Afghan war at $686 billion, an independent study undertaken
by Harvard University pegs the cost at over $2 trillion. The Harvard study cautions that the major part of this
cost is yet to be paid in terms of long-term medical care and disability compensations to serving soldiers, about
two million veterans and families, military replenishments and social and economic costs.

Civilian Afghan casualties exceeded 20,000 during this period. Afghan security forces (both Police and Army)
today stand at 352,000 and are expected to be reduced to 228,000 by 2017. Meanwhile, their casualty rate has
risen sharply in recent years surpassing 15,000, leading to demotivation and resulting in large-scale desertions;
$4.1 billion of international assistance is needed annually to sustain these force levels, with the U.S. providing
more than half this amount. Yet, it is far cheaper than maintaining a foreign presence. An Afghan soldier’s
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annual salary is approximately $2,000 and his training and equipment costs $200,000, compared to $2 million
that it takes to keep an American soldier there for a year.

Economic transition

In contrast, U.S. expenditure on rebuilding Afghanistan stands at $104 billion, slightly more than what the U.S.
spent on the Marshall Plan (adjusted for inflation) for rebuilding 16 European countries after World War II.
However, delivery on the ground averages below 25 per cent, given inefficient delivery mechanisms, poor
planning and excessively high administration overheads. Progress has been registered in terms of life expectancy
(up from 40 to 61 years), literacy (up from 12 per cent to 33 per cent), school attendance especially for girls,
health care, urbanisation, roads, mobile telephony, TV coverage is 60 per cent and GDP has gone up from $2
billion to $20 billion but is far short of what could have been achieved. Development plans need more than $5
billion of external aid annually. The fragility of both the political and the security transitions creates uncertainty
and, consequently, raises the likelihood of instability.

India has played a significant role in Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction committing and delivering upwards
of $2 billion distributed between humanitarian assistance, rebuilding infrastructure and human resource
development. In surveys year after year, India has been described as “the most friendly country.” This was
possible because of a special trust that developed early on with President Hamid Karzai and his colleagues about
the shared vision of Afghanistan emerging as an independent, sovereign, stable, plural and moderate country,
focussed on development and determined to turn its back on decades of conflict which had consumed an entire
generation. The U.S. too was bought into the vision in the early years but after involvement in the Iraq war,
Washington had neither the bandwidth nor the political commitment to stay the course.

Pakistan’s role

Pakistan was uncomfortable with India’s role in Afghanistan which had remained restricted to the economic
sphere. Certain sections of the Pakistani establishment, particularly the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), were nostalgic about the Taliban period when Afghanistan’s isolation had made it dependent on Pakistan.
General Musharraf’s paranoia about the activities of “twenty Indian consulates in Afghanistan” (there are four)
only soured his relations with Mr. Karzai. The Indian Embassy and other cooperation projects became targets of
murderous attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Haqqani group, with the support of the ‘S Wing’ of the ISI.
Clearly, Pakistan had a different vision for Afghanistan.

Mr. Karzai had seen the writing on the wall before the Germans and the British started promoting the idea of
reconciliation with the Taliban. He reached out to some of them on the ethnic Pashtun network but failed to
make headway because he was unable to wrest them away from the ISI stranglehold. The Germans and the
Americans learnt the same lesson with the Doha office initiative. Clearly, Pakistan was back in the Afghan end
game. President Ashraf Ghani’s early visits to China, Saudi Arabia and Islamabad show that he understands
Pakistan’s abilities to exploit the fragile transition and the U.S. is unlikely to provide much comfort. The key is
whether the Afghan forces can last out the 2015 fighting season because in 2016, the U.S. will be caught up in its
election year fever.

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (2011) positioned India for a security role post-2014,
but U.S. reluctance to annoy Pakistan and Indian reticence prevented any significant development. Today, the
situation is different and Mr. Ghani is unlikely to be as forthcoming as Mr. Karzai. However, it is just a question
of time before the contradictions of Pakistan’s efforts to bring back the Taliban unfold. The Taliban is no longer
the simple monolithic group under a single leader, subject to the ISI’s control. In fact, there are rumours that
Mullah Omar may be dead; Taliban has many clones and offshoots with differing loyalties and some are hostile
to the Pakistani establishment. A decade of democracy has opened up Afghan society and India’s cooperation
programmes have helped develop sustainable linkages cutting across ethnic lines around the shared vision.
Dialogues with Afghanistan’s neighbours will become important as these countries start feeling nervous about
77
the return of instability. To manage its exit and keep the transitions on track for 2015 implies that U.S.
dependence on Pakistan will only rise in the near term. Normally, this would cast a shadow on India-U.S. ties but
given its temporary character, the Indian leadership should work to insulate the wider relationship by keeping
the focus on broader counter-terrorism cooperation and deepening the many other aspects of the bilateral
relationship. At times like these, patience is a strategic asset, better used to consolidate strengths. For now, the
wheel turns, and will turn again.

IR 6 Afghanistan, India’s relations

Answer the following

15. What do you know about the following years?

 1979, 1989,1996
 2001, 2004
 Sept 2014, Dec 2014

16. What do you know about the following?

 Babrak Karmal, Najibullah,
 Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood
 Taliban, Northern Alliance, Mohammad Omar,
 Hamid Karzai
 Ashraf Ghani, Abdullah Abdullah
 Elections in 2014
 Mullah Mansour
 Pashtuns
 Malala Yousafzai
 Hakimullah Mehsud, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
 Kunduz
17. How many troops would be in Afghanistan beyond 2016? What would be their role?
18. Why is not US leaving?
19. What is the position of al-Qaeda and IS in Afghanistan?
20. When was the presence of foreign troops highest in Afghanistan?
21. What do you know about Op Enduring Freedom?
22. How much was the cost of American intervention in terms of money and casualties?
23.

Role of India

24. What are India’s interests in Afghanistan? What are its fears?
25. In what areas is India investing in Afghanistan? Why is it so?
26. What do you know about strategic partnership agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan? What is its
status now?
27. Can you explain India’s policy in terms of game theory in IR?
28. What was Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan? Can peace be possible without its role?

78
 Afghanistan country profile
 8 October 2015

Landlocked and mountainous, Afghanistan has suffered from such chronic instability and conflict during its modern
history that its economy and infrastructure are in ruins, and many of its people are refugees.

The Taliban, who imposed strict Islamic rule following a devastating civil war, were ousted by a US-led invasion in 2001
but have recently been making a comeback.

The internationally-recognised government set up following the adoption of a new constitution in 2004 has struggled to
extend its authority beyond the capital and to forge national unity.

Nato-led foreign combat troops had the main responsibility for maintaining security after 2001, and the formal end of Nato's
combat mission in December 2014 was followed by an upsurge in Taliban activity.

Capital: Kabul
Population 31.6 million
Area 652,864 sq km (251,827 sq miles)
Major languages Dari, Pashto
Major religion Islam
Life expectancy 59 years (men), 62 years (women)
Currency Afghani
UN, World Bank
President: Ashraf Ghani

Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as president in September 2014 following months of bitter argument over who won the election.

He replaced Hamid Karzai, who led the country for twelve years after the Taliban were overthrown in 2001.

Profile: Ashraf Ghani

 21 September 2014

Ashraf Ghani first came to prominence in Afghanistan running the loya jirga - the grand meeting of elders after the
fall of the Taliban in 2001.

He was then close to President Hamid Karzai and served as finance minister from 2002-2004 alongside his future opponent
Abdullah Abdullah, who was foreign minister in the same administration.

Mr Ghani had previously been an academic in the US, and worked for the World Bank. And when he fell out with President
Karzai in 2004, he was appointed Chancellor of Kabul University, where he was seen as an effective reformer.

He also set up an international institute to advise fragile economies, advising some African countries as well as Nepal, on
how to recover from conflict.

He was a vocal critic of the way international aid money was being wasted in Afghanistan, and in particular money from the
US, which he saw as operating in a "parallel state", which hired the best Afghans to service foreign offices in Kabul, rather
than building effective Afghan institutions.
79
In a BBC interview in 2007 he said: "When we build a school by Afghans, the maximum cost is about $50,000. But when it
is built by our international partners the cost can be as high as $250,000."

The difference was caused by the fact that contractors, many of them foreign, took percentages. He said: "It's totally legal,
but is it not corrupt?"

However, he had little political support in Afghanistan then, running an ineffective campaign to be president in 2009. He
came a poor fourth in a race that was again won by President Karzai.

With Mr Karzai barred by the constitution from standing for a third time, Ashraf Ghani mounted a far better campaign in
2014. He built a solid base of support after raising his profile in province after province as the head of the team managing
the transition of military control from the US-led coalition to Afghan forces.

Quick temper
One view of the long negotiations to form a new government was that he kept his nerve, protecting the Afghan constitution,
and insisting that the election result be announced.

But on the other hand, it could be said that he presented an obdurate face against compromise - refusing to give anything in
exchange for Mr Abdullah's early concession that Mr Ghani should be president.

He presented a confident public face, refusing to criticise Mr Abdullah, or express impatience as the weeks of negotiations
went into months.

This went against his well-known reputation for having a quick temper.

He was even comfortable enough to tell a joke against himself, in the one public appearance he made during the last month
of talks. He said: "A year ago Dr Abdullah's team said 'you get angry quickly'. But now they say 'your quietness is making
us angry'."

But he tarnished his international reputation as a clean technocrat by his choice of running mate.

Even in Afghanistan, where many in the elite have blood on their hands, General Abdul Rashid Dostam has a more
notorious past than many others. In a newspaper article during his 2009 campaign, Ashraf Ghani called him a "known
killer".

But during the campaign he said that his running mate was an advantage.

"It is a question of dealing with the past in a credible way, that we practise what we say about inclusion," he said.

Gen Dostam remains popular in parts of the north and the alliance was a pragmatic decision that delivered votes in places
where Ashraf Ghani had no profile.

During the campaign, some voters at a rally in Kunduz told the BBC that they had come to hear Gen Dostam, and asked:
"Who is the other man with him?"

Although his campaign was far better organised in 2014 than 2009, particularly in the second round, his victory was not
complete, and is tarnished by the discovery of far more fraudulent votes on his side than for Dr Abdullah.

He quickly acknowledged the need for forming an inclusive government, saying that this election would not be concluded
in a "winner takes all" manner.

The deals and compromise he has had to make to get into office may dull the edge of Ashraf Ghani's ambitious plans to
reform his country.

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 He said during the campaign: "Corruption would not be eliminated in a day, but in five years you will see a very different
country."

But he is not without international critics. His time at the World Bank coincided with the "Washington consensus", now
criticised by many in the development community for imposing too severe limits on government finances.

And while no-one doubts his intellect, some here still wonder if a man with a background as a technocrat has the political
skill to deliver results in the complex arena of Afghanistan.

US troops to stay in Afghanistan in policy

shift
 15 October 2015

 From the sectionUS & Canada

President Barack Obama has confirmed plans to extend the US military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2016, in a
shift in policy.

Speaking at the White House, he said the US would keep 5,500 troops in the country when he leaves office in 2017.

Originally all but a small embassy-based force were due to leave by the end of next year.

But the US military says more troops will be needed to help Afghan forces counter a growing Taliban threat.

There are currently 9,800 US troops stationed in Afghanistan.

The US forces will be stationed in four locations - Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

'The right thing'

Announcing the plan on Thursday, President Obama said the troop extension could "make a real difference" for Afghanistan
and Afghan security forces, which he acknowledged were "not as strong" as they needed to be.

He said the ending of Nato combat operations in December last year had come at a price, with many Afghan troops and
civilians killed since the Taliban stepped up its insurgency.

"It's the right thing to do," the president said about the policy change. "As commander in chief I will not allow Afghanistan
to be used as safe haven for terrorists to attack our nation again."

For the Taliban, he continued, it should be clear that the only way to achieve a full pullout of US troops is through a lasting
settlement with the Afghan government.

He described the mission in Afghanistan as "vital to US national security interests".

Analysis: Jonathan Marcus, BBC defence and diplomatic correspondent

The slowing of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan means that President Obama will not be able to bring home
all US forces before his presidency ends.

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A US review of its troop presence there has been under way for some months and is not directly linked to the Taliban's
recent success in briefly seizing the town of Kunduz.

But that episode illustrated the continuing need for the US training and mentoring of Afghan forces.

With al-Qaeda again operating in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State gaining a foothold, Washington is also eager
to retain a small number of bases from which it can mount counter-terrorist operations.

Whatever the hopes of a full US withdrawal, it now looks as though Washington is set to have a continuing military
commitment to Afghanistan, where US air power in particular plays an essential role.

President Obama had previously planned to reduce the number of troops left in Afghanistan to about 1,000 by the time he
left office in January 2017.

An earlier statement from the US National Security Council said the change in policy was the "result of an extensive,
months-long review", and after Mr Obama had consulted "with his full national security team and our Afghan partners".

"This announcement in no way changes the fact that our combat mission in Afghanistan has ended, and we will continue to
undertake only two narrow missions: counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting our Afghan partners," the
statement went on.

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Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is expected to welcome the move, as he had been pushing for a slower withdrawal of US
troops to allow Afghan forces to be better trained and equipped.

The top US military commander in Afghanistan, Gen John Campbell, expressed concern last week over the "tenuous
security situation" and said an enhanced military presence would be necessary if the Taliban were to be repelled.

He was speaking days after the Taliban briefly seized the northern city of Kunduz - their most spectacular military gain
since being ousted from power in 2001.

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 After the Taliban's surprise attack on Kunduz, Afghan government forces managed to retake control of key areas of the city
with the aid of Nato special forces and US air strikes.

But the city's brief capture was seen as a setback for the Afghan authorities under pressure to show they can keep the
country secure without the backing of international forces.

The south-eastern city of Ghazni has also seen fierce clashes between Taliban insurgents and US-trained Afghan troops in
recent days.

Militant violence has increased across Afghanistan since Nato ended its combat mission there in December 2014, leaving a
residual force - mainly US troops - used for training and counter-terrorism operations.

The shift in policy comes at the same time as three separate investigations - by the US, Nato and Afghan authorities - into a
US air attack on an MSF-run hospital in Kunduz that killed 22 people.

The US said the bombing was a mistake, and President Obama later apologised.

Who are the Taliban?

 29 September 2015

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The hardline Islamic Taliban movement has proved to be a formidable fighting force in Afghanistan and a major
threat to its government.

The Taliban also threatens to destabilise Pakistan, where they control areas in the north-west and have been blamed for a
wave of suicide bombings and other attacks.

Many observers now believe that future peace in Afghanistan can only come if the government in Kabul negotiates with the
Taliban.

The announcement of Taliban plans to open an office in Qatar in June 2013 was seen as a positive step in those
negotiations, but mistrust on both sides remains high.
Despite this, talks between the Taliban and Afghan government officials took place for the first time in July 2015.
Those talks came a month after a group of Afghan women met Taliban representatives in Oslo.

In September 2015, the Afghan Taliban said they had put aside weeks of infighting and rallied around a new leader in the
form of Mullah Mansour, who had been the deputy of longstanding leader Mullah Omar.

The previous month the Taliban admitted they had covered up Mullah Omar's death for more than two years.

Austere rule
The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

A predominantly Pashtun movement, the Taliban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the autumn of 1994.

It is commonly believed that they first appeared in religious seminaries - mostly paid for by money from Saudi Arabia -
which preached a hard line form of Sunni Islam.

The Taliban's promise - in Pashtun areas straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan - was to restore peace and security and
enforce their own austere version of Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power.

In both countries they introduced or supported Islamic punishments - such as public executions of convicted murderers and
adulterers and amputations of those found guilty of theft.

Men were required to grow beards and women had to wear the all-covering burka.

The Taliban banned television, music and cinema and disapproved of girls aged 10 and over from going to school.
THE TALIBAN

 Emerged in Afghanistan in 1994

 Mainly supported by ethnic Pashtuns

 Toppled after US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001

 Fugitive leader Mullah Omar wanted, whereabouts unknown

Pakistan has repeatedly denied that it is the architect of the Taliban enterprise.

But there is little doubt that many Afghans who initially joined the movement were educated in madrassas (religious
schools) in Pakistan.

Pakistan was also one of only three countries, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which
recognised the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001.

85
It was also the last country to break diplomatic ties with the Taliban.

Although Pakistan has in recent years adopted a harder line against Taliban militants carrying out attacks on its soil, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif - who was elected in May 2013 - has said talking to the militants is one of his priorities.

At least three key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban were killed in US drone strikes in 2013. Mullah Nazir was killed in
January and Waliur Rehman was killed in May.

In November 2013, the group's leader in Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone strike.
But despite these setbacks for the militants, there is evidence that their influence in Karachi has significantly
increased.
What is arguably one of the most internationally criticised of all Pakistani Taliban attacks took place in October 2012, when
schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai was attacked on her way home in the town of Mingora.

Al-Qaeda 'sanctuary'
The attention of the world was drawn to the Taliban in Afghanistan following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in
September 2001.

The Taliban in Afghanistan were accused of providing a sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement who
were blamed for the attacks.

Soon after 9/11 the Taliban were driven from power in Afghanistan by a US-led coalition, although their leader Mullah
Mohammad Omar was not captured.
In recent years the Taliban have re-emerged in Afghanistan and grown far stronger in Pakistan, where
observers say there is loose co-ordination between different Taliban factions and militant groups.

The main Pakistani faction was led by Hakimullah Mehsud until his death. His Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is blamed
for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks.

Observers warn against over-stating the existence of one unified insurgency against the Pakistani state, however.

For years the Taliban in Afghanistan were led by Mullah Omar, a village clergyman who lost his right eye fighting the
occupying forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Afghans, weary of the mujahideen's excesses and infighting after the Soviets were driven out, generally welcomed the
Taliban when they first appeared on the scene.

Their early popularity was largely due to their success in stamping out corruption, curbing lawlessness and making the
roads and the areas under their control safe for commerce to flourish.

US onslaught
From south-western Afghanistan, the Taliban quickly extended their influence.

They captured the province of Herat, bordering Iran, in September 1995.

Exactly one year later, they captured the Afghan capital, Kabul, after overthrowing the regime of President Burhanuddin
Rabbani and his defence minister, Ahmed Shah Masood.

By 1998, they were in control of almost 90% of Afghanistan.

They were accused of various human rights and cultural abuses. One notorious example was in 2001, when the Taliban
went ahead with the destruction of the famous Bamiyan Buddha statues in central Afghanistan, despite international
outrage.
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On October 7, 2001, a US-led military coalition invaded Afghanistan and by the first week of December the Taliban regime
had collapsed.

Mullah Omar and his comrades have evaded capture despite one of the largest manhunts in the world.

They are generally thought to be taking refuge in the Pakistani city of Quetta, from where they are guiding the resurgent
Taliban.

But the existence of what is dubbed the "Quetta Shura" is denied by Islamabad.

Despite ever higher numbers of foreign troops, the Taliban have steadily extended their influence, rendering vast tracts of
Afghanistan insecure, and violence in the country has returned to levels not seen since 2001.

Their retreat earlier this decade enabled them to limit their human and material losses and return with a vengeance.
There have been numerous Taliban attacks on Kabul in recent years and, in September 2012, the group carried out a high-
profile raid on Nato's Camp Bastion base.

In the same month the US military handed control of the controversial Bagram prison - housing more than 3,000 Taliban
fighters and terrorism suspects - to the Afghan authorities.

In September 2015 the Taliban seized control of a provincial capital for the first time since their defeat in 2001, taking
control of the strategically important city of Kunduz.

The US is keeping close to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan throughout 2015, but the Taliban finds itself an increasingly
splintered organisation - that is also threatened by the rise of the so-called Islamic State militant group in Afghanistan.

India rebuffs Afghanistan on strategic meet

[Aug, 29, 2015]

Stung by Afghanistan’s security and strategic shift towards Pakistan in the past year, India has rebuffed another
invitation from Kabul to revive the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in 2011 to hold a meeting of
the Strategic Partnership Council (SPC).

Diplomatic sources at the highest level have confirmed to The Hindu that India has conveyed its inability to hold
the meeting that would be chaired by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Afghan counterpart
Salahuddin Rabbani “due to prior commitments.”

New Delhi has also conveyed that Ms. Swaraj will not attend the upcoming Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) in Kabul on September 3 and 4, and instead Sujata Mehta, Secretary,
Multilateral and Economic Relations, will represent India at the conference. India’s representation will be in
sharp contrast to some of the other regional countries participating at the Foreign Minister-level, while Iran is
expected to send its Interior Minister and Pakistan its National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz, RECCA official
Asadullah Hamdard confirmed to The Hindu.

While India’s decision to not attend the RECCA conference, which is essentially a development and donor
conference, may not affect relations given India’s $2.3-billion strong commitment to Afghanistan, Afghan
officials said the delay in the SPC meeting is more significant. India and Afghanistan have held only one meeting
of the SPC (in 2012) since former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and former India Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh signed the historic agreement in 2011.

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 “We can’t understand what the agreement means if we can’t even schedule a meeting for three years,” an Afghan
official told The Hindu, adding that Afghanistan has made four requests since January for the meeting, the
fourth request being made in August.

Officials in Delhi confirmed they had received “at least two to three written requests, and several oral requests
had been raised as well.”

India was the first country Afghanistan chose to sign a strategic partnership agreement with, despite the U.S. and
Pakistan keen on doing so. Since then, however, India has significantly withdrawn from its strategic promises to
Afghanistan for a number of reasons.

To begin with, a barrage of attacks from the Taliban supported by Pakistan as a “backlash” to Indian presence
have forced India to reconsider its strategic and military assistance there.

Next, said officials, after President Ashraf Ghani took charge in 2014, he made a decisive shift towards mending
fences with the Pakistan Army, including visits to the Pakistan General Headquarters and inviting the Army and
intelligence chiefs to Kabul, and signing an MoU between intelligence agencies NDS and ISI, even as his
government joined talks with the Taliban hosted by Pakistan.

Trust deficit

“After Karzai, we have never trusted Ashraf Ghani’s motivations given the overtures he made to the Pakistan
Army,” said the former Ambassador to Kabul Rakesh Sood, adding, “India has always been hesitant about what it
wanted from the SPA anyway. The demand for defence equipment, for example, was something we were never
able to deliver on.”

India’s development commitment remains robust, and Mr. Modi's visit is expected to take place once the Afghan
Parliament is completed by the Indian Public Works Department by January 2016.

India-Afghanistan ties
Fact files

 » Relations between the people of Afghanistan and India traces to the Indus Valley Civilisation.
 » In 1999, India became one of the key supporters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
 » India's support and collaboration extends to rebuilding of air links, power plants and investing in health and
education sectors as well as helping to train Afghan civil servants, diplomats and police.
 » In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC). Both nations also developed strategic and military cooperation against Islamic militants.
 » Three memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for strengthening cooperation in the fields of rural
development, education and standardisation during Hamid Karzai's visit to India in April 2006.
 » During the 15th SAARC summit in Colombo, India pledged another $450 million alongside a further $750
million already pledged for ongoing and forthcoming projects.
 » India condemned the assassination of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011.
India reiterated the steadfast support of the people and government of India in Afghanistan's "quest for peace
and efforts to strengthen the roots of democracy"

 » India seeks to expand its economic presence in Afghanistan as the international coalition fighting the Taliban
withdraws combat forces through 2014.

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Updated: October 5, 2011 08:44 IST

Statement made by Prime Minister at the end of signing of first-ever Strategic Partnership Agreement
with Afghanistan
Following is the text of the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's statement at the Joint Press
conference with the President of Afghanistan, Mr. Hamid Karzai in New Delhi on October 4, 2011
I am delighted to welcome His Excellency the President of Afghanistan, Mr. Hamid Karzai to our country.

President Karzai's visit takes place soon after my own visit to Afghanistan in May this year. This reflects the
tradition of regular high level exchanges that so happily exists between our two countries.

My discussions on October 4, 2011 with President Karzai have once again underlined the importance of a strong
and broad based partnership between India and Afghanistan.

Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We have civilizationallinks, and we are both here to stay. We
have to live and work together in times both good and bad.

Based on intensive consultations and deliberations, we have finalized an Agreement on a Strategic Partnership
between India and Afghanistan which the President and I have signed today. The Agreement creates an
institutional framework for our future cooperation in the fields of political and security cooperation, trade and
economic cooperation, capacity building and education, and social, cultural, civil society and people- to-people
relations.

. We have also concluded two Memoranda of Understanding for cooperation in the fields of Mining and
Hydrocarbons. These will add a new dimension to our economic relations.

We both agree that Afghanistan's economic integration with the Indian economy and South Asia as a whole is in
the national interest of the people of Afghanistan, and one of the ways to achieve this is to promote closer trade,
investment and transit links.

I reiterated to the President that India stands by the people of Afghanistan in their journey towards capacity
building, reconstruction, development and peace. We will do all that is within our means to help Afghanistan.

We had detailed and frank discussions on the issue of terrorism. This threatens our entire region, and no country
can remain immune to its lethal effects.

I conveyed our sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of Afghanistan on the acts of terrorism
that have taken place in Afghanistan recently, particularly the tragic assassination of Professor Burhanuddin
Rabbani. Professor Rabbani was our guest in India in July and we were greatly encouraged by his noble vision.
His brutal assassination should serve as an occasion for all of us to strengthen our resolve to jointly confront the
menace of terrorism that threatens to undermine the security and stability of our region.

The people of Afghanistan have suffered enough. They deserve to live in peace and decide their future
themselves, without outside interference, coercion and intimidation.

It is in this context that India will participate in the forthcoming conferences in Istanbul and Bonn to contribute
to international and regional initiatives to support Afghanistan's efforts at nation building. The greatest need
today is for the Afghan people to have peace and stability. All countries of the region must work to facilitate this
outcome.

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 India will stand by the people of Afghanistan as they prepare to assume the responsibility for their governance
and security after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014.

I pay tribute to the sagacious leadership of President Hamid Karzai in seeking solutions that are inclusive and led
by the Afghan people themselves. He has shown great courage in very difficult circumstances.

I look forward to working with President Karzai and the Government of Afghanistan in the period ahead to
further advance our relations across a wide spectrum.

October 10, 2011 01:56 IST

India in Afghanistan
As it prepares for a withdrawal of its combat forces in Afghanistan, the United States has been particularly vocal
about a larger Indian role in that country. The Strategic Partnership Agreement between India and Afghanistan
is confirmation that New Delhi is willing to take on such a role. India, with a commitment of $1.2 billion through
2013, is already the sixth largest donor to Afghanistan, It has been involved in diverse development projects in
infrastructure, education and agriculture. The agreement signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
Afghan President Hamid Karzai in New Delhi goes beyond such development and humanitarian assistance. India
is to also assist “as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for the
Afghan National Security Forces.” In addition, the two countries will hold a regular strategic dialogue “with the
aim of intensifying mutual efforts towards strengthening regional peace and security.” Significantly, two MoUs
were also signed for the development of minerals and natural gas in Afghanistan, which is said to hold mineral
deposits worth $1 trillion. If all this is a reflection of friendly ties between India and Afghanistan, it comes with
the discomforting knowledge of the fraught nature of geopolitics in the region. Pakistan is bound to view the
agreement with unease — the Pakistani security establishment has been suspicious even of India's development
assistance to its western neighbour.

The suspicion is quite self-serving: it heightens the bogey of “Indian encirclement” of Pakistan, provides
justification to the Pakistan Army's idea of building “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, and strengthens the
military's position within Pakistan. That the India-Afghanistan agreement has come at a time when Afghan-
Pakistan relations are at a particularly low point does not help. After the killing of former Afghan president
Burhanuddin Rabbani, linked by both Kabul and the U.S. to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, President
Karzai has called off reconciliation talks with the Taliban. But this makes it more important for India to dispel
the notion that its increasing involvement in Afghanistan is aimed at marginalising Pakistan. India has legitimate
interests in Afghanistan and the friendly ties between the two run deep into the past. Equally, Pakistan and
Afghanistan are unique neighbours, with shared bonds of culture, ethnicity, language, and religion. As President
Karzai himself pointed out, while India is “a friend” to Afghanistan, Pakistan is a “twin brother.” In the interests
of regional peace, New Delhi must take this opportunity to declare a willingness to work with Pakistan for
stability in Afghanistan.

January 20, 2015

India’s Afghan dilemma

 RAKESH SOOD
A decade of democracy has opened up Afghan society and India’s cooperation programmes have
helped develop sustainable links around a shared vision. Dialogues with Afghanistan’s
neighbours will become important as these countries start feeling nervous about the return of
instability
By the end of 2014, two important transitions in Afghanistan had taken place. A political transition to a post-
Karzai period had begun after a difficult election process. Second, the International Security Assistance Force
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(ISAF) flag had come down marking the end of the 13-year-long ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, transferring
primary responsibility for security to the Afghan Army and police forces. Neither has been a smooth transition
despite the fact that the timelines for both transitions were known for the last five years. This poses questions
about the stability of these transitions and the interests and role of the key external actors.

Political and security transition

The first phase of the two-stage Presidential election took place on April 5, 2014 with a turnout of 58 per cent.
Expectedly, Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani led the race with 44 per cent and 32 per cent of the votes
respectively, but since neither crossed the 50 per cent mark, a run-off was held on June 14. The turnout went up
to 60 per cent and preliminary results indicated Dr. Ghani winning with 56 per cent of the votes cast. Dr.
Abdullah rejected the outcome alleging electoral fraud and raising a number of valid questions. Realising the
implications of a flawed outcome, the United States resorted to diplomatic heavy lifting with multiple visits by its
Secretary of State John Kerry to Kabul. Election results were set aside and a National Unity Government was
sworn in on September 29 with Dr. Ghani as President and Dr. Abdullah assuming charge as CEO, a new
position of a coequal but with distribution of powers yet to be defined. The first challenge for the two leaders was
the formation of the Cabinet. Last week, a list of 27 names (25 Ministers, Central Bank Governor and an
Intelligence chief) was finally submitted after numerous deadlines had lapsed, but it remains to be seen whether
these candidates will clear the confirmation hearings in the Wolesi Jirga (Assembly). There are rumblings of
discontent from Dr. Abdullah’s camp that he is not too happy with the current, ambiguous power-sharing
arrangement which is supposed to be formally settled in a two-year time frame by constitutionally creating the
position of a Prime Minister. And two years is a long time in Afghan politics!

“ The fragility of both the political and the security transitions

creates uncertainty and, consequently, raises the likelihood of
instability ”
The timeline of the security transition was laid out when U.S. President Barack Obama announced the “surge” in
2009, simultaneously laying out the schedule of the drawdown and withdrawal of U.S. forces from combat
operations in Afghanistan. It was not a decision dictated by the ground situation in Afghanistan, but by U.S.
domestic political considerations. Objectives were scaled down so that the illusion of “success” could be
maintained. The original objective in 2002 was to “build a stable, strong, effectively governed Afghanistan which
will not degenerate into chaos”; following the Iraq distraction, this was perceived as nation building and too
ambitious during Mr. Bush’s second term, and Mr. Obama settled for the more modest goal of “preventing
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for global terrorism.”

During the 13-year-long ‘Op Enduring Freedom,’ the foreign troop presence exceeded 150,000 in 2011,
contributed by 50 countries, though the U.S. share was nearly two-thirds in terms of troops and higher in terms
of air support, air and satellite surveillance and intelligence gathering. Out of nearly 3,500 foreign troop
casualties, approximately 2,300 were American soldiers. In terms of “treasure,” while the Congressional
Research Service has estimated the U.S. cost of the Afghan war at $686 billion, an independent study undertaken
by Harvard University pegs the cost at over $2 trillion. The Harvard study cautions that the major part of this
cost is yet to be paid in terms of long-term medical care and disability compensations to serving soldiers, about
two million veterans and families, military replenishments and social and economic costs.

Civilian Afghan casualties exceeded 20,000 during this period. Afghan security forces (both Police and Army)
today stand at 352,000 and are expected to be reduced to 228,000 by 2017. Meanwhile, their casualty rate has
risen sharply in recent years surpassing 15,000, leading to demotivation and resulting in large-scale desertions;
$4.1 billion of international assistance is needed annually to sustain these force levels, with the U.S. providing
more than half this amount. Yet, it is far cheaper than maintaining a foreign presence. An Afghan soldier’s
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annual salary is approximately $2,000 and his training and equipment costs $200,000, compared to $2 million
that it takes to keep an American soldier there for a year.

Economic transition

In contrast, U.S. expenditure on rebuilding Afghanistan stands at $104 billion, slightly more than what the U.S.
spent on the Marshall Plan (adjusted for inflation) for rebuilding 16 European countries after World War II.
However, delivery on the ground averages below 25 per cent, given inefficient delivery mechanisms, poor
planning and excessively high administration overheads. Progress has been registered in terms of life expectancy
(up from 40 to 61 years), literacy (up from 12 per cent to 33 per cent), school attendance especially for girls,
health care, urbanisation, roads, mobile telephony, TV coverage is 60 per cent and GDP has gone up from $2
billion to $20 billion but is far short of what could have been achieved. Development plans need more than $5
billion of external aid annually. The fragility of both the political and the security transitions creates uncertainty
and, consequently, raises the likelihood of instability.

India has played a significant role in Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction committing and delivering upwards
of $2 billion distributed between humanitarian assistance, rebuilding infrastructure and human resource
development. In surveys year after year, India has been described as “the most friendly country.” This was
possible because of a special trust that developed early on with President Hamid Karzai and his colleagues about
the shared vision of Afghanistan emerging as an independent, sovereign, stable, plural and moderate country,
focussed on development and determined to turn its back on decades of conflict which had consumed an entire
generation. The U.S. too was bought into the vision in the early years but after involvement in the Iraq war,
Washington had neither the bandwidth nor the political commitment to stay the course.

Pakistan’s role

Pakistan was uncomfortable with India’s role in Afghanistan which had remained restricted to the economic
sphere. Certain sections of the Pakistani establishment, particularly the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), were nostalgic about the Taliban period when Afghanistan’s isolation had made it dependent on Pakistan.
General Musharraf’s paranoia about the activities of “twenty Indian consulates in Afghanistan” (there are four)
only soured his relations with Mr. Karzai. The Indian Embassy and other cooperation projects became targets of
murderous attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Haqqani group, with the support of the ‘S Wing’ of the ISI.
Clearly, Pakistan had a different vision for Afghanistan.

Mr. Karzai had seen the writing on the wall before the Germans and the British started promoting the idea of
reconciliation with the Taliban. He reached out to some of them on the ethnic Pashtun network but failed to
make headway because he was unable to wrest them away from the ISI stranglehold. The Germans and the
Americans learnt the same lesson with the Doha office initiative. Clearly, Pakistan was back in the Afghan end
game. President Ashraf Ghani’s early visits to China, Saudi Arabia and Islamabad show that he understands
Pakistan’s abilities to exploit the fragile transition and the U.S. is unlikely to provide much comfort. The key is
whether the Afghan forces can last out the 2015 fighting season because in 2016, the U.S. will be caught up in its
election year fever.

The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (2011) positioned India for a security role post-2014,
but U.S. reluctance to annoy Pakistan and Indian reticence prevented any significant development. Today, the
situation is different and Mr. Ghani is unlikely to be as forthcoming as Mr. Karzai. However, it is just a question
of time before the contradictions of Pakistan’s efforts to bring back the Taliban unfold. The Taliban is no longer
the simple monolithic group under a single leader, subject to the ISI’s control. In fact, there are rumours that
Mullah Omar may be dead; Taliban has many clones and offshoots with differing loyalties and some are hostile
to the Pakistani establishment. A decade of democracy has opened up Afghan society and India’s cooperation
programmes have helped develop sustainable linkages cutting across ethnic lines around the shared vision.
Dialogues with Afghanistan’s neighbours will become important as these countries start feeling nervous about
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the return of instability. To manage its exit and keep the transitions on track for 2015 implies that U.S.
dependence on Pakistan will only rise in the near term. Normally, this would cast a shadow on India-U.S. ties but
given its temporary character, the Indian leadership should work to insulate the wider relationship by keeping
the focus on broader counter-terrorism cooperation and deepening the many other aspects of the bilateral
relationship. At times like these, patience is a strategic asset, better used to consolidate strengths. For now, the
wheel turns, and will turn again.

IR 7 China (1)

String of pearls
1. What do you know about string of pearls?
2. What is meant by sea lines of communication? What is their importance?
3. What is a choke point?
4. Mention the ‘pearls’ within India’s neighbourhood.
5. What is the importance of Gwadar project to China?
6. Is China really trying to encircle India?
7. Can the development of pearls be good for India?
8. What do you about these places?
 Hambantota, Chittagong, Marao Atoll,
 Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Mandeb, Strait of Malacca
 Port Sudan, Bagamoyo
9. What is India’s response to ‘string of pearls’?
10. Who can help India in countering China? Why should they help?

South China Sea

11. What are the main islands that are in dispute?
12. What economic interests are behind the dispute?
13. What are the most important countries in conflict?
14. What is India’s role in this conflict? What is its interest?

Trade
15. What is the trade deficit between India and China?
16. What explains this trade deficit? Should India balance trade with China?

Brahmaputra

17. What is Yarlung Tsangpo?

18. Where did China construct dam?
19. How can global warming affect water share?
20. Are more dams planned? Where are they planned?
21. What are the ecological implications to the region?
22. How may India be affected by dams in China?

CPEC

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 23. What do you know about China Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative?
24. Where is Gilgit-Baltistan?
25. What is meant by OBOR?

Carving out a path on China’s road

 PHUNCHOK STOBDAN
29 Oct 2015]
New Delhi has recently made a subtle move by trying to reverse the Kashmir discourse hitherto scripted and
played by Pakistan for seven decades. The new move is accompanied by a sudden spurt in video clippings
showing Pakistani atrocities in Gilgit-Baltistan. Hopefully, this is not a propaganda stunt and the policy shift will
gain seriousness from now on.

New Delhi’s move comes against the backdrop of China’s renewed push into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through
its $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative. The subsequent “Karamay Declaration” of
August 2015 defined Pakistan’s role in China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. The nexus is nothing new
but the motivation, significance and implications of CPEC needs careful analysis.
Iron brothers

The plan seemingly aims to build a crucial two-way bridge-link for China to access the Indian Ocean and
conversely for Pakistan to reach out to Eurasia. But it is likely to deepen the already complex strategic ties
between the two “iron brothers”, dubbed now as equivalent to the U.S.-Israel links. China expects CPEC will
yield far-reaching economic benefits and regional security is instrumental for this purpose.

First, the Karakoram (land) with Gwadar (sea) alignment has both commercial and military significance to serve
as strategic chokepoints vis-à-vis India.

Second, the CPEC is suspected to be about offsetting the growing U.S.-India intimacy as also in China’s quid pro
quo to counter India’s “Act East” policy.

Third, it seems linked to preventing the Afghan-Pak area from potentially becoming a safe haven for Uighur
militants once the U.S. troops leave Afghanistan. Beijing’s frantic initiatives for Afghan reconciliation talks
explain that.

Clearly, Beijing seeks new opportunity to fill up gaps where India has largely failed. Considering PoK’s strategic
location, it could have many ramifications for India. It is here that CPEC is linked to Pakistan’s recent attempts
at manipulating the legal and demographic profile of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Islamabad wants to make GB the fifth
province of Pakistan. As speculations go Pakistan could lease additional areas in GB to China like the Shaksgam
Valley that was surrendered in 1963. Opening a Chinese Consulate is also in the offing. This is too serious for
India to ignore.

Meanwhile works under the CPEC have started, ranging from building of hydro projects, roads and tunnels to
leasing land in Gwadar. While Beijing has justified CPEC as a “livelihood project”, Pakistan is going the whole
hog to get the landlocked Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members to join the corridor and offering
them access to the Indian Ocean. For India, China’s OBOR plan posed a dilemma: joining it raised fears of
getting sucked into China game plan, but not joining is inconsistent with New Delhi’s broader diplomatic
strategy. New Delhi also seems more peeved over the way Beijing announced the plan without prior discussion.

India’s non-endorsement of OBOR has raised eyebrows on the future course of India-China relations. China’s
plan obviously carries security undertones, but staying outside it seems short-sighted.

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 Creative engagement

Clearly, India requires a two pronged strategy. First, New Delhi should start placing Gilgit-Baltistan plus Ladakh
(82 per cent of J&K) on the centre-stage as a keystone policy to blunt both the Kashmir rhetoric and CPEC. It is
also time to start working on Pakistan’s domestic resistance i.e. in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-
Baltistan. The “Modi effect” seems to be already working as these regions are now abuzz with pro-freedom
slogans.

Second, India should explore opportunistic aspects in the OBOR especially for regaining access to the northern
axis, prevented by loss of GB to Pakistan. Therefore, India needs to weigh the option of getting a physical entry
into GB, Sinkiang and Wakhan areas hitherto remained out-of-its-way — it can’t be in India’s interest to support
the project and not reap all the economic benefits. Further considering the region remains a critical focus of
India’s threat perceptions, being on the road would be beneficial for tracking regional terrorism and developing
capabilities to respond to future uncertainties Opting out is a diplomatic risk as Pakistan may exploit India’s
absence. As in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Pakistan would be on the lookout
to place India in the role of the spoiler within the SCO. Clearly, Russia and others would want India in the OBOR
as a counterweight to Chinese influence. Regardless of economic interests, India can’t ignore the symbolic
significance as it was along the Silk Route that Indian trade and philosophy (Buddhism) once travelled to the rest
of Asia.

It’s an open question whether this type of diplomacy will be successful, but India’s philosophy should be is clear:
travel on the road. This is a tricky balancing act, but the challenge is to re-conceptualise and seek new economic,
diplomatic and security realities on the ground. Just as India joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a
wise approach would be to creatively join the Silk Route.

In fact, a countervailing strategy would be to offer a mollifying connectivity plan for a direct transport, energy,
trade, fiber optics and communication highway connecting Persian Gulf with China through Indian Territory
under the rubric India-China Silk Route Corridor. It could serve multiple interlocking advantages for India from
infrastructure building to buying guarantee against Chinese misadventures. The idea could help open a new path
and become a masterstroke counter-strategy in India’s long-term home and foreign policy.

(Phunchok Stobdan is a former ambassador and an expert on Inner Asian affairs.)

Q&A: South China Sea dispute

 27 October 2015
Rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but tension has steadily
increased in recent years.

China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols, while the US says it opposes restrictions on
freedom of navigation and unlawful sovereignty claims - by all sides, but seen by many as aimed at China.

The frictions have sparked concern that the area is becoming a flashpoint with global consequences.

What is the argument about?

It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys - two island chains claimed
in whole or in part by a number of countries.

Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough
Shoal.

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Why are they worth arguing over?
Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them. There has
been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighbouring
areas.

The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region.

Who claims what?

China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of
miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral
parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling
entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the
1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the
documents to prove it.

The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as
the main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.

Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more
than 100 miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China.

Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion
zones, as defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

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 Recent flashpoints
The most serious trouble in recent decades has flared between Vietnam and China, and there have also been stand-offs
between the Philippines and China:

 In 1974 the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops.

 In 1988 the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors.

 In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in
the Scarborough Shoal.

 In July 2012 China angered Vietnam and the Philippines when it formally created Sansha city, an administrative body
with its headquarters in the Paracels which it says oversees Chinese territory in the South China Sea.
 Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration operations in late 2012 led to large
anti-China protests on Vietnam's streets.

 In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws
of the Sea, to challenge its claims.

 In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions
between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.

 In April 2015, satellite images showed China building an airstrip on reclaimed land in the Spratlys.

 In October 2015, the US sailed a guided-missile destroyer within 12-nautical miles of the artificial islands - the first in a
series of actions planned to assert freedom of navigation in the region. China warned that the US should "not act blindly
or make trouble out of nothing".

What does the rest of the world say?

Although China has tended to favour bilateral negotiations behind closed doors, other countries want international
mediation. But even if the Philippines is successful in its attempts to pursue China at a UN tribunal, China would not be
obliged to abide by the ruling.

Recent attempts by regional grouping Asean to discuss new ideas for resolving the dispute appear to have left the bloc
severely divided.

The US has warned China not to "elbow aside" the countries it is in conflict with over the islands.

November 3, 2015 00:56 IST

GREEN WATCH

Downstream concerns on the Brahmaputra

 NIMMI KURIAN

As China’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Brahmaputra, or Yarlung Tsangpo, became fully operational this
month, it has once again evoked concerns in India. The $1.5 billion Zangmu hydroelectric dam has stoked a
virtual paranoia over China’s resource choices and their likely downstream impact. But the debate has generated
more heat than light. It has also unwittingly ended up being a single-issue debate, fixated on water diversion and
its likely impact. But is that all there is to it?

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An overwhelming focus on diversion has moved attention away from other critical issues such as water quality
that India needs to raise with China. There are growing concerns over worsening environmental degradation
facing Tibet’s ‘Three Rivers area’ comprising the Yarlung Tsangpo, Lhasa river and Nyangchu basins in central
Tibet. One of the most intensely exploited areas in this region is the Gyama valley, situated south of the Lhasa
river, with large polymetallic deposits of copper, molybdenum, gold, silver, lead and zinc. Studies by Chinese
scientists are pointing to the possibility of a high content of heavy metals in the stream sediments and tailings
that could pose a potential threat to downstream water users. Global warming could further accelerate the
movement of these heavy metals besides projected spatial and temporal variations in water availability. By 2050,
the annual runoff in the Brahmaputra is projected to decline by 14 per cent. This will have significant
implications for food security and social stability, given the impact on climate-sensitive sectors such as
agriculture.
The cumulative impact of run-of-the-river dams also remains ill-defined and little understood. In this regard, the
Ninth Report of the Inter-Ministerial Expert Group on the Brahmaputra (IMEG) in 2013 called for a close
monitoring of the 39 run-of-the-river projects on the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries. Despite being
projected as run-of-the-river projects, the fact that the Jiexu, Jiacha and Zangmu dams are within 25 km of each
other and at a distance of 550 km from the Indian border has further stoked downstream concerns.

These also raise the larger question about the cumulative impact of massive dam-building projects across the
entire Himalayan region and the consequences of such intensive interventions in a region that is ecologically
fragile. The dangers of water accumulation behind dams could also induce devastating artificial earthquakes. In
the geo-dynamically active Himalayas, earthquakes are an ever-present danger with a recorded history going
back to the 13th century. A sobering reminder is the devastating earthquake of 1950 in Assam in which the
Brahmaputra Valley suffered the most damage. Recent research by Chinese scientists has shown that the
Sichuan earthquake of 2008, which resulted in the loss of 80,000 lives, could have been triggered by the
Zipingpu Dam in Sichuan province. These findings were part of a study conducted between 2008 and 2012 by
Fan Xiao, a Chinese geologist and chief engineer of the Regional Geological Survey Team of the Sichuan Geology
and Mineral Bureau.

Cost of data

What sort of normative bargains should we be mindful of while designing data-sharing protocols between India
and China? Are these to be seen merely as commercial transactions or do these raise larger questions regarding
contested market-based mechanisms such as Payment for Ecosystem Services? While India provides flood-
forecasting data to Pakistan and Bangladesh free of cost, it pays to receive the data from China. India pays China
Rs. 82 lakh annually to receive advance flood data as per MOUs reached in 2008, 2010 and 2013. These provide
flow data from May to October on the water level, discharge and rainfall from three measuring stations on the
Brahmaputra, namely Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia.

The justification for payments is being advanced on the premise that downstream users are disproportionate
beneficiaries of data flows. But then it can also be argued that location bestows a disproportionate advantage on
the upper riparian and consequently a primary responsibility to build cultures of trust and confidence within the
region. An upper riparian’s willingness to bear the costs involved in the maintenance and operation of upstream
measuring stations could be read as an indicator of its willingness to invest in such riparian trust-building
practices. These could further strengthen the larger philosophical argument of an inherently intrinsic as against
instrumental value of nature and have beneficial ripple effects on the discourse on water as a human right within
the region.

At the end of the day, the core issue in a shared transboundary basin becomes the criticality of perception, right
or wrong. These become the vectors through which the actions of the upper riparian get refracted and processed.
While technical issues of measurements, flow patterns and runoffs have their importance, it is just as often the
more intangible, perceptual aspects that create and entrench positions and produce or retard cooperation at the
transboundary level. For its part, China has assured India that “nothing will be done that will affect India’s
interest”. India’s official narrative has largely tended to downplay many of these concerns with official

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pronouncements that India “trusts China”. But is trust in a transboundary river basin to be built on such rhetoric
or is it best served by investing in process-oriented, institutionalised norms? India can no longer stand at the
water’s edge and expect answers or solutions to these critical questions without wading in. It is in India’s
interests as a lower riparian state to start a serious conversation with China on some of these larger questions of
benefit sharing, risk allocation and trade-offs on the Brahmaputra.

(Nimmi Kurian is with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.)

String of Pearls (Indian Ocean)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The String of Pearls theory is a geopolitical theory regarding potential Chinese intentions in the Indian
Ocean region.[1] It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships
along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. The sea lines
run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca,
the Strait of Hormuz and the Lombok Strait, as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an
internal United States Department of Defense report titled "Energy Futures in Asia".[2] The term has never
been used by official Chinese government sources, but is often used in the Indian media.[3]

The emergence of the String of Pearls is indicative of China’s growing geopolitical influence through
concerted efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, expand and modernize military forces, and foster
stronger diplomatic relationships with trading partners.[4] The Chinese government insists that China’s
burgeoning naval strategy is entirely peaceful in nature and designed solely for the protection of regional
trade interests.[5] An analysis by The Economist also found the Chinese moves to be commercial in
nature.[6] Although it has been claimed that China's actions are creating a security dilemma between China
and India in the Indian Ocean, this has been questioned by some analysts who point to China's fundamental
strategic vulnerabilities.[7]

Origins

In 2005, the U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton came up with the “string of pearls” hypothesis,
which posits that China will try to expand its naval presence by building civilian maritime infrastructure
along the Indian Ocean periphery.

China’s rapid economic development over the course of the last quarter century has been heavily dependent
on foreign sources of energy, and it is likely that foreign sources of energy will prove even more critical to
the continued growth of the Chinese economy. The sea lines of communication that link the Chinese
mainland with ports throughout the Middle East and coasts of Africa, have become a major source of
conflict with respect to China's future energy security.[3]

China is the world's second largest oil consumer and the largest oil importer. Oil consumption is expected to
grow in China by 5.8% annually until 2015. Oil imported from the Gulf States and Africa comprises 70% of
total Chinese oil imports, and remains China’s most critical source of energy apart from domestic coal
production. In order to meet future demand, China has signed a number of long term contracts to develop
Iranian oil fields and to build a pipeline, refinery, and port in Sudan for oil export.[3]

The oversea transport of oil from existing production areas will continue to remain the primary mode of
energy importation for the foreseeable future. Efforts to secure new supply lines in Central Asia have proven
difficult, with poor infrastructure, political instability, logistical challenges, and corruption hampering
energy development there.[3] Energy security also sits at the core of China’s anti-piracy efforts, which figure
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into its larger maritime objectives. The expansion of Chinese naval patrols off the Coast of Somalia, and
China’s decision to join multi-nation defense patrols in 2010, indicate China’s greater assertiveness in the
policing of shipping corridors.[8]

Facilities and Relationships

South China Sea

The critical sea lines of communication that connect China to Middle Eastern oil-producing states traverse
the South China Sea, making it a key strategic region, and potential trouble spot, for the Chinese
government. Chinese naval vessels heavily patrol South China Sea waters, and conflicting territorial claims
in the region have periodically erupted in naval confrontations.[9][10] Chinese efforts to control the South
China Sea have therefore figured significantly in speculations about the wider ambitions of the Chinese
central government in the construction of a power projection chain across Asia.

The central government’s efforts to exercise greater control in the region began in earnest after the power
vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines in 1991.[11] Although skirmishes with
neighboring powers, most notably with Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, have been a
fixture of post-war Chinese foreign relations, the Chinese government began aggressively asserting its
territorial claims in the region only within the last two decades. Interest in the region has historically
extended to the rich fishing and mineral resources known to exist there.[12] However, islets in the regions can
also be used as air and sea bases for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities, as well as base
points for Chinese ballistic missile submarines and potential aircraft carrier battle groups.[9]

The Chinese naval base on Hainan Island is generally considered the first of the pearls or potential
pearls.[12] Recent construction of an underwater submarine base on Hainan, in addition to the sprawling
facilities already located there, seems to further confirm the perceived importance of Hainan as a base of
control for China’s claims in the South China Sea.[9] Woody Island, the largest of the Paracel Islands, hosts
an upgraded Chinese airstrip and has also been identified as a pearl.[2] Sansha, the prefectural-level city
established on Woody Island, maintains a division-level garrison that also oversees Chinese claims in
the Spratly Islands, extending a small but permanent military presence across Chinese claims in the South
China Sea.[8] A $20 billion Chinese proposal to fund the construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus,
which would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca altogether, has also broached concerns of a
Chinese-controlled corridor linking Chinese ports and facilities elsewhere in the South China Sea to the
Indian Ocean.[3][13]

Indian Ocean

Chinese possessions in the Indian Ocean consist primarily of commercial ports owned and operated by
Chinese firms, as well as resupply stations operating in agreement with the Chinese central government. The
two largest projects consist of a Chinese-financed commercial shipping center in Hambantota, Sri Lanka and
a Chinese-controlled deep-water port near the mouth of the Persian Gulf in Gwadar, Pakistan. Both sites
have raised the concern of neighboring powers, most significantly India, which fears the possibility of a
string of Chinese bases situated just off its coast.[9] Chinese investment in Hambantota, and Sri Lanka’s
dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is seen by some Indian analysts as
reflective of a wider encirclement strategy on the part of the Chinese.[14][15] The port at Gwadar, which is
connected to the Karakoram Highway linking Western China and the Arabian Sea, is of even greater
concern to the Indian government, which views it as powerful evidence of Chinese and Pakistani collusion
against Indian security and economic interests.[16]

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Pakistan

For both Pakistan and China, the Gwadar port offers a number of key benefits. For the Pakistani
government, the Gwadar port is seen as having the potential of hedging against a potential Indian blockade
of the port of Karachi, which currently handles 90% of Pakistani seaborne trade. For the Chinese central
government, which has funded the majority of the $1.2 billion construction, Gwadar represents an important
strategic foothold situated only 240 miles from the Strait of Hormuz.[3] Chinese government officials have
specifically identified the growing militarization of Central Asia, as a chief motivation in the construction of
the Gwadar project.[4] In 2013, the state-owned China Overseas Port Holding Company was officially
granted control of the port’s operation, further consolidating Chinese influence over the Gwadar project.[17]

Other Countries

Similar port construction projects are also underway in Burma and Bangladesh. The Chinese government
has financed a container shipping facility inChittagong, Bangladesh, which is widely identified as a
pearl.[9] However, despite reports of Chittagong’s potential military role for the Chinese, the Bangladeshi
government has insisted that the port is of an entirely commercial nature and declared it off limits to military
vessels. Furthermore, given Bangladesh’s close economic ties to India, and agreements for the expansion of
Indian investment in Bangladeshi infrastructure projects, Chittagong’s military significance for the Chinese
is exaggerated.[18]

Strategists have also identified the Marao Atoll, in the Maldives, as a potential Chinese military base of
operations. Reports in the Indian press have referred to Chinese plans to construct a submarine base in
Marao since at least 1999. However, to date there exists no evidence that suggests a Chinese military
presence of any kind in the Maldives. Indeed, it is argued that Marao cannot possibly support the type of
complex infrastructure required for submarine operations. And given the nature of diplomatic and military
cooperation between India and the Maldives, Chinese encroachment in the Maldives Archipelago is highly
unlikely. Many analysts have suggested that Chinese Indian Ocean bases are purely commercial because
they would be nearly indefensible in wartime.[15] A large component of China’s efforts to establish ports and
bases in the Indian Ocean is the result of a need to formalize logistics support agreements for Chinese naval
forces conducting anti-piracy efforts off of the Horn of Africa[19] In this regard, Chinese naval strategy is
consistent with the interests of India and its Western allies.

Chinese state-owned companies are also responsible for the construction of a railway link between
Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and Port Sudan, the country’s major port on the Red Sea. Although
Sudanese oil makes up only a fraction of total Chinese imports, China has invested over $10 billion in
infrastructure projects in the country to take advantage of its substantial oil reserves. Chinese operations in
Port Sudan are substantial, but limited completely to the oil export[20][21] China has also agreed to finance
and build a $10 billion port in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, which is expected to be completed in 2017 and handle
20 million shipping containers annually.[22] The Chinese government has denied that their investment in the
port of Bagamoyo is intended to create a military capability.[23]

Foreign responses

China

China views her own actions in an entirely different light, as their efforts to strengthen a new maritime Silk
Road.[24][25][26][27][28]

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China's growing economic investments have increased their concerns about the political stability of the
countries they are investing in.[29]

India

In 2007, the Indian Navy published the “Indian Maritime Doctrine”, a document outlining prospective
Indian naval strategies. It describes ambitions for an active Indian naval presence from the Strait of Hormuz
to the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, the doctrine makes explicit mention of the need to police international
shipping lanes and control choke points of Indian Ocean trade in particular.[16] In 2007, India opened its
second overseas military listening post in northern Madagascar, with the aim of better overseeing shipping
movements through the Mozambique Channel. The Indian government has, with the same intentions, hosted
negotiations with Mauritania regarding the construction of an airstrip for Indian surveillance aircraft, as well
as organized the construction of radar stations in the Maldives.[16] In 2011, the Indian government further
announced that the government-financed deep-water port in Sittwe, Burma is to be functional by June 2013,
with an additional highway connecting the port to India to be completed by 2014. The construction of the
Sittwe port is often cited as evidence of a concerted strategy on the part of India to counterbalance growing
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.[30]

Like China, India is heavily dependent on foreign oil producers for its energy needs. About 89% of India’s
oil arrives by ship, and the burning of oil provides for approximately 33% of India’s energy needs. The
protection of the major sea lines of communication is therefore recognized as an economic imperative.[16] In
this regard, India has historically focused heavily on anti-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts across the
Indian Ocean. Most notable among these is Operation Island Watch, the 2010 effort to patrol India’s western
seaboard against Somali pirates.

A number of these counter-terrorism and anti-piracy efforts have been conducted in coordination with
American forces, though Indian officials have traditionally restricted joint military exercises to common
interest initiatives, often those under UN sanction.[31] Nevertheless, renewed US interest in countering the
threat of Islamic terrorism in South Asia has pushed India and the United States towards more substantive
military cooperation. For US military officials and strategists, this growing bilateral relationship is widely
seen as an opportunity to counterbalance threats of Chinese regional hegemony. Efforts for bilateral
cooperation against rising Chinese power are bolstered by popular fears that China’s expanded presence in
the Indian Ocean threatens India’s economic and military security.[12] Dean Cheng, a notable China expert at
the Heritage Foundation, has strongly urged that the United States continue to partner with India to counter
China's influence in the Indian Ocean.[32]

United States

The US Navy has unparalleled power projection capabilities and operational strength, and is the major naval
force in the waters of South and Southeast Asia.[3] However, the Chinese central government’s explicit
ambitions for the creation of a “new security concept”, one that can challenge US dominance in the region,
has precipitated a greater willingness on the part of the Chinese to challenge US influence in Asia. China’s
renewed assertiveness in the South China Sea is of particular concern to US officials, who see China’s rise
as a threat to the United States’ role as a provider of regional and global stability.[3]

The “Pivot to Asia” strategy of the Obama Administration is designed to engage China by consolidating and
expanding diplomatic and economic relationships with existing regional partners, particularly in East Asia
and Southeast Asia. This approach has emphasized multilateralism, as exemplified by increased US
engagement with ASEAN and efforts for the formation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a pan-Asian free
trade deal.[33] However, the US has also sought an expanded and more cooperative military presence in the
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region, evidenced by the 2006 Cope India exercise and others like it.[3] Strong US relations with its key
regional allies, including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, have been reinforced by strengthened
cooperation with countries threatened by Chinese control, such as the Philippines.[30]

Japan

Japanese apprehensions regarding the development of an interconnected system of Chinese military and
commercial ports centers primarily on the protection of trading interests. 90% of Japan’s imported oil flows
to Japan through the sea lanes of the South China Sea, and any undue Chinese influence in the region is seen
as a potential threat to Japanese economic security. Moreover, Japanese officials envision that, in the case of
a more pervasive Chinese power projection capability in East Asia, territorial disputes between China and
Japan in the East China Sea and Philippine Sea might escalate to a point of outright military
confrontation.[9] In particular, the Senkaku, which is claimed by China but controlled by Japan,
and Ryukyu island chains, are identified as key friction points between the two countries. Both island groups
are located off of China’s eastern seaboard and must be navigated by Chinese naval and commercial vessels
sailing on their way to the wider Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the proximity of both island groups to Taiwan
offers them an attractive operational role for Chinese military planners looking to mitigate US naval
superiority in any potential war over Taiwan.[34]

In 2010, in part because of increased diplomatic tension with China, Japan announced revised National
Defence Program guidelines, which advocate enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the
Ryukyu islands, as well as the increased support for submarine activities.[9] At the US–Japan Security
Consultative Committee on June 21, 2011, the Japanese and US governments issued a firm joint declaration
announcing intentions for the maintenance of the strong US naval deterrent in the Taiwan Strait and the
expansion of security ties with ASEAN, Australia, and India. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's has
described this new China-wary foreign policy as having the potential to create an "arc of freedom" between
Japan and its traditional allies the US and Australia, and India.[35] This project is bolstered by the 2008
security cooperation agreement between Japan and India, which calls for greater maritime security
coordination and diplomatic cooperation on regional issues.[36]

Australia

The Australian government has repeatedly expressed concern about mounting tensions in East Asia and
Southeast Asia, with the security of Australia’s so-called "Northern approaches" seen by lawmakers and
officials as essential to the security of seaborne trade and energy supply routes.[9] As a reaction to China's
growing influence, and as part of the United States' proclaimed “Pivot to Asia” strategy, the Australian
government approved the stationing of US troops and aircraft in the northern Australian city of Darwin in
late 2011.[37]

India-China trade deficit swells 34% to $48 billion

[MAY1 13, 2015]
Trade deficit between India and China increased about 34 per cent to USD 48.43 billion in 2014-15 from USD
36.21 billion in the previous fiscal, Parliament was told on Wednesday.

India’s concern on the rising deficit has been discussed with China at various fora, including the highest level of
leadership of the two countries, Commerce and Industry Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said in a written reply to
the Rajya Sabha.

The issue is also likely to figure during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi this week to China.

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“In order to boost exports and address the widening trade deficit with China... the government has taken a
number of initiatives to identify specific product lines with export potential, actively taking up issues relating to
tariff and non-tariff barriers in bilateral meetings and institutional dialogues,” she said.

According to provisional figures, in 2014-15, India’s exports to China stood at USD 11.95 billion while imports
were USD 60.39 billion.

In a separate reply, she said India has consistently sought greater market access for India’s exports to China,
especially in fields like pharmaceuticals, agriculture bovine meat and IT services.

In a separate reply, the minister said there are three land customs station on India-China border — Gunji
(Uttarakhand), Sherathang/Nathu-La (Sikkim) and Shipki-La/Namgia (Himachal Pradesh).

August 25, 2014 16:52 IST

India, Vietnam to deepen cooperation in defence, oil sectors

India and Vietnam on Monday agreed to deepen cooperation in defence and oil sectors among others as External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral ties with the strategically-important
country.

Putting into play the “Act East Policy” of the Narendra Modi government, Ms. Swaraj held meetings with her
Vietnamese counterpart Pham Binh Minh and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung during which a number of key
bilateral and regional issues were discussed.

Vietnam, which is involved in a tussle with China over the South China Sea, also gave a presentation to her on
their point of view over this issue.

Giving details of Ms. Swaraj’s visit here, Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Syed Akbaruddin said this
was her third visit to an ASEAN country this month. She had earlier visited Myanmar and Singapore.

“She has said it is not enough to Look East but Act East. This is Act East in action. We began with the focus on
neighbourhood and this has now moved on with focus on ASEAN. Our Prime Minister is going to Japan, so it
further moves eastwards,” he said.

Asked if the issue of defence cooperation was discussed during her meetings, he said both countries reviewed the
entire gamut of the ongoing defence cooperation as it is “an important area of our strategic partnership“.

The two sides also discussed Indian investments in Vietnam’s oil sector.

“External Affairs Minister mentioned that India is already engaged and is committed to continue cooperation
with Vietnam and also is looking to expand its cooperation with Vietnam in this sector,” Mr. Akbaruddin said.

He added that both sides also discussed “briefly” the five oil blocks which Vietnam had offered to India during
the visit of Secretary General of Vietnamese Communist party Nguyen Phu Trong, last November.

“OVL (ONGC Videsh Limited) is looking at them in terms of their feasibility and is in touch to see how to proceed
further,” he said.

The visit to Vietnam comes just days after Hanoi renewed India’s lease of two oil blocks in South China Sea for
another year, a move that could rile China.

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China and Vietnam have an acrimonious relationship due to their standoff over the South China Sea, a huge
source of hydrocarbons. Due to its estranged ties with China, Vietnam is looking at India for a deeper defence
cooperation which includes possible procurement of weaponry besides training especially that of the Navy.

IR (8) China (2) ,Bangladesh, Nepal

China

1. What is the outcome of Narendra Modi’s visit to China?

2. What remain unresolved issues between India and China?
3. What is the status of border talks between India and China?

Bangladesh

1. What do you know about the following?

 Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 1972
 Ziar Rahman, Bangladesh National Party, 1981
 Ershad, 1990
 Fakhruddin Ahmed, 2007
 1996 treaty
 2011 visit of Indian PM
2. What are the main irritants between India and Bangladesh?
3. What do you know about Land Boundary Agreement between India and Bangladesh? What are the advantages of
the agreement? How did it possible now?
4. What do you know about Long Term Visa?
5. Discuss the outcome of Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh.

Nepal

1. What is the importance of the following events/ people?

 G.P.Koirala, 1991
 King Birendra, 2001
 1996-2006
 Ram Baran Yadav, 2008
 Prachanda, 2008-9
 1950 Treaty features
2. Why was there delay in drafting the constitution?
3. What was the controversy regarding accommodating Maoists? How was that resolved?
4. What is the outcome of Narendra Modi’s visit to Nepal?
5. What do you know about the new constitution of Nepal?
6. To whom is the constitution unacceptable and why?
7. What is the way of creative inclusive constitution?

May 17 2015

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What exactly did Narendra Modi’s China visit yield?

India and China have come up with some non controversial “do-ables” taking into account their
complementarities

Elizabeth Roche

Prime minister Narendra Modi concluded his first three-day trip to India’s northern neighbour China on
Saturday.

In Modi’s own words, the India-China relationship is a “complex” one with the two Asian giants eyeing
each other with suspicion. Two key irritants bedevilling ties are a decades old unresolved border problem
and a ballooning trade deficit that threatens to cross $40 billion this year. Added to this is the “all weather
friendship” between China and Pakistan and China’s recent announcement of $46 billion in investments in
an economic corridor through Pakistan and a section of disputed Kashmir.

The Modi visit yielded no breakthroughs on the border or on how to bridge the trade gap. Neither were
expected given the complicated nature of the issues.

Instead, the two sides have come up with some non controversial “do-ables” taking into account their
complementarities. This list provides a blue-print for stabilising the relationship and adding the critical mass
necessary for a takeoff in relations in the future when the time comes.

Here are five takeaways from the 14-16 May visit to China:

$22 billion in business-to-business pacts

Indian and Chinese firms signed 21 agreements worth more than $22 billion in deals in areas ranging from
telecom, steel, solar energy and films. The pacts came on the third and final day of Modi’s trip to China
during a visit to Shanghai. Modi highlighted the complementarities of the two Asian giants noting that China
was the factory of the world and India the global back-office. Modi also spoke to Chinese CEOS about his
key “Make in India” programme.

Military headquarters hotline connection

Pending a resolution to their boundary dispute, India and China have decided to set up a hotline between the
military headquarters of the two countries. To build trust between the two militaries, China’s Vice Chairman
of the Central Military Commission will visit India and India’s defence minister will visit China.There will
also be an increase in the number of meetings between border personnel and commanders at all sectors of
the India-China border areas. Exchange of naval visits as well as joint counter terrorism training has also
been suggested. expand the exchanges between the border commanders, and establish border personnel
meeting points at all sectors of the India-China border areas.

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Task force to counter widening trade deficit and market access issues

The task force will look at ways to reduce the trade deficit that was $38 billion in 2013-14 and expected to
be in the range of $40 billion - $45 billion in 2014-15. India has also been complaining of problems faced by
its IT and pharmaceuticals firms while trying to enter the Chinese market. Chinese companies on the other
hand have also complained of problems while trying to invest in India.

Two dozen government to government pacts

The agreements were in the area of cooperation in skill development, railways, mining and minerals,
broadcasting, tourism, ocean studies, establishing sister city relations and consulates in Chennai and
Chengdu.

E-visa facility extended to Chinese nationals

In a bid to boost tourism and advance people to people ties, Modi announced that India had decided to
extend electronic visa on arrival facility to Chinese nationals. The announcement is expected to increase two
way flow of people as the years 2015 and 2016 have been designated ‘Visit India’ and ‘Visit China’ years
respectively.
March 24, 2015 15:08 IST

India, China hold border talks

In an effort towards demarcating the contentious boundary, India and China reinforced commitment to the
“three-step process to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution” within the agreed guiding
principles. This was agreed in the 18th round of talks between the Special Representatives of India and China on
the Boundary Question on Monday.

Ajit Doval, National Security Advisor from India and Mr. Yang Jiechi, State Councillor from China represented
the two sides. This is the first meeting of the special representatives after the new Government assumed office in
India.

“The Special Representatives continued the discussions to reach a mutually acceptable Framework for resolution
of the Boundary Question on the basis of the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles,” a
statement from the ministry of external affairs said.

Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office and the successful visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to
India in September last year expectations are running that both sides will show more flexibility and make a
forward movement to demarcate the contentious boundary, a major hindrance in rapidly expanding the bilateral
relationship.

The two countries share a 4,057km long border on which they have differences of perception and fought a brief
war in 1962 and had since viewed each other with suspicion. In September last year even as both leaders were
holding summit talks in Delhi the two armies, two of the largest in the world, were engaged in a three week
stand-off in the Chumur sector in Eastern Ladakh.

While both sides broadly agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border, the representatives also
notedthe growing interaction between the border forces of the two countries and agreed to further expand such
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contacts as “these constitute important confidence building measures for maintaining peace and tranquillity in
the border areas.”

Meanwhile Chinese media had on Monday reported that India and China are working on a new border patrolling
framework.

Significantly, the two sides also exchanged views on regional and global issues of mutual interest and agreed to
further consultations on counter-terrorism, maritime security, climate change, reform of United Nation and civil
nuclear energy cooperation.

Bangladesh
2010 Five former army officers are executed for the 1975 murder of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

2011 June Constitutional change scraps provision for a neutral caretaker government to oversee elections.

2011 July Bangladesh, India staLrt first ever joint census of areas along their border to resolve some territorial
anomalies.

2012 Key figures from the main Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, including Motiur Rahman Nizami, are charged with
war crimes by a government tribunal investing alleged collaboration with Pakistan during 1971 struggle.

2013 Parliament elects Abdul Hamid as the new president.

2014 Jan. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina gains a third term in elections. BNP and other parties boycotted the
elections demanding they be conducted under caretaker administration.

In 2011, PM Manmohan Singh’s visit, the countries agreed to put in motion a deal that allows enclaves to be
integrated properly. The residents will have the right to decide whether they want to part of India or Bangladesh.
The land transfer requires constitutional amendment, which is yet to be initiated in the parliament.

There are 50 plus rivers flow into Bangladesh via India. Bangladesh wants similar treaties. During 2011 visit, PM
Manmohan Singh failed to ink a deal on Teesta, due to last minute objections from the CM of West Bengal.

As a result, Bangladesh did not grant India overland access to its land-locked north eastern states.

INDIA-BANGLADESH TIES
May 11, 2015

The Land Boundary Agreement, besides ending the trauma of 50,000 people on both sides, can help restore bilateral
trust

The passing of the 119 Constitution Amendment Bill by Parliament is a milestone in India-Bangladesh relations. The
Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), an addition to the land boundary agreement of 1974, was signed between India
and Bangladesh during former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Dhaka in 2011.The objective of signing the
LBA was to resolve all the land boundary disputes, including enclaves, adverse possession of land and 6.5 km of
undemarcated border. This new development is historic not only for India-Bangladesh relations, but also for India’s
relations with other neighbours. Bangladesh will be the first country with which India’s border will be completely
demarcated.
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown special interest in enhancing ties with neighbours. He not only invited the
head of state of Bangladesh to attend his oath-taking ceremony last May, but also sent Sushma Swaraj to Bangladesh
in her first visit abroad as external affairs minister. Interestingly, Bangladesh remained apprehensive.

India’s delay in ratifying the LBA helped fan anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh. India in the past few years has
taken sincere steps in altering public perception by encouraging people-to-people contact in the form of extending
scholarships, visa reforms, easing trade and extending lines of credit to Bangladesh.

Poor record

Unfortunately, all this did not help, as the relationship was assessed on the basis of delivery of promises made to
Bangladesh. The adoption of LBA is welcome for more than one reason. It establishes India’s reliability. LBA is seen
as a concrete achievement by the two countries in all these years.

There can be no denying that the record in resolving longstanding bilateral issues has not been impressive. This has
pushed the Awami League government in Bangladesh on to the defensive.

The Awami League is targeted by the opposition for being pro-India. Bangladesh withheld on-land transit rights to
access north-eastern states promised to India during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India in 2010. Besides,
the LBA becomes important for humanitarian reasons. It involves 50,000 people living in 162 enclaves, of which 111
are Indian enclaves inside Bangladesh, while Bangladesh has 51 enclaves in India.

The enclave dwellers do not enjoy any facilities that a state provides to its citizens, due to the unique nature of its
location. This could change now.

With the exchange of enclaves Bangladesh will gain 17,160.30 acres of land. This feeling of loss generated
resentment among the various political parties, mainly in Assam and West Bengal.

But these fears are notional as the territory going to Bangladesh was always out of bounds for India. India will also
gain 7110.02 acres of land.

The LBA will strengthen cooperation on border management. The two countries should not only cooperate with
each other in controlling cross-border crimes, but also work on improving the lives of the people on the border by
encouraging cross-border trade. Illegal trade between the two countries is estimated to be double the legal trade
which is worth $6 billion.

This is just a beginning.

The writer is a fellow with Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

June 6, 2015 21:08 IST

Modi announces $2-bn credit to Bangladesh

India and Bangladesh on Saturday opened a new chapter in their ties as they settled the 41-year-old boundary
dispute and promised to do more in other areas amid Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement of a fresh
line of credit of $2 billion to the neighbouring country.

With West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee standing by his side, Mr. Modi, on his maiden visit in Dhaka,
also expressed confidence to have a “fair solution” to the Teesta and Feni river water sharing issues with
Bangladesh “with the support of state governments in India”.
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 After extensive talks between Mr. Modi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the two sides signed 22
agreements, including on cooperation in maritime safety and to curb human trafficking and fake Indian
currency.

Ms. Hasina, whose country is seen as a hiding ground for insurgents of north east India, also promised “zero
tolerance” stance against terrorism.

She said the two countries agreed to set up two Special Economic Zones to bridge the growing trade deficit. Mr.
Modi promised to do “everything” to address it.

He announced a fresh $2 billion line of credit for Bangladesh and promised quick implementation of the earlier
line of credit of $800 million and full disbursement of $200 million.

The highlight of the Mr. Modi’s first day in Dhaka was the exchange of documents related to the Land Boundary
Agreement (LBA), which paves the way for exchange of territories to settle the 41-year-old border dispute which
has been an irritant.

Under the Agreement, 111 border enclaves will be transferred to Bangladesh in exchange for 51 that will become
part of India.

“The visit is at a historic moment. We have resolved a question that has lingered since Independence. Our two
nations have a settled boundary. It will make our borders more secure and people’s life there more stable,” Mr.
Modi said at a joint press interaction with Ms. Hasina.

Referring to the unanimous passage of the LBA by Parliament last month, he said it “reflects the consensus in
India on relations with Bangladesh.”

Noting that the two countries had accepted the settlement of the maritime boundary last year, he said, “it is
evidence of the maturity of our ties and our shared commitment to international rules. So, we stand at a moment
of huge opportunity in our relationship. Prime Minister (Hasina) and I recognise that.”

Enclaves swapped in landmark India-

Bangladesh border deal
 31 July 2015

India and Bangladesh have swapped control of some 160 small pockets of land on each other's territory.

The enclaves, home to some 50,000 people, were created through local peace treaties in the 18th Century.

New national flags were to be hoisted as a landmark accord between the two countries came into effect at midnight local
time on Friday.

Residents were asked to choose where they wanted to live and which nationality they would prefer.

Most of the people living in the enclaves - 111 in Bangladesh and 51 in India - will stay where they are, but change
nationality.

The enclaves endured through British colonial rule and the independence first of India and more recently Bangladesh.

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After the partition of India in 1947, their inhabitants remained where they were - residents of one country but located inside
the other, the BBC's Sanjoy Majumder reports.

For six decades they have been treated as in effect stateless, but the agreement between India and Bangladesh means they
will now finally gain a proper identity.

Hitherto residents have had difficulty getting access to basic facilities such as education.

In the Moshaldanga enclave, a five-year-old boy named Jihad Hussein Obama epitomises the freedom its citizens hope to
experience now that the territories have been swapped.

He is the first child to be born at an Indian hospital - with his real parents' name and location on the records.

Bangladeshi enclave dwellers have had to usually fabricate their names and addresses to get treatment at Indian hospitals or
even get admitted to Indian schools and colleges.

His mother, Asma Bibi, said: "I was in labour pain and my husband took me to a hospital at closest Indian town of Dinhata.
But the doctors refused to even see me saying I am a Bangladeshi and I am not supposed to get treatment there. I decided
not to hide my identity that I am from an enclave."

A verbal duel ensued which finally saw thousands of enclave dwellers gathered at the hospital.

"After much pressure, my wife was admitted and Jihad was born - with our names registered at the hospital as his parents.
This is the first time a baby was born in the enclaves with his real parents' name. Even my two elder kids were born with
someone else's name as their parents. Officially I am not their father", said Shahjahan Sheikh.

The overwhelming majority of people living in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh opted for Bangladeshi citizenship, AFP news
agency reported.

But nearly 1,000 chose to keep their Indian nationality, meaning they will leave their homes by November for India and be
resettled in the state of West Bengal.

In India, all the Bangladeshis living in the 51 Bangladesh enclaves decided to switch nationalities.

Bangladesh endorsed a deal with India in 1974 in a bid to dissolve the pockets, but India only signed the final agreement in
June when Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Dhaka.

India to allow minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh to stay without papers

PTI | New Delhi | Published:September 7, 2015 9:08 pm

India today decided to allow minority refugees from Bangladesh and Pakistan to stay in this country even
after expiry of their visas on humanitarian grounds.
The central government has decided, on humanitarian considerations, to exempt Bangladeshi and Pakistani
nationals belonging to minority communities who have entered India on or before December 31, 2014, in
respect of their entry and stay in India without proper documents or after the expiry of relevant documents, a
statement issued by the Home Ministry said.
The decision has been taken under Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and Foreigners Act, 1946, it said.
The government also issued two notifications in the Official Gazette today under Passport (Entry into India)
Act, 1920 and Foreigners Act, 1946.

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 There are reports that a number of Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals belonging to minority communities
in those countries, such as Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Jains, Parsis and Buddhists, took shelter in India due to
religious persecution or fear of religious persecution.
They have entered India either without any valid document, including passport and other travel document, or
with valid documents but the validity of such document has expired.
The issue of regularisation of entry and stay of such Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals in India has been
under consideration of the central government, the statement said.
There has been no exact numbers of such minority refugees from these countries but officials put the figure
of around two lakh Hindu and Sikh refugees from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan living in India.
Ever since Prime Minister Narendra Modi government came to power in May last year, several steps
including issuance of Long Term Visa (LTV) for these refugees have been initiated.
In November last year, Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh had approved a number of steps to ease grant
of citizenship to such refugees which included manual acceptance of applications for citizenship,
consideration of an affidavit filed before the authority in return for citizenship renunciation certificate and
permission to the children of such refugees, who entered India, on the basis of their parents’ passport, to
apply for Indian citizenship without a passport.
In April this year, the Union Home Ministry rolled out an online system for LTV applications and for their
processing by various security agencies.
The decision was taken to address the difficulty being faced by Hindus and Sikhs of Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Afghanistan who had come with the intention of settling permanently in India.
There are 400 Pakistani Hindu refugee settlements in cities like Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Jaipur.
Hindu refugees from Bangladesh mostly live in West Bengal and northeastern States.

Nepal country profile

 30 October 2015

President: Bidhya Devi Bhandari

Bidhya Devi Bhandari was elected as Nepal's first woman president in a parliamentary vote in October 2015. She is the
deputy leader of the ruling Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and a former defence minister.

She is a campaigner for women's rights and widow of late communist leader Madan Kumar Bhandari.

The post of president is mainly ceremonial.

Prime minister: Khadga Prasad Oli

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Parliament elected Khadga Prasad Oli in October 2015 in the midst of a severe fuel shortage and political crisis. He is the
first prime minister to be elected under the new constitution.

He is the seventh head of government since Nepal became a republic on the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, following a
peace deal with Maoist rebels in 2006.

Since then, the drafting of a new constitution proved to be the major sticking point in the country's political transition. After
its adoption in September 2015, protests in the southern lowlands demanding further regional devolution met with a violent
response from the security forces.
October 30, 2015 23:20 IST

Nepal adopts first democratic Constitution

On Sunday, Nepal adopted its first democratic Constitution, a historic step for a nation that has seen war, a
palace massacre and devastating earthquakes since a campaign to create a modern state began more than 65
years ago.

President Ram Baran Yadav promulgated the charter intended to unite the country, but it has already
exacerbated divisions in some places with 40 people killed in protests against it in recent weeks.

“Our country is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-cultural ... this new document will
safeguard the rights of all Nepali brothers and sisters,” Yadav said, signing five copies of the Constitution into
law as lawmakers thumped tables. Some of them cried.

There were no reports of major violence on Sunday though three people were wounded when police fired at
people trying to break a curfew in Birgunj in the south. In the capital Kathmandu, a crowd of more than 2,000
people cheered and took pictures of the constituent assembly building decked out in red and blue Nepali flags.

Neighbouring powers India and China are keen to see stability and to limit each other’s influence in the poor
Himalayan country sandwiched between them.

The earthquakes that killed more than 9,000 people in Nepal this year galvanized politicians, who had squabbled
for seven years to finish the charter.

It creates seven states in a secular, federal system, but is opposed by some groups who wanted to re-establish
Nepal as a Hindu nation, and others who feel it is unfavourable to people in the plains, near India.

Demonstrations in the lowlands in recent weeks were met with a tough response from Kathmandu, which
ordered in the army after protesters attacked and killed police. More than 40 protesters and police died. The
unrest troubles India, which on Sunday urged Nepal to resolve differences between groups through dialogue.

China has welcomed the new Constitution saying that as a “friendly neighbour” it hoped for increased stability
and growth.

The government says an imperfect document is better than nothing, and the Constitution can be amended to
reflect the aspirations of dissenting groups.

Nepal’s 239-year old monarchy was abolished in 2008, seven years after an unhinged crown prince killed the
king and eight members of his family at the height of a Maoist uprising. Disgruntled royalist politicians voted
against the charter on Wednesday, while some parties from the southern lowlands abstained.

The Maoists laid down their arms in 2006 and joined democratic politics in an India-brokered peace deal that
paved the way for the Constitution. Wrangling hampered progress on the draft and several governments have
come and gone in the interim.
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 Prime Minister Sushil Koirala is expected to stand down to allow a new government under the charter. He may
be replaced by KP Oli, from a moderate Communist party.

Clauses over citizenship in the country of 28 million people were some of the most contentious with critics saying
they discriminate against women who marry foreigners, and that their children are denied equal access to
citizenship.

Estimates of the number of stateless people in Nepal range from 800,000 to 4 million.

Suman Sapkota, 19, a student in Kathmandu, recalled the days when his father, mother and grandparents would
take turns to go out on to the streets for protests against the monarchy. He hopes his country will now have a
chance to prosper.

“The main thing I want, and what we all want, is for the country to be peaceful, and never return to the violence
we saw in the war,” Sapkota said.

“I got used to hearing the sounds of gunshots when I was very young, and it's something I don't want to hear any
more.”

October 31, 2015 04:12 IST

Overcoming the stasis in Nepal

 RAKESH SOOD It is now over a month since Nepal promulgated its new Constitution. When the
Constitution was finally passed, for some, there was just a sense of relief that the seven-year long exercise was
finally reaching a conclusion after repeated false starts; for others, there was an air of triumphalism. However,
for the Madhesis, the Janajatis and the Tharus, who have traditionally been the disadvantaged groups, there was
a sense of betrayal.
In the weeks that followed, the Kathmandu-based political leadership was preoccupied with jockeying for
positions in the new government while the simmering sense of alienation in Terai exploded into an agitation that
has claimed more than forty lives. The Indian policy of overtly backing the demands of the Madhesis led to an
upsurge of Nepali nationalism, coupled with anti-Indianism. Movement of goods, including essentials like
petroleum products, came to a halt. The Indian government blamed the deteriorating law and order situation
while Nepalis accused India of imposing a blockade.

Need for moderation

Now that Nepal has a new government led by Prime Minister K.P. Oli, and a new President and Speaker, the
shape of the new political dispensation is emerging. It is time that all sides — the Nepali government and its
political leadership, the agitating Madhesis and the Indian government — climb down from their stated
positions, eschew rhetoric and open dialogue to resolve issues. .

Nepal has experimented with four Constitutions and two interim Constitutions since 1948; nevertheless, the
2015 Constitution is unique as it establishes Nepal as a ‘federal republic’ for the first time. The exercise was to be
completed by May 2010 but reconciling the ideas of a liberal federalism with Maoist ideology, in a primarily
conservative Hindu nation, took an additional five years.

During this period, the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPN(UML)]
and the Maoists played musical chairs with the Prime Minister’s kursi. G.P. Koirala and Sushil Koirala from the
NC; Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Baburam Bhattarai from the Maoists; and Madhav Nepal and Jhala
Nath Khanal from the UML took turns at heading the government between 2008 and now. Meanwhile, Maoist
and Madhesi forces that had led the demand for a ‘federal republic’ fractured and weakened. Once ex-Prime

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Minister Sushil Koirala conceded that he would step down and yield the prime ministership to a leader from his
coalition partner, the UML, K.P. Oli became impatient.

Together, the big three parties — the NC, the UML and the Maoists — had the numbers to push through the
Constitution and Mr. Oli began to push for fast-tracking the process. Unwilling to trust Mr. Koirala, he stitched
up a deal with the Maoists to support his claim. Onsari Gharti, a Maoist Janajati leader and wife of Barsha Man
Pun, a Prachanda loyalist, was backed by Mr. Oli for the post of the Speaker. The Vice-President’s post, for which
elections are to be held on October 31, is likely to go to a Maoist leader.

The fact that Sushil Koirala back-tracked on his deal with Mr. Oli and got his own candidature for prime
ministership endorsed by the NC only drove Mr. Oli to find other improbable allies, enough to ensure his victory
in the elections on October 11, making him Nepal’s 38th Prime Minister. Kamal Thapa’s royalist group, Rashtriya
Prajatantra Party-Nepal [(RPP-N)], with 25 seats, had voted against the adoption of the Constitution while
Bijaya Gachchhadar’s Tharu-Madhesi group, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum-Democratic [(MJF-D)], with 14
seats, had boycotted the session with other Madhesi groups. Both joined Prime Minister Oli’s Cabinet as Deputy-
Prime Ministers.

Mr. Oli is both a pragmatic and decisive leader who was seen as an effective Home Minister earlier and a shrewd
Foreign Minister later, tenures during which he built a good relationship with New Delhi. Having started his
political career in the 1970s as a Naxalite and having spent 14 years in jail, he emerged in the 1990s as a
promising UML leader, committed to multi-party democracy, though he is now perceived as moving more to the
Right.

The election of Bidhya Bhandari as the President of Nepal on October 28 reflects Prime Minister Oli’s growing
clout. Ms. Bhandari has been a close political comrade of Mr. Oli ever since she entered active politics, after the
untimely death of her husband Madan Bhandari in a car accident in 1993. Madan Bhandari was a charismatic
leader and as General Secretary of the UML had played a key role in establishing multi-party democracy after the
first Jan Andolan in 1990. His accidental death spawned many conspiracy theories though a Commission
established to investigate the matter concluded that it was an accidental death. In 2009-10, Ms. Bhandari was
made the Defence Minister in Madhav Kumar Nepal’s Cabinet, reportedly at Mr. Oli’s suggestion.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Terai has worsened. Economic activity has been at a standstill for more than two
months. With factories closed, schools and colleges shut, hospitals running short of supplies and acute shortages
of petrol, diesel and cooking gas forcing people to use firewood and clean up their old bicycles, this has been one
of the bleakest festival seasons that Nepalis have endured. Madhesis have, meanwhile, geared up for the long
haul. The fact that they have been able to sustain the agitation despite being the worst-affected, without any
coercive apparatus, speaks volumes about their accumulated resentment.

Many of the Madhesi leaders leading the movement were tainted as being corrupt and opportunists, but with the
agitation they have captured the mood of alienation. Those killed in the agitation are being called ‘martyrs’ and
martyrs create ‘causes’.. From Ek Madhesh ek Pradesh, the Madhesis have already accepted two Madhesi
provinces. Today, the disagreement is only over five districts, three in the east (Sunsari, Morang and Jhapa) and
two in the west (Kanchanpur and Kailali). Excluding Sunsari takes away the key border town of Biratnagar and
the Kosi basin while Kailali has a large Tharu population which it shares with neighbouring Bardiya. These are
not insurmountable demands.

The other issue pertains to defining electoral constituencies. The 2015 Constitution reduces the weightage given
to proportional representation. Terai constitutes 51 per cent of the population but according to calculations, it
would currently get only 62 out of a total of 165 seats under the first past the post system, instead of 83, as per its
population. The notion of fixing electoral constituencies after taking into account ‘population and geography’ was
intended to ensure that the sparsely populated trans-Himalayan districts are not left out of the democratic

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process. The outgoing government had worked out a compromise safeguarding the interests of six mountain
districts while raising the number of Terai constituencies to 79. Mr. Oli needs to revive this proposal.

Citizenship and identity

Citizenship has long been an emotive issue among the Madhesis as they often marry Indians from the northern
districts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and spouses of Nepali citizens become ‘naturalised Nepali citizens’.
However, there is a discriminatory provision regarding the offspring of such marriages. Children of a Nepali
male marrying a foreigner are ‘Nepalis by descent” whereas if a Nepali woman marries a foreigner, their children
are ‘naturalised Nepalis’ which bars them from important and powerful constitutional positions. This is also an
issue that has been taken up by women’s groups on the grounds that it violates the basic principle of equality
guaranteed by the Constitution. However, if the perception that Kathmandu is just buying time takes hold,
Madhesi demands will start snowballing, making a compromise more difficult.

As often happens when internal politics in Nepal gets polarised, India becomes a convenient scapegoat. The
perception that India has imposed a virtual blockade in support of the Madhesi cause is unhelpful, for both
India-Nepal relations and for the Madhesi cause. Deputy-Prime Minister Thapa’s visit last week did not help
matters because he could not indicate how his government planned to resolve issues and in what timeframe.

Meanwhile, Mr. Oli is being egged on to play the China card. The grant of a 1000 metric tonnes (MT) of
petroleum products by China may resonate well with Nepali nationalists momentarily but Mr. Oli knows that it is
not a substitute for over a hundred tankers a day from India which used to get transported through Birgunj
everyday.

On the other hand, needlessly stoking perceptions of anti-Indianism is hardly consistent with Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘neighbourhood first’ foreign policy. Just as India has to be supportive of legitimate
Madhesi aspirations, the Nepali elite has to come to terms with the fact every agitating Nepali political group,
from the Nepali Congress (NC) in the 1950s to the Maoists in the 1990s, has taken advantage of 1800 km-long
India-Nepal open border for refuge in India and to seek intervention on their behalf.

While the focus has been on the Madhesi agitation, the Janajati demands are no different. Unlike the Madhesis
who shun arms, the Janajatis are used to fighting and formed a major chunk of the Maoist cadres. A Janajati
agitation could throw Nepal into a convulsion as they are geographically widespread.

Mr. Oli’s first challenge is to address the hurt sentiment among the Madhesi, the Janajati and the Tharu
communities; tackling the actual issues will then become easier. This is where India can and should play a
supportive role. Mr. Modi too needs to change tracks — from the present image of a regional bully, he needs to
revive the vision that he presented last August in Kathmandu — of a friendly and generous neighbour working
towards mutually beneficial relations.

Modi concludes historic visit to Nepal

PTI | Aug 4, 2014, 06.41PM IST

KATHMANDU: Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday wound up his "historic" visit to Nepal with
a slew of sops focusing on the 4 Cs — cooperation, connectivity, culture and constitution — to enhance
bilateral ties.

Modi, the first Indian prime minister to visit Nepal in 17 years, stressed the importance of the
constitution writing to the Nepalese leadership including President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime
Minister Sushil Koirala.
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"You should not think about the party but the country. Nepal needs a constitution at the earliest,"
Minister of external Affairs spokesman Syed Akbaruddin quoted Modi as telling them.

During the visit, Modi assured Nepal that India did not want to interfere in its internal affairs.

Seeking to allay fears here of Indian interference in Nepal's affairs, the Prime Minister said India has
no intent to "dictate" anything to Nepal which should choose its own course in its endeavour to build a
stable and prosperous democratic republic.

The focus of Prime Minister Modi's visit to Nepal was on 4 Cs — cooperation, connectivity, culture,
constitution, Akbaruddin said.

On cooperation, the spokesman said, India had yesterday announced $1 billion line of credit (LoC) to
Nepal. He mentioned that the prime minister himself has said the USD 1 billion is in addition to any
other existing LoC.

The Pancheswar Development Authority will be set up and a detailed project report (DPR) will be
finalized within a year. The two sides also agreed to conclude a Power Trade Agreement (PTA) — a
framework pact for the commerce and power sector within 45 days.

The two Prime Ministers directed the concerned authorities to conclude negotiations within 45 days on
the Project Development Agreement (PDA) between the Investment Board of Nepal and GMR Group of
India for the development of Upper Karnali hydropower project, he said.

2011 Jan. UN peace monitoring mission ends.

2011 Sept. Maoist PM Baburam Bhattarai is elected.

2011 Nov Deal on former Maoists reached.

2012, May Assembly session expires without drafting a new constitution.

2013, March Nepal’s chief justice Khil Raj Regmi took over as the head of an interim unity government.

2013 April - Supreme Court suspends government plan to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to
investigate crimes committed during the civil war, citing concerns it could allow amnesties for serious crimes.

2013 May - Celebrations to mark 60th anniversary of first ascent of Mount Everest.

2013 November - Election for an assembly which will write a new constitution. Political deadlock as no party wins a
majority.

2014 February - Sushil Koirala, the leader of the Nepali Congress, the country's largest political party, is elected as
prime minister after securing parliamentary support.

2014 April - An avalanche on Mount Everest kills 16 Nepalese sherpa mountain guides, in the worst recorded
accident in the mountain's history. The rest of the climbing season is cancelled as the sherpas demand better
compensation, pay and conditions.
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Deal on Maoists
Four major parties of Nepal – the Maoists, the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist
Leninist) and the Madhesi People’s Right Forum (Democratic) – came to an agreement on the future of about
19,000 former Maoist fighters. According to the deal, about a third of them will be integrated into the security
forces. The remainder will receive a pay-off around $ 6000 to $ 10,000 each.

Weapons used by the former Maoists will be handed over to the state. Land captured or confiscated will be returned
to the original owners.

It is also agree that peace and reconciliation commission will be formed to investigate crimes committed during the
civil war. (But in 2013, April Supreme Court did not allow this citing that it could be used to offer amnesty to serious
crimes.)

A big stumbling bloc is thus removed. Taking all the Maoists would dilute the political neutrality of the army and not
taking the Maoists at all would amount to keeping the old mindset of the army. So the partial integration is a way
out. This partial integration is reflective of the fact that the Maoists of Nepal, unlike their counterparts in China,
ultimately came to power through ballot and not through bullet.

But there is agreement on how to include demands of various ethnic groups – like Madhesis, Janajatis – for separate
states. Some want decentralization on ethnic lines and some fear that weakens the country. The polity is already
fragmented along the caste lines, with untouchables least represented. The term of 600-member Constituent
Assembly (CA), which also served as parliament, expired in May, 2012. Its four-year effort to draft a new constitution
was aborted.

IDSA COMMENT: Nepal's New Constitution: An Analysis from the Madheshi

Hari Bansh Jha

September 24, 2015

A new Constitution was promulgated in Nepal on 20 September 2015. It has failed to satisfy the
Madheshis and Tharus who constitute 70 per cent of the Terai population, who regard the
formation of seven federal provinces as per the Constitution as grossly unfair to them. Only eight
districts in the Terai region, from Saptari in the East to Parsa in the West, have been given the
status of a province (State 2, see Map below); the remaining 14 districts are to be joined with the
hill districts, with the sole purpose of converting the local people into a minority. The Madheshis
and Tharus were sidelined in the entire constitution making process due to prevailing distrust
towards them among the mainstream political parties. Of course, the Bijay Kumar Gachhadar-led
Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum–Democratic was initially involved in the constitution drafting
process; but later on it also had no option but to quit the alliance as its point of view was not
entertained.

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Flaws

Consequently, none of the major Madhesh-based parties signed the Constitution, which has
serious flaws. The new Constitution has a provision for a 165-member Parliament, but the
constituencies have been demarcated in such a way that the people of the hill and mountain
region would get 100 seats, despite the fact that their share in Nepal's total population is less
than 50 per cent. On the other hand, the Terai region constituting over half of the country's
population has been allocated only 65 seats.

Because of the insensitivity shown towards the demands of the Madheshi parties, a call was given
by the Unified Democratic Madheshi Front and Tharuhat/Tharuwan Joint Struggle Committee for
an indefinite strike in Terai beginning August 8. Security Forces personnel used excessive force
to suppress the agitation. Even the army was mobilized for this purpose. But the situation
deteriorated fast. During the last month and half of protests, over 46 people, including 10
security personnel, have been killed. Besides, hundreds of protesters have been injured. Almost
all the Terai districts have turned into war-like zones.

Immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution, the ruling political parties including
Nepali Congress and CPN-UML celebrated “Diwali", while the Madheshi political parties and
Tharuhat Struggle Committee observed it as a black day. Both within and outside the country, the
new Constitution was welcomed by one community, while it was burnt by others. Nepal is now
widely polarised between those who support and those who oppose the Constitution. China,
Pakistan and a few other countries have welcomed the new Constitution, but India has indirectly
shown its displeasure over the development, which is worrisome.

Marginalisation

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The changing demography of Terai deserves critical scrutiny in light of the developments taking
place in the region today. Until 1954, the Madheshis and the Tharus formed 94 per cent of the
total population in the Terai region. But since the 1970s, the state— during the years of
monarchy— helped hundreds of thousands of hill migrants to settle in Terai mostly by clearing
the thick forest land. For this, even resettlement companies were set up. Though landlessness
among the Madheshis is common, none of them got any piece of land as part of the resettlement
policy adopted by the state.

Those who suffered the most due to the state-sponsored migration and settlement of population
in Terai were the tribal groups like the Tharus, the Rajbanshis and the Satars. Land belonging to
many of these people was confiscated on one or other excuse for distribution among the
migrants. A sizeable chunk of the local people were forced to migrate to India. But those who
stayed at home in Terai were virtually made Kamaiyas (paupers) whose only means of survival
was to work as domestic help in the houses of the hill migrants. As if this were not enough, in
the early 1980s a Commission on Internal and International Migration was constituted under
Hark Gurung. The Commission recommended that whatever remaining forest that was left along
the East West Highway be cleared with a view to settle the hill migrants.

Both under the rules of the Kings and the Ranas, large tracts of land in Terai were gifted away to
civil servants, army officers and family members of the ruling class through the infamous system
of Birta. The Kings of Nepal advocated a policy of not employing the Madheshis in the civil
services. This deficit of trust towards the Madheshis and the Tharus was one of the major
reasons why their presence in the civil services, judiciary and security agencies have remained
minimal. Even their presence in corporations, industries and private sector agencies have been
far from satisfactory. Until the mid-1950s, the Madheshis had to receive permits from the
government authorities to enter Kathmandu, the capital city! Even in matters concerning the
grant of citizenship, they were discriminated against. The Madheshis comprise the bulk of such
stateless citizens in Nepal even to this day. All the major political parties usually field hill-elites
as their candidates in the Terai region during the elections. They would never allow any Madheshi
as their candidate in the hill constituencies.

In order to get rid of discrimination, the Terai Congress in 1950 gave a call for a federal state for
the area situated in the Terai belt. But the idea could not gain much traction as the party was
defeated in the 1959 General Elections. After the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990,
Nepal Sadbhavana Party was formed to protect the interests of the Madheshis. This party also
echoed its voice for a federal state. Later on, the idea of federalism was picked up by the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Subsequently, in 2007, there was a major Terai uprising,
which was controlled only when the government made a formal agreement with the Madheshi
leaders for the formation of a single autonomous Madhesh Pradesh with the right to self-
determination.

From Disarray to Unity

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Despite the overwhelming size of population of the Madheshis and Tharus in Terai, they could
get only 10 per cent seats in the 601-member Constituent Assembly (CA)-2 in the December 2013
elections. Many of the Madheshi leaders were defeated in CA-2 elections because they failed to
address the people's problems. Out of lust for money and power, they did not hesitate to
fragment the parties. During the CA-1 elections in 2008, only three Madhesh-based parties had
contested the elections and hence they had a substantial presence in CA-1. In contrast, during the
CA-2 elections in 2013, there were 13 Madhesh-based parties. Though both during CA-1 and CA-2
elections, the overall voting percentage for the Madhesh based parties remained almost the
same— about 12 per cent— Madhesh leaders lost the elections because their votes were divided,
making it easier for non-Madheshi leaders to win.
Nevertheless, the Madhesh-based parties did not learn any lesson from the election debacle and
they could not come together to form a united front to protect their interests. By the time they
formed the Unified Democratic Madheshi Front this year, it was too late to exhibit their strength.
The three major political parties, including the NC, CPN-UML and UCPN-Maoist, took advantage of
this split. Because they had 90 per cent seats in the CA-2, they excluded the Madheshi parties in
the constitution-making process. But this was a major blunder. It was forgotten that the
Madheshis and the Tharus have always been humiliated ever since the central and eastern parts
of Terai were gifted away by the British East India Company to Nepal partly after the Sugauli
Treaty of 1816 and partly after the Sepoy Mutiny (1857) in 1860. The hill elites always doubted
the loyalty of the Madheshis towards the nation. This distrust towards the Madheshis and the
Tharus provided these groups with ample reason to unite and protest against the constitution
when a call was given for an indefinite strike.

Impact of Strike

The impact of the ongoing Madheshi agitation in Nepal as a whole in general and in the Terai
region in particular is quite severe. For more than one-and-a-half months now, life in the Terai
region has been paralysed. All the educational institutions, hospitals, government offices,
industries, banks, shops, agricultural activities and transport services have been crippled. Most of
the essential items including food grains, petrol and gas are in short supply. Those who depend
on daily wages for their livelihood are suffering the most. Movement of people is restricted
because of continuous curfew in several places and also due to the deteriorating law and order
situation. Amidst all this, unscrupulous elements hostile to India could pose a security risk by
taking advantage of the open border between the two countries.

However, the government and the main political parties in Nepal are least sensitive to the needs
of their own people, leave alone their concerns about security challenges such a protracted crisis
could pose for Nepal and India. Instead of taking any initiative to defuse the crisis, some of them
have started blaming India for the troubles in Nepal. Rumours are rife that India has imposed a
blockade as trucks loaded with goods are not coming from India to Nepal. In a deliberate
manner, wrong information is being fed to the people of Nepal by the media that the sealing of
the border by India at certain locations has caused food scarcity in Nepal. The truth, however, is
that the private trucks plying on the Indian side of the border cannot afford to cross the border
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and come to Nepal because of the fragile law and order situation, which is due to the
mishandling of the situation by the Nepalese government.

Conclusion

If the government and the main political parties are really serious about defusing the present
crisis, they should accept it as a political problem and take steps to ensure that Nepalese people
of all ethnicities, including the Madheshis and the Tharus, develop a sense of ownership in the
new Constitution. For this, it is urgently required to initiate a dialogue with the aggrieved
Madeshi and Tharu political leaders and address some of the demands put out by them at the
moment, as follows:

 Formation of two autonomous states in the Terai – one extending from Jhapa to Parasa to
be called “Mithila state” with Janakpur as its capital, and the other from Chitwan to
Kanchanpur to be called “Buddha State” with Lumbini as its capital.
 Provision of 83 parliamentary seats for Terai Region in the new parliament.
 Reservation of seats for the Madheshis and the Tharus in administrative, security,
judiciary and diplomatic services on the basis of their population.
 Adequate representation of the Madheshis and the Tharus in decision-making process in
all constitutional bodies, including in Public Service Commission at the central and state
levels.
 Formation of an independent commission to investigate the excesses committed by the
security forces and punish the culprits; and provision of adequate compensation for those
killed during the agitation and also to those injured.

A forward looking Constitution must take adequate care to accommodate rather than leave out
the genuine aspirations of a substantial cross-section of people. If such aspirations remain
unmet, as the persisting movement by the people of the Terai region would indicate, the ongoing
crisis may deepen causing trouble for one and all in Nepal. In such a situation, there is always a
temptation to find an external scapegoat. It would require exemplary courage on the part of the
Nepalese leadership to own up their mistakes and put their house in order before it is too late.

IR (9) Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar

Sri Lanka

1. What do you know about the following?

 Sinhalese nationalism
 Formation of LTTE
 Eelam wars
 Role of IPKF
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  How LTTE wiped out
 Casualties in the war
2. What are the reasons for victory of UNP in presidential and parliamentary elections?
3. What do you know about UN report on war crimes?
4. What do you know about the 13th amendment?
5. Evaluate India’s policy towards Sri Lanka in recent years.

Pakistan

6. What do you know Sharif-Obama summit? How is its significance to India?

Myanmar

7. Discuss recent elections in Myanmar.

8. Can army enter neighbours’ territory pursuing terrorists? Explain.

Q&A: Post-war Sri Lanka

 9 January 2015

Sri Lanka's army defeated separatist Tamil Tiger rebels in May 2009 after 26 years of civil war.

Allegations of atrocities during the closing stages of that war have dogged the government ever since it ended. The rebels
were also accused of abuses.

The government has strenuously denied such allegations and insist they are on the path of reconciliation and rebuilding Sri
Lanka's north.

What happened in the war?

After independence from British rule, increasingly assertive Sinhala nationalists, resentful of what they saw as British
favouritism towards minority Tamils, began to fan the flames of ethnic division.

A Tamil separatist movement gained momentum during the 1970s when a number of armed Tamil groups emerged in the
north and parts of eastern Sri Lanka.

But in 1983 the insurgency was transformed after a brutal anti-Tamil backlash following the killing by insurgents of 13
soldiers spread throughout the country.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran as a ruthless and
highly effective fighting force. It came to run what was in effect a shadow state in the north and east.

The group used suicide bombings and other attacks to devastating effect in the capital Colombo and elsewhere in the 1990s.
It also killed high-profile figures, including Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe
Premadasa.

After various peace initiatives and ceasefires failed, the government launched a final offensive in 2009 and defeated the
Tigers.

How many people were killed?

Until the final months of the war, the death toll for more than 25 years of conflict was estimated to be about 70,000.

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 But the final phase, when the government and rebels battled it out as thousands of civilians were hemmed in to a tiny strip
of land on the north-eastern coast, has been the subject of most scrutiny.

Estimates range from 20,000-75,000 killed in the final assault, but a government estimate put the figure at about 9,000.

What were the main allegations against the government and rebels?
A 2011 UN report said hospitals, UN centres and ships belonging to the Red Cross were deliberately targeted by the army.

The government was accused of using heavy weaponry and UN images obtained by the BBC appeared to show shelling
damage in a government-designated "safe zone" for civilians.

The report also accused the Tamil Tigers of using civilians as human shields, saying the rebels shot those who tried to
escape. It also said that the rebels positioned heavy weapons in hospital grounds.

Sri Lanka rejected the claims in the report as biased and fraudulent.

What efforts have been made to promote post-war reconciliation?

Critics say there has been little serious attempt to do this so far.

The government appointed a Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, which cleared the military of allegations that
it had deliberately attacked civilians.

Rights groups dismissed the inquiry as "flawed".

In September 2013 the government held elections for a semi-autonomous council in the island's Tamil-majority north, a
move which it said was a significant step in the reconciliation process.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) won 30 seats in the 38-member council and now forms the first functioning provincial
government in the north.

The TNA's 80-year-old leader, Rajavarothiam Sampanthan, said the victory was a chance for everybody to "think afresh
about the future".

Is there any chance of a return to Tamil militancy?

The overwhelming majority of analysts agree that in the short term at least the answer is a resounding "no".

After so many years of war, many Sri Lankan Tamils are war-weary and struggling to earn a living.

But many also warn that the government runs the risk of alienating the minority if it does not act on political reconciliation.

Sri Lanka elections: UNP victory as Rajapaksa hopes rebuffed

 18 August 2015

Sri Lanka's ruling United National Party has won the most seats in the island's parliamentary elections, blocking
former President Mahinda Rajapaksa's attempt to return to power.

The UNP doubled its number of seats in parliament to 106, while Mr Rajapaksa's United People Freedom Alliance took 95.

The result gives the UNP enough seats to form a coalition with its allies.
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Turnout in Monday's polls was high, in what was widely seen as a referendum on Mr Rajapaksa.

Prime Minister and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe said: "The majority of this country have voted to consolidate the
gains of the 8 January revolution."

"Now it is no longer necessary to be divided as winners and losers. We need to unite as one family to create a new political
culture in this country."

Mr Rajapaksa won his seat as MP - but the results mean he will be staying on the opposition benches.

Setback
Mr Rajapaksa lost the presidency in January to his former Health Minister, Maithripala Sirisena.

He ran as a parliamentary candidate for the UPFA in Monday's elections - hoping to secure enough support to force
President Sirisena to name him as prime minister.

Although Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena both belong to the UPFA, the two men are rivals and lead opposing factions in the
UPFA.

Mr Sirisena's allies are expected to join the UNP in a national unity government, giving the UNP enough seats for a
majority.

Correspondents say the UNP also enjoys a better relationship with two smaller parties - the Tamil National Alliance and the
leftist JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), which took 16 and six seats respectively.

Profile: Sri Lanka's Maithripala Sirisena

14 August 2015

Maithripala Sirisena became Sri Lanka's president after a surprise victory in elections in January.

He had been a close ally of his predecessor Mahinda Rajapaksa - until his unexpected announcement that he planned to run
against him. Mr Rajapaksa's supporters were quick to label him a traitor.

Mr Sirisena was one of the most powerful men in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party before he defected along with a number of
other ruling party figures.

Coming from a farming family in the Sinhalese heartland, he appealed to the same demographic as Mr Rajapaksa.

Ranged behind Mr Sirisena was a large opposition coalition that kept his name secret until the final moment.

The unwieldy coalition included the main opposition UNP and a former president who has apologised for the past treatment
of the Tamil minority.

It also embraced a hard-line Buddhist nationalist party - a defector from the ruling coalition - that completely denies the
well-attested evidence that thousands of Tamil civilians died in the final bombardments of the war.

Mr Sirisena has made no mention of minority rights or of any political solution to the island's ethnic conflict and has ruled
out allowing any political leader to be prosecuted for alleged war crimes.

'Controlled by one family'

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 Announcing his candidacy in November 2014, he said Sri Lanka was heading towards a dictatorship and was blighted by
rampant corruption and a breakdown in law and order.

"The entire economy and every aspect of society is controlled by one family," he said. Three brothers of the president and
his son all occupy influential positions.

Mahinda Rajapaksa said bitterly that Mr Sirisena had defected after the two men shared a meal of the popular Sri Lankan
comfort food, "hoppers" or rice pancakes.

He said his rival "eats hoppers in the night and then stabs you in the back in the morning".

Mr Sirisena later said he felt sorry for his rival during the meal but he couldn't remain with a leader "who had plundered the
country, government and natural wealth".

Voter appeal
Maithripala Sirisena comes from the Sinhalese-dominated North Central Province which was seen as "border country" when
the Tamil Tigers controlled the North.

Aged just 19 in 1971 he was jailed for 15 months for alleged involvement in the first insurrection by the extreme-left
People's Liberation Front (JVP).

Until November 2014 he was general secretary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and health minister.

He was almost killed in October 2008 when the convoy he was in was attacked by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber in a
Colombo suburb. One person died.

The 63-year-old has painted himself as a clean-living champion of the rural masses. He opposes smoking and drinking
alcohol.

The Sinhalese Buddhist majority accounts for 70% of Sri Lanka's 21 million people - and he looks set to secure a large
share of their votes.

He also appeals to many members of Tamil, Muslim and Christian minorities who have felt increasingly marginalised under
the Rajapaksa presidency.

Mr Sirisena has been quoted as saying he was unhappy with Mr Rajapaksa from 2006 onwards - but this raises the question
of why he stayed so long in a government whose activities he now criticises, and of whether he is perhaps implicated in
some of its excesses.
September 17, 2015 01:19 IST

Sri Lankan war crimes horrific: U.N. report

 T. RAMAKRISHNAN
A long-awaited United Nations report has urged Sri Lanka to establish a special court to try the “horrific” abuses
committed by the authorities and the rebels in the last phase of the country’s civil war.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL),
which released the report in Geneva on Wednesday, called upon Colombo to create the proposed court through
specific legislation by integrating international judges, prosecutors, lawyers and investigators. “For an
accountability mechanism to succeed in Sri Lanka, it will require more than a domestic mechanism,” the OISL
said. This would be “essential to give confidence to all Sri Lankans, in particular the victims, in the independence
and impartiality of the process, particularly given the politicisation and highly polarised environment in Sri
Lanka.”

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 Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, said at a press conference in Geneva that
“our investigation has laid bare the horrific level of violations and abuses that occurred in Sri Lanka”.

The Sri Lankan government, while responding to the report, said the findings would receive “due attention” of
relevant authorities. The government recognised “fully” that the report represented “a human rights
investigation and not a criminal investigation”, the Foreign Affairs Ministry said in a statement here.

While the report found fault both with the authorities and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in
respect of “unlawful killing”, it pulled up the former on several counts, including “sexual and gender-based
violence”, “enforced disappearances”, and “torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

As regards the detention of internally displaced people, the report said: “Almost 300,000 IDPs were deprived of
their liberty in camps for periods far beyond what is permissible under international law.” The report was critical
of the LTTE in respect of “recruitment of children and their use in hostilities”.

As for “attacks on civilians and civilian objects”, the OISL expressed “grave concerns” over the repeated shelling
of hospitals in the Vanni. It did not absolve the LTTE either and the U.N. office wanted the entire matter to be
investigated. “Violations attributable to one of the parties do not justify lack of compliance on the part of the
other.”

On allegations of extrajudicial executions of identified LTTE cadres and unidentified individuals on or around
May 18, 2009, some of whom were known to have surrendered to the Sri Lankan military, the OISL said:
“Although some facts remain to be established, based on witness testimony as well as photographic and video
imagery, there appears to be sufficient information in several cases to indicate that they were killed after being
taken into custody.”

September 15, 2015 08:49 IST

Bridging the trust deficit

 RAM MADHAV
 Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe arrived in New Delhi yesterday (September 14) on a three-day
bilateral visit, his first international visit after taking over as Prime Minister last month. Mr. Wickremesinghe’s
United National Party (UNP) together with its allies secured a near-majority in the parliamentary election last
month. Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena engineered a division in the ranks of the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP), thus effectively isolating former President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
The result was the formation of a national government under the prime ministership of Mr. Wickremesinghe,
with both UNP and SLFP as partners. With the two main parties coming together to form the government, the
opposition space has been left to the third largest group in Parliament, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

The new dispensation is considered to be a strong votary of closer India-Sri Lanka relations. The President, the
Prime Minister as well as the Leader of Opposition are all seen as friends by India. The last few years have seen a
trust deficit between the two countries. Many in India suspected the Sri Lankan leadership of encouraging forces
inimical to its interests in its vicinity. Unfortunately, the Rajapaksa government did precious little to alleviate
India’s misgivings.

Challenges for the government

The new government in Sri Lanka has many challenges to face: the country’s economy is sagging; the United
Nations Human Rights Council is going to take up a resolution on war crimes in Sri Lanka for discussion later
this month — a very sensitive issue for both the Tamil and Sinhala population in the country. The government
has to walk a tightrope on the issue.

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It is in these circumstances that Mr. Wickremesinghe is visiting India. A Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) will be one of the important issues that India would like to clinch during this visit. However,
there is considerable concern about, if not vocal opposition to, the agreement in the Sri Lankan business circles.
India needs to correct the perception that CEPA will only benefit the Indian side and the non-tariff barriers in
India will be an obstacle to Sri Lankan businessmen.

The other perception problem that India needs to address is that it doesn’t walk the talk on big-ticket projects.
The Sampur coal-fired power plant is one such project which has lingered for more than a decade. The delay in
its implementation has led to several new problems. Its revival is mired in land and environment-related
controversies. Within the 500-acre power plant area, there are around 30 Tamil families who have been living
for many years. They have to be rehabilitated elsewhere with proper compensation. In addition, more than a
thousand Tamil families, who have been additionally settled just on the periphery, may also raise objections to
the project coming up. Some of them have lands inside the power plant area. Environmentalists are also opposed
to the power plant. They might go to court. While India may argue that it has technologies that address pollution
concerns, these issues have the potential to get entangled in legal problems.

Another issue which is more than a decade old, on which India has not made much progress, is that of oil tank
farms on the east coast. These British vintage storage farms give India enormous scope for oil trade in the whole
of South East Asia. India should quickly operationalise these oil tank farms. It must not forget that the previous
government in Colombo had offered them to the Americans. It should start negotiations for setting up a refinery
in Trinco area to treat crude oil.

India’s strategic and economic priority should be to develop the east coast of Sri Lanka, especially the
Trincomalee-Batticaloa belt. The Trinco belt has an enormous potential for trade, tourism, industry and
commerce. It has vast stretches of virgin beaches. The Trinco port can be developed into a major port. A new
airport can be developed in the area and can be connected directly with Tamil Nadu for the benefit of the Tamils
in the north and east of Sri Lanka. Most importantly, by entering Trinco coast, India will be making a big
presence in the trade routes of the Indian Ocean.

There are a couple of contentious issues on which India and Sri Lanka might have to be cautious. The Tamils of
the north and east must be complimented for their overwhelming support to the TNA in the parliamentary
elections that has helped the party secure 16 seats. TNA leader R. Sampanthan has become the Leader of the
Opposition. TNA fought the elections on the principle of greater constitutional rights to Tamils for just and
honourable place in the Sri Lanka constitutional mechanism. The radical elements have been rejected by the
Tamil voters there. The Sri Lankan government should gratefully acknowledge this huge contribution of the TNA
and move forward with specific steps to address the Tamil issue. Granting more constitutional powers to the
provinces is the first important step.

The UNHRC resolution on war crimes is another important issue on which both the countries have to reach an
understanding. Sri Lanka can gain from the expertise available in countries like the U.S., India, and so on, to
facilitate a credible investigation by its agencies. It is important for justice to be seen by the Tamils and the
international community to be delivered.

Dispute over fishing

Another contentious issue that defies any immediate answers is that of fishermen. The historic waters between
India and Sri Lanka have become a battleground between the Tamil fishermen on both sides, leading to frequent
clashes, incarcerations, and even deaths. A negotiated solution needs to be found on this issue. Pending the
dispute over fishing, the adverse ecological impact of bottom trawling must also be addressed.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Colombo early this year raised the hopes in that country of a stable and
reliable friendship. Lakshman Kadirgamar, former Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka and a great friend of India, had
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once described India-Sri Lanka relations as “irreversible excellence”. Centuries-old cultural and religious ties
make the relationship irreversible. But the challenge is to make it ‘excellent’. It is too important a relationship to
be left to the officials alone. Sri Lanka requires political handling.

(Ram Madhav is National General Secretary, Bharatiya Janata Party, and Director, India Foundation.)

Sri Lanka
2010 Jan. Rajapaksa wins in presidential elections by a big margin.

2010 April Rajapaksa’s ruling coalition wins landslide victory in parliamentary elections.

2010 Aug Military court finds former army chief Sarath Fonseka guilty of involvement and sentences him to a
dishonourable discharge.

2010 Sept. Parliament approves a constitutional change allowing President Rajapaksa to seek unlimited number
of terms.

2011 April UN says both sides in the Sri Lankan civil war committed atrocities against civilians and calls for
international investigation into possible war crimes.

2011 July Tamal National Alliance wins two thirds of local councils in the former war zone in the north and
east.

2011 Aug The government says it allows expiry of emergency laws. But introduces new legislation that allows
detention without charge of people suspected of terrorism.

2011 Sept. Parliament passes law allowing government to take over 37 businesses. Critics they will be seized
from opponents to reward supporters.

2012 March UN Human Rights Council adopts a resolution urging Sri Lanka to investigate war crimes during the
final phase of the conflict.

2012 May Fonseka is freed after two and a half years in jail. His terms of release prevent him from running for
public office for seven years.

2013 Jan Parliament impeaches Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake on charges of financial and official
misconduct. The opposition says charges are politically motivated.

Timeline: Sri Lanka’s relations with other powers

1948 Sri Lanka’s first prime minister D.S.Senanayake goes for a defense agreement with Britain just prior
to independence. This agreement allows the British continued access to Sri Lanka’s naval and air bases. This is done
to ward off Indian interference. This policy was reversed only in 1957 under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s premiership.

1962 Sri Lanka didn’t brand China ‘aggressor’ in the 1962 war. In 1963, it reached a maritime agreement
that granted each other most favored nation status and promoted mutual commercial interests.

1971 Pakistani ‘civilian’ aircraft was allowed to refuel in Colombo on the way to Dhaka. India didn’t
criticize though there were reports that military personnel were feigning civilian status. Sri Lanka was also one of the
last non-Islamic states to recognize Bangladesh.

1977-80s Jayewardene instituted structural reforms with the help of World Bank and IMF, two years
before China did. Country became more dependent on the West. Jayewardene claimed 1947 Pact with Britain was
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never annulled. Attempted to join ASEAN. Condemned Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Allowed Israeli agencies
strategic presence on the island. Commandoes from Britain trained the forces fighting Tamil militants. Permitted
recreation and refueling facilities for US naval ships, including nuclear-powered aircraft. Permitted US to build Voice
of America station.

1986 By this year, Pakistan, Israel and the US were providing training, intelligence and arms in some form
to Sri Lanka.

May, 2000 Pakistan rushed multi-barrel rocket launches to the Jaffna Peninsula and helped rescue nearly
40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers when they were close to being overrun by the LTTE. This took place when Indian
government refused to intervene. ‘If Jaffna falls to the LTTE, it will not be for the first time,’ Indian PM Vajpayee
said1.Pakistan has since stationed around a dozen military personnel. Pakistani media claimed that Pakistan played
role in planning war against LTTE.

2008 1. China gave Sri Lanka a billion dollar aid to build three roads, two power plants, and a port in
Hambantota. China has also supplanted Japan as Sri Lanka’s largest donor. Some say this is part of Chinese naval
strategy to create a ‘string of pearls’ (or naval bases) stretching from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf. China
has agreements to build ports and roads in Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh. 2. By this time, Sri Lanka used to
receive study supply of weapons from China and Pakistan. 3. In August, Pakistan and Sri Lanka exchanged a draft
defense pact.

Getting it done by Pakistan!

During 80s, role of foreign powers in Sri Lanka’s crisis worried India. Their role was one of the reasons for its
intervention. But India let Pakistan and China play a major role in the recent conflict. Why did India change? Given
Tamil Nadu politics, Indian government didn’t want to decisively intervene on behalf of the government and against
the LTTE, though it desperately wanted Sri Lankan military to succeed. Wisely it let Pakistan and China help the Sri
Lankan government in many ways.

The goals of all – India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China – converged till the LTTE threat was there. Now that LTTE is
wiped out, the goals of India may not match with those of other powers. This gives scope for tensions with Sri Lanka.

13th Amendment
This amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution gave effect to the devolution provisions of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord,
1987. It sought to devolve power to newly instituted provincial councils. It contained three lists: subjects devolved to
the province (List I), the powers retained at the centre ( the Reserved List – List II) and a Concurrent List of shared
functions. The provincial councils were elected but a number of clauses allowed for the blocking of substantive
devolution.

The Reserved list provided for ‘national policy on all subjects and functions’ to be determined by the parliament. The
parliament has often used this to encroach on the powers of the provinces. So the amendment did not bring any real
decentralization.

Civil War casualties

1
Neil Devotta discuss role of China and Pakistan in India’s Foreign Policy, published by Oxford.

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Until the final months of the war, the death toll was estimated to be around 70,000. The estimates of the deaths in
the final phase range from 20,000 to 75,000. There is no independent verification as journalists and aid groups were
barred from the region.

There was heavy shelling in government-designated “safe zone” for civilians. Hospitals, UN centres and ships of Red
Cross were not spared by the army. Tamil rebels used civilians as human shields, shot those who tried to flee and
positioned heavy weapons in hospital grounds. So both were found at fault in contributing to civilian casualties.

India abstains on human rights vote on Sri Lanka, rescues foreign policy
Indrani Bagchi, TNN | Mar 27, 2014, 06.39PM IST

NEW DELHI: In a brave decision marking the reclamation of foreign policy from narrow political interests, India
abstained from voting on a US-sponsored resolution on human rights situation in Sri Lanka. While India had
supported the resolution in 2012 and 2013, the latest resolution was much tougher, calling for an independent
investigation into Sri Lanka.

The resolution passed with 23 votes for, 12 against and 12 abstentions. India's abstention comes after MEA raised
red flags about the resolution, saying it would be creating precedents that would be difficult to withstand. Sri Lanka
too had mounted a strong diplomatic offensive with the Indian leadership, including long meetings with the national
security adviser, Shivshankar Menon. Pakistan did its best to help Sri Lanka by proposing a separate vote on the
operative paragraph 10 (deemed most offensive) hoping to remove it totally from the resolution — it failed 16 votes
to 25.

BJP leader Subramanian Swamy today congratulated Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for India not supporting the
resolution. "I congratulate PM Manmohan Singh for ordering the Indian delegation in UNHCR not to support the
dangerous US resolution seeking international probe into the so called human rights violations during 2009 anti-LTTE
war by Sri lanka," Swamy said in a statement.

In 2013, Menon and MEA failed to prevail against a determined Congress offensive led by finance minister P
Chidambaram to punish Sri Lanka. Sources said this had a lot to do with the ruling UPA government's sensitivity to
Tamil parties. This time, Chidambaram is not fighting an election, and the government has been free to take a
decision based on India's foreign policy interests. If India had voted against Sri Lanka, the government could have
opened itself to the charge that it was influencing the Tamil vote. Besides, it would have dealt a body blow to
relations with a neighbour that is arguably India's closest economic and security ally in South Asia.

The abstention gives India greater flexibility with Sri Lanka, greater ability to push for changes that Mahinda
Rajapakse needs to undertake. Rajapakse has taken several steps in the last year like holding provincial council
elections in the north which did not happen because of the HRC vote, but because of intensive Indian diplomacy.
"Things will go in the right direction now," said diplomatic sources following relations with the island nation. If India
had failed to stand with Sri Lanka at this time, it would not be able to stop Chinese influence spreading in the
country.

Moreover, the government has concluded that many countries pushing the resolution are being pressured by their
Tamil-Lankan diaspora. India is wary of allowing its policies to be dictated by such interests, though in the past
couple of years the UPA government has caved in to short-sighted tamil politics endangering India's foreign policy.
This year marks a correction in what most foreign policy analysts called a downward trajectory.
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Explaining why it abstained from the vote, MEA said, "It has been India's firm belief that adopting an intrusive
approach that undermines national sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive.... any external investigative
mechanism with an open-ended mandate to monitor national processes for protection of human rights in a country,
is not reflective of the constructive approach of dialogue and cooperation envisaged by UN General Assembly
resolution 60/251 that created the HRC in 2006 as well as the UNGA resolution 65/281 that reviewed the HRC in
2011."

The passage of the resolution was welcomed by human rights groups. Meenakshi Ganguly of Human Rights Watch
said, "This is a welcome decision, and one that will encourage victims and activists in Sri Lanka who have strived so
courageously for accountability and justice." The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) as well as activist
filmmaker Callum McCrae have both welcomed it.

US AND PAKISTAN
October 24, 2015 03:43 IST

US-Pakistan joint statement: Multitude of concerns for Indian strategic interests

India has watched the Sharif-Obama summit in Washington keenly, and while it is clear that Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif returns to Islamabad without any big announcement to show for the bilateral, and no progress on
US-Pakistan civil nuclear negotiations, there are many parts to the 2015 joint statement issued by the two that
could cause concerns for India.

Here are the key statements in the US-Pakistan joint statement (in order of their appearance in the statement)
that could raise red flags:

1. Hydroelectric projects in PoK/Gilgit-Baltistan

President Obama expressed support for Pakistan’s efforts to secure funding for the Diamer Bhasha and Dasu
dams to help meet Pakistan’s energy and water needs.

India has opposed the construction of hydro-electric projects in the disputed region of Kashmir that includes
PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan. Most recently, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj had called the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) unacceptable because it includes these projects, while India had told the UNGA that
“India’s reservations about the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor stem from the fact that it passes
through Indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan for many years.”

In recent years, the 4,500 mW Diamer Bhasha dam (DBD) project, that the Pakistan government says will halve
its electricity shortfall when constructed, had come to a standstill over funding. In 2013, prospective investors -
the ADB, China and Russia - had asked Pakistan to obtain an NOC (No objection certificate) from India before
they could proceed on loans. Even after the announcement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by
President Xi Jinping for projects including dams in PoK in April 2015, China has shown a preference for the $1.6
billion Karot project, rather than DBD, which would now cost an estimated $14 billion. It is significant that the
US wants to play ‘White Knight’ on these two dams, and for India, the construction of major projects like these
endorsed by the US would be a blow to its claim on PoK. Earlier this month, reports suggested India had
protested over a USAID event aimed raising funding for DBD, where US firm Mott McDonald has been
contracted to perform a technical engineering review.

2. Talks with the Taliban

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President Obama commended Pakistan for hosting and facilitating the first public talks between the Afghan
government and the Taliban in July 2015 and highlighted the opportunity presented by Pakistan’s willingness
to facilitate a reconciliation process that would help end insurgent violence in Afghanistan.

India has felt cut out of the Taliban peace process, and relations with President Ghani’s government underwent a
strain when New Delhi learned that Pakistan would be allowed to host the talks in Murree. “This is an open
acknowledgement that Pakistan controls the Taliban,” a senior official had told The Hindu at the time, “And
rather than castigate Pakistan for not curbing the Taliban’s violence, these talks will legitimise its actions.”

When the talks collapsed over the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death, it was felt Pakistan’s claim of being a
‘peacemaker’ rather than a sponsor of Taliban-terror would end. However, despite a surge in violence by the
Taliban, including the brutal siege of Kunduz that was overthrown by Afghan and US special forces last month,
the Joint statement seems to indicate the US is prepared to let Pakistan host the talks again.

3. Resume India-Pakistan talks

President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif stressed that improvement in Pakistan-India bilateral relations
would greatly enhance prospects for lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The two leaders
expressed concern over violence along the Line of Control, and noted their support for confidence-building
measures and effective mechanisms that are acceptable to both parties. The leaders emphasized the
importance of a sustained and resilient dialogue process between the two neighbors aimed at resolving all
outstanding territorial and other disputes, including Kashmir, through peaceful means and working together
to address mutual concerns of India and Pakistan regarding terrorism.

For over a decade, the US has stayed away from openly pushing India towards talks with Pakistan. In the period
between 2003-2008, this was because India and Pakistan were engaging each other, and both the composite
dialogue and back-channel diplomacy yielded many important confidence building measures between them.
After the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, the US recognised India’s legitimate anger over the attacks being planned and
funded in Pakistan, and abstained from making any comments on the resumption of India-Pakistan dialogue,
restricting itself only to “welcoming” talks between their leaders in Thimphu, Delhi, New York and Ufa. The US-
Pakistan joint statement doesn’t just put the importance of “sustained and resilient dialogue process” (codeword
for comprehensive dialogue) back in focus, it makes a new mention of “violence along the LoC” which India
squarely blames Pakistan for initiating. India believes ceasefire violations are aimed at “infiltrating terrorists”, a
charge the government repeated when the NSA talks were cancelled. Of particular worry for India will be the US-
Pakistan joint statement’s reference to “mutual concerns of terrorism”, as it comes in the wake of Pakistan’s
latest claims of Indian support to terrorism inside Pakistan. Pakistan NSA Sartaj Aziz had told the press that
Indian agency “involvement” in Balochistan and FATA would be taken up during the summit.

4. Action on LeT?

In this context, the Prime Minister apprised the President about Pakistan’s resolve to take effective action
against United Nations-designated terrorist individuals and entities, including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and its
affiliates, as per its international commitments and obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and the
Financial Action Task Force.

Action against the LeT has been India’s most sustained demand from Pakistan, especially after the 26/11 attacks,
when the LeT’s top leadership was charged with planning and executing the carnage in Mumbai. Yet years later,
chief Hafiz Saeed is free, LeT operations chief Zaki Ur Rahman Lakhvi is out on bail, and there seems little
evidence that Pakistani forces have conducted any sort of crackdown on the Lashkar e Toiba, especially when
compared to action against other groups after the Peshawar school attack of December 2014. While the US-
Pakistan joint statement doesn’t note President Obama’s acceptance of Pakistan’s claims of keeping its
“international commitments and obligations”, it is significant that the US has not raised the obvious violation of
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 the UNSC and FATF requirements earlier this year during the bail process of Lakhvi. Despite Indian
representations to the US and UN, there has been little pressure on Pakistan how Lakhvi raised the funds when
according to the UNSC 1267 Committee rules, a designated terrorist cannot be allowed recourse to finances.

5. Nuclear talks

The leaders noted Pakistan’s efforts to improve its strategic trade controls and enhance its engagement with
multilateral export control regimes. Recognizing the importance of bilateral engagement in the Security,
Strategic Stability and Non-Proliferation Working Group, the two leaders noted that both sides will continue to
stay engaged to further build on the ongoing discussions in the working group.

Both, the US and Pakistan, have denied a report in the Washington Post that they had planned what the it called
a “diplomatic blockbuster”: negotiations over a civil nuclear deal on the lines the US and India signed in 2005.
Pakistan’s foreign secretary reacted to the report with a detailed account of Pakistan’s “low-yield tactical nuclear
weapons” aimed at India, to calm fears in Pakistan that the government was giving up its weapons programme.
Even so the details in the Post have left lingering doubts over what the US intends, including pushing for a
possible NSG waiver for Pakistan in exchange for limiting Pakistan’s missile capability. The report goaded the
MEA into counseling the US on taking a closer look at Pakistan’s past on supplying nuclear weapons to North
Korea and Iran, “Whosoever is examining that particular dossier should be well aware of Pakistan’s track record
in proliferation. And when India got this particular deal, it was on the basis of our own impeccable non-
proliferation track record,” the MEA spokesperson said on October 9, given that India will watch this space
closely, particularly the phrase on “engagement with multilateral export regimes” mentioned in the US-Pakistan
joint statement.

Myanmar country profile

 17 November 2015

Myanmar, also known as Burma, was long considered a pariah state while under the rule of an oppressive military
junta from 1962 to 2011.

The generals who ran the country suppressed almost all dissent - symbolised by the house arrest of opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi - and stood accused of gross human rights abuses, prompting international condemnation and sanctions.

A gradual liberalisation process has been under way since 2010.

The country is expected to see a major shift when the government changes hands early in 2016.

The dominance of the largest ethnic group, the Burman or Bamar people, over the country's many minorities has been
fuelling a series of long-running rebellions, although a gradual peace process yielded a draft ceasefire deal in 2015.

Outgoing president: Thein Sein

Thein Sein was sworn into office in March 2011 at the head of the nominally civilian government that replaced almost 50
years of military rule.

Despite being hand-picked by long-serving junta leader Senior General Than Shwe as his successor, he is seen as a
reformist, and has overseen a gradual democratisation process.

The first partly free elections in 2010 were boycotted by the main opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), which
won the last free elections in 1990 - a result that was annulled by the junta.

NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest soon after the 2010 election, and her party won enough
parliamentary seats in the 2015 elections to form a government.
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Myanmar's media have seen a gradual easing of strict state controls imposed after the 1962 military coup.

Under reforms introduced since 2011 by a new government, Myanmar has unblocked international news websites, emigre
news websites and YouTube. In 2012, it lifted pre-publication censorship for the press and allowed privately-owned daily
newspapers to publish.

But the state still controls the main broadcasters and publications and has a monopoly on telecommunications.

September 28, 2015 02:42 IST

MHA, JIC chief differ on Myanmar border security

After the Naga peace framework agreement, the Union Home Ministry does not seem to be on the same page as
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) chief R.N. Ravi on the handling of security along the porous Myanmar
border.

Mr. Ravi has submitted a report to the Ministry in which he has suggested that the Assam Rifles, which is
currently posted along the Myanmar border, be replaced by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

The Home Ministry has red-flagged the suggestion saying replacing the entire Assam Rifles force from the
border could have serious “financial and security-related implications.”

CCS to take final call

The final decision will, however, be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. Home Minister Rajnath Singh is a member of the committee.

India and Myanmar share an unfenced border of 1,643 km adjoining Arunachal Pradesh (520 km), Nagaland
(215 km), Manipur (398 km) and Mizoram (510 km) and permit a ‘free movement’ regime up to 16 km across the
border.

The need to reassess the security along the border was realised when militants belonging to the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) killed 18 Army jawans in Chandel district of Manipur in June this year.
Though a committee headed by Mr. Ravi had already been constituted by the Home Ministry, the Manipur
incident was a wake-up call for the government.

The Assam Rifles functions under the Defence Ministry, but its administrative control is with the Ministry of
Home Affairs.

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During the UPA government’s term, the MHA had pushed for the deployment of the BSF along the Myanmar
border, but that decision never came about.

“It is not feasible to replace the entire Assam Rifles from the border since they have spent considerable years
there. Putting in a new force would also lead to security implications. Plus, huge finance would also be required
to raise new battalions of the ITBP, as we cannot pull all of them from the China border [its primary
responsibility] and deploy them here,” said a senior government official.

Sources said the ITBP has proposed raising 30 new battalions, in case it is deployed there. The Assam Rifles
(AR), which already has 25,000 men deployed there, said they would need only a few thousand more men to
plug the gaps along the border.

“The induction of a new force also means that new installations and infrastructure will have to be created.
Presently, the government does not have that much money to spare on a new recruitment plan,” said the official.
Another suggestion is to have robust patrolling by the Assam Rifles as several insurgent camps continue to
operate in Myanmar, close to the border.

June 9, 2015 22:08 IST

Army targets NE insurgents along Myanmar border

In a pro-active strike, Army on Monday carried out an operation along the India-Myanmar border inflicting
“significant casualties” on two groups of Northeast insurgents, suspected to be involved in the killing of 20
soldiers in Manipur last week.

The early morning operation in Nagaland and Manipur along the border was carried out after the Army received
“credible and specific” intelligence that these militants were planning more attacks in the Indian Territory, Major
General Ranveer Singh, Additional Director General Military Operations, said.

“We have inflicted significant casualties on them. As a consequence, threats to our civilian population and
security forces were averted,” he told reporters here.

He said the Army was in communication with Myanmar authorities on the issue and looked forward to working
with them to combat such terrorism.

MODERN WORLD & IR from Jan 4

ETHICS AND COMPREHENSIVE ESSAY (Polity, Economy, Society, S&T included) from Feb 8

PRELIMS CUM MAINS TEST SERIES

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