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Resolved: Spain should grant Catalonia its independence.

January 2018 PF Brief*

*
Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by Jami
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Contents

1 Topic Analysis by Kyle Chong 4

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 The Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Affirmative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Negative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 Pro Cards 12
2.0.1 States derive authority from the nations they rule . . . . . . . . . 12
2.0.2 Legal Considerations don’t matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.0.3 Self Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.0.4 Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.0.5 Quelling Spanish nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.0.6 Avoiding War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.0.7 Catalan Nationalism will get worse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.0.8 Catalan nationalism has classic nationalist foundations . . . . . . 30
2.0.9 Catalan Nationalism Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.0.10 Solution: Offer Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.1 Catalonia would reject independence, so offering it now is best for Spain 40
2.1.1 Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1.2 Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.1.3 Independence movements die when they get rejected by their
own country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.1.4 Catalan independence parties are not united, their victory has
been labeled “symbolic” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.1.5 AT: Independence is Unconstitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.1.6 AT: Spain’s Economy Relies on Catalonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1.7 AT: Catalonia’s Economy Would Tank, Dragging Spain Down Too 50
2.1.8 AT: Spanish Unity is Essential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.1.9 AT: Other Regions in Spain Will Secede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

2.1.10 AT: Undermine Spain’s International Clout . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

2.1.11 AT: The Catalonia Crisis Helps Spain by Distracting Everyone’s
Attention from Corruption Scandals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.1.12 AT: Most Catalonians Don’t Want Independence . . . . . . . . . 69
2.1.13 AT: Spanish Citizens Do Not Support Catalonian Independence . 72
2.1.14 AT: Spain Should Negotiate with Catalonia Instead . . . . . . . . 73

3 Con Cards 76
3.0.1 Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.0.2 Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.0.3 Catalonia Will Not Be Internationally Recognized . . . . . . . . . 95
3.0.4 Democracy/Internal Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.0.5 Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.0.6 Catalonia Is Not Ready for Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.0.7 Catalonia is drawing back on claims for independence . . . . . . 104
3.0.8 Spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.0.9 Catalan independence movement inspires Texas secessionists . . 111
3.0.10 Legitimacy/Rule of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.0.11 Alternative: Spain should pursue constitutional changes to solve
the Catalonia crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.0.12 Alternative: Spain should grant Catalonia greater tax autonomy 123
3.0.13 AT: Spain Will Boycott Catalonian Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.0.14 AT: Spain should value Catalonia’s self-determination . . . . . . 125

Kyle Chong debated for the Bronx High School of Science from 2011-2015 and currently
studies Political Economy at Berkeley. While at Bronx, he advanced to late outrounds at
tournaments like Valley, Emory, Harvard, Blake, Princeton, the Glenbrooks, and many
others, finishing his debate career at tenth in the country, amassing seven career bids
to the Tournament of Champions. Kyle currently coaches at The Nueva School, where
his students reached late outrounds at or won several tournaments across the national
circuit, including Berkeley, ASU, Harker, Bronx, and the Tournament of Champions.

1.1 Introduction

Hola, and welcome to my topic analysis. The January 2018 PF resolution is “Resolved:
Spain should grant Catalonia its independence.” As is emblematic of many topics this
season, the Catalonia debate is one that many failed to predict upon the announcement
of the “Europe” topic area. In spite of a very controversial year in regional and inter-
national politics for the continent, we get to focus on a smaller issue that may stray
debaters away from the more traditional, security literature of international relations. I
admittedly don’t see any fair way debaters can impact out to casualties or risks of ex-
tinction, which means weighing at the impact level will be important on this topic. At
any rate, the Catalonia debate will be a clash between differing interests, and could even
become a topic that will be blown wide open given how fast the updates are coming.

This topic analysis will first define the key terms the resolution and discuss the historical
tensions of the topic. First, I will set to define a few key terms of art in the resolution.
Then, it will go over major arguments on the topic that you can use to construct effective
cases.

1.2 The Resolution

First, let’s analyze the history of Catalonia and Spain to describe why this topic is being
debated today. Catalonia is in the northeastern region of Spain, adjacent to France, and
has been a part of Spain since the formation of the Spanish Republic in 1649. Catalonia
is a relatively rich region of Spain, and it enjoys a great deal of independence from the
Spanish government. Coupled with the fact that they have their own language, Catalan,
there is real sentiment among Catalans that they’re entitled to self-determination. In
1938, Spain was under rule of the dictator Francisco Franco, wherein Spain silenced
democratic liberties and unified the state with a national identity. This had the effect of
minimizing the Catalan regional identity, and even suppressed the Catalan language in
public spaces. Upon Franco’s death in 1975, democracy was restored and Catalonia’s
independence was restored.

The turn of the twenty-first century saw a great amount of change for Spain and Catalo-
nia. In 2006, the Catalan people passed the Catalan Referendum, which called for a new
economic system, to be defined as a nation, and the restoration of Catalan as the official
regional language. This proposal was battled in the Spanish courts, and eventually the
Spanish Constitutional Court struck much of the referendum down by deeming it illegal,
sparking protests in the magnitude of millions. The economic losses for Spain during
the 2008 Financial Crisis were staggering, and led to a large rise in unemployment. Fol-
lowing this was a series of austerity measures that have hurt the long-term economic
growth of the country. Furthermore, the most recent elections in 2015 saw the rise of a
multi-party system in the Spanish government, with a nearly four-way split across the
conservative People’s Party, the social democratic Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, the
centrist Ciudadanos, and the left-wing populist Unidos Podemos.

Fast forwarding to the year 2017, the Catalan government is now revisiting the issue of
independence. Also known as “1-O” (signifying October 1st), the Catalan Parliament
asked the people of Catalonia via referendum whether they wanted independence from
Spain. The Constitutional Court of Spain deemed this illegal in September, and sent po-
lice forces into Catalonia to prevent anybody from voting. Protests ensued, and nearly
a thousand Catalans were injured. The result of this referendum was 92% of respon-
dents in favor of independence. However, as a result of the voter suppression from the
Spanish national government, voter turnout was only at 43%. It is unclear whether a
majority of Catalans truly support independence, though according to the Guardian1 ,

1
Jones, Sam, and Daniel Boffey. “ ‘They’ve Called Me a Traitor’: Catalans Divided as In-

support is growing.
Following the results of the referendum, Spain in mid-October invoked Article 155 of
their constitution, calling to strip Catalonia of its regional government, dissolving its
Parliament and imposing direct rule on the region. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Ra-
joy has called for reelections, while now-ousted Catalan president Carles Puigdemont
and the Catalan Parliament moved to declare independence. New elections for the Par-
liament of Catalonia have been called to be scheduled right before Christmas. This topic
is changing frequently, and updates to this history will definitely be necessary.
Now that we have the history out of the way, we can discuss the framing of the reso-
lution. To start, let’s dive into the wording of the resolution. This is a pretty straight-
forward resolution, but what it lacks in complexity it makes up for in strategy. What
I think debaters will find to be most interesting here is that the actor in the resolution
is Spain. Though that would technically include Catalonia’s regional government, it’s
likely assumed that we’re specifically looking at Spain’s parliament. However, though
the actor is clear, the question of who the impacts are to be aimed at is ambiguous. Un-
like the most recent South Korea topic, the resolution doesn’t specify that we should be
looking to maximizing the “interests of Spain”. As such, many PFers will see this as a
debate between costs and benefits towards the country of Spain as a whole, and in those
cases, debates will likely skew to the negative – the benefits of keeping Catalonia a part
of Spain are likely to outweigh its costs. Alternatively, and less intuitively, teams could
frame this issue in terms of the interests of Catalonia. If we disregard the actor as Spain,
and instead think of the topic as a question behind the spirit of self-determination, then
this debate is suddenly very different. Inevitably, coming to grips with these framework
interpretations will be a large source of clash on this topic. Whether we are looking at
this from the perspective of Spain’s interests or Catalonia’s interests will be a key ques-
tion that debaters will need to answer for judges, and necessarily there will be a pretty
heavy framework debate.
Actor analysis aside, let’s discuss the second half of the resolution. The issue of Cat-
alonia’s independence is a tricky one, and involves constitutional jargon and a lengthy
process to complete. This will probably also be a central question of the resolution, and
it would be wise for teams, especially on the negative, to outline what a world would
look like wherein Catalonia is independent. First and foremost, if Catalonia is to be in-
dependent, then it would have to operate as if it were a state all on its own. That means
dependence Vote Nears.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 19 Sept. 2017,
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/19/temperature-climbs-in-spain-as-catalan-question-
comes-to-a-head.

that it would need to establish things like a central bank, an immigration policy, and
its own military defense scheme. Moreover, Catalonia as a new nation would have to
reckon its relationship with the European Union, and would need to reevaluate their
diplomatic stances on many issues.

In the next section, I will discuss possible avenues of argumentation for the affirmative
side of the resolution. As a disclaimer, it is important to note that this is not a compre-
hensive list of arguments for the whole topic. January is a long month for PF, stretching
from the Blake tournament in December all the way to the final weeks of January at
Emory. Your arguments should strengthen from weekend to weekend as you come
across more arguments, more interpretations, and more positions. This is a product of
my own brainstorming and is not meant to be an exhaustive list, nor is it meant to be
used as evidence. If you are interested in crafting cases based on this, consider looking
at the rest of the brief for more in-depth argumentation and substantiated evidence.

1.3 Affirmative

Here, we will go through what I believe will be the most common arguments on the
affirmative.

Economy: One of the most common reasons cited for the independence of Catalonia
is that they do not benefit economically from their engagement with the rest of Spain.
As the home to the city of Barcelona (along with its soccer team, FC Barcelona!) and a
very powerful manufacturing industry, Catalonia has the means to sustain itself. This
is even true to the extent that they provide more for the rest of Spain than it does receive
benefits. According to an article in BBC2 ,

There is a widespread feeling that the central government takes much more
than it gives back although the complexity of budget transfers makes it hard
to judge exactly how much more Catalans contribute in taxes than they get
back from investment in services such as schools and hospitals. According
to 2014 figures, Catalonia paid about €10bn (£9bn; $12bn) more to Spain’s
tax authorities than it received in spending - the equivalent of 5% of its GDP.
Meanwhile, state investment in Catalonia has dropped: the 2015 draft na-
tional budget allocated 9.5% to Catalonia - compared with nearly 16% in

2
“Catalonia’s Bid for Independence from Spain Explained.” BBC News, BBC, 4 Dec. 2017,
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29478415.

2003. But some argue that is a natural state of affairs in a country with such
regional economic disparities.

From the perspective of the Catalan people, Spain is leeching off of the economic suc-
cess of the region, and so for purely economic reasons there is sentiment to declare
independence. If that lost tax revenue were to be reinvested in Catalonia, life would
be significantly better for Catalans by way of social services. Additionally, one could
argue that Spain’s mismanagement of their economy is reason enough to secede as well.

Self-Determination: Another very compelling argument is that it is the will of the Cata-
lan people to be granted independence. Catalan people speak a different language than
the Spanish, have different cultures, and are even raised believing they are independent
of Spain. This is also evidenced by the fact of the referendum results from last October,
and in spite of the Spanish government meddling, it seems there is significant support
for secession among the Catalan people.

As CNN3 reports,

Spain is facing a political and constitutional crisis after Catalans voted in fa-
vor of independence in a contested referendum that descended into chaos
when police launched a widespread and violent crackdown. The Catalan
government said it had earned the right to split from Spain after results
showed 90% of those who voted were in favor of a split. But amid an un-
expectedly harsh response from Spanish police, turnout was only around
42%. The Catalan health ministry said 893 people were injured in the clashes
Sunday as riot police raided polling stations, dragged away voters and fired
rubber bullets. The Catalan President Carles Puigdemont denounced the po-
lice crackdown as the worst violence Catalonia had seen since the military
dictatorship of Francisco Franco, and demanded the withdrawal of Spanish
national forces from the region.

If independence were solely up to Catalonia, then there wouldn’t be a debate here. Cat-
alonia has already voted in favor of declaring independence from Spain. For an argu-
ment like this to fly, there needs to be some handling of the uniqueness question – Cat-
alonia has already fulfilled the wishes of the Catalan people by declaring independence
from Spain, but Prime Minister Rajoy needs to agree to secession in order for Catalonia
to become its own nation.
3
Soares, Isa. “Catalonia Referendum Result Is a Crisis for Spain.” CNN, Cable News Net-
work, 2 Oct. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/10/01/europe/catalonia-spain-independence-referendum-
result/index.html.

Catalonia First: This is a bit of an unconventional section within the topic analysis, but
I thought it would be necessary to include considering it’s a framework argument that I
think only affirmative teams will be making. The argument here essentially says that the
most important impacts in play are the ones aimed at Catalonia. Just because the actor is
Spain doesn’t mean it should be Spain that we should play the role of Spain as debaters.
There are a few ways to go about this line of argumentation. The first is that Spain is
a part of Catalonia, and that the Spanish government has just as strong an obligation
to Catalans as it does to the rest of Spain. And considering the resolution will most
significantly affect the people of Catalonia, impacts to them should take precedence.
At that point, the debate becomes whether the benefits of an independent Catalonia
outweigh its costs.

There is also the “theory” approach that would use the purpose of the debate round in
terms of education and fairness as reasons to prefer the argument. The judge should,
at a minimum, play the role of an unbiased observer, with allegiances to neither Spain
nor Catalonia, because it makes for a more fair or educational debate.

Next, we will discuss the common negative arguments.

1.4 Negative

Debt and EU: One interesting argument is that Catalonia would be subject to the obli-
gations of a real nation if it were to become independent. Looking just at the numbers,
Catalonia would run into a few economic problems as a new nation. Many companies
that do business and headquarter in Barcelona have already and will likely continue to
leave for Spain or elsewhere, leading to stunted growth for the new Catalonian econ-
omy. Moreover, this is a big problem for Spain as well, as Catalonia is a large part
of their GDP, their greatest source of exports, and an important source of tax revenue
for the rest of the country. According to Luis de Guindo4 , Spain’s Economic Minister,
slowed growth is ahead.

Spain’s economy is expected to be impacted by the political crisis with Cat-

alonia next year, Spanish Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said on Mon-
day. “For 2018, we expect growth of 2.3 percent, which would be 2.7 or 2.8

4
Emmott, Robin. “Catalan Crisis to Have an Impact on Spain’s 2018 Growth: De Guindos.” Reuters,
Thomson Reuters, 6 Nov. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-economy/catalan-crisis-
to-have-an-impact-on-spains-2018-growth-de-guindos-idUSKBN1D61U6.

percent without the Catalan issue,” he told reporters as he arrived at a meet-

ing with his EU counterparts. The government had already lowered the 2018
forecast from 2.6 percent to 2.3 percent last month due to Catalonia.

Moreover, Catalonia’s relationship with the European Union would be left up in the air.
Though much of Catalonia’s exports go out to member nations in the EU, the question
of whether Catalonia would be a member state is unclear. Even if those negotiations
were favorable, it wouldn’t be immediate. However, the most sinister question that is
left unresolved is that of Spain’s debts to the European Union. According to CNBC5 ,

Spain’s national public debt in 2016 was priced at roughly $1.18 trillion, ac-
cording to central bank statistics. Meanwhile, Catalonia has amassed one
of the largest public debts of Spain’s regions, at roughly 72.2 billion euros
($86.9 billion) in 2016. Around 6 billion euros of this is for long-term secu-
rities that have been issued and the rest being various loans from different
institutions. Therefore, Catalonia accounts for 16.34 percent of Spain’s debt,
which is not a small price tag. This aspect, combined with the loss of Catalo-
nia’s tax revenues, would be a hit to the Spanish economy.

Nationalism: Catalonia’s independence movement isn’t an isolated incident – it’s part

of a very recent trend of growing nationalism within Europe and the United States.
Though this nationalism is not based on xenophobia and hysterical racism, a successful
campaign to grant secession would certainly set the precedent for other independence
movements elsewhere across Europe and the world. Scotland and the UK, Flanders
and Belgium, and Madeira and Portugal are all examples of nationalist movements that
advocate for separatism only in Europe, and there are even more far-reaching exam-
ples like Iraqi Kurdistan that can see increased momentum worldwide. Debaters will
certainly need to impact these arguments out, but I would go out on a limb and say
that strengthening secessionary movements worldwide would probably be bad for the
nations affected. That’s open to debate though!

Spain First: The flipside of the “Catalonia First” argument is that the judge should prior-
itize impacts to Spain over impacts to Catalonia. This argument is less of a stretch than
its opposite, as there’s a pretty clear link from the resolution. That the judge should role-
play as the Spanish government, and should prioritize the people of Spain is definitely
a more believable argument. Debaters could even argue that the most important value
5
Bosch, Sofia. “Spain’s Economy Losing Catalonia Would Be like the US Losing California and Florida
Combined.” CNBC, CNBC, 2 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/09/21/heres-how-bad-economically-a-
spain-catalonia-split-could-really-be.html.

to uphold for Spain is the strength of its own state, and that Catalonia’s independence
movement is a critical weakening of the Spanish government’s hold on its subjects. This
is a pretty Machiavellian argument that may make some judges pretty uncomfortable
if argued incorrectly.

Happy debating! I look forward to seeing you all on the circuit.

2.0.1 States derive authority from the nations they rule

States once derived their authority from religion, now they do from the people

At the heart of the issue is Spain’s inability to balance nationalist sentiments with demo-
cratic demands. A lot of people misunderstand the relationship between democracy
and nationalism. They think of nationalism as an authoritarian ideology that holds no
place in a representative democracy. But in reality, the two are inextricably linked. No-
tions of democracy and nationalism For much of European history, legitimate political
authority derived from one source: God. Kings claimed the right to rule because their
position was the will of the divine. The French Revolution dramatically changed the
political landscape, in that it simultaneously gave birth to our modern conceptions of
democracy and nationalism. The source of authority became the will of the people. This
“will of the people” was to be demonstrated by democratic elections. And the people
whose will was to be obeyed were the people of the “nation”. The scale of the change
brought about by this can be shown with a few anecdotes. Louis XIV, king of France
for much of the seventeenth century, famously said “I am the State”. Meanwhile, Louis
XVI, when told in 1788 that a proposed action of his was illegal, responded “it is legal
because I will it so”. In other words, kings answered to no-one, and certainly not to “the
people”.

If there is no philosophical basis for the State of Catalonia, there is no basis for
Spain either.

Caoimhín De Barra [Assistant professor, Irish history at Drew University in New Jer-
sey,], “Catalan independence: ‘Ireland came into being as a result of a similar “illegal”
action’,” The Journal, September 22 2017. Available at: http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/catalan-
independence-ireland-came-into-being-as-a-result-of-a-similar-illegal-action-3608994-
Sep2017/
The Spanish constitution says that the Spanish State is inviolable, and that no region of
the country has the right to secede. Catalan nationalists, on the other hand, argue that
a democratic mandate from the Catalonian people trumps any legal mechanism Spain
might use to prevent their independence. What is interesting to note in media coverage
on the topic is that, as with the Scottish independence referendum, the nationalists are
all assumed to be on one side of the debate. There are lots of political and economic
reasons for why Spain would want to hold on to Catalonia, but the overriding one is
the belief that Spain must be preserved as it is because that is Spain’s “natural” territory.
In brief, the desire of Spain to keep Catalonia is no less nationalistic than the longing of
Catalonian nationalists to separate from it.

Supporters of territorial integrity over self-determination tacitly support

cololnialism

Phillip Stevens [CHIEF POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, Financial Times], “Sovereignty

and self-determination collide in Catalonia,” Financial Times, October 5 2017. Available
at: https://www.ft.com/content/47672d08-a8f8-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97
Madrid’s post-fascist constitution, endorsed at its promulgation by the people of Catalo-
nia, invests sovereignty in the people of Spain. Catalans cannot vote to secede without
affecting Spanish citizens in Castile or Andalusia. There is no magic formula to rec-
oncile these competing nationalisms. Self-determination, as often as not, is in the eye
of the beholder. George Orwell, who fought in Catalonia on the Republican side dur-
ing the Spanish civil war, well understood this. “All nationalists,” he observed, “have
the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will
defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsis-
tency.” Few would claim that the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy has been adroit
in its response to the Catalan government’s independence vote. The Spanish constitu-
tion guarantees the autonomy of its nations as well as the indivisibility of the state. But

Mr Rajoy’s ill-judged use of force is a question of tactics rather than principle. The rela-
tionship between Catalonia and Spain ultimately will be decided by political agreement
or by civil war.

2.0.2 Legal Considerations don’t matter

Legality is a “semantic trap designed to maintain the status quo”

But many of us are blind to the nationalism of established nation-states. We consider

these to be normal, rational entities, but view anything that challenges them as a form
of irrational madness. This thinking leads people to believe that some nations are more
“authentic” than others. For example, journalist Melanie Phillips claimed earlier this
year that Scotland and Ireland did not have a “real” claim to nationhood, in the way
that Britain did. Along similar lines, the claim that Catalonian nationalists are wrong to
hold a referendum because such a move is illegal misses the point entirely. The Spanish
government has explicitly said there can never be a referendum. If you believe that Cat-
alonia should be independent, but Madrid will never create a legal pathway to facilitate
this, what option is there? In this context, the notion of “illegality” is a semantic trap to
maintain the status quo

An independent Catalonia would be consistent with precedent – Ireland became

independent in the same way

It should be remembered that our own independent government came into being as a
result of a similar “illegal” action. In the 1918 general election, Sinn Féin campaigned on

a promise to keep elected MPs in Dublin to form an Irish parliament, rather than send-
ing them to Westminster. Arthur Griffith’s belief was that if the Irish people accepted
this Irish parliament as their government, Britain would have grant Ireland indepen-
dence. This theory was never fully tested, because events were overtaken by the War
of Independence. But most of us today accept that first Dáil as the original, legitimate
Irish government, and we are untroubled if Britain or anyone else saw its existence as
illegal at the time.

2.0.3 Self Determination

Self Determination is Cemented in International Law

VITA GUDELEVIČIŪTĖ [Vytautas Magnus University School of Law], “DOES THE

PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION PREVAIL OVER THE PRINCIPLE OF TER-
RITORIAL INTEGRITY?,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BALTIC LAW Volume 2,
No. 2 (April, 2005). Available at: http://t.tamilnet.com/img/publish/2009/10/Gudeleviciute.pdf

The principle to self-determination of peoples7 is one of the fundamental human rights

firmly established in the international law. It is very much a matter of international con-
cern and “must be applied equally and universally”.8 The right to self-determination
is conferred on peoples by international law itself and not by states.9 As it is a legal
principle, not a precise rule, it embraces a high degree of generality and abstraction10
. International legal instruments relating to self-determination invariably refer to the
“peoples” as being entitled to the right of self-determination. Thus, self-determination
is a collective right. The exercise of this right requires the expression of the free will of
people. The Charter of United Nations declares that one of the purposes of the United
Nations is: “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the prin-
ciple of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples11, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace”12. Therefore, respect to this principle is a pur-
pose of the United Nations and a measure for strengthening peace. However, the UN
Charter neither defines self-determination precisely, nor imposes direct legal obliga-
tions on member states in this area13. The provisions on the right to self-determination,
both totally identical in language and both under Article 1, appeared in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 14(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 15(ICESCR): “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and

freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. The right shall be pro-
moted “in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”16 .

Self determination toppled colonialism

Patrick Thornberry [Emeritus Professor of International Law, Keele University], “Self-

Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments.”
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, 1989, pp. 867–889.
JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/759918.

SELF-DETERMINATION and the rights of minorities are two sides of the same
coin. When a colony or subject people accedes to independence in the name of
self-determination, political unity and integral statehood will rarely be matched by
national unity and ethnic homogeneity.’ The new State will frequently be dominated
by a particular ethnic group in a majority, and there will be ethnic minorities. The
consequences for the smaller groups of the transition from Empire to statehood may be
severe; inter-ethnic solidarity in the face of a common alien oppressor may be ruptured
and replaced by a more intimate, local and knowing oppression. This applies both
when the new State is “national” in the sense of having a developed national character
at the inception of statehood, and when the new State is born of a territorial concept,
and nationality is still to be forged, if necessary by the plundering of small groups to
achieve assimilation.2 Accession to independence and defence of that independence
parade under the banner of self-determination, a concept enshrined in the United
Nations Charter,3 the International Covenants on Human Rights and other interna-
tional instruments.4 The legal implications of this concept for minorities are, therefore,
a matter of considerable moment. Self-determination is a concept of liberation. Its
inscription in legal texts has coincided with an astounding transformation of political
geography. States have replaced Empires. The age of colonialism becomes a historical
datum, even if its long-term effects

Seperatists use self determination to defend their arguments

Patrick Thornberry [Emeritus Professor of International Law, Keele University], “Self-

The connection between minorities and self-determination has been discussed in the le-
gal literature, though the volume of writings is limited and minorities are frequently not
the main focus of enquiry.6 Minorities appropriate the vocabulary of self-determination
whether governments or scholars approve or not. Conflicts between State and minority
demonstrate a quality of endurance. Contemporary State-minority disputes of high
topicality include those involving the Basques, Corsicans, Eritreans, Kurds, Sikhs, the
protagonists in the civil strife in the Sudan, and the Tamils of Sri Lanka-there are many
others.7 Minorities have utilised the notion of secession, where a group would form its
own State. The Biafrans wanted to secede from Nigeria; the Bengalis achieved secession
from Pakistan and statehood in Bangladesh.8 Even if the demands of minorities are not
so “extreme”, self-determination is part of their vocabulary.

Self Determination was the “Bedrock of the decolonisation agenda”

Daniel Grutters [International Law Adviser at British Red Cross], “Catalonia: The Right
to Secede and the Right to Self-Determination,” Oxford Human Rights Hub, October
23 2017. Available at: http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/catalonia-the-right-to-secede-and-the-
right-to-self-determination/

The right to self-determination of peoples became the bedrock of the decolonisation

agenda of the UN, following its inclusion in the UN Charter. When the UN General
Assembly condemned colonialism and called for its unconditional end in 1960, it re-
lied explicitly on the right to self-determination. The General Assembly also included
the right to self-determination as one of seven principles of international law in its
historic Declaration Concerning the Friendly Relations among States of 1970. In this
context, numerous former colonies (so called “non-self-governing territories”) achieved
self-determination through the establishment of sovereign and independent States.

Seperatism toppled colonialism and only political reasons have led it not to be
applied to seperatism. AFF argues that is unjust.

Johnson, Niall, Barbara Metzger, and M Weller. Settling Self-Determination Disputes:

Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2008. Available at: https://goo.gl/wT7ioS

The main challenge to the conventional interpretation of self-determination, as de-

colonialization, came from secessionists: these were, after all, precisely those who

took the principle seriously, and who understandably drew the conclusion, that if
self-determination was a fundamental human right, it should apply to them. Of the
three Cold War secessionist crises, which spilled onto the world stage ± Katanga,
Biafra and Bangladesh ± only the Biafran case was debated seriously in terms of the
substantive meaning of self-determination. The reintegration of Katanga into the
Congo was the price the USA was prepared to pay to marginalize Soviet influence
within the United Nations peace-keeping operation. The rebellion in East Bengal was
often explained by academic analysts in terms of a theory of internal colonialism, but,
as we have already noted, it was the Indian army which expelled Pakistan, not the
Bangladeshis themselves. Biafra’s bid for independence collapsed because, unlike
Bangladesh, the Biafrans failed to secure a powerful external patron who was prepared
to defy the international consensus in favour of the territorialstatus quo.

Catalan leaders call for self determination

In an address to the Parliament of Catalonia on 10th October 2017, the President of

Catalonia issued a ‘suspended’ unilateral declaration of independence (“UDI”) from
Spain. The ‘suspended’ UDI followed a controversial independence referendum on 1st
October 2017. The referendum, which was mired by protests and attempts by federal
police forces to prevent people from voting, had resulted in a vote of 90% in favour
of independence with a reported 42% turn-out. However, the Constitutional Court of
Spain has consistently insisted any such referendum would be illegal because it violates
the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Article 2 of the Constitution refers to the “indissoluble
unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards”,
while it also “recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities
and regions of which it is composed”. The Prime Minister of Spain has announced it
will seek to activate Article 155 of the Constitution, which would allow it to “take all
measures necessary” to ensure compliance with the law, including suspending the self-
government (autonomy) of Catalonia. In organising the referendum and in declaring
independence, the secessionists relied explicitly on the right of the Catalan people to
self-determination under international law. In effect, the secessionists have equated the
right to self-determination with the right to secede.

2.0.4 Economics

Swift resolution avoids economically damaging uncertainty

No Author, “Catalan separatists to lose majority in tight election - poll,” Reuters, Decem-
ber 10 2017. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-politics-catalonia-
poll/catalan-separatists-to-lose-majority-in-tight-election-poll-idUKKBN1E40IM

The uncertainty over the independence drive in Catalonia could lead to slower eco-
nomic growth and lower job creation in the next few months in Spain, the Bank of Spain
said on Thursday. If the secessionist movement intensified or dragged on it could have
an effect on economic outlook and financial stability in Spain, it said. In its Novem-
ber report, the Bank of Spain said that in the worst case scenario, the political uncer-
tainty caused by an illegal secessionist drive could reduce Spanish economic growth
by 2.5 percentage points between end-2017 and 2019. However, a quick resolution of
the Catalan independence drive could mitigate the risks for the Spanish economy, it
added. The government currently forecasts the euro zone’s fourth-largest economy to
grow 3.1 percent this year, but the standoff with Catalonia over its independence ambi-
tions has prompted Madrid to slash growth projections for next year. Spain’s Economy
Minister recently said the Spanish economy could grow by more than 2.5 percent next
year just weeks after he cut 2018’s growth forecast to 2.3 due to a political crisis in the
northeastern region of Catalonia.

Uncertainty hurts the Spanish economy

Alanna Petroff [Staff reporter, CNN Money], “Catalonia vs. Spain: Here’s what could
happen next,” CNN Money, October 5 2017. Available at: http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/04/news/econ
independence-spain-business/index.html

“Catalonia would not have the means, including the fiscal means, to enforce a full in-
dependence,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank. “At some
point in time, Barcelona and Madrid will need to talk.” A negotiated settlement could
leave Catalonia with more autonomy and increased control over its own finances. Even
so, uncertainty and public unrest in the coming days (or months) could do a fair bit
of damage to local businesses and the economy. Protests forced the closure of several
highways on Tuesday, causing production delays at a Volkswagen-owned plant in the
region. More disruptions would threaten worker attendance and productivity. Invest-
ments could also be delayed as corporate executives consider the implications of Cata-

lan independence, said Stephen Brown, an economist at Capital Economics. Schmieding

warned that a period of confusion could slow Spain’s economic growth from its current
3.2% expansion to around 2.5%.

Uncertainty deters investment

Michael Stothard [reporter, FT], “Business fears economic fallout from Catalonia con-
frontation,” Financial Times, September 26 2017. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/376ea180-
a293-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2

Business in Catalonia has warned that political instability, violence and legal uncer-
tainty could deter investment and hurt the economy, as tensions escalate ahead of the
region’s planned independence referendum on Sunday. The region, one of Spain’s rich-
est, has an economy the size of Portugal and its government has promised to declare
independence within 48 hours of a Yes vote — despite Spanish courts ruling the ref-
erendum illegal and Madrid’s plans to prevent the vote. Executives in Barcelona, the
region’s political and business capital, have raised concerns over the rapid escalation in
tensions. “Decisions are not being taken and investments are already being postponed,”
said Borja García-Nieto, the chief executive of local private equity group Riva y García.
“This is already bad for the economy, and the problems are potentially just starting.

Uncertainty creates confusing tax environment - deters investment

Business also fears longer term disruption in the battle of wills between Barcelona and
Madrid. Catalonia has been ramping up investment in its tax agency this year, increas-
ing staff numbers 75 per cent to 700, in the hope of taking billions of euros that currently
go to Madrid. “We could have a situation where the Catalan government starts trying
to collect tax from companies,” said Jaime Malet, chairman of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Spain. Mr Malet said that several companies in Catalonia — both Spanish
and international — had paperwork ready to move office out of the region in the event
of independence. But he declined to name those making the preparations. “Companies
need legal certainty,” he added.

Uncertainty is economically dangerous

Maria Tadeo [reporter, Bloomberg], “Spain’s Economy to Count the Cost If Catalan Cri-
sis Continues,” Bloomberg, Noember 23 2017. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
11-23/spain-s-economy-to-count-the-cost-if-catalan-crisis-continues

While Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has stepped in to take over the region, upcoming
Catalan elections could prove another flashpoint for the independence movement. For
Oxford Economics, that means lingering uncertainty, posing a risk to sentiment, share
prices and bonds. In their worst-case scenario, Spain’s expansion would be weaker
and the economy would be 17 billion euros ($20 billion) smaller in 2019 than would
otherwise have been the case. That “adverse” view – not Oxford’s central projection –
assumes a permanent increase in bond yields of 50 basis points and a 10 percent decline
in stocks in 2018 and 2019 compared with its baseline scenario. “The economic impact
of the Catalan independence crisis is still unknown, but the increased political tensions
have already caused uncertainty to surge to the highest levels in over a decade,” Senior
Eurozone Economist Angel Talavera said.

Unsanctioned separation is the worst case economic scenario

Experts said the most dangerous scenario for business would be an unsanctioned sep-
aration. Businesses in Catalonia would face the prospect of operating in a newly in-
dependent state with no formal trade agreements, a situation even more serious than
Brexit, said Carsten Hesse, a European economist at Berenberg Bank. Catalonia ac-
counts for nearly a fifth of Spain’s economy, and it leads all regions in producing 25%
of the country’s exports. “It would affect the Spanish economy pretty significantly at a
time when Spain has been recovering from its [economic] crisis,” said Megan Greene,
chief economist at Manulife Asset Management. In this scenario, investors could stop
buying Catalan and Spanish debt and government financing costs would spike. Spain
could go into a recession and risks could spread across Europe, said Greene. “This could
bring back the eurozone crisis in a worst-case scenario,” she said.

Uncertainty over Catalonia prevents necessary economic reforms

Maartje Wijffelaars [economist at RaboResearch Global Economics & Markets], “Cata-

lan crisis escalates, economic costs become visible,” RaboResearch, October 20 2017.
Available at: https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2017/october/catalan-
crisis-escalates/

The current institutional crisis has several longer-term implications. For one, the insti-
tutional crisis fills the entire government’s agenda. As such, necessary policy measures
and reforms to improve Spain’s growth potential are delayed, possibly restraining fu-
ture economic growth. Furthermore, the minority government has not yet been able
to get parliamentary approval for the 2018 budget. The government needs the support
from the Basque party (PNV), which has said it will not lend its support before the Cata-
lan crisis is over. In the short term, this means that the government will continue on a no
policy change basis. This can be beneficial to growth next year as no additional austerity
measures will be taken. That said, with debt just below 100 percent of GDP and a struc-
tural deficit of about 3.5 percent of GDP, structural austerity measures are necessary to
put public debt on a firm lasting downward path. This is necessary to have scope to
accommodate the economy when a next crisis hits and to guarantee debt sustainability
in case of adverse interest rate or growth shocks

2.0.5 Quelling Spanish nationalism

Spanish nationalism is growing

For years, people considered him a right-wing extremist for wearing the Spanish flag on
a bracelet, explained Angel Muñoz, a 62-year-old chauffeur, standing in central Madrid.
But not anymore, he said, pointing out dozens of Spanish flags outside the apartments
around him. Most of them have appeared in recent weeks. “Now with this thing hap-
pening in Catalonia, perhaps they feel a bit prouder to show the flag,” Mr. Muñoz said,
referring to the northeastern region’s push for a separate state. That is what the Cata-
lans “have achieved with this referendum,” he added. “Somehow now the rest of Spain
feels more united.”

Spanish nationalism is dangerous

Patrick Kingsley and Raphael Minder [reporters, New York Times], “Catalonia Sep-
aratism Revives Spanish Nationalism,” New York Times, October 5 2017. Available
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/europe/catalan-independence-
referendum.html?_r=0
Nationalism has always been a tricky thing for Spain. The dictator Gen. Francisco
Franco died in 1975. Only three years afterward did the country embrace a democratic
Constitution. But nationalism is still associated with Franco, whose authoritarian rule
centralized Spain after a bloody civil war that was one of the defining ideological con-
flicts in 20th-century Europe. Continue reading the main story Today, as Europe ap-
proaches the third decade of a new millennium, nationalism is back, for better or worse
— with its warm cloak of identity as well as its concomitant dangers. Whether this wave
of nationalism will awaken old demons in Spain is an open question, and one that has
suddenly become more urgent with Catalonia’s push for independence.

Spanish nationalist governments have tried to wipe out Catalan as a language

David Gardner [reporter, FT], “Separatists reawaken Spanish nationalism,” Financial

Times, November 21 2012. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b3e6cd00-2f52-
11e2-b88b-00144feabdc0
Catalonia, which withstood the Franco dictatorship’s attempts to expunge its language,
operates a bilingual education policy, which education ministry studies show produces
children at least as good if not more proficient in Spanish than their peers in the rest of
Spain. Some commentators noted gleefully that whereas Catalan leaders are invariably
multilingual, Spanish prime ministers tend to be linguistically challenged. Mr Wert’s
intervention in a policy area under Catalan government jurisdiction did not just anger
Catalan nationalists. “This is an incendiary attempt to homogenise our education sys-
tem,” said one anti-separatist business figure. “This man has just created 100,000 more
separatists,” fumed a Spanish diplomat. Observers on the sidelines of the dispute expect
worse to come.

Spanish nationalism feeds a vicious cycle of nationalist sentiment

Patrick Kingsley and Raphael Minder [reporters, New York Times], “Catalonia Sep-
aratism Revives Spanish Nationalism,” New York Times, October 5 2017. Available

at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/world/europe/catalan-independence-
referendum.html?_r=0

Before the referendum, Catalans watched online videos of Spanish police officers leav-
ing for Catalonia to enforce Madrid’s order to close polling stations, encouraged by
residents shouting “go for them.” After the vote, Spanish television broadcast images
of some of the same police officers, their hotels surrounded by crowds shouting abuse
and calling for them to leave. “Nationalist movements need to feed off each other,” said
Joan B. Culla, a Catalan historian. “It’s both unfortunate and normal that the escalation
of Catalan nationalism, particularly in recent days, will fuel a Spanish nationalism that
already existed, even if it seemed to many to have been kept underground.”

Rajoy stokes Spanish nationalism for political gain

Nando Vila [host and producer at Fusion TV], “How the Spanish government is push-
ing Catalans to support independence,” Washington Post, October 5 2017. Available
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/05/how-
the-spanish-government-is-pushing-catalans-to-support-independence/?utm_term=.b067c75013be

But as support for the separatists grew over the past several years, Rajoy would get
more and more Spaniards to rally behind his hard-line stance. This is how he was able
to win reelection in 2015, as the Catalan monotema grew bigger and bigger. Stirring up
nationalist sentiment and playing up a common enemy is, after all, a time-honored way
for a government in power to distract from voters’ economic misery. Meanwhile, the
conservative Carles Puigdemont won tumultuous 2015 regional elections in Catalonia
that were billed as a plebiscite on independence. He sat atop a coalition of strange
bedfellows that included anti-capitalist radicals side by side with austerity-loving right-
wingers.

Independence is unpopular - [Implication: Rajoy loses]

Daniel Sastre [reporter El Mundo], “El apoyo a la independencia baja hasta el 33% en
Cataluña,” El Mundo, October 30 2017. Available at: http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2017/10/30/59f6

Entre el total de españoles, los partidarios de la independencia de Cataluña son, como es

lógico, muchos menos. Fuera de la comunidad autónoma hay un 10,6% de ciudadanos
partidarios de esa secesión, frente al 84,6% contrario. En conjunto, un 80,4% no quiere
que Cataluña se independice y un 14,2% sí.

Translation: Among the totality of Spaniards, Catalonian independence supporters are,

as is logical, many fewer. Outside the autonomous region, 10.6% of citizens support
secession, against 84.6% against. In total, 80.4% do not want an independent Catalonia
and 14.2% do.

The independence movement is responsible for reawakening Spanish nationalism.

Pro ends the movement

David Gardner [reporter, FT], “Separatists reawaken Spanish nationalism,” Financial

Times, November 21 2012. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b3e6cd00-2f52-
11e2-b88b-00144feabdc0

This year’s surge of separatist sentiment in Catalonia and the Basque Country is reawak-
ening what had appeared to be a dormant Spanish nationalism, led by rightwing forces
in and around the ruling Popular party, with salvos of rhetorical artillery between the
two sides poisoning political debate. More modulated voices that subscribe to neither
brand of nationalism are being drowned out by this increasingly atavistic discourse,
which some feel summons up the spectres of Spain’s fractious past. Faced with a drive
for independence by the home rule government of Catalonia ahead of a watershed elec-
tion there on Sunday, the central government in Madrid is threatening to use the full
force of the law to prevent Catalan plans for a subsequent plebiscite on the region’s
future.

Spanish nationalists are “most excited” by internal territorial conflicts [Brackets in

original]

David Gardner [reporter, FT], “Separatists reawaken Spanish nationalism,” Financial

Times, November 21 2012. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/b3e6cd00-2f52-
11e2-b88b-00144feabdc0

“We haven’t yet really seen Spanish nationalism go into action, but it exists and it’s
pretty belligerent, and what gets them most excited is [internal] territorial conflicts; it’s
in their genetic code,” says Mr Ceberio, recalling the adage of one of Franco’s generals
in the 1936-39 civil war, that he preferred “a red [roja] Spain to a broken [rota] Spain”.
Many Spanish conservatives contend that it is Catalan nationalists, with their narrative
of collective victimhood at the hands of over-bearing Madrid, who have sown divisions
among Spaniards.

Independence movement reenergizes nationalist parties

Creede Newton [contributor, Al Jazeera], “How the Catalan crisis helps Spain’s far
right,” Al Jazeera, November 28 2017. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/catalan-
crisis-helps-spain-171127165448828.html
As the Catalan independence crisis enters its fourth month in December, the intended
outcome of an independent Catalonia remains elusive. But the push for independence
has had an unintended consequence; it has invigorated Spain’s far-right movements
unlike any event since the country’s transition to democracy in the 1970s, according
to Jordi Borras, a Catalan photojournalist and author who monitors the Spanish far
right. In the years before the crisis, the far right’s impact has been negligible both on the
Spanish streets and in parliament, even as similar movements flourished in France, the
Netherlands, Austria, Hungary and elsewhere, Cas Mudde, a professor and scholar at
the University of Georgia who specialises in European far-right politics, told Al Jazeera.
Scholars say it is a combination of the mainstream conservative ruling People’s Party
“capturing the nationalist vote” and “regionalist division” between Spain’s minority re-
gions that has put the far right in the spotlight, Mudde commented.

Catalan independence movement unites fringe movements

Creede Newton [contributor, Al Jazeera], “How the Catalan crisis helps Spain’s far
right,” Al Jazeera, November 28 2017. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/catalan-
crisis-helps-spain-171127165448828.html
Borras explained that the Spanish far right was previously a “constellation” of ultrana-
tionalist groups. Some are Neo-Nazis, some are “Falangists” or the remnants of the fore-
most paramilitary group under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain
as a right-wing conservative, Catholic nation from 1939 until 1975. Others exist in their
own groups. Though these groups have a history of infighting, Catalan independence
has given the far right a reason to unite, Borras said.

2.0.6 Avoiding War

Clashes in Catalonia have already been violent

Nando Vila [host and producer at Fusion TV], “How the Spanish government is push-
ing Catalans to support independence,” Washington Post, October 5 2017. Available

at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/05/how-
the-spanish-government-is-pushing-catalans-to-support-independence/?utm_term=.b067c75013be

Puigdemont’s commitment to Catalan independence is such that he would not travel

to Madrid directly from Barcelona by air, instead buying a ticket through, say, Brussels,
so that he could enter Madrid through the international terminal. About a month ago,
Puigdemont scheduled the vote on independence for this past weekend and announced
that should it prevail, Catalonia would declare a republic within 48 hours. The Madrid
government vowed to block it by any means necessary. No one knew what would
happen at the ballot boxes, but no one expected that level of state violence. No one
expected 800 injured Catalans.

Some say the conflict will either end in agreement or war (AFF is best chance at
agreement)

Phillip Stevens [CHIEF POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, Financial Times], “Sovereignty

and self-determination collide in Catalonia,” Financial Times, October 5 2017. Available
at: https://www.ft.com/content/47672d08-a8f8-11e7-ab55-27219df83c97

Madrid’s post-fascist constitution, endorsed at its promulgation by the people of Catalo-

nia, invests sovereignty in the people of Spain. Catalans cannot vote to secede without
affecting Spanish citizens in Castile or Andalusia. There is no magic formula to rec-
oncile these competing nationalisms. Self-determination, as often as not, is in the eye
of the beholder. George Orwell, who fought in Catalonia on the Republican side dur-
ing the Spanish civil war, well understood this. “All nationalists,” he observed, “have
the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will
defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsis-
tency.” Few would claim that the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy has been adroit
in its response to the Catalan government’s independence vote. The Spanish constitu-
tion guarantees the autonomy of its nations as well as the indivisibility of the state. But
Mr Rajoy’s ill-judged use of force is a question of tactics rather than principle. The rela-
tionship between Catalonia and Spain ultimately will be decided by political agreement
or by civil war.

Breakup of Czechoslovakia shows that peaceful breakups can turn out fine. Violent
ones have much longer recovery times.

Steven Johnson [editorial fellow, The Atlantic], “When Rich Places Want to Secede,” Oc-
tober 28 2017. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/catalonia-
secede-rich-region/544244/

Jenne, of Central European University, has published research indicating that economic
issues are often not as strong of motivators as other factors, such as how densely a group
is concentrated in its territory, or whether a region eager to split off is offered military
support by another nation. But that doesn’t stop groups all over the world from using
regional inequality as a negotiating tool. The U.S. has seen it, too: In February, Cali-
fornia argued that its role as a “donor state”—that it sends more money to the federal
government than it receives—gave it leverage over the Trump administration’s threats
to withdraw federal funding following its actions to declare itself a “sanctuary state” for
immigrants. California is indeed a “donor,” but not by much: The state gets 99 cents
back in federal spending for every dollar it contributes through taxes, below the nation-
wide average of $1.22. There’s an initiative in the state to put secession on the ballot in
2018, and Silicon Valley floats talk of breaking off to form an independent nation (some-
times literally floating). Similarly, after Brexit, the Texan Nationalist Party pushed to
mimic the U.K. Independence Party’s tactics, billing Texas’s $1.6 trillion economy as the
“World’s 10th Largest.” Texan lawmakers, though demurring on secession, started to
adopt the economic language of the fringe group. Of course, there have been hundreds
of these movements in American history, and few expect these recent ones to amount
to much. Calls for secession happen for all sorts of reasons, and rarely gain majority
support—although Catalonia’s vote overwhelmingly passed, it drew just 43 percent of
eligible voters, with many opponents staying home. Still, “you never really know what
you’re going to get when you enter into these negotiating processes,” said Jenne. She
pointed to the relatively peaceful “Velvet Divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia in 1993. Slovakia, the weaker region, was “absolutely shocked” when the Czechs
bought into their calls for secession, she said. After the decade or so it took the weaker
Slovakia to recover, “it has done relatively well,” said Rodríguez-Pose. “So it can hap-
pen.” But that’s about as good as can be hoped, he said: “If secession takes place with
conflict, then recovery times are much, much worse—and it can take a generation, if not
longer.”

Velvet divorce short history

Kate Connolly [Guardian’s Berlin Correspondant], “Is there a lesson for Catalonia in
the Czechoslovakian ‘velvet divorce’?,” The Guardian, November 19 2012. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/19/lesson-catalonia-czecho-slovak-
divorce

Secession can be a bit like breaking a biscuit: crumbs everywhere and two pieces that
don’t seem quite as appealing as the original. Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce”, ap-
proaching its 20th anniversary, probably serves as the best example in postwar Europe
of a relatively smooth parting of the ways. Whether it can serve as a template for Catalo-
nia is another matter. “No divorce is a particularly happy experience but it’s part of life
and this one has worked out well,” says Michal Žantovský, the Czech ambassador to
the UK, who was at the heart of the talks as spokesman and adviser to the Czechoslovak
president, Václav Havel, in 1992 when dissolution was being hammered out by Prague
and Bratislava. “For Václav Havel, it was a very sad thing. He thought of it as his
personal failure because he invested enormous energy into trying to keep the country
together. Later he recognised the split had worked out reasonably well and that most
Slovaks and Czechs were reasonably content,” he said. The split came about for a range
of reasons, though mainly due to historical grievances between the Czechs and the Slo-
vaks that were arguably exploited by the political leaderships of both nations, which
lacked democratic experience due to their long communist legacy.

Velvet Divorse was a smooth process

Adam Taylor [reporter, Washington Post], “What South Sudan can teach Catalo-
nia about creating a new country,” Washington Post, October 2 2017. Available
at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/29/9-new-
countries-were-founded-in-the-past-25-years-what-could-they-teach-catalonia/?utm_term=.32e83bd99d8

On Jan. 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia was separated by parliament into two countries: The
Czech Republic and Slovakia. After the “Velvet Revolution” ended one-party Commu-
nist rule, it was the “Velvet Divorce.” Immediately after the split, there appeared to
be some trepidation: The New York Times noted “wide regret” over the end of the na-
tion that was formed after World War I. However, the contemporary view is that the
split was a (relative) success: “The split was really smooth,” Slovakian journalist Pavol
Mudry told the BBC in 2013.

If the Catalan independence movement is not going anywhere, the Velvet Divorce
Scenario is the best case (other scenarios are discussed in the article)

Alfons Lopez Tena [member of Catalan Parliament from 2010 - 2012] and Elisenda
Paluzie [associate professor of economics and the Dean of the Faculty of Economics at
Barcelona University], “Here are the economics of a Catalan secession from Spain,” Busi-
ness Insider, February 24 2016. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/economics-
of-catalan-secession-from-spain-2016-2

1. Velvet divorce scenario: agreed secession. The independent Catalonia is recog-

nized by Spain, becomes a full EU member- state, enters the UN and all the in-
ternational organizations, assumes its rights and obligations under the existing
treaties, etc. In this case few are the economic impacts on economics since almost
everything goes on as usual. Catalonia would gain full control of its own taxes,
hence around €16 billion ($21 billion) wouldn’t be siphoned off by Spain every
year; economic policies best suited to Catalan needs may be developed if voters
choose wisely; and both parts take their fair share of former Spain’s public assets
and debt in application of the Vienna Convention of 1983. Spain’s only loss should
be the fore-mentioned Catalan taxes, around 2% of Spanish GDP every year: a big
but not an overwhelming blow.

2.0.7 Catalan Nationalism will get worse

2.0.8 Catalan nationalism has classic nationalist foundations

David Frum [senior editor, Atlantic], “Catalan Nationalism Means More European Divi-
sion,” The Atlantic, September 30 2017. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
spain-catalonia-referendum-independence/541572/

Catalans speak their own language. They are richer than their fellow citizens in the rest
of Spain, and thus contribute more to the national budget than they receive back. They
carry unhappy memories of domination by centralizing governments in Madrid. The
Franco dictatorship of 1939-1975 harshly suppressed their culture, identity, and politi-
cal and civil liberties. It’s a pure accident of history that Catalonia ended up inside the
Kingdom of Spain at all. Portugal successfully broke away in the 1640s. Had the Thirty
Years War, the War of Spanish Succession, or the Napoleonic wars taken a slightly dif-
ferent turn, Catalonia might well have followed.

Catalan seperatism is growing in popularity

As late as 2009, opinion polls showed that only about 16 percent of Catalans supported
full independence from Spain. Before the vote on Oct. 1, that number had risen to
somewhere near half. After seeing the state’s violent crackdown, that number is surely
much, much higher. An acquaintance of mine texted this week, “I was not an indepe
(pro-independence), but I voted en caliente because of how the police and the govern-
ment acted. Also because it became very difficult to imagine that in Spain things will
ever change unless an entire generation just dies off.”

Nationalist education

Hurst Hannum [Hurst Hannum is Professor of International Law at The Fletcher

School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University], Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Print.

The two most significant changes in Catalonia are perhaps the introduction in 1993 of
Catalan-only education for children between three and eight years old, and increasing
controlf or the regionalgovernment over teaes raised within Catalonia. The former, in
particular, has increased tensions between Catalans and non-Catalans with the region,
but the practice as upheld as falling within the region’s powers by the Spanish Consti-
tutional Court in December 1994; other legal challenges remain pending.

Catalonia uses schools to form Catalonian identity, so future generations will have
an even stronger sense of Catalan identity than the current generation

Alia Wong [ssociate editor at The Atlantic], “Is Catalonia Using Schools as a Political
Weapon?,” The Atlantic, November 2 2017. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/arch
catalonia-using-schools-as-a-political-weapon/544898/

In 1983, the parliament of Catalonia passed a law that would help the region assert its
identity, and its autonomy, relative to the rest of Spain. It made Catalan the region’s

official language—this after the language was banned for four decades under the dicta-
torship of Francisco Franco, who had died in 1975. In the words of a 2014 report from
the Catalan Ministry of Culture, the policy “constituted the basis on which the popu-
lation of Catalonia would become one sole people, free of dynamics differentiated by
language.” In addition to mass media, schools would also become a key vehicle for
the propagation of the Catalan language. The 1983 law required that public schools in
the region use Catalan—a romance language similar to Spanish that is today spoken by
some 9 million people—as the primary mode of instruction. This and similar policies
aimed to reclaim the Catalan identity that Franco had attempted to annihilate. And now
that Madrid has suspended Catalonia’s autonomy following the region’s contested dec-
laration of independence, scholars argue the sacredness of Catalan identity is key to un-
derstanding Spain’s most serious constitutional crisis since the end of Franco’s regime.
Meanwhile, a region whose leaders pushed for full independence from Spain now finds
itself stripped, at least temporarily, of the powers it did have, including control over its
education system. Spanish nationalists have blamed Catalan-language instruction as a
sinister force for fostering separatist sentiments. But the question of language and iden-
tity is much more complicated, as is Catalonia’s history of using its classrooms to foster
unity.

Spain sees Catalan-only education as threatening to sever Spanish-Catalan

identities

But elsewhere, the discussion of Catalan schools had a different subtext. Spain’s
Congress considered a motion earlier this month aimed at stamping out “ideological
indoctrination” and “nationalist hatred” in Catalonia’s schools. And Madrid’s Ministry
of Education has since September sent two notices to the Catalonian government
requiring it to address alleged incidents of indoctrination in schools, alluding to dozens
of cases. These concerns tend to center on things such as curricula and teachers’
messaging, but some observers suggest it’s impossible to divorce those anxieties
from the fact that language identity is the cornerstone of education in Catalonia. In
an interview with El Mundo, Jordi Cantallops, the education inspector in Barcelona,
argued that indoctrination in schools happens in large part through the language-
immersion program. “For decades an exclusive identity concept has been promoted,

Catalanization, with linguistic immersion, or rather linguistic imposition, with Catalan

as the only vehicular and communication language in the centers,” he wrote in Spanish.
“Catalonia has the dubious honour of being the only place in the Western world where
the majority of the population do not even have the option of enrolling their children in
schools that teach in their native language” of Spanish, wrote Nacho Martin Blanco, a
journalist and political-science professor at the University of Barcelona, in an Al Jazeera
op-ed opposing secession. In Spain’s Basque Country, by contrast, parents are allowed
to choose what language their children are educated in.

There is “little doubt” that Catalan education solidifies Catalan identity

In a recent op-ed encouraging anti-secession Spaniards not to scapegoat Catalonia’s

schools for the current conflict, Lluís Orriols, a political-science professor at la Univer-
sidad Carlos III de Madrid, acknowledged, writing in Spanish: “There is little doubt
that education has always been an important instrument at the hands of States to pro-
mote national identity among citizens.” But “the data do not seem to support the thesis
that intervening Catalan education is an effective solution to defuse the independence
movement.”

Parents’ views affect childrens’ views

Perhaps more important than public schools’ language policy in shaping kids’ political
views is their parents’ political views. As María José Hierro, a political-science lecturer
at Yale who’s studied national identity in multinational contexts, wrote in a 2015 paper,
the more Catalan-oriented mothers felt, the less likely their children were to identify
themselves as primarily Spanish. Given significant residential socioeconomic and eth-
nic segregation, Hierro found that where one lives has a significant impact on youths’
political views, too—children living in neighborhoods with high concentrations of im-
migrants, for instance, were less likely to say they identified themselves as “more Cata-

lan than Spanish” or as “only Catalan.” What’s more, parents can steer their children
into more- or less-Catalan-oriented education settings by, say, sending them to a school
in a different neighborhood or opting for a private or public-private school.

Violent crackdowns

For years, the conservative ruling party in Madrid, led by the hapless Mariano Rajoy,
has made authoritarian moves that have steadily pushed more and more Catalans to-
ward independence, culminating with what we saw Sunday: a return to brutal, dare I
say fascistic, state violence in Spain. And an independence movement that might have
seemed pointless suddenly looks, in light of the Spanish government’s actions, quite
justifiable.

2.0.9 Catalan Nationalism Impacts

Spain is not a very stable country

Andrew MacLeod [reporter, the Independent], “The Catalan crisis could cause the col-
lapse of Spain,” The Independent, October 2 2017. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ca
crisis-spain-collapse-independence-referendum-police-violence-voters-civilians-
protests-a7978131.html Just in my lifetime, Spain has been ruled by a military
dictator, restored a monarchy, restored democracy, experienced a military coup, had a
terrorist separatist organisation kill innocent civilians, joined the EU, joined the euro,
just escaped a near financial collapse, and had a king abdicate. Read with this historic
context, Spain is in a much more perilous shape than you may think. And with this
past weekend’s Catalonian referendum, Spain became just a little more fragile. It may
not be a basket case of a country, but nor is it an island of stability.

Historic Basque nationalism looks very similar to the trajectory of Catalan

nationalism

Teresa Whitfield [senior advisor to the president of the International Crisis Group], “The
Basque Conflict and ETA The Difficulties of an Ending,” US Institute of Peace, December
2015. Available at :http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/whitfield_basque_conflict_eta_dec2015.pdf

The Basque Autonomous Community, or Euskadi, enjoys a high degree of autonomy

within Spain. Yet, for thirty-five years, it has been shadowed by the existence of ETA
and the complex relationship of its violence to an underlying “Basque problem” of two
dimensions: the differences among Basques and between Basque and Madrid regard-
ing the nature of the relationship between the Basque Country and the contemporary
Spanish state. The problem is rooted in distinct versions of Basque history. One ver-
sion is informed by what Diego Muro has termed “the mobilising myths of Basque
nationalism.”1 It draws on Basques’ perception of themselves as a people and nation
with a unique language and culture and a long egalitarian tradition vested in customary
rights (fueros) and autonomy. The other version sees the Basque trajectory as integral
to Spain’s development as a unitary nation-state. Within this tradition, Basque society,
like others, has developed as a consequence of the evolution of elite interests, at times
in conflict with centralizing forces in Madrid and at times not.

Rejecting Spanish identity while remaining in Spain could result in violence -

Basques prove

Enric Martínez-Herrera [PhD, European University Institute], “Nationalist Extremism

and Outcomes of State Policies in the Basque Country, 1979-2001,” International Journal
on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 4, No. 1 ISSN 1564-4901 © UNESCO, 2002, Available at:
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/5502278/vl4n1martinez.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=A
content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DNationalist_Extremism_and_Outcomes_of_St.pdf

At the basis of the extremist behaviour under consideration here lies a system of beliefs
that constitutes a clear example of a political subculture. It is a consistent and stable
system of rejectionist attitudes towards Spanish identity, while adhering to a Basque
national identification, preferences for secession and an inclination to violence. 2.12.
A quite reliable expression of Basque extremist subculture lies in the exclusive identi-
fication with the Basque Country, expressed on a bipolar scale of identification pref-
erences, rejecting multiple social identifications.4 As Linz and his collaborators (1986)

have shown, these attitudes are closely associated with each other, both in the degree
of “sovereignism” and the perception about ETA members. Specifically, the perception
of ETA militants as patriots or idealists is much more likely to occur among citizens
inclined towards Basque rather than national Spanish identification than among the
rest. Moreover, the proportion of acquiescent attitudes towards ETA kept quite stable
among the former during the 1980s (Llera 1994). Thus, although a part of these identi-
fiers do not sympathise with terrorism, I will consider the percentage of people feeling
themselves to be Basque only.5

Basque nationalism resulted in terrorism

Between 1968 and 2011, ETA and related groups killed approximately 840 people,
wounded 2,500 more, and kidnapped eighty.12 The violence peaked in 1980, when
ETA itself claimed ninety-two lives, but declined after Spain began to secure counterter-
rorism cooperation from France in the late 1980s. The count remained low during much
of the 1990s, before an escalation in 2000 prompted a particularly robust crackdown in
the early 2000s. ETA’s death toll was zero between 2003 and late 2006, and only twelve
between 2006 and the cessation of violence in 2011. But forty years of killing and the
attendant effects of kidnapping, extortion, and other threats had a corrosive effect on
Basque society and were a persistent challenge to Spanish democracy.

2.0.10 Solution: Offer Independence

Autonomy expansion prevents violence - Basque agreement proves

No Author, “The Basque Country: Spain’s effective but expensive antidote to secession,
Reuters, October 9 2017. Available at:”https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-
politics-catalonia-basques-anal/the-basque-country-spains-effective-but-expensive-
antidote-to-secession-idUSKBN1CE2G6

BILBAO, Spain (Reuters) - As Spain and Catalonia head toward a constitutional colli-
sion over the region’s claim to independence, lawmakers on both sides of the crisis are
pointing to a way out: north, to Basque Country. Among the verdant mountains of

Basque Country, which borders France, a once-violent campaign for independence has
petered out, with generous fiscal autonomy from Madrid helping to keep popular ag-
itation for independence in check. “We don’t have that economic resentment,” Aitor
Esteban, organizer for the Basque National Party in Spain’s parliament, told Reuters in
an interview at party headquarters in Bilbao. “People don’t feel that need to act upon
a grievance about money; that makes a big difference.” The Catalan government is not
calling for a Basque-style deal, insisting instead on independence after declaring over-
whelming support for secession in an Oct. 1 referendum banned by Madrid.

Basque agreement background

Gorka Espiau Idoiaga [served as spokesperson for Elkarri, the movement for dia-
logue in the Basque region, from 1995 to 2005. He was a Jennings Randolph Senior
Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace], “The Basque Conflict New Ideas
and Prospects for Peace,” United States Institute of Peace, April 2006. Available at:
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr161.pdf

Following the referendum, the new Spanish government negotiated with the moderate
Basque nationalists in order to achieve broader popular support for its nascent politi-
cal system and agreed to grant a substantial level of autonomy to the Basque region.
This agreement, which established Basque and Spanish as official languages in the re-
gion and officially sanctioned a Basque Parliament and president, was formalized in
the Statute of Autonomy of Guernica, which was approved by the Basque Autonomous
Community in a referendum on October 25, 1979. (A separate agreement similar to
the Statute of Autonomy was approved without a referendum in Navarre on March 15,
1982.)1

Basque country enjoys the highest level of subnational autonomy in Europe.

The agreement also saw the transfer of significant powers to the Basque government.
For example, the region was given a high degree of fiscal autonomy and the ability to

collect taxes and regulate its own tax contribution to the state treasury. Additionally,
the agreement allowed for the creation of an autonomous Basque police force, Basque
radio and television stations, and autonomous education and health systems. In prac-
tice, the statute allowed for the highest level of self-governance of any subnational entity
in Europe.

Autonomy has historically been used to diffuse violence

Yash Ghai [head of the Constitution Advisory Support Unit of the United Nations
Development Programme in Nepal], “Autonomy as a Strategy for Diffusing Con-
flict” in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. Paul C. Stern
and Daniel Druckman. (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2000).
https://doi.org/10.17226/9897. Chapter available at: https://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/13

Third, the offer to consider autonomy has served to bring hostilities to an end.
Bougainville was persuaded to bring its rebellion to an end by the Papua New Guinea
government in early 1976 by the offer to consider significant autonomy or other options.
Truces in many other conflicts have been made for similar reasons (including such
difficult customers as the Tamil Tigers, the southern Sudanese, and secessionists in
Catalonia and the Basque Country). The promise or grant of autonomy can transform
the nature of dispute—from territorial claims to the nature of government, as in Åland,
Mindanao, and New Caledonia. Autonomy has enabled a region to exercise substantial
self-government without assuming all functions of state or losing the benefits of
metropolitan nationality (as with associated states such as the Cook Islands, which
opted for a link with New Zealand after decolonization but assumed most functions
of self-government). On the other hand, autonomy has also been used when a region
of a state does not want to join a bigger union (e.g., in Greenland and Faroes when
Denmark joined EU; and special provisions could be negotiated for Åland when
Finland joined the EU because of its preexisting autonomy). Autonomy has been used
as a complement to other conflict-resolving devices or packages. Various forms of
autonomy (personal, corporate, or territorial) have been linked to consociationalism,
which has been gaining popularity in recent years, as in Bosnia, Belgium, and Fiji.

Agreements preclude violence at least to some extent - anecdote from Northern

Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement

Jason Walsh [Christian Science Monitor Ireland Correspondent], “15 years after
Good Friday Agreement, an imperfect peace in Northern Ireland,” Christian Science
Monitor, April 10 2013. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-
News/2013/0410/15-years-after-Good-Friday-Agreement-an-imperfect-peace-in-
Northern-Ireland

And on this date 15 years ago, they succeeded: the Ulster Unionist Party agreed to work
with republicans, something that would have been unimaginable just a short time ear-
lier. Life in Northern Ireland has been transformed since that day, no one disputes that.
But the conflict has not been replaced with perfect peace. In July 1998, three young
Catholic children were killed when the Ulster Volunteer Force, supposedly on cease-
fire, firebombed their home. The infamous Omagh bomb, planted by dissident repub-
licans, was to go off on August 15 of the same year, killing 29. And there have been
murders carried out by both unionist and republican groups since then, as well as an-
nualized rioting. In some ways, the post-Good Friday state of affairs mirrors that of
Northern Ireland prior to 1969, with sporadic episodes of violence punctuating a shaky
peace. Still, with Irish republicans represented in government and Catholics no longer
discriminated against in jobs, education, and housing, it is difficult to imagine the same
sense of grievance that give birth to the conflict being nurtured ever again. The problem,
as with so many conflicts today, is that an honest desire to put an end to bloodshed and
misery may not so much bring about peace as transform violence into deep-frozen cul-
tural and pseudo-political resentments. In Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, there was
no single winner or loser. Both sides can legitimately claim to have won, or to have
lost. Whichever they claim depends on how they are feeling at any given moment. This
year’s rioting in Northern Ireland, sparked by a decision to fly the British Union flag
over Belfast city hall on state occasions rather than every day, speaks of a unionist com-
munity that is brittle and fearful. A community that thinks it has lost. A community
that feels abandoned and is itself now nursing a sense of grievance. High-flown talk
about plurality and neutrality simply do not reflect reality on the ground, except per-
haps in a few well-to-do areas. No one, other than a few extremists on the fringes of
unionism and republicanism, wants to see a return to violence in Northern Ireland, and
so the architects of the Good Friday Accord can rightfully claim a victory on that front.
A permanent peace remains a more remote prize.

2.1 Catalonia would reject independence, so offering it now is

best for Spain

2.1.1 Public Opinion

Recent data - 54% of Catalans oppose independence

Simon Nixon [reporter, WSJ], “Spain Sees Signs That Tide Is Turning in Catalonia,” Wall
Street Journal, November 12 2017. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/spain-
sees-signs-that-tide-is-turning-in-catalonia-1510524920

MADRID–One of the first things a visitor to Madrid will notice these days is the Spanish
flags festooned from balconies across the capital, something that usually only ever hap-
pens when the national football team is playing in a major tournament. The same is true
in other Spanish cities. It is a mark of how the crisis triggered by the regional govern-
ment in Catalonia’s decision to hold an independence referendum that was illegal un-
der the Spanish constitution and subsequently declare independence has reawakened
previously dormant Spanish nationalism, including among the 54% of Catalans who
according to a recent poll oppose independence.

Support for independence is a reaction to crackdowns. It’ll decline eventually.

https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/875508/Catalonia-news-Spain-Madrid-
independence-catalunya-carles-puigdemont-catalunha-video

Catalonia saw a hike in support for the pro-independence movement since the central
government in Madrid begun its crackdown on the autonomous region. And LSE Pro-
fessor Sebastian Balfour said it is more than likely Catalan people will continue to move
towards the idea of independence if Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy continues his aggres-
sive strategy to return the rule of law in Catalonia. He said: “The latest poll, which was
published last week, puts the percentage of people polled who support independence
to 48.7 per cent whereas three months ago it was 41 per cent. So that figure seems to be
creeping up.”What happens now is up for grabs I expect and in fact, we’ve seen signs
of it already. I expect there to be widespread civil unrest I expect there to be strikes as
well.”

Even after the activation of Article 155, unionists are ahead in the polls

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-poll/hundreds-of-
thousands-march-for-unified-spain-poll-shows-depths-of-division-idUSKBN1CY072

The poll of 1,000 people by Sigma Dos for newspaper El Mundo showed unionist parties
winning 43.4 percent support and pro-independence parties 42.5 percent. The survey
was taken from Monday to Thursday, just as the central government prepared to take
control of Catalonia. Madrid said on Saturday that secessionist politicians, including
Puigdemont, were free to take part in the election. The hardline CUP has been unclear
if it would.

2.1.2 Economics

Catalonia would undergo economic crisis if it goes independent

Luis de Guindos, Spain’s finance minister, recently argued that independence would
hurt the Catalonian economy in several ways. He told the Financial Times that breaking
away from Spain could lead to a 30 per cent fall in the region’s gross domestic product
since Catalonia would be outside the EU and the eurozone. He also said it could cause
a banking crisis. Two years ago Spain’s leading banks, including Caixabank and Banco
Sabadell, warned that they would have to reconsider their operations in Catalonia if it
was independent and outside the eurozone.

Large employers would leave an independent Catalonia

US companies, including Procter & Gamble and DowDuPont, are among the largest for-
eign investors in Spain and have operations in Catalonia. European companies such as
Volkswagen, Nissan and Nestlé also operate in the region. Mr García-Nieto said that

some of his wealthier clients were also preparing to move if Catalonia became indepen-
dent — but added that it was unlikely that secession would happen.

The EU has already disapproved of the independence movement

Thirdly, the Catalan leadership misjudged the international reaction to their indepen-
dence bid. They had been banking on support from other European Union countries
who they hoped would act as intermediaries with Madrid. But while the Catalan sepa-
ratists have won some popular sympathy internationally following scuffles with police
on the day of the referendum and following the jailing of the Catalan leadership, not
a single foreign government has recognized Catalonia’s declaration of independence.
Instead, EU governments in particular have lined up behind Madrid in insisting that
this is an internal Spanish issue that must be resolved in full respect of the Spanish con-
stitution and the rule of law. In particular, the EU has signaled that an independent
Catalonia couldn’t count on automatic entry to the EU or membership of the eurozone:
for other EU member states, many of which also face separatist threats, this is also an
existential issue.

2.1.3 Independence movements die when they get rejected by their own
country

SNP is losing momentum

Euan McKirdy [reporter, CNN], “Scottish referendum in doubt after steep losses for
SNP in UK vote,” CNN, June 9 2017. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/08/europe/snp-
uk-general-election/index.html

Scottish National Party (SNP) leader Nicola Sturgeon’s continued support for a second
independence referendum appears to have backfired, after her party endured a series
of shock defeats in Thursday’s UK general election. The party lost a total of 21 seats
across Scotland, including that of SNP deputy leader Angus Robertson, and former
party leader and SNP heavyweight Alex Salmond. The sizable losses appear to have
been a repudiation of the party’s promise to send Scots back to the polls for a second

independence vote. In the early hours of Friday morning, Sturgeon admitted the poor
results meant she would need to “reflect” on the appetite for a referendum

SNP is losing momentum after losing election

Barney Henderson and Simon Johnson [reporters, Telegraph], “Scotland election re-
sults: Alex Salmond defeated and SNP suffer huge losses as Tory chances boosted north
of the border,” The Telegraph, June 9 2017. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/08/
election-results-live-will-snp-nicola-sturgeon-do/

Prof John Curtice, the political scientist and polling expert, said some of the momen-
tum behind the SNP’s push to break-up Britain had “gone”, Auslan Cramb reports. He
told BBC Scotland: “I think clearly the concern for the SNP must be that some of the
momentum that’s been behind the independence movement and the push for indepen-
dence, which survived the defeat in the referendum three years ago, that some of that
has gone. “The SNP may want to reflect that their domestic record, not least on schools,
is beginning to undermine their support among those who on the constitutional ques-
tion are still willing to support the Nationalist position.”

Catalan independence parties are already losing after failing to deliver

Paul Day [reporter, Reuters], “Catalan independence parties seen losing parlia-
mentary majority in election: poll,” Business Insider, October 29 2017. Available
at: http://www.businessinsider.com/r-catalan-independence-parties-seen-losing-
parliamentary-majority-in-election-poll-2017-10

Catalan independence parties are seen as losing their parliamentary majority in an elec-
tion, according to a poll published on Sunday, though the wafer-thin margin between
the two sides predicts a hard-fought campaign to December’s ballot. The poll was taken
from last Monday to Thursday, just as Spain’s central government was preparing to take
control of the restive region, which then made a unilateral declaration of independence
on Friday. Pro-independence parties were seen as taking 42.5 percent of the vote while
anti-independence parties would win 43.4 percent, according to the poll of some 1,000
people surveyed by Sigma Dos and published in the anti-independence newspaper El
Mundo.

2.1.4 Catalan independence parties are not united, their victory has been
labeled “symbolic”

Madrid is cautiously optimistic that thanks to these miscalculations, the separatists are
losing momentum and that pro-independence parties will fail to win a majority in the
Catalan parliament in December’s elections. Spanish ministers note that the imposi-
tion of direct rule and the arrest of the Catalan leadership hasn’t led to widespread
disorder as some had predicted. They are also hopeful that the failure of the three pro-
independence parties to reach an agreement to form an alliance for the elections as they
did in 2015 reflects tactical splits among the separatists. They also believe that the sepa-
ratist cause was damaged by the admission by Catalan parliament speaker Carme For-
cadell in a bail hearing last week that she regarded the declaration of independence as
“symbolic” and would in future agree to respect Spanish law.

Catalan nationalist leaders are not even in Catalonia at the moment

Underestimating the strength of feeling that the push for independence would provoke
among pro-Spanish Catalans and elsewhere in Spain was just one of a series of misjudg-
ments by Catalonia’s separatist leaders, five of whom including the former president,
Carles Puigdemont, are now in exile in Belgium. Eight others are being held in prison
on charges of sedition, rebellion and misuse of public funds.

2.1.5 AT: Independence is Unconstitutional

Unilateral declaration of independence is unconstitutional, not granting

independence.

Koltonowski, Austin [University of Pittsburgh School of Law]. “Spain Constitutional

Court nullifies Catalan independence declaration,” Jurist. 31 October 2017.

[JURIST] Spain’s Constitutional Court [official website] on Tuesday formally nullified

Catalonia’s October 27th declaration of independence. Citing earlier decisions related
to the Catalan referendum on independence, the Constitutional Court reiterated their
right to trump last week’s declaration of independence under Article 161 of the Spanish
Constitution, which provides that The Government may appeal to the Constitutional
Court against provisions and resolutions adopted by the bodies of the Self-governing
Communities, which shall bring about the suspension of the contested provisions or
resolutions.

This is because only the Spanish government can change the constitution.

The Economist. “Why the referendum on Catalan independence is illegal,” The

Economist. 26 September 2017.

THE Catalan regional government of Carles Puigdemont is preparing to hold a unilat-

eral referendum on seceding from Spain on October 1st, which it says will be legally
binding. Catalans will be asked whether they want to form an independent republic.
But there is a problem: Spain’s democratic constitution of 1978, which was approved
by more than 90% of Catalan voters, gave wide autonomy to the regions but affirmed
“the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation”. Only the Spanish parliament can change
the constitution. Mr Puigdemont’s referendum is therefore illegal, and Mariano Rajoy,
Spain’s conservative prime minister, is determined to prevent it taking place.

There are two ways to call a legal Catalonian referendum.

Vintró, Joan. [Professor of Constitutional Law at the Institute of Public Law, University
of Barcelona]. “Legality and the Referendum on Independence in Catalonia,” Institut
de Dret Public. 2017.

What are the mechanisms under the Constitution and current legislation that can legally
allow the will of the people of Catalonia regarding the creation of their own sovereign
state to be known? Essentially, there are two: the referendum provided for in Article
92 of the Constitution and the referendum established by the Catalan Act 4/2010 on
popular consultations. Both are purely advisory, so that their outcome can not have
directly effective legal consequences, although following democratic logic, the verdict
of the inquiry could hardly not be politically binding. In the first case, the power to
call a referendum resides with the central government. In the second, it corresponds

to the Government of Catalonia, with prior authorization from the central government.
It should be recalled that, as stipulated by the JCC 103/2008, a referendum involves
the participation of the entire electorate of the entire Spanish territory, or part thereof,
conducted with the guarantees of electoral procedure established by State organic law.

Self-determination is a right enshrined by international law.

Catalonia Parliament. “The Law on the Self-Determination Referendum.” 6 September

2017.

In parallel, Resolution 1999/57, on the Promotion of the right to democracy, of the

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, proclaimed the indissoluble links be-
tween the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
foundation of any democratic society. Within this context, democratic management of
public affairs has been internationally accepted as one of the cornerstones of contempo-
rary society and has been inextricably linked to, amongst other rights, that of citizens’
direct and indirect political participation and to the right to freedom and to human dig-
nity, including freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of thought and freedom of
association, rights recognised in the principal universal and European treaties on the
protection of human rights. They therefore assert that the democratic management of
any political discrepancy must take place with full respect for these fundamental human
rights and freedoms. In recent opinions, the International Court of Justice has stated
that, during the second half of the 20th century, there have been cases of new states that
have exercised the right to self-determination without the exercise of this right to decide
being motivated by the end of imperialism. The Court notes that the right of peoples
to decide has evolved, and that, to counter this evolution, no new rule or custom has
arisen at an international level to prohibit these new practices. The only limitation on
the right to decide that the Court regards as enforceable is the unlawful resorting to
force or other serious violations of the rules of international law.

The Spanish Constitution establishes that international treaties, rights, and

freedoms Spain has recognized are domestically binding.

Catalonia Parliament. “The Law on the Self-Determination Referendum.” 6 September

2017.

The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights, approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December

1966, ratified and in force in the Kingdom of Spain since 1977—published in Spain’s
Official Gazette, the BOE, on 30 April 1977—recognise the right of all peoples to self-
determination as the first human right. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes,
in Article 96, that international treaties ratified by Spain form part of its domestic legis-
lation and, in Article 10.2, establishes that the rules on fundamental rights and public
freedoms shall be interpreted in accordance with applicable international treaties on the
matter.

Catalonia is exercising its right to self-determination.

Catalonia Parliament. “The Law on the Self-Determination Referendum.” 6 September

2017.

The Parliament of Catalonia has continuously and unambiguously expressed Catalo-

nia’s right to self-determination. This was manifested in Resolution 98/III, on the Cata-
lan nation’s right to self-determination, adopted on 12 December 1989, and ratified in
Resolution 679/V, adopted on 1 October 1998, in Resolution 631/VIII of the Parliament
of Catalonia, on the right to self-determination and on the recognition of public refer-
enda on independence, adopted on 10 March 2010. More recently, Resolution 5/X of
the Parliament of Catalonia, which approved the Declaration of Sovereignty and the
right to decide of the people of Catalonia and Resolution 306/XI, adopted on 6 October
2016, on the general political orientation of the Government of Catalonia, have asserted
Catalonia’s indefeasible and inalienable right to selfdetermination and have confirmed
a parliamentary majority in favour of independence.

2.1.6 AT: Spain’s Economy Relies on Catalonia

Independence would force Spain to develop its economy in other regions.

Jofre-Bonet, Mireia and Banal-Estanol, Albert. [both are Professors of Economics from
City, University of London]. “Catalonia, Spain and the economic consequences of a
split,” The Conversation. 12 October 2017.

Despite the inevitable transition costs for both sides, there may also be some benefits
to a split. The new Spanish state would lose a dynamic economy with better economic
indicators than its average in terms of GDP, unemployment, exports and innovation.

But this may trigger greater economic development and modernisation in its remaining
regions.

Companies are moving from Catalonia to Spain.

Erickson, Amanda. [Staff Writer — Washington, D.C.]. “Since Catalonia’s indepen-

dence vote, 2,700 businesses have moved their headquarters,” The Washington Post. 30
November 2017.

But the October referendum — and Spain’s subsequent takeover — has left businesses
nervous. Since the vote, more than 2,700 firms have moved their headquarters from
the region, according to Spain’s commercial registrar’s office, the Agence France-Presse
reported. That list includes major banks like Caixabank and Sabadell, along with small
and medium firms. Many of these shifts are administrative. But they may be the first
step to relocating staff and production. As AFP explains: “While tensions have eased
somewhat since Spain’s central government last month took direct control of the North-
east region and has scheduled regional elections in December, many businesses in Cat-
alonia still feel the need to guard against uncertainty.”

Important Spanish companies are not very exposed to Catalonia.

Enero, David. [Works for a Tech Hub called Apiumhub]. “Catalinia’s Economic Impact
of the Referendum,” Apiumhub. 16 November 2017.

In front of all these positions that defend the worst case if Catalonia gets the autonomy
stand those who, on the opposite site, claim that the Catalan economic impact or the
Spanish one won’t be even affected. An analyst for the Société Générale states that
“the actual exposure of Ibex 35 companies to Catalonia is minimal” That is good news
for the Spanish economy. There is a 34% of revenue coming from inside Spain for those
companies and a 50% of investors away from the European Union, that is a huge amount
of business outside of the Spanish market.

Spain may be better off without Catalonia in the long run.

The new Spanish state may gain in the long run if the preferences of its citizens are more
homogeneous and better aligned with the central government than at present. Needless
to say, prior to independence, both parties may have vested interests in using economic
and non-economic threats against each other. After secession, however, mutually ben-
eficial agreements would unavoidably be pursued. In any case, both new states are
viable, and they could well be better off in the long run.

Tourism plays an enormous role in the Spanish economy.

Scowsill, David. [President & CEO of World Travel and Tourism Council]. “Travel &
Tourism Economic Impact 2017 Spain,” World Travel & Tourism Council and Oxford
Economics. March 2017
GDP: DIRECT CONTRIBUTION The direct contribution of Travel & Tourism to GDP
was EUR57.1bn (USD63.7bn), 5.1% of total DFP in 2016 and is forecast to rise by 3.5%
in 2017, and to rise by 2.0% pa, from 2017-2027, to EUR72.1bn(USD80.5bn), 5.5% of
total GDP in 2027. GDP: TOTAL CONTRIBUTION The total contribution of Travel &
Tourism to GDP was EUR158.9bn (USD177.2bn), 14.2% of GDP in 2016, and is forecast
to rise by 3.8% in 2017, and to rise by 1.8% pa to EUR196.5bn (USD219.2bn), 15.0% of
GDP in 2027. EMPLOYMENT: DIRECT CONTRIBUTION In 2016, Travel & Tourism
directly supported 862,000 jobs (4.7% of total employment). This is expected to rise by
2.9% in 2017 and rise by 1.4% pa to 1,016,000 jobs (5.2% of total employment) in 2027.
EMPLOYMENT: TOTAL CONTRIBUTION In 2016, the total contribution of Travel &
Tourism to employment, including jobs indirectly supported by the industry was 14.5%
of total employment (2,652,500 jobs). This is expected to rise by 3.0% in 2017 to 2,733,000
jobs and rise by 0.9% pa to 2,981,000 jobs in 2027 (15.3% of total). VISITOR EXPORTS
Visitor exports generated EUR58.9bn (USD65.7bn), 16.1% of total exports in 2016. This
is forecast to grow by 4.5% in 2017, and grow by 2.5% pa, from 2017-2027, to EUR78.5bn
(USD87.5bn) in 2027, 15.1% of total. INVESTMENT Travel & Tourism investment in
2016 was EUR15.4bn, 6.9% of total investment (USD17.2bn). It should rise by 5.0% in
2017, and rise by 2.7% pa over the next ten years to EUR21.2bn (USD23.6bn) in 2027,
7.5% of total.

The current stand-off is terrible for Spain’s image, causing tourism to slump.

Giles, Ciaran. [Writer from The Associated Press]. “Tourism Is the Biggest Loser So Far
in Spain-Catalonia Standoff,” Associated Press. 30 October 2017.

Tourism seems to be taking the biggest hit so far. Experts say spending in the sector
in Catalonia in the first two weeks of October — that is, following the independence
referendum — was down 15 percent from a year earlier. Tourism represents about 11
percent of Spain’s 1.1-trillion euro ($1.3 trillion) gross domestic product, with Catalonia
and its capital, Barcelona, providing a fifth of that, being the most popular destinations
for visitors. Exceltur, a nonprofit group formed by the 25 leading Spanish tourist groups,
expects growth in tourism this year to ease from an estimated 4.1 percent to 3.1 percent.
Reservations in Barcelona alone are down 20 percent compared with last year, it said.
If the trend continues in the final three months of the year, it could lead to losses of up
to 1.2 billion euros ($1.41 billion) in the sector, which in turn could affect jobs. Analysts
fear that the independence movement’s stated aim of continuing to create as much social
and economic chaos for Spain as possible could exacerbate the situation. The Catalan
National Assembly group has been openly talking about a boycott against Spain’s top
companies and major strike activity. “Spain, its tourism, everything is very dependent
on image,” Diaz Gimenez said. “And this is just killing it.”

Economic Arguments are Not the Crux of the Problem

Bosch, Sofia. [Correspondent for CNBC]. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-
Catalonia split could really be,” CNBC. 2 October 2017.

Catalonia could also face economic turmoil due to its separation for the European single
currency, and increased tariffs on their goods and services. Ultimately though, Cata-
lan nationalists will pay any price for independence, regardless of the economic losses.
“The economic arguments will not be the prevailing ones in the debate over Catalonia’s
independence,” Cuenca said. “The arguments used by both sides appeal to identity.”

2.1.7 AT: Catalonia’s Economy Would Tank, Dragging Spain Down Too

Catalonia’s economy has the natural advantages of a cohesive, mid-sized

population.

There are a number of reasons why this is likely to be so. For a start, it has a population

of 7.5 million. There is no right or wrong size as such, for there are successful countries
that are very small: Luxembourg, with a population of just under 600,000, is the richest
country in the world in terms of GDP per person. (Monaco probably comes in higher,
but it is a special case.) And of course the three largest countries in terms of population
– China, India and the US – are also success stories in their own ways. But there does
seem to be a sweet spot in the 5 million to 15 million bracket, where countries are big
enough to offer their citizens a full range of services but are also small enough to be
socially cohesive. This includes Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland.
Catalonia would naturally join that group.

Catalonia has a prime location.

That argument leads to a second condition for success: location. Countries cannot
choose their location, and have to make the best of what they have. But if your neigh-
bours are doing well, unless you deliberately cut yourself off from them, you will tend
to be pulled along too. Catalonia, in that sense, is lucky in several ways. It has prosper-
ous neighbours, France and the rest of Spain (though relations with the latter would be
difficult for a while). It has a coastline, and a Mediterranean one at that. Barcelona and
Tarragona, a little to the south, are Spain’s two largest ports.

Catalonia has an established economic base.

McRae, Hamish. [Associate editor of The Independent. Business and Finance Journalist
of the Year 2006 at the British Press Awards]. “Catalonia could be an extremely success-
ful economy and EU member state,” The Independent. 28 October 2017. Third, it has an
established economic base. It is a manufacturing centre, has two top-ranking business
schools, and the usual array of service industries. Separatists have noted that though
Catalonia has about 18 per cent of Spain’s population, it generates more than 20 per cent
of its GDP. Were it to be fully independent, with Barcelona and its 1.6 million people, it
would have one of the glitziest capital cities on earth.

Another reason Catalonia would succeed economically is that it has brand

advantage.

A final point: Catalonia has brand recognition. Brand is an intangible advantage, but
can be deployed to leverage other economic advantages. Ireland is a fine example of
that, using its brand (and its educated workforce) to make it a base for high-tech Amer-
ican companies seeking to enter the European market. On its own, Catalonia could be
nimble in attracting business, and consequently creating jobs, than it has been as part
of Spain.

Catalonia can survive a trade boycott from Spain.

Bosch, Sofia. [Correspondent for CNBC]. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-
Catalonia split could really be,” CNBC. 2 October 2017.

Furthermore, Catalonia may also face a trade boycott from the rest of Spain. For Banal-
Estañol, this is not a deal-breaker as boycotts have been circumvented by Catalonia in
the past. People hold Spanish flags and a banner reading ‘Government of Spain, comply
with and enforce the constitution: article 155 now’ during a demonstration organised
by the Spanish right-wing party Vox in front of the Spain Government Delegation in
Barcelona, on September 6, 2017. “It is unclear how long a boycott would last, and how
strong it would be,” Banal-Estañol said. “Businesses may search for other markets, as
they did in the past, during previous boycotts (as in the case of the Cava, the sparkling
wine of Catalonia) or during the severe economic crisis in Spain.”

Catalonia could continue to use the euro without EU consent.

Parada, Guiomar. [Reporter for East West]. “The economic challenge of an independent
Catalonia,” EastWest. 21 September 2017.

Catalonia could actually continue to use the euro even without an EU consent, like
Kosovo and Montenegro. ”No economic agent in Europe or in the world would want
Catalonia to leave the euro,” said economist David Ros, a member of the College of
Economists in Catalonia. ”For the ECB it would entail little more than changing a zip

code, and it would be in its interest, and in that of the EU, if the goal is to preserve the
integrity of the European single market, its unified payment system, supervision over
systemic risk, liquidity….”

Catalonia would likely be able to rejoin the EU eventually.

My guess is that an independent Catalonia would be welcomed into the EU if it still

wanted to rejoin, but that could take a decade. In the meantime we are seeing hostility
from the EU. As for the other major countries, while their present stance of not recog-
nising Catalonia is quite understandable and correct, if and when the country became
truly independent, they have no option but to accept reality. But – and this is important
– there is a considerable economic cost to political disruption on this scale. The call for
calm by Catalonia’s sacked leader Carles Puigdemont is sensible and strikes a helpful
tone. Let’s see what happens. But if the end does turn out to be a new European country,
then in another decade it is likely to be a prosperous one.

There is no consensus on the impact to Catalonia’s economy, but some estimate

seven percent long term growth.

Michel, Emmanuelle. [Writer for Agence France-Presse (AFP), an international news

agency headquartered in Paris, France]. “Catalonia, one of Spain’s economic heavy-
weights,” AFP. 2 October 2017.

The issue is much debated among both camps, who generally present widely different
figures, often based on different methodologies and hypotheses. If independence were
to happen, Spain’s economy ministry claims that Catalonia would leave the European
Union, its GDP would fall 25 to 30 percent and unemployment would double. But some
economists believe that the newly formed republic would stay in the EU, predicting its
GDP would remain stable in the short term and rise seven percent long term. Catalo-
nia’s government also says the region would no longer suffer from what it calls a “fiscal
deficit”, given that the region pays more in taxes to Madrid than it gets back. The re-
gional executive says this deficit is around 16 billion euros, or 8 percent of Catalonia’s

GDP and the central government, with a different methodology, estimates it to be 10

billion euros, or 5 percent of regional GDP.

A friendly split, such as this resolution describes, would minimize the short term
economic costs.

Minder, Raphael. [Spain and Portugal correspondent for The New York Times]. “Cri-
sis in Catalonia: The Independence Vote and Its Fallout,” The New York Times. 26
September 2017.

Until the recent political turmoil, economists had generally agreed that Catalonia would
be viable as an independent country, but they differed on the impact on jobs, barriers to
trade and the spending needs of a new state. An independent Catalonia would be a mid-
size European nation, with Barcelona as its capital. Economists disagree over whether
withdrawal would hurt the region significantly, or instead weaken the rest of Spain.
But they agree that there would be short-term economic costs as the two sides adjusted,
even if the split took place on friendly terms. Much would depend on the financial and
political terms under which Catalonia left, including how Spain’s debt burden would
be apportioned and whether Madrid would impose economic sanctions on Catalonia.

The deciding question is whether Spain and Catalonia can rebuild their
relationship.

McRae, Hamish. [Associate editor of The Independent. Business and Finance Journalist
of the Year 2006 at the British Press Awards]. “The Catalan independence referendum
is a much bigger issue for the EU than Brexit,” The Independent. 30 September 2017.

Legally, Spain would be able to push an independent Catalonia out, but in the real world
of European politics it would be hard for the rest of Europe to exclude a country that
wanted to remain a member – or to be technically more correct, to rejoin. In economic
terms Catalonia will be fully viable and there is no practical reason why it should not
continue to use the euro, even if technically it were for a time outside the EU. The ob-
vious big question really is not so much the outcome of the referendum but whether
Spain and Catalonia can rebuild their relationship. If they cannot do so, then Catalonia
becomes a threat not just to Spain but to the EU as a whole, in some ways a greater threat
than the departure of the UK.

Catalonia would be a successful economy after an initial period of disruption.

It is not for foreign economists to take positions on the independence of Catalonia, for
that is for the people of Catalonia and Spain to decide. What can be said, though, is
that if Catalonia were to become a fully independent country there is no reason why it
should not – after a period of disruption – be an extremely successful economy.

2.1.8 AT: Spanish Unity is Essential

Denying Catalonia self-determination fuels demands for independence, eroding

the stability and reputation of Madrid.

Hamid, Nafees and Pretus, Clara. [Research fellow at Artis International and Faculty
at the department of psychiatry and forensic medicine at the Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, respectively]. “How Spain Misunderstood the Catalan Independence Move-
ment,” The Atlantic. 1 October 2017.

The actions of the Spanish government reveal a deep misunderstanding about the psy-
chology of the independence movement. Authorities are attempting to wear down the
movement by denying a vote. Our findings suggested that Madrid’s current approach
may well backfire: The government’s muscular response to Catalans’ desire for self-
determination could increase the number of independentists and heighten their pas-
sion, which, in the long run, may further erode the stability and reputation of Spain’s
central government. Allowing a vote to proceed, meanwhile, could actually strengthen
Madrid. The current strain of the Catalan independence movement began under the
rule of fascist dictator Francisco Franco, who took over Spain in 1939. Under Franco,
the public use of the Catalan language was banned, and all specifically Catalan institu-
tions, such as the Government of Catalonia, were abolished as part of an attempt to end
regionalism in Spain. Shortly after Franco’s death in 1975, the government reinstated
Catalonia’s status as an autonomous community within Spain. But a small minority of
activists still wanted full independence. The share of those favoring independence be-
gan to rise steeply in 2010, from 25 percent to its peak of 57 percent in 2012. The first
reason for this rise was likely the 2008 economic crisis. Using government data from
2005 to 2016, we found a very high correlation between support for independence and

unemployment in Catalonia. The second reason for this rise was public outrage at the
2010 constitutional court’s cutting down of reforms aimed at increasing sovereignty in
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, its equivalent of a constitution. Both events led many
to feel that Catalonia would be better off under self rule. Since then, Madrid has been
adamantly opposed to an independence referendum, arguing that it is illegal according
to the 1978 Spanish constitution (which mentions the “indissoluble unity of the Span-
ish Nation”). Since then, the Catalan independence movement has been building. It is
driven by strong personal identification with Catalan culture and what social psychol-
ogists call sacred values: moral values of the highest significance that, in some cases,
people would give their lives for. According to our research, the top two sacred values
motivating the Catalan movement were the right to vote for independence and the pro-
tection of Catalan identity. In studies of conflicts around the world, our colleagues have
found that threats to sacred values and identities often lead to increased activism and,
sometimes, violence. The denial of a vote is a threat to these values and identity and,
most likely, will only further fuel the independence movement. Until recently, many
supporters of the referendum have been undecided on the question of independence.
However, the denial of the vote by Madrid has outraged some, turning them into pro-
independence activists.

Granting Catalonia independence would make Spain more homogenous.

Catalonia would of course need to invest in creating new state structures, such as em-
bassies and a central bank. This may cost more than what Catalonia pays now as a pro-
portion of the same structures for a larger state. Conversely, the new Spanish govern-
ment could use the split as an opportunity to simplify its own administrative structures,
as the preferences of the rest of the Spanish population would be more homogeneous
without Catalonia.

2.1.9 AT: Other Regions in Spain Will Secede

Denying Catalonia self-determination increases regional distrust toward Madrid.

Denying Catalans their vote may only increase the sense of distrust towards Madrid
from Spain’s other regions, such as Galicia and Basque country, both of which have had
their own independence movements of varying degrees of popularity. Many Spaniards
do not have confidence in the country’s democratic institutions. For example, the Peo-
ple’s Party, the current ruling party, has been implicated in 65 cases of corruption. Pres-
ident Mariano Rajoy has stood by many of those involved, causing many to question
their government’s interest in the public good.

Citizens of Basque County is no longer interested in independence.

Dowsett, Sonya. [Senior Correspondent for Spain for Reuters]. “The Basque Country:
Spain’s effective but expensive antidote to secession,” Reuters. 9 October 2017.

Among the verdant mountains of Basque Country, which borders France, a once-
violent campaign for independence has petered out, with generous fiscal autonomy
from Madrid helping to keep popular agitation for independence in check. “We don’t
have that economic resentment,” Aitor Esteban, organizer for the Basque National
Party in Spain’s parliament, told Reuters in an interview at party headquarters in
Bilbao. “People don’t feel that need to act upon a grievance about money; that makes a
big difference.”

Just 17 percent of Basques want independence.

Dowsett, Sonya. [Senior Correspondent for Spain for Reuters]. “The Basque Country:
Spain’s effective but expensive antidote to secession,” Reuters. 9 October 2017.

Just 17 percent of Basques want independence and less than half would like to hold a
referendum on the issue, according to a poll carried out by the university of Deusto.

Basque militant group ETA, which killed more than 850 people in a decades-long cam-
paign to carve out a separate state, effectively ended its armed resistance this year when
it surrendered its weapons. The region now has one of the highest economic outputs
per capita and one of the lowest unemployment rates in Spain. “The independence de-
bate is on standby in Basque Country because of great fatigue after years of violence and
uncertainty after the economic crisis,” said Xabier Barandiaran, professor of sociology
at Deusto University.

The Catalan crisis has not significantly increased support for independence in
Basque.

Kingsley, Patrick. [International correspondent for the New York Times]. “As Catalonia
Crisis Deepens, Many Basques Wary of New Independence Bid,” The New York Times.
28 October 2017.
Until the 19th century, Spanish kings swore an oath to respect Basque autonomy un-
derneath a tree here in Guernica. But the region’s self-government was dismantled in
1876, and so it remained (barring a brief period of autonomy during the Spanish Civil
War) for more than a century. Even after its restoration, self-government was still not
enough for some Basques — including a militant group, ETA, which killed more than
800 civilians, policemen and soldiers in a decades-long campaign for independence that
formally ended this year. But despite this tortured history, or perhaps because of it, the
Catalan crisis does not appear to have markedly increased the zeal for Basque inde-
pendence. Many here sympathize with Catalan nationalists. But after a controversial
Catalan independence referendum in early October, an opinion poll found that nearly
63 percent of Basques did not want to copy the Catalan approach to achieving inde-
pendence, while only 22 percent were in favor. And while 44 percent hope for greater
autonomy from Madrid, just 23 percent want their own independent country. After
over 40 years of separatist violence, many Basques want a timeout from the indepen-
dence question, suggested Kirmen Uribe, an acclaimed Basque author who writes in
Euskera, the Basque language.

Independence movements in the other Catalan counties of Valencia and the

Balearic Islands are much weaker than Catalonia’s.

Newton, Creede. [Journalist with Al Jazeera]. “Which other regions want to secede
from Spain?,” Al Jazeera. 27 October 2017.

Spain’s present-day Catalan countries include Valencia, Catalonia’s southern neighbour

and the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean Sea. Valencia is the birthplace of one of
Spain’s most well-known dishes, the rice-based paella. Santiago Calatrava, the world-
famous architect who designed the new World Trade Center hub in New York, as well
as many other works. “These territories have regionalist parties that demand, like Cat-
alonia years ago, better autonomy and respect for cultural diversity,” Jordi Graupera, a
Catalan author and researcher at Princeton University, told Al Jazeera. The president
of Valencia’s regional government, Ximo Puig of the centre-left regional branch of the
Spanish Socialist Party, has yet to comment on the use of Article 155. The Balearic Is-
lands are home to the popular tourist destination of Mallorca and birthplace of tennis
star Rafael Nadal. Francina Armengol, president of the Balearic Islands also from her
regional Socialist Party, has said that she wants Catalonia to remain part of Spain, but
is against the application of Article 155. While there are grassroots independence move-
ments in these regions, they aren’t as strong as those of Catalonia.

Other Catalan areas identify strongly with Spain, making them unlikely to push for
independence.

Alandete, David. [Managing editor at El País, the world’s leading newspaper in Span-
ish]. “What is really happening in Catalonia?,” El Pais. 5 October 2017.

Catalonia has never been an independent state. It was part of the Kingdom of Aragon
when Aragon joined the Kingdom of Castile in the 15th century. It shares a language and
culture with other autonomous regions – Valencia and the Balearic Islands. Many pro-
independence leaders propose that these other regions should join Catalonia to make
the ‘Països Catalans,’ something unlikely to happen given that these other regions feel
strongly Spanish.

Galicia consistently votes for Spanish nationalist parties.

Newton, Creede. [Journalist with Al Jazeera]. “Which other regions want to secede
from Spain?,” Al Jazeera. 27 October 2017.

But Galicia remains a rural, largely agrarian region with much less industrialisation
than the modern Basque Country and Catalonia, with a lower economic output. So, in
spite of the same cultural “starting conditions” as these regions, economic underdevel-
opment and has slowed the spread of Galician nationalism, Tiago Peres Goncalves, a

Galician historian and author, told Al Jazeera. The region consistently votes for Spanish
nationalist parties. The authoritarian Spanish leader Francisco Franco was from Galicia
as is Rajoy, the current prime minister.

Secessionist parties only have 15 of 75 seats in the Galician Parliament.

Comháin, Antóin Mac. [Member of Political Irish]. “Galician Independence News,”

Political Irish. 26 April 2017

The Galician independence movement or the Galician separatist movent (Galician: inde-
pendentismo galego) is a political movement, derived from Galician nationalism, which
supports the independence of Galicia and Galicia estremeira (As Portelas, O Bierzo e
Terra Eo-Navia) or the unification with Portugal. The first realization was the organized
political committee Comité Revoluzonareo Arredista Galego, formed by Fuco Gomez
in Cuba in the 1920s, but during the Second Spanish Republic did not have much sig-
nificance. In Argentina there was an association called Sociedade Nazonalista Pondal,
active mostly in the 1930s. In 1931, Galicia declared its independence. The next day,
Galicia rejoined Spain. The BNG and Anova-Nationalist Brotherhood, the two nation-
alist/secessionist political parties, have 15 of the 75 seats in the Galician Parliament.

There is nowhere near the demand for independence in Aragon as in Catalonia.

Hannan, Martin. [Journalist for The National]. “Wha’s Like Us: The independence
movements of Spain,” The National. 28 August 2017.

The Aragonese are proud of the fact that they are recognised as a “nationality” within
Spain’s regional autonomy constitution introduced in 1982, yet there is nowhere near
the demand for independence that there is in neighbouring Catalonia. Instead there
are constant demands for greater autonomy for a region which could quite easily be
self-sufficient, not least because of the agricultural strength of the valley of the River
Ebro.

This is because support for Aragonian independence is split across left-, center-,
and right-leaning political parties.

Hannan, Martin. [Journalist for The National]. “Wha’s Like Us: The independence
movements of Spain,” The National. 28 August 2017.

The problem for those who would like Aragon to be an independent nation is that the
political parties who promote Aragon as a nationality are split across the left, centre and
right spectrum. One of the leading leftist political parties is the Chunta Aragonesista
(CHA), led by lawyer Jose Luis Soro, who is a minister in the coalition that runs the
regional government. Soro and his party stand for secularisation of Aragonese culture
and politics, and are very much on the left wing. They also have relatively few elected
representatives apart from mayors and councillors in the small municipalities which
provide the CHA’s main strength, and none at all in the Madrid Cortes, the Spanish
parliament.

Other autonomous regions, such as Andalusia, strongly support Spanish unity.

Bernhard, Meg. [Journalist and graduate of Harvard University]. “Catalonia’s push for
independence roils larger — and poorer — regions of Spain,” LA Times. 2 November
2017.

Sanchez, like other Seville residents, takes offense at the independence movement in the
prosperous northeastern region of Catalonia, whose proponents argue that the central
government takes a disproportionate amount of tax money from them for redistribu-
tion to other parts of the country. To that end, independistas use the slogan “España
nos roba,” or “Spain robs us,” as a rallying point for their cause. For some Andalusians,
the push for Catalan independence is a stinging rebuke of all Spaniards, particularly
those who reside in less well-off regions. “We are angry,” said Javier Martín, 55, a lec-
turer of business at the University of Seville. “Behind this nationalist feeling there is a
big base of supremacism. They feel better than the other.” In Andalusia, where more
than 8 million people live, about 25% of residents are unemployed, according to Spain’s
National Statistics Institute. Forty-two percent are at risk of poverty, according to the
Andalusian Network to Fight Poverty and Social Exclusion. Catalonia, where 7.5 mil-
lion people reside, is an economic hub for Spain, accounting for 19% of the country’s
gross domestic product despite representing 16% of the population. The region’s un-
employment rate is about 12.5%, lower than the national average of 16.4%. For Juan
Luis Pavón, the separatists’ desire to be independent comes from a position of privi-
lege. “I think in all of Europe, the regions where there are independence movements
are the rich regions, not the poor ones,” said the journalist and organizer of the initia-
tive Sevilla Abierta, which advocates for social change in Seville. The independence
movement has put Andalusian leaders on the defensive. In September remarks, An-
dalusia’s top government leader, socialist Susana Díaz , said it was “absolutely clear

that Andalusia is not less than Catalonia, or the Basque Country, or Galicia,” referring
to other autonomous regions with separatist strains. Díaz voted to support efforts from
the central government in Madrid to crack down on Catalan leaders seeking indepen-
dence. The Spanish government called Catalonia’s secessionist drive illegal and ousted
its top leaders Friday after the region’s parliament declared independence. The govern-
ment summoned the region’s Cabinet members to court Thursday for possible charges
of rebellion, but ousted Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, who is in Belgium, re-
fused to comply. Prosecutors asked a judge to issue an international arrest warrant for
Puigdemont and four regional ministers. “Puigdemont is an idiot,” Zorrilla Sanchez
said. “Look at him. He just left. First he’s in Brussels, and then it will be jail.” In Seville,
the capital of Andalusia, support for Spanish unity is evident. The red and and yellow
national flag is everywhere: draped over balconies, hung on equipment at construction
sites, inundating social media profile photos.

2.1.10 AT: Undermine Spain’s International Clout

Catalonia is just seeking to exercise its right to self-determination.

Costa, Josep. [Lawyer and associate professor of Political Theory at the UPF University
in Barcelona]. “Does Catalonia Have the Right of Self-Determination?” Public Diplo-
macy Council of Catalonia. 2017.

Given all the above-mentioned, we can conclude that Catalonia could legitimately ap-
peal to the right to self-determination to declare independence – justifying this argu-
ment by the fact that its political status is an imposed one and that it cannot develop
itself freely within Spain. The debate regarding the Catalan issue has been based on
these arguments for some time, although it is not usually expressed as a question of
internal selfdetermination vs. secession. Having said that, it is difficult to imagine a sit-
uation with more arguments in favour of external self-determination in any present-day
western democracy.

Spain’s heavy-handed response has drawn international condemnation.

Raphael, Therese. [Writes editorials on European politics and economics for Bloomberg
View. She was editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal Europe]. “Spain Can
Blame Only Itself for Catalonia’s Resistance,” Bloomberg. 2 October 2017.

In the early hours, Catalonia’s government announced that it had counted nearly 2.3
million ballots that hadn’t been seized, and 90 percent were for independence. It hardly
matters that turnout was a low 42 percent; Catalonia’s leaders got exactly what they
wanted – victory in the court of public opinion and widespread international condem-
nation of Madrid. As clashes with police were broadcast, Catalan President Carles
Puigdemont, a former journalist and mayor of Girona, nimbly recast the narrative as
“truncheons versus the ballot box.”

Respecting political rights is essential for a country to maintain an international

draw (including tourism) and global political influence.

MacDonald, Alistair. [Senior Policy Analyst, British Council]. “Soft power today: Mea-
suring the effects,” Institute for International Cultural Relations at the University of
Edinburgh. October 2017.

Political pluralism, high levels of democracy and few restrictions on political rights are
other important factors attracting international students, tourists and FDI. As political
rights become restricted, student numbers decline, the research found. Looking more
closely at the data, political rights restrictions in a country matter more for explaining
global political influences than overall levels of democracy. Foreign aid has a positive
influence on the influx of students, tourists, FDI and political influence, as measured by
a country’s ability to affect voting patterns at the United Nations.

National branding is very important for Spain.

Lee, Donna and Sharp, Paul. [Donna Lee is a Senior Lecturer in International Organisa-
tions and International Political Economy, University of Birmingham, UK; Paul Sharp
is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Alworth Institute for International
Studies at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, USA]. “The New Public Diplomacy:
Soft Power in International Relations,” Studies in Diplomacy and International Rela-
tions. 2005.

Spain, once a world power of the first rank, went into a long, self destructive decline,
culminating in the hideous Civil War in the 1930s. It degenerated into an isolated, au-
tarkic, poverty-stricken, authoritarian anachronism, hardly part of modern Europe at
all. Since Franco’s death in 1975, it has transformed itself into a modern, well-off, Eu-
ropean democracy. The reality has changed but so have perceptions. Spain appears to

have carefully orchestrated and promoted its re-entry into the European family. The ex-
tent to which this has been explicitly managed is difficult to determine. Success always
makes it easy to postrationalize and rewrite history, but it certainly did not happen
only through serendipity. The Joan Miró sun symbol was an identifier for a massive
promotional programme that was closely linked to national change and modernization.
Institutional and tourist advertising on a national and regional level, the creation of suc-
cessful international business schools, the growth, privatization and globalization of
Spanish companies like Repsol, Telefónica and Union Fenosa, the rebuilding and beau-
tifying of major cities such as Barcelona and Bilbao, the selfmocking, sexually explicit,
tragicomic films of Pedro Almodóvar and his contemporaries, political devolution, the
Barcelona Olympics and the Seville International Exhibition of 1992 all underlined and
exemplified the change and helped to alter perceptions. This programme of activities,
much based around individual initiatives, has rehabilitated and revitalized Spain, both
in its own eyes and in the eyes of the world. Spain is among the best examples of mod-
ern, successful national branding because it keeps on building on what truly exists. It
incorporates, absorbs and embraces a wide variety of activities to form and project a
loose and multifaceted yet coherent, interlocking, mutually supportive whole. Many
countries have examined the Spanish example and have taken notice of what has been
done and how.

Soft power is essential economically and diplomatically.

New research by the Institute for International Cultural Relations at the University of
Edinburgh has found that promoting a nation’s culture and political ideals on the global
stage brings significant economic and strategic advantages. In a world first, researchers
have found that a state’s soft power has statistically significant impact on foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), overseas student recruitment, tourism, and international influ-
ence in fora like the UN General Assembly. The new research was conducted for the
British Council by the Institute for International Cultural Relations at the University of
Edinburgh. It used available data from 2000 to 2012. Experts assessed how various
forms of soft power – including cultural institutions, prosperity and internet connectiv-
ity, democracy and foreign aid, and overall cultural ranking – influenced a country’s
international pull. A 1% increase in the number of countries a cultural institution from

country X covers results in almost 0.66% increase in FDI for that country

2.1.11 AT: The Catalonia Crisis Helps Spain by Distracting Everyone’s

Attention from Corruption Scandals

Distracting from the ruling party’s corruption scandals helps the Partido Popular
party but not Spain as a whole.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

Studies at Oberlin College. Bécquer Seguín is an assistant professor of Iberian studies
at Johns Hopkins University]. “Spain’s Conflict Over Catalonia Is Covering Up Massive
Political Corruption,” The Nation. 24 November 2017.

The most consequential outcome of the Catalan crisis may have little to do with the cri-
sis itself: It has served to distract citizens from the wide-ranging corruption revelations
in the Partido Popular. In late October, during the days leading up to the independence
vote in the Catalan Parliament, anti-corruption prosecutor Concepción Sabadell deliv-
ered a devastating report that wrapped up a decade-long investigation into the illegal
financing of the PP. Sabadell is in charge of the Gürtel case, named after the mastermind
of the corruption ring, Francisco Correa, whose last name means “belt” in Spanish (Gür-
tel in German). Sabadell’s report confirmed that several of the PP’s regional branches,
as well as its national headquarters, for many years kept a set of shadow books to log
illegal commissions pocketed from corporations in exchange for major government con-
tracts. Among the direct beneficiaries of these commissions were middlemen (Correa
and his accomplices), dozens of PP politicians (who received bribes or under-the-table
salary supplements directly from the party’s treasurer), and the party organization itself,
which used the money, among other things, to finance its campaigns—in effect under-
mining the legitimacy of the elections. When Prime Minister Rajoy was called to testify
in the case, in late July, he claimed he did not know about the corruption scheme because
he had never been in charge of the party’s finances. He also denied ever having received
payouts from the shadow books. But that testimony was undermined on November 7,
when Manuel Morocho, chief inspector of the economic and fiscal delinquency unit of
Spain’s national police, testified before a congressional committee charged with investi-
gating the PP’s illegal financing. Asked whether he believed that Prime Minister Rajoy
had been the recipient of under-the-table payouts, he confirmed there was evidence to
indicate that he did. Morocho’s investigation of the party, so far, extends back to 1999
and includes all of the party’s leaders and treasurers. He described having found “cor-

ruption in its purest form” but lamented the party’s numerous attempts to “destabilize”
his investigation through spurious lawsuits. While such revelations would be grounds
for Rajoy’s impeachment, its coverage in major newspapers has been minimal and, on
Spanish public television, practically nonexistent.

The corruption scandal reaches into the judicial branch as well.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

The Gürtel case, moreover, is only one of many such investigations keeping the Span-
ish courts busy. In mid-November, Francisco Granados, a former top PP official in the
regional government of Madrid, faced trial for his involvement in a similar corruption
scheme. Meanwhile, on November 15, the PP itself was criminally charged for tamper-
ing with evidence. (In 2013, the party leadership ordered the destruction of two hard
drives that potentially contained data on its shadow books.) On November 17, a trial
opened against former PP economy minister and IMF director Rodrigo Rato, for cook-
ing the books during his tenure at the helm of Bankia, a major Spanish bank. These cases
point to the measure of independence that parts of the Spanish judiciary have managed
to maintain. But, more consistently, they have revealed the high level of collusion be-
tween the executive branch and the courts. An intercepted phone conversation between
an indicted PP official and a former PP minister in a parallel case, for instance, showed
how the official was able to influence a key judicial appointment that directly affected
his case. Such dealings behind closed doors are assumed, by many Spaniards, to be
commonplace.

The Catalonia crisis is a political strategy for the ruling party to fracture the
opposition, preventing it from demanding meaningful reforms.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

What might sound like electoral catnip for the opposition has been anything but. In

the Spanish Parliament, where the PP governs without an absolute majority, the Cata-
lan crisis has somehow further divided the country’s two largest opposition parties,
the social-democratic PSOE and the young anti-austerity party Podemos. While the
PSOE supported the imposition of direct rule in Catalonia, Podemos has from the out-
set argued that the only political solution to the Catalan challenge is a binding referen-
dum on self-determination. The PSOE’s submissive role as a handmaiden to the PP’s
hard-line centralism has alienated its progressive allies in Catalonia. (Its party leader-
ship went ahead with supporting the PP’s invocation of Article 155 without consulting
its membership, a move some believe was meant to avoid an internal vote against the
deal.) But Podemos’s middle-of-the-road position, too, would likely punish the party
at the ballot box were a national election to be held anytime soon. The Catalan crisis, fu-
eled by a politicized media, has polarized opinion around issues that for many in Spain
are deeply emotional. Any political stance that falls somewhere between strongly pro-
independence and strongly anti-independence has little galvanizing power. To make
matters worse, the issue has caused fractures within Podemos. Ciudadanos, by con-
trast, whose aggressive Spanish nationalism in response to the Catalan independence
movement has pulled the PP even further to the right, is seeing its support skyrocket.

The Catalan crisis has also allowed the Catalan right to whitewash their image.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

Just as the Catalan crisis has served to distract from PP corruption, it has also given
the Catalan right an opportunity to whitewash its own image. Behind a cloak of mar-
tyrdom, Puigdemont and his party have blurred the memory of their own corruption
scandals—also based on systematic illegal commissions in exchange for major contracts.
And, today, many no longer remember their implementation of harsh austerity mea-
sures in the wake of the Great Recession and the violent repression of citizen protests
that followed. “The conflict with Madrid has helped improve the image of the Catalan
right,” the journalist Emilio Silva told us. “In the speech he gave after Rajoy fired him as
president, Puigdemont spoke of a Catalan Republic whose citizens would live in equal-
ity, liberty, and fraternity. Well, that’s the same Puigdemont who, as mayor of the city
of Girona, put padlocks on supermarket dumpsters to prevent those who had no other
resources from taking food from them.”

Corruption is terrible for the Spanish people.

Ugaz, Jose. [Transparency International Secretariat]. “Spain Needs Urgently to Deal

with Systemic Corruption,” Transparency International. 18 May 2017.

Spain has been systematically engulfed in corruption scandals in recent years. Few as-
pects of public life in the country have remained exempt of corruption, be it the Royal
House, large corporations, municipal authorities, sports, or political parties. Accord-
ingly, Spain has suffered one of the steepest declines in the past years on Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Spain has gone down by seven points
since 2012 and with 58 now scores worse than most Western European democracies.
“Corruption in Spain distorts policy making and hurts people’s basic rights for the ben-
efit of a few. Just looking at recent scandals like the Pujol case in Catalonia, the linkages
between the ruling People’s Party and the construction group OHL, the Gürtel case,
the Bankia fraud and Rodrigo Rato, gives a sense of the scale of the problem,” said
José Ugaz, Chair of Transparency International. “This does not need to remain this
way. Spain has the democratic maturity, the institutions and a vibrant population and
can reverse this trend and stand up to corruption, including grand corruption,” added
Ugaz. To stop grand corruption scandals and end systemic corruption the Spanish gov-
ernment must act immediately. The first step should be to reverse the appointment of
the anti-corruption prosecutor who has been widely called into question for a potential
lack of impartiality given his links to the ruling party. Transparency International urges
political forces in the country to stop looking at corruption as part of the political and
electoral struggle for power and instead come together in a broad coalition to deal with
the challenge of systemic corruption as a policy of state that transcends specific political
parties. “The institutional and legal infrastructure for preventing corruption and pun-
ishing corrupt acts needs to be improved in dialogue between the government, political
forces and civil society. It is urgent that the judiciary operate in a professional manner,
free of political intervention, so we can start seeing timely and effective sanctions for
those responsible for corruption,” said Ugaz.

Successfully addressing this problem requires public attention on corruption.

Byrne, Elaine; Arnold, Anne-Katrin; and Nagano, Fumiko. [Byrne is a columnist with
the Sunday Business Post and an associate lecturer in law at the Institute of Technology,
Carlow. Arnold is a Communications Officer in the World Bank’s External Affairs Op-
erational Communication department. Nagano is a consultant to the Communication

for Governance & Accountability Program and previously worked for the World Bank].
“Building Public Support for Anti-Corruption Efforts,” United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime. 2010.

Another example that shows the importance of working with the media involves the
issue of norms. Petty corruption is furthered by people’s perception that it is absolutely
normal to pay an official for some service that should be provided free of charge by
the state. If people assume that everyone pays bribes and that most people just put up
with the abuse, then petty corruption will become part of everyday life. The smaller
the number of people who protest the practice, the smaller the number of people who
will oppose it or voice their opinions against it. But if people rally together and speak
up against corruption, they create a climate of opinion against it. And if they speak up
loud enough, more and more people will join them because they won’t want to be iso-
lated as outsiders who support bribery. Eventually, the climate of opinion will become
the dominant stance—open opposition to corruption will become public opinion. Only
by mobilizing public opinion can anticorruption agencies create the conditions neces-
sary for systemic change. Defined as the rethinking and restructuring of systems in an
interconnected way, systemic change involves four different stages: selfpreservation,
development of awareness, active reflection, and acceptance of risk.

2.1.12 AT: Most Catalonians Don’t Want Independence

Removed Catalan President Puigdemont still enjoys widespread support.

Although he has been greatly demonised in the Spanish press, Puigdemont comes from
a political tradition that makes pacts. But he is also in a coalition that sees an opportunity
that may not come again for generations. According to an opinion poll for the December
election, Puigdemont could, if he is lucky, be returned to power with the same coalition
as he has now.

Recent events have increased support for independence.

Tiobin, Colm. [Irish author and the Leonard Milberg lecturer at Princeton University].
“Colm Tóibín: ‘Why shouldn’t Catalonia be an independent state within Europe?’ ” The
Guardian. 3 November 2017.
In the same poll, support in Catalonia for complete independence from Spain has risen
seven points (from June 2017) to 48.7%, while opposition to independence has dropped
six points to 43%. Puigdemont, who is fighting for his life, has to do nothing more in
this campaign than what he has already been doing – quietly, rationally and peacefully
making the case for secession. Should his coalition win the election, he can come back
to Catalonia and face arrest with equanimity. He will be operating from an unassailable
position. He can dream of standing on the balcony where Tarradellas stood in 1977 and
giving an even better speech, a calmer one, one that will make clear that he belongs to
a European political mainstream, one in which he wishes to be allowed to take part in
full, as prime minister of an independent Catalan republic. Rajoy, on the other hand,
who has been using coercion rather than argument in Catalonia, might be wise to soften
his tone. Since he has dissolved the Catalan autonomous government in a region (or a
country? or a nation?) in which the vast majority, including those who don’t support
independence, want much greater autonomy, then his representatives in Catalonia, in-
cluding the police, will have to be careful not to throw their weight around in the next
six weeks.

The pro-independence party ERC is currently in the lead.

Jones, Sam. [Madrid correspondent for the Guardian]. “The Catalan regional election –
everything you need to know,” The Guardian. 13 November 2017.
A recent poll for Barcelona-based newspaper La Vanguardia suggested the ERC could
win 45 or 46 seats and the PDeCat 14 or 15. That would leave them needing the CUP’s
help to reach the 68-seat threshold. Another poll - for the conservative newspaper La
Razón - showed pro-independence parties would capture the most votes though still
fall three seats short of a majority.

The leftwing Catalunya en Comu party looks likely to play the decisive role.

Burgen, Stephen. [Freelance correspondant for the Guardian, writing from Barcelona].
“Catalonia poll vow: if elected I’ll use first 100 days to unravel independence row,” The

Guardian. 29 November 2017.

According to the polls published so far, Catalonia’s pro- and anti-independence parties
are running neck and neck in the run-up to the 21 December election. Ciutadans are
only about one percentage point behind Esquerra Republicana (Republican Left), whose
leader, Oriol Junqueras, is in jail remanded on charges of rebellion. The two are polling
at about 25% while Together for Catalonia, the party of the deposed president Carles
Puigdemont, trails the anti-independence socialist party in fourth place with about 13%.
On current figures, coalitions of pro- or anti-independence parties would be tied on 46%,
leaving the leftwing Catalunya en Comú as a potential, though unlikely, kingmaker.

Catalunya en Comu partnered with the Podemos party for the December elections,
and they support a binding referendum.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

Still, the hope for political renewal remains strongest in the three bilingual regions that
have long had their own national identity: Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country.
In all three regions, the presence of nationalist parties since the transition to democracy
meant that the two-party system never fully took hold. It is there, too, that Podemos and
its allies have made their deepest inroads, leaving the country’s two major parties, PSOE
and the PP, with barely more than a residual presence. For the December 21 elections in
Catalonia, Podemos has joined Catalunya en Comú (“Catalonia in Common”), founded
last year by Barcelona mayor and former anti-eviction activist Ada Colau, and headed
up by Xavier Domènech, a charismatic historian from the Autonomous University of
Barcelona. Although “Els Comuns” are being outpolled by the pro-independence ERC
and PDeCAT, they may well end up playing a key role in the formation of a regional
government if the pro-independence bloc falls short of a parliamentary majority. With
their focus on the economy, they are well-placed to siphon progressive votes from two
of the three pro-independence parties, ERC and CUP. Electoral success would allow
Domènech and Colau to push the focus away from independence and toward the econ-
omy. It also may put into play what they see as the only political solution to the national
question: a binding referendum.

2.1.13 AT: Spanish Citizens Do Not Support Catalonian Independence

Everyone has a right to self-determination.

Underrepresented Nations & People’s Organization. “Self-determination,” Underrep-

resented Nations & People’s Organization. 21 September 2017.

All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. UNPO’s Members are indigenous peoples, minorities, unrecognised
States and occupied territories that have joined together to promote their right to
self-determination, while also defending their political, social and cultural rights and
preserving their environments. What is Self-determination? Essentially, the right to
self-determination is the right of a people to determine its own destiny. In particular,
the principle allows a people to choose its own political status and to determine its
own form of economic, cultural and social development. Exercise of this right can
result in a variety of different outcomes ranging from political independence through
to full integration within a state. The importance lies in the right of choice, so that
the outcome of a people’s choice should not affect the existence of the right to make a
choice. In practice, however, the possible outcome of an exercise of self-determination
will often determine the attitude of governments towards the actual claim by a people
or nation. Thus, while claims to cultural autonomy may be more readily recognized
by states, claims to independence are more likely to be rejected by them. Nevertheless,
the right to self-determination is recognized in international law as a right of process
(not of outcome) belonging to peoples and not to states or governments.

What’s important is what Catalonians want because self-determination is enshrined

in international law.

Underrepresented Nations & People’s Organization. “Catalonia Has a Right to Self-

Determination,” Underrepresented Nations & People’s Organization. 22 September
2017.

This conflict is now becoming an issue of an attack on basic rights, including freedom of
assembly, speech and the press, and less about different concepts of democracy. Spain’s
King Felipe has called for political dialogue and for the Spanish Government to listen
to the voice of the people. On 20 September 2017, UNPO joined Catalan supporters at
the Schuman square in Brussels to protest the violations of the Spanish Government

and raise our voice in defending Catalonia’s self-determination. In Barcelona, thou-

sands of people gathered to protest outside of Catalonia’s judiciary body to demand
the release of the officials arrested in connection with the planned referendum. On this
occasion, UNPO strongly condemns the Spanish Government’s actions in violating the
basic freedoms and values. UNPO also welcomes the Catalan Government’s right to a
referendum on independence planned for 1 October 2017 and their self-determination.
Self-determination is enshrined in international treaties, including the United Nations
Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR), and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICESCR. Self-determination
is the legal right of a people to decide their own destiny, its form of political organization
and their relation to other groups.

More Catalonian citizens support independence than support unity.

In the same poll, support in Catalonia for complete independence from Spain has risen
seven points (from June 2017) to 48.7%, while opposition to independence has dropped
six points to 43%. Puigdemont, who is fighting for his life, has to do nothing more in
this campaign than what he has already been doing – quietly, rationally and peacefully
making the case for secession. Should his coalition win the election, he can come back
to Catalonia and face arrest with equanimity. He will be operating from an unassailable
position.

2.1.14 AT: Spain Should Negotiate with Catalonia Instead

The heated crisis has made it hard for moderate politicians to influence the
conversation.

Vicente, Adrien [Writer for Agence France-Presse (AFP), an international news agency
headquartered in Paris, France]. “ANALYSIS Crisis in Catalonia: what happens next?,”
3 October 2017.

After five years of a dialogue of the deaf between Madrid and Catalonia, the two sides
could try to restart talks to reach a compromise that grants Catalonia a special status

within Spain with much more power over taxation and other matters. Puigdemont
called for “international mediation” to solve the crisis without clarifying what he ex-
pected from it. But Simon said it was “very difficult to see how the moderates in both
camps” could impose their ideas now that the issue had become so heated. Bartomeus
was also pessimistic, saying the PP had become “trapped in a hardline discourse that
does not take them anywhere.”

The crisis has polarized opinions so that moderate positions have little public
support.

Faber, Sebastiaan and Seguín, Bécquer. [Sebastiaan Faber is a professor of Hispanic

But Podemos’s middle-of-the-road position, too, would likely punish the party at the
ballot box were a national election to be held anytime soon. The Catalan crisis, fueled
by a politicized media, has polarized opinion around issues that for many in Spain
are deeply emotional. Any political stance that falls somewhere between strongly pro-
independence and strongly anti-independence has little galvanizing power.

Catalonian separatists are no longer interested in fiscal concessions.

Minder, Raphael. [Spain and Portugal correspondent for The New York Times]. “Cat-
alonia Showdown Tests Spanish Leader’s Instinct for Survival,” The New York Times.
22 September 2017.

But in 2012, in the midst of Spain’s banking crisis, Mr. Rajoy rejected a request from Cat-
alonia’s regional government to negotiate better fiscal terms for a region that accounts
for almost a fifth of Spain’s economy. The leadership of the main conservative party of
Catalonia then joined the drive to split from Spain. Five years later, Catalan leaders are
saying that they are no longer interested in tax concessions but want to manage their
own state. The separatists hold most of the seats in their regional parliament (without
having won a majority of votes). Opinion polls show support for independence wan-
ing, but a majority in favor of voting over Catalonia’s future. “Rajoy’s focus has always
been on keeping the loyalty of his own electorate, based on the rule of law but now also
with the use of more force in Catalonia,” said Jaime Pastor, a Madrid-based professor of

politics at UNED, a distance-learning university. “That can perhaps help keep him in
power in the short term, but it can only deepen the territorial fracture of Spain.” Indeed,
Spain’s main opposition Socialist party, which had backed Mr. Rajoy’s stance toward
Catalonia, now appears less certain in its support.

The former leaders of the Catalan government are not willing to give ground.

Smith-Spark, Laura and Cotovio, Vasco. [Reporters for CNN]. “Catalonia crisis:
Crowds urge dialogue to break independence deadlock,” CNN. 7 October 2017

Mercè Remolí, 64, a retired journalist, told CNN the protesters were dressing in white
to avoid “flags taking over the conversation.” The referendum, ruled illegal by the
country’s highest court, has stoked fierce divisions in Catalonia and across Spain, with
neither the Catalan regional government nor the government in Madrid willing to give
ground.

3.0.1 Economics

A loss of jobs and GDP would result

Bosch, Sofia. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-Catalonia split could really be,”
CNBC. September 21, 2017.

The short-term outcomes of separation would be negative for both parties, according to
Alain Cuenca, an economics professor at the University of Zaragoza in Spain. “The es-
tablishment of a border would result in a loss of jobs, income and wealth for everybody,
whether they live in Catalonia or in the rest of Spain,” Cuenca told CNBC via email.
“Those losses would be provoked by the obstacles to trade, by financial problems, by
the spending needs of the new state.” While Catalans only account for about 16 percent
of the Spanish population, Catalonia makes a hefty contribution to the overall Spanish
economy, making 223.6 billion euros ($262.96 billion) a year, according to the regional
government. This is around 20 percent of its total gross domestic product (GDP). Larger
than the contribution that California makes to the whole United States. Using figures
from official European and Catalonian organizations, Business Insider claimed earlier
this year that the region would quickly gain about 16 billion euros yearly in the case of
a split, as they would no longer have to pay taxes to Spain. This would then result in a
loss of about 2 percent to the Spanish GDP (gross domestic product) yearly.

Catalonia is Spain’s powerhouse for exports, foreign investment, and corporations

No author. “Can Spain’s economy survive a Catalan secession?,” Al Jazeera. September

30, 2017.

Catalonia is by far Spain’s top exporting region, with 25 percent of all goods produced
there sold abroad last year and in the first quarter of 2017. It attracted some 14 percent
of foreign investment in Spain in 2015, in second place after Madrid, which received a

huge 64 percent, but far ahead of all the other regions, according to the economy min-
istry’s latest data. Several large companies have their headquarters in Catalonia’s capi-
tal, Barcelona: textile group Mango, Spain’s third-largest bank CaixaBank, Gas Natural,
highway giant Abertis or perfume firm Puig, which owns Nina Ricci, Paco Rabanne and
Jean-Paul Gaultier.

Spain would lose out on the source of 20% of its GDP

McRae, Hamish. [associate editor of The Independent and Business and Finance Jour-
nalist of the Year in 2006]. “The Catalan independence referendum is a much bigger
issue for the EU than Brexit,” The Independent. September 30, 2017.
For most of us, Catalonia is Barcelona, the glittering planned capital, host of the
Olympics in 1992, the event that brought the city to the world stage, and home to the
Sagrada Familia, Antoni Gaudi’s huge and still unfinished cathedral. Actually it is
much more. The region is an economic powerhouse, in effect subsidising the rest of the
country. Its 7.5 million people, some 16 per cent of the population of Spain, generate
nearly 20 per cent of the country’s GDP. Were it a country it would rank in economic
size somewhere between Denmark and Finland. As for Barcelona itself, its port is
the biggest in the Mediterranean, and the fourth largest cruise ship destination in the
world. It also has two of the top business schools in the world, ESADE and IESE, and a
tradition of business competence.

Businesses are already preparing to leave Catalonia.

Smith, Lydia. [Reporter for The Independent]. “Catalonia crisis could spark ‘civil war’
in Europe, EU commissioner warns” The Independent. October 2017. Catalan busi-
nesses are considering moving out of the region due to the threat of an impending inde-
pendence declaration and the region’s political stability, with Barcalona-based Sabadell
bank already announcing plans to move its head office to the city of Alicante. Spain’s
third-largest lender Caixabank has said its board will meet on Friday to consider trans-
ferring its legal base out of Catalonia to the Balearic Islands.

Catalonian per capita incomes would decrease by 20%.

Plumer, Brad. [Reporter for The Washington Post]. “What would happen if Catalonia
seceded from Spain?” The Washington Post. November 2012.

All told, Credit Suisse estimates that Catalonia’s GDP would fall by as much as 20 per-
cent if it seceded, as businesses fled and trade with the rest of Spain suffered. “A 20% fall
in Catalonia’s per capita income would leave Catalonia falling below the wealth level
of the remainder of Spain,” the report estimates. “And this is not taking into account
the likely effects coming from capital flight, financial instability and the introduction of
a new currency.”

Catalonia will incur significant debt, have difficulty finding a currency, and
experience brain drain.

Runde, Daniel. [Director of the Project on US Leadership and Development at the Cen-
ter for Strategic and International Studies]. “Catalonia and the Costs of Independence,”
Forbes. April 8, 2015.

President Artur Mas, the Prime Minister of Catalonia, is visiting the U.S. this week to
push an independence agenda. His efforts to split Catalonia from Spain should be more
than a niche news story here in the United States. At a time when Europe is in signifi-
cant political and financial turmoil, President Mas’ aspiration to create an independent
Catalan state should be viewed with considerable skepticism. The reality is that an in-
dependent Catalonia would face a messy divorce from Spain. Under any independence
agreement Catalonia’s economy would take a serious hit—Catalans would have to as-
sume a significant part of Spain’s debt. This challenge would be further complicated by
the need to find a currency other than the Euro, as Spain would veto Catalan member-
ship in the monetary union. For that reason alone, not to mention political uncertainty,
there would be a likely exodus of multinational and Spanish companies to other regions
in Spain. An independent Catalonia would have a hard time getting NATO member-
ship for the same reasons.

Independence would catalyze uncertainty around consumers, businesses, and

foreign investment to the region

Martin, Will. “A Catalan split from Spain could be even worse than Brexit,” Business
Insider. October 2, 2017.

“As with Brexit, we believe that any Catalexit would plunge the region into a long pe-
riod of uncertainty and would most probably be negative for the private sector,” the

ING economist Geoffrey Minne wrote in a note titled “Catalonia: the cost of being sin-
gle.” The movement for Catalan independence is largely a political one, with campaign-
ers arguing that for Catalonia to prosper and maintain its traditions the region must be
separate from Spain. ING, however, is focusing on the economics of a Catalexit. A fall
in consumption among Catalan households is the most obvious and immediate likely
impact of Catalan secession, ING says. “The starting point when analysing the effect of
Catalexit on consumer behaviour is the uncertainty it generates,” the note argued. “A
recent poll conducted by Metroscopia showed that 62% of respondents in Catalonia said
they were ‘worried’ about the future of their region, compared to 31% who said they
were ‘excited’.”There is only one step between worries and precautionary saving and
if about two-thirds of all consumers decide to moderate consumption then this would
dent private demand. If worries turn into panic then there could also be a run on the
banks and capital controls.” Consumer uncertainty would be followed by uncertainty
around business investments in the region, Minne suggested, saying: “For business
investment, uncertainty might even be more important than for consumers as any per-
ception of political instability could affect foreign investment far more than local invest-
ment.”

Catalonia’s economy could shrink by 25 to 30 percent

Bosch, Sofia. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-Catalonia split could really be,”
CNBC. September 21, 2017.

At the same time, Catalonia could take a potential hit, as 35.5 percent of Catalan exports
are to the Spanish market. Catalonia would also have pay to create new state structures
(embassies, central banks, etc.) which carry a large price tag. Earlier this month, Spanish
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos claimed that Catalonia could see its economy shrink
by 25 to 30 percent and its unemployment double if it splits to form a separate state.
Regardless, the fate of both nations would ultimately come down to the decisions made
in post-separation negotiations on debt and the European Union.

The price of imported goods would increase and result in job losses

Kottasova, Ivana. “Spain loses 20% of its economy if Catalonia splits,” CNN Money.
October 2, 2017.

Dropping out of bloc would likely raise the cost of exporting goods produced in Catalo-
nia to EU members and other nations. “It would join the small list of countries that are
not World Trade Organization members, meaning it would face significant trade bar-
riers,” said Stephen Brown, an economist at Capital Economics. Brown said the move
would increase the price of imported goods in Catalonia and result in job losses. In-
dependence could also make it more expensive for the region’s government to borrow.
Credit ratings agencies Moody’s and S&P both downgraded Catalonia’s debt rating in
2016.

Catalan businesses are concerned about political stability

Smith, Lydia. “Catalonia crisis could spark civil war in Europe, EU commissioner
warns,” The Independent. October 6, 2017.

“If a referendum were to be organised in line with the Spanish Constitution it would
mean that the territory leaving would find itself outside of the European Union,” the
statement read. Catalan businesses are considering moving out of the region due to the
threat of an impending independence declaration and the region’s political stability,
with Barcalona-based Sabadell bank already announcing plans to move its head office
to the city of Alicante. Spain’s third-largest lender Caixabank has said its board will
meet on Friday to consider transferring its legal base out of Catalonia to the Balearic
Islands.

Businesses are already leaving Catalonia

Erickson, Amanda. “Since Catalonia’s independence vote, 2700 businesses have left,”
Sydney Morning Herald. December 1, 2017.

In theory, independence was supposed to make the region more prosperous. But the
October referendum - and Spain’s subsequent takeover - has left businesses nervous.
Since the vote, more than 2,700 firms have moved their headquarters from the region,
according to Spain’s commercial registrar’s office, the Agence France-Presse reported.
That list includes major banks such as Caixabank and Sabadell, along with small and
medium firms. Many of these shifts are administrative. But they may be the first step
to relocating staff and production. As AFP explains: “While tensions have eased some-
what since Spain’s central government last month took direct control of the Northeast

region and has scheduled regional elections in December, many businesses in Catalonia
still feel the need to guard against uncertainty.”

Trade relations will suffer from not being a member of the World Trade
Organization

Henley, Jon. [European Affairs correspondent]. “An independent Catalonia: practical-

ities of leaving Spain,” The Guardian. October 9, 2017.

An independent Catalonia would need to set up its own trading standards regulators
and to start negotiating its own trade agreements. Unlike Britain, it is not a member
of the World Trade Organisation, putting it at an instant disadvantage. Like British
nationals, Catalans would lose their EU citizenship – but also their Spanish citizenship:
if Madrid really plays it tough, they could conceivably find themselves having to apply
for visas to visit not just the EU but also Spain. As Britain’s experience with Brexit shows,
leaving the EU is not a straightforward process. An independent Catalonia, however,
would face an altogether greater problem: it would also have to exit the eurozone, at
least temporarily.

The diversity of the pro-independence group will make establishing a stable

economy difficult

Khan, Mehreen. [Brussels correspondent]. “The economics of Catalan secession,” Fi-

nancial Times. October 6, 2017.

The secessionist threat will also shine a light on just what kind of economic policies
any independent region would pursue, given the disparate groups that back indepen-
dence, from anti-capitalist anarchists to centre-right nationalists. “The liberals want less
bureaucracy, the middle class wants less regulation and the anarchists want a socialist
dream of a leftist participatory democracy,” adds Mr Otero. And for all its perceived
economic divergence from the rest of Spain, Catalonia is hardly immune from deep-
seated structural issues that have beset the country as a whole. As this data crunching
from the FT shows, inequality and unemployment may be lower than the national aver-
age, but are far from solved. Catalonia’s youth unemployment engulfs over a third of
its young people.

Independence would cause consumer uncertainty.

Martin, Will. [Correspondent for Business Insider]. “A Catalan split from Spain could
be even worse than Brexit,” Business Insider. October 2017.

A fall in consumption among Catalan households is the most obvious and immediate
likely impact of Catalan secession, ING says. “The starting point when analysing the
effect of Catalexit on consumer behaviour is the uncertainty it generates,” the note ar-
gued. “A recent poll conducted by Metroscopia showed that 62% of respondents in
Catalonia said they were ‘worried’ about the future of their region, compared to 31%
who said they were ‘excited’.”There is only one step between worries and precaution-
ary saving and if about two-thirds of all consumers decide to moderate consumption
then this would dent private demand. If worries turn into panic then there could also
be a run on the banks and capital controls.”

Unemployment could double.

Bosch, Sophia. [Correspondent for CNBC]. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-
Catalonia split could really be,” CNBC. September 2017.

3 out of 4 Spanish business owners predict Catalonian independence to harm the

regional economy.

Harel, Victor. [Israel Ambassador to Spain]. “Economic impact of ‘Catalexit’ could

affect the likes of Volkswagen and Nestle” Europe Business Review. September 2017.

Volkswagen has three sizeable plants in the region for its SEAT brand, employing
over 14,000 workers, while US conglomerate Cargill has its Spanish headquarters in
Barcelona, as well as several plants in the wider area. Nestle and Airbnb also have
bases there and experts believe the economic uncertainty could match that of the United
Kingdom following the Brexit vote. “As with Brexit, we believe that any Catalexit
would plunge the region into a long period of uncertainty and would most probably be

negative for the private sector,” said ING economist Geoffrey Minne. Recent research
by El Pais also revealed that three out of four directors of Spanish businesses believe
that independence would be detrimental to the national economy.

Independence would harm startups and small businesses.

Diaz, Jesus. [Contributor for Fast Company]. “You Can’t Support Catalonia’s Secession
Movement If You Were Horrified By Brexit” Fast Company. October 2017.

Being out of the European Union means that these companies would have trouble ex-
porting their products and services, as they would be subject to custom taxes. It would
also limit their ability to hire people, something that is already affecting startups in
Barcelona. While some businesspeople keep their faith in the future of the city as a main
technological hub in the continent, no matter what happens, others feel that they may
have to leave. Just today, it was announced that the Catalan situation has diminished
the country’s growth forecast for 2018.

Catalonia would not have a budget surplus if they seceded.

Lacalle, Daniel. [PHD Economist and Fund Manager]. “Catalonia’s Independence

Threat Is Bad for Spain (And Catalonia)” Daniellacalle. October 2017.

Catalonia does not have a budget surplus if it secedes. Its outlays exceed 60 billion
euros a year without considering all new areas that would have to be created, and its
own estimate of “tax revenue capacity” is just 42 billion. The 18-billion-euro financing
gap would be impossible to finance under a credit event of this magnitude, leading
to tax increases beyond what is already one of the highest tax wedges in Spain, and
budget cuts. Fiscal balances are not a cash concept, just an estimate of outlays versus
financing capacity. Separatists make a massively optimistic assumption of their excess
contribution to Spain, ignoring the cost of many contributions to administration and
international entities and overestimating the tax revenues generated in the region by
counting with all the taxes paid by multinationals based in Catalonia. Catalonia does
contribute, but less than half what the region of Madrid does.

It would be incredibly difficult for Catalonia to fight corporate corruption.

Madongo, Irene. [University of Westminster]. “Catalonia: Independence would create

‘mammoth’ tasks for banking, anti-money laundering compliance,”KYC360. October
2017.

Spain also has relatively strong measures to tackle financial crime such as money laun-
dering and terrorism financing.The Financial Action Task Force’s 2014 evaluation of
Spain found it has “up-to-date laws and regulations and sound institutions for com-
batting such threats, in particular a strong financial intelligence unit.” Generally, an
independent Catalonia would still likely seek to be part of the single market and com-
ply with EU legislation. However, it would be a ‘mammoth’ task ahead as it would
need to draft a whole raft of laws, said Nicholas Ryder, financial crime professor at the
University of the West of England, Bristol. An independent Catalonia would also have
to ensure that compliance and enforcement aspects, such as its suspicious transaction re-
porting regime, financial intelligence unit and mutual evaluation teams are all in place
and there’s a sound legal framework, he explained It would also want to abide by laws
such as the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive as well as EU and UN sanctions,
but “an important question is if they will have the resources to keep up with and also
implement these AML and sanctions regimes?” he said.

Catalonia secession would reduce anti-poverty programs in Spain.

Studebaker, Benjamin. [PhD candidate in Politics and International Studies at the Uni-
versity of Cambridge]. “The Left-Wing Case Against Catalan Independence” Benjamin-
studebaker. September 2017.

In the Catalan case, an independent Catalonia would mean that the Spanish government
would have less tax revenue to redistribute to poor and working people in places like
Andalusia. It would aid and abet right-wing Spanish governments in their quest to
shrink the Spanish welfare state and erode the hard-won rights of Spanish workers.
It would also deprive left-wing Spanish movements of much-needed votes. In the last
Spanish election, Catalonia was one of just two regions in Spain to deny Rajoy’s People’s
Party a plurality. Nationally the People’s Party won 33% of the vote, but in Catalonia
they managed just 13%. The poor and working people of Spain need the solidarity of
Catalonia if they are to rid themselves of Rajoy. They’ve been very close before–in 2015
Rajoy’s party managed only 28% and was forced to form a minority government.

Economic uncertainty lies in what policies an independent Catalonia would adopt.

Chapman, Anthony. [Journalist]. “The economics of Catalan secession” The Financial

Times. September 2017.

Spain’s economic growth is actually outpacing Catalonia’s.

Chapman, Anthony. [Journalist]. “The economics of Catalan secession” The Financial

Times. September 2017.

Catalonia’s economy has tended to grow at a faster rate than that of the Spanish econ-
omy as a whole but Spain overtook it this year for the first time since 2010. According to
its latest projections, the International Monetary Fund expects Spanish GDP to expand
by a healthy 3.1 per cent this year, driven by services and newly competitive export
sectors.

Economic consequences would exceed Brexit, Catalonia is completely depended on

Spain.

Madongo, Irene. [University of Westminster]. “Catalonia: Independence would create

‘mammoth’ tasks for banking, anti-money laundering compliance,”KYC360. October
2017.

The difference between Catalexit and Brexit is that Britain has the structure and capacity
to negotiate, including a well-established banking industry and advanced legal systems,
Kaunert said, “Catalan does not have this. It has to create everything from scratch – all
its capacity is basically in Spain, its capacities are in Madrid.” Last week, an economist at
Dutch bank ING reportedly said Catalonia breaking away from Spain would place the
region into uncertainty and could end up having negative effects that “proportionally
exceed” those of Brexit.

Even the prospect of Catalexit devalues the euro.

Kottasova, Ivana. [Reporter for CNN Money]. “Spain loses 20% of its economy if Cat-
alonia splits” CNN Money. September 2017.

“As with Brexit, we believe that any Catalexit would plunge the region into a long pe-
riod of uncertainty and would most probably be negative for the private sector,” ING
economist Geoffrey Minne wrote in a research note. Kathleen Brooks, the research di-
rector at City Index, said a referendum win for the separatists could cause the euro to
decline by as much as 5%. The European currency was down about 0.3% against the
dollar in morning trading in Asia on Monday.

Catalexit will have a worse impact on the Eurozone than Grexit.

Winkler, Matt. [Journalist]. “ ‘Catalexit’ is Is More Devastating to the Eurozone Than

‘Grexit’ ” Nasdaq. October 2017.

Catalonia accounts for 21% of Spanish GDP and about 16% of its population. Cut that
tax revenue out of Spain’s budget and a spike in Spanish interest rates is likely. If and
when Catalonia’s $255 billion annual GDP gets cut out of the national figures, Spain’s
debt to GDP ratio will skyrocket and attention will shift once again to Italy, Greece,
Portugal and Ireland, the weakest and most indebted of Eurozone countries. So far, the
European Commission is staying out of the issue and is hinting the vote was illegitimate,
and the reason is clear. The EU has a vested interest in keeping Barcelona and Madrid
together because it knows the dangers a divided Iberian peninsula would mean for the
eurozone and the EU. They know Catalexit would be mathematically more serious than
Grexit, aside from the fact the power centers of the EU are still reeling from Brexit, which
is still in the midst of being negotiated.

Much of Catalonia’s infrastructure is provided by Spain.

Henley, John. [Contributor for The Guardian]. “An independent Catalonia: the practi-
calities of leaving Spain” The Guardian. October 2017.

But an independent Catalonia would need to establish its own central bank, inland rev-
enue, air traffic control and defence force, all of which are currently run from Madrid
– as are electricity and gas transportation and distribution. The region’s telephone net-
works are run by major Spanish and foreign operators and also regulated from Madrid.

Its airports are 51% owned by the Spanish state, and its railway tracks and rolling stock
are operated by the state. Catalonia’s government debt as a proportion of GDP has
more than tripled since 2009, standing at €76.7bn at the end of June. Its low credit rat-
ing means it cannot borrow directly on financial markets so depends on loans from the
Spanish state. Outside the EU, Catalonia would also have to establish its own border
controls and customs service. The borders between Catalonia, Spain and France would
become external borders of both the EU and the passport-free Schengen zone.

Catalonia has bad credit and too much debt.

Madongo, Irene. [University of Westminster]. “Can Spain’s economy survive a Catalan

secession?,”Al Jazeera. September 2017.

Catalonia’s debt represents 35.4 percent of its GDP, which made it the third-most in-
debted region in Spain in the first quarter of 2017, after Valencia and Castilla La Man-
cha. At the end of June, its debt stood at 76.7 billion euros. Ratings agencies have given
it a low, speculative grade, which means Catalonia is not able to borrow directly on
financial markets. So it depends on loans emitted by the Spanish state.

The European Union doesn’t want an independent Catalonia to join.

Espana, Melissa. [Digital Content Producer at WGNTV]. “EU official says no one will
recognize Catalonia,” WGNTV. October 2017.

Officials in Europe are speaking out against Catalonia’s declaration of independence.

European Union President Jean-Claude Juncker, speaking from French Guyana, said
“there isn’t room in Europe for other fractures or other cracks. We’ve had enough of
those.” Juncker said the EU wants “to respect the Spanish constitutional and legal order.
We are not in favor of letting Europe develop so that tomorrow we’d have 95 member
states. Twenty-eight is enough for now.” Greece also expressed concern Saturday about
Catalonia’s independence bid, saying it supports Spain’s territorial integrity.

Catalonia would immediately leave the EU if it became independent.

Jones, Sam. [Correspondent for The Guardian]. “Catalonia independence declaration

would not be recognized says France,” The Guardian. October 2017.

Loiseau also repeated the European commission’s warning that an independent Cat-
alonia would find itself outside the European Union and obliged to reapply for mem-
bership. “If independence were to be recognised – which is not something that’s being
discussed – the most immediate consequence would be that [Catalonia] automatically
left the European Union.

Catalonian independence harms the EU’s goal of integration

Brinded, Lianna. [Europe News Editor]. “Catalonia has “deepened the cracks” of the
disunity created by the existence of the euro,” Quartz. October 4, 2017.

The European Union created the euro in order to unite as many member states as possi-
ble under one currency. However, according to research by Franz Buscha, Professor of
Economics at Westminster Business School, the currency union has done the complete
opposite and this is only being exacerbated by the turmoil in Catalonia. “The Catalo-
nia referendum has deepened cracks in the EU’s plan for greater integration, driving
debate around identity across the continent. Among the policies implemented in the
earlier days of the EU was the adoption of the euro, intended to provide a common
currency and link the European nations together,” said Buscha.

The Euro could decline as much as 5%

Kottasova, Ivana. “Spain loses 20% of its economy if Catalonia splits,” CNN Money.
October 2, 2017.

The buzzword for investors is uncertainty. “As with Brexit, we believe that any
Catalexit would plunge the region into a long period of uncertainty and would most
probably be negative for the private sector,” ING economist Geoffrey Minne wrote in a
research note. Kathleen Brooks, the research director at City Index, said a referendum
win for the separatists could cause the euro to decline by as much as 5%. The European
currency was down about 0.3% against the dollar in morning trading in Asia on
Monday. A decisive “yes” vote is unlikely to result in Madrid or the EU recognizing
Catalonia as “independent,” according to experts. “The Catalan government will
instead attempt to use a positive referendum result to increase its leverage in future
negotiations with the Spanish government,” said Laurence Allan of IHS Markit.

If Catalonia did join the EU, they would have to take on significantly more debt.

Giugliano, Ferdinando. [Writer for Bloomberg View]. “Catalans Would Pay a High
Price for Independence” Bloomberg View. October 2017.

As it faces a major financial crisis, Catalonia would need to negotiate a new trade deal
with the EU. The EU would likely demand as a precondition that Barcelona takes on
a portion of Spain’s sovereign debt. One option would be for Catalonia to accept an
amount of debt equal to its share of GDP. That solution would leave Spain’s debt-to-
GDP ratio unchanged at around 100 percent, Catalonia’s debt would shoot up from its
current level of roughly 35 percent to nearly 100 percent of its own income (far above
the EU’s admittedly unenforced 60 percent convergence criteria joining the euro zone).
The good news would be that such a split could open the way to a negotiated deal over
market access to the EU and the rest of Spain.

If it’s even possible, joining the EU would take years.

Garcia, Rafael. [President of the Catalan Civil Society]. “Why Catalonia Should Stay
With Spain” The New York Times. May 2017.

We are also worried that such a separation would distance us from the European Union.
Despite the secessionists’ mantra that independence for Catalonia would not lead to
exclusion from the European Union, the practical matter is that if Catalonia became a
new state, it could not be a member of the European Union until the member states
approved its incorporation. That would take years of negotiation, at best — a scenario
of uncertainty and risk that is neither justified nor desirable.

The EU is a crucial trade partner for Catalonia.

Martin, Will. [Correspondent for Business Insider]. “A Catalan split from Spain could
be even worse than Brexit,” Business Insider. October 2017.

Declaring independence from Spain would automatically mean that Catalonia would
have to leave the European Union, which would inevitably cause issues around its mem-
bership of the EU’s single market. “Most foreign companies, as well as Catalan ones,
fear falling out of the European single market,” Minne wrote. “A consequence would
be that investment could be delayed or redirected outside the region.” “Probably the
most impacted companies are those exporting to the EU. The EU accounted for 65% of

exports and 70% of foreign investment in Catalonia over the last three years,” Minne
continued.

Acceptance into the EU relies on the agreement of every other EU member state,
including Spain

Henley, Jon. [European Affairs correspondent]. “An independent Catalonia: practical-

ities of leaving Spain,” The Guardian. October 9, 2017.

The immediate practical consequences of Catalan independence – like those of the UK

crashing out of the EU without a deal – would have far-reaching implications for the
region, its businesses and its people. As with warnings of City firms fleeing a hard
Brexit, industry is already alarmed: half a dozen Spanish companies, including major
banks, are moving their registered head offices to guarantee access to their domestic
and wider EU markets. Despite claims by pro-independence campaigners that the EU
would not want to lose a wealthy region that would rank 15th or 16th in the bloc in
terms of GDP, Brussels has made clear that the region will not automatically become a
member. It would have to apply, and acceptance would require the agreement of every
other EU member state – including Spain, which in 2014 threatened to veto an eventual
Scottish accession bid precisely to discourage Catalan independence.

The EU Commission does not find potential for Catalan to be an EU member

Wildman, Sarah. [Foreign Policy correspondent]. “Why part of Spain is trying to secede
— and why the Spanish government cracked down on it,” Vox. October 2, 2017.

“Beyond the purely legal aspects of this matter, the Commission believes that these are
times for unity and stability, not divisiveness and fragmentation,” the statement read.
That kind of language is meant to put down any notion that an independent Catalonia
would be a formal member of the EU — and to stop other secession movements from
getting similar ideas. If the Catalans won independence, theoretically there would be lit-
tle to stop the Flemish from breaking away from Belgium, or the Corsicans from peeling
off from France. In other words, creating the theoretical nation of Catalonia wouldn’t
simply be a blow to Spain; it would also be a potentially large blow to the territorial
integrity of an array of other EU nations.

3.0.2 Geopolitics

Russia is influencing the Catalonian independence movement.

Badcock, James. [Journalist for The Telegraph]. “EU cyber team raises alarm over Rus-
sian role in Catalonia independence bid,”The Telegraph. November 2017.

Romanian MEP Victor Bostinaru, vice chair of the Social Democratic group in the Eu-
ropean Parliament, on Thursday said he had evidence of Russian interference in the
Catalan crisis. Mr Bostinaru called Catalonia “another case of perverse interference”
by Russian-backed media organisations and hackers with the aim of destabilising the
EU, which has supported Spain in its crackdown on the Catalonian pro-independence
movement. “We mustn’t be naive: behind those words and those slogans favourable to
the independence movement, there are hidden intentions.”

China may try to influence a Catalonian state.

No Author. “The geopolitics of Catalan secession” VilaWeb. September 2017.

Possible Russian interest in Catalonia worries Brussels, but even more so does any pos-
sible Chinese involvement. In this case, the ideological component does not concern
them so much, but the trade threat is much more serious and significant, so much so
that some observers believe that the EU would never let Catalonia escape because hav-
ing the ports of Barcelona and Tarragona at the service of China’s commercial strategy
would be the greatest problem that the EU might face in the near future. The Chinese
government has launched the so-called New Silk Road, an extraordinarily ambitious
project that aims to reconfigure world commerce around Beijing’s interests. This initia-
tive is designed to change the economic structure of the entire world, and has already
had an enormous impact in Asia and Africa. For the moment, its impact in Europe is
limited precisely because of the role of the European Union. As a result, China has only
managed to get a toehold for part of this project in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, and
has obtained some facilities from Greece, which is a far cry from what they hope and
need. An independent Catalonia, with its ports in Barcelona and Tarragona outside of
the EU, would be —in this sense— candy for the Chinese, and would create an absolute
trade nightmare for the European Union.

Catalonia might not be able to join NATO.

Runde, Daniel. [Contributor for Forbes]. “The Case Against Catalan Independence”
Foreign Policy. September 2015.

A secessionist Catalonia would have a very difficult time getting into the European
Union because Spain would veto its entry. An independent Catalonia would have the
same problem with using the Euro. U.S. and other multinational companies that have
operations in Catalonia would likely relocate to different parts of Spain or the EU given
the uncertainty potential secession poses from a business perspective. It is unclear given
NATO enlargement fatigue if an independent Catalonia would be admitted to NATO,
even before considering a near certain veto by Spain.

Catalonian Independence threatens the EU.

Salmon, Jack. [Contributor for The Hill]. “Despite economic might, Catalan indepen-
dence will fail” The Hill. October 2017.

Due to the EU turning a blind eye to the Catalan vote earlier this month, political sepa-
ratists find themselves without allies, both nationally and across the continent. The only
sympathizers that Catalonia can muster at this time are other failed separatist national-
ists, such as those in Scotland. The EU feels deeply threatened by Catalan independence,
as it does by all separatism. If the EU were to endorse, or ignore the idea that people are
better off governing themselves, the supranational case for European integration would
collapse.

Nationalism threatens the European Union.

No Author. “How Nationalism Undermines the European Union” Stratfor Worldview.

May 2015.

Regardless of its shape, any restructuring of the European Union would require a new
treaty. Current European economic optimism is only the result of short-term patterns
— a cheap euro and low oil prices. Structural reforms are needed to boost the economy
in the long run, but member states are unwilling to implement them because they are
unpopular with voters. Consequently, economic prosperity will remain Europe’s main
challenge. The longer Brussels waits, the harder it will be to convince some member

states to engage in integration projects as the prospect of prosperity fades. In the mean-
time, the temptation of nationalism will influence member states to confront Brussels
and repatriate power to their capitals, ultimately meaning the death of the European
Union.

The Catalan independence movement is fueling nationalism in Spain and Europe

Kingsley, Patrick. [International Correspondent for The New York Times]. “Catalonia
Separatism Revives Spanish Nationalism” The New York Times. October 2017.

“Nationalist movements need to feed off each other,” said Joan B. Culla, a Catalan his-
torian. “It’s both unfortunate and normal that the escalation of Catalan nationalism,
particularly in recent days, will fuel a Spanish nationalism that already existed, even if
it seemed to many to have been kept underground.” That latent nationalism has also
begun to resurface outside Spain. One of the ideas behind a European Union, in addi-
tion to economics, was always to absorb and dilute the nationalist impulses that had
fueled the cataclysmic destruction of the Continent in two world wars. Increasingly,
that rationale is being challenged by right-wing, populist and nationalist movements
across Europe. Britain voted last year to leave the bloc. In France, the far-right National
Front entered the final round of the presidential election this year.

Catalonia independence could prevent Spain from competing in The World Cup.

Chapman, Anthony. [Journalist]. “FIFA could suspend Spain from competing in inter-
national football if Barcelona are kicked out of La Liga after Catalan independence” The
Sun. September 2017.

Secession, though, would be a tricky political football for FIFA. If La Liga were to ex-
clude Barcelona in the event of Catalan independence – a move Tebas said would be
required by Spanish law – FIFA could be asked to determine if Spain had breached its
rule against government interference in football. FIFA would have the power to sus-
pend Spain, the 2010 World Cup winners, from competing in international soccer, less
than a year before the 2018 tournament in Russia. A soccer crisis could be avoided if
the law were to be amended, but most Spanish lawmakers are opposed to Catalan inde-
pendence and it is not clear if they would approve that.

Israel would be key to initially financing an independent Catalan

Keinon, Herb. [BA in Political Science from University of Colorado at Boulder]. ‘Amid
Spanish sparring, Israel unlikely to recognize Catalonia,” The Jerusalem Post. October
29, 2017.

In 2014 a Barcelona High Court judge, Santiago Vidal, said in an interview with a Span-
ish magazine that Israel and Germany may be key to initial financing of an independent
Catalan state. Vidal, an advocate of independence, predicted then that an independent
Catalan state could be established in three years through “legal, political and peaceful
means.” He said, however, that without being a member of the EU, this fledgling state
could not get the Central Bank of Europe to finance its debts. “But there is a solution for
this, another state with solvency, basically speaking of Israel and Germany, will serve
as our temporary bank,” he said.

Israel is unlikely to support Catalonia

Keinon, Herb. [BA in Political Science from University of Colorado at Boulder]. ‘Amid
Spanish sparring, Israel unlikely to recognize Catalonia,” The Jerusalem Post. October
29, 2017.

While Israel is unlikely to support Catalonia, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last
month was one of the only leaders in the world to come out in favor of the Iraqi Kurdish
independence moves, which have since been partially quashed. But, as opposed to the
situation in Spain, Jerusalem has a strategic interest in seeing the establishment in the
Middle East of an independent Kurdish state. President Reuven Rivlin is scheduled
to travel to Madrid next Sunday for a three-day visit marking the 30th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and Spain. Jerusalem’s official
position on the Catalonia issue will surely have to be formulated by then. Rivlin, a guest
of King Felipe, is also scheduled to meet Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy during the visit.
Following the referendum on Catalan independence on October 1, Foreign Ministry
spokesman Emmanuel Nahshon, when asked about Israel’s stance on the issue, said,
“We see it as an internal Spanish matter.”

3.0.3 Catalonia Will Not Be Internationally Recognized

France won’t recognize an independent Catalonia

Kester, John. “France Won’t Recognize an Independent Catalonia,” Foreign Policy. Oc-
tober 9, 2017.
France will not recognize Catalonia if it declares independence from Spain, according
to Nathalie Loiseau, the country’s minister of European affairs. “If there were a declara-
tion of independence, it would be unilateral [and] it would not be recognized,” Loiseau
told French news channel CNEWS. If Catalonia were independent, Loiseau cautioned,
“the first consequence is that automatically it would leave the European Union.” Carles
Puigdemont, the president of the wealthy northeastern Spanish region, may declare in-
dependence Tuesday when the Catalan Parliament next meets. That threat comes after
Spanish government forces cracked down on what they viewed as an illegal indepen-
dence referendum held Oct. 1. EU officials have long hinted sotto voce that the laws
of the land are those of member states — meaning Spain’s constitution would prevail
in the dispute. The country’s Constitutional Court declared Catalonia’s bid unconstitu-
tional. But France’s vocal rejection makes clear the perilous path that any independent
Catalonia would have to tread.

No EU state will recognize an independent Catalonia

Pinnington, Rebecca. “ ‘No EU state will recognise Catalonia’ Brussels turns on

Barcelona,” Express. October 28, 2017.
Although the region has declared itself an independent country, it will now need inter-
national recognition to be counted as a state in its own right. An EU legal expert believes
there is no chance any state in the bloc would recognise Catalonia. French legal expert
Jean-Claude Piris, a former legal advisor to the EU Council, said: “What’s important is
recognition by the international community. “Maybe some countries like North Korea
or Venezuela will recognise this independence, but no EU state will.” France, Germany,
the UK, the US and Mexico have all refused to acknowledge Catalan statehood.

The UK, Germany, and US will not recognize an independent Catalonia

Smith-Spark, Laura. [Middle East, Europe, and Africa correspondent]. “Catalonia gov-
ernment dissolved after declaring independence from Spain,” CNN World. October 28,

2018.

The UK and Germany, through government spokesmen, said they would not recognize
Catalonia’s independence declaration. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said
his nation does not recognize the declaration of independence. “France wishes Spain to
be strong and united. It only maintains one partner, which is the Madrid government.
The constitution of Spain must be respected,” Le Drian said in a statement. The United
States also voiced its support for the Madrid government. “Catalonia is an integral part
of Spain, and the United States supports the Spanish government’s constitutional mea-
sures to keep Spain strong and united,” US State Department spokeswoman Heather
Nauert said in a statement.

3.0.4 Democracy/Internal Support

Support for independence is far from universal

Badcock, James. [Journalist for The Telegraph]. “Catalan secessionism is bad for Spain
and Europe,”The Financial Times. November 2017.

There is a world of difference between the abuses committed against Catalonia under
Francisco Franco, the dictator who died in 1975, and the extensive self-government and
individual freedom that the region and its people have enjoyed for the past four decades.
Catalan nationalists purport to speak in the name of the whole people. It is a baseless
claim. In truth, the separatists are driving forward a radical agenda that deeply divides
Catalonian society. This will be evident on Sunday. Large numbers of voters will refuse
to take part in the referendum because they regard it, correctly, as illegal and because
they do not support secession from Spain.

Catalan independence referendum was illegitimate

Varadarajan, Tunku. [Contributor for Politico]. “Catalonia’s ‘kangaroo referendum’

leaves Spain in poisonous gridlock” Politico. October 2017.

This was a kangaroo referendum. There is no other way to describe an exercise where
voters could print ballots at home and vote at any polling booth in all of Catalonia with-
out having to worry about their names appearing on an authenticated voters’ roll. If
there were ever a Platonic ideal of a riggable, manipulable exercise in voting, it was this
separatist simulacrum of democracy, designed to ensure the only result possible was a

majority vote for secession. Even before the tarnished votes were counted, Puigdemont
declared “the citizens of Catalonia have earned the right to have an independent state.”
These are wily words, for they foreclose any debate on the outcome of the referendum
while stopping short of an actual assertion of independence. It is only a matter of time
before such an assertion is made. The Spanish government will not, of course, tolerate
a unilateral declaration of independence when it comes — nor should it.

The pro-independence movements suppresses those who disagree.

Ames, Paul. [Journalist for The PRI]. “Even some of the proudest Catalans worry that
splitting from Spain is a bad idea” PRI. January 2014.

Nevertheless, the Franco era’s legacy runs deep. Many Catalans fear being associated
with those years of oppression if they seek to swim against the separatist tide. “If you
say something in a newspaper or whatever media against the nationalist thesis, you will
start being attacked and insulted in a matter of hours,” says political consultant Xavier
Roig. “They’ll call you Fascist, espanolista [lover of Spain], all sorts of insults.” Roig is a
veteran of the opposition Socialists’ Party of Catalonia, whose official line opposes inde-
pendence. He contends that the main separatist parties discourage dissent by keeping
a firm grip on much of the region’s media and civil society. “There is a terrible pressure
exerted on public opinion on the part of the Catalan government,” he said in an inter-
view. In the current mood, Roig says, speaking out against secession can jeopardize
Catalans’ job security and business opportunities.

There’s never been a majority support for independence

Lacalle, Daniel. [PHD Economist and Fund Manager]. “Catalonia’s Independence

Threat Is Bad for Spain (And Catalonia)” Daniellacalle. October 2017.

The rising risk in Catalonia poses significant risks to what is already a promising re-
covery of the Spanish economy. Unfortunately, the separatist movement has decided
to call an illegal referendum, in a region that already enjoys more independent powers
and more autonomy than any other in the European Union. The referendum is illegal
because it is against a constitution that was voted by a wide majority, in fact 90% voted
in favour in Catalonia itself. It also goes against the laws of a democratic country and
has been called against the mandate to defend the constitution and represent the nation
of the members of the regional government. It is worth reminding that Catalonia enjoys

the highest autonomy level of any region in the EU, and has voted more than 35 times
in regional elections where the separatist parties have never gained more than 40% of
the votes combined.

Pro-independence politicians aren’t predicted to win a majority in the upcoming

election.

Reuters Staff. [They work for Reuters]. “Catalan separatists to lose majority in tight
election; poll” Reuters. December 2017.

Catalonia’s independence movement could suffer a serious setback in elections this

month, according to a poll published on Sunday, which suggests separatist parties will
narrowly fail to secure a majority in the regional parliament. The three parties which
supported Catalonia’s frustrated push to split from Spain in October are seen as return-
ing a total of 66 or 67 seats in the Dec. 21 election, just shy of the 68 seats they would
need to control the regional parliament, according to the poll in Spanish newspaper La
Vanguardia.

Anti independence protests are just as big as pro-independence ones.

Reuters Staff. [They work for Reuters]. “Thousands against Catalan secession” The
Financial Times. December 2017.

Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Barcelona on Sunday to urge that
Catalonia remain part of Spain, adding to pressure on the Catalan regional government
as it considers whether to declare independence as early as this week. The demonstra-
tions came after Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s prime minister, reiterated his threat to suspend
Catalonia’s autonomy if the region secedes, a sign Madrid has no intention of backing
down from a potential conflict with the pro-independence Catalan government.

Internal support is a prerequisite for independence.

Roden, Lee. [The University of Glasgow]. “This is what could happen if Catalonia
declares independence” The Local. October 2017.

“It’s always important, but before international recognition the most important thing is
internal effectiveness. International recognition can take a while or not, and it could

be major or minor, but the conditions for a state to be independent aren’t really that
it’s recognised internationally, but rather that it’s recognised internally by the citizens
it has to manage and impose law upon,” Vintró argues. “So the issue with a unilateral
declaration of independence isn’t really international recognition – of course it helps –
but what’s more important is that citizens of this new state recognize the new power as
theirs. Do they pay taxes, do they respect the institutions put in place, and do you have
a state with all the elements of state power, capable of consolidating itself?”

Support for independence drops to 48% if the Spanish government doesn’t support
it and is declining in general.

M.R. “Why the referendum on Catalan independence is illegal,” The Economist.

September 26, 2017.

The Catalan government’s own pollster finds that while 70% want a referendum on
the territory’s future, only 48% do if Spanish government doesn’t agree—which it em-
phatically does not. According to the same poll, support for independence is slowly
declining, and now stands at 41%. Mr Rajoy is relying on the courts to stop the refer-
endum, arguing that the rule of law is fundamental to democracy. The Constitutional
Tribunal has suspended the two laws. The Civil Guard arrested 14 senior people, most
of them Catalan officials, involved in organising the referendum, and has seized 9.8m
ballot slips. Mr Puigdemont insists that the vote will go ahead. He is relying on popular
mobilisation: tens of thousands protested against the arrests in Barcelona. But it is hard
to see the vote being anything more than an unofficial consultation, similar to one held
in 2014. Most supporters of “No” side won’t vote. If anything like the 2.3m alleged to
have voted in 2014 were to turn out, Mr Puigdemont would claim victory.

Most polls show a greater percent of Catalonians are against secession

Wildman, Sarah. [Foreign Policy correspondent]. “Why part of Spain is trying to secede
— and why the Spanish government cracked down on it,” Vox. October 2, 2017.

Catalonia’s economic prowess was instrumental in helping Madrid finally recover from
the devastating 2008 economic crisis and the subsequent years spent climbing back out
of that fiscal nightmare. Many Catalans are angry that they funnel more taxes into
Madrid than they receive back in government aid. It got them thinking they’d be better
off as citizens of their own state. And yet, this referendum aside, most polls show that

the region is deeply divided over the question of independence — 41 percent of Cata-
lans say they want a fully independent Catalonia, while just under 50 percent say they
want to remain part of Spain.

The Catalan regional government’s survey showed more against independence than
for it

Mortera-Martinez, Camino. [Research fellow and Brussels representative]. “Crunch

time in Catalonia: Why Spain needs a constitutional overhaul,” Centre for European
Reform. October 4, 2017.

Not all Catalans want independence. A survey carried out in July by the regional gov-
ernment’s Centre of Opinion Studies found 49.9 per cent of voters opposed indepen-
dence, while while 41.1 per cent supported it. Nevertheless, when Carles Puigdemont –
a life-long separatist – became leader of Catalonia’s regional administration in January
2016, with the backing of a handful of like-minded, radical parties, he put independence
firmly on the agenda and set the region on a collision course with Madrid – culminating
in Sunday’s controversial referendum.

Turnout was only 42% for the referendum

Mortera-Martinez, Camino. [Research fellow and Brussels representative]. “Crunch

time in Catalonia: Why Spain needs a constitutional overhaul,” Centre for European
Reform. October 4, 2017.

The Catalan government said about 90 per cent of the 2.2 million people who voted in
the plebiscite backed independence, though the figures have not been independently
verified and turnout was just 42 per cent. But regardless of the result, according to the
Spanish constitution, the referendum was illegal. The Constitutional Court of Spain
ruled against the referendum in early September. Puigdemont’s arguments that a ref-
erendum was justified on the grounds of Catalans’ right to self-determination and a
democratic right to decide do not hold water. Spanish experts on international public
law signed a manifesto explaining that Catalonia did not fulfil the legal criteria to have
a right to self-determination, as Catalans were not being “oppressed, discriminated or
prosecuted by the Spanish state”. But Puigdemont ignored the Court’s ruling and his
government’s own legal advice. He did not ask the Catalan or the Spanish parliament
for their opinion on the referendum either.

100

3.0.5 Civil War

Tensions could create a second Spanish Civil War

Webb, Sam. “How Spain could be ripped apart like the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia
as independence battle rages on,” The Sun. October 25, 2017.

Tension over Catalan independence could spill over into a second Spanish Civil War, a
political expert has warned. The volatile stand-off between Madrid and Catalan sepa-
ratists has chilling echoes with the turmoil that led to the devastating conflict that killed
140,000 people in former Yugoslavia 20 years ago, claims political and military analyst
Sara Plana. The Spanish government plans to take unprecedented control of Catalonia’s
key affairs and halt the region’s push for independence after a partial referendum ear-
lier this month saw violence break out as police dragged voters out of polling stations.
As tension mounted during the day, Spanish cops fired rubber bullets and beat peo-
ple with batons as they tried to disperse crowds gathering to vote. Police also forcibly
dragged people out of polling stations as they tried to vote.

Spain may be willing to go to war to preserve their governance

Webb, Sam. “How Spain could be ripped apart like the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia
as independence battle rages on,” The Sun. October 25, 2017.

In Yugoslavia, wealthy Slovenia and Croatia were angry that they had to share their
money with less well-off regions, Plana writes. The Spanish state may also fear other
separatist movements in Spain – such as the Basque region – could take heart from Cat-
alonia’s boldness. She said: “In perhaps the most alarming parallel to Yugoslavia, a
number of nations within Spain have separatist aspirations, and an independent Cat-
alonia could be just the first of many dominoes to fall. “Catalan independence could
therefore reveal the fragility of the project of Spanish governance, which is why the state
may be willing to go to war to preserve it.” Civil war and violent separatist groups are
hardly new to Spain.

101

3.0.6 Catalonia Is Not Ready for Independence

Catalonia is heavily reliant on Madrid for key infrastructure

Henley, Jon. [European Affairs correspondent]. “An independent Catalonia: practical-

ities of leaving Spain,” The Guardian. October 9, 2017.

Catalonia has much of the paraphernalia of statehood: it has a flag, a parliament, its
own police force and broadcast regulator, and it provides some of its own public ser-
vices such as healthcare and education. But an independent Catalonia would need to
establish its own central bank, inland revenue, air traffic control and defence force, all
of which are currently run from Madrid – as are electricity and gas transportation and
distribution. The region’s telephone networks are run by major Spanish and foreign
operators and also regulated from Madrid. Its airports are 51% owned by the Span-
ish state, and its railway tracks and rolling stock are operated by the state. Catalonia’s
government debt as a proportion of GDP has more than tripled since 2009, standing at
€76.7bn at the end of June. Its low credit rating means it cannot borrow directly on fi-
nancial markets so depends on loans from the Spanish state. Outside the EU, Catalonia
would also have to establish its own border controls and customs service. The borders
between Catalonia, Spain and France would become external borders of both the EU
and the passport-free Schengen zone.

Catalans don’t know how to move forward after the referendum

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

It was a hunger for a kind of recognition. “It’s a question of dignity, a question of re-
spect,” said Esther Vera, the editor-in-chief of Ara, a Catalan-language daily newspaper
that supports the independence cause, but had not wanted this referendum. A copy of
Ara sat on the table. Its lead headline read “We Weren’t Prepared,” above a story in
which Catalan leaders said they hadn’t fully thought through what would happen after
the referendum. “We have not been pragmatic,” Vera said. “The fact of proclaiming
independence was excessively sentimental.”

102

Pro-independence Catalans are disorganized and incoherent

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

There’s little that unites the pro-independence bloc, which contains a confusing mix of
hard-left anti-globalists and free marketeers. “Are we with Milton Friedman or Rosa
Luxembourg?” Xavier Vidal-Folch, a columnist for El País, wondered. The grouping
was incoherent, he said, and naïve. Vidal-Folch’s great-grandfather had translated The
Divine Comedy into Catalan. When he was growing up under Franco, he was forbidden
from speaking the language and is glad his grandchildren grew up speaking it in school.
But he was opposed to independence and worried it was dividing Catalonia and Spain
in dangerous ways.

Spain dissolved Catalonia’s parliament after the referendum

Smith-Spark, Laura. [Middle East, Europe, and Africa correspondent]. “Catalonia gov-
ernment dissolved after declaring independence from Spain,” CNN World. October 28,
2018.

Spain dismissed Catalonia’s president and Cabinet, and dissolved its Parliament on Fri-
day hours after lawmakers in the autonomous region defied Madrid and voted to de-
clare independence. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy called new elections and
fired the Catalan police chief, as part of an unprecedented package of measures to seize
control of the renegade administration in Barcelona. He said the moves were needed to
restore legality, after a political and constitutional crisis that has gripped the country for
months. “In this moment, we need to be serene and careful, but we also need to have
confidence that the state has the tools, backed by the law and reason, [to] peacefully and
reasonably go back to legality and take away threats to democracy,” he said.

Pro-independence support is too low for an independent state to be legitimate or

viable

Ribo, Ignasi. [Catalan writer and lecturer at Mae Fah Luang University]. “To solve
Catalonia, Spain needs a new constitution,” Politico. November 14, 2017.

Madrid’s suspension of Catalan political autonomy and the imprisonment of the re-
gional government is clearly a breach of the 1978 constitutional agreement. The fact

103

that these steps were taken in coordination with the country’s high courts is a definite
sign of Spain’s lack of essential separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.
In recent years, Catalan separatism has grown considerably in reaction to encroaching
state centralism. But the ceiling of pro-independence support seems to have stabilized
at 50 percent of votes — enough to proclaim an independent state, but insufficient to
legitimize or make it viable, especially considering the hostility of a significant minority
of Catalans and a large majority of Spaniards.

The Catalan pro-independence movement could become violent

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

No one I spoke to seemed to know what would unfold. The pro-independence leaders
can’t really walk back the popular sentiment, and if their bloc wins, they’ll have to figure
out how to satisfy their constituents. For now, the pro-independence movement has
been peaceful. “I’m afraid at some point it could not be as peaceful as it has been,”
Esther Vera, the newspaper editor, had told me. Where would the violence come from?
“I don’t want ever to think of it, it is very far from reality,” she said. She was more afraid
that the elections wouldn’t produce a clear majority for or against independence. The
government officials I spoke to in Madrid told me they were confident Spain would sort
things out. Somehow. Two paraphrased the Spanish writer and politician José Ortega
y Gasset, who before the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s had written something that still
rings true today: “The Catalan problem will never be solved, but it will be managed.”

3.0.7 Catalonia is drawing back on claims for independence

The independence movement is unlikely to have any effect

Doubleday, Simon. [Professor of History at Hofstra University]. “A peaceful solution

to the Catalan crisis is possible, but it must address austerity,” The Guardian. October
9, 2017.

It is a paradox deeply embedded in Iberian history. In regions such as Catalonia, Gali-

cia, and the Basque country, simultaneous and competing loyalties have often made
for uneasy bedfellows (and team-mates). Spanish politicians invoke the word “democ-
racy” with a frequency that suggests deep-rooted uncertainty about its longevity and

104

stability. But Piqué’s call for dialogue suggests that these tensions could be contained
and controlled. The independence movement, he claimed, was like the outburst of an
18-year-old threatening to leave home. “If you talk to him,” he suggested, “maybe he
won’t leave.”

Catalonian leader is open to solutions besides complete independence

Reuters staff. “Non-secessionist solution to Catalan crisis possible, says ex leader,”

Reuters. November 13, 2017.

Catalonia’s deposed president said he might consider a solution to Spain’s political cri-
sis that did not involve the region’s secession, appearing to soften the staunchly pro-
independence stance that cost him his leadership last month. In an interview with Bel-
gian daily Le Soir, Carles Puigdemont was asked if a non-secessionist option was on
the table to resolve a crisis triggered when Spain took over control of the region after
its parliament declared independence on Oct. 27. “I‘m ready, and have always been
ready, to accept the reality of another relationship with Spain … It (another solution) is
still possible,” Puigdemont said.

Catalonian leader is walking back on claims to full independence

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

Ahead of the elections, the parties are jostling for position and trying to lay out their plat-
forms. Puigdemont recently gave an interview from Brussels saying he thinks there are
other alternatives to declaring independence, but he didn’t go into detail. This suggests
he’s walking back a bit, or at least open to more dialogue. But from his prison cell out-
side Madrid, Oriol Junqueras, the leader of Esquerra Republicana, continues to call for
independence—and has decided his party won’t run on the same ticket as Puigdemont’s.
It’s hard to keep track of the plot since the actors keep changing their lines. Meanwhile,
the government in Madrid has been calling attention to the economic consequences, the
businesses leaving the region, to make clear that a lot is at stake. It seems to want the
independence movement to fizzle if not collapse under the weight of its own internal
contradictions. “I hope they will not win,” Méndez de Vigo told me. “I hope they’ll pay
in votes for what they’ve done to the Catalonian people. “I hope people will say ‘We
don’t want people to govern us who break the society in half.’ ”

105

Catalonia will need to make concessions to avoid violence

Ribo, Ignasi. [Catalan writer and lecturer at Mae Fah Luang University]. “To solve
Catalonia, Spain needs a new constitution,” Politico. November 14, 2017.

On the other hand, Spanish nationalism — disguised as constitutional patriotism — is

increasingly vocal in its push to turn Spain into a unitary state resembling France. But
history shows that a centralized Spain can only be sustained under an authoritarian
regime that would place the country outside the democratic norms of the European
Union. Given the current demographic and political conditions, neither the Catalan
Republic dreamed up by the independence movement nor the homogenous Spain envi-
sioned by the unionists can take place without recourse to forms of violence that most
people on both sides squarely reject. What is to be done, then? If neither side can impose
its project on the other, both will be forced to make concessions to reach an agreement,
as they did in 1978.

Businesses moving out of Catalonia weakens their case for independence

Khan, Mehreen. [Brussels correspondent]. “The economics of Catalan secession,” Fi-

nancial Times. October 6, 2017.

The second-largest bank based in the region will move its legal HQ out of Catalonia in
the wake of Sunday’s renewed push for independence. Banco de Sabadell’s decision
follows that of biotech group, Oryzon which confirmed its relocation from Barcelona
to Madrid earlier this week. The board of CaixaBank, Spain’s third-largest lender, will
meet on Friday to discuss redomiciling. Markets have responded by sending the share
prices of all three companies surging. High-profile relocations have the potential to
humble Catalonia’s pro-independence government. In its headlong rush for secession,
the region’s leadership has long championed the unique strengths of the Catalan econ-
omy, which is the same size as Portugal’s and makes up a fifth of Spanish GDP.

3.0.8 Spillover

Catalonian secession would set a dangerous example for the rest of Europe

Editorial Board. “The Catalan vote: which consequences for Spain and European
Union?,” Mediterranean Affairs. December 5, 2014.

106

It is well known that this northern region accounts for one fifth of Spain’s economic
output, therefore secession could bring disastrous consequences for one of the countries
most affected by the debt crisis. Solidarity seems needed now more than ever. EU is
facing a moment of dramatic economic instability and the solution could be a stronger
unity and a reinforced cooperation between Member States and between regions within
the Member States. Catalonia’s secession could encourage other European regions to
follow its example, leading to a balkanization of Europe.

There are many other regions that could make a case for secession

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

The situation in Catalonia may be unique and even baroque, but it fits larger patterns: an
economic crisis that has upended traditional political parties, grassroots social-media-
driven activism, filter bubbles, political corruption. It’s a local issue gone international—
—and one that could threaten the cohesion of the European Union. If Catalonia breaks
away, would Italy’s wealthy northern Lombardy and Veneto regions aim to follow?
Or the Flemish parts of Belgium? Or the French island of Corsica, where a nationalist
coalition just won 45 percent of the vote in the first round of regional elections? And
yet—the way some supporters of Catalan independence see it—the European Union is
a product of the post-nation state world, so why not let Europe embrace regions, not
just central governments?

Setting a precedent of secession will cause divisiveness and strife across Europe

No author. “As Catalonia Declares Independence, Spain Must Be Determined To Pre-

vent Europe’s Balkanization,” Synglobe. October 27, 2017.

If Spain fails to bring together its people, if Catalan separatists win, if the principle that
any nationalist group can violate the law and secede triumphs, then Europe will sink
into the abyss of civil strife and chaos. Years of infighting, and perhaps of war, will en-
sue. Instead of focusing on a sound and reasonable debate about economic and social
policies, the continent will be marred by hatred, identity politics and division. Spain’s
decision to divest Catalonia of its autonomy is not an easy one. The implementation of
Article 155 will meet with resistance. And what will separatists do then? Will they use

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their bodies to sabotage the police? And how will the police respond? Catalan nation-
alists knew from the start that any heavy-handed approach by the central authorities
would be a propaganda victory for separatism. Catalan nationalists welcome confronta-
tion, because it allows them to portray themselves as martyrs, despite the fact that they
have been violating the law in the name of an ideology of division. The scenes of the
Spanish police enforcing the law will be exploited by nationalists and demagogues, in
Catalonia and elsewhere in Europe, as the sign of repression. They will compare Spain
with Franco’s dictatorship. They will smear the government and the more than half of
the Catalan population that do not want secession. The price Spanish central govern-
ment has to pay is the damage to its reputation, but the reward will be the long-term
benefit, peace and stability of Spain and Europe. Madrid will look like an oppressor in
the eyes of the nationalist-minded and of those who easily fall for the rhetorical tricks
of demagogues. But if the government does not persevere, the price to be paid will not
be just symbolic. It will be the beginning of a vicious circle of hatred and strife that
once again will wreck Europe, and wreck even those who now believe that the gospel
of division, resentment, anger and intolerance will save them.

Catalonia could ignite moves for independence elsewhere

Louarn, Anne-Diandra. “Other European regions continue to push for more auton-
omy,” France 24. October 30, 2017.

For Barbara Loyer, professor at the French Institute of Geopolitics at the University of
Paris 8, the Catalan vote might ignite new moves for independence elsewhere on the
continent. “The potential for destablisation is very large,” she said. Loyer estimates
that the violent scenes witnessed during the Catalan vote are particularly damaging.
“It opens the debate on the question of democracy, and we reduce the situation to a
confrontation between people and the state and police. It’s a blessing for regionalism
in Europe.”

Serbia and Bosnia could be threatened by secessions

Louarn, Anne-Diandra. “Other European regions continue to push for more auton-
omy,” France 24. October 30, 2017.

Hit hard by the civil war of the 1990s, the situation in many nations of the former Yu-
goslavia remains tense. Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008,

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becoming the world’s newest republic at the time. The United States and 23 EU mem-
bers have recognised its independent status but many other nations – including Russia
and five EU member states – continue to consider it a part of Serbia. And Laborderie
said more areas are likely to seek greater autonomy in the future. “We can imagine
that Serbia’s autonomous province of Vojvodina wants to claim more control. There
is also the Serbian side of Bosnia that could hold a referendum,” he said. Laborderie
added that, unlike in Spain, the Serbian or Bosnian police would be unable to prevent
a serious push for independence “because they do not have the means”.

Catalonian Independence gives ground to other European separatists

No Author. “Why the EU is right to back Spain against Catalan separatism” The Con-
versation. October 2017.

The position of the EU and the European leaders on Catalonian independence has been
one of self-preservation. Separatism exists in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the
UK – none of which want to encourage divisions at home by supporting the Catalo-
nian separatist cause. According to this hypothesis, if the EU encouraged Catalonia to
separate from Spain, whether because it was guaranteed EU membership or because
the EU leaders intervened in favour of the separatist goals, Spain could reciprocate if
separatism flared up elsewhere in the EU.

Catalonia Independence could fuel violent secession movements elsewhere

O’Malley, James. [Contributor for The Independent]. “We shouldn’t blindly support
independence for Catalonia-here’s why” The Independent. October 2017.

Okay, so you might not worry about Scotland – it is pursuing independence by peaceful
means that have been legitimated by the “parent” country, but what about other coun-
tries and regions with arguably trickier circumstances? What about the long history of
demands for Spain’s Basque region to become independent? Could it restart the violent
separatist movement there? And what about the push for Kurdish independence? Con-
ceivably it might be a good idea, but it could equally further inflame an already difficult
situation in the Middle East. And what if – for example – seeing the Catalonia prece-
dent, a Russian speaking region of Latvia was to suddenly demand its independence,
with all of the geopolitical baggage that would entail? It also goes without saying that
in situations where there is a secessionist movement, it is rarely universally supported.

109

Look at Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Cyprus and countless others – if we let the secession-
ist genie out of the bottle, it could be a recipe for igniting – or reigniting – dozens of
potentially violent conflicts around the world.

Past independence movements like Kosovo encouraged other separatists

movements

O’Malley, James. [Contributor for The Independent]. “We shouldn’t blindly support
independence for Catalonia-here’s why” The Independent. October 2017.

One of the few exceptions to the border taboo described above is Kosovo. In 2008, the
country, which used to be a part of Serbia made a unilateral declaration of independence
(just as Catalonia is threatening to do). Since, it has been cited by other secessionist
movements as evidence of their legitimacy. When Crimea declared independence from
Ukraine, it literally cited the Kosovo precedent in its declaration of independence. While
it is hard to not be sympathetic to Kosovo declaring independence (it was in response
to a potential genocide) – what’s clear is that there can be second-order consequences
to events in the international system.

Other Spanish independence movements would be encouraged by Catalonian

independence.

Runde, Daniel. [Forbes Contributor]. “Catalonia And The Costs Of Independence”

Forbes. April 2015.

The national government refuses to allow Catalans hold an actual referendum on the
issue,insisting that any such vote is illegal. The general perception is that an indepen-
dence vote in Catalonia would likely fail, but among other fears, the national govern-
ment believes that allowing Catalonia to hold a vote would encourage similar move-
ments in other Spanish regions.

The Basque region push for independence has historically been violent

No Author. “What is Eta?” BBC. April 2017.

But despite the fact that Spain’s Basque country today enjoys more autonomy than any
other - it has its own parliament, police force, controls education and collects its own

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taxes - Eta and its hardline supporters have remained determined to push for full inde-
pendence. Its violent campaign has led to more than 820 deaths over the last 40 years,
many of them members of the Guardia Civil, Spain’s national police force, and both
local and national politicians who are opposed to Eta’s separatist demands.

Russia will use Catalonia independence to revive support for Crimea annexation.

Gregory, Paul. [Contributor for Forbes]. “How Russia Is Playing Catalonia To GAa
Reprieve On Crimea” Forbes. October 2017.

Russia’s complex Catalonian game aims to gain traction for its “let bygones be bygones”
campaign for Crimea. Russia also hopes to restore lagging domestic enthusiasm for
the “return of Crimea to its motherland” campaign as symbolized by the Krim Nash
(Krim is ours) slogan. Weakening European unity is perhaps Russia’s most cherished
policy goal, and Catalonian independence from Spain strikes at the heart of European
cohesion. Putin hopes that Catalonia will end with a messy separation that throws the
European experiment into chaos as he basks behind a stance of neutrality while hoping
for forgiveness for the Crimean annexation.

Scottish secession would be an economic disaster.

Nicholson, David. [Contributor for Forbes]. “5 Reasons Why Scottish Independence

Would Be An Economic Disaster” Forbes. March 2014.

Once the oil runs out, what does Scotland have that will sustain its fabulously wealthy
future? It has whisky, but even with this contribution of £3 billion ($4.8 billion) across
the economy, as estimated by the Scotch Whisky Association, it’s small beer. The ability
to attract major industries – manufacturing, IT, finance – to the country would be dimin-
ished by independence, for all the reasons listed above. The insurer Standard Life has
already warned that it could relocate its headquarters in the event of a Yes vote for
independence, endangering 5,000 Scottish jobs. Many more companies are doubtless
thinking along the same lines.

3.0.9 Catalan independence movement inspires Texas secessionists

Benavides, Lucia. [Freelance Journalist]. “How the Catalan Independence Movement

Has Inspired Texas Secessionists” Texas Monthly. November 2017.

111

Daniel Miller is president of the Texas Nationalist Movement, an organization founded

in 2005 from smaller pro-independence groups, which now has around 368,800 active
supporters. He says that today, the movement looks to Catalonia for inspiration. “If
you look at [Catalonia’s] particular set of grievances with the Spanish central govern-
ment, all you have to do is replace the proper nouns and it would read like one of our
pamphlets that we hand out to potential supporters,” says Miller.

3.0.10 Legitimacy/Rule of Law

The referendum vote was illegal in the first place

Wildman, Sarah. [Foreign Policy correspondent]. “Why part of Spain is trying to secede
— and why the Spanish government cracked down on it,” Vox. October 2, 2017.

Sunday’s violence was shocking but not entirely unexpected: The Spanish government
in Madrid had spent weeks arguing that a vote for independence would be illegal. That
ruling hinges on the text of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which calls for the “indissol-
uble unity of the Spanish Nation.” Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy also made
clear that he was willing to use heavy-handed measures to prevent the vote from taking
place. In the run-up to Sunday’s ballot, the Spanish Civil Guard raided offices in Cat-
alonia, arrested Catalan leaders, and impounded 10 million ballots — all in the name of
squelching the vote. On September 7, Spain’s Constitutional Court ruled that the vote
was illegal and should not proceed. As expected, as well, the Catalan government re-
fused to acknowledge the authority of that ruling. “We will respond to the tsunami of
lawsuits with a tsunami of democracy,” Carles Puigdemont, the Catalan president, told
the press, insisting the vote would be held anyway.

The part cannot rule over the whole

Girauta, Juan Carlos. “Why Israel should oppose the Catalonia referendum,” The
Jerusalem Post. September 28, 2017.

And why is the vote illegal? Why should the Catalans not be allowed to vote? First, no
group can decide regarding something that it does not own. A part cannot rule over the
whole. And, as in any trust or mutual enterprise, a portion of its members cannot vote
on decisions affecting all of them, much less when they do not allow the rest to vote. A
portion of Catalonians cannot decide for themselves to derogate Spain’s Constitution

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and make most Spaniards foreigners in part of their own country. Spain’s democratic
system allows for these discussions, but in the context of a national parliament decision
and a national vote. A vote that, unlike the proposed illegitimate referendum, would be
based on an official census, full procedural guarantees and, most likely, a required min-
imum participation and qualified majority, as one should expect when talking about
breaking a country. Banning this illegal referendum should not be considered a restric-
tion of political freedom.

There is no provision for independence in the Spanish constitution

Jenkins, Simon. “Catalonia’s independence movement is not just a problem for Spain,”
The Guardian. October 27, 2017.

Catalonia is wrong. Madrid is right. There is a Spanish constitution which clearly lays
down the sovereignty and integrity of the Spanish state. There is no provision for break-
ing away. Catalonia, despite its distinctive past, has long acquiesced in the Spanish
constitution and has no legal right to become independent. On that point the law is
clear. The essence of the post-1945 European settlement is the integrity of states. Af-
ter centuries of horrific wars, stable statehood is the rock on which Europe’s security
rests. Allow old grievances to recur, old feuds to revive and old boundaries to shift,
and chaos will ensue. Besides, that other rock of stability, the European Union, relies
on states being able to enforce EU diktats on subordinate regions without challenge.

The Spanish government will only operate under what the constitution provides

Withnall, Adam. “Spain will step in to protect the nation if Catalonia declares indepen-
dence, says ex-minister,” The Independent. October 9, 2017.

Speaking on the BBC’s Today programme on Monday morning, an MP and ex-minister

from the ruling People’s Party, Francisco Martinez Vazquez, hailed the anti-separatist
march on Sunday and warned that “no one can talk on behalf of the whole of Catalonia”.
Mr Vazquez, who is also a professor of constitutional law, said the government would
not accept a unilateral declaration of independence “just supported by a part of the
Catalan society and a part of the regional government”. If Mr Puigdemont did try to
declare independence, he warned, Spain will intercede. “Of course the government will
do what the law and the constitution provides for the government to do,” he said. “It

113

is not just the government, it is all the other institutions that make us a country - the
constitutional court, the prosecutors - everyone reacting to protect the national state.”

The European Commission sides with Spain on the unconstitutionality of secession

Smith, Lydia. “Catalonia crisis could spark civil war in Europe, EU commissioner
warns,” The Independent. October 6, 2017.

After the vote, Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont told the BBC on Wednesday the au-
tonomous region would declare independence from Spain “at the end of this week or
the beginning of next”. The Spanish government responded by accusing Catalonian
separatists of “blackmail”. The European Commission sided with Spain in a statement,
which deemed the independence vote “not legal” under the Spanish constitution and
called for all parties involved to seek “unity and stability”. “If a referendum were to be
organised in line with the Spanish Constitution it would mean that the territory leaving
would find itself outside of the European Union,” the statement read.

Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution allows Spain to take over Catalan powers

No author. “As Catalonia Declares Independence, Spain Must Be Determined To Pre-

vent Europe’s Balkanization,” Synglobe. October 27, 2017.

The Catalan parliament has voted to declare independence from Spain. Today (October
27) Junts Pel Sì (United for Yes), the largest pro-independence party in the parliament,
filed a motion to declare independence and begin the procedure for the formation of
a constituent assembly. The motion was approved with 70 votes in favour, 10 against
and 2 abstentions. Lawmakers of the pro-unionism socialist party, Ciudadanos (citi-
zens) and the Popular Party left the plenum in protest. The Spanish Senate has voted to
implement Article 155 of the Constitution, which will allow the central government to
take over some of the powers of the regional Catalan authorities.

Catalonian secession is actually undemocratic

Mingiu-Pippidi, Alina. [Professor of Democracy at the Hertie School of Governance in

Berlin]. “Why Catalonia does not deserve to be independent,” openDemocracy. Octo-
ber 31, 2017.

114

Therefore, the insistence of the Catalan Parliament on being allowed a unilateral right
to secede is anything but democratic. There is no iron law of democracy allowing the
right to unilaterally vote to leave a nation state that one has subscribed to before without
coercion. Catalonia was no colony. Therefore, the citizens of the rest of a Spanish state
based on the 1978 democratic Constitution have as much right to vote on the future of
their joint project as do those who reside temporarily in the autonomous Catalonia (of
which many are Spanish).

Catalonia should receive more autonomy without seceding.

John, Tara. [Reporter for Time]. “What to Know About the Catalan Independence Ref-
erendum” Time. September 2017.

The ideal situation, writes the European Council on Foreign Relations, is for “substan-
tial reform of the Spanish Constitution, including a further strengthening of Catalonia’s
self-rule, including an explicit recognition of their character as a Nation, could be enter-
tained. It would require elections, qualified majorities and a nation-wide referendum,
perhaps followed by a specific referendum in Catalonia.”

Catalonia is not treated unfairly.

Harel, Victor. [Israel Ambassador to Spain]. “Why an Independent Catalonia Would

Be a Huge Mistake” Haaretz. October 2017.

The vast majority of the arguments put forth by the referendum’s organizers are base-
less. Catalonia’s autonomy is obvious: Catalan is the dominant language of the region,
the local culture is flourishing and Catalonia receives relatively large budget alloca-
tions from the central government. It’s true that Catalonia is wealthy, contributing a
quarter of Spain’s exports and a fifth of its gross domestic product. But let’s recall the
global financial crisis of 2012: Who, if not the central government, rescued the banks in
Barcelona? And just this week, the Spanish government gave Catalonia one third of all
the regional funding it allocated, 7 billion euros. The Catalan government’s economic
plan may blow up in its face when international corporations, which will operate only
in a stable economic environment, begin preparing to leave.

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Catalonia wouldn’t have any debtor credibility.

Lacalle, Daniel. [PHD Economist and Fund Manager]. “Catalonia’s Independence

Threat Is Bad for Spain (And Catalonia)” Daniellacalle. October 2017.

Welcome to a “credit event”. Suppose a country owes all its debt to a single nation.
With default, according to some, everyone will be happy and the country will finance
itself like royalty, right? It is not like this. Risk is not reduced, it multiplies. Because
credibility as a debtor is destroyed. Not only will refinancing be more expensive. It is
more difficult to access markets. See the case of Ecuador, which defaulted and it took
years to access the debt markets. When it finally came to issue bonds, it was for a very
small amount at 7.95% for ten years in dollars. Today it is financed at 10.5%. And it is
an oil rich country.

Secession erodes the rule of law.

Blanco, Nacho. [Professor at The University of Barcelona]. “The case against Catalan
secession” Al Jazeera. September 2017.

Perhaps the most tragic and lasting consequence of this political moment is the effect
this is having on public opinion, eroding the idea of the state and the rule of law within
a democratic framework that guarantees our individual rights and freedoms. After five
years of continuous invective spewed by pro-independence politicians and commenta-
tors against the Spanish Constitution of 1978, this sort of depressing antisystemic dis-
course that would revile our hard-won democratic gains is not only becoming tolerated,
but normalised.

Independence would harm Spain’s economy.

Kottasova, Ivana. [Reporter for CNN Money]. “Spain loses 20% of its economy if Cat-
alonia splits” CNN Money. September 2017.

A split would leave a hole in Spain’s finances and dramatically increase uncertainty. If
Catalonia declares independence unilaterally, it might also refuse to take on its share
of the national debt. “While there does not appear to have been any serious effect on
the wider Spanish economy so far, it is likely that business and consumer confidence
would deteriorate if Catalonia were to secede,” Brown said.

116

The independence movement is predicated on falsehoods and propaganda.

Diaz, Jesus. [Contributor for Fast Company]. “You Can’t Support Catalonia’s Secession
Movement If You Were Horrified By Brexit” Fast Company. October 2017.

Those who support Catalonian secession by default support the official nationalistic
myths, which have been taught in schools and broadcasted in government-controlled
media for decades now: Catalonia, they say, was originally a singular nation that found
itself beneath the boot of Spanish tyrants ever since Isabella, Queen of Castile, and Fer-
dinand, King of Aragon, joined their territories by marriage to form the Kingdom of
Spain in the 15th century (in reality, Catalonia was not a nation under any standard,
but a county that became part of the Crown of Aragon). Catalonia, they claim, tried to
secede from Spain in a war for independence in 1714 (in reality, it was a civil war of
succession that resulted in the end of the Principality of Catalonia for not backing the
“right” heir to the Spanish throne). Much later, in 1939, General Franco established a
dictatorship that hindered Catalonia’s soul. That last part is certainly true. But the in-
dependence narrative loses yet another wheel with its claim that since the death of the
dictator, the evil central Spanish government has continued his iron fist policy against
the people of Catalonia, stealing their money and actively destroying their national iden-
tity, sovereignty, and democracy.

There is no right to secession under international law.

Fisher, Max. [Writer for The Interpreter]. “Catalans and Kurds Discover the Hard Truth
About Secession” The New York Times. September 2017.

The modern international system is built, in part, on two ideas that turned out to be in
tension: Borders are sacrosanct and people determine their own political status. The
former was meant to put an end to war by discouraging invasion or separatist rebellion.
The latter was meant to protect citizens from dictators or occupiers. But when a sub-
set of a population decides to break off, those two principles collide. This has opened
a vacuum in the international system when it comes to declaring independence. Nei-
ther norms nor the law are particularly clear on how or when it’s permissible. “As it
is generally understood, there is no right to secede under international law,” Chris Bor-
gen, a law professor, wrote in 2014 for Opinio Juris, a legal scholarship site. He added,
“Secession is neither a right nor necessarily illegal.”

117

The independence process is riddled with corruption and cynically manipulated by

politicians.

Valero, Alfonzo. [International Dispute Resolution Lawyer]. “Why the EU Should Back
Spain Against Catalonia” US News. October 2017.
The Catalan government also went against the Code of Good Practice on Referendums
of the Venice Commission, the very legal instrument on which it based the referendum
process. Contrary to this code, the referendum was held in contravention of the Span-
ish Constitution and the organization and procedure of the referendum was rudimen-
tary. European leaders are all too aware that since 1993, Spanish governments have
been propped up by Basque and Catalan nationalists – in exchange, they have obtained
more forms of self-government and financial concessions. As a result, the current situa-
tion has been helped by successive Spanish governments who have agreed to withdraw
the presence of central government in the Basque and Catalan regions in exchange for
votes from Catalan MPs in the Spanish parliament. The forgotten victims of this con-
flict are the Catalans themselves, who for the most part – according to recent polling
– want to remain Spanish, but are being used as pawns by their politicians. A demo-
cratic government with the goal of becoming a democratic, independent country does
not send people to participate in an illegal vote so that it can get international attention
with photographs of the rioting.

There is no significant cultural divide between Spain and Catalonia, nor is there a
lack of representation.

Blanco, Nacho. [Professor at The University of Barcelona]. “Why Catalonia’s call for
independence is unfounded” Politico. January 2017.
The cultural basis on which Puigdemont portends to support the Catalan government’s
secessionist project is entirely without merit. Catalans and the rest of the Spanish peo-
ple share a long collective history, including a language, Castilian — known broadly as
Spanish — which is as Catalan as the Catalan language itself, considering it has been
spoken in Catalonia since the 15th century. It would be senseless to break this shared
history on the whim induced by Catalan nationalist parties’ propaganda. According
to Puigdemont, the Spanish government “says no to the linguistic question, no to ques-
tions about taxes … No democracy. No vote. It’s very difficult to speak with the Spanish
government.” This is an accurate reflection of the victimized propaganda the national-
ists have been spreading for more than three decades. But this runs contrary to the

118

Catalan government’s already considerable autonomy — Catalonia is currently one of

the most autonomous territories in the world.

Catalonia would not be a nation state.

Runde, Daniel. [Forbes Contributor]. “Catalonia And The Costs Of Independence”

Forbes. April 2015.

It’s also true that in the 40 years that Franco has been dead, Catalonia has undergone sig-
nificant demographic change. Today, nearly one fifth of Catalonia’s residents are non-
Spanish immigrants, and more residents identify Spanish as their primary language
than Catalan. It’s not clear how these residents would view independence.

Past pro-independence politicians have been corrupt.

Runde, Daniel. [Forbes Contributor]. “Catalonia And The Costs Of Independence”

Forbes. April 2015.

It is a great irony that Artur Mas’ political mentor, Jordi Pujol, may be one of the rea-
sons that Catalan independence fails. A corruption scandal in the Pujol family has set
back the Catalan independence cause, as it undermines one of the movement’s key ar-
guments: vote for an independent Catalonia and we will give you clean politicians.

Kosovo is not a justification for Catalonia independence.

Borja, Francisco. [Policy fellow at The ECFR]. “Three myths about Catalonia’s indepen-
dence movement” European Council on Foreign Relations. September 2017.

The precedent of Kosovo has also been spearheaded by the Catalan government to but-
tress their claims of persecution. Thankfully for both Catalonia (a rich region) and the
rest of Spain, the comparison with Milosevic’s Serbia and Yugoslavia in general does
not hold: there has been no violent campaign of ethnic cleansing, no systematic dis-
crimination leading to mass outflows of refugees, and not one previous international
condemnation of Spain’s treatment of its Catalans.

119

The Spanish constitution does not permit independence.

Borja, Francisco. [Policy fellow at The ECFR]. “Three myths about Catalonia’s indepen-
dence movement” European Council on Foreign Relations. September 2017.

Some suggest a sort of Quebec- or Scotland-style arrangement for an agreed self-

determination referendum, with due guarantees. This would require a fundamental
reform of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, for which there is no political consensus.
According to the Spanish Constitution, sovereignty rests with the whole of the Spanish
people. One may like this or not, but it is not undemocratic and it is line with similar
provisions in most Western democracies. The draft Catalan Constitution does not, of
course, provide for self-determination within its borders.

The broader rule of law is at stake.

Borja, Francisco. [Policy fellow at The ECFR]. “Three myths about Catalonia’s indepen-
dence movement” European Council on Foreign Relations. September 2017.

The crisis in and around Catalonia may be ushering in a new broader cleavage in Spain.
On one side are the proponents of “popular democracy” (which now includes the pro-
independence bloc, Podemos and other forces), who emphasize street, insurrection-
style politics and “the will of the people”; and on the other are the defenders of rule
of law-based democracy (which combines PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos, and many Catalans
who favour a legal referendum), who stress constitutional order and institutions. The
former label Rajoy’s government measures and judicial actions as repression. The latter
denounce authoritarianism in Catalonia and even refer to a coup d’état at the Catalan
Parliament. This cleavage will probably define the politics of the country for years to
come.

3.0.11 Alternative: Spain should pursue constitutional changes to solve the

Catalonia crisis

Constitutional revisions could resolve the conflict

MacBeth, Alex. “Analysis: Could reform in Spain solve Catalonia crisis?,” The Local.
November 2, 2017.

120

In Catalonia neither of the two polarized blocs has the sufficient strength to impose itself
on the other. What does exist though is a significant social majority in favour of a vote
taking place. Considering the unwillingness to move that the central government has
shown, acting as a force of political containment in the face of the changes demanded
by society both in terms of the Catalan issue as well as other political and social spheres,
and faced with those who think territorial breakaway is the route to follow, there’s room
for a counter-proposal of a third route that would be a possible solution: articulating
a federal system, while developing the profound and necessary reforms at state level.
This route would involve a deep revision of the constitution and have to be voted on in
a referendum, and could repair the broken consensus that Catalonia was part of.

Constitutional reform would allow Catalonia and the rest of Spain to peacefully
coexist

Ribo, Ignasi. [Catalan writer and lecturer at Mae Fah Luang University]. “To solve
Catalonia, Spain needs a new constitution,” Politico. November 14, 2017.

The only reasonable way out of Spain’s current crisis over Catalonia is a new consti-
tution. Recognizing both the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial
integrity would lay the foundation for peaceful coexistence between Catalan separatists
and Spanish unionists. The 1978 Spanish constitution resulted from an agreement be-
tween very diverse ideological and territorial interests. After the death of General Fran-
cisco Franco, the Spanish nationalist right was exhausted and unable to sustain an au-
thoritarian regime that had isolated Spain from Europe and was rejected by the large
majority of the population. Dissidents from liberal, social democratic and communist
factions recognized that they couldn’t pursue their political agendas without first set-
ting up democratic rules and institutions that allowed for the expression of political
and social plurality, as was already the case in neighboring European countries. For
Catalans and Basques, this also meant creating a framework for a progressive recovery
of self-rule. The constitution approved in 1978 reflects the compromises made by each
of these parties. It was an ambiguous and rhetorical text, but it was also sufficiently
balanced to provide some degree of institutional stability for almost 40 years. The eco-
nomic crisis, the emergence of widespread corruption scandals and the conflict with
Catalonia have finally shed light on its severe dysfunctions. It’s now become painfully
apparent that Spain needs a new constituent process in order to establish more trans-
parent, democratic and efficient institutions.

121

Reform needs to better define regional and central powers and recognize different
national identities

Ribo, Ignasi. [Catalan writer and lecturer at Mae Fah Luang University]. “To solve
Catalonia, Spain needs a new constitution,” Politico. November 14, 2017.

This simple reform would be an incentive to develop common institutions that can pro-
vide stability to the new constitutional system. These institutions should clearly define
central and territorial powers, set up impartial and transparent arbitration bodies, and
establish a fair system of interregional solidarity. They should also provide some level
of symbolic and international recognition to different national identities. A federal or
confederal framework is crucial for internal self-determination to be viable and effective
in Spain. But it is practically impossible for this type of reform to be carried out without
first accepting a restricted right and a constitutional path to independence. That would
force Spain’s central institutions and demographic majorities to respect and seek stable
agreements with devolved authorities like the Catalan government. Equally, making
it difficult to access independence without a broad consensus of the territory’s popula-
tion would force those authorities to seek stable agreements with central institutions,
discouraging them from pursuing unilateral solutions. To avoid further escalation of
the current conflict, Spain urgently needs to engage in a new constituent process. Next
year, instead of celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Spanish constitution, we’d all be
better off trying to revive its spirit.

Constitutional reform avoids angering other regions

Mortera-Martinez, Camino. [Research fellow and Brussels representative]. “Crunch

time in Catalonia: Why Spain needs a constitutional overhaul,” Centre for European
Reform. October 4, 2017.

There is a way for Rajoy to step back from the brink of a constitutional crisis. As much
as Spaniards cherish their hard-fought constitution, it is time to change it. The constitu-
tion is based on the asymmetric devolution of competences: regions such as Catalonia,
the Basque Country or Navarra have more devolved powers than others such as Ex-
tremadura, Murcia and Asturias. Spain is a country of strong regional identities, and
most Spanish regions have separatist movements of some sort. If Madrid makes conces-
sions to Catalonia alone, it could upset other regions. The government should reform
Spain’s outdated model of regional government, including rethinking the role of the

122

Senate. As in other federal or quasi-federal countries Spain’s upper chamber was de-
signed to represent the regions in the law-making process. But the constitution did
not give it enough competences to play this role effectively. Consequently, the Senate
has become a virtually defunct institution, and regional representatives have to chan-
nel their claims through other fora – not least the Congress, Spanish lower chamber.
This has accentuated regional divergences and exacerbated secessionism. Turning the
Senate into a chamber dedicated to handling regional issues could help resolve this
problem.

3.0.12 Alternative: Spain should grant Catalonia greater tax autonomy

Catalonians pay a disproportionate amount of taxes

Reuter’s Staff. “The Basque Country: Spain’s effective but expensive antidote to seces-
sion,” Reuters. October 9, 2017.

Typically, regions pass taxes to Madrid which redistributes money back to them accord-
ing to a formula that favors the poorer regions. Former Catalan leader Artur Mas tried
to hold talks with Rajoy in 2012 about granting Catalonia powers to raise and spend its
own taxes, but the prospect of negotiations in the current climate look bleak. Catalonia
has long said it pays a disproportionate level of taxes to Madrid in relation to the central
funding it receives. A study backed by the Budget Ministry says Catalonia pays to the
state 9.9 billion euros more than it receives. The Catalan economy ministry says this
is even higher. Economists say an overhaul of the fiscal relationship between Madrid
and the regions is overdue because the current system has led to intense tax competi-
tion between regions. Some autonomous communities have become under-financed,
resulting in cuts in public services. “Now the situation is so critical, there might just be
the political momentum needed to tackle it,” said Antonio Garcia Pascual of Barclays
Capital.

Catalonian lawmakers will drop independence claims if given tax autonomy similar
to Basque

Reuter’s Staff. “The Basque Country: Spain’s effective but expensive antidote to seces-
sion,” Reuters. October 9, 2017.

As Spain and Catalonia head toward a constitutional collision over the region’s claim

123

to independence, lawmakers on both sides of the crisis are pointing to a way out: north,
to Basque Country. Among the verdant mountains of Basque Country, which borders
France, a once-violent campaign for independence has petered out, with generous fiscal
autonomy from Madrid helping to keep popular agitation for independence in check.
“We don’t have that economic resentment,” Aitor Esteban, organizer for the Basque Na-
tional Party in Spain’s parliament, told Reuters in an interview at party headquarters in
Bilbao. “People don’t feel that need to act upon a grievance about money; that makes a
big difference.” The Catalan government is not calling for a Basque-style deal, insisting
instead on independence after declaring overwhelming support for secession in an Oct.
1 referendum banned by Madrid. But the most moderate lawmakers in the region’s rul-
ing coalition privately say they could drop independence claims if they were given the
tax autonomy that Basque Country enjoys. In Madrid, some socialists have suggested
it could serve as a model for a compromise that would defuse Spain’s biggest political
crisis since a failed coup in 1981, although the cost to the central government would be
significant. Basque staged modest protests over Madrid’s violent crackdown on Catalo-
nia’s referendum, but the crisis has failed to rekindle secessionist fervor on the streets of
Bilbao, the Basque capital nestled on the banks of the Nervion. Catalan flags hang from
balconies alongside the Basque flag in a sign of solidarity, but Bilbao is prosperous and
peaceful. Where once unionist politicians needed bodyguards and car bombings were
a constant fear, tourists now crowd the taverns of the old town and the world-famous
Guggenheim museum.

3.0.13 AT: Spain Will Boycott Catalonian Trade

Boycotts have been circumvented by Catalonia in the past

Bosch, Sofia. “Here’s how bad economically a Spain-Catalonia split could really be,”
CNBC. September 21, 2017.

For Banal-Estañol, this is not a deal-breaker as boycotts have been circumvented by

Catalonia in the past. “It is unclear how long a boycott would last, and how strong it
would be,” Banal-Estañol said. “Businesses may search for other markets, as they did
in the past, during previous boycotts (as in the case of the Cava, the sparkling wine of
Catalonia) or during the severe economic crisis in Spain.”

124

3.0.14 AT: Spain should value Catalonia’s self-determination

The right to self-determination barely exists outside of the colonial context

Connolly, Christopher K. “Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the

European Union,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. 2013.

There is little support for the proposition that a right to external selfdetermination exists
beyond the colonial context. Even the former colonies, having achieved independence
under the banner of selfdetermination, promptly rejected the notion that the right might
be used to adjust their own borders.115 At most, only three non-colonial territories in
the UN Charter era�Bangladesh, Eritrea, and most recently Kosovo�have successfully
seceded without their former parent states’ consent.116 All three involved unique cir-
cumstances that arguably limit their precedential value.117 For example, in recognizing
Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, numerous states, including the
United States, characterized Kosovar independence as the sui generis result of a unique
set of circumstances, specifically Serbia’s human rights abuses in Kosovo during the
1990s and the international community’s subsequent military intervention and admin-
istration of the province.118 By contrast, the vast majority of attempted non-colonial
secessions have failed.119

Catalans have advanced autonomy in a highly democratic nation and do not suffer
rights infringements

Mingiu-Pippidi, Alina. [Professor of Democracy at the Hertie School of Governance in

Berlin]. “Why Catalonia does not deserve to be independent,” openDemocracy. Octo-
ber 31, 2017.

Of course, if there is a real threat to the identity or survival of the minority group in
the seceding region, its right to self-determination becomes stronger. The international
community respects existing borders, but has acknowledged secessions by endangered
regions or groups whose rights were systematically infringed by the state they lived in.
This was the situation of Kosovo, where the entire education in their native language
had first been suppressed under the Communist strongman Slobodan Milosevic, fol-
lowed by a mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav army once an armed
conflict broke down. The Kurds can also point to the Anfal genocide that killed over
50,000 Kurds and the enforced change of the ethnic character of Kurd areas like Kirkuk
through Arabization during Saddam Hussein. The forces surrounding them today are

125

not so very different from the ones during the Iran-Iraq war that ended in their victim-
ization, and so their argument that they alone can ensure their own safety (especially
after their heroic fight against ISIS) is worth listening to. They have a legitimate claim
which should be discussed peacefully. But not so the Catalans. They have an advanced
autonomous rule in a country ranked by OECD in the top ten in the world where fiscal
decentralization (direct collection of taxes by the sub-national units) is concerned. Not
only are their general human rights not infringed upon in democratic Spain, which also
ranks among the most democratic countries in the world by Freedom House or Human
Watch standards, but their linguistic policy had been, on the contrary, one of exclusion,
not inclusion[1].

The right to self-determination is not in the constitution

Donadio, Rachel. [Paris-based contributor]. “Catalans can’t agree on what indepen-

dence means,” The Atlantic. December 8, 2017.

Méndez de Vigo also disputed the idea that there had been no dialogue between Cat-
alonia’s politicians and the central government—they had been in talks since 2012, he
said. “The dialogue is whether you can find a solution for certain political aspirations
and accommodate. This is what politics is about,” he said. “But if the other party only
wants one thing and that one thing is independence, the government doesn’t want and
cannot give it because we have a constitution and the right of self-determination is not
in it. Dialogue is very difficult.” Indeed.

Catalonia already has its own regional government with power over healthcare,
education, and tax collection

Smith-Spark, Laura. [Middle East, Europe, and Africa correspondent]. “Catalonia gov-
ernment dissolved after declaring independence from Spain,” CNN World. October 28,
2018.

Several times during its history, Catalonia has found itself caught between the rivalries
of France and Spain. The region industrialized before the rest of Spain and had strong
anarchist, socialist and communist movements that all fought against Gen. Francisco
Franco in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. The current dispute goes back to that
conflict. Franco repressed Catalonia’s earlier limited autonomy, and in the early years

126

of the dictatorship at least, expressions of Catalan language and culture. Four years af-
ter Franco’s 1975 death, the region regained some of that autonomy. In 2006, Madrid
backed Catalonia’s calls for even greater powers, granting it “nation” status and finan-
cial control. But four years later, the Constitutional Court rescinded that status, ruling
that while Catalan is a “nationality,” Catalonia itself is not a nation. One of Spain’s 17
autonomous provinces, Catalonia has had its own regional government with consider-
able powers over health care, education and tax collection.

127

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