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Case-92 Tijam Vs Sibonghanoy

This case summary discusses a collection case filed in 1948 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for P1,908.00. A new law passed a month prior deprived that court of jurisdiction for cases under P2,000. The case proceeded for 15 years, with the appellant never raising the jurisdiction issue until losing their appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant was estopped from raising jurisdiction due to laches, as they invoked the court's jurisdiction for years without objection. The Court of Appeals decision granting execution against the surety was affirmed.

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153 views2 pages

Case-92 Tijam Vs Sibonghanoy

This case summary discusses a collection case filed in 1948 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for P1,908.00. A new law passed a month prior deprived that court of jurisdiction for cases under P2,000. The case proceeded for 15 years, with the appellant never raising the jurisdiction issue until losing their appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant was estopped from raising jurisdiction due to laches, as they invoked the court's jurisdiction for years without objection. The Court of Appeals decision granting execution against the surety was affirmed.

Uploaded by

EileenShiellaDialimas
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.

MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO


SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15,
1968

FACTS:
A collection for sum of money amounting to P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin
Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the
filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of
First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc.
vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc.
vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948,
it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of
this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal, The court states that “after going over the entire record,
We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval,
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution
against the surety x x x”.

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