Morfe vs Mutuc

FACTS:

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, provides that “every public officer, ...after his assumption to office
and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year...”. Jesus P. Morfe contends that the periodical submission "within
the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was (1)
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an (2) unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. He filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the submission of pleadings and
stipulation of facts, the CFI found for Morfe,affirming that the requirement of periodical submission
of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and
is thus offensive to the due process clause – hence, Section 7 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed the decision of the CFI before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is:

1. An oppressive exercise of police power;

2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination;

3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

CONTENTION OF STATE:

RTC Decision is reversed. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing
andminimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public
officemust indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued
commandsthe assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The
timesdemanded such a remedial device.

1. Valid exercise of Police Power

In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statute’s validity must prevail over
mere pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila). While in the
attainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights
is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable that what the Constitution
condemns, the statute allows.
 What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote
morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom.

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he
had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly
without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the
extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be
denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is
observed.

The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. It would
be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary
and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due
process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional
exercise of police power.

2. Right to Privacy

Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from
unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom."

It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an
objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is
bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and
sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.

3. Guarantees against Unreasonable Search and Seizure and against Self-incrimination

The latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and
that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain
statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.

It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has
been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition
as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

4. "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials

Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."
 Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern."

Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary."

Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the
wisdom of the law."

Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86 that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the
last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of
the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its
wisdom cannot be sustained.