D.

TYPES/ CLASSES OF JURISDICTION

i. Orginal concurrent jurisdiction vis-à-vis original exclusive jurisdiction
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT
COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: In January 2006, Vivas acquired the Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI). Upon acquisition,
Vivas initiated an internal audit of RBFI. The audit highlighted the dismal operation of RBFI.
On 8 Dec. 2006, BSP issued a Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for
another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its name to EuroCredit Community
Bank, Inc. (ECBI)
R.A. 7653, The New Central Bank Act, required the general examination of certain banks
including ECBI. The following are the serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the
general examination:
1. Negative capital of P14.674M and Capital Adequacy ratio of Negative 18.42%;
2. Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite rating of “2” with a Management
component rating of “1”; and
3. Serious supervisory concerns on activities deemed unsafe or unsound.
Because of these findings, BSP cancelled the rediscounting line of the ECBI. Moreover, BSP
directed the bank to:
1. Infuse fresh capital of P22.643M
2. Book the amount of P28.563M representing unbooked valuation reserves on classified loans
and other risks assets on or before October 31, 2008; and
3. Take appropriate action necessary to address the violations/exceptions noted in the
examination.
Vivas claimed that the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) took the above courses of
action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.
Vivas moved for reconsideration of such resolution for being arbitrary and violative of due process.
BSP on the contrary, said that there are several instances that the BSP invited ECBI to
discuss pertinent matters but Vivas kept on postponing the meeting.
The Monetary Board of BSP posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners
from examining and inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No.
7653. In its letter, 13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already due for another
annual examination and that the pendency of its appeal before the MB would not prevent the BSP
from conducting another one as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.
In view of ECBI's refusal to comply with the required examination, MB issued a resolution
imposing penalty on ECB. In a Letter-Reply of ECBI, it asked for another deferment of the
examination due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB,
and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered the
general examination to proceed as previously scheduled.
A complaint was filed before DOJ for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents
against certain officials and employees of ECBI.
Eventually, the Monetary Board issued a resolution as follows:
1. To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and
affairs under receivership; and
2. To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.
Vivas filed a petition for prohibition before SC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB
for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the Monetary Board has jurisdiction over the case
(2) Whether Vivas was correct in filing a prohibition before the Supreme Court
RULING: (1) The Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing.
(2) The Petition for PROHIBITION Should Have Been Filed in the CA
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4
of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas. 30
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction,
however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a
petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason
which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal
to this Court only on pure questions of law. 31 In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues
as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the
extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the
obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 32 The judicial policy must be observed
to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EJIEYANAGISAWA
G.R. No. 175303 (2012)
FACTS: Eiji, a Japanese, married Evelyn, Filipina, in 1989 at the City Hall of Manila.
On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse in Paranaque. The Registry of Deeds
issued a title to “Evelyn P. Castaneda, Filipino, married to EjieYanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of
legal age.”
In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint before RTC Makati for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, he asked that Evelyn be
enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. Evelyn and her lawyer
voluntarily undertook to acede to the motion of Eiji.
In 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000 from petitioner PAFIN. To secure the loan, Evelyn
executed a real estate mortgage (the property above-described). At the time of the mortgage, Eijis's appeal was
pending before the CA.
Eiji filed an action before RTC Paranaque for annulment of the real estate mortgage. PAFIN denied
prior knowledge of the Order in the first case. PAFIN admitted that it did not conduct any verification of the
title because Evelyn is good and friendly. Moreover, PAFIN averred that Eiji has no personality to seek the
annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.
The RTC Paranaque dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Eiji cannot possibly own
the property because he is a foreigner.
 Eiji appealed, arguing that his inability to own a real estate does not automatically deprive
him of all his interest in the mortgaged property, because the same was purchased with his money.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the property should be liquidated and
divided between Eiji and Evelyn.
The appellate court determined that the Parañaque RTC’s Decision was improper because it violated
the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate
jurisdiction over each other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Parañaque RTC’s decision to
dismiss Eiji’s complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC Paranaque’s decision was proper?
RULING: No. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque townhouse
unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right
to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2,
1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue
operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. By insisting on
ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue
and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns
the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said
question and should not have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was
improper for the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA
and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178845
ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and
ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the December 29, 2006 Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95293,
entitled "Dr. Dante G. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service Commission and Atty.
Honesto L. Cueva."
FACTS:
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-
Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP
Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating
Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials
and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his
pending criminal and administrative cases
In his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines
(General Form No. 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:
“11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof
NO”
This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17
pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan
The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final
conviction in a criminal or administrative casebecause their cases had not yet been decided by the
Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A
correctly and in good faith
March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521formally charging
Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after
a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.
the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie
Case.
Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive
Suspension12ςrνll and an Omnibus Motion13ςrνll seeking the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the following offenses in the formal
charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No.
6713.
CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for being a non-responsive
pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission. 15ςrνll It also denied Cuevas
motion to include additional charges against the respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra
under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-
in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible witnesses against him.
Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning
the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva.
CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned
resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction
the CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the
latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the
attention of the PUP Board of Regents.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.
The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this case is whether the CSC
has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state
university.
HELD:
The petitions are meritorious.
CSC has jurisdiction over cases
filed directly with it, regardless of
who initiated the complaint
Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil service:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341 PUP became a chartered state university, thereby
making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees
are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.
The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as
specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:
SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it
may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.
The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the
penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In
case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292
which states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against
a government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly
before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed
by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without any
qualification.
It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC.
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Board of Regents over
administrative cases
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service(the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows
the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have
the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees
in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers and employees.
The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to
mean that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this case the Board
of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably,
the CA failed to take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably
granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion that the CSC could only
take cognizance of cases on appeal:
Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the
Commission, over their respective officers and employees.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by
law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the
Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the
complaint, then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, not all administrative
cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize some
other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby considerably
easing the burden placed upon the CSC.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006
and June 30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of “other forms of swindling”
for selling the mortgaged land. The land was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court further denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for review, however, denied the same for
petitioners’ failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.

With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the
police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail
term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was
nowhere to be found.

Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first
time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, the
instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions.

The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001
Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001
Resolution.

In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following the ruling in People v.
Bitanga the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court
likewise rejected petitioners’ contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES

1. Whether the ruling on PEOPLE VS BITANGA would apply to this case?

2. Whether the accused were guilty of other forms of swindling?
RULING

1. No.

Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending
in the trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to
dismiss the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners’ advanced
age, the length of time this case has been pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty
as a result of petitioners’ conviction, the Court resolves to grant pro hac vice the motion for
reconsideration.

This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure
where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has
allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on
the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be avoided. It is far better and more prudent for the court to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of
justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties.

Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although
captioned differently, was indeed one for certiorari.

Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one for certiorari, the doctrine in People
v. Bitanga no longer finds application in this case.

Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 316. Other forms of swindling. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
three times such value, shall be imposed upon:

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance be not recorded;

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged and the complicity or participation of the accused.

For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under Article 316 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the burden to prove the confluence of the following
essential elements of the crime:

1. that the thing disposed of be real property;

2. that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,
whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;
3. that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is
 free from encumbrance; and
4. that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.

One of the essential elements of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2, is

that the act of disposing the encumbered real property is made to the damage of
another. In this case, neither the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any
damage to the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the CA
is there any discussion that there was damage suffered by complainant, or any
finding that his rights over the property were prejudiced.

On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the land even as
the cases were being heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion over the
property was not disturbed. Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title.
This, however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually decided in
petitioners’ favor.

If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would have been
committed by the vendor, as the element of damage would then be lacking. The
inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime
charged.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009
is SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioners of the crime
charged on the ground of the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR
GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners, vs.
P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, respondent.
FACTS: The Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was
accorded due process during the summary hearing. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following reasons:
1. Proceedings were null and void because no hearing was conducted; and
2. The evidence does not prove that respondent is guilty

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Summary Proceedings conducted were null and void
2. Whether the evidence presented is insufficient to prove respondent’s guilt

RULING: 1. NO. The fact that there was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer
does not invalidate said proceedings. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
time-honored principle that: Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being
violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the
place of their direct testimony.

2. To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence
presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove
respondent's guilt of the charges against him.
However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the RTC is one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC and as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does not toll the running of the
period to appeal. However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to
promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances,
are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the
country.

In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy of

certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chief’s decision as an appeal
before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had
jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41
(where it shall be filed in People’s Law Enforcement Board) and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975
(states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member
who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer) or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in 2005 or after respondent had
already filed the petition for certiorari with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of
jurisdiction. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant
dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said
authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of
the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may
file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled
jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed thus: “After
all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the
proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be
construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.”
Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to
respondent in the higher interest of substantial justice.
MR: Partly granted. Allowed to file an appeal.
GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 165835

FACTS:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.
On 27 September 2004, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT before
the Sandiganbayan against Garcia for VIOLATION of the following:
1. SECTION 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees)
2. Art 183, RPC
3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law

His wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as
conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and
disposing of ill-gotten wealth.
Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife
and 3 sons. Ombudsman has determined a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen Garcia since
during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful
income. SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Garcia filed Motion to Dismiss and a Petition for Certiorari:

Garcia alleged that the Sandiganbayan has a LACK OF JURISDICTION over forfeiture
proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379. He claimed that RTC has the jurisdiction as provided
under Sec2(9) of the law.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions
for recovery of unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.
SB was intended principally as a criminal court. This is supported by Presidential issuances
and laws, to wit:
(1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and
cronies,
(2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family
and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws, and
(3) E.O. No. 14-A which further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379
by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Even if SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to comply with
jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, Sec. 2:
i. inquiry similar to a Preliminary Investigation
ii. Certification to Solicitor General of prima facie case (In this case: there is no certification)
iii. action filed by Solicitor General. (In this case it is filed by Ombudsman)

COMMENT by SB:
In Republic v. SB the Court ruled that “there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of
[R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.”
Moreover, under Constitution and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under RA 1379.
SB’s jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019
IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE

COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:
1. Republic vs. SB
2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of
RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials
3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on
Constitution and RA 6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman
is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which
appears to be “illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient” covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by
public officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379
4. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of
unlawful acquisition of wealth.
5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGEN’s
participation no longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and
prosecute
6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB

REPLY by Garcia
1. SB’s criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SB’s jurisdiction over
forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil
jurisdiction
2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not under
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

ISSUES
1. Whether SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379
2. Whether Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for
forfeiture
3. Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELD
Petition without MERIT, dismissed

I. SB HAS JURISDICTION
Under RA 8249, jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w Sandiganbayan.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, originally, the solicitor general was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or
holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]. However, upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original
and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in SB.
Eventually, PD 1606 repealed PD 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its
jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection w/ crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of SB,
including:
* Restitution or reparation for damages;
* Recovery of instruments and effects of the crime;
* Civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code; and
* Forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379
BP 129 abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, and expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of SB over offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 to embrace all
such offenses irrespective of imposable penalty.
PD 1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the
proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher than Prision Coreccional or its equivalent and even
such cases not serious in nature.

ON CIVIL NATURE OF FORFEITURE ACTIONS

Forfeiture actions are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY
ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs.
Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [“An Act Declaring Forfeiture In

Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or
Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.”]: the law provides a procedure for forfeiture in
case a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the law
imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully acquired properties

2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)

RA 6770 and Article XI, Sec. 13 of 1987 Constitution provides for the POWERS OF
OMBUDSMAN:

1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases;
…
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
 It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379
BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
AFTER FEB 1986.

3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!

Garcia failed to inform the SC that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss in relation to the petition
for forfeiture before the SB.
A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same
issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the petitioner’s
argument that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only
difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition
for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for
the annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both
Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against
petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking.
This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright,
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.
G.R. No. 173121 April 3, 2013
FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by Franklin Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the
February 21, 2006 decision2 and the June 15, 2006 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appeal on the August 20, 2004
decision4 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him administratively
liable for grave misconduct.

FACTS: On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila
Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that the
Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire
hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila. 5
On May 10, 2000, PNP-CIDG conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.
During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICO’s car-wash boys
indeed had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-
wash boys and confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredo’s
father and the Barangay Chairman or punong barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila,
interfered with the PNP-CIDG’s operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated
containers. This intervention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the
apprehended car-wash boys to escape.
Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial
investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint
against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his
unwarranted intervention.
In its decision9 dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled
that the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to
disrespect proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated
the illegal acts of MICO’s car-wash boys.10
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. But
the CA dismissed the petition for premature filing.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling-DENIED.
Hence this petition.
The petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order his dismissal
from the service since under Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991), an elective local official may be removed from office only by the order of a proper court.
Finally, he posits that the penalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted under the available
facts.

ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRES A
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43 REVIEW.
II.
WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.
III.
WHETHER PETITIONER’S ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT TO WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.

HELD:
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the Ombudsman
The petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he filed his motion for
reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the
case at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he
was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. 18 It is tasked to exercise
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act 19 and the Local Government Code both provide for the
procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been
resolved in cases decided by this Court.20
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore
ours]
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher.22
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of
jurisdiction is concurrent.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions
Section 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These powers unmistakably grant the Office
of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely
recommendatory.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was
granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
Substantive Issue
The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
After the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about the operation, the police officers
immediately showed their identifications and explained to him that they were conducting an anti-
water pilferage operation. However, instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered several
bystanders to defy the PNP-CIDG’s whole operation. The petitioner’s act stirred further commotion
that unfortunately led to the escape of the apprehended car-wash boys.
Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penalty against the petitioner. His open
interference in a legitimate police activity. and defiance of the police's authority only show his clear
i1itent to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot official tasked at
the first level with the enforcement of the law. The photographs, taken together with the investigation
report of the Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses, even lead to conclusions
beyond interference and defiance; the petitioner himself could have been involved in corrupt
activities, although we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point. 43 We make this observation
though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys were engaged in water pilferage. What we can
conclusively confirm is that the petitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate
police activity where his own son appeared to be involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as grave.
Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544.
ii. Appellate jurisdiction vs Original jurisdiction (review)
DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
BENGUET
FACTS This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the resolution of CA which dismissed petitioner
Darma Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The Petition also assails the
CA’s September 22, 2006 Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of
original certificate of title against the respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s
property.

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders
dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents’ contention that the
proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Who has jurisdiction over the case?

2. Whether petioner’s appeal is the proper remedy?

HELD:

1. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and
exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value
of the subject property. Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, 29 as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30 provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the
property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for
Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the
MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it
is “not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.”
Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into
what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised.

Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that already
involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of
appeal was improper to begin with.

Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,

vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was
operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was
performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia)
approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of
mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills which in total amounts to P50,000.00. Following casino
procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills
into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers
for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia.
Convinced that she was tricked by the petitioner in getting less than the amount she must received.
She filed a case against petitioner. And On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a
Memorandum issued by the casino informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy
towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours.
Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009 practically
reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of
Directors 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal
basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty
of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in
imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner
explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed
on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction. He also
claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is
punishable only by reprimand.ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
RULING: Court of Appeals decision reversed.
In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal
of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any
legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an
error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent
court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the
evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred
or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances
and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is
in order.
A. Errors of Jurisdiction vis-a-ivs errors of judgement
DIPAD V. OLIVAN
G.R. NO. 168771 (2012)

FACTS: The car of Dipad and passenger jeep of Olivan collided. Dipad filed a civil action for damages.
Dipad claimed that he is entitled of damages because he was not able to use his car for his buy-and-
sell business. But when Dipad was being asked by the defense to produce his Income Tax Return
years 2001-2003, he refused to do so on ground of confidentiality. He claimed that the demand for
his ITR was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition. The MTC judge ordered the
petitioners to show their basis for invoking the confidentiality of the ITR's. Dipad invoked the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on the rule on confidentiality of Income Tax
return.1 Moreover, in a commentary of the NIRC by Gonzales, there is a general rule “that despite a
court order, copies of the income tax returns cannot be furnished in view of the prohibition contained
in Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code.” Eventually, the court required the production of
the ITR's.
Dipad filed a MR, but was denied. He instituted a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 before the RTC alleging that the MTC issued the order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case because the petition filed is
an inappropriate remedy. The error alleged to be committed is error of judgment. Errors of judgment
is correctible by appeal, and not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy in this case?
Whether the ITR's sought to be produced are confidential in nature?

RULING:
I
No. A petition for certiorari is not a mode of appeal. This remedy only corrects errors of
jurisdiction. If the issue involves an error of judgment, it is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45
petition.
Errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.

1 Natinoal Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 71: “Disposition of Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of
Taxpayers and Filers - After the assessment shall have been made, as provided in this Title, the returns, together with
any corrections thereof which may have been made by the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office of the
Commissioner and shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as such upon the order of the President
of the Philippines, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Commissioner.”
 Errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings20 based on a mistake of law or of
fact.
Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or
authority to resolve the issue of confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC's
very judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they claim that the ruling
violated the provisions of the NIRC on the alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

II
No. The commentary was explaining Sec. 270. This provision prohibits employees of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. The provision does
not in any way address the confidentiality of ITR's.Thus, petitioners cannot rely on the inappropriate
provision.
Section 71 is an excerption to the rule on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.
G.R. No. 162757 December 11, 2013
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the instance of the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in whose name the title has been
meanwhile consolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.
FACTS:
Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) appeals the decision of Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed and set aside the order by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8, 2
denying the motion of respondents Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession issued against
them.
The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. Tosecure the
performance of their obligation, they constituteda real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in
Boracay, Aklanand all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated as abeach resort
known as Titay’s South Beach Resort.
Upon theirfailure to settle the obligation, UCPB appliedon November 11, 1998 for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held
on January 12, 1999. Thecertificate of sale was issued on the same day, andUCPB registered the sale
in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the
name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.
On January 7, 2000, the respondents broughtagainst UCPB inthe RTC 3 an action for the annulment
of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages(Civil
Case No. 5920).
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession to recover possession of the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884).-GRANTED and
ISUUE the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual
possession of the property.
The writ of possession was served with a demand for them to peacefully vacate. Although the
possession of the property was turned over to UCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to
temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons.
On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed inthe RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a
petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale.
Special Proceedings No. 5884 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 5920 on March 1, 2002.
On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the
CA which resolved C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70261 by granting the respondents’ petition, setting aside the
assailed orders,and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession "pending the final
disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale.
UCPBsought thereconsiderationof the decision, butthe CA denied itsmotion for reconsiderationon
March 8, 2004.
Hence, UCPB appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
UCPB asserts that the CA did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it
granted the respondents’ petition for certiorariand enjoined the implementation of the writ of
possession issued by the RTC in favor of UCPB;
that the respondents were not entitled to the issuance of an injunctive writ;
that the assailed decision and resolution were tantamount to a pre-judgment of the respondents’
petition to cancel the writ of possession; andthat the respondents were illegally attempting to wrest
away its possession of the property.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is necessary to explain the nature of the writ of possession and the consequencesof its
implementation.
A writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real property. It may be
issued inthe following instances, namely:
(1) Land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided
the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened;
(3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and
(4) Execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC of the province or place where
the property or any part of itis situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the useof the property for a period of
twelve months, to indemnify the debtor shouldit be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135.
The RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the
sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shallthenexecute said order
immediately. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person
against whom the relief is sought.
Its natureas an ex partepetition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the
issuance of a writ of possessiona non-litigious proceeding. 17 Indeed, thegrant of the writ of possession
is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on
the part of the purchaser.18 The judge issuing the orderforthegranting of the writ of possession
pursuant to the express provisions of Act No. 3135cannot be charged with having acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, with UCPB as the highest bidder.
The sheriff issuedthe certificate of saleto UCPB on the same day of the sale. Considering that UCPB
registered the certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999,the period of redemption was one
year from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the respondents within said period, UCPB
consolidated the title over the property in its name.
It isclear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion but acted
inaccordance withthe law and jurisprudence indenying the respondents’ application for the injunctive
writ filed on February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent the implementation of the
writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001.
Consequently, the CAgrossly erred in granting the respondents’ petition for
certiorariand/ormandamus, and in enjoining the RTC from implementing thewrit of possession in
favor of UCPB.
Otherweighty considerations justify resolvingthis appeal in favor of UCPB.
The first is that the CA did not properly appreciate the nature of the supposed error attributed to the
RTC.
Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents’ applicationfor
injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, itserror related only to the
correctapplication of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such,
the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction.An error of judgment is one that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and sucherror is reviewable only throughan
appealtaken in due course.In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained
of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and sucherror is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25
Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over bothCivil Case No. 5920
andSpecial Proceedings No. 5884, it should follow that its consideration and resolution of the
respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884 were taken in
the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the property
was at that point unquestionably entitled to thefull implementation of the writ of possession. In the
absence of any clear and persuasive showing that itcapriciouslyor whimsicallydenied the
respondents’ application,its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The second concerns the CA’s reversing and undoing the RTC’s denial of the respondents’ application
for the injunctive writ, andenjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the
respondents "pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of
the foreclosure sale."27 The CA effectively thereby granted the respondents’ application for the
injunctive writ. In so doing, however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the
injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents held noright in essence that the
injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a
particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctionmay
be justified under any of the following circumstances, namely:
(a)Theapplicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attemptingto do, or is procuring or
suffering to bedone, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be shown to exist prima
facie. Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. The Court
has stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a right in ease to be
protected, stating:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who
possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ arc: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie;
(b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's reversal of
the RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the
CA afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law".
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES the decision
promulgated on November 27, 2003 and the resolution promulgated on March 8, 2004 in C.A.-G.R.
SP. No. 70261; DISMISSES the petition in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261 for lack of factual and legal
merits; DECLARES that there is now no obstacle to the implementation of the writ of possession
issued in favor of the petitioner; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
LIGOT VS REPUBLIC
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari wherein Ligot et al claim that the Court of Appeals (CA) acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its
resolution extending the freeze order issued against the Ligot’s properties for an indefinite period of
time.
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued against him and his family even
though no predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the allegation of money
laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view
of the 6-month extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The
CA, in extending the freeze order, not only unduly deprived him and his family of their property, in
violation of due process, but also penalized them before they had been convicted of the crimes they
stand accused of.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the said freeze order.
RULING: (Generally) NO. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order.
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available in cases
involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal
shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs
otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity
period of the freeze order over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of their petition
shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the
applicability of the 6-month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall
outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As held in People v. Court
of Appeals:
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving
only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the
appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not
a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.25 (citations omitted; italics supplied)
EXCEPTION: However, considering the issue of due process squarely brought before us in the face of
an apparent conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this Court finds it imperative to relax the application of the rules of
procedure and resolve this case on the merits in the interest of justice
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lipa due to failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City
for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months.
However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his
family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification.
Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of
Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of
private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City,
and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure
to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the
pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the
duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position.
He accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari
with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a
Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
RULING: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into
an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty
to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.
As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule
64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence,
shall be final and non-reviewable.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari
case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this
regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is
not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the
May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELEC’s
appreciation thereof.
Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in
denying his COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The court here defined what grave abuse of
discretion is; and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of Lipa and the SC granted his petition.
AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid, Petitioners, vs. MELANIO B. YUAG, Respondent
FACTS: Respondent Melanio Yuag worked for petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid as a driver in his trucking
business, delivering sacks of sugar from the Busco Sugar Mill to the port of CDO City. He was hired
on February 28, 2002 and earns on a commission basis of 9% of his gross delivery per trip. During
the course of his employment, petitioner received reports that that the respondent was incurring
substantial shortages in his deliveries since September 30, 2004 (see notes), was illegally selling bags
of sugar at a lower price along the way, and was banned from entry into the premises of Busco Sugar
Mill. When confronted, the respondent remained quiet. As a result of the reports, the petitioner
monitored the activities of all its drivers, instructing them to report their location from time to time as
well as deliver their assigned cargoes by convoy to avoid the illegal sale o f cargo.
On December 4, 2004, the respondent was assigned to deliver bags of sugar from CDO to the Coca-
Cola Bottlers Plant, along with other drivers. The respondent could not be reached through his
cellphone during the course of the trip. The Coca-Cola Plant later reported that the delivery he made
had an enormous amount of shortage. When the goods were subsequently weighed on December 9, it
was found out that there was a shortage of 111 bags of sugar equivalent to P166, 000.00. When the
respondent reported for work on December 6, the petitioner confronted respondent who remained
quiet. As a result, the petitioner told the respondent to “take a rest”, which the respondent construed
as a dismissal.
The respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal on the very day of confrontation with the Labor
Arbiter.
The petitioner argued that he merely told the respondent to “take a rest”, which was not a dismissal
but a temporary break, since the company’s clients had lost their confidence in the respondents. He
alleged that as a response, the respondent demanded offered to resign and demanded separation pay,
which the former could not grant at the time as it would entail computation by the cashier. He told
the respondent to come back the next day but he did not.
The respondent claimed on the other hand that his cellphone battery was drained, the reason for his
failure to answer the petitioner’s calls. The petitioner was allegedly enraged and during their
confrontation, shouted at him to take a rest. When he asked for a clarification, petitioner allegedly
told him, “No more talking! Take a rest!” which he construed to be a dismissal. When he asked for his
separation pay, the petitioner refused, hence the complaint.
The LA ruled in favor of the respondent, ruling that the respondent was illegally dismissed and
ordered payment of his separation pay and proportionate 13th month pay. The LA stated that the
petitioner failed to prove the alleged shortages committed by the respondent and to afford him due
process before he was terminated.
The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA, dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC
stated that the respondent had the burden of proving that he was dismissed from his job by the
petitioner, which he failed to do, as there was no proof showing any overt act subsequently done by
the petitioner that would suggest he carried out the intention of dismissing the respondent when he
said, “Pahulay naka!” (You take a rest). Instead, the respondent was merely considered on leave of
absence without pay pending his new assignment. It also held that the respondent was not entitled to
the payment of 13th month pay as he was paid on a commission basis, which was an exception
under PD 851 (the law requiring employers to pay their employees 13th month pay.)
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 days after the period to file had already elapsed.
The NLRC denied the MR for being filed out of time hence, the respondent filed a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA reversed the NLRC ruling, brushing aside the “technicality issues” and proceeding to resolve
the substantive issues, such as the existence of an e-e relationship between the petitioner and
respondent, and the legality of the dismissal of the latter. It ordered the payment of full backwages to
the respondent, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, temperate damages and exemplary damages.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in its reversal of the NLRC decision
RULING: YES. First, in its decision, the CA proceeded to review the records of the case and to rule
on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. The issue before the NLRC, which was whether the petitioner’s
telling the respondent to “take a break” was an overt act of dismissal was not discussed by the CA.
Second, there were patent errors in the decision of the CA, such as its ruling that the NLRC refused
to grant the award of separation pay because the respondent had not been found to be a regular
employee, when the NLRC made no such ruling. The refusal by the NLRC to grant separation pay was
merely consistent with its ruling that there was no dismissal.

Third, the CA entertained the Petition for Certiorari by the respondent despite the prescribed Motion
for Reconsideration with the NLRC. Since the respondent failed to file the MR within the reglementary
period provided by law, the Resolution of the NLRC has already become final and could no longer be
modified by the CA (see notes). An MR filed out of time could not reopen a final and executory
judgment by the NLRC. Since the CA could no longer modify the NLRC Resolution, the modification of
the award cannot be done either (see notes). The NLRC Resolution had become final and executoy 25
days before the respondent filed his MR, thus, subsequent proceedings and modifications are not
allowed and are deemed null and void.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed 23 June 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its 20 December 2010 Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE. The 30 November
2006 and 30 March 2010 Resolutions of the NLRC are AFFIRMED and sustained.
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: On or about September 1,1991, the private respondents, Abelardo Palanqui, the then
Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, without being authorized by the Sanguniang Bayan,
entered into a Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by accused
Wilfredo Cunanan, whereby the municipality leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell
and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty (30)
days, which equipment items were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto
and Pakulayo. The accused caused it to appear that the work had been accomplished, but actually no
work had been ever done, thus, payment was made and received by Wilfredo Cunanan, for the
supposed project.
The private respondents then charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, for
they took advantage of their positions as public officers, while performing their duties in relation to
their offices, did then and there with evident bad faith causes undue injury to the government for
granting unwarranted benefits to J.S Lim Construction.
All private respondents pleaded not guilty as to the crime charged against them, and since the
prosecution failed to show evidences as to prove the guilt of the private respondents, the court
acquitted all private respondents, unsatisfied with the court’s decision, hence, this present petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: (1.) Whether the court erred in relying to mere assumption rather than on the evidence on
records;
(2.) Whether the court committed an error of judgment or error of jurisdiction.
HELD: The court finds the petition unmeritorious.
First. The court ruled as it reiterated the one cited in the case of People vs Tria-Tirona:
After trial on merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a
finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
As it is also stated in another case of First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
The present petition is to overturn the decision of the Sandiganbayan that dredging were actually
done along Palto and Pakulayo River. However, the prosecution failed to established a clear evidence
being not all the elements of the crime charged are present.
The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error of judgment, not an error of
jurisdiction. Respondent trial court clearly stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its
conclusion that the project was actually undertaken, justifying payment to the contractor. Clearly,
petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in denial of due process.
There being no mistrial in this case, the acquittal of private respondents can no longer be reviewed by
the Court as this would constitute a violation of the constitutional right against double jeopardy, and
since this is an error of judgment petitioner is not entitled to extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was dismissed and the earlier decision is hereby affirmed.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II
FACTS: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, a banking entity organized and doing business
under the laws of the Philippines, represented by LUCILA Y. UY, its Senior Manager.
Accused, Dominador Ong, under trust Receipts dated September 6, 1989 and September 15, 1989
executed by the said Dominador Ong/Sun Ray Metal, Inc. in favor of the said Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, received in trust from the latter the trust receipt or all valued at P413,133.00 for the
purpose of holding the said merchandise in trust under the express obligation on his part to dispose
of the same and turn over the proceeds of the sale to the said bank, if sold, or to the account for or
return the same, if unsold, on its due date or upon demand, but the said accused, once in possession
of the same, the accused with intent to gain, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same or the
value thereof, to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
The prosecution showed that Sun Ray Metal, Inc. purchased brass metals and aluminum wires
separately through two (2) letters of credit[3] issued by the petitioner bank in favor of the supplier of
the raw materials. To secure the obligation by Sun Ray Metal, Inc. to the petitioner bank, the private
respondent, in his capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc., executed two (2) trust receipts [4] in
favor of the petitioner bank. However, despite repeated demands, the private respondent failed to pay
the petitioner bank the proceeds of the sale of the raw materials or to turn over the said materials in
case of his failure to sell the same.
The prosecution offered its documentary evidence. The defense presented its evidence to show that
herein private respondent signed the trust receipts in blank and that he was acting only in his
capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc. and the petitioner bank has been novated when a
representative of the bank verbally proposed to restructure the obligation. Private respondent claimed
that he paid thrice under the restructuring agreement and showed as proof of the said novation a
receipt evidencing one of his payments to the petitioner bank.
The prosecution presented Lucila Uy, as rebuttal witness to refute the claim of the defense that there
has been a novation of the obligation under the trust receipts.
The public respondent promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused Dominador Ong for failure to
establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the petition.
HELD: Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when the latter acquitted the private respondent.
Conversely, there cannot be a grave abuse of discretion where the trial court gave both parties the
opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda from which its
decision is based, as in this case. In other words, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no
grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy
rule.
the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is no indication
or proof that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of the trial court’s decision
of acquittal will put the private respondent in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1)
upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as argued by the petitioner in this
petition, such are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari
proceeding.
Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual question that
cannot be reviewed not only because the decision of the trial court is now final but also because a
review of such question at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of the accused
against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
It bears stressing that whenever a criminal case is prosecuted and the State is the offended party, the
case must always be prosecuted under the control and guidance of the State through its government
prosecutors. Accordingly, whenever there is an acquittal or dismissal of a criminal case and the
private complainant intends to question such an acquittal or dismissal, the same must likewise be
undertaken by the State through the Solicitor General. This, petitioner failed to comply.
The present petition for certiorari before this Court was filed by petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company. It was not initiated by the Solicitor General. In fact, the Solicitor General intimated
to this Court in his comment that a reversal of the assailed judgment would place the private
respondent in double jeopardy.
Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In this case, petitioner’s action does not concern the civil aspect of the case but the validity of the
judgment itself. Indeed, petitioner does not actually question the award of damages. What he
contends is that the trial court decided the case outside the issues made out by the pleadings and
thereby deprived the prosecution of due process.
The instant petition should be dismissed not only for lack of merit but also for lack of legal
personality on the part of the petitioner to appeal the public respondent’s ruling on the criminal
aspect of the case.
1. In Criminal Cases

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ASIS

On October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o'clock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo was riding his
motorcycle when he was met by private complainants Kennard Majait , Joeniel Calvez and Jose
Montes. An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in
the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt. Abordo was charged with two (2) counts
of attempted murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder. The trial court found no treachery and
evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,[2] the RTC held Abordo liable only for
Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to
Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a
supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial
Prosecutor filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait's motion for reconsideration while Calvez's
motion to withdraw was granted.
The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court,
the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. Moreover, the petition
for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact - a mistake of judgment - appeal
is the remedy. In view of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from
a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It appears to us that
the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez when it
questioned the dismissal of the latter's Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the
civil aspect of the case.
In filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse
is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal. Hence, this petition is
dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of
judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.
The OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari.
HELD: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of
acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.

However, in several cases, it may not be the proper remedy, as an exception, a judgment of acquittal
in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion (People v. Louel Uy).

Appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused's demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal
order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.

The OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of
that remedy.

However, it need not to remand the case to the Court of Appeals, because the OSG's petition
for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be
given due course simply because it is bereft of merit.

While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

RATIO: The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is
no double jeopardy.
It further pointed out that the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.

What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved
without violating Abordo's constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy.
The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is
apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the
parties.

In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent
in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.

The CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground
that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the
petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

PEOPLE VS TRIA-TIRONA

FACTS: Armed with two search warrants, members of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Anti-Organized Crime Division, together with members of the NBI Special Investigation Division and
the Presidential Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Task Force Hammer Head serving as security,
conducted a search on the house of accused-private respondent located on Banawe, Quezon City.

The accused, Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot, have in his possession Four Hundred Ninety-Eight
point One Thousand Ninety-Four (498.1094) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) a
regulated drug without any license, permit, prescription or authority coming from any government
office, bureau, agency, or department authorized to issue such license, permit, prescription or
authority in blatant violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended by RA 7659.

During arraignment, the private respondent pleaded not guilty and after trial on the merits, public
respondent rendered a decision acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable doubt.

The acquittal of private respondent, is being assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent,
committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when
considered, would lead to the inevitable conclusion of the latter’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused . .
. goes deeply into the trial court’s appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the
parties.

On 10 November 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.

Private respondent Muyot filed his memorandum on 4 March 2005, invoking the Rule of Double
Jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of respondent court for acquitting private respondent may be
reviewed by filing petition for certiorari.
HELD: The fact that we gave due course to the petition means that the issue on the sufficiency of the
evidence in this case may be reviewed. It added that a petition for certiorari should be an available
remedy to question the acquittal of the accused (People Vs. Velasco).

An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the
trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked
because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.

The fact that the petition was given due course does not necessarily mean we have to look into the
sufficiency of the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the appealability of an acquittal.

There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if
we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation
of the accused’s right against double jeopardy.

An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 159288. October 19, 2004
JOHNSON LEE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE MARKETING,
INC.,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was incorporated on January 27, 1978 with funds provided by the
Uy Family. It had an authorized capital stock of P3 million divided into 30,000 shares with a par
value of P100 per share.
There were two stock dividend declarations, one on June 7, 1980 in the amount of P60,000.00 and
another on May 2, 1981 for P40,000.00. On May 15, 1986 Eugenio Flores, Jr. assigned/divested
himself of his shares in favor of Sonny Moreno, 1,050 shares; Arsenio Yang, Jr., 700 shares and
Charles O. Sy, 700 shares.
On June 11, 1987, the NMI sold and delivered to the Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMCI), in
Victorias, Negros Occidental, 77,500 pieces of empty white bags for the price of P565,750.00. NMI
issued Charge Invoice No. 0809.
n June 18, 1987, VMCI purchased 100,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for P730,000.00 for
which NMI issued Charge Invoice No. 0810.
On June 25, 1987, VMCI again purchased 28,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for the price
of P204,400.00 and the latter issued Charge Invoice No. 0811
In payment of said purchases from NMI, VMCI drew and issued two Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) Checks: Check No. 068706 dated August 3, 1987 in the amount of P565,750.00and Check No.
068993 dated August 19, 1987 in the amount of P934,400.00.
On October 13, 1987, 2/3 of NMI voted to call a stockholders’ meeting and the agenda was the
dissolution of the corporation.
October 24, 1987 in Bacolod City. The following stockholders, who were also directors, were present
and voted to dissolve the corporation
Name of Stockholders Number of Shares
Arsenio Yang, Jr. 1,050
Charles Sy 2,800
Lok Chun Suen 1,400
Total 5,250
Notices were again sent to all stockholders of record, all of whom properly acknowledged the said
notices, that a meeting was to be held on November 30, 1987 to consider the dissolution of the
corporation
On March 22, 1988, Johnson Lee, Sonny Moreno, Leoncio Tan and Nicanor Martin filed a petition
with the Securities and Investigation Clearing Department (SICD) of the Commission praying, among
other things, for the annulment or nullification of the Certification of Filing of Resolution of Voluntary
Dissolution of NMI for being contrary to law and its by-laws.
In the meantime, the trustee wrote the petitioner, Johnson Lee, on March 8, 1988 requesting him to
turn over to it the P1,500,150.00 he received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI.
However, he failed to do so.
A verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa was filed against the petitioner and Sonny Moreno
with the City Prosecutor’s Office.
During the requisite preliminary investigation, the petitioner and Moreno submitted their counter-
affidavits. After the investigation, two (2) Amended Informations were filed against the petitioner and
Moreno, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who testified that she saw the two
checks in the office of the petitioner at the Singson Building, Plaza Moraga, Sta. Cruz, Manila
Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, declared that the records section of VMCI,
which had custody of all checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She testified that
the checks, including their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985.
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered in evidence the counter-affidavit of the petitioner during
the preliminary investigation, as well as the charge invoices and checks.
The accused objected to the admission of the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices on the
ground that the best evidence were the original copies thereof.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, claiming that the prosecution failed to
prove the authenticity and due execution of the offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission
thereof as secondary evidence. They also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner alleged that -
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
admitting in evidence the People’s documentary evidence, consisting of mere unauthenticated
photocopies, in flagrant violation of the Best Evidence Rule (Sec. 3, 4, 5 and 6, Rule 130), despite the
repeated vehement objections of the petitioner, thereby wantonly refusing to exclude such clearly
inadmissible evidence, which actuation as embodied in his two (2) assailed Orders, is capricious,
whimsical and patently erroneous, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, and the remedy of ordinary
appeal would not afford petitioner adequate and expeditious relief, for while available eventually,
such remedy is cumbersome for it requires petitioner to undergo a useless and time-consuming trial,
and thus becomes an oppressive exercise of judicial authority; hence, the imperative necessity for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring respondent judge to
refrain from further proceeding with Crim. Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 until the Petition shall have
been disposed of, otherwise, failure of justice is sure to ensue.
On March 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the petition at bar is the proper remedy of the petitioner
(b) whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in admitting in evidence the photocopies of the checks and charge invoices in lieu
of the original copies thereof.
HELD:
We held that for a petition for certiorari or prohibition to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate,
plainly and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ.
The trial court acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case;
there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the
case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the
public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its
judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. 27 A petition for
certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for
certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.28
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving
only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by
the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is
not a remedy to correct errors of judgment.29 An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 30 Certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors made by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law thereon. 31 As long as the
court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will
amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party
raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only
questions of law are involved.
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public
respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the
charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if
erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission
of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. 33 Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court
admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission
of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after
trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions
We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of
discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
 A petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent
court acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment which can be reviewed or corrected on appeal.
But it must be stressed that, even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would
not have automatically given rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
general rule is that, where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the
merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration was filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 would
still be unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. The petition
before the Court of Appeals, subject of this appeal, did not allege any of such grounds.
Furthermore, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before
this Court only allows questions of law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

TAN Y CHUA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On 12 December 1996, petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy.

On 23 December 1996, petitioner applied for probation.

On 8 January 1997, the application was granted by the trial court but the release order was withheld
in view of the filing by the prosecution.

On 21 January 1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty.

The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having been filed out of time since the
decision sought to be modified had already attained finality.

On 13 July 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court and elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in a decision, dated 18 August 2000, dismissed petitioner's appeal on the
ground that petitioner raised a pure question of law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, on 18 May 2001, was denied by the appellate
court. The petition for review on certiorari before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to an appeal after he has applied for probation.

HELD: Petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court.
Ordinarily, the Court should have the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Section 3(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

"Section 3. How appeal is taken. –

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party.

The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998, three days after the questioned
decision was promulgated.

The clear impingement upon petitioner's basic right against double jeopardy, however, should here
warrant the exercise of the prerogative by this Court to relax the stringent application of the rules on
the matter. When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it
had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the
previous verdict could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality.

Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states –

"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation"

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best: Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment or conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only, filed
in the trial court and deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision and writes finis to the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The amendatory judgment of the trial court is set
aside and the decision dated December 12, 1996, is reinstated.

B. Power of the reviewing court

V.C. PONCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE and SAMPAGUITA HILLS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.,Respondents.
"It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party x x x when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure."
FACTS: On October 5, 1987, respondent Municipality (now City) of Parañaque (municipality) filed a
complaint7 against petitioner VCP for the expropriation of its property, which is located in the
municipality’s Barrio San Dionisio and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 116554. 8 The
municipality intended to develop the property for its landless residents, in line with the Presidential
Commission on Urban Poor’s classification of the site as an area of priority development.
On August 23, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, Branch 274, sustained the
municipality’s right to expropriate the said property11 and to a writ of possession.12 The trial court
also informed the parties in the same Order of the reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation, thus:
The defenses having thus been ruled upon, the Court hereby declares that the plaintiff has the lawful
right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of
the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first
The parties did not file any objection to the above Order and proceeded to submit the names of their
respective nominees for commissioner. On February 26, 2003, the trial court appointed three
commissioners14 to assist in ascertaining the just compensation
VCP did not participate in the meetings despite notification17 and that, due to time constraints,18 the
commissioners denied19 VCP’s request for an additional four months to submit its independent
valuation of the property
VCP moved for a reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated August 15, 2005
Upon receipt, it filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time (MOTEX) to File Petition for
Cerrtiorari,32 which the CA granted.
CA ruled; observed that an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 was available to petitioner and would have
constituted a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to correct any perceived error in the RTC
Decision. VCP, for unknown reasons, failed to avail itself of the said remedy within the
reglementary period. Having lost its right to appeal, VCP resorted to a Petition for Certiorari in
the hope that it could nevertheless, obtain a reversal of the RTC Decision. The CA held that
certiorari is unavailing as a substitute for a lost appeal. The CA brushed aside as unfounded
VCP’s excuse that an appeal would be slow and inadequate. Such excuse, it noted, would
allow any litigant to avail itself of extraordinary remedies after they lose their right to appeal.
The CA then held that, even if it were to rule that certiorari is proper, it would still dismiss the
petition for certiorari. It held that grave abuse of discretion was not attendant in the trial
court’s rejection of the commissioners’ report. The CA explained that the trial court has such
authority as long as it finds just cause. The report’s contravention of the principle regarding
the proper reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is such a cause.
Hence this petition.
Upon receipt, it filed a MOTEX of time to file a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it has
yet to engage the services of a new counsel and requested another 15-day to file its MR.
Denied for the same cannot be extended.
Issues
1. Is petitioner’s lack of counsel a justifiable excuse for the late filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration?
2. Is a Petition for Certiorari the proper remedy to correct alleged errors in the trial court’s
Decision?
Held:
Petition has no merit. Based on Rule 52 of the Rules of Court 57 and Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), VCP had 15 days from its receipt of the Decision, or until April 25,
2007, to file a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a motion for new trial. Failure to file the
necessary pleading within the reglementary period would render the CA Decision final and executory.
The Court has pronounced strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Judge Japson61that "no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)."62 Since the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration is not extendible, VCP’s MOTEX did not toll the reglementary period. 63 Thus, there
being no Motion for Reconsideration as of April 25, 2007, the Decision of the CA dated March 23,
2007 became final and executory by operation of law.64 The CA was correct in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration that VCP had belatedly filed on May 25, 2007 as its lateness had rendered it moot.
There is no justification for the
application of equity and for the
relaxation of the rules.
The Court, in the interest of equity and justice, sometimes allows a liberal reading of the rules, so
long as the petitioner is able to prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-
observance.65 The Court, however, does not find a justification to warrant such relaxation in this
instance.
It is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel. 66 VCP knew
since August 29, 2006, seven months before the CA rendered its Decision, that it had no counsel.
Despite its knowledge, it did not immediately hire a lawyer to attend to its affairs. Instead, it waited
until the last minute, when it had already received the adverse CA Decision on April 10, 2007, to
search for a counsel; and even then, VCP did not rush to meet the deadline. It asked for an extension
of 30 days to file a Motion for Reconsideration.67 It finally retained the services of a new counsel on
May 24, 2007,68 nine months from the time that its former counsel withdrew her appearance. VCP
did not even attempt to explain its inaction. The Court cannot grant equity where it is clearly
undeserved by a grossly negligent party.69 As the Court pronounced in another case:
x x x Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the
respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.
Furthermore, the failure to file x x x on time was due primarily to petitioners’ unwise choices x x x.
They hired their subsequent lawyers too late.
It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their
original lawyer or consent to let him go. x x x They delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer.
Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence x x x are the main culprits for the situation they
now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to
respondents. Petitioners’ low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements x x
x has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of justice, in the present case. 70
This Court cannot ascribe good faith to
VCP as it had neglected reglementary
periods in the past.
Another reason that this Court is unable to accept VCP’s plea for indulgence is its observation that
VCP has a penchant for disregarding procedural rules and the periods allotted to it for its action
Appeal is a sufficient and adequate
remedy unless the party proves
otherwise.
A court with appellate jurisdiction can review both the facts and the law, including questions of
jurisdiction.72 It can set aside an erroneous decision and even nullify the same, if warranted. Appeal
is a speedy remedy, as an adverse party can file its appeal from a final decision or order immediately
after receiving it. A party, who is alleging that an appeal will not promptly relieve it of the injurious
effects of the judgment, should establish facts to show how the appeal is not speedy or
adequate.73 VCP’s empty protestations, therefore, fail to impress. There is no reason, and VCP cannot
explain, why an appeal would not be speedy and adequate to address its assigned errors. 74 VCP
cannot complain of delay because it was guilty of delay itself, and it even waited until the 58th day of
its receipt of the CA Decision before taking action. Clearly, petitioner resorted to certiorari as a
substitute for its lost appeal.75 The CA did not err in dismissing the same.
E. DOCTRINES INVOLVED AFFECTING JURISDICTION AND THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
i. Doctrine of PRIMARY JURISDICTION in relation to doctrine of EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
G.R. No. 196842 October 9, 2013
ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and ROSA S. BUSUEGO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office
of the Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional
Hospital, Apokon, Tagum City.
Sia and De Leon(mistresses) were subsequently impleaded. But the two failed to submit their
respective affidavits within a period of time. After investigation, the same office found that Busuega
and Sia are probably guilty, hence ordered that the case be filed in appropriate court. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON there was grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict him
and Sia for Concubinage
Held:
Petition denied. The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why judicial review of the resolution of
the Ombudsman in the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and prosecute felonies and/or
offenses of public officers is limited to a determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute their
judgment for that of the Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. In this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman's
abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion.
The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office,
had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, 17 and
affirmed in subsequent cases:
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan
Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies
such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from
any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices.
In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan was a public officer who was charged
with coup d’etat for the occupation of Oakwood on 27 July 2003, the preliminary investigation
therefor was conducted by the DOJ. Honasan questioned the jurisdiction of the DOJ to do so,
proferring that it was the Ombudsman which had jurisdiction since the imputed acts were committed
in relation to his public office. We clarified that the DOJ and the Ombudsman have concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees. Nonetheless, we pointed out
that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. Plainly, applying that ruling in this case, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosa’s complaint, and after choosing to exercise
such jurisdiction, need not defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In
other words, the Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DOJ.

G.R. No. 166330 September 11, 2013

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA, GREGORIO V. MANSANO, JERRY
CORPUZ and ESTELITAACOSTA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On March 9, 2000,
petitioner entered into a contract of lease4 with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to
lease to the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay
Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor, Allarilla Construction,
immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the
cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and
transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power
generator. Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and
establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U.
Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.
Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of
nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction because SMART’s tower being constructed at Vira, Roxas, Isabela, is weak, unstable, and
infirm, susceptible to collapse like the Mobiline tower which fell during a typhoon as earlier alleged,
and its structural integrity being doubtful, and not earthquake proof, this tower poses great danger to
life and limb of persons as well as their property, particularly, the respondents whose houses a but,
or are near or within the periphery of the communications tower;
Further, the tower is powered by a standby generator that emits noxious and deleterious fumes, not
to mention the constant noise it produces, hence, a hazard to the health, not only of the respondents,
but the residents in the area as well;
When in operation, the tower would also pose danger to the life and health of respondents and
residents of the barangay, especially children, because of the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio wave
emissions it radiates. Only recently, Cable News Network (CNN) reported that cell phones, with
minimal radiated power, are dangerous to children, so more it is for this communications tower,
whose radiated power is thousands of times more than that of a cellphone;
Worse, and in violation of law, petitioner constructed the tower without the necessary public hearing,
permit of the barangay, as well as that of the municipality, the Environmental Compliance Certificate
of the [Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)],construction permit, and other
requirements of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint. The respondents averred that among others that it belies
the petitioner’s claim that it sought the consent of the majority of the respondents surrounding the tower site as
there where only a handful of residents signed the document prepared by petitioner and the contents of which were
misrepresented by a Sangguniang Bayan Member in the person of Nick Sebastian who is an interested party being the
owner of the land where the tower is constructed.
The petitioner filed as well a Motion for Summary Judgment which was, later on granted by RTC. The residents
then filed a memorandum stating that the test was conducted onNovember 14 and 15, 2000 and the result shows
that the
petitioner’s power generator failed the noise emission test, day and night time.
RTC ruled in favor of Smart dismissing the complaint as the allegations therein are purely speculative and hence no
basis in fact to warrant further proceedings of this case.

Appeal to CA which declared the cellular base station of petitioner a nuisance that endangered the health and
safety of the residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational clearance granted to petitioner was a
nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution
endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base
station exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) standards.

Issue:
WON CA erred when it encroached upon an executive function of determining the validity of a locational clearance
when it declared, contrary to the administrative findings of the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board("HLURB"),
that the locational clearance of Petitioner was void
HELD:
Based on the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of and rule upon the issue of the
validity or nullity of petitioner’slocational clearance for its cellular base station.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction were
explained at length by the Court in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 25 as follows:
The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence,
if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the
court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons.
Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition
of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to
give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
xxxx
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.
In Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic & Social Organization, Inc. v. Megaworld Properties & Holdings,
Inc., et al.,26 citing Republic v. Lacap,27 to wit:
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas
of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses
and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of
justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that
is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
In this case, there is no showing that respondents availed themselves of theafore-mentioned administrative
remedies prior to instituting the case before the RTC. While there are accepted exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Respondents never asserted
nor argued any of them. Thus, there is no cogent reason for the Court to apply the exceptions instead of the
general rule to this case
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise
in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed
upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to
uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within
reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is
acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
PARTIALLY GRANTED
Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand, respondents'
health, safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business interest and the public's need for
accessible and better cellular mobile telephone services, the wise and prudent course to take is to
remand the case to the RTC for trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective
factual claims.
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,
vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S.
ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M.
MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged
in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF
Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2 130 residential
lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters
for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds
of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to
San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565
square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San
Miguel Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. It claimed that it withheld the delivery of
the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced
as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.
San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City
(OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-
2256). At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs
in its favor.
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by
contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain
did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as
BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the
lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the
SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend
all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its
powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the
distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending
receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the
action.
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Piñas, 8 citing the
pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. The OCP Las Piñas then rendered its
resolution,10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the
SEC that had appointed him; and there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of
the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative
jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for
not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale. Likewise that, BF officers cannot be held
liable.
San Miguel appealed to DOJ. The latter did not disturb the decision of OCP Las Pinas. Case was
elevated to CA but it denied the same; the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on
prejudicial question generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In
this case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution
of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of
the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the
rule on prejudicial question.
Issue: WON Court of Appeals committed grave, serious and reversible errors when it dismissed
petitioner’s certiorari and mandamus petition to order and direct respondent secretary to indict
respondents for violation of section 25, pd. 957
Held: The petition has no merit. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case
for specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is
correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is
so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 22 The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. 23 The essential
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San
Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge
for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because
the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. 25
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in
the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party
bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first
be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment,
if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in
view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude
of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of
the registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it
prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its
provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede
that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery
of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale
due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to
proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested
its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. 30
________________________________________________________________________________________
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of
in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies
but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution.
The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and
the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function
exercisable only by the regular courts.31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills,
and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of
the courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but
only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are
threshed out and determined.32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy
having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a
regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the
administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a
question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that
question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to
ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action
*** San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’
directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension
unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do
away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of
rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the
procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to
be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable
consequences.
G.R. No. 175039 April 18, 2012
ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC & SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL, in his capacity as
Director, NCR, and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,Respondents.
FACTS:
[Private respondent] MEGAWORLD was the registered owner of a parcel of land located along Lee
Street, Barangay Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City with an area of 6,148 square meters, more or less,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12768, issued by the Register of Deeds for
Mandaluyong City.
MEGAWORLD conceptualized the construction of a residential condominium complex on the said
parcel of land called the Wack-Wack Heights Condominium consisting of a cluster of six (6) four-
storey buildings and one (1) seventeen (17) storey tower. Thereafter secured the necessary clearances,
licenses and permits for the condominium project.
When construction begaun, the plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, docketed as Civil Case No. 65171, for yo (sic) annul the Building
Permit, CLV, ECC and Development Permit granted to MEGAWORLD; to prohibit the issuance to
MEGAWORLD of Certificate of Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units; and to
permanently enjoin local and national building officials from issuing licenses and permits to
MEGAWORLD.
Megaworld filed a Motion to Dismiss but RTC denied. Subsequently, Megaworld filed its Anwer and
pre-trial commenced. RTC favored AHMCSO declared licenses void. Megaworld appealed before CA.
The latter reversed RTC’s decision. Herein petitioner moved for reconsideration but then denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON CA erred when it found that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial intervention from the courts.
WON CA erred when it found that the case filed before and decided by the regional trial court of
pasig, branch 158, does not fall under any one of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
WON CA erred when it found that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial intervention from the courts.
WON CA erred when it concluded that the hlurb had jurisdiction over actions to annul certificates of
locational viability and development permits.
HELD: Petition has no merit. It is long settled, by law and jurisprudence, that the Court is not a trier
of facts.10Therefore, the only relevant issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the remedy
sought by the petitioner in the trial court is in violation of the legal principle of the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas
of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses
and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of
justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. 11
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,12 we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of
all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.13
It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in Lacap, we also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g)
when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. x x x.14
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, we find that none of the aforementioned
exceptions exist in the case at bar.
In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellee AHMCSO failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies
before seeking judicial intervention via a petition for annulment. The power to act as appellate body
over decisions and actions of local and regional planning and zoning bodies and deputized official of
the board was retained by the HLURB and remained unaffected by the devolution under the Local
Government Code.
Under the rules of the HLURB then prevailing at the time this case was filed, a complaint to annul
any permit issued by the HLURB may be filed before the Housing and Land Use Arbiter
(HLA). The decision of the HLA may be brought to the Board of Commissioners by Petition for
Certiorari and the decision of the Board of Commissioners [is] appealable to the Office of the
President.16(Citations omitted; emphases supplied.)
HONORIO SAAVEDRA, JR., ESTER SAAVEDRA, CESAR SAAVEDRA, & ROEL
BEJASA, petitioners,
vs.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GREGORIO RAMOS, NAPOLEN RAMOS, CELSO
TINGCUNGCO, ARMANDO DOMINGO & CAROLINA SEBASTIAN, respondents
FACTS:
Private respondents in the above-mentioned case(Gregorio Ramos. et al., vs. Honorio Saavedra, et al.)
with the SEC, alleging in then amended complaint that, on or above 2 July 1981, private respondents
sold all their stocks, lights and interests in Philippine Inc. to petitioners for the sum of P12 million
payable in installments.
The parties agreed that the sale agreement would automatically be rescinded upon failure on the part
of petitioners to pay any amount due; that petitioners failed to pay the last sum due on the scheduled
date, so that private respondents rescinded the sale under an instrument, Rescission of
Memorandum of Agreement. Private respondents prayed, among others, that said instrument of
rescission be declared as having been made and executed -in accordance with law and that a
Temporary Restraining Order be issued to enjoin petitioners from ... "committing acts of disposal of
the Company assets, merchandise stocks, equipment's, machineries and other company
paraphernalia."
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the SEC.
SEC denied the same. Hence, the present recourse by petitioners to this Court.
Issue:
WON SEC lack jurisdiction over the case
Held:
Petition dismissed. As aptly held by the SEC, the dispute at bar is an intra-corporate dispute that has
arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the corporation due to the refusal of the
defendants (now petitioners) to fully comply with what has been covenanted by the parties. Such
dispute involves a controversy "between and among stockholders,' specifically as to plaintiffs' right, as
stockholders, over unpaid assignment of shares and the validity of defendants' acquisition of the
same. 1 In other words, the present case involves an intra-corporate dispute as to who has the right
to remain and act as owners-stockholders of the corporation.
Pursuant to PD No. 902-A, as amended, particularly Section 5(b) thereof, the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case properly belongs to the SEC. The pertinent provision reads:
SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative function of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnership and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
5(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates;
between any and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity; ...
In Abejo vs. de la Cruz, 2 citing Philex Mining Corporation vs. Reyes, the Court held that "an intra-
corporate controversy is one which arises between stockholder and the corporation. There is no
distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds
of controversies between stockholders and corporations."
In the same case of Abejo vs. de la Cruz, the Court expounded on the expanded jurisdiction of the
SEC in line with the government's policy of encouraging investments, and more active public
participation in the affairs of private corporations and enterprises through which desirable activities
may be pursued for the promotion of economic development, and to promote a wider and more
meaningful equitable distribution of wealth. The expanded jurisdiction of SEC includes absolute
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations, who are the
grantees of primary franchise and/or a license or permit issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines (Sec. 3, PD 902-A as amended); ... and, in addition to its regulatory and adjudicative
functions over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under laws and decrees, original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business
associations, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners,
members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and
among stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and
the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist sa such
entity;
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.

In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the same to an administrative
agency of special competence. As early as 1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers vs.
Samar Mining Co. Inc.3 held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction " ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
premises of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this Court speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee said:
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge. experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
 indispensable. 4
BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILS V TANTUICO
FACTS: Sometime in 1976, the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a
special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had received.
As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the
petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the
Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various
letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to collect the short levies and overpaid
subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to
remit the amount due.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decisions
has become moot.

RULING: In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that acts were done with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Case dismissed.
Petitioners contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is
confined to government-owned or controlled corporations.
Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall
have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by
or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the
Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established
rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or
audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors. n view of the above considerations,
we apply the principle of primary jurisdiction:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence. As early as 1954, the Court in Pambujan Sur
United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. (94 Phil. 932,941), held that under the sense-
making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered." Recently, this Court specaking thru Mr.
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee said that "In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable." The court reminds us that The legal presumption is that official duty has been
duly performed.
1. EXCEPTION: DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

PROVINCE OF AKLAN VS JODY KING CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

FACTS: The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction entered into a contract for the design and
construction of the Caticlan Port and terminal (phase 1). In the course of construction, Petitioner
Aklan issued a change orders for additional works and again entered into a negotiated contract with
respondent for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase 2). After the construction of
Phase 1 and change orders were agreed, respondent allegedly failed to settle. Then, respondent sued
petitioner to RTC for collection a sum of money. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, Petitioner denied any unpaid balance. RTC rendered decision in favour of respondent,
issued a writ execution and garnished petitioners funds deposited in different banks. Petitioner filed
petition in the CA, but it was denied for its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration and is
stopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it stopped from making the doctrine or
primary jurisdiction as it only raised after its notice of appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. COA has primary jurisdiction over money claim and petitioner is not
stopped from not raising the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are
based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical
and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings. All the proceedings and decisions of the court in violation of the doctrine
rendered null and void.

2. DOCTRINE OF CONTINUING JURISDICTION

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: The Provost Martial General of the AFP, Col Galarpe, issued a restriction to quarters and a
charge sheet was filed with the Special General Court Martial against Gen Carlos Garcia allegedly for
violation of the Article of War (Section 96 Unbecoming an officer and Gentlemen; Section 97
Prejudicial to good order and military discipline). Upon arraignment, petitioner plead not guilty on all
charges. After the transfer of confinement to the ISAFP Detention Center, petitioner, having reached
the age of 56, compulsorily retired from service. After the trial, petitioner was found guilty and
dishonourably discharged from service and to be confined at ward labor for a period of two (2) years.
The staff Judge Advocate recommended that the period of confinement shall be credited in his favour
and deducted from 2 years of his sentence. And to effectuate the foregoing, thru Secretary of National
Defense, recommending approval of the attached prepared “Action of the President.” Then, the office
of the President confirmed the sentence, further that the sentence shall not be remitted by any
previous confinement. Consequently, petitioner was again arrested and detained.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner asserts that the General Court Martial ceased jurisdiction ipso facto
upon his compulsory retirement, thus, the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in
issuing the Confirmation of Sentence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the General Court Martial retained jurisdiction over the petitioner despite his
retirement during the pendency of the proceeding.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. However, applying provisions of Article 29 or the Revised Penal Code,
the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the
sentence confirmed by the President.
Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time petitioner was arraigned,
the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continued until the case is terminated.
Therefore, petitioner’s retirement did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction.

3. HIERARCHY OF COURTS (APPLICATION)

KULAYAN VS TAN

FACTS: Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in the
Province of Sulu by the members of the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG). A task force was created joining
PNP/AFP and Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) under the leadership of Governor Abdusakur Tan.
Governor Tan issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency citing kidnapping incident as a
ground invoking Section 465 of LGC of 1991. In the same proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and
CEF to set up checkpoints and conduct general search and seizure including arrests. Several persons
were arrested and detained. Jamar Kukayan et al, filed petition for Certiorari claiming that the
proclamation was issued with grave abuse of discretion, as it threatened fundamental freedoms, and
only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the Commander-in-Chief.
Respondent contended that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they
filed the petition directly in the court of last resort.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the petition even if both CA and RTC possessed
concurrent jurisdiction with the SC under Rule 65.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. Simply put, the doctrine provides that where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or RTC, it is in either of these courts and
not the SC, that the specific issuance of such writ must be sought UNLESS special and important
laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immortal tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance.
“The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual issues.” The instant
case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.

1. EXCEPTIONS / RELAXATION OF THE RULE

UNITED CLAIMANTS OF NEA (UNICAN) VS NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION

FACTS: NEA is created in accordance with PD 269 where its Board is empowered to reorganize NEA’s
staffing structure. RA 9136 – Electric Power Industry Reform Act – was enacted to enhance the
electrification including the privatization of the NAPOCOR. To Implement RA 9136, rules and
regulations were issued, Section 3 (b) – all NEA’s employees and officers are considered terminated
and the 965 plantilla positions of NEA vacant. NEA Board submitted a reorganization plan to the
president and the DBM approved NEA’s termination plan.

The NEA implemented an early retirement program and giving incentives to those who availed
of it. Hence, this petitiom. UNICAN asserts that the NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA
employee, but NEA Board asserts that the court has no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they filed the
petition directly to SC

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. The termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA’s
Board powers (Sec 5, PD 264).
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception
to the general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for “special and important
reasons”. Such reasons exist in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire
plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees, who were effectively dismissed from employment in on
swift stroke. Thus, to the mind of the court entailed its attention.

TUNA PROCESSING INC VS PHILIPPINE KINGFORD INC

FACTS: Kamimitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of US patent, Philippine patent, Indonesian Patent and five
(5) tuna processors, one of which is the respondent Kingford, entered into a MOA. The parties agree
to the establishment of the Tuna Processors Inc (TPI), a corporation established in the State of
California, in order to implement its objectives which is the licensor, co-owner of patents, wishes to
form an alliance with sponsors (Tuna Processor) for purposes of enforcing his three patents, granting
licenses, and collecting royalties.
Due to a series of events, the licences including Kingsford, withdrew from TPI and remerged
on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute before the International Center of Dispute
Resolution in the State of California and won the case against the respondent. To enforce the award,
petitioner TPI filed a petition for confirmation, recognition, and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award
before the RTC. Kingsford filed a motion to dismiss which was granted on the ground of lack of legal
capacity to sue in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition. Kingsford contends that the case should be dismissed for failure to
observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquire jurisdiction over the case

RULING: Petition GRANTED. It is in the best interest of justice that the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bans foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. Clearly, on the
matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected because RA 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law in question.
Failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts warrants the outright dismissal of the
case. A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present
in a case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. The novelty and the paramount
importance of the issue herein should be seriously considered.

CAPALLA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Commission on Elections posted and published an invitation to apply for eligibility to bid for
the 2010 poll Automation Project pursuant to RA 9369 – the Automation Law. Thereafter, the
COMELEC issued Resolution awarding the contract to smartmatic. The contract was one of lease of
the Automated Election System with option to purchase (OTP) the goods. After 2010 election, the
COMELEC issued resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic – TIM’s offer to extend the period to
exercise the OTP and to authorize chairman Brillantes to sign in behalf of the COMELEC. Then
COMELEC issued a resolution to approve the Deed of Sale to purchase the PCOS machine to be used
in the May 2013 elections. Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.
Archbishop Capalla, et al filed a petition claiming that the issuance of the COMELEC and the
transactions entered as illegal and unconstitutional. However, COMELEC assails the locus standi of
petitioners and the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquire jurisdiction over the case

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. As the CIMELEC is confronted with time and budget constraints, and
in view of the COMELEC’s mandate to ensure free, honest and credible elections the acceptance of
the extension of the option period, and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the more prudent
choices available to the COMELEC for a successful 2013 automated elections.
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues
raised by petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondent should not be allowed to stand in the
way, if the ends of justice would not be sub served by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.

F. TYPES OF ACTION

i. Accion reinvindicatoria and accion publiciana distingusshed

SPOUSES ALDOVER VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Siblings Tomas and Sodra Reyes and their father Alfredo obtained a loan from Antonio
Aldover secured by real estate mortgage. When Reyes failed to pay, Aldover foreclosed the mortgage
and she emerged as the winning bidder. RTC issued a writ of possession over the subject property. In
compliance with the writ, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate, but in the report, he cannot fully
implement the writ because there are several persons who occupy portion of subject lot claiming to be
the owners thereof. In view of Sheriff’s partial report, Aldover filed a motion for special order of
Demolition which was granted by the court. Respondents filed before the CA a petition for Certiorari
with prayer for TRO against petitioners and Reyes claiming that they were neither impleaded nor
notified in the proceedings conducted bin LRC, and there are not bound by the order of the court for
want of jurisdiction. CA dismissed petition on procedural grounds, but after Motion for
Reconsideration, it was granted for substantial justice. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintain that respondents ancillary prayer for injustice relief lacked basis as they
have in clear right that must be protected. And none of the respondent, alleged proofs of ownership
were over registered.
Respondents assert that the issue to resolve in this Petition for Certiorari is whether CA
committed grave abuse of discretion, not of who have the better right over the property in question.
ISSUE: Whether the issue of who have a better right over the property in question is an extraneous
matter that is totally irrelevant in the present controversy.
RULING: Petition DISMISSED. A petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the
intrinsic correctness of the public respondent’s ruling. Petitioners cannot resort to procedural
shortcut in ousting respondents by the simple expedient of filing a motion for Special Order of
Demolition for under Article 433, NCC, petitioners have failed to file the appropriate judicial process
to recover the property from the respondents. The judicial process could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or a reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims may be heard and
adjudicated.
GAMBA V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Violeta Herrera owner of Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey, that shee inherited the house/lot
to her parents and she only tolerated Rene and others to construct residential houses without
rentals. Private respondent how demanded to the petitioner to vacate the lot and remove their
houses; but, petitioner refused. After reconciliation failed, private respondent filed 2 ejectment
complaints before the MTC. MTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. RTC affirmed the
decision of MTC. CA also denied the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners insist that private respondent should have filed an action to
recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, because they possessed Lot 1227 in
good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners and there was no withholding of
possession since private respondent was not in a prior possession of the lot.
ISSUE: Whether MTC has jurisdiction over the complaints for unlawful detainer, and that the only
issue to be determined in a mere physical possession (de facto) and not juridical possession (de jure).
RULING: Petition DENIED. Jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in MTC and in
ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
Petitioners’ contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover
possession de jure with the RTC is not supported by law. What really distinguishes an action for
unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publicana) and from a reinvidicatory action
(accion reinvidicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful
detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that
may be filed to recover possession of real property.
”Accion publiciana” on the plenary action to recover the right to possession, and “accion
reinvindicatoria” or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession.
JOSE V. ALBERTO
FACTS: Chua Sing owned a parcel of land, which he leased to Jose. Jose demanded Rodolfo, et al., to
vacate the property. Based on the contract of lease, the lessor transfers all the rights and prerogatives
to evict said occupant in favor of the lease. But the respondents refused to vacate the premises.
Petitioner then file an ejectment case before the MeTC claiming that as lessee of the subject property,
he had the right to eject the respondent who unlawfully occupy the land.
Respondents argued that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land. However, MeTC held that respondents had no right to possess the land and
their occupation was merely by owner’s tolerance. RTC affirmed MeTC decision. But CA reversed the
RTC and MeTC decisions. It ruled that respondents allegation that they had in possession of the land
before Chua had acquired it in 1991 supports that there is no tolerance, and having been in
possession of the land for more than a year, respondents now cannot be evicted though an ejectment
case which is summary proceeding. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy in this case.
RULING: Petitioner DENIED. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of
real property. Tolerance of possession must have been present at the beginning of the possession; if
the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper
remedy and should be dismissed.
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion
reinvindicatoria. An ejectment suit is bought before the proper inferior court to recover physical
possession only on possession de facto, NOT possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry
cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession.
VDA. DE BINAY V. SPOUSES UZI
636 SCRA 811

FACTS: Ellen Mendiola owned several parcels of land. A subdivision plan for Lot 733 was divided into
6, Mendoza executed two deeds of absolute sale transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Viray and Lot 733-A
to Avelino & Margarita. Purchasers annotated the blabla blabla of sale on TCT 141, Fajardo Plan.
Notwithstanding consequences, Mendoza, spouses Usi, et al., as purported co-owners of Lot 733,
executed a Subdivision Agreement which was approved the subdivision plan by the Land
Management Bureau. Based on the Agreement, they are the sale and exclusive owner of the said
land. The Lot 733 was subdivided into those based on Galang Plan A, B, & C. Lot 733-C not further
divided into 13 smaller lots. The subdivision of the Lot 733, per Galang Plan, virtually resulted in the
loss of the identity of Lot 733-A & Lot 733-F of Spouses Viray and Jesus Viray, from Mendoza.
As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions, involving the same property,
spawned several suits, and counter-suits featuring, in particular, herein petitions, and respondents,
(1) Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, 733-A Fajardo Plan, Decision in favor of Sps Viray, (2)
Annulment of Absolute Sale (3) Forcible Entry (4) Petition for Annulment of MCTC Decision or
Forcible Entry (5) Cancellation of Titles before RTC, (6) Petition for Accion Publiciana and
Reinvindicatoria before RTC.

RTC dismissed the petition of Spouses Uzi for Accion Publiciana / Reinvindicatoria for failure to
establish to support their claim of title, possession and ownership over the lots. But the CA reversed
the RTC’s decision despite the defense of res judicata. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the better right to possess and the right of ownwership of Sps Viray over the parcel
of land can be re-litigated three actions to recover possession filed by Spouses Uzi

RULING: The court in “Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale” has in effect determined that the
conveyances and necessarily the transfer of ownership made to Sps Viray were valid. This
determination operates as a bar to the reinvindicatory action to annul said conveyances and
precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the settles issue of ownership and possession
arising from ownership.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) and
the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-
litigated thru actions to recover possession and vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court,
in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and Amelita Usi v. Spouses Avelino Viray and
Margarita Masangcay and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the conveyances
and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray)
on April 29, 1986 were valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usis reivindicatory action to
assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same parties of the
settled issue of ownership and possession arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi did
not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question in their action for
annulment of the deed sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is closely intertwined
with the issue of ownership, and affects the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent
doctrine, to borrow from Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,52 "is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property."
And lest it be overlooked, the Court, in G.R. No. 154538 (Spouses Jose and Amelita Usi v.
Ruperta Cano Vda. de Viray), again in effect ruled with finality that petitioner Vda. de Viray has a
better possessory right over Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan). Thus, the Court’s decision in G.R. No. 122287
juxtaposed with that in G.R. No. 154538 would suffice to bar the Sps. Usi’s accion publiciana, as the
spouses had invoked all along their ownership over the disputed Lot 733-F as basis to defeat any
claim of the right of possessiOn. While an accion reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an
ejectment case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana, because
the matter of possessioq between the same parties has become res judicata and cannot be delved into
in a new action.

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN, vs. JOSE JUAN
TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG,

FACTS: Respondent Jose Tong, thru his representative Jose Ong, filed an action for ejectment case
against Anita Monasterio-Pe et al before the MTC. Petitioners are occupying the house without any
contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by
mere tolerance of Tong. Tong demanded to vacate the house but respondents refused to vacate the
same. Respodnents alleged that Tons is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a
dummy. MTC rendered decision in favour of Tong. RTC also affirmed the decision.
Hence, this petition. Respondents claiming that Jose Tong should have filed an Accion
Publiciana and not an unlawful detainer case because one year period to file a case for unlawful
detainer has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether the one year period should be counted from the date of petitioners occupation in the
land.

RULING: Petition DENIED. The person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them, Rule 70, Secton 1 of the Rules of Court, the one year perios within which a complaint for
unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the
lapse of that perios does the possession become unlawful.

ii. Action in rem, quasi in rem and action in personam distinguished.

MACASAET vs CO, Jr.

FACTS: Herein respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila,
sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher, its Managing, its Circulation
Manager, its Editors, and its Columnist/Reporter (petitioners), claiming damages because of an
allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course
issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite,
Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address in the summons to effect the personal service of
it on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile
because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of
that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners
were still out of the office. He then decided to resort to substituted service of the summons and
explained that per information, said defendants are always roving outside and gathering information.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case alleging lack of jurisdiction because of the invalid and
ineffectual service of summons.
HELD: Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem
or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it
acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in
such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a)
to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant
the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. when jurisdiction in personam is not
acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such
proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. Under the Rules of Court, the service of the
summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. But if, for
justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of
the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of
service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made
through his substitute.
After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that there was
no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other
day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be
futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the
serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal
service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do
not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is
the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED vs LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY
FACTS: Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a
judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to
Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondent’s (plaintiff’s)
motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect
service of summons on petitioner (defendant).
Herein petitioner prays for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper service of
summons. While the Motion to Dismiss is still pending, petitioner filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for
Leave to take the deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner) before the
Philippine Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on respondent.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court,
there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account
of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to do business in the Philippines, nor
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating
some person on whom summons and other legal processes maybe served.
HELD: When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance, extraterritorial service of summons
can be made upon the defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest
if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the
parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its
obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the
plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the
plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the
action will be converted to one quasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the defendant, petitioner
Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot
try any case against it because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it
voluntarily appears in court. However, respondent points out that while petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss was still pending, petitioner prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against
respondent, such as written interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for
production of documents.
Therefore, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
JESSE U. LUCAS vs JESUS S. LUCAS
FACTS: On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate
Filiation before RTC-Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that his mother, Elsie Uy got pregnant and,
on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was
not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father
is respondent. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing
up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation.
On September 4, 2007 respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia
that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree
that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary
appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the
confidentiality of the subject matter.
HELD: An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem
is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person
as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are
deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in
order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence,
failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In
such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had,
in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process
requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in
the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to
establish filiation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MERLYN MERCADERA
FACTS: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. The fact of her
birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. In
the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as
Marilyn and not Merlyn.
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera, according to the
rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. In her elementary diploma,
high school diploma and college diploma uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera. Her
certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears her
complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera.
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics
Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this
petition.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous enough
to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive
rights." What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name, which would
have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.
HELD: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that
is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name,
a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a person’s identity and interactions
are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name
aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all,
publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it."
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer
to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in
Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in
the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule.
The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly
prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN,"
and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN."
SPS FERNANDO TORRES and IRMA TORRES vs AMPARO MEDINA
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent Medina wrote a letter to the Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, applying for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of the property of
petitioner spouses Fernando and Irma Torres (Spouses Torres) which was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-61056 (354973) and which is subject of a Deed of Mortgage dated
December 20, 1993.
On May 27, 1997, the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale and, on June 30,
1997, sold at public auction the subject property to Medina being the highest bidder thereof.
On September 21, 1999, the Spouses Torres filed a Complaint before the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage conducted by the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
On July 20, 2000, Medina filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the grounds of res judicata and forum
shopping. Medina argued that the Spouses Torres had filed an earlier Complaint praying for the
annulment of the real estate mortgage involving the same property and which was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-94-18962 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 216. Medina contended that said
complaint was already dismissed as evidenced by the RTC’s Decision dated March 7, 1997.
On December 27, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting Medina’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
The RTC ruled that res judicata was present and that the Spouses Torres were guilty of forum
shopping.
HELD: The Spouses Torres only filed their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-38781 after more than
two years had already lapsed from the time the ex-officio sheriff sold the property in question at
public auction. The foreclosure proceeding was an action in rem, and therefore, the Spouses Torres
cannot feign knowledge thereof. More importantly, the Spouses Torres were not completely left
without any remedy as they still had the right of redemption, which expired one year from and after
the date of the registration of the Certificate of Sale. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this
Court must assume that no attempt to redeem the property was undertaken by the Spouses Torres
and that they simply allowed their right and remedy to lapse by their inaction.
In addition, the Spouses Torres have already lost their right to question the validity of the real estate
mortgage, for most part due to the negligence of their counsel. More importantly, the decision
upholding the validity of the real estate mortgage is already final; hence, the same can no longer be
questioned in another proceeding by simply varying the form of the action, or adopting a different
method of presenting their case.
ACOSTA vs SALAZAR
FACTS: Herein respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the back of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 40287 registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and
Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without issue. The Salazars claim that two of the entries – Entry Nos.
19756 and 20102 – annotated at the back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of
rights appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9297, which supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent
according to a certification issued by the RD. On October 21, 1986, RTC Branch 63 of Tarlac resolved
to grant the petition and ordered the cancellation of Entry No. 20102. No respondent was impleaded
in the said petition.
Petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property – twenty-
seven (27) titleholders in all – filed their formal written comment. In their comment, the oppositors
contended, among others, that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the
lower court, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. The
appellees further argued that the orders of RTC Branch 63 are null and void for lack of proper notice.
The CA struck down the arguments of the appellees and ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land
registration proceeding , which is an action in rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners or
claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the parties.
HELD: It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not
in personam. Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those
outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff,
when the proceeding is to bar all.
Interestingly, however, the proceedings instituted by the Salazars can hardly be classified as actions
in rem. The petition for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No. 40287 ought to have
been directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as appearing in Entry No.
20102 and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of
the property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the
Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta
Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership over the property under their names because they are
indispensable parties. This was not done in this case. Since no indispensable party was ever
impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC
of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court. Consequently, the
judgment or order of the said court never even acquired finality.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL vs
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.
FACTS: Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets against the bank
deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the
Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriff’s return dated June 30, 2004 stating that
the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given
address since July 2002 and left no forwarding address. On August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a
manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special
Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It alleged, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction over
its person as summons had not yet been served on it. The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to
dismiss. It contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court.
HELD: As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the
person.20 In actions in rem orquasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res.21 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the
requirements of due process.22 For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of
service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.23
In this connection, paragraph (b), Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture provides:
Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order. xxx

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION vs CLT REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: These two petitions1 involve properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. 2 The vast tract of land stretches
over three (3) cities. Despite their prime location within Metropolitan Manila, the properties included
in OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and
shady transfers.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present acknowledgment of the
validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It
dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find origination
from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also
covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two
competing sources of title – the OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 arising from the issuance of Decree
No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the registration
of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34, even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is
void since such registration could not supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.
HELD: The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in
ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San
Agustin.65 Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the
description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the
registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his
title."66 It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz 67 that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court
over such lands even extends to the determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered
titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title
to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be
within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings."68
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in the name of
a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his
favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial rights. 72 Yet such
prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action involving
the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court
may not issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights of the previously registered
owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that
because there was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such
titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued, and they would be
valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated
3 May 1917 was issued.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA
FACTS: Essentially, in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
LANDTRADE and Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo are calling upon this Court to determine whether the
Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456, erred in (1)
upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and
heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, the action for quieting of title; (2) not holding that Vidal and
AZIMUTH have neither cause of action nor legal or equitable title or interest in the parcels of land
covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to establish
Vidal’s status as Doña Demetria’s granddaughter and sole surviving heir; and (4) not holding that
Civil Case No. 4452 was already barred by prescription.
HELD: An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.
In Calacala v. Republic,95 the Court elucidated on the nature of an action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile
claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the
benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use,
and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x . (Emphases supplied.)
The Court expounded further in Spouses Portic v. Cristobal96 that:
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem
nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike
suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title.
However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the
registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the
original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not
necessarily bar an action to quiet title. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an action for quieting of title, a special proceeding
wherein the court is precisely tasked to determine the rights of the parties as to a particular parcel of
land, so that the complainant and those claiming under him/her may be forever free from any danger
of hostile claim. Vidal asserted title to the two parcels of land as Doña Demetria’s sole heir. The cloud
on Vidal’s title, which she sought to have removed, was Teofilo’s adverse claim of title to the same
properties, also as Doña Demetria’s only heir. For it to determine the rights of the parties in Civil
Case No. 4452, it was therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch 3 to squarely make a finding as to the
status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo. A finding that one is Doña
Demetria’s sole and rightful heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the claim of the other.
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. Ernesto obtained
several loans from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-
mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand.
On February 22, 2000, respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the
spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Ernesto received the
summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were
declared in default upon motion of the respondent bank.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, 4 asserting that even if the action is quasi in
rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted
service made by the sheriff at her husband’s office cannot be deemed proper service absent any
explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts
failed.
HELD: An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An
action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in
rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. 14
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 15
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 16 Significantly, in a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a
defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by
voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG vs SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY VELAYO
FACTS: In their Complaint, respondents allege that petitioner, a resident of 1860 Alamoana
Boulevard, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and her co-defendants, who are residents of the Philippines,
made it appear that their common father, Rodolfo Velayo, Sr. (Rodolfo Sr.) and petitioner had filed a
complaint against Raymond before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), accusing Raymond of
the crimes of estafa and kidnapping a minor; that petitioner and her co-defendants also requested
that respondents be included in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) which was granted, thereby preventing them from leaving the country and resulting
in the cancellation of respondents' trips abroad and caused all of respondents' business transactions
and operations to be paralyzed to their damage and prejudice; that petitioner and her co-defendants
also filed a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as Case No. 4422
entitled "Rodolfo Velayo Sr. et al. v. Raymond Velayo et al." which caused respondents' funds to be
frozen and paralyzed the latters' business transactions and operations to their damage and prejudice.
Since petitioner was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, respondents prayed for a writ of
preliminary attachment against petitioner's properties located in the Philippines.
Before respondents' application for a writ of preliminary attachment can be acted upon by the RTC,
respondents filed on September 10, 1993 an Urgent Motion praying that the summons addressed to
petitioner be served to her at Suite 201, Sunset View Towers Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City and at No. 5040 P. Burgos Street, T. Towers Condominium, Makati. 4 In its Order dated
September 13, 1993, the RTC granted the said motion.5
Upon ex-parte motions7 of respondents, the RTC in its Order dated November 23, 1993 and January
5, 1994, declared petitioner and her co-defendant in default for failure to file an answer and ordered
the ex-parte presentation of respondents' evidence.8
On September 1, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was
prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents' complaint
because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer's Return, no summons was served
upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents' material
allegations.10 Respondents opposed said Motion.11
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and validity of the service of
summons made upon her. Petitioner argues that summons should have been served through
extraterritorial service since she is a non-resident.
HELD: Under Section 17,28 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the defendant is a nonresident and
he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially. There are only four
instances when extraterritorial service of summons is proper, namely: (a) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiffs; (b) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property,
within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (c) when
the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; and (d) when the defendant's property has been
attached within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action
against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in
rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.29
Where the action is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on the basis of her personal
liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. 30 Summons on the defendant must be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him.31 This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly
try and decide the case against him.32
The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment
therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 33 Thus, it is an action in personam. As
such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.34
G. CLASS SUIT
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., LILIA MARQUINEZ PALANCA, ROSANNA D. IMAI, GLORIA
DOMINGO and RAY VINCENT, Petitioners,
vs.
AMELIA P. MUER, SAMUEL M. TANCHOCO, ROMEO TANKIANG, RUDEL PANGANIBAN,
DOLORES AGBAYANI, ARLENEDAL A. YASUMA, GODOFREDO M. CAGUIOA and EDGARDO M.
SALANDANAN, Respondents.
FACTS: Pursuant to the by-laws of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., petitioners Lilia Marquinez Palanca,
Rosanna D. Imai, Gloria Domingo and Ray Vincent, the incumbent Board of Directors, set the annual
meeting of the members of the condominium corporation and the election of the new Board of
Directors at the lobby of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. The Committee on Elections of Legaspi Towers 300,
Inc., however, found most of the proxy votes, at its face value, irregular, thus, questionable; and for
lack of time to authenticate the same, petitioners adjourned the meeting for lack of quorum.

However, the group of respondents challenged the adjournment of the meeting. Despite petitioners'
insistence that no quorum was obtained during the annual meeting held on April 2, 2004,
respondents pushed through with the scheduled election and were elected as the new Board of
Directors and officers of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. and subsequently submitted a General Information
Sheet to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
On plaintiffs’ motion to admit amended complaint (to include Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. as plaintiff),
the RTC ruled denying the motion for being improper. Then, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals and held that Judge Antonio I. De Castro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders denying petitioners’ Motion to Admit Second
Amended Complaint and that petitioners the justified the inclusion of Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. as
plaintiff by invoking the doctrine of derivative suit.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals thereafter. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Derivative Suit proper in this case.
RULING: The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. Derivative Suit is not applicable.
Since it is the corporation that is the real party-in-interest in a derivative suit, then the reliefs
prayed for must be for the benefit or interest of the corporation. When the reliefs prayed for do
not pertain to the corporation, then it is an improper derivative suit.
The requisites for a derivative suit are as follows:
a) the party bringing suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction
complained of, the number of his shares not being material;
b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of
directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having
been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the
suit.
As stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ complaint seek to nullify the said election, and to
protect and enforce their individual right to vote. The cause of action devolves on petitioners, not the
condominium corporation, which did not have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint for nullification
of the election is a direct action by petitioners, who were the members of the Board of Directors of the
corporation before the election, against respondents, who are the newly-elected Board of Directors.
Under the circumstances, the derivative suit filed by petitioners in behalf of the condominium
corporation in the Second Amended Complaint is improper.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. vs FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.
March 5, 2012

FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of
Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted
a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters
and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La
Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
 Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and
intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. . They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not
necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of them
has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.
With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that
they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz
Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it.

ISSUES: A)Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action;

B)Whether or not the complaint was properly filed as a class suit
C)Whether or not a WPI is warranted

RULING: A) The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint.
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of
action. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road.
These are:
(1) their right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the
road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over
the said roads

B) The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:

1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to
court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.
“The individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it
is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.”

C) A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury

to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must
be shown to be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that
they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the
issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right
therein.

BANDA V. ERMITA
FACTS: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office)
over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation
in the General Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,
petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers
of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino
when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’
security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
HELD: YES
J. Leonardo-de Castro. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority
to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title
III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in
various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the
Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be
stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must
be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
J. Carpio: RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of
the government including the acquisition of “items, supplies, materials, and general support services
x x x which may be needed in the transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of any
government x x x activity