Hardening Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 Workstations

December 2017
CONTENTS

Introduction 4

High priorities 5

Address Space Layout Randomization 5

Application hardening 5
Application versions and patches 5
Application whitelisting 6
Credential caching 8
Credential entry 8
Data Execution Prevention 9
Elevating privileges 9
Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit 10
Local administrator accounts 11
Multi-factor authentication 12
Operating system architecture 12
Operating system patching 12
Operating system version 13
Password policy 13
Restricting privileged accounts 14
Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection 14

Medium priorities 15

Account lockout policy 15

Anonymous connections 15
Antivirus software 16
Attachment Manager 16
Audit event management 16
Autoplay and AutoRun 18
BIOS and UEFI passwords 19
Boot devices 19
Bridging networks 19
Built-in guest accounts 19
Case locks 20
CD burner access 20
Centralised audit event logging 20
Command Prompt 20
Direct Memory Access 21
Endpoint device control 21
File and print sharing 22

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 Group Policy processing 22
Hard drive encryption 23
Installing applications 26
Internet printing 27
Legacy and run once lists 27
MSS settings 27
NetBIOS over TCP/IP 28
Network authentication 28
NoLMHash policy 29
Operating system functionality 29
Power management 29
PowerShell 30
Registry editing tools 30
Remote Assistance 31
Remote Desktop Services 31
Remote Procedure Call 33
Reporting system information 33
Safe Mode 34
Secure channel communications 34
Security policies 34
Server Message Block sessions 35
Session locking 36
Software-based firewalls 36
Sound Recorder 36
Standard Operating Environment 37
System backup and restore 37
System cryptography 37
User rights policies 37
Virtualised web and email access 38
Windows Remote Management 39
Windows Remote Shell access 39
Windows Sidebar and Gadgets 39

Low priorities 41

Displaying file extensions 41

File and folder security properties 41
Location awareness 41
Publishing information to the Web 42
Resultant Set of Policy reporting 42
Windows Marketplace 42

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Contact details 43

Page 3 of 43
Introduction
1. Workstations are often targeted by an adversary using malicious webpages, emails with
malicious attachments and removable media with malicious content in an attempt to extract
sensitive information. Hardening workstations is an important part of reducing this risk.
2. This document provides guidance on hardening workstations using Enterprise and Ultimate
editions of Microsoft Windows 7 SP1. Some Group Policy settings used in this document may
not be available or compatible with Professional, Home Premium, Home Basic or Starter editions
of Microsoft Windows 7 SP1.
3. While this document refers to workstations, most Group Policy settings are equally applicable to
servers (with the exception of Domain Controllers) using Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2.
The names and locations of Group Policy settings used in this document are taken from
Microsoft Windows 7 SP1; some differences may exist for earlier or later versions of Microsoft
Windows.
4. Before implementing recommendations in this document, thorough testing should be undertaken
to ensure the potential for unintended negative impacts on business processes is reduced as
much as possible.
5. This document is intended for information technology and information security professionals
within organisations looking to undertake risk assessments or vulnerability assessments as well
as those wishing to develop a hardened Standard Operating Environment for workstations.

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High priorities
6. The following security controls, listed in alphabetical order, are considered to have an excellent
effectiveness and should be treated as high priorities when hardening Microsoft Windows 7 SP1
workstations.
Address Space Layout Randomization
7. An adversary may attempt to compromise a workstation by accessing the location of important
information in memory such as an executable’s base address and the position of the heap, stack
and libraries in a process’ address space. To reduce this risk, Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) should be enabled for all applications that support it. By default, ASLR is
enabled from Microsoft Windows Vista onwards and can mitigate some forms of attacks by
randomising the location of important information in memory. The use of ASLR can be confirmed
by using the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit from Microsoft1 to ensure ASLR is set to
Application Opt In.
Application hardening
8. When applications are installed they are often not pre-configured in a secure state. By default,
many applications enable functionality that isn’t required by any users while in-built security
functionality may be disabled or set at a lower security level. For example, Microsoft Office by
default allows untrusted macros in Office documents to automatically execute without user
interaction. To reduce this risk, applications should have any in-built security functionality
enabled and appropriately configured along with unrequired functionality disabled. This is
especially important for key applications such as office productivity suites (e.g. Microsoft Office),
PDF readers (e.g. Adobe Reader), web browsers (e.g. Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla
Firefox or Google Chrome), common web browser plugins (e.g. Adobe Flash), email clients
(Microsoft Outlook) and software platforms (e.g. Oracle Java Platform and Microsoft .NET
Framework). In addition, vendors may provide guidance on configuring their products securely.
For example, Microsoft provides the Microsoft Office 2013 Security Guide as part of the
Microsoft Security Compliance Manager tool2. In such cases, vendor guidance should be
followed to assist in securely configuring their products.
9. The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) also provides guidance for hardening Microsoft Office.
For more information see Hardening Microsoft Office 20133 and Hardening Microsoft Office
20164.
Application versions and patches
10. While some vendors may release new application versions to address security vulnerabilities,
others may release patches. If new application versions and patches for applications are not
installed it can allow an adversary to easily compromise workstations. This is especially
important for key applications that interact with content from untrusted sources such as office
productivity suites (e.g. Microsoft Office), PDF readers (e.g. Adobe Reader), web browsers (e.g.
Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox or Google Chrome), common web browser plugins
(e.g. Adobe Flash), email clients (Microsoft Outlook) and software platforms (e.g. Oracle Java
Platform and Microsoft .NET Framework). To reduce this risk, new application versions and
patches for applications should be applied in an appropriate timeframe as determined by the
severity of security vulnerabilities they address and any mitigating measures already in place.

1
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/security/jj653751/
2
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/solutionaccelerators/cc835245.aspx
3
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Hardening_MS_Office_2013.pdf
4
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Hardening_MS_Office_2016.pdf

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 In cases where a previous version of an application continues to receive support in the form of
patches it still should be upgraded to the latest version to receive the benefit of any new security
functionality; however, this may be done as soon as practical rather than within two days of
release.
11. For more information on determining the severity of security vulnerabilities and timeframes for
applying new application versions and patches for applications see Assessing Security
Vulnerabilities and Applying Patches5.
Application whitelisting
12. An adversary can email malicious code, or host malicious code on a compromised website, and
use social engineering techniques to convince users into executing it on their workstation. Such
malicious code often aims to exploit security vulnerabilities in existing applications and doesn’t
need to be installed on the workstation to be successful. To reduce this risk, an application
whitelisting solution should be appropriately implemented. Application whitelisting when
implemented in its most effective form (e.g. using hashes for executables, dynamic link libraries,
scripts and installers) can be an extremely effective mechanism in not only preventing malicious
code from executing but also ensuring only authorised applications can be installed on
workstations. Less effective implementations of application whitelisting (e.g. using approved
paths for installed applications in combination with access controls requiring privileged access to
write to these locations) can be used as a first step towards implementing a more
comprehensive application whitelisting solution.
13. For more information on application whitelisting and how it can be appropriately implemented
see Implementing Application Whitelisting6.
14. If Microsoft AppLocker7 is used for application whitelisting, the following rules can be used as a
sample path-based implementation. In support of this, the rules, enforcement of rules and the
automatic starting of the Application Identity service should be set via Group Policy at a domain
level. Furthermore, the hotfix for KB2532445 should be applied to prevent malicious code from
using the SANDBOX_INERT or LOAD_IGNORE_CODE_AUTHZ_LEVEL flags to bypass
AppLocker rules8.
Whitelisting Rule Recommended Value
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Application Control
Policies\AppLocker\DLL Rules
[Path] %PROGRAMFILES%\* Allow Everyone

5
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Assessing_Security_Vulnerabilities_and_Applying_Patches.pdf
6
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Application_Whitelisting.pdf
7
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd723678(v=ws.10).aspx
8
https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/2532445/you-can-circumvent-applocker-rules-by-using-an-office-
macro-on-a-compu

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[Path] %WINDIR%\* Allow Everyone

Exceptions:
%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\*
%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\
color\*
%SYSTEM32%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\debug\WIA\*
%WINDIR%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\Temp\*
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Application Control
Policies\AppLocker\Executable Rules
[Path] %PROGRAMFILES%\* Allow Everyone
[Path] %WINDIR%\* Allow Everyone

Exceptions:
%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\*
%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\
color\*
%SYSTEM32%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\debug\WIA\*
%WINDIR%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\Temp\*
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Application Control
Policies\AppLocker\Script Rules
[Path] %PROGRAMFILES%\* Allow Everyone
[Path] %WINDIR%\* Allow Everyone

Exceptions:
%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\*
%SYSTEM32%\Com\dmp\*
%SYSTEM32%\FxsTmp\*
%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\
color\*
%SYSTEM32%\spool/PRINTE
RS\*
%SYSTEM32%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\debug\WIA\*
%WINDIR%\Registration\CRM
Log\*
%WINDIR%\Tasks\*
%WINDIR%\Temp\*
%WINDIR%\tracing\*
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Application Control
Policies\AppLocker\Windows Installer Rules
[Publisher] CN=Microsoft Corporation, O=Microsoft Corporation, L-Redmond, Allow Everyone
S=Washington, C=US

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Credential caching
15. Cached credentials are stored in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) database and can allow
a user to log onto a workstation they have previously logged onto even if the domain is not
available. Whilst this functionality may be desirable from an availability of services perspective,
this functionality can be abused by an adversary who can retrieve these cached credentials
(potentially Domain Administrator credentials in a worst-case scenario). To reduce this risk,
cached credentials should be limited to only one previous logon.
16. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable credential caching.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache (in case domain 1 logons
controller is not available)
Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords and credentials for Enabled
network authentication
17. Within an active user session, credentials are cached within the Local Security Authority
Subsystem Service (LSASS) process (including the user’s passphrase in plaintext if WDigest
authentication is enabled) to allow for access to network resources without users having to
continually enter their credentials. Unfortunately, these credentials are at risk of theft by an
adversary. To reduce this risk, WDigest authentication should be disabled.
18. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable WDigest authentication. For
the WDigest Authentication Group Policy setting to be effective KB2871997 must first be
installed9.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\MS Security Guide
WDigest Authentication Disabled

Credential entry
19. When users enter their credentials on a workstation it provides an opportunity for malicious
code, such as a key logging application, to capture the credentials. To reduce this risk, users
should be authenticated by using a trusted path to enter their credentials on the Secure Desktop.
20. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure credentials are entered in a
secure manner as well as prevent the disclosure of usernames of previous users.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Credential User
Interface
Enumerate administrator accounts on elevation Disabled
Require trusted path for credential entry. Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Logon
Options
Disable or enable software Secure Attention Sequence Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Interactive logon: Do not require CTRL+ALT+DEL Disabled

9
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2014/06/05/an-overview-of-kb2871997/

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Data Execution Prevention
21. Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a security function that can help protect workstations by
monitoring applications to ensure they use memory safely. If DEP notices an application
attempting to execute instructions from a portion of memory used for data it will close the
application and notify the user. The default setting for desktop lines of Microsoft Windows is Turn
on DEP for essential Windows programs and services only. This default setting does not cover
non-Windows programs and will fail to block malicious code that would otherwise be blocked if
DEP was applied to it. To reduce this risk, DEP, preferably hardware-based, should be enabled
for all applications and services except those that need to be explicitly excluded for compatibility
reasons. To enable DEP for all applications and services, except those that need to be explicitly
excluded, the DEP setting within Microsoft Windows can be changed to Turn on DEP for all
programs and services except those I select. This can be set under the Data Execution
Prevention tab within the Performance Options of System Properties. Additionally, if the CPU
supports hardware-based DEP, the text Your computer’s processor supports hardware-based
DEP will be displayed. Should there be a need to force the use of DEP for all applications and
services, the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit10 from Microsoft can be used to set DEP to
Always On. This toolkit can also be used to determine the DEP status of running processes at
any given time. The Process Explorer tool11 in the Windows Sysinternals suite12 can also display
this information.
22. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to ensure DEP is used in Windows
Explorer.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Explorer
Turn off Data Execution Prevention for Explorer Disabled

Elevating privileges
23. Microsoft Windows provides the ability to require confirmation from users, via the User Access
Control (UAC) functionality, before any sensitive actions are performed. The default settings
allow privileged users to perform sensitive actions without first providing credentials and while
standard users must provide privileged credentials they are not required to do so via a trusted
path on the Secure Desktop. This provides an opportunity for an adversary that gains access to
an open session of a privileged user to perform sensitive actions at will or for malicious code to
capture any credentials entered via a standard user when attempting to elevate their privileges.
To reduce this risk, UAC functionality should be implemented to ensure all sensitive actions are
authorised by providing credentials on the Secure Desktop.
24. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to configure UAC functionality
effectively.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator Enabled
account
User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation Disabled
without using the secure desktop

10
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/security/jj653751/
11
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-au/sysinternals/downloads/process-explorer
12
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-au/sysinternals/

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User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Prompt for credentials on the
Admin Approval Mode secure desktop
User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users Prompt for credentials on the
secure desktop
User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation Enabled
User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in Enabled
secure locations
User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode Enabled
User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for Enabled
elevation
User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user Enabled
locations

Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit

25. An adversary that develops exploits for Microsoft Windows or 3rd party applications will have a
higher success rate when measures designed by Microsoft to help prevent security
vulnerabilities from being exploited are not implemented. The Enhanced Mitigation Experience
Toolkit (EMET)13 was designed by the Microsoft Security Research Center (MSRC) engineering
team to provide additional system-wide and application-specific mitigation measures for
Microsoft Windows operating systems and 3rd party applications.
26. To reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows or 3rd
party applications, the latest version of EMET should be implemented using system-wide and
application-specific mitigation measures.
27. The Group Policy Administrative Templates for EMET are provided in the EMET installation
directory. The ADMX and associated en-us ADML file for EMET can be placed in
C:\Windows\SYSVOL\domain\Policies\PolicyDefinitions on the Domain Controller and they will
automatically be loaded in the Group Policy Management Editor. Of note, each time changes are
made to EMET Group Policy settings on the Domain Controller, the emet_conf --refresh
command will need to be run via a script or scheduled task on workstations to import the
changes to the EMET configuration.
28. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure EMET is appropriately
implemented.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\EMET
Default Action and Mitigation Settings Enabled

Deep Hooks: Enabled

Anti Detours: Enabled

Banned Functions: Enabled

Exploit Action: Stop

Program
Default Protections for Internet Explorer Enabled

13
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/security/jj653751/

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Default Protections for Popular Software Enabled
Default Protections for Recommended Software Enabled
EMET Agent Visibility Enabled

Start Agent Hidden: Disabled

Reporting Enabled

Event Log: Enabled

Tray Icon: Enabled

Early Warning: Disabled

System ASLR Enabled

ASLR Setting: Application

Opt-In
System DEP Enabled

DEP Setting: Always On

System SEHOP Enabled

SEHOP Setting: Application

Opt-Out

Local administrator accounts

29. When built-in administrator accounts are used with common account names and passwords it
can allow an adversary that compromises these credentials on one workstation to easily transfer
across the network to other workstations. Even if built-in administrator accounts are uniquely
named and have unique passwords, an adversary can still identify these accounts based on
their security identifier (i.e. S-1-5-21-domain-50014) and use this information to focus any
attempts to brute force credentials on a workstation if they can get access to the SAM database.
To reduce this risk, built-in administrator accounts should be disabled. Instead, domain accounts
with local administrative privileges, but without domain administrative privileges, should be used
for workstation management.
30. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable built-in administrator
accounts.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Accounts: Administrator account status Disabled
31. If a common local administrator account absolutely must be used for workstation management
then Microsoft’s Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)15 needs to be used to ensure

14
https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems
15
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=46899

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 unique passphrases are used for each workstation. In addition, User Account Control restrictions
should be applied to remote connections using such accounts16.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\MS Security Guide
Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons Enabled

Multi-factor authentication
32. As privileged credentials often allow users to bypass security functionality put in place to protect
workstations, and are susceptible to key logging applications, it is important that they are
appropriately protected against compromise. In addition, an adversary that brute forces captured
password hashes can gain access to workstations if multi-factor authentication hasn’t been
implemented. To reduce this risk, hardware-based multi-factor authentication should be used for
users as they perform a privileged action or access any important or sensitive data repositories.
33. For more information on how to effectively implement multi-factor authentication see Multi-factor
authentication17.
Operating system architecture
34. The x64 (64-bit) versions of Microsoft Windows include additional security functionality that the
x86 (32-bit) versions lack. This includes native hardware-based Data Execution Prevention
(DEP) kernel support, Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard), mandatory device driver signing
and lack of support for malicious 32-bit drivers. Using x86 (32-bit) versions of Microsoft Windows
exposes organisations to exploit techniques mitigated by x64 (64-bit) versions of Microsoft
Windows. To reduce this risk, workstations should use the x64 (64-bit) versions of Microsoft
Windows.
Operating system patching
35. Patches are released either in response to previously disclosed security vulnerabilities or to
proactively address security vulnerabilities that have not yet been publicly disclosed. In the case
of disclosed security vulnerabilities, it is possible that exploits have already been developed and
are freely available in common hacking tools. In the case of patches for security vulnerabilities
that have not yet been publically disclosed, it is relatively easy for an adversary to use freely
available tools to identify the security vulnerability being patched and develop an associated
exploit. This activity can be undertaken in less than one day and has led to an increase in 1-day
attacks. To reduce this risk, operating system patches and driver updates should be centrally
managed and deployed in an appropriate timeframe as determined by the severity of the
security vulnerability and any mitigating measures already in place. This can be achieved using
Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM)18. Microsoft Windows Server Update
Services (WSUS) can also centrally deploy patches but only for Microsoft applications.
36. For more information on determining the severity of security vulnerabilities and timeframes for
applying patches see Assessing Security Vulnerabilities and Applying Patches19.
37. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure operating systems remain
appropriately patched.

16
https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/951016/description-of-user-account-control-and-remote-restrictions-
in-windows
17
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Multi_Factor_Authentication.pdf
18
https://www.microsoft.com/en-au/cloud-platform/system-center-configuration-manager
19
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Assessing_Security_Vulnerabilities_and_Applying_Patches.pdf

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 Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update
Allow Automatic Updates immediate installation Enabled
Configure Automatic Updates Enabled

Configure automatic updating:

4 - Auto download and
schedule the install

Schedule install day: 0 –

Every day
Do not adjust default option to ‘Install Updates and Shut Down’ in Shut Down Disabled
Windows dialog box
Do not display ‘Install Updates and Shut Down’ option in Shut Down Windows Disabled
dialog box
No auto-restart with logged on users for scheduled automatic updates Enabled
installations
Turn on recommended updates via Automatic Updates Enabled
38. If a Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) server is used, the following Group Policy setting
can be implemented.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update
Specify intranet Microsoft update service location Enabled

Set the intranet update service

for detecting updates:
<server:port>
39. Alternatively, if a WSUS server is not used, the following Group Policy setting can be
implemented to access Microsoft Windows updates over the Internet.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Update
Specify intranet Microsoft update service location Disabled

Operating system version

40. Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update has introduced improvements in security functionality
over Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 and Microsoft Windows 8.1 Update. This has made it more
difficult for an adversary to craft reliable exploits for security vulnerabilities they discovered.
Using older versions of Microsoft Windows exposes organisations to exploit techniques that
have since been mitigated in newer versions of Microsoft Windows. To reduce this risk,
workstations should use Microsoft Windows 10 Anniversary Update or later.
Password policy
41. The use of weak passwords, such as eight character passwords with no complexity, can allow
them to be brute forced within minutes using applications freely available on the Web. In
addition, having no maximum password age can allow an adversary to maintain extended
access to a workstation or network once a password has been compromised while having no
minimum password age can allow an adversary to recycle passwords if forced to change them

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 due to maximum password ages. To reduce this risk, a secure password policy should be
implemented.
42. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to achieve a secure password policy.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Password Policy
Enforce password history 8 passwords remembered
Maximum password age 90 days
Minimum password age 1 days
Minimum password length 10 characters
Password must meet complexity requirements Enabled
Store passwords using reversible encryption Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Accounts: Limit local account use of blank passwords to console logon only Enabled

Restricting privileged accounts

43. Providing users with a privileged account for day to day usage poses a risk that they will use this
account for external web and email access. This is of particular concern as privileged users have
the ability to execute malicious code with privileged access rather than standard access. To
reduce this risk, users that don’t require privileged access should not be granted privileged
accounts while users that require privileged access should have separate standard and
privileged accounts with different credentials. In addition, any privileged accounts used should
have external web and email access blocked.
44. For more information on the use of privileged accounts and minimising their usage see
Restricting Administrative Privileges20.
Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection
45. Without Structured Exception Handling Overwrite Protection (SEHOP) an adversary can use
Structured Exception Handler overwrite techniques to execute malicious code on a workstation.
By default, SEHOP is disabled in the desktop line of Microsoft Windows. To reduce this risk,
SEHOP should be enabled for all applications.
46. SEHOP can be enabled by using the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit from Microsoft21 to
set SEHOP to Always On or by implementing the following registry entry.
Registry Entry Recommended Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\kernel
DisableExceptionChainValidation REG_DWORD 0x00000000
(0)

20
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Restricting_Admin_Privileges.pdf
21
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/security/jj653751/

Page 14 of 43
Medium priorities
47. The following security controls, listed in alphabetical order, are considered to have a very good
effectiveness and should be treated as medium priorities when hardening Microsoft Windows 7
SP1 workstations.
Account lockout policy
48. Allowing unlimited attempts to access workstations will fail to prevent an adversary’s attempts to
brute force authentication measures. To reduce this risk, accounts should be locked out after a
defined number of invalid authentication attempts. The threshold for locking out accounts does
not need to be overly restrictive in order to be effective. For example, a threshold of 5 incorrect
attempts, with a reset period of 15 minutes for the lockout counter, will prevent any brute force
attempt while being unlikely to lock out a legitimate user who accidently enters their password
incorrectly a few times.
49. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to achieve a reasonable lockout policy.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Account Lockout
Policy
Account lockout duration 0
Account lockout threshold 5 invalid logon attempts
Reset account lockout counter after 15 minutes

Anonymous connections
50. An adversary can use anonymous connections to gather information about the state of
workstations. Information that can be gathered from anonymous connections (i.e. using the net
use command to connect to the IPC$ share) can include lists of users and groups, SIDs for
accounts, lists of shares, workstation policies, operating system versions and patch levels. To
reduce this risk, anonymous connections to workstations should be disabled.
51. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable the use of anonymous
connections.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Network access: Allow anonymous SID/Name translation Disabled
Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts Enabled
Network access: Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and Enabled
shares
Network access: Let Everyone permissions apply to anonymous users Disabled
Network access: Restrict anonymous access to Named Pipes and Shares Enabled
Network security: Allow Local System to use computer identity for NTLM Enabled
Network security: Allow LocalSystem NULL session fallback Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Access this computer from the network Administrators
Remote Desktop Users

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Deny access to this computer from the network Guests
NT AUTHORITY\Local
Account

Antivirus software
52. An adversary can develop malicious code to exploit security vulnerabilities in software not
detected and remedied by vendors during testing. As significant time and effort is often involved
in the development of functioning and reliable exploits, an adversary will often reuse their
exploits as much as possible before being forced to develop new exploits. To reduce this risk,
endpoint security applications with signature-based antivirus functionality should be
implemented. In doing so, signatures should be updated at least on a daily basis.
53. Whilst using signature-based antivirus functionality can assist in reducing risk, they are only
effective when a particular piece of malicious code has already been profiled and signatures are
current. An adversary can create variants of known malicious code, or develop new unseen
malicious code, to bypass traditional signature-based detection mechanisms. To reduce this risk,
endpoint security applications with host-based intrusion prevention functionality (using heuristics
to identify and block malicious behaviour) should also be implemented. In doing so, heuristic
functionality should be set at the highest level available.
Attachment Manager
54. The Attachment Manager within Microsoft Windows works in conjunction with applications such
as the Microsoft Office suite and Internet Explorer to help protect workstations from attachments
that have been received via email or downloaded from the Internet. The Attachment Manager
classifies files as high, medium or low risk based on the zone they originated from and the type
of file. Based on the risk to the workstation, the Attachment Manager will either issue a warning
to a user or prevent them from opening a file. If zone information is not preserved, or can be
removed, it can allow an adversary to socially engineer a user to bypass protections afforded by
the Attachment Manager. To reduce this risk, the Attachment Manager should be configured to
preserve and protect zone information for files.
55. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure zone information associated
with attachments is preserved and protected.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Attachment Manager
Do not preserve zone information in file attachments Disabled
Hide mechanisms to remove zone information Enabled

Audit event management

56. Failure to capture and analyse security related audit events from workstations can result in
intrusions going unnoticed. In addition, the lack of such information can significantly hamper
investigations following a security incident. To reduce this risk, security related audit events from
workstations should be captured and routinely analysed.
57. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure security related audit events
are appropriately captured.

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 Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Event Log
Service\Application
Maximum Log Size (KB) Enabled

Maximum Log Size (KB):

65536
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Event Log
Service\Security
Maximum Log Size (KB) Enabled

Maximum Log Size (KB):

2097152
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Event Log
Service\System
Maximum Log Size (KB) Enabled

Maximum Log Size (KB):

65536
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Manage auditing and security log Administrators
58. Furthermore, the following Group Policy settings can be implemented to enable a
comprehensive auditing strategy.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Logon
Audit Credential Validation Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management
Audit Computer Account Management Success and Failure
Audit Other Account Management Events Success and Failure
Audit Security Group Management Success and Failure
Audit User Account Management Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Detailed Tracking
Audit Process Creation Success
Audit Process Termination Success
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Logon/Logoff
Audit Account Lockout Success and Failure
Audit Logoff Success
Audit Logon Success and Failure
Audit Other Logon/Logoff Events Success and Failure

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Audit Special Logon Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Object Access
Audit File Share Success and Failure
Audit Kernel Object Success and Failure
Audit Other Object Access Events Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Policy Change
Audit Audit Policy Change Success and Failure
Audit Authentication Policy Change Success
Audit Authorization Policy Change Success
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\Privilege Use
Audit Sensitive Privilege Use Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy
Configuration\Audit Policies\System
Audit IPsec Driver Success and Failure
Audit Other System Events Success and Failure
Audit Security State Change Success
Audit Security System Extension Success and Failure
Audit System Integrity Success and Failure
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Audit: Force audit policy subcategory settings (Windows Vista or later) to Enabled
override audit policy category settings

Autoplay and AutoRun

59. When enabled, Autoplay will automatically begin reading from a drive or media source as soon
as it is used with a workstation, while AutoRun commands, generally in an autorun.inf file on the
media, can be used to automatically execute any file on the media without user interaction. This
functionality can be exploited by an adversary to automatically execute malicious code. To
reduce this risk, Autoplay and AutoRun functionality should be disabled.
60. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable Autoplay and AutoRun
functionality.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\AutoPlay Policies
Default behavior for AutoRun Enabled
Default AutoRun Behavior: Do
not execute any autorun
commands
Turn off Autoplay Enabled
Turn off Autoplay on: All drives
Turn off Autoplay for non-volume devices Enabled

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BIOS and UEFI passwords
61. An adversary with access to a workstation’s BIOS or UEFI can modify the hardware
configuration of the workstation to introduce attack vectors or weaken security functionality
within the workstation’s operating system. This can include disabling security functionality in the
CPU, modifying allowed boot devices and enabling insecure communications interfaces such as
FireWire and Thunderbolt. To reduce this risk, strong BIOS and UEFI passwords should be used
for all workstations to prevent unauthorised access.
Boot devices
62. By default, workstations are often configured to boot from optical media, or even USB media, in
preference to hard drives. An adversary with physical access to such workstations can boot from
their own media in order to gain access to the content of the hard drives. With this access, an
adversary can reset local user account passwords or gain access to the local SAM database to
steal password hashes for offline brute force cracking attempts. To reduce this risk, workstations
should be restricted to only booting from the designated primary system drive.
Bridging networks
63. When workstations have multiple network interfaces, such as an Ethernet interface and a
wireless interface, it is possible to establish a bridge between the connected networks. For
example, when using an Ethernet interface to connect to an organisation’s wired network and a
wireless interface to connect to another non-organisation controlled network such as a public
wireless hotspot. When bridges are created between such networks an adversary can directly
access the wired network from the wireless network to extract sensitive information. To reduce
this risk, the ability to install and configure network bridges between different networks should be
disabled. This won’t prevent an adversary from compromising a workstation via the wireless
network and then using malicious software as a medium to indirectly access the wired network.
This can only be prevented by manually disabling all wireless interfaces when connecting to
wired networks.
64. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable the ability to install and
configure network bridges.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Network\Network Connections
Prohibit installation and configuration of Network Bridge on your DNS domain Enabled
network
Route all traffic through the internal network Enabled

Select from the following

states: Enabled State

Built-in guest accounts

65. When built-in guest accounts are used, it can allow an adversary to log onto a workstation over
the network without first needing to compromise legitimate user credentials. To reduce this risk,
built-in guest accounts should be disabled.
66. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable and rename built-in guest
accounts.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Accounts: Guest account status Disabled

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Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Deny log on locally Guests

Case locks
67. Without the use of case locks an adversary can gain physical access to the insides of a
workstation. An adversary with this access can install or remove hardware, remove and replace
the CMOS battery to reset the BIOS or UEFI to default settings (i.e. no password), or temporarily
remove hard drives to create copies for offline analysis at a later date. To reduce this risk, case
locks should be used on workstations to prevent an adversary from gaining unauthorised
access.
CD burner access
68. If CD burning functionality is enabled, and CD burners are installed in workstations, an
adversary may attempt to steal sensitive information by burning it to CD. To reduce this risk,
users should not have access to CD burning functionality except when explicitly required.
69. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to prevent access to CD burning
functionality, although as this Group Policy setting only prevents access to native CD burning
functionality in Microsoft Windows, users should also be prevented from installing 3rd party CD
burning applications. Alternatively, CD readers can be used in workstations instead of CD
burners.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Explorer
Remove CD Burning features Enabled

Centralised audit event logging

70. Storing audit event logs on workstations poses a risk that an adversary could attempt to modify
or delete these logs during an intrusion to cover their tracks. In addition, failure to conduct
centralised audit event logging will reduce the visibility of audit events across all workstations,
prevent the correlation of audit events and increase the complexity of any investigations after
security incidents. To reduce this risk, audit event logs from workstations should be transferred
to a secure central logging server.
Command Prompt
71. An adversary who gains access to a workstation can use the Command Prompt to execute in-
built Microsoft Windows tools such as net and at to gather information about the workstation or
domain as well as schedule malicious code to execute on other workstations on the network. To
reduce this risk, users should not have Command Prompt access or the ability to execute batch
files and scripts. Should a legitimate business requirement exist to allow users to execute batch
files (e.g. cmd and bat files); run logon, logoff, startup or shutdown batch file scripts; or use
Remote Desktop Services, this risk will need to be accepted.
72. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to prevent access to the Command
Prompt and script processing functionality.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System
Prevent access to the command prompt Enabled

Disable the command prompt

script processing also: Yes

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Direct Memory Access
73. Communications interfaces that use Direct Memory Access (DMA) can allow an adversary with
physical access to a workstation to directly access the contents of a workstation’s memory. This
can be used to read sensitive contents such as cryptographic keys or to write malicious code
directly into memory. To reduce this risk, communications interfaces that allow DMA (e.g.
FireWire and Thunderbolt) should be disabled. This can be achieved either physically (e.g. using
epoxy) or by using software controls22 (e.g. disabling the functionality in the Basic Input/Output
System (BIOS) or Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI); removing the SBP-2 driver and
disabling the Thunderbolt controller; or using an end point protection solution).
74. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to remove the SBP-2 driver and disable
the Thunderbolt controller.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Device Installation\Device
Installation Restrictions
Prevent installation of devices that match any of these device IDs Enabled

Prevent installation of devices

that match any of these
Device IDs: PCI\CC_0C0A

Also apply to matching

devices that are already
installed.
Prevent installation of devices using drivers that match these device setup Enabled
classes
Prevent installation of devices
using drivers for these device
setup classes:
{d48179be-ec20-11d1-b6b8-
00c04fa372a7}

Also apply to matching

devices that are already
installed.

Endpoint device control

75. An adversary with physical access to a workstation may attempt to connect unauthorised USB
media or other devices with mass storage functionality (e.g. smartphones, digital music players
or cameras) to facilitate malicious code infections or the unauthorised copying of sensitive
information. To reduce this risk, endpoint device control functionality should be appropriately
implemented to control the use of all removable storage devices.
76. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable the use of removable storage
devices.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Removable Storage Access
All Removable Storage classes: Deny all access Enabled

22
https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/help/2516445/blocking-the-sbp-2-driver-and-thunderbolt-controllers-to-
reduce-1394-d

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77. Alternatively, if specific classes of removable storage devices are required to meet business
requirements, the execute, read and write permissions should be controlled on a class by class
basis.
78. The following Group Policy settings provide a sample implementation that allows data to be read
from but not executed from or written to all classes of removable storage devices.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Removable Storage Access
CD and DVD: Deny execute access Enabled
CD and DVD: Deny read access Disabled
CD and DVD: Deny write access Enabled
Custom Classes: Deny read access Disabled
Custom Classes: Deny write access Enabled
Floppy Drives: Deny execute access Enabled
Floppy Drives: Deny read access Disabled
Floppy Drives: Deny write access Enabled
Removable Disks: Deny execute access Enabled
Removable Disks: Deny read access Disabled
Removable Disks: Deny write access Enabled
Tape Drives: Deny execute access Enabled
Tape Drives: Deny read access Disabled
Tape Drives: Deny write access Enabled
WPD Devices: Deny read access Disabled
WPD Devices: Deny write access Enabled

File and print sharing

79. Users sharing files from their workstations can result in a lack of appropriate access controls
being applied to sensitive information and the potential for the propagation of malicious code
should file shares have read/write access. To reduce this risk, local file and print sharing should
be disabled. Ideally, sensitive information should be centrally managed (e.g. on a network share
with appropriate access controls). Disabling file and print sharing will not affect a user’s ability to
access shared drives and printers on a network.
80. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to prevent users from sharing files.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\HomeGroup
Prevent the computer from joining a homegroup Enabled
User Configurations\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Network Sharing
Prevent users from sharing files within their profile. Enabled

Group Policy processing

81. Relying on users to set Group Policy settings for their workstations creates the potential for
users to inadvertently misconfigure or disable security functionality without consideration of the
impact on the security posture of the workstation. Alternatively, an adversary could exploit this to
disable any Local Group Policy settings that are hampering their efforts to extract sensitive

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 information. To reduce this risk, all audit, user rights and security related Group Policy settings
should be specified for workstations at an organisational unit or domain level. To ensure these
policies aren’t weakened, support for Local Group Policy settings should also be disabled.
82. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure only domain-based Group
Policy settings are applied to workstations.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Network\Network Provider
Hardened UNC Paths Enabled

Hardened UNC Paths:

\\*\SYSVOL
RequireMutualAuthentication=
1, RequireIntegrity=1

\\*\NETLOGON
RequireMutualAuthentication=
1, RequireIntegrity=1
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Group Policy
Registry policy processing Enabled

Process even if the Group

Policy objects have not
changed
Security policy processing Enabled

Process even if the Group

Policy objects have not
changed
Turn off background refresh of Group Policy Disabled
Turn off Local Group Policy objects processing Enabled

Hard drive encryption

83. An adversary with physical access to a workstation may be able to use a bootable CD/DVD or
USB media to load their own operating environment. From this environment, they can access
the local file system to gain access to sensitive information or the SAM database to access
password hashes. In addition, an adversary that gains access to a stolen or unsanitised hard
drive will be to recover its contents when connected to another machine on which they have
administrative access and can take ownership of files. To reduce this risk, 256-bit AES full disk
encryption should be used to protect the contents of hard drives from unauthorised access.
84. If Microsoft BitLocker is used, the following Group Policy settings should be implemented.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive
Encryption
Choose drive encryption method and cipher strength Enabled

Select the encryption method:

AES 256-bit

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Prevent memory overwrite on restart Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive
Encryption\Fixed Data Drives
Choose how BitLocker-protected fixed drives can be recovered Enabled

Allow data recovery agent

Configure user storage of

BitLocker recovery
information:
Allow 48-digit recovery
password
Allow 256-bit recovery key

Omit recovery options from

the BitLocker setup wizard

Save BitLocker recovery

information to AD DS for fixed
data drives

Configure storage of BitLocker

recovery information to AD
DS: Backup recovery
passwords and key packages

Do not enable BitLocker until

recovery information is stored
to AD DS for fixed data drives
Configure use of passwords for fixed data drives Enabled

Require password for fixed

data drive

Configure password
complexity for fixed data
drives: Require password
complexity

Minimum password length for

fixed data drive: 10
Deny write access to fixed drives not protected by BitLocker Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive
Encryption\Operating System Drives
Allow enhanced PINs for startup Enabled

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Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered Enabled

Allow data recovery agent

Configure user storage of

BitLocker recovery
information:
Allow 48-digit recovery
password
Allow 256-bit recovery key

Omit recovery options from

the BitLocker setup wizard

Save BitLocker recovery

information to AD DS for
operating system drives

Configure storage of BitLocker

recovery information to AD
DS: Backup recovery
passwords and key packages

Do not enable BitLocker until

recovery information is stored
to AD DS for operating system
drives
Configure minimum PIN length for startup Enabled

Minimum characters: 13
Require additional authentication at startup Enabled

Allow BitLocker without a

compatible TPM (requires a
password or a startup key on
a USB flash drive)

Settings for computers with a

TPM

Configure TPM startup: Do not

allow TPM

Configure TPM startup PIN:

Allow startup PIN with TPM

Configure TPM startup key:

Allow startup key with TPM

Configure TPM startup key

and PIN: Allow startup key
and PIN with TPM

Page 25 of 43
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\BitLocker Drive
Encryption\Removable Data Drives
Choose how BitLocker-protected removable drives can be recovered Enabled

Allow data recovery agent

Configure user storage of

BitLocker recovery
information:
Allow 48-digit recovery
password
Allow 256-bit recovery key

Omit recovery options from

the BitLocker setup wizard

Save BitLocker recovery

information to AD DS for
removable data drives

Configure storage of BitLocker

recovery information to AD
DS: Backup recovery
passwords and key packages

Do not enable BitLocker until

recovery information is stored
to AD DS for removable data
drives
Configure use of passwords for removable data drives Enabled

Require password for

removable data drive

Configure password
complexity for removable data
drives: Require password
complexity

Minimum password length for

removable data drive: 10
Control use of BitLocker on removable drives Enabled

Allow users to apply BitLocker

protection on removable data
drives
Deny write access to removable drives not protected by BitLocker Enabled

Installing applications
85. While the ability to install applications may be a business requirement for users, this privilege
can be exploited by an adversary. An adversary can email a malicious application, or host a
malicious application on a compromised website, and use social engineering techniques to

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 convince users into installing the application on their workstation. Even if privileged access is
required to install applications, users will use their privileged access if they believe, or can be
convinced that, the requirement to install the application is legitimate. Additionally, if applications
are configured to install using elevated privileges, an adversary can exploit this by creating a
Windows Installer installation package to create a new account that belongs to the local built-in
administrators group or to install a malicious application. To reduce this risk, all application
installations should be strictly controlled.
86. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to control application installations.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Installer
Always install with elevated privileges Disabled
Enable user control over installs Disabled
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Installer
Always install with elevated privileges Disabled

Internet printing
87. Microsoft Windows has the ability to print to internet printers over HTTP. If not disabled, this
functionality could result in the accidental or intentional release of sensitive information into the
public domain. To reduce this risk, internet printing should be disabled.
88. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to prevent the use of internet printing.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Internet Communication
Management\Internet Communication settings
Turn off downloading of print drivers over HTTP Enabled
Turn off printing over HTTP Enabled

Legacy and run once lists

89. Once malicious code has been copied to a workstation, an adversary with registry access can
remotely schedule it to execute (i.e. using the run once list) or to automatically execute each
time Microsoft Windows starts (i.e. using the legacy run list). To reduce this risk, legacy and run
once lists should be disabled. This may interfere with the operation of legitimate applications that
need to automatically execute each time Microsoft Windows starts. In such cases, the Run these
programs at user logon Group Policy setting can be used to perform the same function in a more
secure manner when defined at a domain level; however, if not used this Group Policy setting
should be disabled rather than left in its default undefined state.
90. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable the use of legacy and run
once lists.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Logon
Do not process the legacy run list Enabled
Do not process the run once list Enabled
Run these programs at user logon Disabled

MSS settings
91. By failing to specify MSS specific registry values an adversary may be able to exploit
weaknesses in a workstation’s security posture to gain access to sensitive information. To

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 reduce this risk, MSS specific registry values that are still relevant to modern versions of
Microsoft Windows should be specified using Group Policy settings.
92. The Group Policy Administrative Templates for MSS specific registry values are available from
the Microsoft Security Guidance blog23. The ADMX and associated en-us ADML file can be
placed in C:\Windows\SYSVOL\domain\Policies\PolicyDefinitions on the Domain Controller and
they will automatically be loaded in the Group Policy Management Editor.
93. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to configure MSS specific registry
values that are still relevant to modern versions of Microsoft Windows.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\ Administrative Templates\MSS (Legacy)
MSS: (DisableIPSourceRouting IPv6) IP source routing protection level Highest protection, source
(protects against packet spoofing) routing is completely disabled
MSS: (DisableIPSourceRouting) IP source routing protection level (protects Highest protection, source
against packet spoofing) routing is completely disabled
MSS: (EnableICMPRedirect) Allow ICMP redirects to override OSPF generated Disabled
routes
MSS: (NoNameReleaseOnDemand) Allow the computer to ignore NetBIOS Enabled
name release requests except from WINS servers

NetBIOS over TCP/IP

94. NetBIOS over TCP/IP facilitates a number of intrusion methods. To reduce this risk, NetBIOS
over TCP/IP should be disabled. As NetBIOS over TCP/IP is only used to support legacy
Microsoft Windows operating systems, such as those prior to Microsoft Windows 2000, there
shouldn’t be a business requirement for its use except in very rare circumstances. NetBIOS over
TCP/IP can be disabled by setting the NetBIOS settings under the IPv4 WINS settings on each
network interface to Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP. NetBIOS over TCP/IP is not supported by
IPv6.
Network authentication
95. Using insecure network authentication methods may permit an adversary to gain unauthorised
access to network traffic and services. To reduce this risk, only secure network authentication
methods, ideally Kerberos, should be used for network authentication.
96. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to configure Kerberos, and if required
for legacy purposes, the use of NTLMv2.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos AES128_HMAC_SHA1
AES256_HMAC_SHA1
Network security: LAN Manager authentication level Send NTLMv2 response only.
Refuse LM & NTLM
Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including Require NTLMv2 session
secure RPC) clients security
Require 128-bit encryption

23
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/secguide/2016/10/02/the-mss-settings/

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Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including Require NTLMv2 session
secure RPC) servers security
Require 128-bit encryption

NoLMHash policy
97. When Microsoft Windows hashes a password that is less than 15 characters, it stores both a
LAN Manager hash (LM hash) and Windows NT hash (NT hash) in the local SAM database for
local accounts, or in Activity Directory for domain accounts. The LM hash is significantly weaker
than the NT hash and can easily be brute forced. To reduce this risk, the NoLMHash Policy
should be implemented on all workstations and domain controllers. As the LM hash is designed
for authentication of legacy Microsoft Windows operating systems, such as those prior to
Microsoft Windows 2000, there shouldn’t be a business requirement for its use except in very
rare circumstances.
98. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to prevent the storage of LM hashes for
passwords. All users should be encouraged to change their password once this Group Policy
setting has been set as until they do they will remain vulnerable.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password Enabled
change

Operating system functionality

99. Leaving unneeded functionality in Microsoft Windows enabled can provide greater opportunities
for potentially vulnerable or misconfigured functionality to be exploited by an adversary. To
reduce this risk, unneeded functionality in Microsoft Windows should be disabled or removed.
Power management
100. One method of reducing power usage by workstations is to enter a sleep, hibernation or hybrid
sleep state after a pre-defined period of inactivity. When a workstation enters a sleep state it
maintains the contents of memory while powering down the rest of the workstation; with
hibernation or hybrid sleep, it writes the contents of memory to the hard drive in a hibernation file
(hiberfil.sys) and powers down the rest of the workstation. When this occurs, sensitive
information such as encryption keys could either be retained in memory or written to the hard
drive in a hibernation file. An adversary with physical access to the workstation and either the
memory or hard drive can recover the sensitive information using forensic techniques. To reduce
this risk, sleep, hibernation and hybrid sleep states should be disabled.
101. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure that sleep, hibernation and
hybrid sleep states are disabled.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Power Management\Sleep Settings
Allow Standby States (S1-S3) When Sleeping (On Battery) Disabled
Allow Standby States (S1-S3) When Sleeping (Plugged In) Disabled
Require a Password When a Computer Wakes (On Battery) Enabled
Require a Password When a Computer Wakes (Plugged In) Enabled
Specify the System Hibernate Timeout (On Battery) Enabled

System Hibernate Timeout

(seconds): 0

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Specify the System Hibernate Timeout (Plugged In) Enabled

System Hibernate Timeout

(seconds): 0
Specify the System Sleep Timeout (On Battery) Enabled

System Sleep Timeout

(seconds): 0
Specify the System Sleep Timeout (Plugged In) Enabled

System Sleep Timeout

(seconds): 0
Specify the Unattended Sleep Timeout (On Battery) Enabled

Unattended Sleep Timeout

(seconds): 0
Specify the Unattended Sleep Timeout (Plugged In) Enabled

Unattended Sleep Timeout

(seconds): 0
Turn Off Hybrid Sleep (On Battery) Enabled
Turn Off Hybrid Sleep (Plugged In) Enabled

PowerShell
102. Allowing any PowerShell script to execute exposes a workstation to the risk that a malicious
script may be unwittingly executed by a user. To reduce this risk, users should not have the
ability to execute PowerShell scripts; however, if using PowerShell scripts is an essential
business requirement, only signed scripts should be allowed to execute. Ensuring that only
signed scripts are allowed to execute can provide a level of assurance that a script is trusted and
has been endorsed as having a legitimate business purpose.
103. For more information on how to effectively implement PowerShell see Securing PowerShell in
the Enterprise24.
104. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to control the use of PowerShell scripts.
Registry Entry Recommended Value
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows PowerShell
Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging Enabled
Turn on Script Execution Enabled

Execution Policy: Allow only

signed scripts

Registry editing tools

105. One method for malicious code to maintain persistence (i.e. remain after a workstation is
rebooted) is to use administrative privileges to modify the registry (as standard privileges only
allow viewing of the registry). To reduce this risk, users should not have the ability to modify the

24
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Securing_PowerShell.pdf

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 registry using registry editing tools (i.e. regedit) or to make silent changes to the registry (i.e.
using .reg files).
106. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to prevent users from viewing or
modifying the registry using registry editing tools.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System
Prevent access to registry editing tools Enabled

Disable regedit from running

silently: Yes

Remote Assistance
107. While Remote Assistance can be a useful business tool to allow system administrators to
remotely administer workstations, it can also pose a risk. When a user has a problem with their
workstation they can generate a Remote Assistance invitation. This invitation authorises anyone
that has access to it to remotely control the workstation that issued the invitation. Invitations can
be sent by email, instant messaging or saved to a file. If an adversary manages to intercept an
invitation they will be able to use it to access the user’s workstation. Additionally, if network
traffic on port 3389 is not blocked from reaching the Internet, users may send Remote
Assistance invitations over the Internet which could allow for remote access to their workstation
by an adversary. While Remote Assistance only grants access to the privileges of the user that
generated the request, an adversary could install a key logging application on the workstation in
preparation of a system administer using their privileged credentials to fix any problems. To
reduce this risk, Remote Assistance should be disabled.
108. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable Remote Assistance.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Remote Assistance
Offer Remote Assistance Disabled
Solicited Remote Assistance Disabled

Remote Desktop Services

109. While remote desktop access may be convenient for legitimate users to access workstations
across a network, it also allows an adversary to access other workstations once they have
compromised an initial workstation and user’s credentials. This risk can be compounded if an
adversary can compromise domain administrator credentials or common local administrator
credentials. To reduce this risk, Remote Desktop Services should be disabled.
110. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable Remote Desktop Services.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop
Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Connections
Allow users to connect remotely using Remote Desktop Services Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services <blank>

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Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services Administrators
Guests
NT AUTHORITY\Local
Account
111. Alternatively, if it is an essential business requirement to use Remote Desktop Services, it
should be configured in a manner that is as secure as possible and only on workstations and for
users for which it is explicitly required.
112. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to use Remote Desktop Services in as
secure a manner as possible.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop
Services\Remote Desktop Connection Client
Configure server authentication for client Enabled

Authentication setting:
Do not connect if
authentication fails
Do not allow passwords to be saved Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop
Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Connections
Allow users to connect remotely using Remote Desktop Services Enabled
Deny logoff of an administrator logged in to the console session Enabled
Set rules for remote control of Remote Desktop Services user sessions Enabled

Options: Full Control with

user’s permission
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop
Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Device and Resource Redirection
Do not allow clipboard redirection Enabled
Do not allow drive redirection Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Remote Desktop
Services\Remote Desktop Session Host\Security
Always prompt for password upon connection Enabled
Do not allow local administrators to customize permissions Enabled
Require secure RPC communication Enabled
Require use of specific security layer for remote (RDP) connections Enabled

Security Layer: SSL (TLS 1.0)

Require user authentication for remote connections by using Network Level Enabled
Authentication
Set client connection encryption level Enabled

Encryption Level: High Level

Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment

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Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services Remote Desktop Users
Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services Administrators
Guests

Remote Procedure Call

113. Remote Procedure Call (RPC) is a technique used for facilitating client and server application
communications using a common interface. RPC is designed to make client and server
interaction easier and safer by using a common library to handle tasks such as security,
synchronisation and data flows. If unauthenticated communications are allowed between client
and server applications, it could result in accidental disclosure of sensitive information or the
failure to take advantage of RPC security functionality. To reduce this risk, all RPC clients should
authenticate to RPC servers.
114. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to ensure RPC clients authenticate to
RPC servers.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Remote Procedure Call
Restrictions for Unauthenticated RPC clients Enabled

RPC Runtime
Unauthenticated Client
Restriction to Apply:
Authenticated

Reporting system information

115. Microsoft Windows contains a number of in-built functions to, often automatically and
transparently, report system information to Microsoft. This includes system errors and crash
information as well as inventories of applications, files, devices and drivers on the system. If
captured by an adversary, this information could expose potentially sensitive information on
workstations. This information could also subsequently be used by an adversary to tailor
malicious code to target specific workstations or users. To reduce this risk, all in-built functions
that report potentially sensitive system information should be directed to a corporate Windows
Error Reporting server.
116. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to prevent potentially sensitive system
information being reported to Microsoft.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Troubleshooting and
Diagnostics\Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool
Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool: Turn on MSDT interactive communication Disabled
with Support Provider
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Application
Compatibility
Turn off Problem Steps Recorder Enabled
Turn off Program Inventory Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Defender
Configure Microsoft SpyNet Reporting Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Error
Reporting\Advanced Error Reporting Settings

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Configure Corporate Windows Error Reporting Enabled

Corporate server name:

<organisation defined>

Connect using SSL

Server port: <organisation

defined>

Safe Mode
117. An adversary with standard user credentials that can boot into Microsoft Windows using Safe
Mode, Safe Mode with Networking or Safe Mode with Command Prompt options may be able to
bypass system protections and security functionality such as application whitelisting solutions.
To reduce this risk, users with standard credentials should be prevented from using Safe Mode
options to log in.
118. The following registry entry can be implemented to prevent non-administrators from using Safe
Mode options.
Registry Entry Recommended Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
SafeModeBlockNonAdmins REG_DWORD 0x00000001
(1)

Secure channel communications

119. Periodically, workstations connected to a domain will communicate with the domain controllers.
If an adversary has access to unprotected network communications they may be able to capture
or modify sensitive information communicated between workstations and the domain controllers.
To reduce this risk, all secure channel communications should be signed and encrypted with
strong session keys.
120. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure secure channel
communications are appropriately signed and encrypted.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Domain member: Digitally encrypt or sign secure channel data (always) Enabled
Domain member: Digitally encrypt secure channel data (when possible) Enabled
Domain member: Digitally sign secure channel data (when possible) Enabled
Domain member: Require strong (Windows 2000 or later) session key Enabled

Security policies
121. By failing to comprehensively specify security policies, an adversary may be able to exploit
weaknesses in a workstation’s Group Policy settings to gain access to sensitive information. To
reduce this risk, security policies should be comprehensively specified.
122. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented, in addition to those specifically
mentioned in other areas of this document, to form a comprehensive set of security policies.

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 Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Device Installation
Allow remote access to the Plug and Play interface Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\RSS Feeds
Prevent downloading of enclosures Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Search
Allow indexing of encrypted files Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Explorer
Turn off heap termination on corruption Disabled
Turn off shell protocol protected mode Disabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Domain member: Disable machine account password changes Disabled
Domain member: Maximum machine account password age 30 days
Network security: Allow PKU2U authentication requests to this computer to use Disabled
online identities
Network security: Force logoff when logon hours expire Enabled
Network security: LDAP client signing requirements Negotiate signing
System objects: Require case insensitivity for non-Windows subsystems Enabled
System objects: Strengthen default permissions of internal system objects (e.g. Enabled
Symbolic Links)

Server Message Block sessions

123. An adversary that has access to network communications may attempt to use session hijacking
tools to interrupt, terminate or steal a Server Message Block (SMB) session. This could
potentially allow an adversary to modify packets and forward them to a SMB server to perform
undesirable actions or to pose as the server or client after a legitimate authentication has taken
place to gain access to sensitive information. To reduce this risk, all communications between
SMB clients and servers should be signed, with any passwords used appropriately encrypted.
124. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure communications between
SMB clients and servers are secure.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\MS Security Guide
Configure SMB v1 client (extra setting needed for pre-Win8.1/2002R2) Enabled

Configure LanmanWorkstation
dependencies:
Browser
MRxSmb20
NSI
Configure SMB v1 client driver Enabled

Configure MrxSmb10 driver:

Disable driver (recommended)
Configure SMB v1 server Disabled

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Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always) Enabled
Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (if server agrees) Enabled
Microsoft network client: Send unencrypted password to third-party SMB Disabled
servers
Microsoft network server: Amount of idle time required before suspending 15 minutes
session
Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always) Enabled
Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (if client agrees) Enabled

Session locking
125. An adversary with physical access to an unattended workstation may attempt to inappropriately
access other users’ sessions in order to use their credentials to access sensitive information
they don’t have access to or to conduct actions on the network that won’t be attributed to them.
To reduce this risk, a session lock should be configured to activate after a maximum of 15
minutes of user inactivity.
126. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to set session locks.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Control Panel\Personalization
Enable screen saver Enabled
Password protect the screen saver Enabled
Screen saver timeout Enabled

Seconds: 900

Software-based firewalls
127. Network firewalls often fail to prevent the propagation of malicious code on a network, or an
adversary from extracting sensitive information, as they generally only control which ports or
protocols can be used between segments on a network. Many forms of malicious code are
designed specifically to take advantage of this by using common protocols such as HTTP,
HTTPS, SMTP and DNS. To reduce this risk, software-based firewalls that filter both incoming
and outgoing traffic should be appropriately implemented. Software-based firewalls are more
effective than network firewalls as they can control which applications and services can
communicate to and from workstations. The in-built Windows firewall can be used to control both
inbound and outbound traffic for specific applications.
Sound Recorder
128. Sound Recorder is a feature of Microsoft Windows that allows audio from a device with a
microphone to be recorded and saved as an audio file on the local hard drive. An adversary with
remote access to a workstation can use this functionality to record sensitive conversations in the
vicinity of the workstation. To reduce this risk, Sound Recorder should be disabled.
129. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable the use of Sound Recorder.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Sound Recorder
Do not allow Sound Recorder to run Enabled

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Standard Operating Environment
130. When users are left to setup, configure and maintain their own workstations it can very easily
lead to an inconsistent and insecure environment where particular workstations are more
vulnerable than others. This inconsistent and insecure environment can easily allow an
adversary to gain an initial foothold on a network. To reduce this risk, workstations should
connect to a domain using a Standard Operating Environment that is centrally controlled and
configured by experienced information technology and information security professionals.
System backup and restore
131. An adversary that compromises a user account with privileges to backup files and directories
can use this privilege to backup the contents of a workstation. This content can then be
transferred to a non-domain connected workstation where the adversary has administrative
access. From here an adversary can restore the contents and take ownership, thereby
circumventing all original access controls that were in place. In addition, if a user has privileges
to restore files and directories, an adversary could exploit this privilege by using it to either
restore previous versions of files that may have been removed by system administrators as part
of malicious code removal activities or to replace existing files with malicious variants. To reduce
this risk, the ability to use backup and restore functionality should be limited to administrators.
132. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to control the use of backup and
restore functionality.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Back up files and directories Administrators
Restore files and directories Administrators

System cryptography
133. By default, when cryptographic keys are stored in Microsoft Windows, users can access them
without first entering a password to unlock the certificate store. An adversary that compromises
a workstation, or gains physical access to an unlocked workstation, can use these user keys to
access sensitive information or resources that are cryptographically protected. To reduce this
risk, strong encryption algorithms and strong key protection should be used on workstations.
134. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to ensure strong encryption algorithms
and strong key protection is used.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options
System cryptography: Force strong key protection for user keys stored on the User must enter a password
computer each time they use a key
System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, Enabled
and signing

User rights policies

135. By failing to comprehensively specify user rights policies, an adversary may be able to exploit
weaknesses in a workstation’s Group Policy settings to gain access to sensitive information. To
reduce this risk, user rights policies should be comprehensively specified.
136. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented, in addition to those specifically
mentioned in other areas of this document, to form a comprehensive set of user rights policies.

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 Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\User Rights
Assignment
Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller <blank>
Act as part of the operating system <blank>
Allow log on locally Administrators
Users
Create a pagefile Administrators
Create a token object <blank>
Create global objects Administrators
LOCAL SERVICE
NETWORK SERVICE
SERVICE
Create permanent shared objects <blank>
Create symbolic links Administrators
Debug programs Administrators
Enable computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation <blank>
Force shutdown from a remote system Administrators
Impersonate a client after authentication Administrators
LOCAL SERVICE
NETWORK SERVICE
SERVICE
Increase scheduling priority Administrators
Load and unload device drivers Administrators
Lock pages in memory <blank>
Modify an object label <blank>
Modify firmware environment values Administrators
Perform volume maintenance tasks Administrators
Profile single process Administrators
Take ownership of files or other objects Administrators

Virtualised web and email access

137. An adversary can often deliver malicious code directly to workstations via external web and
email access. Once a workstation has been exploited, an adversary can use these same
communication paths for bi-directional communications to control their malicious code. To
reduce this risk, web and email access on workstations should occur through a non-persistent
virtual environment (i.e. using virtual desktops or virtual applications). When using a virtual
environment, workstations will receive additional protection against intrusion attempts targeted at
exploiting security vulnerabilities in web browsers and email clients as any attempts, if
successful, will execute in a non-persistent virtual environment rather than on a local
workstation.

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Windows Remote Management
138. Windows Remote Management (WinRM)25 is the Microsoft implementation of the WS-
Management Protocol26 which was developed as a public standard for remotely exchanging
management data between devices that implement the protocol. If appropriate authentication
and encryption is not implemented for this protocol, traffic may be subject to inception by an
adversary. To reduce this risk, Windows Remote Management should be securely configured.
139. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to secure the use of the Windows
Remote Management.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Remote
Management (WinRM)\WinRM Client
Allow Basic authentication Disabled
Allow unencrypted traffic Disabled
Disallow digest authentication Enabled
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Remote
Management (WinRM)\WinRM Server
Allow Basic authentication Disabled
Allow unencrypted traffic Disabled
Disallow WinRM from storing RunAs credentials Enabled

Windows Remote Shell access

140. When Windows Remote Shell is enabled it can allow an adversary to remotely execute scripts
and commands on workstations. To reduce this risk, Windows Remote Shell should be disabled.
141. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable Windows Remote Shell
access.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Remote
Shell
Allow Remote Shell Access Disabled

Windows Sidebar and Gadgets

142. The Windows Sidebar allows mini-programs known as Gadgets to run on users’ desktops. While
these Gadgets are typically used to display information such as local weather conditions, news
feeds or system resource levels, they can also be used to remotely execute malicious code. To
reduce this risk, the Windows Sidebar and its use of Gadgets should be disabled.

25
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/library/aa384426(v=vs.85).aspx
26
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/library/windows/desktop/aa384470(v=vs.85).aspx

Page 39 of 43
143. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable the Windows Sidebar and its
use of Gadgets.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Desktop Gadgets
Restrict unpacking and installation of gadgets that are not digitally signed Enabled
Turn off desktop gadgets Enabled
Turn Off user-installed desktop gadgets Enabled

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Low priorities
144. The following security controls, listed in alphabetical order, are recommended for consideration
and should be treated as low priorities when hardening Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 workstations.
Displaying file extensions
145. When extensions for known file types are hidden, an adversary can more easily use social
engineering techniques to convince users to execute malicious email attachments. For example,
a file named vulnerability_assessment.pdf.exe could appear as vulnerability_assessment.pdf to
a user. To reduce this risk, hiding extensions for known file types should be disabled. Showing
extensions for all known file types, in combination with user education and awareness of
dangerous email attachment file types, can help reduce the risk of users executing malicious
email attachments.
146. The following registry entry can be implemented to prevent extensions for known file types from
being hidden.
Registry Entry Recommended Value
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
HideFileExt REG_DWORD 0x00000000
(0)

File and folder security properties

147. By default, all users have the ability to view security properties of files and folders. This includes
the security properties associated with files and folders as well as users and groups that they
relate to. An adversary could use this information to target specific accounts that have access to
sensitive information. To reduce this risk, users should not have the ability to view security
properties of files and folders.
148. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable users’ access to the security
tab in file and folder properties in Windows Explorer.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Windows Explorer
Remove Security tab Enabled

Location awareness
149. When users interact with the Internet their workstations often automatically provide geo-location
details to websites or online services to assist them in tailoring content specific to the user’s
geographical region (i.e. the city they are accessing the Internet from). This information can be
captured by an adversary to determine the location of a specific user. To reduce this risk,
location services in the operating system and applications should be disabled.
150. The following Group Policy settings can be implemented to disable location services within the
operating system.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Location and
Sensors
Turn off location Enabled
Turn off location scripting Enabled

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Publishing information to the Web
151. Microsoft Windows has the ability to assist users in either directly publishing information to the
Web or sending information to publishers for professional publication. If not disabled, this
functionality could result in the accidental or intentional release of sensitive information into the
public domain. To reduce this risk, the ability to publish information to the Web or send to
publishers should be disabled.
152. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable the ability to publish
information to the Web or send it to publishers.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Internet Communication
Management\Internet Communication settings
Turn off Internet download for Web publishing and online ordering wizards Enabled

Resultant Set of Policy reporting

153. By default, all users have the ability to generate Resultant Set of Policy (RSOP) reports which
allows them to view the Group Policy settings being applied to their workstation and user
account. This information could be used by an adversary to determine misconfigurations or
weaknesses in Group Policy settings being applied to the workstation or the user account. To
reduce this risk, users should not have the ability to generate RSOP reports.
154. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to disable users’ ability to generate
RSOP reports.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
User Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\System\Group Policy
Disallow Interactive Users from generating Resultant Set of Policy data Enabled
Windows Marketplace
155. Whilst applications in the Windows Marketplace are vetted by Microsoft, there is still a risk that
users given access to the Windows Marketplace could download and install potentially malicious
applications or applications that cause conflicts with other endorsed applications on their
workstation. To reduce this risk, access to the Windows Marketplace should be disabled.
156. The following Group Policy setting can be implemented to prevent Windows Marketplace
access.
Group Policy Setting Recommended Option
Computer Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Digital Locker
Do not allow Digital Locker to run Enabled

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Contact details
157. Commonwealth entities with questions regarding this advice should contact ASD Advice and
Assistance by emailing asd.assist@defence.gov.au or by calling 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371).
158. Australian businesses or other private sector organisations with questions regarding this advice
should contact CERT Australia by emailing info@cert.gov.au or by calling 1300 172 499.

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