Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. CA, GR No.

122191, October 8, 1998

FACTS: Plaintiff was a flight attendant went out with two Saudi nationals to which one attempted to rape her but failed
due to arrival of Indonesia police who then arrested the said nationals. When brought to SAUDI court, plaintiff was made
to sign a document in Arabic and such was actually a notice to appear. In the same court, plaintiff was erroneously
sentenced to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes for being allegedly guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention
of Islamic tradition. Plaintiff sued for damages

ISSUES:
a. Whether RTC has jurisdiction.
b. Whether Philippine Law governs.

HELD:
a. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction
b. Yes, Philippine Law governs
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that
the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception. The forms in which
this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to
a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with
the petitioner Saudi as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation
to arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents
itself here, and the question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo. After a careful study of the private respondent's
Amended Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is
quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although
ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always
do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or
not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." 55 The purpose of "characterization" is to enable
the forum to select the proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. 57 An essential
element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules
invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of
contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable
law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and
torts;

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 (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or
the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori — the law of the forum
— is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of
the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master
or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion
that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person
while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most
interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is
in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., vs MINORU KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177

November 23, 2007

FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management
support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that
Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the
project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion,
DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision
of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed
term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a
MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the
RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard &
ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the
case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was
correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance &
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex
loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.

HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law,
and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers
whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether
the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power
to exercise jurisdiction does notautomatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary
“significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different
from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to
validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the

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defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over
the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually
referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is furtherdetermined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed
in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must
show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate
the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear
the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation
& is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant
relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is
made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or
to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.Under the “state of the most
significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state
has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or
place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into accountseveral contacts and evaluates them according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for
the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues
of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out
any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a
conflict of laws situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is
invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal
law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may
choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other
formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not
a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd,
whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrinedepends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this
conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Raytheon International vs. Stockton Rouzie, GR. No. 162894, 26 February 2008

FACTS: Respondent filed before (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert
and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.
respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The
Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. Petitioner moved to dismiss on grounds of forum non convenies and
no cause of action.

ISSUE: WON CA ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. and WON CA ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.

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HELD: Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution
of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus,
in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a
foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign
prerogative of the country where the case is filed.29

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law 30 and by the
material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of
contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff)
upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was
acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut
does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the
civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant
only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the
trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of
its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

HONGKONG SHANGAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) v. SHERMAN

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

FACTS
In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a company incorporated in Singapore applied w/, & was
granted by the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility in the max amount of Singapore $200,000 (w/c amount
was subsequently increased to Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on
amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a security for the repayment by Eastern of sums advanced by HSBC to it
through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, Jack Sherman, Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom
were directors of Eastern at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby Sherman,
Reloj and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC under the
aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising
hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic
of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this
guarantee.”

Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment of the obligation from Sherman & Reloj,
conformably w/ the provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as Sherman & Reloj still failed to pay,
HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against them. Sherman & Reloj filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, and (2) the court has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants.

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ISSUE
W/N Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit.

RULING
YES. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee
contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "this guarantee and
all rights, obligations & liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed & determined under & may be enforced in
accordance w/ the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules
of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must
be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Indeed,
as pointed-out by HSBC at the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone
would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, w/ more reason as a defendant. However, in this case, Sherman
& Reloj are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against
them before a foreign court and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have
a Philippine court try and resolve the case. Their stance is hardly comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to
evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.

The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality.
They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass
Sherman & Reloj.

The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction.
Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is
often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things w/in its boundaries subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic
representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory w/ the
permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive
w/in and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making
its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.

Aznar v. Garcia
Facts
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will executed in the
Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen") and the remainder of his estate
to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any
manner he pleases. However, California law also provides that the personal property of a person is governed by the
laws of his domicile. The executor, Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed
the project of partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed in the
project deprived her of her legitime.

Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by the national
law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom
in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other
hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its
owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the
Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

BELLIS VS. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three
illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his
seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have been
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deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the
deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights

RULING: Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of
those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by
his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the
national law of the deceased.

CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL

GRN 104776, December 5,1994.

FACTS: This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a
class suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC
(BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC
is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund;
interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and
premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited
practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but
required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and
BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within
ten days from receipt of the order.

(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both
parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a
period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC
and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA
Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.
Claimants submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its
MR and/or appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits
awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by
AlBC and BRII.

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The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty
Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the
Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:

“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a
minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until
seven o’clock in the morning .”

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.”

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional
sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on
full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five
continuous years of service.”

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto
after giving the other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and
fifteen days’ notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice shall pay
to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice
or the unexpired portion thereof.”

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity
for the period of his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of the first three years of
service and of one month’s wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of
leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.”

ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who have worked in
Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).

2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants’ claim for the
benefits provided therein have prescribed.)

3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)

RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a
foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the
Private Sector).

NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the
overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of
the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those
Page 7 of 15
stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the compensation of the
employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent
to the compensation” therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total remuneration
and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that
drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.” The presumption is that there
was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that
reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a
case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their
capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign
statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by giving
effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3 years, as provided in
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the
expiry of the Contract”.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as
service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the
forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case
filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the
Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period
provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a
foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as
well as within the foreign country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that as a
yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory one.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed
against the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on
prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of
the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
Page 8 of 15
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing
statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause
of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall promote
social justice in all phases of national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the
Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accross:

(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-
year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.

3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims are for
benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were
deployed in Indonesia under different terms and condition of employment.

Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based on the Amiri
Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their
claims in a class suit.

While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims is the same (for employee’s
benefits), there is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain,
many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested
only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in
protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-
claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who
worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

Page 9 of 15
Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp.,
GR No. 133876, 29 December 1999

“In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign law, Philippine law prevails”

Facts: The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate mortgage by the respondent. Upon
the loan maturity, the corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts
(England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in
the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public
auction. The respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage
extrajudicially despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal loan. Petitioner contends
that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor
and such actions were filed in foreign courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the
Philippines unless a separate action is filed in the Phils to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which
is the law governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action
for sum of money. The court rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection
of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors before foreign courts constitutes
a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

RULING: The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure provides that “if two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” A mortgagor creditor may pursue two remedies either to institute
against the mortgage debtor a personal action for collection of money or foreclosure of a mortgage but cannot avail of
both remedies. In Phil. jurisdiction these remedies are alternative and not cumulative. Thus, choosing one remedy is a
bar to avail of the other remedy. Plaintiff cannot split up a single cause of action by filing both remedies as
expressly prohibited by the rules on civil procedure.

On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should apply to the principal agreements that states that the
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money, the court held that a foreign
law must be properly pleaded and proved as fact. If not pleaded, the court will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is the DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION.

Granting however that the English law is applicable in the Phil. court, such law is contrary to sound and established
public policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single cause of action, thus still cannot be applied
by the court in the case.

It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the country upon which the case is filed. Therefore, the filing
of a collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for the remedy of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

DACASIN vs DACASIN
G.R. no. 168785, February 5, 2010

PRINCIPLE: An alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. A foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's nationality,
irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

FACTS: On April 1994, petitioner Herald Black Dacasin (American), and respondent Sharon del Mundo Dacasin
(Filipino) got married in the Philippines. The following year, respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl they
named Stephanie. In June of 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of
Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction,
since Illinois Court holds the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and enforce the Agreement on the
joint custody of the parties' child.

Page 10 of 15
RULING: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner's suit and call for the remand of
the case to settle the question of Stephanie's custody.
What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
[its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner's suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce
decree but of the post- divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court's so-called "retained jurisdiction.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) states: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother..." Clearly then, the
Agreement's object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
Further, petitioner cannot rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity — not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse
— to support the Agreement's enforceability. A foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee
in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Davao,

G.R. No. 55380, Sept. 26, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil registrar
of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro
Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and information reflected therein clearly and conclusively
revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a
petition for correction of entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
correction of the name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in
nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error

HELD: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under Art.
412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or
clerical errors apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it, such as
misspellings and obvious mistakes. However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Adversary Proceeding, defined
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows: One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it...” Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit
or proceeding is “appropriate.”

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner
and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have
been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
Page 11 of 15
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.

CRIME CHARGED: violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)

RTC: DISMISSED on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the respondent who is an ALIEN.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
his minor child.

SC HELD:

*Note: petition was allowed to be directly appealed to the SC without violating hierarchy of courts since the petition
involves purely questions of law.

Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,
respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree,
he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial support.

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that
they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability for the reason that when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that
the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case,

Page 12 of 15
which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn
in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has
clearly not prescribed.

PETITION GRANTED, CASE REMANDED TO RTC.

Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs Court of Appeals

342 SCRA 213 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Proof of Foreign Law
FACTS: In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to
the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President
Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the
Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a
result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The
blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued
PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to
wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two
laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was
proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the
river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws
were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same
as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez.
PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly
accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL MA.
GUERRERO, respondent.

FACTS: On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld
taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account.
Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
BANK’S DEFENSE: that by stipulation Guerrero's account is governed by New York law and this law does not
permit any of Guerrero's claims except actual damages.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a NEW YORK ATTORNEY , supported the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero's New York bank account
stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero's claims except actual
damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the Walden AFFIDAVIT does not serve as PROOF of the New York LAW and jurisprudence

Page 13 of 15
relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence
AS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS defined in Section 19 , Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows: "SEC. 19.Classes
of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;

xxx xxx xxx."

The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in
proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24.Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy ATTESTED by the officer having the legal custody of the record , or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a CERTIFICATE that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."

ISSUES: WON THE NEW YORK LAW SHOULD GOVERN THE CASE FILED

RULING: First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden
affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims
is warranted.

Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and
those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden
affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained
in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving
but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant's personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the
case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden
affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts.
While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not
comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank's intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However,
because of the failure to comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did
not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

Norse Management Co. vs National Seamen Board

Facts: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second
Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner
NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her
complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the
amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered.
Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board
cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s
Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally
the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held: The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases,
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that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the
country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between
petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free
medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must
be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or
injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines
or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code
provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

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