3-PHAP vs. Secretary of Health (Domer)
3-PHAP vs. Secretary of Health (Domer)
Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of EO No. 51 aka The “Milk Code”, Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations, and for other Purposes (RIRR)
WoN the questioned RIRR is not valid as it (a) contains provisions that are not
Constitutional and (b) go beyond the law it is supposed to implement. (This part is sooo
long)
IV. Are there facts established and material to the disposition by the Court
(discussion of evidentiary submission and evaluation of evidence by the court)?
Antecedent
In 1986, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 51 which gives effect to
Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICMBS).
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be promoted and protects, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitues.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued the herein assailed RIRR.
Partially.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code’s coverage is limited only
to 0-12 months old. The coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age
of the child but on the kind of product being marketed to the public. The law
treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute
as separate and distinct product categories.
Breastmilk Substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as “any food being marketed
or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether
or not suitable for that purpose.” The aforementioned section lacks reference to
any particular age group. Hence the provision of Milk Code cannot be
considered exclusive for children aged 0-12 months.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code,
does not recognize that breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible
substitute for breastmilk.
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that “when medically indicated and only when
necessary, the use of breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete
and updated information.
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code
The court finds no inconsistency between the Milk Code and the RIRR. Under
Section 12(b) of the Milk Coe, the DOH shall be principally responsible for the
implementation of the Code therefore the prohibition of the RIRR on milk
companies participating in any policymaking body is in accord with Milk Code.
The court ruled that neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code
grants the DOH authority to fix or impose administrative fines.
DOH may authorzed means such as (1) causing prosecution under the Code or
(2) imposing penalties to the violators pursuant to the sanctions provided for in
the Milk Code.
8. Petitioner claims that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are
contrary to the RIRR—this is frivolous.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders,
issuances and rules and regulations.
2.2 WoN the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines
are part of the law of the land. If yes, whether the RIRR is in accord with the
international agreements;
There are two ways an International Agreement can become part of the law of
the land:
The Milk Code does not contain such absolute prohibition either. It calls for
regulation of said advertising and promotion.
*Only provisions in the Milk Code, NOT those of subsequent WHAT
Resolutions, can be validly implemented through the RIRR.
2.3 Whether certain sections of the RIRR violate the due process clause
and are in restraint of trade;
Yes. Section 13 of the RIRR sets a viable standard against which the IAC may
screen promotional materials on breastmilk substitutes before they are made
public.
*Total Effect – should not suggest that buying their milk product
produces better individuals.
Referring to Equi-Asia Placement, Inc vs. DFA, the court accepted as sufficient
standards the ff.: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and
welfare, and simplicity, economy and welfare.
In this instant case, the court believes that correct information as to infant
feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.
The Petition is partially granted. Sections 4(f), 11, and 46 of the RIRR are declared Null
and Void for being ultra vires. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.
The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of the RIRR is concerned.