Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D.

ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G.
ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P.
MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P.
PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH
N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G.
TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988,
denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and
their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an

election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent
Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court
and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators
Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr.,
Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada
but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of
the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal
Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with
the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents
therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the
same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to
Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same
ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same contest,
thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for
disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral
arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards
issuing the Resolutions now complained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both
SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest
filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as
alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two
cases.

The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification
sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution
both practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of
the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being
decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the

concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including
one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
 system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be
its Chairman.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by

both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of
this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an
intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of
course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of
Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component"
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate
without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not

prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit
in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for
settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations
must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its
disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it
acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado JJ., concur.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the
Court. I would merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in
the penultimate paragraph of his opinion.

Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal

voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in
SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between
the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still
constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations
of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent
above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the
Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This
denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by
certiorari.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the
Court. I would merely like to carry forward however slightly the analysis found in
the penultimate paragraph of his opinion.

Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal

voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in
SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between
the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still
constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations
of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent
above noted concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the
Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served. This
denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by
certiorari.

Footnotes
1 Page 2, Resolution of public respondent Tribunal of May 27, 1988; p. 25, Rollo.