International Studies Quarterly (2011) 55, 487–491

No Alternative to ‘‘Isms’’
Henry R. Nau
George Washington University

In this thoughtful and well-intended essay, David Lake expresses a frus-

tration with the sectarian debates among the ‘‘isms’’ of international
relations and calls for a common lexicon or ‘‘Rosetta stone’’ that ‘‘aims
to facilitate conversation across research traditions by suggesting that all
theories of international studies can be disaggregated into the basic and
common concepts of interests, interactions, and institutions.’’ But his
lexicon inevitably privileges some concepts and theories over others—
agency over structure, interests over identities, interactions over sover-
eignty, and institutions (hierarchy) over anarchy. A better way is to
recognize that ‘‘isms’’ are inevitable, given the nature of social knowl-
edge, and to encourage them to address one another more directly and
jointly.

In this thoughtful and well-intended essay, David Lake expresses a frustration

that all of us have felt at one time or another. Why doesn’t knowledge about
international affairs accumulate? Lake concludes because international relations
scholars divide into sects with those scholars who stake out extreme positions
warring against one another in ‘‘an intellectual tower of Babel’’ that poorly
serves both education and public policy. It is not entirely clear whether his beef
is with the substance or the tone of this feuding. If it is about tone, his com-
plaint will be widely resonated. But if it is about substance, he may find less sup-
port. Although he acknowledges that a universal or even consensus
understanding of international relations IR is highly unlikely, if indeed possible,
he nevertheless offers a ‘‘Rosetta stone’’ that ‘‘aims to facilitate conversation
across research traditions by suggesting that all theories of international studies
can be disaggregated into the basic and common concepts of interests, interac-
tions, and institutions.’’ Any such list of concepts, however, inevitably privileges
some theories over others, as this list relatively emphasizes interactions and insti-
tutions (liberalism) over ideas (constructivism) and structural power (realism).
Forcing ‘‘isms’’ to confront one another more directly offers a better way to
achieve the same objective.
Lake is right; scholarship is prone to sectarianism. Edward Shils (1969), the
well-known sociologist and critical scholar, once attributed this tendency to schol-
arship’s origins in the medieval monastery. Scholars talk too easily about knowl-
edge as truth and speaking truth to power. As Lake argues, we are a privileged
community, largely self-regulating based on our commitments to honesty, open-
ness, and improving the lot of humanity. But we are not so privileged that we
hold a claim to truth. Knowledge pursued by scientific testing is not false, but it
is also never ‘‘true.’’ Another theory, yet unknown, may explain the same reality,
or further testing may always prove today’s knowledge false. Thus, knowledge is
never final and must be continuously contested.
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00658.x
 2011 International Studies Association
488 No Alternative to ‘‘Isms’’

Why then does knowledge accumulate in a natural science like physics but not
in a social science like international politics? Physics too is not truth. Newtonian
mechanics describes a totally different objective reality than quantum mechanics.
Neither is false, but which one is true? Yet physics, unlike politics, facilitates
learning across time and cultures. Rockets work whenever and wherever they are
launched. Why don’t democracies work wherever and whenever we apply them?
Here we get at the core of the problem in the social sciences. The ‘‘objects’’ that
physics studies do not have individual or collective minds of their own. Fortu-
nately or unfortunately, human beings that political science studies do. It is
this feature that limits social science, more so than inter-subjectivity, which also
characterizes the natural sciences. Thus, any law of politics, even if it is known
not to be false, may change as people, states, and communities change their
mind. Social knowledge is evolutionary and endogenous rather than cumulative
and exogenous (Nau 2008).
Given the nature of social knowledge, I am not persuaded that our profession
suffers excessively from Lake’s five pathologies. Because the ‘‘subjects’’ we study
are laden with values, and we as scholars are ‘‘subjects’’ ourselves, we take sides
in our studies. This taking sides is subtle; it is not partisan or deliberate. In fact,
it is quintessentially human. When we select topics, we inevitably ignore others.
What is ‘‘worth knowing,’’ Max Weber ([1917] 2004:18) reminds us, ‘‘can never
be proved by scientific methods. It can only be interpreted with reference to its
ultimate meaning.’’ We study things that have different ultimate meanings for
us.
Lake acknowledges this fact: ‘‘much of our self-worth is entwined with our
ideas.’’ Realism privileges the study of force because realist scholars are con-
vinced that violent conflict is ineradicable, and the more we know about it, the
better. Liberalism prioritizes the study of diplomacy and disarmament because
liberal scholars believe that, under almost all circumstances, violent conflict is
unnecessary. We inevitably like certain ‘‘subjects,’’ such as labor unions, more
than others, such as Wall Street financiers. Indeed, we belong to the ‘‘subject’’
groups we study, such as political parties and activist organizations. And it bears
remembering that our profession is not representative of American politics.
Almost all our colleagues belong to the Democratic Party and support liberal
causes. The conservative half of America distrusts the academy, and the academy
distrusts large portions of the American public, such as the Tea Party movement.
To the extent humanly possible, we as scholars separate our likes and dislikes
from our research. But, honestly, we are not superhuman, and we can never give
all problems equal attention or all evidence equal or even adequate coverage.
Hence, we are unlikely to agree objectively either on a definitive list of theories
or on a definitive list of concepts (Rosetta stone) around which ‘‘all theories of
international studies can be disaggregated.’’ Social science research is innately
open-ended and falsifiable. ‘‘None of our sacred cows is immune to criticism,’’
as Bob Keohane (2009a) reminds us, and new ‘‘isms’’ may be developing just
around the corner.
Under these circumstances, ‘‘theological’’ scholarly debate is not only ineradi-
cable, it is functional. Sectarian debates expose the full human character of the
research enterprise; we pursue our research with passion, not dispassion. And
that passion is necessary if knowledge is truly open-ended. Revolutionary science
requires doggedness to challenge and upend normal science because consensus
can be just as deadening as sectarianism. I have been through enough ‘‘ism’’
debates in our field over the years to believe that they have value. When I
trained in the 1960s, classical realism reigned. Idealism was dead. With the good
intention of accumulating knowledge, neorealism streamlined classical realism
seeking greater parsimony. Thankfully, at that point, the profession did not settle
for consensus. While European integration studies kept alive the flicker of
 Henry R. Nau 489

idealism (its concern with political loyalties ⁄ identities), interdependence and

neoliberal institutional studies challenged neorealism (Keohane 1986; Baldwin
1993). The ‘‘neo’’ debate not only invigorated research and teaching; it was pro-
gressive. Eventually, it showed that realism and liberalism shared more than we
thought. Both took actor identities for granted. The stage was set for the con-
structivist turn and a revival of ‘‘idealist’’ or ideational studies of international
relations (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Who would argue that this latest era
of sectarian competition has not been both invigorating and productive?
Nevertheless, Lake urges the profession to move on. He wants to put aside
the ‘‘dead hand of the isms’’—realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism,
etc.—and focus on a ‘‘lexicon’’ of problems—units of analysis, interests, inter-
actions, and institutions. This lexicon embraces theoretical eclecticism and seeks
complementarity among ‘‘contingent, mid-level theories of specific phenomena’’
rather than competition among full-blown ‘‘isms’’. It envisions a kind of ecume-
nism among equivalent and partial international relations theories, analogous
perhaps to the ‘‘global ecumene’’ among equivalent and diverse world civiliza-
tions that Peter Katzenstein (2010) calls for in his APSA presidential address in
2009.
There is much to be said for this sentiment, especially the appeal for more
humility and openness. I wholeheartedly support that sentiment and add two
suggestions that our journals might follow to make it more concrete: a greater
emphasis on replication and more jointly drafted author–critic discussion of the-
oretical and methodological differences. The top political science journals, today
as in the past, do not value replication. It is tedious, boring, and takes up publi-
cation space.1 But no knowledge accumulates without replication, especially
knowledge that is inherently ‘‘subject’’-ive. Secondly, journals should invite more
immediate, direct criticism of key articles. International Security (IS) does a good
job of this through its regular correspondence section; all journals should do
more of it. And I would tweak what IS does. After inviting criticism, do not give
the author(s) the last word. That leaves a combative rather than collegial after-
taste. Instead require the critic(s) and author(s) to formulate jointly where they
agree and disagree and why. More tedious replication and more direct and joint
critique will raise the hurdle for holistic theories without intellectually discourag-
ing them.
However, going beyond this to seek a profession or world without theoretical
or ideological walls is hopelessly utopian. Problems do not exist without underly-
ing theories to explain why they are problems in the first place. Take Lake’s lexi-
con of problems. It is essentially a taxonomy derived from rational choice
theory.2 Relatively speaking, it privileges agency over structure, interests over
identities, interactions over sovereignty, and institutions (hierarchy) over anar-
chy. OK, you say, add these concepts to the list as well. But, now, what have we
gained? We have a long list of problems which various theories treat differently.
That’s where we are now. Moreover, mid-level theories, which Lake calls for,
inevitably leave out ‘‘big questions’’ posed from different or higher levels of
analysis, such as the effect of the global structure of power on unit interests and
interactions (Keohane 2009b). Thus, mid-level theories focusing on specific
problems may not get rid of ‘‘isms’’; they may just hide them and make it harder
to challenge prevailing ones.

1
I experienced this bias personally in the 1970s when a top political science journal accepted and then,
because of space, rejected an article primarily because the article sought to replicate existing research and ‘‘contrib-
uted nothing new.’’
2
As Kathleen R. McNamara (2009:73) points out, this approach essentially converges ‘‘around a single theoreti-
cal perspective, liberalism; a single ontological position, rationalism; and a single method, quantitative analysis.’’
490 No Alternative to ‘‘Isms’’

Take Lake’s comment that scholars ‘‘identify levers that when manipulated
can facilitate progress toward more humane and normatively desirable ends.’’
This formulation completely ignores critical theory studies. Some Western and
most non-Western scholars would argue that levers sifted from the past by ration-
alist, Western thought are soaked with Western imperialism and therefore not
applicable or desirable as guides to manipulate the future. They would debate
what ‘‘more humane’’ and ‘‘normatively desirable ends’’ might mean. Once we
go beyond the most vaporous formulations of common goals such as common
humanity, we disagree on almost everything else.3
An alternative to Lake’s approach, as suggested above, is to compel multiple
full-scale theories or ‘‘isms’’ of international relations to confront one another
more directly and have the author(s) and critic(s) of articles formulate jointly
how they differ. These differences often derive less from boundary conditions,
which exclude certain independent variables and levels of analysis, than from
judgments scholars make about how the causal arrows run among the variables
they include. ‘‘Isms’’ usually include all independent variables (power, interac-
tions ⁄ institutions, ideas, and deep-seated historical forces) and levels of analysis
(individual, domestic, foreign policy, and systemic) but differ in terms of which
independent variable and level of analysis exert the primary causal influence in
world affairs (Nau 2011). Realism, for example, does not ignore ideas; it just
concludes that power is the primary source of ideas—big powers think one way,
small powers another. Liberalism dos not devalue force; it just sees diplomacy as
the primary means to constrain the use of force. And constructivism does not
diminish practices ⁄ institutions or material power; it just sees identities and dis-
course interpreting and giving meaning to these variables.
We all agree that there is an ‘‘elephant’’ out there, namely some objective
reality that adjudicates (falsifies) our propositions; but, be careful, it may be a
‘‘tree’’ not an elephant. Calling it an elephant suggests we already know what
the whole is and therefore, as Lake argues, can pool the parts to assemble the
whole. Realism has the trunk; constructivism has the tail. But we do not know
whether the whole has a tail or a leaf, any more than Newtonian or quantum
mechanics knows whether nature is fixed or probabilistic. We are searching for
the elephant or the tree. So we have only parts of different, possibly not comple-
mentary, wholes. And, if we deliberately reject holistic theories because they are
hegemonic, we may never know what a possible whole looks like. The profession
descends into a cacophony of partial and incompatible theories. No one under-
stands anyone because whatever whole we have is little more than an open-ended
taxonomy that means different things to different sects. That’s the real tower of
Babel.
I am less persuaded than Lake that ‘‘we are not giving society what it deserves
even in terms of basic theoretical and empirical knowledge about world politics.’’
In my lifetime, international relations theory has contributed some significant
policy ideas to public life and human improvement. Policies of freer trade and
globalization advanced the lives of millions of people since the 1930s, in recent
decades with greater equality as developing economies grew faster than advanced
ones. And policies of democratic enlargement and economic engagement, drawn
from democratic peace studies, made Eastern Europe and much of the rest of
the world noticeably better off after the Cold War than they were before. Admit-
tedly, globalization and democracy promotion remain contested. Iraq and the
financial meltdown generated blowback, especially from non-Western societies.
But that’s my point. Good ideas remain good only against continuous and

3
For example, Katzenstein (2010:13) defines ‘‘ecumene’’ as ‘‘a loose sense of shared values entailing often
contradictory notions of diversity in a common humanity.’’ That’s a pretty thin reed for holding together diverse
civilizations.
 Henry R. Nau 491

open-ended opposition. We need more spirited and wider intellectual and policy
debates, not less animated or narrower ones.
Lake’s laments may mean that the profession is ready to take a break from sec-
tarian competition. That’s happened before, when the ‘‘neo’’ debate wound
down in the 1980s. But that break was followed by new ‘‘isms’’, with beneficial
consequences, and this one will be too.

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