UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to

support its case.
[G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003] 9. On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the
The Republic of the Philippines​, ​petitioner trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial
v. ​Sandiganbayan​, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of
Elizabeth Dimaano, ​respondent. further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated
its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the
FACTS​: evidence already presented or to change the averments to
1. Upon her assumption to office following the successful show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies
EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued or properties subject of the forfeiture.
Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential 10. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). delayed the case for over a year mainly because of its
2. EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all many postponements, so it issued a Resolution dismissing
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close xxx
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to a. There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
conduct an investigation as may be necessary in order to confiscated.
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and
the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as Petitioner’s argu​ment - Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. government was operative at that time the raiding team
3. Accordingly, the PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board conducted the search and seizure (​on March 3, 1986, or five days
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and after the successful EDSA Revolution​). The revolutionary
corrupt practices by AFP personnel. government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
4. The AFP Board investigated various reports of an alleged Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus right. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
Q. Ramas and issued a Resolution, whih stated that the had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the
AFP Board confiscated equipment/items and search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
communication facilities and money in the amount of and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars, which were found against her since, at the time of their seizure, private respondents
in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress did not enjoy any constitutional right.
of Ramas. Further, it was recommended that Maj. Gen.
Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA ISSUES​;
3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and (1) WON the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of interregnum​, that is, ​after the actual and effective
Unlawfully Acquired Property. take-over of power by the revolutionary government
5. Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces ​up
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the
against Ramas. Provisional Constitution); and
6. Ramas filed an Answer, contending that his property (2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the
consisted only of a residential house, valued at P700,000, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which was not out of proportion to his salary and other (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment, and interregnum.
other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
7. Dimaano filed her own Answer, admitting her HELD​: We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However,
January-November 1978 only, and claiming ownership of we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry, and land Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
titles taken by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team. interregnum.
8. After termination of the pre-trial, the court set the trial for
the merits of the case. However, petitioner asked for a During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the jewelry, and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. ​Thus, raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these
constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration items are contraband ​per se​, and they are not, they must be
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
of Rights during the interregnum. ​Nevertheless, even during the However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner
interregnum, the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in not be used as a basis to seize and withhold these items from the
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily Notes:
deprived of his property. ​Although the signatories to the - The people effectively abrogated the Constitution.
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being - Individuals do not have legally demandable claim/right
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as under international law (i.e., a person cannot invoke his
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and right under the ICCPR, given that the Constitution was not
binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was operative).
also obligated under international law to observe the rights of - Interregnum: from February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon
individuals under the Declaration. Aquino took her oath as President) to March 24, 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Freedom
The Court considers the Declaration as part of customary Constitution).
international law and that Filipinos as human beings are proper
subjects of international law laid down in the Covenant. As the ​de Justice Puno (separate opinion)​:
jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape - Considering that the right against unreasonable search
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot
obligations under international law. claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to
the right for the reason alone that there was no
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on constitution granting the right at the time the search was
25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal the constitution and does not depend on positive law. It is
law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with
void. other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the
restoration of the Filipinos natural rights that justified the
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights establishment of the Aquino government and the writing
existed, directives and orders issued by government officers of the 1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence
were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority of a constitution, private respondent Dimaano had a
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives fundamental and natural right against unreasonable
and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the search and seizure under natural law.
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant. However, the Constabulary
raiding team seized items not included in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the

warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

- Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position

that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
[G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014] without proper hearing and evidence.
James Imbong and Lovely-Anne Imbong​, for themselves and in - In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
behalf of their minor children, Lucia Imbong and Bernadette conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
Imbong and Magnificat Child Development Center, Inc., ​petitioner female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the
v. ​Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.​, ​respondent[s] spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to
the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
FACTS​: - The ponente is of the strong view that ​life begins at
1. On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted Republic Act No. fertilization​. In answering the question of when life begins,
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section
and Reproductive health Act of 2012 (RH Law). 12 which reads: “​The State recognizes the sanctity of family
2. Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the life … It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
said law, challengers from various sectors of the society life of the unborn from conception. ”​
challenged its constitutionality, as presented in fourteen - The traditional meaning of "conception" which, as
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, on described and defined by all reliable and reputable
the following grounds: sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
a. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn; - Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
b. It violates the right to health and the right to personality. Records of the Constitutional Convention also
protection against hazardous products; shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
c. It violates the right to religious freedom; term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
d. It violates the constitutional provision on Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
involuntary servitude because to be accredited the moment of "fertilization."
under the PhilHealth program, medical practitioners - In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of understood under medical parlance, and more
pro bono services for indigent women, under threat importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is
forms of punishment; a human organism and that the life of a new human being
e. It violates the right to equal protection of the law; commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
f. The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
the due process clause of the Constitution; - This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
g. The RH Law violates the right to free speech; devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
h. It intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the
protected by the Constitution; fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
i. violates the constitutional principle of object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
non-delegation of legislative authority; 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized
j. violates the one subject/one bill rule provision only for convenience by those who had population control
under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution; in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
k. The RH Law violates Natural Law; only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution
l. The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of
Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Justice Carpio:​
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). - The Court is simply not competent to declare when human
life begins, whether upon fertilization of the ovum or upon
ISSUE​: Whether the RH LAw is unconstitutional. attachment of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The
issue of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
HELD​: that cannot be decided by this Court without the proper
On the Right to Life hearing and evidence. This issue has not even been settled
- It is a universally accepted principle that every human within the scientific and medical community.
being enjoys the right to life. Even if not formally - Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is repeated in
established, the right to life, being grounded on natural Section 2 of R.A. No. 10354. The law does not provide a
law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or definition of conception. However, the law is replete with
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It provisions that embody the policy of the State to protect
precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men. the travel of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall.
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

6. However, in the 1967 armed conflict between Israel and

Jordan, ​Israeli forces occupied all the territories which had
constituted Palestine under British Mandate.
On the Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in 7. Under customary international law, these were therefore
the Occupied Palestinian Territory occupied territories in which Israel had the status of
occupying Power.
"What are the legal consequences arising from the construction 8. It is in these territories that Israel has constructed or
of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the plans to construct the works described in the report of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Secretary General - the construction of a “security fence”
Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, 9. In resolving this case, Israel expressed doubts as to the
considering the rules and principles of international law, applicability in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of
including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant certain rules of international humanitarian law and
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?" human rights instruments.
10. Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and
FACTS: Political Rights and the International Covenant on
1. Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights​, both of which it has
the First World War, a class "A" Mandate for Palestine was signed, ​are applicable to the occupied Palestinian
entrusted to Great Britain by the League of Nations, which territory​. It asserts that humanitarian law is the protection
provided that: "​Certain communities, formerly belonging to granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West
the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas ​human rights treaties were
where their existence as independent nations can be intended for the protection of citizens from their own
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of Government in times of peace​.
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until
such time as they are able to stand alone.” ISSUE​: Whether or not international human right only applies in
2. Meanwhile, the General Assembly had on 29 November times of peace.
1947 adopted a resolution which "​Recommends to the
United Kingdom . . . and to all other Members of the United HELD​: The protection of the International Covenant of Civil and
Nations the adoption and implementation . . . of the Plan of Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by
Partition​" of the territory between two independent operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions
States, one Arab, the other Jewish, as well as the creation may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect
of a special international régime for the City of Jerusalem. for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle,
The Arab population of Palestine and the Arab States the right not arbitrarily io be deprived of one's life applies also in
rejected this plan, contending that it was unbalanced. hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life,
3. In 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence on the however, then falls to be determined by the applicable ​lex
strength of the said resolution; armed conflict then broke specialis namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
out between Israel and a number of Arab States and the designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
Plan of Partition was not implemented.
4. The Security Council then decided that "an armistice shall More generally, the Court considers that ​the protection offered
be established in all sectors of Palestine" and called upon by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed
the parties directly involved in the conflict to seek conflict​, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of
agreement to this end. In conformity with this decision, the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on
general armistice agreements were concluded in 1949 Civil and Political Rights. In order to answer the question put to
between Israel and the neighbouring States through the it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these
mediation by the United Nations branches of international law, namely human rights law and, as
5. In particular, one such agreement was signed in Rhodes lex specialis, international humanitarian law.
on 3 April 1949 between Israel and Jordan, which fixed
the ​armistice demarcation line between Israeli and Arab The Court would observe that, while the jurisdiction of States is
forces (also known as the "Green Line"). The agreement primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the
further provided that "​No element of the ... military or national territory. Considering the object and purpose of the
paramilitary forces of either Party ... shall advance beyond International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would
or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Demarcation seem natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to
Lines . . .​" the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

- while there is no clear societal consensus on

physician-assisted dying, there is a strong consensus that it
would only be ethical with respect to voluntary adults who
are competent, informed, grievously and irremediably ill,
Lee Carter v. Canada (Attorney-General), 2015 SCC 5 and where the assistance is “clearly consistent with the
patient’s wishes and best interests, and [provided] in order
FACTS: to relieve suffering”
1. In 2009, Gloria Taylor was diagnosed with a fatal - The trial judge concluded that the decision in ​Rodriguez did
neurodegenerative disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis not prevent her from reviewing the constitutionality of the
(or ALS), which causes progressive muscle weakness. Like impugned provisions, because (1) the majority in ​Rodriguez
Sue Rodriquez b ​ efore her, she did “not want to die slowly, did not address the right to life; (2) the principles of
piece by piece” so she brought a claim before the British overbreadth and gross disproportionality had not been
Columbia Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality identified at the time of the decision in ​Rodriguez and thus
of the ​Criminal Code p ​ rovisions that prohibit assistance in were not addressed in that decision; (3) the majority only
dying, specifically ​ss. 14 ​, ​21 ​, ​22 ​, ​222 ​, and​ 241​. “assumed” a violation of ​s. 15 ​; and (4) the decision in
2. She was joined in her claim by ​Lee Carter and ​Hollis Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony​, 2009 SCC 37,
Johnson​, who had assisted Ms. Carter’s mother, Kathleen [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, represented a “substantive change” to
(“Kay”) Carter, in achieving her goal of dying with dignity the ​s. 1 ​ analysis (para. 994).
by taking her to Switzerland to use the services of - declared the prohibition unconstitutional, granted a
DIGNITAS, an assisted-suicide clinic; ​Dr. William Shoichet​, one-year suspension of invalidity, and provided Ms. Taylor
a physician from British Columbia who would be willing to with a constitutional exemption for use during the one-year
participate in physician-assisted dying if it were no longer period of the suspension. Ms. Taylor passed away prior to
prohibited; and the ​British Columbia Civil Liberties the appeal of this matter, without accessing the exemption.
Association​, which has a long-standing interest in patients’
rights and health policy and has conducted advocacy and ISSUE​: Whether the prohibition on physician-assisted dying
education with respect to end-of-life choices, including found in ​s. 241 ​(​b​) of the ​Criminal Code violates the claimants’
assisted suicide. rights under ​ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian ​Charter of Rights and
3. The appellants challenge the constitutionality of the Freedoms.
following provisions of the Criminal Code:
a. 14. “​No person is entitled to consent to have death HELD: The prohibition on physician-assisted dying infringes the
inflicted on him, and such consent does not affect the right to life, liberty and security of Ms. Taylor and of persons in
criminal responsibility of any person by whom death her position, and that it does so in a manner that is ​overbroad and
may be inflicted on the person by whom consent is thus is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
given.​ ” justice.
b. 241. ​Everyone who (a) counsels a person to commit
suicide, or (b) aids or abets a person to commit We do not agree that the existential formulation of the right to
suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an life ​requires ​an absolute prohibition on assistance in dying, or
indictable offense and liable to imprisonment for a that individuals cannot “waive” their right to life. ​This would
term not exceeding fourteen years. create a “duty to live”, rather than a “right to life”​, and would call
4. The appellants invoked the following provisions of the into question the legality of any consent to the withdrawal or
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: refusal of lifesaving or life-sustaining treatment. The sanctity of
a. 7. ​Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security life is one of our most fundamental societal values. Section 7 is
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof rooted in a profound respect for the value of human life. But s. 7
except in accordance with the principles of also encompasses the life, liberty, and security of the person
fundamental justice​. during the passage to death. It is for this reason that the sanctity
b. 15. ​(1) Every individual is equal before and under the of life “is no longer seen to require that all human life be
law and has the right to the equal protection and preserved at all costs” (​Rodriguez​, a​ t p. 595, per ​Sopinka J.). And
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, it is for this reason that the law has come to recognize that, in
in particular, without discrimination based on race, certain circumstances, an individual’s choice about the end of her
national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or life is entitled to respect. It is to this fundamental choice that we
mental or physical disability​. now turn.

British Columbia Supreme Court An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical
condition is a matter critical to their dignity and autonomy. The
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

law allows people in this situation to request palliative sedation,

refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, or request the removal
of life-sustaining medical equipment, but denies them the right to
request a physician’s assistance in dying. This interferes with
[G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008]
their ability to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed
and medical care and thus trenches on liberty. And, by leaving Forces of the Philippines​, ​petitioner.
people like Ms. Taylor to endure intolerable suffering, it impinges v. ​Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo​, respondents.
on their security of the person.
FACTS:
While the limit is prescribed by law and the law has a pressing 1. On Feb 14, 2006, several armed soldiers wearing white
and substantial objective, the prohibition is not proportionate to shirts, fatigue pants, and army boots, entered Raymond’s
the objective. An absolute prohibition on physician-assisted house and asked him if he was Bestre. He replied that he
dying is rationally connected to the goal of protecting the was Raymond, not Bestre. However, the armed soldier
vulnerable from taking their life in times of weakness, because slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the
prohibiting an activity that poses certain risks is a rational stomach. He was then handcuffed, blindfolded, and forced
method of curtailing the risks. However, as the trial judge found, into a white L300 van.
the evidence does not support the contention that a blanket 2. Another person was brought inside the van and made to
prohibition is necessary in order to substantially meet the sit beside Raymond. On the road, he recognized the voice
government’s objective. The trial judge made no palpable and of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo’s.
overriding error in concluding, on the basis of evidence from 3. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at
scientists, medical practitioners, and others who are familiar with a house, where respondents were brought to different
end-of-life decision-making in Canada and abroad, that a rooms. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond
permissive regime with properly designed and administered saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
safeguards was capable of protecting vulnerable people from Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the
abuse and error. It was also open to her to conclude that butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which,
vulnerability can be assessed on an individual basis, using the Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was
procedures that physicians apply in their assessment of informed his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room.
consent and decisional capacity in the context of medical 4. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
decision-making more generally. The absolute prohibition is Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit
therefore not minimally impairing. with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his
comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how
The appropriate remedy is not to grant a free-standing many NPA members he had helped. Each time he
constitutional exemption, but rather to issue a declaration of answered none, they hit him.
invalidity and to suspend it for 12 months. Nothing in this 5. Raymond then attempted to escape but he was spotted by
declaration would compel physicians to provide assistance in some soldiers, who brought him to another place near the
dying. The ​Charter rights of patients and physicians will need to entrance of Fort Magsaysay. For about three and a half
be reconciled in any legislative and regulatory response to this months, the respondents were detained in Fort
judgment. Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two
rooms and a kitchen.
6. They were continuously detained until they escaped on
August 13, 2007. ***
7. Respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop
petitioners and/or their officers and agents from
depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and
other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the
promulgation of the ​Amparo R ​ ule. They also sought
ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule
135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the ​Amparo
Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

have their petition treated as an ​Amparo petition as it 2. The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily
would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances and psychological integrity or security.
of the Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court 3. The right to security of person is a guarantee of
granted their motion. protection of ones rights by the government.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if

Petitioners’ argument - Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. The
Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing
by the military. The Secretary of National Defense does not threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have
engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only
undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other
in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan,
responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus
and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture
and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
ISSUE​: Whether or not respondents may avail the privilege of the apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and
Writ of Amparo. this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of
HELD​: YES. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance amparo.
of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now
passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But
while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and G.R No. 182161 December 3, 2009
are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every Rev. Father Robert Reyes, ​petitioner​ ​v. ​CA, ​respondent
sense of the word as their movements continue to be restricted
for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits ISSUE​: whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been
and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ
directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and of amparo.
are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents rights to life,
liberty and security. (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that HELD:
they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive
or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
security of person.
SECTION 1. Petition. ​The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
The right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
life lived in fear that his person and property may be omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
with the assurance that the government he established and disappearances or threats thereof.
consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.
In a broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a The Court, in ​Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et
persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, al.​ ,made a categorical pronouncement that ​the Amparo Rule in its
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to present form is confined to these two instances of extralegal
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof​.
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things
which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual. amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he
is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his
various permutations of the exercise of this right: right to travel.
1. The right to security of person is freedom from fear.
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to
another. As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx ​a Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
sound discretion. writing and in the presence of counsel.

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his
him was not unlawful. ​Petitioner failed to establish that his right basic and fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his
to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it silence should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse deemed as implied admission of guilt. In fact, this right cannot be
or remedy. waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any
admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be inadmissible
Petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift in evidence.
HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however,
did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs HDO, as his HOWEVER, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as
co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it affirmed by the CA, finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, The trial court’s Decision convicting appellant of rape was
and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied
the HDO but also to question before this Court the admission. More importantly, it was based on the testimony of
constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt
HDO. beyond reasonable doubt.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of

amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his G.R. No. 94284
motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely ​ . ​Court of Appeals, Hon. Benigno
Ricardo Silverio, ​petitioner v
speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his Gaviola ​and ​People of the Philippines, ​respondents
right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has
for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued.
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an
and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure,
Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused
Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes). in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
G.R. No. 191756 November 25, 2013 accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
People, ​plaintiff-​ appellee v. ​Jonas Guillen y Atienza, proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best
accused-appellant interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
Guillen’s argument - his silence at the police station himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
immediately after his arrest cannot be considered as an implied
admission of guilt.
G.R. No. 179736
HELD: ​We agree with the appellant. Sps. Hing ​v. ​Choachuy

It should be borne in mind that ​when appellant was brought to The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
the police station, he was already a suspect to the crime of rape.
As such, he was already under custodial investigation​. Section 12, The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our
Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz: laws. It is defined as "​the right to be free from unwarranted
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and
ordinary sensibilities.​" It is the right of an individual "​to be free factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the
necessarily concerned​." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners
right to be let alone." would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "​The
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and injure the rights of a third person."​
protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard,
the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their Thus, petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
social need and then only under the stringent procedural residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their
However, ​an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of right to privacy.
the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as
it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy G.R. No. 181881
of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or Pollo v. David
even situations which an individual considers as private. And as
long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in government employee who was charged administratively and
limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
residences. files stored in the computer were used by the government
employer as evidence of misconduct.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the "​reasonable expectation of privacy"​ test. This Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In ​Ople v. files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a
Torres​, we enunciated that "​the reasonableness of a person’s transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether,
by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of ISSUES:
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
reasonable.​" Customs, community norms, and practices may, office and computer files? NO.
therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of
of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer
of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it reasonable in its inception and scope? YES.
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
HELD​:
In this day and age, ​video surveillance cameras are installed In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. consider include (1) the employees relationship to the item
The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took
the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be actions to maintain his privacy in the item. These factors are
affected, was obtained​. Nor should these cameras be used to pry relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the
into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime together. Thus, where the employee used a password on his
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the
same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why search of that space and items located therein must comply with
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving the Fourth Amendment.
camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

(1) Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict
government-issued computer which contained his scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
separate enclosed office which he did not share with
anyone, or that his office was always locked and not The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an
open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he American constitutional construct,1 useful in determining the
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
prevent other employees from accessing his computer persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification
files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
would have visitors in his office like friends, associates class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to government to prove that the classification is necessary to
use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, ​the strict
petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
would recognize as reasonable. Moreover, ​even with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to
proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, equal protection.
that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation
of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1)
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
of office computers. ​The CSC in this case had no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything system of another without right. It is a universally condemned
they create, store, send or receive on the office conduct.
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in
done to ensure that the computer resources were used that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes
only for such legitimate business purposes. into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
(2) The search of petitioners computer files was conducted
in connection with investigation of work-related Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
misconduct prompted by an anonymous constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved
letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of invading the area of protected freedoms​. But Section 4(a)(3) does
the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying
cases in the CSC. ​A search by a government employer without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
of an employee’s office is justified at inception when computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message.
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
work-related misconduct​. documents.

All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an

Disini, ​et al. ​v. ​Secretary of Justice inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to
provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in
provisions that would enable the government to track down and addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the
penalize violators. chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section
4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s HELD:

constitutional rights.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
ZONES OF PRIVACY whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the particularly in instances in which such information is being
protection of the law against such interference or attacks." collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a)
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an
the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of alleged unauthorized access to information about a
communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a liberty or security on the other. ​Thus, the existence of a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
intrusion. right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended​.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his
name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keep certain
or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can
effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
law. the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or
her right to informational privacy.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the
overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific It is well to emphasize at this point that ​setting a post’s or profile
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms details privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer
like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal source of the content. ​The user’s own Facebook friend can share
identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
acquire another’s personal data. regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
The main issue to be threshed out in this case is whether or not a
writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu.
Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened Marcos v. Manglapus
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.
 UNIVERSITY OF CEBU SCHOOL OF LAW ​LAW 226 | HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the

exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country
as separate and distinct rights.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights

specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered,
as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right
to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Nevertheless, the President cannot be said to have acted

arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.