Questions and Answers: Italian Unification

1. What factors discouraged an early unification of Italy and how were these overcome?

Before the year of 1848, the Italian faced a lot of difficulties to urge the unification movement. Until, 1848, the situation had
been changed and directly contributed to the unification movement.

After 1815 Italy was once again a mere geographical expression. Austria was to control a large part of Italy directly, that is,
Lombardy and Venetia, and indirectly through the restored Bourbon Kings in some minor Italian states. Italian unification
was once again frustrated ever the Risorgimento was quickly in advance. The explosion of Austrian power in Italy was the
main problem which discouraged an early unification of Italy. Moreover, the general political atmosphere in Europe did not
allow new concessions to Italian balance when the powers were concerned with maintaining the balance of power and to
prevent the setting of French hegemony in Europe again. So a united Italy in 1815 would only mean French domination of
Italy, so the powers generally accepted the settlement even though the 1815 settlement ignored the moral principles which
first French Revolution and the Romanticism had unleashed in Europe. Even liberal powers like Britain and the mother of
Revolution, France did not dare to take the risk of a war which may be caused if Italy was united and this might invite
foreign intervention in the young Italy. So foreign aid was generally unavailable in the first generation of the nineteenth
century. Moreover, any war against Austria in the 1820's would mean war against Russia and Prussia too because the Holy
Alliance acted as international police force resisting the tide of change. So the political, diplomatic and military condition
in 1820's and 1830's did not favour the unification of Italy.

Moreover, the movement of unification tied more in Italy itself because Italy was divided, without communication network
backward in economy and local rivalry prevented a common front to develop when states were as states localism with
different culture, languages, political system and interest prevented any united effort against foreign rule, for example, the
position of Rome was the central position of any unifying movement. But the Pope had its own finance, army and
administration which formed an individual and separate state local rivalry was marked and particularism prevented the rise
of a homogeneous nationalism. As Metternich said "in Italy, states are against states, provinces against provinces, towns
against towns, families against families and men against men." This was of no less significant a factor which discourage
early unification.

Moreover, the movement of Risorgimento which was the awakening of Italian nationalism and an intellectual and civil
revival called English tenmen, was not "pure" in any way because many lines worked at the same time her unification
without coordination and unity, but on the contrary rivalry was marked the revolutionaries and the republicans feared the
masses more than they feared Austria power. The lead of Mazzini was vague and he was concerned more with the
government structure of Italy them with unification. He and Garibaldi had little political principle but only unification from
below and under the flag of republicanism. His optimism was his main weakness because he thought that Italians, illiterate
and divided could carry out the revolution from, that is, to achieve liberty before independence. As Fisher says "Mazzini was
the Saint of Italian unification but he was doomed to failure because he could not foresee that the unification with Rome and
the entire extinction of Austrian power in Italy could not be achieved without foreign aid". The Young Italy was only a
minority movement and he was the die-hard enemy of monarchism.

Federation was another line when unification was to be under the Pope as advocated by Goberti. However, the Papal States
as marked by religious conservatism was greatly doubted for her sincerity. And finally it proved useless when the movement
was betrayed by the Pope.

Moreover, the Piedmontese army was also one of the potential source of unification, but its reluctance to first social
concession and political liberty weakened her cause when the Emperor feared and hated the massed more than he feared
Austrian power. When liberty and unity were to be achieved at the same time, the emperor feared the former and finally
abandoned both came to conservatism prevented a common union between the throne and the people to achieve any
effective movement against Austrian rule in Italy.

Moreover, the uncoordinated and ineffective effort of the secret societies, for Carbonari did not achieve. Gicat's success
when Austrian power was strong but the sects unity and forced was weak. As Metternich said "the seats are not nearly so
dangerous as we may fear." These uncoordinated and piece-meal effort was doomed to failure.

In conclusion the question before Italy was foreign rule on independence, unity in federation, political change from above or
social and economic revolution from below. All these were undecided and even the road was unclear. It was doubtful
whether they could succeed with no foreign aid but only an ant-revolutionary Holy Alliance. The main forces of
Risorgimento, that is, Romanticism with the intellectual work of Lesparda and Mazzini and industrialism with little
economic basis and an awakened education were still weak, uncoordinated, vague in goal and divided in leadership and this
was no clear effort to know which method was to the employed.

In revolution of 1848 frustrated these uncoordinated and contradicted effort, but the movement had not gone to far to be
stopped. The Republicans under Mazzini ceased to be a main stream of movement when the Young Italy was defeated by
Austrian and Italian conservatism. The Federalists betrayed the movement and it was the wrong horse to be backed. Only
Piedmont posed the needed economic basis and military force to fight Austrian rule in Italy. The three great task of
achieving unity, explosion of Austrian from Italy and gaining liberty had to be sacrificed to achieve national unity under
Piedmont. As Rascaoli says "Piedmont today is all of Italy." Cavour when he came to power, carried out vigourous economic
reform and industrial development since he knew that a strong economic basis was the prerequisite for national struggle.
Moreover, he knew that diplomacy was important by exploiting the revolution of 1848 when the Holy Alliance was on the
reign of collapse, Italian unification was to be achieved by foreign war with friendly foreign relationships. "Italy could not
make herself, she could only be made by exploiting the differences between the powers", as A. J. P. Taylor comments, and
France was the potential ally when Napoleon III was a member of the Carbonari and he was eager for national prestige and
to break the 1815 settlement. As Cavour once said, "We must be the partner of France in the great game that sooner or later
must be played in Europe."

Moreover, the war was to be achieved from above not below, by the monarchy, not the masses. Mazzini and the Carbonari
still served the Italian cause, but their role now was only subsidiary. Mazzini was continue to be preacher of Italian
nationality and it needed "Mazzini to endow the revolutionary movement with a spiritual quality", as J. Dnz says, and as
Lipson observed "Mazzini broadened the political horizon of the Italians and create vigourous public opinion in favour of
nation unity." While the Carbonari was now served little, but the "political immigration was the political hard school in
which the political philosophy of Italian unification was gradually evolved." Romanticism still played a role in keeping
alive a national spirit, but the crux of the question was to achieve by diplomacy not the republican slogan of the masses.
Cavour was to make known to the world the Italian question and to exploit the enthusiasm of Napoleon III in order to
exclude Austrian power from Italy. While it left to the monarchy to take care of the liberty of the people at time the essential
condition was the break up of the Holy Alliance with the fall of Metternich. Whole the goal was a constitutional monarchy
under the House of Savoy. It was to be achieved not in Italy but in Europe. While the Italy to be united should not include
South Italy which marked by backwardness and this was only a source of economic and social problem (the final unification
was only forced on Cavour by the military action of Garibaldi), so the Italy to be achieved was a small Italy, based on its
division not unification and the problem of Rome was to be solved, in a peculiar way which formed a perpetual obstacle to
real Italian unification. When France occupied Rome in 1848 and this was also to be excluded in 1870.

As a conclusion, with the help of nationalists such as Mazzini and Cavour, the nationalistic feeling and factors for Italian
unification had been risen. Thus, Italy could at last be unified in the hand of the Italians.

2. Discuss the part played by nationalism in the Italian Unification movement.

The Napoleon Conquest and reorganization of 'Italy' had revealed to Italians the advantages of enlightened laws and
administration and secondly awaken them to a desire to free themselves from foreign rule. The restoration of 1815 lost for
the Italians in large measure the advantages of French rule and substituted the French domination by the Austrian
domination. Hence, revolutionary sentiment grew, aiming at first to overthrow the existing government and gradually
embracing the idea of unity for all of 'Italy".

Following the restoration of ancien regime and the legitimate despots in the Italian peninsula, there broke out in Naples, in
1820, in Piedmont in 1821, in Central Duchies and Papal States in 1831 some liberal revolts engineered by the secret
societies - Carbonari which aim was to combat tyranny and to overthrow the existing governments. Though these small
scale and sporadic risings were easily suppressed by a combine force of royalists and Austrians, they indeed represented the
embryonic Italian nationalism which growth ultimately led to full scale 'liberation' war against Austria in the northern
Italian plain in 1848, as well as the proclamation of the Roman Republic in 1849. That Piedmont could easily incorporate
Central Duchies in 1860; Papal Sates, Naples and Sicily in 1861 and finally Rome in 1870, Italian nationalism played the
most important part without which Cavour's diplomacy and foreign powers' aid could only rendered slightly to the
completion of Italian unification.

The political restoration under the domination of Austria as well as the failure of the anti-absolutist risings led by the
Carbonari in 1820 and 1830 greatly fostered the Italian Risorgimento. It was first witnessed by the appearance of a
republican movement led by Mazzini, a romanticist as well as a former Carbonaro who from early youth had dreamt of
freeing Italy from the present rulers and of giving her a republican constitution. Realizing the importance of unified effort
by Italians everywhere, Mazzini found a new revolutionary society - The Young Italy in March 1831 and thence launched
the propaganda and risings for a free 'Italy'. Seen in 1840s there appeared another political stream fro constitutional reform
and for some type of unification for the peninsula. There stream represented the idea of moderate liberals in northern Italy
who found Mazzini's republicanism offensive and his methods dangerous and impractical. Among these moderate liberals,
one school favoured a federation of states under the presidency of the Pope. These were the neo-guelphs led by Gioberti
whose book On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians was the representative of the political view. The other school led
by Balbo advocated the extrusion of Austria by a peaceful means if possible and the reorganization of Italy under the
Monarchy of Piedmont.

The impact of Italian Risorgimento could well be felt in 1848 - 1849 Revolution. It was a liberal national revolution under
which tide all the rulers were obliged to promulgate a liberal constitution to their respective states. The liberal revolution in
each Italian state was seen examined in a national liberties movement under Piedmont against Austria following 'the Five
Days of Milan' and the proclamation of a Venetian Republic under Xannim. Under the impact of this tide, Charles Albert of
Piedmont, the Pope and even the Naples sent troops to expel the Austrians from the northern Italian plains. As a romantist,
Charles Albert believed that 'Italy will do it alone.' But his illusion was soon shattered by his defeat in the Battle of Sustozza
(July 1848) and the Battle of Novara (March 1849). The Austrian Sword was proved to be mightier. Moreover, particularism
and forces of conservatism in the Italian peninsula were still predominant and the formation of a common front against
Austria was seen rendered abortive by the withdrawal of the Papal and Neapolitan troops. In the height of Italian national
revolution Mazzini and Garibaldi in early 1849 proclaimed the establishment of the Roman Republic. Despite its collapse
owing to the joint intervention of Austria, France and Spain, it was the most memorable episode of Italian nationalism
which from then on was fast expanding. After 1849, Italian nationalism took a more realistic form of struggle.

The Italian war against Austria in 1859 was initially prepared by Cavour of Piedmont with military aid from Napoleon III of
France for the expulsion of Austrians from North Italy and ultimately the establishment of an Upper Italian Kingdom of
Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Parama, Modena and Papal Legation. The success of this semi-unification could only be said
as a by-product of Piedmontese aggrandizement with French aid for the expulsion of the Austrian influence and at the
expense of the Central Italian states. In a real sense it was only unification by war and not unification by popular revolution.
In the midst of the Austro-Piedmontese war risings which were engineered by the Italian national societies broke out in
Tuscany, Modena and Parma in May 1859 and rulers of these central Duchies fled the country. The Villfrance Pact of July
1859 was reached at last. France and Austria yearly destroyed favour's project of Piedmontese aggrandizement but could no
longer stop Italian nationalism and effect the restoration of the overthrow princes in the Central Duchies. It was only under
the impact of nationalism that Piedmont and Central were unified-- a great step towards Italian unification.

The unification of north and Central Italy were soon followed by an heroic expedition to the south by Garibaldi and his
thousand Red Shirts. After his landing at Marsala, Garibaldi proclaimed himself dictator of the island. The Sicilian people
allied to him for the purpose of shaking off the despotic rule of Francis II of Naples. In August, Garibaldi led his forces
across the Strait of Messina to attack Naples and took it early in September. The liberation of the south by Garibaldi marked
the height of Italian nationalism. For fear that the nationalist mostly in the south might threaten the Piedmontese
monarchical rule in the north as well as to forestall Garibaldi's march to take Rome. Cavour by agreement with France sent
the Piedmontese army to invade the Marches: then march on to Naples. For the unification of North and South, Garibaldi
handed over his conquest to Victor Emmanuel and set sail for his island home refusing all rewards. In February 1861, the
first of all Italian parliament met at Turin and in March the kingdom of Italy was proclaimed with Victor Emmanuel II was
the first king. Undeniably, the achievement of unification of North and South Italy in 1861 was the great proof of the part
played by Italian nationalism.

Though the kingdom of Italy was proclaimed in 1861, the Italians were still restless to recover Venetia from Austria and to
find their Capital on Rome which was then under the French garrison. To all Italian nationalists Rome historically the
cultural centre was the soul of Italy, thus "without Rome, without Italy". In March 1862, Garibaldi organised the society for
the emancipation of Italy with the explicit aim to liberate Venetia and Rome. Belying the government, Garibaldi raised the
cry. "Rome or Death", and had thrice tried to liberate Rome (August 1862, September 1867 and November 1867) without
success. In 1864 September there was the September Convention by which Napoleon III finally agreed to evacuate Rome
within two years, in return for an Italian promise to move the capital from Turin to Florence. Though it was approved by the
parliament the agreement raised a storm of protest in Piedmont and was denounced by Garibaldi. Napoleon III tried to
summon an international congress to discuss the Roman question, but accomplished nothing, as all Italians were all intent
in making Rome their capital. As soon as the French troops withdrew from Rome in August 1870 as a result of the Franco-
Prussian War, Rome was occupied and controlled by Italians. It was later proclaimed the capital of Italy. This marked the
climax of Italian Risorgimento.

3. Give an account of the forces forging the Italian nationality or making for the
Risorgimento since 1830-1848.
The French Revolution of 1830 detonated a train of small insurrections up and down Italy. A young lawyer of Modena,
Misley had devised a scheme for the creation of a constitutional kingdom of Central Italy under the Duke Francis of
Modena whom he had won over to his ideas. On the other hand, a silk merchant Menotti had visions of national unity based
on Rome. When Sebastini, the new French Foreign Minister, announced in September that France would oppose any
intervention by Austria outside her frontiers in Italy, revolutionary leaders decided to take the risk and in February 1831,
revolt broke out in Bologna. The realization that Italian hopes depending upon the attitude of the French was perfectly
sound and pointed to the means where by success was ultimately to be achieved in 1860.
The only practical outcome was brief displacement of several governments in central Italy. Francis fled from Madena in
February, Maria Louise from Parma, and the Bapal legates from Bologna. But instead of joining a common front, their
instinctive municipalism came uppermost Piaconza remained in rivalry with Parma, Rggio was suspicious of Modena,
Genoa of Turin and Sicily of Naples. Each city-state was proud of its riches and cultural tradition. In March 1831, the
Austrians crossed the Poto to restore the throne of the three former governments.

The revolution of 1831-32 proved that the primary obstacles to the Italian unity was regional particularity and the Austrian
predominance was one of secondary importance. However, the Austrian intervention beyond her frontiers in Lombardy and
Venetia and the exercise of naked force in the suppression of the liberal revolts contributed powerfully to the popular belief
that Austria was the chief oppressor of Italy. Only the presence of French troops in Ancona to counter that of the Austria in
Bologna recreated that balance whose absence had frustrated the revolutionaries of the previous year; and on this slender
thread of Franco-Austrian rivalry the future of Italy depended.

To Mazzini, a prophet of the new age, the moral was national unity and independence, not the practical liberties demanded
by the Carbonari and Federati. Mazzini had bitter words for the ineffectual Italian resistance against Austria in 1831, and
concluded that discipline and a self-conscious nationalism were urgently required. He intended his new society, the Givoine
Italia (Young Italy), to be not only a regional body, but also national, an integrating and initiating force. Its first test came
in the "Sergeant' Conspiracy" of 1833 in Piedmont. Charles Albert reacted with excessive severity. Mazzini and Garibaldi
were condemned to death in 1834.

Meanwhile, almost every year, insurrections occurred somewhere. Their inspiration, though not always their direction,
came from Mazzini, who wanted not a federation of monarchies but a single republic, not an imposition from above but an
autonomous self-determination from below. Mazzini's idea was best expressed in his remarks "Flowers would blossom
rapidly if watered with blood." National unity was to be accomplished by a democratic mass uprising. To Gioberti's
objections that local insurrections were wasteful and disheartening, Mazzini replied: "only thus, could you rouse the people,
and without the Italian nation generated a very powerful force with which the royalists were driven to compete." Charles
Albert told D' Azaglioto to assure the people that, if only they abandoned agitation, circumstances might permit his army to
stages effective enough to resolve the contradiction between the capital and the labour.

Lastly, the mystic idea of the German as the super race destined to dominate the world, prompted Hitler and the Nazis to
launch the anti-semitic campaigns and the Second World War.

Rather than Mazzini, it was the new-guelph writers who provided the necessary intellectual stimulus for the first war of
liberation. They tried to involve the pope historically by showing how the medieval papacy had fought the Germans. The
advent of a liberal pope, Pius IX, created the hopes for a federation of the Italian states.

In spite of his personal sympathy for the Lombard liberals, the greatest of the Italian of the age of Manzoni had begun to
develop the idea of liberal Catholicism. He contributed power fully to Italian nationality in his generalization of Tusean
usage in Italian speech and writing.

Silvic Fellice's Le Mie Prigioni (My Life in Prison) appeared as early as 1832. It's greatest success almost accidentally
labelled Austria as the greatest oppressor of the peninsula.

At Brussels in 1843, Gioberti produced his Primato Moralo Civile degli Italiani (the Primacy of the Italian Civil Morality).
Here he argued that there existed an Italian race which was united in Blood, religion and language, even if political unity
was unattainable and its natural leader was the Pope. He was aiming at an audience of priests and he carefully exited from
his manuscripts all criticism of Austria and the Jesuits. His scheme reconciled religion and country. Patriotism suddenly
became orthodox and matter for public discussion instead of for conspiracy. Yet, his earlier appeal to papal leadership and
his theme of Italian 'primacy' helped his countrymen to regain the self-confidence necessary for a political revolution.

Another influential work was Balbo's Belle Speranso Italian (the Italian Spirit). Balbo agreed that federal state was the
obvious goal, because the various peoples of Italy were so distinct that they needed different forms f government. As a good
Piedmontese, he envisaged Charles Albert, not the Pope, as leader of the future Italian confederation. Unlike Giobetti,
however, he developed the idea that Austria would voluntarily expand eastward into the Balkans and leave Italy free.
The influence of the Neo-Guelph writers was to assimilate the distinct Italian peoples into Catholicism, underpinned the
cultural unity and associated political liberalism with nationalism.

But if the objective conditions of nationality were not present, no effort of individuals to rose the people would be of avail.

Like other similar societies in Lombardy and Tuscany, the Piedmontese Agricultural Society helped to inaugurate an
agricultural revolution by experimenting with new breeds of farm animals, introducing machinery, curing plants diseases,
and trying to improve the quality and transportation of wine. The Sardinian Monarchy began to build irrigation canals,
railways and above all the port facilities at Genoa.

This spirit was a sign of the times and no peculiar to Piedmont. It was in Naples that there appeared the first Italian
steamboat, as well as the first iron bridges and the first railway; and as early as 1833 Ferdinand II had talked of making a
league among the various Italian States.

Undoubtedly, it was Austria Lombardy which showed the greatest prosperity and the greatest advance in industrialization.
Lombardy boasted the finest system of communications in Continental Europe, and it was not Austrian resistance to reform,
as much as the municipal jealousy which held up the Milan-Venice railroad. The Austrian rulers went far ahead of other
Italian Sovereigns in educational development. Their taxes, though heavy, were less than those of their predecessors or
successors. Their press laws allowed the existence of more than twice as many newspapers as in Piedmont and Tuscany.
Apparently the people of Lombardy remained content and loyal, at least until 1840. So far were they from feelings of Italian
unity that the Milan chamber of commerce advocated joining the German Zollverein as a means to greater prosperity.
Metternich was planning a close economic union of Austria with the States of Italy as an antidote to Italian nationalism.
Even some radicals believed that there was more to be gained from Piedmont. Where Metternich failed was in preventing
single campaigns against individual gradually developing into a larger scheme of renovations and when the movement for
reforms reach a certain point, it became political and even anti-Austrian.

Economically speaking, the objective conditions of the Italian nationality gradually came to take shape. Through capitalistic
farming and industrialisation there developed the demand for a wider market within the nation. This trend towards
economic integration did more than any other thing to reduce the primary obstacle to Italian unity, that is, regional
particularly.

Without the rise of Sardinia-Piedmont to leadership, political unity could hardly be possible.

In 1815, Piedmont almost casually picked up the Italian coastal province of Liguaria; hence forward a southern outlet
through Genoa made her a maritime-power and an industrial and essentially Italian state. The unification of Liguria with
Sardinia, Piedmont and Savoy was, too, a distinct step towards the defeat of regional particularity. The radical merchants of
Genoa had protested angrily against subjection to Turin; but before long their liberal and national ideas were to engulf the
narrow court aristocracy of the capital.

Some historians have argued that Charles Albert continued to be one of the chief obstacle to the Risorgimento. His
persecution of the radicals in 1833-4 certainly fitted in with his Austrian alliance of 1831. (His wife was a Hapsburg, and in
1842 he married his son Victor Emmanuel to another; on the occasion this marriage, the Austrian General Radetsky
referred to the Piedmontese army as the advanced guard of the imperial forces.)

Eventually, Charles Albert changed side; he had his covetous eyes fixed on the fertile plain of Lombardy, for a long time; an
object of dynastic ambition. Austrian intervention in central Italy was upsetting the balance of Italian power against
Piedmont. Austrian separate railway-system was diverting the trade of central Europe from Genoa to Trieste.

Charles Albert himself was by temperament insincere, given to concealing his opinions even from friends. Metternich
agreed that he was ambitious as well as vacillating. His intimate correspondence with Francis IV then showed his views
altering as he began to fear that other sovereigns might do him harm as national leaders.

As he claimed that he himself and the Pope were the sole legitimate rulers in Italy, he ultimately found conservative and
Catholic reasons for himself exploiting nationalism in a dynastic war against Austria. A new situation emerged when
Austrian troops entered Modena on the death of Francis, and when in July 1847 Metternich was unwisely to have defied
papal protests and occupied Ferrara. This lost Austria her position as the guardian of legitimacy; it also impelled the pope
still more towards the liberals, and gave Charles Albert the excuse for war which could be justified as defensive and in aid
of the Holy See.
When demonstrations took place in Genoa in December 1847, the king thought they were an attempt to restore Genoese
independence, and ordered troops to suppress them. They frightened him with visions of republican and the city of Turin
joined in the request for a constitution. He was thus driven by ambition, jealously and fear to liberate Italy from the Austria
domination. Comments on the nature of the Italian nationalism.

Out of the interplay of these forces, there gradually emerged the Italian self-consciousness as a nation. The Italian
nationalism of this age was negative in its nature; it arose as nation-wide antagonism to two evils: first regional particularly
and second foreign intruders, that is, the Austrian intervention.

But as yet there was no agreement on aims nor any form of government for a United Italy, and these forces more frequently
rivaled one with another. No unity existed. By 1848 the Italian nationality was recognized, though it was still far from
reaching maturity. Even in 1860-1870 the Italian unity was artificially imposed from above rather than an outcome of the
genuine national revolution from below as Mazzini anticipated.

4. Assess the roles of Napoleon III, Cavour and Caribaldi in the unification of Italy.

First we must realise that neither Napoleon III nor Cavour wanted or expected Italian unification. To some extent, the
achievement of an united Italy was something that happened partly because of Napoleon III and Cavour but perhaps
considerably in spite of both of them.

Both Napoleon III and Cavour wanted to create a 'Kingdom of Italy' which was to include Piedmont and parts of northern
Italy. But it did not mean the whole of Italy. For Napoleon III, the Italian adventure meant the expulsion of the Austrians
from the northern part of Italy but it did not involve Italy's unification. The creation of an Italian kingdom comprising the
whole of Italy was contrary to dominating position of France in Europe in the past had depended on the weakness of both
Germany and Italy. Once united, the two countries would become strong the dominant position of France in Europe. So
Napoleon III did not want the unification of either Italy or Germany. All he wanted was to create large client states or states
that were friendly to France and at the same time, acquire additional territory for France. This would mean that in Italy, he
aimed at a north German state under the Hohenzollerns. This would also corresponding increase in French influence. It is
therefore incorrect to think of Napoleon III as venturing into Italy because of sentimental attachment to Italian nationalism.
Napoleon III was by no means a romantic idealist. He took the action in Italy because it was compatible with the extension
of French influence in Italy. On the other hand, we can not rule out completely the desire of the people's monarch to do
something for the people of Italy. After all, what he did fitted in with the Napoleonic tradition. He chose to become the
leader of the nationalities and he might think in so doing, he could make use of the most powerful force of the day to
achieve his political and territorial ambition; to obtain the popular support he needed and to extend French influence
abroad.

In Cavour, Napoleon III found someone who understood the problem of power and who was prepared to use the apparatus of
power-politics, diplomacy and war, to achieve his goals. Hence they formed a good and workable partnership in Italy.
Cavour therefore, began by giving Piedmont the essential apparatus of power with the economic and military reforms. He
supplied the diplomacy while the Piedmontese provided the armies and armament. But Piedmont was a small state with
limited resource so the support of a Great Power was needed. But Cavour had to make sure that Piedmont retained her
independence while receiving support from another country. As a parliamentary liberal, Cavour disliked radicalism. As a
loyal supporter of the House of Savoy, he did not like republicanism. As a constitutional monarchist, he did not like populist
and direct democracy. On the whole, he did not believe in the possibility of Italian unification, because he thought that there
were too many obstacles in the way.

What was planned at Plombieres was therefore not Italian unification. If fully materialized, the Plombieres Pact would
result in the division of Italy rather than unification. It would in fact fit in with Napoleon III's intention: it would expel
Austrian influence from northern Italy; it would reform the governments in other parts of Italy to France's advantage.
Lombardy-Venetia, the Duchies and Romagna would be added to Piedmont-Sardinia to make a Kingdom of Italy large
enough to be a useful French client-state but not powerful enough to resist the wishes of France and to pursue a independent
policy of its own. Alternately, Tuscany and Romagna could form another client state to be ruled with a French ruler. The two
Sicilies could form another French client state to be ruled by a French ruler. The Pope would retain control of the Papal
States and gain increased prestige as the president of an Italian Federation. For Napoleon III, this would satisfy various
interest concerned: Italian patriots by the expulsion of the Austrians; Liberals by the abolition of ancient misgovernment;
Victor Emmanuel and Cavour by the greatly increased size and prestige of Piedmont the French clericals by the new dignity
of the Pope; the French patriots by the acquisition of new territory and the substitution of French for Austrian influence
throughout Italy; and the Bonapartists by the creation of new family connection and areas of influence in Italy.
For Cavour, the Plombieres Pact was a plan to extend the power and influence of his monarch and Piedmont. He might not
have any master plan that he was to pursue without any deviation. He was, like Bismarck, prepared to adopt his policy and
objectives to every changing circumstance, yet at the same time remaining firmly in control. He was able to see what was
possible at each given moment. He was able to control a situation that was constantly fluid. Thus, we can say that Cavour
wanted to get as much as could reasonably be obtained, but no more. At Plombieres, he was successful in getting Napoleon
III to consent to Piedmont's acquisition of Romagna. But his agreement to cede Savoy and Nice to France showed that he
was not an Italian nationalist. On the other hand, we can never be sure absolutely of Cavour's real aims. Some might
consider that Cavour wanted to secure Napoleon III's support so much that he concealed his true aim of uniting Italy and
consented to the limited plan of Napoleon to divide Italy. What he wanted was to drive out the Austrians first and then deal
with France later. So in his sense, Plombieres was a diplomatic triumph for Cavour, for it got France going as an ally of
Piedmont. Nevertheless, the general evidence suggested that Cavour was not in favour of popular nationalism for it might
lead to the victory of democratic republicanism over constitutional monarchism. However, later development was to show
that Cavour was shrewd enough to make one of the fervour of Italian nationalism to consolidate the control of Piedmont
over the other parts of Italy. Italian nationalism helped him to beat Garibaldi in the political battle for Italian supremacy.
Thus, it may well be that there was more deception involved in Cavour's negotiation with Napoleon III than what was
apparent. On the other hand, it may be said that Cavour's efforts to acquire the Papal States and southern Italy were forced
upon him by the success of Garibaldi and the Thousand. It is reasonable to assume that without the intervention of
Garibaldi, Cavour's diplomacy and military exploits would stop at Villafranca. But Garibaldi had formed his hand with the
threat of democratic republicanism in southern and central Italy. Perhaps, Cavour was thinking of an Italian federation
under Piedmont in Italy seemed a reasonable possibility, while a unitary Italy did not. After all, a united Italy might not be
acceptable to Prussia or Russia as much as Austria and France himself. Cavour was not interested in the impossible. He
chose the least difficult and pursued the easiest solution to Italy's problem, a solution that also fitted in with Piedmont's plan
of expansion.

In any case, we can say that both the men of Plombieres, Napoleon III and Cavour, whatever their real intentions, were
deceived by the Italians in general and by Garibaldi in particular. They had swept away Napoleon III's careful schemes and
Cavour's nice diplomatic calculations. Both men had not dreamed that Plombieres would inaugurate a series of events that
in three years would make Victor Emmanuel king over nearly all Italy. As things developed in Italy and Europe, Napoleon
III began to be aware of the rising tide of Italian nationalism and increasing public opinion on the side of Italian unification.
He therefore started to turn conservative in his Italian venturer. Villafranca was not a reversal of his policy because Italian
unity was never his goal. In fact, it gave Piedmont, Lombardy and Parma. France, on the other hand, got nothing. Then
Cavour resigned in protest and made himself look like a discontented patriot. But he kept negotiating with Napoleon III. At
the same time, Ricasoli in Tuscany, Farini in Modena and D'Azeglio in the Romagna organised the movement for
annexation to Piedmont. Thus Cavour was prepared to use the Italian nationalist sentiment to his advantage. He then
insisted that Napoleon III should be given Savoy and Nice. This not only rallied the Italian people behind Piedmont; it also
gave Piedmont and Italy unity the support of Britain for fear of French expansion. Moreover, Napoleon III had to recognise
the Piedmontese acquisition of the Romagna when he received Savoy and Nice. That made him unable to change his mind
and lose him the support of the Austrians and the French clericals at home. So Cavour was smarter than it all seemed.
Nevertheless, Plombieres was a violation of the principle of Italy for the Italians which Cavour had accepted freely,
whatever his true intentions. In the years 1858 to 1861, we may see more initiative in Napoleon III and Garibaldi than in
Cavour. It was Napoleon III's approach to Cavour that led to Plombieres and it was Napoleon III's will to revise the Vienna
Settlement and attack the Hapsburgs in northern Italy that led to the negotiation with Cavour. Similarly, Garibaldi's attack
on the Bourbons at South Italy led,to Cavour's despatch of armies to the Papal States and to Naples. Both efforts by these
men led to the unity of Italy. In the process, Cavour seemed to have played a rather passive role. Perhaps the verdict of
Garibaldi after Villafranca reflected the true role of Napoleon III: "Do not forget the gratitude we owe to Napoleon III, and
to the French army... for the cause of Italy."

If Cavour had had his way, there would have been so immediate sequel in the south to the war of liberation in the north.
With the absorption of Lombardy, the Duchies, Tuscany and the Romagna, all that war and diplomacy could achieve had
been achieved. For Cavour, therefore, with his fine sense of the possible, this was the time to stop, not as a matter of
principle, but of practical politics. Rome and Venetia could not for the moment be attained because of the insuperable
international obstacles. Similarly, an attack on the Two Sicilies was impossible and only was could help Piedmont to attain
southern Italy. Cavour might not even be interest in obtaining south Italy. After all, Cavour might not want to unite Italy, for
the centre was strongly Catholic and the south was exceedingly poor. So both would be burden to the liberal and rich north.

Fortunately for Italy, Garibaldi was interested in the south and all other parts of Italy. Unlike Cavour, he believed in the
impossible, in the people and the power of revolution to achieve his goal of a united Italy. It was Garibaldi and not Cavour
whose policy it was to unite Italy by revolution from the south became diplomacy had made it impossible to do so from the
north. Cavour said later that it was his policy. It is also usual to say that Cavour encouraged Garibaldi in secret; some
historians say that Cavour and Garibaldi are allies; some say that Cavour used Garibaldi as a catspaw. In opposing him in
public, Cavour was concealing his true aims from his enemies. But the facts seemed to have denied this interpretation of the
role of Cavour and Garibaldi.

Cavour's first reaction to Garibaldi's plans was rather negative. He tried to oppose and step Garibaldi from executing it.
Once Garibaldi was at Sicily, he ordered the Piedmontese navy to stop Garibaldi's expedition for several reasons. Cavour
might lose Napoleon III's support with a renewal of war with Austria and some sort of European intervention. Cavour also
suspected that Garibaldi was linked with radicalism, and avoid possibly demand a republican Italy based on a system of
universal suffrage. Cavour did not want to see Piedmont merge into a radical republican Italy. If Garibaldi succeeded in
Sicily, it seemed likely that radicalism would go on to sweep Naples and the Papal States and threaten to divide Italy
between a radical republican south and liberal monarchical north. Cavour wanted to avoid this possibility at all coast
because it would have meant civil war in Italy, and a civil war which Cavour had no choice but to fight. After all, Cavour
did not trust Garibaldi when the latter said that he was fighting for Victor Emmanuel.

Contrary to Cavour's expectations and hopes, Garibaldi succeeded in Sicily, Cavour's aim was to get Sicily annexed to
Piedmont at once. Garibaldi wanted annexation too, but not before he had reached Rome. He knew that once Piedmont
assumed control over Sicily, he could not use it as a supply base of his attack on Naples and Rome. This was precisely why
Cavour wanted to annex Sicily. Napoleon III demanded a plebiscite for Sicily but no one in Sicily wanted annexation with
Piedmont. So Cavour knew that it was the wrong time to arrange for a plebiscite. So the problem of the Naples and the
Papal States led to the open quarrel between Cavour and Garibaldi. This dispute soon became one between the south and the
north, the radicals and the liberals. It might lead to civil war unless the south followed the leadership of the north, the
radicals surrendered to the policies of the liberals, and above all, Garibaldi gave up his power to Cavour. So Cavour had to
turn the people from admiring Garibaldi to accepting the role of Victor Emmanuel, so that the fruits of the radical victory
in the south would be enjoyed by the industrialists and middle class of the liberal north. In this, Cavour showed great skill.

Garibaldi's arrival at Naples and the prospect of his attacking Rome raised the fundamental question of who was to rule
Italy: Victor Emmanuel or Garibaldi. Garibaldi had said that it was to be Victor Emmanuel. But the even worse thought was
that Garibaldi would go on to attack Venetia. This might lead to renewed war with Austria without French support. If so, the
gains so far made would have been lost completely and all that had been done would be undone. So Cavour tried to
overcome Garibaldi by a series of moves. He attempted to organised a liberal revolt in anticipation of Garibaldi's arrival.
But it failed. Cavour's most famous and successful manoeuvre was the invasion of the Papal States. He took this step for the
purpose of taking the Risorgimento completely out of Garibaldi's hands and placing it once more under the control of
himself and the Piedmontese. Garibaldi had forced his hand. As an attempt to stop the spread of revolutionary
republicanism, Cavour's intervention in the Naples and Papal States was reactionary. Yet he did keep foreigners out of Italy
at a highly critical moment. By saving Rome from the Italian radicals, Cavour secured the acquiescence of Napoleon III in
Piedmontese absorption of the Papal States; and by settling the matter without active assistance from the French, he secured
the unqualified approval of the anti-clerical government of England. Meanwhile, Garibaldi lacked the ability and the will to
organise an effective opposition to the Piedmontese and most people turned to Piedmontese rule. After all, Garibaldi had
always proclaimed himself the loyal servant of Victor Emmanuel. The alternative to his abdication of authority was civil
war, and for Garibaldi that was unthinkable. Finally throughout Italy, the plebiscites were in favour of annexation to the
house of Savoy. These popular desires Garibaldi could not deny nor turn against with the forces of arms. That would be
against his ideals and what he stood for as the man of the people. The plebiscites showed that the Italian people wanted a
united Italy with a stable and strong government that was acceptable to the other European governments. So Garibaldi had
no choice but to give the Italians what they wanted.

In the final analysis, Italian unification could not have been begun without Napoleon III and would not have been
completely without Garibaldi. Cavour's diplomacy and control throughout the process was essential in ensuring the Italian
unification happen the way it did, otherwise, it might and in the French domination of northern or southern Italy, or in civil
war or foreign intervention which would destroy the Risorgimento altogether. It is important to realise that Cavour's
original purpose was a limited one: free institutions, free trade, unrestricted opportunities for the commerical, industrial and
professional middle class. Up to April 1860, he was concerned with outmaneuvering the Austrians and with managing
Napoleon III. Beyond that, he was forced to deal with the situation thrust upon him by Garibaldi. In this second phase, he
had to maneouvre Garibaldi. He had to stop Garibaldi from making endless wars on Rome, and Venetia. Garibaldi aimed at
liberty and unity but he had non concrete plan for a government of a united Italy. So for the ask of a stable and united Italy,
Cavour and Piedmont proved a better alternative to Garibaldian radicalism and republicanism. Thus Cavour had no choice
but to extend Piedmontese sovereignty and free institutions throughout Italy. In this sense, Cavour was both an anti-
revolutionary and as anti-nationalist. He wished to prevent the unification of Italy but he knew it could not be resisted. Then
he made use of the tide of Italian nationalism to best Garibaldi at his own game of popular revolution. He made use of the
fear of radicalism to get Napoleon III's consent to secure the Romagna and the Papal States. He forestalled the moves of
Garibaldi to prevent any civil war or foreign intervention. In these ways he secured the unity of Italy and saved it from
foreign interference. These were the bases for the importance of Cavour's role in the Risorgimento. In a nutshell, Napoleon
III made Italian unification possible by starting it, Garibaldi made it complete by forcing its pace, Cavour made it safe by
containing the force of radicalism and avoiding military conflict within and without.

5. Assess the diplomatic role of Napoleon III and Cavour in the unification of Italy.

Napoleon III was interested in Italy because he wanted to overthrow the settlement of 1815, and he believed that once the
Italian settlement of 1815 was overthrown, the rest would follow. The 1815 settlement had destroyed French hegemony in
central Europe, and Italy was the backdoor into Europe. After the Crimean War, it was even more tempting for Napoleon III
to do something in Italy because Austria was isolated. The economic crisis of 1857 challenged the stability of the Second
Empire. The elections of May 1857 returned opposition to the Empire. So Napoleon sought to gain internal support by
external adventure. On 14 January 1858, Orsini, as Italian revolutionary, tried to assassinate him. He decided to ally with
Italian nationalism. So he took the initiative in planning for the expulsion of Austrian influence in northern Italy. On 1
January 1858, he wrote to the Czar, expressing the hope that's great chance might occur in which they could march side by
side; it was the first warning of the Italian storm.

For Cavour, the Italian question was a problem in international relations, not in domestic politics; this explained his split
with the revolutionaries but this was also his decisive contribution to Italian history. Italy could not make himself; she
could only be made by exploiting the differences between the Great Powers. Cavour knew that he must make use of the
differences between France and Austria to attain his goals. As Austria-French alliance must be prevented and Napoleon III's
ambitions worked to Cavour's advantage. In January 1855, Cavour had flung himself unconditionally into the Crimean War
in order to prevent as exclusive Austro-French partnership. He then held before the eyes of Napoleon III the advantages of a
revolutionary policy in Italy. Cavour offered Napoleon two temptations, dynastic and national. He proposed to marry Victor
Emmanuel's daughter to Napoleon's cousin, Prince Jerome he would cede Savoy to France and help restore France's natural
frontier, provided that France helped Piedmont to defeat Austria and set up a kingdom of Upper Italy 'from the Alps to the
Adriatic'. These terms suited Napoleon's every dream. After some preliminary sounding, Cavour and Napoleon met secretly
at Plombieres on 20 July to settle their future programme. There was to be first the marriage of Prince Jerome; then a
common war against Austria. Italy would become a federation of four states under the presidency of the Pope- Upper Italy
under the House of Savoy; the papal states; the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; and a new kingdom of central Italy. This
scheme satisfied both Napoleon III and Cavour. For Napoleon III, it would mean the extension of French influence in Italy
and the preservation of papal power. For Cavour, the important thing was to get thing moving, not to settle the future - that
could be settled when it came. At Plombieres, Cavour and Napoleon III also divided their labour. Cavour was to provoke
Austria into war in a respectable way; Napoleon III was to isolate Austria diplomatically.

In September 1858, Napoleon III sent Prince Jerome to Warsaw to negotiate with Alexander II. He asked for a formal treaty
by which Alexander II could agree to go to war if Prussia went to Austria's assistance. But the Czar only promised as
observation corps of 70,000 men on the Austrian frontier. Then Napoleon III and Prince Jerome presented the Czar with a
new treaty: Russia would engage to immobilize 150,000 Austrian troops in Galicia; Russia should guarantee France against
attack from Prussia; in return, France should guarantee Russia against attack from Britain. There were also secret articles:
Alexander should underwrite Napoleon III's pact with Cavour for the future of Italy; Galicia should go to Russia and be
united with Poland; Hungary should be independent; the Black Sea clauses should be revised; in return, Alexander should
give assurance that Russia gave a counterproposal: Russia would support France diplomatically and even agree to territorial
changes in Italy; in exchange France must regard the clause of the treaty of Paris concerning the Black Sea and Bessarabia
"as abolished" and should help Russia to secure their international annulment. Prince Jerome replied with the new clause
that Russia would agree to support the revision of the settlement of 1815 in return for French support for revision of the
clauses of 1856 relating to the Black Sea. Bessarabia was not mentioned. The Czar, Alexander, wanted to revise the treaty of
Paris and thought that war in Italy was first step. Finally, on 3 March 1859, France and Russia signed a secret treaty in
general terms. In the Italian war, Russia would 'display a benevolent neutrality towards France'. Although nothing was said
about the revision of treaties, this secret treaty was enough to isolate Austria from the possible military support of Russia
and also to prevent possible support from Prussia in war with a third power. The treaty was a triumph for Napoleon III for it
alone made possible the liberation of Italy. Though it did not give the Italian cause any active support, from Russia, it
ensured that there would be no opposition from her. Napoleon III was thus free to overthrow the existing settlement in Italy
if he felt strong enough to do so.

But Napoleon III was still worried about Prussian aid to Austria. His real fear was war on the Rhine. He had hoped that
Russia would keep Prussia neutral but Russia was only allying with France exclusively against Austria. In fact, Russia did
not want to antagonize Prussia. Prussia was in fact offering help to Austria in return for the supreme command of the
federal forces on the Rhine. Fortunately for France, Austria refused to concede to Prussia in return for their aid against
France.
Napoleon III was worried about Britain too. So Austria had to appear as aggressor in order to ensure the neutrality of
Britain and possibly Prussia as well. On 19 January 1859, the treaty of alliance between France and Piedmont was at last
signed: it differed from the 'pact of Plombieres' in providing for the cession of both Savoy and Nice and in dropping the
project of an Italian federation.

Britain offered a peace plan which was brought to Vienna by Cowley, her ambassador; the Great Powers would agree to
'neutralize' Piedmont; in return Austria would renounce her rights of interference in the central Italian states. But Austria
refused to desert the Italian states and Piedmont refused to be neutralized. Then Russia proposed a European congress to
settle the affairs of Italy on 18 March, because Russia wanted to avoid war with Prussia over Italy. The Austrians did not
like the idea of congress for it would mean their humiliation and the possible loss of Italy. So she had to act quickly to save
her position in Italy. To do so, she needed to humiliate Piedmont first and force her to accept the leadership of Austria in
Italy. So Austria demanded Piedmont to disarm before the congress. Cavour counter-proposed the withdrawal of both armies
from the frontier and general disarmament. But Napoleon III was still unwilling to help Piedmont for fear of Prussian
intervention unless Austria appeared the aggressor. In mid-April, Napoleon III asked Cavour to accept a final British
proposal for disarmament. On 19 April, Cavour agreed. Austria did not like this. She did not want to see the Italian question
solved on the initiative of France or Britain. She would like to solve the Italian problem by meeting the challenge of
Piedmont and eliminating it altogether. At the same time, she seemed certain of Prussian support. On 12 April, the
Austrians sent an ultimatum to Piedmont demanding her disarmament. In fact, the Austrians wanted to defeat the
Piedmontese and eliminate their threat once for all. They counted on Prussian help against the French aid to Piedmont.
Cavour rejected the ultimatum on 26 April; Austrian troops invaded Piedmont on 29 April; on 3 May, Napoleon III
announced his intention to help the Piedmontese. In this way, Austria gave France and Piedmont the chance to revise the
map of Italy and destroy the settlement of 1815.

Napoleon III continued to secure Prussian neutrality. He offered to guarantee the integrity of German federal territory in
exchange for a Prussian promise of neutrality. Alexander II offered to underwrite Napoleon III's proposal. But the Prussian
refused because they did not want to disassociate from German national feeling. Besides, they still hoped that Austria would
surrender German leadership to them in exchange for military support. Napoleon III would have liked Russia to keep
Prussia neutral by a threat of war; but Russia would not do so. If Prussia attacked France, Russia would attack Austria. So
Russia could overthrow the treaty of Paris while Prussia defeated France in the west. After all, Russia wanted to keep the
threat of Prussia alive as a check on France. Russia also did not like the plan of Cavour and Napoleon III of a revolution in
Hungary in collaboration with the Hungarian revolutionary Kossuth. So Russian threat was never the cause for Prussia to
keep out of the war; it was the Prussia desire to make use of the difficulties of Austria to secure the military command and
supremacy of Germany and the failure of Austria to offer such to Prussia in return for aid against France and Piedmont.

Nevertheless, after the Austrian defeat at Magenta and Solferino, the Prussian and German sentiment became restive. On 24
June, the Prussian army was mobilized, and the Prussian government determined to offer armed mediation on the basis of
the treaties of 1815. Russia too asked Napoleon III to end war quickly. So this meant that after all the efforts of Napoleon
III, he failed to secure the complete isolation of Austria. The fatal blow to Italian liberation at this time was his failure to
secure the neutrality of Prussia, and the whole-hearted support of Russia. Napoleon feared Prussian intervention and the
lack of support of Russia. Napoleon III feared Prussian intervention and the lack of support from Britain and Russia. So he
proposed an armistice to Francis Joseph. Austria would retain Venetia and Piedmont would gain Lombardy. This would
mean that Austrian and French influence stayed in Italy, while Russian, Prussia and Britain had gained nothing from the
Austro-French conflict. But Villafranca signified a conservative partnership between France and Austria in Italy. This might
put an end to Italian liberation. In fact, Napoleon III was frightened by the revolts in central Italy. During the war, the states
of central Italy had revolted and expelled their rulers. This had disturbed both Napoleon III and the Czar, Alexander II.
This was why Napoleon III ended the war early. It also led him to revive the creation of an Italian federation, including
Venetia, and the idea of a European congress to confirm the new order in Italy in the pact of Villafranca. These terms were
turned into a formal treaty at Zurich on 10 November.

Again the Austrian failure to respond to the aid of Prussia led the Prussian dissatisfied. The Prussian mobilization had saved
the Austrians from total defeated by the French, but they were not shown any gratitude by the Austrians. So their frustration
turned them away from the Austrians. Russia wanted to secure her neutrality in Italy. In October, William and Alexander
met at Breslau. Prussia accepted Russia's guarantee against a French attack on the Rhine; and agreed in return to be neutral
in the affairs of Italy. So Alexander and not Napoleon III helped to secure Prussian neutrality in Italy. But it was Napoleon
III's truce with Francis Joseph that forced the hand of Russia because Russia was afraid that a Franco-Austrian Alliance
would mean the impossibility of revising the treaty of Paris. So Russia would like France to renew her adventure in Italy.
Meanwhile, Napoleon III was also restless, because he still wanted to get Savoy and Nice to boost his image at home. He
demanded the cession of Savoy and Nice. On 24 March 1860, Cavour ceded Savoy and Nice to France.

In the central states, internal revolts had driven away the old rulers, Cavour's representatives had come in to restore order.
In Sicily, however, the revolt was suppressed by the Neapolitan troops. So he diverted Garibaldi to Sicily, because he wanted
to avoid radical revolution in the north or war with Austria in Venetia or with France in Rome. When Garibaldi crossed to
the mainland, Cavour did not interfere with him. But he knew he had to outmanoeuvre Garibaldi. When Garibaldi was still
in Sicily, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour had planned to annex Naples. But Garibaldi was too quick for the regular army to
move. So Cavour planned the same thing for the papal states. Napoleon III did not oppose Cavour provided that Rome was
left untouched. So Cavour stirred up revolts in the papal states; on 11 September Victor entered them to restore order. Then
Cavour had to convince Garibaldi to give up his authority and control over south Italy to Victor Emmanuel. At this point,
Garibaldi knew that he could not defeat the Neapolitan army with his Red Shirts. So he welcomed the arrival of army from
Piedmont. On 26 October, he met Victor Emmanuel and formally gave up his control to him. In March 1861, a parliament
drawn from all Italy except Venetia and Rome made Victor Emmanuel King of Italy.

The lack of foreign intervention against Garibaldi's expedition and the subsequent moves of Cavour was a result of complex
power conflicts. For the British, the fear of Cavour ceding Genoa to France in return for support against Austria. So the
British offered an alliance with Cavour. Cavour then ended British fear with his diplomatic skill and secured British trust in
the matter. For Prussia and Russia, both the prince regent and the Czar did not like Garibaldi. But Prussia would not
cooperate with Austria and Russia did not want to break her alliance with France. From 25 to 27 July, William and Francis
Joseph met at Teplitz in an attempt to work out an alliance against French aggression. William demanded the command of
all German forces. But Austria refused to concede such demand, so the plan for an Austria-Prussian alliance did not come
through. As a result, there was no joint force of Austria and Prussia against Garibaldi and Cavour in south and central Italy.

Meanwhile, Britain was prepared to accept changes in the Italian peninsula in order to maintain the neutralization of the
Black Sea. So Britain refused a Prussia request to reconcile Russia by abandoning the clauses of the treaty of Paris. From 25
to 27 October, the three monarchs of Austria, Prussia and Russia met at Warsaw. But they failed to come to any agreement
or plan for action in Italy. Instead Russia wanted Austria and Prussia to remain neutral unless Piedmont attacked Venetia.
So both Austria and Prussia was disappointed and the meeting broke up without achieving any harm to Italian liberation.
But the meeting made the British fear the revival of a conservative alliance. So Britain publicly approved Italian unification
in the same of the people.

The making of Italy owed most to French arms and British moral approval, but also to Russian resentment against the treaty
of Paris and Prussian resentment against Austrian hegemony in Germany. If Russia had remained friendly with Austria and
Prussia had fought France on the Rhine, Italy could not have been made. Italy's unification meant the destruction of the
European order: Metternich's system depended on Russia's guarantee; without that, it could be overthrown.

6. Discuss Cavour's contribution to the Italian Unification.

Camillod de Cavour was the architect of Italian unification. He hold that only by economic and military strengthening of
Piedmont-Sardinia and also by timely alliance with foreign powers could Italy be unified. With these ideas in mind, Cavour
prepared Italy by for unification and took first step to bring unity about. In March 1861, Victor Emmanuel II, king of
Piedmont-Sardinia assumed the title of king of Italy and proclaimed the new kingdom of Italy. However, in June 1861,
Cavour died, dying at the very moment when his survival seemed essential to the completion of unification. Nevertheless,
Cavour was praised as the national hero of Italy.

Cavour was a strong advocate of constitutional monarchy in Italy. He studied the political systems of Britain and France and
from the beginning he insisted that the unified Italy should be a parliamentary monarchy on the British model. In 1847,
Cavour founded a newspaper, Risorgimento, to propagate his national ideas. One year later, he was elected to be the
member of Piedmontese Parliament. In 1850, Cavour was made Minister of Commerce and Agriculture. One year later, he
also was made Minister of Navy and Finance and finally to be Prime Minister in 1852. Within a few years, Cavour
transformed Piedmont-Sardinia into a completely modern state.

Cavour saw that the construction of railways, miles, factories, banks and business enterprises were the only avenue to
economic prosperity in Italy. He seized upon the importance of railways, making Piedmont-Sardinia part of an international
network of communication. The railways greatest strategic importance was extended. The Mont Cenis tunnel was planned
to pierce the Alps and link up the Piedmontese territories with France. Genoa was changed from a naval base into a great
commercial port with new docks and leading facilities. By rail and steamship, Piedmont-Sardinia came to be linked closer
with the western Europe. Moreover, Cavour brought about some importance from trade treaties with Belgium, France and
Britain. As a result, Piedmont-Sardinia was able to gain much needed industrial goods from more advanced nations and
then strengthen her finance. The growth of economic expansion urged the conquest of Lombardy and Venetia and other
parts of Italy. Thus, the process of Piedmontization came into being.
Besides, economic reforms, Cavour also gave much attention to the strengthening of the army of Piedmont-Sardinia. The
whole force was re-equipped and the promotion of middle-class officers made easier. Furthermore, there was political
reforms. The parliamentary constitution was set up and acceptable to the middle-class and radicals. In the nineteenth
century, liberalism in Italy meant parliamentarism which was the pre-condition for unification.

However, Italy could not make herself an independent unit. Cavour never fell into the error that Italy could achieve
independence on her own. He realised that Piedmont needed strong alliance against Austria. By understanding fully well
that the acquisition of Lombardy and Venetia had to be won by blood and iron, and by realised that the Piedmontese
leadership in Italy could only be safeguarded by exploiting the rivalry between France and Austria, he cleverly sought the
support of Napoleon III.

In the Treaty of Paris of 1856, Cavour acquired Napoleon III's sympathy and in 1859 in a Treaty of Plombieres, it was
agreed that a Northern Italian state under Victor Emmanuel would be created while a central Italian federation would be
created under the Pope. In return, France would receive Savoy and Nice. This secret treaty of Plombieres secured French
help to defeat Austria. As history showed, the French help was essential. Austrian troops were defeated in Magnata and
Solferine and that Austria withdrew from Lombardy. With Piedmont's successful leadership, there were also national
uprisings in Parma and Tuscany. They had overthrown their respective legitimate rulers. Cavour sent agents to establish a
Pro-Piedmontese government which was favoured union with Piedmont-Sardinia.

On the other hand, which had already withdrew after winning the important battles at Maganta and Solferino, feared a
possible intervention. This induced Napoleon III to make hasty negotiations with Austria at Villafranca without consulting
Piedmont-Sardinia. With the conclusion of this agreement, Lombardy was to be transferred to Piedmont-Sardinia and the
hereditary rulers of the Duchies were to be restored. But the Villafranca agreements were unenforceable. Modena, Parma
and Romagna were unified under Fariui and Tuscany was controlled by Ricosoli both voted for union with Piedmont-
Sardinia. In August 1859, France, Austria and Piedmont-Sardinia met at Zurich. France opposed favoured the creation of a
unitary Italian state. Plebiscites which were suggested by Russia to Napoleon III resulted in the overwhelming majority of
duchies favoured annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia.

The success of National Movement in Central Italy inspired anti-Bourbon movement in the south. In March 1860, the
Sicilian approached Cavour for union. But Cavour neglected this proposal. Being a good Piedmontese, he realised that the
inclusion of the south to the north was impossible. The south, with different economic background and temperament, when
included, would work against the interest of Piedmontese. Also, the development was unfavourable because there was
always the prospect of formation of a republic in the south. This would divide Italy between a radical republican south and
liberal monarchical north. It would mean a civil war in Italy. However, Garibaldi was knocking on the door of Rome. If
Austria did not intervene, France would. Thus, in mid-September 1860, Cavour informed the powers that he was sending
troops to the Papal States to restore order. Plebiscites were held in the newly liberated areas and resulted in favour of union
with Piedmont-Sardinia. Cavour from the outset saw no advantage in adding the south to Piedmont-Sardinia. Since
Garibaldi was alarming every European country, Cavour had to intervene to forestall western intervention and a southern
republic. Thus, the fact that the south was annexed was only a by-product of Piedmont's intervention. However, this Italian
cause was conditioned by international power politics. If not for international rivalry, the turn of event might have been
different.

With most of the peninsula now united under a single rule, Victor Emmanuel II, King of Piedmont-Sardinia assumed the
title of king of Italy, and the first Italian parliament met in Turin. Only Venetia and Rome were not included in the new
kingdom. On 6 June 1860, Cavour died, dying at the very moment when his survival seemed essential if his work were to be
completed and true national unity preserved.

To sum up briefly, the important first stage in the unification of Italy had been completed by Cavour. He had created, by a
series of diplomatic alliance, reform and wars, a kingdom of Italy with Piedmont as its core, but still excluding Venetia and
Rome. Furthermore, a constitutional monarchy for which Cavour had been working was imposed on the new state, despite
Mazzini and Garibaldi. Such political and diplomatic achievements were his most memorable. Yet it took place against a
background of economic development which had an essential place in the whole scheme, and which in itself would have
earned for Cavour a high position in the history of Italy.

7. Assess the importance of the part play by foreign powers in the unification of Italy.

Europe after the Napoleonic Wars found itself being divided into two: the Eastern despotic countries and the Western
Constitutional states. Italy was right in the centre. Hence, her national movement in the nineteenth century drew the
attention of the Great Powers: Britain France, Prussia, Austria and to lesser extent, Russia. The part played by them was of
decisive importance to her Unification.
Despite the mission of Minto (1847), Palmerston, the British Prime Minister was extremely cautions when crisis came. He
asked France and Charles Albert and to help the Milauese. It showed that the role played by Britain in later 1840s was
inimical to the Italian cause. But if she adopted a vigourous foreign policy and helped to crush Austria, the Liberation of
Italy would be followed by a strife for ideal form of government and probably not an intensively patriotic movement towards
unity. Besides, the crushing of Austria would lead to Russia advance into Central Europe. The weak and disunited Italian
States would then be put under the influence of Russia. Thus, despite the fact that Britain did not give any substantial help
to the Italians the policy of Palmerston who aimed at checking Russian advance was to serve the interest of the Italian Unity
in the long run.

In December 1848, Louis Napoleon was elected President of the Second Republic. His sole interest was in the building of
his prestige by conciliating the different elements at home, particularly the clerical party. The Italian cause presented him a
chance. He sent an army to overthrow the Republic in Rome, and restore the Nepal Power there. The effect of his
intervention on the development in Italy was two-fold. It contributed to the Italian tragedy of 1849 and made her suffer an
army of occupation. On the other hand, it dealt a death-blow to Mazzinian Republicanism. Henceforward, the leadership of
Italian unification, could only be assumed by the king of Piedmont whose national mission had been exalted tremendously.

The Crimean War had strengthened the friendship between Sardinia and the Western Constitutional states. The secret Pact
of Plombieres obliged Napoleon III to come to her aid. In the First Italians war of independence, the French sided with
Piedmont and secure Lombardy from Austria on the behalf of the Italians. But the importance of his work should not be
ever-exaggerated Napoleon III who had ambitions in Central Italian states and Rome would not cherish the idea of a
unified and increasingly powerful Italy to the south of France. Besides, the Catholic opposition in France would not allow
him to go too far in helping the liberal Sardinia State to encroach on the Papal States, and thus his hand was restrained.
There came the Truce of Villafranca between France and Austria giving Milan to Sardinia. But restoring the central Italian
duchies to their former reactionary rulers, and so leaving Cavour desperate. If not for his effective worker in Central Italy
and the success of Garibaldi in the South, the unification would be sunken on his sudden withdrawal of French support.

In 1859 Britain proposed an European Congress to preserve peace and to forestall French aggression in Italy. If Austria was
clever enough, she would not have plunged herself head long into war, if she waited in patience, the Franco-Sardinia
alliance would inevitably be broken into pieces under the weight of European disapproval. She committed a blunder by
declaring war on Sardinia on April 1859. In July 1859 when France and Sardinia were beginning to quarrel over the
Central States, Britain appeared on the scene. She compelled France to acquiesce in the unity of the whole peninsula.
Napoleon would never quarrel with Britain. Hence Sardinia was spared of French anger when the Central states voted for
union with Sardinia.

The adventure of Garibaldi shocked Europe. Napoleon III wanted to intervene. But under Russell, Britain did not come to
Napoleon's design. If Russell was to follow the advice of Napoleon, by counteracting Garibaldi's action in the South, this
might well have been fatal to Italian Unity.

Russia policy also bore on the Italian Unification. She emerged extremely powerful after her invasion into Hungary. If not
for the threat of Russian domination, Britain might be bold enough to Italian liberals crushing the Austrian power in 1849.
Then the Crimean War in which Russia was heavily defeated. The neutrality of a strip that was embittered the Czar. Russia
wanted to forsake Austria in times of university but Austria looked on the defeat of Russia with calm. Sardinia reaped the
harvest for it was just because of the estrangement between Austria and Russia that Britain was ruled to adopt a bold line
towards the Italians.

Prussia did not escape the revolution in 1848. This espodic courage had no liking on the Italian cause. Though she had her
own quarrel with Austria, she could not tolerate the humiliation of a Crimean power by France and Italy. Besides, the
victories of France would tempt the Emperor to extend the French frontier towards the Rhine. Prussia therefore threatened
war on France and so frightened Napoleon to sign peace treaty with Austria at Villafranca. If she did intervene, there might
be a Franco-Prussian War. If this be the case, Sardinia might be challenged all the despotic states of Eastern and Central
Europe. But it was equally clear that Prussian intervention would only be followed by Austria concession to Prussia in
Germany. If Napoleon was not intimidated Austria would be the first to ask for peace instead of France as at that time
Hungary was about to revolt. If that happened, Venetia might be incorporated into Sardinia in 1859 instead of 1866.

The outbreak of the Seven Weeks' War waged by Bismarck was to adventure of Italy. By joining Prussia, Italy was
compensated with Venetia and so gained a step towards complete unification. Henceforward Rome was the only place which
was outside the control by Sardinia. In 1870 it was again Bismarck who bestowed Rome to Italy indirectly by defeating
France in the Franco-Prussian War. In this respect, Prussia rather Bismarckian diplomacy did contribute much to the Italian
Unification.
Hence, it can be seen that the Italian Unification was not solely the work of Cavour or Garibaldi. Though France did
actually fight side by side with the Sardinians the ambitions and insincerity of Napoleon III endangered the Italian cause in
every war. Th threat of Prussia intervention was to the disadvantage of Italy, but the contribution made by Bismarck should
not be neglected though he had no liking on the Italian cause. Austria, by her nervousness and incompetent diplomacy,
failed to destroy the Franco-Sardinian alliance and brought her on defeat. Her strife for leadership with Prussia in Germany
helped Sardinia to gain Venetia in 1866. The cautious and yet beneficial policy of Britain in 1849 aimed at propping up
Austria against Russia. So it was no one to be denounced. The quietness of Russia after the Crimean War enabled Britain to
adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality on behalf of the Italians in the name of non-intervention, and so aid Cavour
through the crisis created the modern Italy of today.

8. Discuss the importance of Cavour in the Unification of Italy.

Nationalism and Liberalism or Constitutionalism were dominant theme during the Italian history of 1815 to 1860. These
two dynamic forces stirred up the Italian Risorgimento and the outcry for unification. But the 1848 Revolution saw the
many obstacles of such a unification mainly unrealistic leadership and foreign dominance. Cavour played an essential role
in solving these problems and of his expectation with the aid of Garibaldi, successfully completed the Italian Unification in
1870.

The motivating forces of the Italian unification movement was liberal nationalism. However, up to 1848, it was frustrated by
the Italian princes and Austria who were upholders of conservationism. Strong regional favour, coupled with clerical
dominance and the ignorance and inertia of the peasantry posed great difficulty to the nationalists who were themselves
merely a mediocre middle class. The failure of Mazzini and the withdrawal of the Pope in 1848 convinced the nationalists
that given the social and political situation of Italy, they had to look for a strong independent state to defeat Austria and
complete the unification. Therefore, the success of Italian unification depended on the strength of a state, not on middle
class movement nor the masses.

Piedmont was what the nationalists look upon after 1848 because of the war of Charles Albert with Austria and his
maintenance of the Constitution after the revolution. Cavour, the Piedmontese, Prime Minister was to raise Piedmont to
predominant position to replace the Austrians. And his pragmatic line of thought also coincided with the nationalists,
Italian unification should be accomplished with foreign help because a single state was too weak to confront Austria. During
the ten and more year after the 1848 Revolution and before the Italian unification, Cavour played a positive role in
promoting economic prosperity and military strength of Piedmont-Sardinia, and by his tactful use of diplomacy, he
succeeded, in setting up the kingdom of Northern Italy.

The aim of Cavour was not nationalistic as it might look. Cavour in fact was against nationalism. He was no more than a
liberal and Constitutionalists who envisaged a free Italy out of Austrian control with Piedmont-Sardinia as the leading state.
He was practical enough to discuss the regional differences between Italian states and the danger and resulted from a
unification or centralization of them. He also understood the international scene favoured a divided Italy. France was eager
to appease the Pope and the Austrians would preserve her control in the agricultural Naples. However, he was eager to
strengthen Piedmont-Sardinia and expand her territories in Northern Italy at the expense of Austria. In 1848, his continuous
efforts realized his ambition. He intentionally completed a united Northern Italy, and as he became involved in the
movement, he had to complete it out of his reluctance.

By introducing liberal reform, Cavour earned Piedmont-Sardinia leadership in the constitutional usurgence. Piedmont had
retained his constitution and she had her liberal parliamentary, and liberal systems. This was important in arousing the
hopes of the nationalists, who were disappointed with the conservative Pope and Princes, as well as the favour and
countenance of liberal powers, like France and Britain. And economic development and social improvement like building
railways, introducing industrialisation and constructing a society of civil liberties made Piedmont economically strong and
self-sufficient among Italian states. Piedmont became the sample Italian state that could comparable individual
achievements with other advanced powers. His contribution to setting up a strong army and a strong navy also made
Piedmont-Sardinia militarily prepared for a war with Austria. In short, Cavour did a good task in strengthening Piedmont
and raising its prestige. This was to prepare Piedmont-Sardinia to ride upon the wave of national movement against Austria.

The maneuvering of Cavour in diplomacy was decisive in unifying Italy. Cavour had his aims in joining the Crimean War
in 1854. The victory in the war was not all satisfactory to Cavour because his raising of Italian Question was not headed in
the Paris Conference 1856. Nevertheless, by the war, Piedmont's status rose; almost equal with France and Britain as they
were victors. More important was the isolation of Austria in the war. Russia, Britain and France were drawn to the attention
to the Italian problems, and in due course, they were willing to connive at the Piedmontese fighting against Austrians.
Moreover, the close links established between Cavour and Napoleon during the congress actually posed a wide path for the
Italian unification for after the conference, Cavour and the emperor met again in Plombieres 1858. Here we saw the role of
Cavour in manipulating the international politics to achieve his aims for a dominant Piedmont. By the agreement in
Plombieres, Napoleon promised Piedmont, Lombardy and Venetia by helping in the Austro-Italian War. Despite Napoleon's
wavering, Cavour was successful in provoking the war with Austria, and Piedmont gained Lombardy by it. Cavour might
not have realised all his ambitions by this time, but he had played an important role and the setback was mainly due to the
vacillation of Napoleon. After the Treaty of Villafranca and other dealings, Cavour managed to draw Napoleon to his side.
Parma, Tuscany, Duchies were united with Piedmont after plebiscites. This was another victory in diplomacy by Cavour. But
we should also remember the outcry rebellion against the legitimate monarchs in these states were provoked by the partial
success of the Austro-Piedmontese War of 1858, therefore, the war with Austria under the plan of Cavour was even more
successful than what he had expected. Cavour might not have a complete and mediated plan for Italy, but his magic to raise
Piedmont to head the Italian Movement earned him more than he had expected.

Actually, Cavour was quite satisfied with an enlarged Piedmont, occupying one third of Italian territory, and embracing half
of the Italian population by 1860. But as explained, his role in the whole movement meant more than he predicted and
planned. As Italian nationalistic feelings were aroused, they as a high tide to submerge Piedmont-Sardinia. Cavour was
forced to undertake the whole movement to preserve Piedmont-Sardinia and his own position in the new Italy. Before the
completion of the Northern Italy, he had manipulated the Italian liberal opinion for his cause. Popular insurrections were
stirred in the Central States and Southern Italy, especially after 1860, Garibaldi led his expedition of the Thousand to
conquest Sicily and Naples, and before he approached Rome, Cavour was forced to march troops to stop him. By this,
Italian unification was completed except Venetia and Rome. It should be concluded that the Southern Italy was completed
by Garibaldi but utilized by Cavour to Piedmont-Sardinia's advantage, Cavour was able to prevent revolution or republic. In
the unification with the south, Garibaldi took the initiative but Cavour was pushed by him to grasp it back. He had not
aimed at unification but circumstances forced to him, he was clever enough to turn them to his use.

To clarify the whole argument once more, the unification of Italy was initiated by the national-liberal forces which had their
riot from the Napoleonic era. But the actual political movement required action. Both intervention against Austria and non-
intervention towards the changes in Italy --- foreign help and war with Austria. Cavour played an essential role in
strengthening Piedmont, getting French support, and the non-intervention of Russia and Britain during the Austro-
Piedmontese War through his skill in diplomacy. This resulted in a predominant Piedmont in Northern Italy. But the
completion of the whole task was done by Garibaldi. Therefore, the role of Garibaldi should not be neglected and Cavour
was to utilize and override such popular insurrection to turn the course of the Italian unification to his own. Cavour's role
was great, though he was like Bismarck in general in the sense that he had not designed the unification but he was forced to
take its reins.

9. "Curiously, a favourable European climate was an essential ingredient for the unification
of Italy." To what extent was this comment justified by events?

The 1848 Revolution in Italy had proved that unification could not achieved by foreign war and diplomacy under the House
of Savoy. "Italy could not make herself, she would only be made by exploiting the differences of powers." A. J. P. Taylor
observes. And "Piedmont today is all of Italy." So a favourable European climate was of prime importance.

First of all, the Holy Alliance must be removed and so as to isolate Austria derive her of any foreign aid. This was possible
after 1848 when Metternich, "the coachman of Europe," fell from power, while Austria struggled for primary in Germany
with Prussia. The cracks of the Holy Alliance were marked. While Cavour future success was determined by his ability to
utilize Austria's difficulty elsewhere. Moreover, this struggle left Russia to extend the influence in Balkans. "When the
eastern question was raised, the Holy Alliance when the Crimean War broke out, Austria was hated by Russia for her
hesitation to go to war. And Russia after concluded the Black Sea Clause became a revisionist power. "The greatest single
achievement was to make Russia a revisionist power." Moreover, Piedmont participation in the war prevented a possibility
of the development of a Franco-Austrian agreement. While he gained great moral result when the Italian question was
announced and this was a deadly to blow to Austria. Moreover, now Russia was not the supporter, but the enemy of Austria.
And Austria was to stand idle to face the renewed challenge in Germany from Prussia and in Italy. There was no
compensating friendship from France and Britain for her not entering the war. Austria was completely isolated. The second
opportunity came after the Crimean war had provided free and unfettered opportunity for the destruction of Austria power in
Germany and Italy. Napoleon III was eager for prestige and he wanted to champion the cause of nationality. This provided
Cavour an opportunity for allying with France and at last in the Austro-Piedmontese War. Austria was excluded from
Lombardy as Cavour himself said "we must be the partner of France in the great game that sooner or later must be paid in
Europe." Austria and France's half-heartedness resulted in this partial success.
Then the struggle for primacy in Germany intensified. Austria must give up either the influence in Italy for France support
or the primacy in Germany for Prussia's support in Italy. When she refused to give up both, she would loss all in foreign
law. The Italian and German unification sometimes and always unintensiously aided each other. The Austro-Prussian War
excluded Austria from Germany and also from Venetia and the final partial unification was achieved. However, the French
occupation of Rome, Piedmont herself could not exclude France from Rome. When Germany and France went to war in
1870, France was excluded from Rome at the same time. However, Italy was too dependent on the European situation when
Garibaldi united Italy from south. Cavour feared foreign intervention against this war of republicanism, so he was urged to
stop Garibaldi half the way. This showed that European atmosphere was essential and prime condition for Italian
unification. "This aim is not to acquire more provinces, but to stop Garibaldi." One foreigner observed. Cavour was an
opportunist who follow with the cause of event and steer so that Austria's difficulties were exploited and France's support
was ensured with Britain's moral support and Prussia's indirect military support under the condition that Russia stayed away
from helping Austria.

However, this favourable Europe climate was only responsible for partial, not responsible for the total unification of Italy.
Other subsidiary roles of Mazzini, Carbonari, the work of intellectual and Romanticism and the work of Cavour were also
important, if not the crucial factor of Italian unification. First of all Cavour must credited as the architect of the Italian
unification when he steered well doing the world events, for example, Crimean war participation, France's military support,
Prussian alliance and the Franco-Prussia War. He raised the Italian question to international concern and pull the strings of
diplomacy to Piedmont's favour. Without him, Italian unification may not be achieved or only achieved in another manner,
by bloodshed and revolution from below which may invite not foreign aid, but intervention.

Mazzini's role must be understood. He, as Lipon says "bordered the political horizon of the Italians and created a vigourous
public opinion in favour of national unification." He was the saint of Italian unification, by constantly champion the cause
of Italian unification he kept alive a nationalist thinking and "endow the revolutionary movement with a spiritual quality."
He was the teacher of Italian unification. His role was essential if not crucial.

Moreover, without Garibaldi, Italy would only be partial united. As Seamen comments, "the rapid annexation of the South
by Piedmont was due to the fact that Garibaldi had forced the head of Piedmont at such." Cavour was afraid of the wave of
republicanism under Garibaldi and his growing influence in Italy which might invite foreign intervention from France if
Garibaldi reached Rome. So Cavour took the lead to stop Garibaldi's half way to prevent any further adherence. This
inherited the southern social and economic problems of the southern states to Piedmont and resulted in the final unification
of Italy.

Moreover, the work of the intellectuals like Leopardi and Mazzini were important in bringing it about a seek of nationalism.
Their work helped the Italian to form an idea which was not merely local but national. The work of Romanticism and
Risorgimento were also of crucial importance inside Italy.

Furthermore, the work of Carbonari raised the question of Italy to international concern although they have failure because
of their un-coordination. However, "political immigration formed the political hard school at which the political philosophy
of Italian unification was gradually evolved. They arouse foreign sympathy, mainly from France when Napoleon III decided
to free Italy from the rule of Austria and champion the cause of nationality.

Moreover, because of foreign interest and ambition, the Italian unification Irredenta was not united in Italy. In fact, those
land was in foreign hands until after the First World war the conflicting foreign interests prevented Italy from advancing
into those area, for example, Trentino and Treste, this was a source of province for the Italians.

In conclusion, a favourable European atmosphere was essential to the success of Italian unification to a central degree only.
The main of it was the isolation of Austria and military aid from France under Napoleon III, but this was only working
outside Italy and tooled by Cavour diplomacy. This work inside Italy under Mazzini;s preaching, Garibaldi's military action
and Cavour's vigourous economic pressure which created a secure basis for military action and the work of Romanticism
were also important without their work Italian unification may not be achieved so quickly and with a little agent even the
destruction of the 1815 settlement open the door to the destruction of Austrian power and the reconstruction of central
Europe. Italian nationalism and sentiment were also important to a large degree.