No. L­15138. July 31, 1961.

BILL MILLER, petitioner­appellee, vs. ATANACIO A.

MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents­
appellants.

No. L­16781. July 31, 1961.

CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY,and LAO KANG

SUY,petitioners­appellees, vs. ATANACIO A.
MARDO,JORGE BENEDICTO, and CRESENCIO
ESTAÑO, respondents­appellants.

No. L­15377. July 31, 1961.

NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff­appellant, vs. SEN

BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and
SERGIO TAN, defendants­appellees.

No. L­16660. July 31, 1961.

VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner­appellee, vs. ANGEL

HERNANDO, ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents­
appellants.

No. L­17056. July 31, 1961.

FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner­appellant, vs.

MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO
PABILIARE,respondents­appellees.
_______________

1 Corominas, et al. vs. Labor Standards Commission, G.R. No. L­

14837; Manila Central University vs. Calupitan, G.R. No. L­15483;
Wong Chun vs. Carlim, G.R. No. L­13940; Balrodgan Co., Ltd., et al.
vs. Fuentes, et al., G.R. No. L­15015, 30 June 1961.

899

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 899

Miller vs. Mardo

Government Survey and Reorganization Commission;

Grant of judicial power to Regional Offices of Department of
Labor over cases involving money claims, null and void.—
Reorganization Plan No. 20­A, prepared and submitted by the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under
the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said
Plan to decide cases other than those falling under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, is invalid and of no effect. In
Enacting Republic Act No. 997, it was not the intention of
Congress to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction
granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be
appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan,
Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution
that judicial powers are vested only in the Supreme Court,
and in such courts as the law may establish. The Commission
was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away
from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to
the officials appointed or offices created under the
Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended
to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an
executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot
delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice to any
other agency of the Government. (See Corominas, et al. vs.
Labor Standards Commission, et al., L­14837 and companion
cases, June 30, 1961).
 Same; Conferment of quasi­judicial powers to
administrative bodies must be made in express terms.—It may
be conceded that the Legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies quasi­judicial powers
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident
to the performance of administrative functions, but in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express
terms that would have leave no doubt, as even such quasi­
judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid,
only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the
performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in
the courts. Such conferment can not be implied from a mere
grant of power to a body, such as the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission, to create “functions” in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the Government.

Same; Enactment of law by legislative inaction, not

sanctioned.—It is argued that the defect in the conferment of
judicial or quasi­judicial functions to the Regional Offices,
emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization
Commission, has been cured by the non­disapproval of
Reorganization Plan No. 20­A by Congress under the
provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as
amended, and that, therefore, the Reorganization Plan is not
merely the creation of the Reorganization

900

900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miller vs. Mardo

Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an

act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and duly
passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in
the mode provided in the enabling act. Such a procedure of
enactment of law by legislative inaction is not countenanced
in this jurisdiction. A comparison between the procedure of
enactment provided in Section 6(a) of the Reorganization Act
and that prescribed by the Constitution, will show that the
former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first,
consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or
adjournment or by “concurrent resolution”. In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions
requiring positive and separate action by each House of
Congress. It is contrary to the “settled and well­understood
parliamentary law” which requires that the “two houses are to
hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be
submitted to the separate determination of the other” (Cooley
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).

APPEALS from the decisions of different Courts of First

Instance. Baguio, Manila, Cebu and Isabella.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     R.L. Resurrection for petitioner­appellee.
          Paciano C. C. Villanueva for respondents­
appellants.

BARRERA, J.:

These appeals, although originating from different

Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in
this single decision because they present but one
identical question of law, namely, the validity of
Reorganization Plan No. 20­A, prepared and submitted
by the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission under the authority of Republic Act No.
997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it
confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide
claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation
pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L­15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in
Manila, a complaint (IS­1148) against Bill Miller
(owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a
driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31,
1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily
dismissed,
901

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 901

Miller vs. Mardo

without being paid separation pay. He prayed for

judgment for the amount due him as separation pay
plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief
Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No.
3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an
answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759)
praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer
from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said
Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the subject matter of the complaint. The court then
required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer
and, as prayed for, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. The latter filed their separate motions to
dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, and non­exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant
to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as implemented by
Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and
Reorganization Plan No. 20­A, regional offices of the
Department of Labor have exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims
arising from violations of labor standards or working
conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the
court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard.
Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding that
Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive
Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan
No. 20­A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the
provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of
first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of
money claims arising from violations of labor standards.
The question of venue was also dismissed for being
moot, the same having been already raised and decided
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously
filed with this Court in G.R. No. L­14007 (Mardo, etc.
v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit
in our resolution of July 7, 1958. From the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents
Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present
appeal now before us.
In G.R. No. L­16781, Cresencio Estaño filed with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a
com­
902

902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miller vs. Mardo

plaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua

Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong,
as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof,
respectively, claiming to have been their driver from
June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was
not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and
for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay.
He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus
attorney’s fees. Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed their
answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof
was started before Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio
Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before
trial of the case could be terminated, however, Chin
Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 26826), to
restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the
disposition of the case, on the ground that they have no
jurisdiction to entertain the same, as Reorganization
Plan No. 20­A and Executive Order No. 218, series of
1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering them to
adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional.
As prayed for, a preliminary injunction was issued by
the court. After due hearing, the court rendered a
decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20­A is
null and void and therefore, granted the writ of
prohibition making permanent the preliminary
injunction previously issued. From this decision, the
claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves
only questions of law.
In G.R. No. L­15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
complaint (Civil Case No. R­5535) against appellees Sen
Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan,
claiming that she was employed by appellees as a
seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for
which service she was underpaid and was not given
overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She
prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the
same, plus damages. To said complaint, appellees filed
a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it
903

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 903

Miller vs. Mardo

involves a money claim and should, under

Reorganization Plan No. 20­A be filed with the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor; and there is pending
before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a
claim for separation, vacation, sick and maternity leave
pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the
same defendants­appellees). Acting on said motion, the
court dismissed the case, relying on the provision of
Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20­A
and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca, et
al. (G.R. No. L­12249, May 6, 1957). From this order,
appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but said court certified the case to us.
In G.R. No. L­16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with
Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a
complaint (Wage Case No. 196­W) against Sia Seng, for
recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and
separation pay. Sia Seng filed an answer. At the date
set for hearing, the latter did not appear despite due
notice to him and counsel. Upon his petition, Romero
was allowed to present his evidence. Thereafter, a
decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of
Romero. Upon the latter’s motion for execution, the
records of the case were referred to Regional Labor
Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ
of execution, he being the officer charged with the duty
of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng
should be given a chance to present his evidence,
refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re­
hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court
of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus
(Case No. Br. II­35) praying that an order be issued
commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator
to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision
in Wage Case No. 196­W. To this petition, respondent
Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss,
on the ground that it states no cause of action, but
action thereon was deferred until the case is decided on
the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the
validity of the rules and regulations issued under the
authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20­A. After
hearing, the court rendered a decision ordering, inter
alia, respon­
904

904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Miller vs. Mardo

dent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwith issue

the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined by
Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of the
Labor Standards Commission. From this decision of the
Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor
Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant Sia
Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in
not dismissing the petition, in spite of the fact that the
decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was
rendered by a hearing officer who had no authority to
render the same, and in failing to hold that
Reorganization Plan No. 20­A was not validly passed as
a statute and is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. L­17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a
complaint (IS­2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson &
Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services
as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from
October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was
summarily dismissed without cause and without
sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed
that during his employment he was not paid for
overtime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for
the amount due him for such overtime and separation
pay. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the
ground that said regional office “being purely an
administrative body, has no power, authority, nor
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be
recovered in the action.” Said motion to dismiss having
been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton
Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction
(Civil Case No. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing
officer from proceeding with the case, and praying,
among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20­A,
insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction
over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of
justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, be
declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed
for, the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer
and the case was heard. After hearing, the court
905

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 905

Miller vs. Mardo

rendered a decision declaring that “by the force of

Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241,
Plan No. 20­A was deemed approved by Congress when
it adjourned its session in 1956’ (Res. of May 6, 1957 in
National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Arca,
G.R. No. L­12249). It follows that the questioned
reorganization Plan No. 20­A is valid.”
Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly
to us from this decision.
The specific legal provision invoked for the authority
of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject
matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of
Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20­A, which is
hereunder quoted:

“25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen’s
Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims
arising from violations of labor standards on working
conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages,
underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave
of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime,
separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical
services of domestic help.”

Under this provision, the regional offices have been

given original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
 (a) all cases falling under the Workmen’s
Compensation law;
(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from
violations of labor standards on working
conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment,
overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of
employees and laborers; and
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation
pay, vacation pay and payment for medical
services of domestic help.

Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20­A,

however, the Department of Labor, except the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission with respect to
claims for compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle
cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had
being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties
so agree in writing. In case of re­

906

906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miller vs. Mardo

fusal by a party to submit to such settlement, 1

the
remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court.
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as
those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a
new conferment of power to the Department of Labor
not theretofore exercised by it. The question thus
presented by these cases is whether this is valid under
our Constitution and applicable statutes.
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending
Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission,
the latter was empowered—
“(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions
which may not be necessary, or create those which may be
necessary for the efficient conduct of the government services,
activities, and functions.” (Italics supplied)

But these “functions” which could thus be created,

obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial
functions. For the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission was created to carry out
the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as
amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not
include the creation of courts. And the Constitution
expressly provides that “the Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law.” (Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in
the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature
may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi­
judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion, as incident 2 to the performance of
administrative functions. But in so doing, the
legislature must state its intention in express terms
that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi­judicial
prerogatives must be

_______________

1 Potente v. Saulog, G.R. No. L­12300, April 24, 1959; Figueroa v.

Saulog, G.R. No. L­12745, June 29, 1959; Santos v. Caparas, G.R. No.
L­11777, June 29, 1959; La Union Labor Union v. Philippine Tobacco
Flue­Curing and Redrying Corporation, G.R. No. L­14087, June 30,
1960.
2 16 CJS 866.

907

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 907

Miller vs. Mardo
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental
to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction
3
over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress
must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative
bodies with quasi­judicial functions, then certainly such
conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of
power to a body such as the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission to create “functions” in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive
Branch of the Government.
And so we held in Corominas, et al. v. Labor
Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L­14837 and
companion cases, June 30, 1961):

“x x x it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting

Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of powers and
jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the
officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the
Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions
of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested only in the
Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish.’
The Commission was not authorized to create courts of
justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and
transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices
created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could
not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization
Commission, an executive body, as the Legislature may not
and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of
justice to any other agency of the Government.’ (Chinese Flour
Importers Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L­
4465, July 12, 1951; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L­5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs.
Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed. 175, and Johnson vs. San
Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur. 921­922.)” (Italics
supplied.)

But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the

conferment of judicial or quasi­judicial functions to the
Regional Offices, emanating from the lack of authority
of the Reorganization Commission, has been cured by
the non­disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20­A by
Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of
Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect,
argued that Re­

_______________

3 Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial

Accident Commission, 218 P. 563, 161 Cal. 770.

908

908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miller vs. Mardo

organization Plan No. 20­A is not merely the creation of

the Reorganization Commission, exercising its
delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself,
a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress
in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode
provided in the enabling act.
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as
amended, invoked in favor of this argument reads as
follows:

“SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans

submitted by the President during the Second Session of the
Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the
adjournment of the said session, and those of the plan or
plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted
after the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemed
approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of
the Congress following the date on which the plan is
transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and
the expiration of such period, either House by simple
resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any
modification thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any
modification thereof may, likewise, be approved by Congress
in a concurrent Resolution within such period.”

It is an established fact that the Reorganization

Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20­A to
the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to
Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its
sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or
adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now
contended that, independent of the matter of delegation
of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this
opinion), said plan, nevertheless, became a law by non­
action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above­
quoted provision.
Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative
inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By
specific provision of the Constitution—

“No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have

been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the
Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage by
the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President
shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment
thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final
passage

909

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 909

Miller vs. Mardo

shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays

entered on the Journal.” (Sec. 21­[a], Art. VI).
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same,
he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his
objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two­thirds of all
the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two­thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be
entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the
President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it,
unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in
which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the
President within thirty days after adjournment.” (Sec. 20[1].
Art. VI of the Constitution).

A comparison between the procedure of enactment

provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and
that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the
former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the
first, consent or approval is to be manifested by silence
or adjournment or by “concurrent resolution.” In either
case, the contemplated procedure violates the
constitutional provisions requiring positive and
separate action by each House of Congress. It is
contrary to the “settled and well­understood
parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses
are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and
the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to
be submitted to the separate determination of the
other,” (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p.
187).
Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense
with the “passage” of any measure, as that word is
commonly used and understood, and with the
requirement of presentation to the President. In a
sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in
counsel’s argument, would be a reversal of the
democratic processes required by the Constitution, for
under it, the President would propose the legislative
action by action taken by Congress. Such a procedure
would constitute a very dangerous precedent
 910

910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miller vs. Mardo

opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of

weakness or indifference, to eventual abdication of its
legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our
Constitution, is already one of the strongest among
constitutional heads of state. To sanction such a
procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri­
departmental scheme of our democracy.
Even in the United States (in whose Federal
Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific
method of passing laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of
our Constitution) and in England (under whose
parliamentary system the Prime Minister, real head of
the Government, is a member of Parliament), the
procedure outlined in Section 6(a) hereinbefore quoted,
is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule­
making power, to preserve the control of the legislature
and its share in the 4responsibility for the adoption of
proposed regulations. The procedure has never been
intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of
passing or enacting any law or measure by the
legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in
one of these cases.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold
and declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20­A, insofar
as it confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over
cases other than those falling under the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, is invalid and of no effect.
This ruling does not affect the resolution of this
Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards
Corporation v. Arca, et al., G.R. No. L­12249, dated May
6, 1957, considering that the said case refers to a claim
before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
which exercised quasijudicial powers even before the
reorganization of the Department of Labor.
 WHEREFORE

(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of

Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L­15138 is
hereby affirmed, without costs;
(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of
Ma­

_______________

4 Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) p. 76, et seq.

911

VOL. 2, JULY 31, 1961 911

People vs. Delfin

nila questioned in case G.R. No. L­16781 is

hereby affirmed, without costs;
(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of
First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case
G.R. No. L­15377 is set aside and the case
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, without costs;
(d) In case G.R. No. L­16660, the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, directing the
Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of
execution of the order of the Regional Office No.
2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and
(e) In case G.R. No. L­17056, the decision rendered
after hearing by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment
of the proceedings, before the Regional Office
No. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary
injunction at first issued by the trial court is
revived and made permanent, without costs. SO
ORDERED.
      Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
     Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
     Concepcion and Paredes, JJ., took no part.

Decision affirmed.

Note.—See notes under De Vera v. Supitran, et al.,

L­13945, Jul. 31, 1961.

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