COMPLEXITIES OF RIOTING

A riot is a form of civil disorder commonly characterized by a group lashing out in a violent
public disturbance against authority, property or people. Riots typically involve vandalism and
the destruction of property, public or private.

In India, rioting is an offense under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Section 146,147,148 of IPC deals with rioting. We will study the various aspects of rioting
cases and trail procedure in case of rioting.

Difference between unlawful assembly and rioting: Use of Violence1

As provided under Section 146 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a riot is simply an unlawful
assembly in a particular state of activity, that activity being accompanied by the use of force or
violence. It is this use of force or violence that distinguishes rioting from an unlawful assembly.

The word ‘Violence’ in this context is not restricted to force used against persons only but it
extends also in force used against inanimate objects. Thus, if an unlawful assembly came
together to for the purpose of pulling down a house or a shop or destroying any other property,
it would be enough to show that violence was used.

Was there a common object?

A charge of rioting presupposes the existence of an unlawful assembly with a common object
as defined in Section 141 of the IPC. The essential actuality for assurance of culpability is the
presence of common object among the individuals and whether they were activated by it.
Generally, no direct evidence being available to prove the existence of common object, it
becomes a question of fact to be determined. This needs to, for every situation, be determined
by facts and circumstances viz. dialect of the individuals, their activities, signs, gestures and
finally whether the death was caused as a result of the injuries inflicted by them.

1
Defining Peaceably: Policing the Line between Constitutionally Protected Protest and Unlawful
Assembly, 80 MO. L. REV. 961 (2015)
In Ramjanam Pandey vs State of Bihar (19932), the Supreme Court stated “it is well settled
that common object has to be inferred from various factors like the weapons with which the
members were armed, their movements, the acts of violence committed by them and from the
results thereof”.

Trial: joint or separate?

The discretion stays with the Court whether to arrange a different or a joint trial relying on
which of the two would better fill the need of justice in rioting cases. For the most part, every
individual is qualified for demand that his case be tried separately. Nonetheless, Section 223(a)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that people accused for similar offense,
committed in the course of the same transaction, might be charged and tried together. Courts
may think of it as advantageous to discard such cases in a solitary judgment, depending on the
nature of the incident or where evidence on record is essentially the same against all accused,
or where the incident took place in the course of the same transaction.

The Court, in the of Garib Singh and others vs State of Punjab (1973)3 held that “In case of
rioting, where a number of men are accused, the magistrate should deal with the case of each
of the accused separately or discuss the evidence against of each of the accused, especially
when the evidence against each of the accused is by no means equally strong.”

Case Study
Sr. No Subject:
Law of Crimes/Indian Penal
Code

1. Case Title and Citation Garib Singh and others vs

State of Punjab, 1973 AIR 460
2. Topic Rioting
3. Scope/Chapter Offences against public
tranquillity

2
JT 1993 (4) SC 379
3
1973 AIR 460
 4. Provision/s of Law Sec.324,146,147,148,149,34
5. Briefs Facts of the case Five persons including three
appellants were jointly charged
and tried for rioting and
offence committed in the
course of it under Section
324,148,147,149

6. Held by Trail Court The Sessions Judge acquitted

all the accused because he
found the prosecution story to
be art ficial.
7. Held by High Court The High Court in appeal filed
by the. State re-assessed, the
evidence and reversed the
judgment of acquittal in
respect of the three appellants.
8. Issues raised i.) Whether the reversal of the
judgment of the trial court
by the High Court was justified
with reference to principles
of appreciation of evidence and
the decisions of the Court?
ii.) Whether the conviction of
the appellants by recourse to
s. 34 was justified on the facts
of the case?
9. Judgment Appeal Allowed, not guilty
under S.34 or 149 or 147 but
individual guilty of S.324

10. Cases referred Chet Ram v. State, [1971] 1

S.L.I.153
 Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State
of Bihar, [1971] 1 S.C.R.
839

Laxman Kalu Nikalje v. The

State of Maharashtra, [1968]

11. Comment or Observations In case of rioting, where a

or Critical Analysis by the number of men are accused,
Researcher
the magistrate should deal
with the case of each of the
accused separately or discuss
the evidence against of each of
the accused, especially when
the evidence against each of
the accused is by no means
equally strong.

Testimony of witnesses

Witnesses shape a key fixing in a criminal trial and it is the testimonies of these very witnesses,
which establishes the guilt of the accused.

In recording evidence in riot cases, care ought to be taken to decide, as far as possible, the
genuine part played by each accused. The likelihood of guiltless people being erroneously
accused ought to be dependably borne at the top of the priority list.

The accompanying rule was set around the Supreme Court in the case State of Uttar Pradesh
vs Dan Singh (1997)4 ‘In case of rioting, where there are a large number of assailants as well

4
State of U.P vs Dan Singh And Ors on 3 February, 1997
as witnesses, it is but natural that the testimony of the witnesses may not be identical. What has
to be seen is that whether the basic features of the occurrence have been similarly viewed or
described by the witnesses in a manner which tallies with the outcome of the riot.’

Because there might be some immaterial disagreements or distortion in the declaration of eye
witnesses, that ought not be a ground to dismiss their evidence. The rule of prudence requires
that courts should insist on plurality of eye witness account”

Who is to be held culpable?

By virtue of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, the basis of constructive guilt is the
mere membership of an unlawful assembly. The section creates constructive or vicarious
liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for unlawful acts committed pursuant to the
common object by any other member of the assembly.

Is an overt act necessary?

The commission of an overt act is certainly evidence against the accused; however, the opposite
may not generally be valid. It is a bit much that all people part of the gathering must play out
an obvious demonstration. The accused cannot put forward the defence that he did not, with
his own hands, submit the offense. It must be taken that everybody planned the likely
aftereffects of the blend of the demonstrations of which he was additionally a section along
these lines making a vicarious liability upon each the individual from the assembly independent
of whether he was acting in show and has partaken in the criminal demonstration or not.

Definite roles need not be ascribed to accused persons. Likewise, in Gangadhar Behera &
Others v/s State of Orissa (2002)5 it has been stated that “Even if no overt act is imputed to a
particular person when the charge is under Section 149, the presence of the accused as part of
an unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction.

It must be significant to consider whether the gathering comprised of a few people who were
simply passive witnesses and were present there as a result of idle curiosity without intending
to entertain the common object of the assembly. The question here is, whether such people

5
Appeal (crl.) 1282 of 2001
were guiltlessly present at the place of event, were they harmless observers or were they really
individuals from the assembly. In a riot or disturbance, people who remain for the purpose of
simply gratifying curiosity or the love of seeing sights, stand in a very dangerous position, both
civilly and criminally, encourage the rioters.

Moreover, in a riot or disturbance, people who remain for the purpose of simply gratifying
curiosity or the love of seeing sights, stand in a very dangerous position, both civilly and
criminally, encourage the rioters.6

ENGLISH CASE:

Sr. No Subject:
Law of Crimes/Indian Penal
Code

1. Case Title and Citation Regina v. Sharp; Regina v.

Johnson; [1957] 1 QB 552
2. Topic Affray
3. Judge Lord Goddard CJ
4. Briefs Facts of the case There had been a fight
between the two defendants
in a public place in the
presence of a large number of
spectators. They were jointly
indicted on a charge of
affray.
5. Judgement The court considered the
offence of affray and
convicted.
6. Books referred Northampton, 2 Edw 3, c 3;
Pleas of the Crown (1824),
8th ed, vol 1, chap 28, p 488.
7. Comment or Observations It needs to be shown in case
or Critical Analysis by the of Rioting or Affray, such
Researcher

6
Riots, Routs, and Unlawful Assemblies, 3 Am. L. Mag. 350, 367 (1844).
 degree of violence as such
which would alarm at least
one person of reasonable
courage, which need not to
be shown by calling a person,
who has been alarmed but it
may be made out of the facts
and circumstances of the
case.

Section 152 of IPC: Assaulting or obstructing public servant when

suppressing riot, etc:

This section attempts to deter persons from interfering with some of the duties of a public
servant with respect to maintaining public peace. It says that whoever assaults or threatens to
assault, or obstructs or attempts to obstruct, any public servant in the discharge of his duty as
such public servant, in his endeavour to disperse an unlawful assembly, or in his endeavour to
suppress a riot or affray, or uses criminal force, or threatens to use criminal force, or attempts
to use criminal force to such public servant, shall be punished with simple or rigorous
imprisonment for a term extending up to three years, or with fine, or with both.

he interference must be in the form of assaulting or threatening to assault, or obstructing or

attempting to obstruct, a public servant. The interference must be with respect to the discharge
of his duty as such public servant in endeavouring to disperse an unlawful assembly or to
suppress a riot or affray. Or use of, or threatening the use of, or attempting to use criminal force
to such public servant must be established for the applicability of this section. The meaning of
‘affray’ is the same as given under section 159 of the Code, while ‘criminal force’ and ‘assault’
have been defined under sections 350 and 351 of the Code respectively.

The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable and non-compoundable, and is triable by
court of session, metropolitan magistrate or magistrate of the first class.