SECOND DIVISION On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case

1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his
marriage to petitioner be declared null andvoid.  He alleged that
they had no marriage license when they got married.  He also
[G.R. No. 127406.  November 27, 2000] averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still
married to Anna Maria.  He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had
not been issued.  The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil
APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
REYES, respondents. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted
DECISION without a valid license is untrue.  She submitted their Marriage
QUISUMBING, J.: License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979,
as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July when it was submitted in evidence.  Petitioner also submitted
24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897, the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null
Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said
and voidab initio.  It also ordered private respondent to pay Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were
P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner,
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes. are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein.  The
fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his
married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on prior marriage as null and void is undisputed.  It also appears
March 29, 1977, in Manila.  Then they had a church wedding on indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church
August 27, 1977.  However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982. [1]

and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their

marriage null andvoid ab initio for lack of a valid marriage The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and
license.  The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991.  Both parties
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals.  On July 24, 1996,
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision.  It ruled
Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna
petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
of the City Court of Pasay.  On April 4, 1982, they also had a could be validly contracted.  Said the appellate court:
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN
defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is necessary REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S
to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE
say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
without a judicial decree.  While it is true that if a
marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no II

subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING
matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each
IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
married spouse to determine for himself – for this would
be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a III
second marriage even before a competent court issues a
judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT
would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE
have been the intendment of even the now-repealed RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME
provisions of the Civil Code on marriage. MARRIAGE LICENSE.
xxx IV

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND
modify the appealed Decision in this wise: EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.
1.  The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein
private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant- The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of
appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
and void ab initio; marriage can be entered into validly?  To resolve this question,
2.  Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed
monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from which we shall discuss jointly.
November 4, 1991; and
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared
3.  Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes. the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null and void for
lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between
SO ORDERED. [2]
private respondent and Villanueva.  The appellate court rejected
petitioner’s claim that People v. Mendoza  and People v.
[3]

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, Aragon  are applicable in this case.  For these cases held that
[4]

this instant petition asserting that the Court of Appeals erred: where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial
I. decree is necessary to establish its invalidity.  But the appellate
court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the (1)  The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no
longer control.  A binding decree is now needed and must be (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
read into the provisions of law previously obtaining.[5]
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the without the spouse present having news of the absentee
appellate court also said: being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been
absent for less than seven years, is generally considered
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although spouse present at the time of contracting such
decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the dead according to articles 390 and 391.  The marriage
Civil Code, as in the instant case. so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
xxx
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration provision to that effect.  Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is appears to be conflicting.
essential. . . .
[6]
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,  and People v. Aragon,
[10]

 this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to

[11]

At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first establish the nullity of a void marriage.  Both cases involved the
and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, same factual milieu.  Accused contracted a second marriage
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil during the subsistence of his first marriage.  After the death of
Code.  The present case differs significantly from the recent his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the
cases of Bobis v. Bobis   and Mercado v. Tan,  both involving
[7] [8]
subsistence of the second marriage.  The second wife initiated a
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was complaint for bigamy.  The Court acquitted accused on the
contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,  under
[9]
ground that the second marriage is void, having been
which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly contracted during the existence of the first marriage.  There is
required. no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil void.  Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
Code provides that: terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting
valid marriages.  Hence, there can be no bigamy.  Justice Alex
Art. 83.  Any marriage subsequently contracted by any Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
 In Gomez v. Lipana,  and Consuegra v. Consuegra,
[12]
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,  however, the Court found the
[19]

 however, we recognized the right of the second wife who

[13]
second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus
entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired reverting to the Odayat, Mendozaand Aragon rulings.
estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to
husband.  The Court observed that although the second
rest under the Family Code.  Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra,
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
Code.  Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
[20]

was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second
declaration of nullity of marriage –
marriage).  And since the death of the husband supervened
before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife
to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and Art. 40.  The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
equity.[14] be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),  the Court adverted
[15]

marriage void.
to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents.  We exonerated a clerk
of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his
In Terre v. Terre (1992)  the Court, applying Gomez,
[21]

marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since

Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial
she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary.  Thus, we
February of the same year.  The Court held that no judicial
disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
the subsistence of his first marriage.  He claimed that his first
marriages.  This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras. [16]

marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),  the Court held
[17]
married in 1968.  We held that Atty. Terre should have known
that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void that the prevailing case law is that “for purposes of determining
marriage.  In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972.  In 1978, she whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
married another man, Wiegel.  Wiegel filed a petition with the judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to initio is essential.”
Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage.  The
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent
Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: [18]

cases.  In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),  the Court held:

[22]

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the

existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.  A declaration of
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.  (Art.
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz 39 of the Family Code).  Where the absolute nullity of a
Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
would be regarded VOID under the law.  (Emphasis supplied). of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
previous marriage void.  (Family Code, Art. 40; See also properly.  Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private
arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). [23] respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
marriage license.  Indeed we find there was a marriage license,
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and
peculiar circumstances of the case.  In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) used in both the civil and the church rites.  Obviously, the
 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
[24] church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.  As
entering into a second marriage.  The judge claimed that his first petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
first wife whom he got pregnant.  On the issue of nullity of the marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise
first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.  We this matter as affirmative defense during trial.  She argues that
held that since the second marriage took place and all the such failure does not prevent the appellate court
children thereunder were born before the promulgation from  giving  her  defense  due  consideration and weight.  She
of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. technicality.  In our view, petitioner and private respondent had
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first
private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel.  At of the two ceremonies.  That this license was used legally in the
that time, the prevailing rule was found inOdayat, celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
Mendoza and Aragon.  The first marriage of private respondent ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.  The appellate court
second marriage.  In this case, therefore, we conclude that might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense
private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid. of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered
a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code
the trial court.  But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so
to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit
would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
from what the CA calls “his own deceit and perfidy.”
children.  As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,   the Family
[25]

Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and
vested rights.  In the present case, that impairment of vested attorney’s fees.  Although the appellate court admitted that they
rights of petitioner and the children is patent.  Additionally, we found private respondent acted “duplicitously and craftily” in
are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because
finding that despite private respondent’s “deceit and perfidy” in the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim. [26]

contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her

silence on the issue.  Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no
church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent damages should be awarded in the present case, but for
using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil another reason.  Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting.  She is suing to maintain
her status as legitimate wife.   In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation
from her parents.   Should we grant her prayer, we would have
a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds.  To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd.  Logic, if not common sense,
militates against such incongruity.  Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife
merely because of breach of a marital obligation.  There are
[27]

other remedies.[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its
Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so
that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private
respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID
AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00
is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two
children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as
long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.