PRESENTATION ON

Electronic Voting Machine (EVM)

& Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail (VVPAT)
February 2019.
 AGENDA

1. History
2. Technical Expert Committee (TEC)
3. Technical Security
4. Administrative safeguards
5. Debate around EVMs- Explained
6. Aspersions Vs. Confidence
7. Past Judgements
8. Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)

2
HISTORY OF EVM
40 YEARS

3
 HISTORY OF EVM – 40 YEARS

1977 CEC- S L Shakdar talked about introducing an Electronic machine

EVMs developed and demonstrated by Electronic Corporation of
1980-81 India Limited (ECIL) and Bharat Electronic Limited (BEL)
EVMs used in 50 polling stations of Parur LA in Kerala. Used
1982-83 in 11 Assembly Constituencies:8 states, 1UT
Usage of EVMs suspended: SC ruling-EVMs cannot be used
1984
till Representation of People (RP) Act is amended
1988 RP Act amended: enabling use EVMs wef 15.03.1989
2018 SC dismissed petition asking for return to Ballot papers!
• Since 2000, EVMs have been used in all elections. 3 Lok
Sabha and 118 State Legislative Assemblies. Till date, more than 4
250 crore voters have cast their votes with full confidence and satisfaction.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVM-VVPAT IN INDIAN
ELECTIONS (1/2)

Date Chronology of Events

1977 ECI mooted the idea of EVM

1979 A proto-type was developed

6th August, 1980 Demonstration by ECI before the representatives of political parties

January 1981 BEL approached ECI for manufacturing EVMs

ECI held a meeting with the representatives of BEL, ECIL, the Ministry
29th July, 1981, of Law and Chief Electoral Officers of some state

19th May, 1982 EVMs first used in 70-Parur AC in Kerala

1982-83 EVMs used in 10 Bye-elections in different parts of the Country 5

 CHRONOLOGY OF EVM-VVPAT IN
INDIAN ELECTIONS (2/2)

December 1988 A new Section 61A was included in the Representation of the People Act 1951(The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of section 61A in 2001)
January 1990 Electoral Reforms Committee (ERC) formed by Government of India
April 1990 Technical Experts Committee recommended the use of EVMs
24th March, 1992 Necessary amendments to the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961 were notified by the Government
1998 A general consensus was reached on the use of EVMs for conducting Indian Elections
1999-2004 EVMs used in different state assembly elections
2004 - 2014 EVMs used in three consecutive elections to the Lok Sabha
14th August, 2013 The Conduct of Elections Rules 1961 were further amended and notified to provide for VVPATs
4th September, 2013 VVPAT was first used in a bye-election for 51-Noksen AC in Nagaland
8th October, 2013 Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the ECI to introduce the VVPAT in a phased manner
2013 – March 2017 Limited number of VVPATs introduced in phases by ECI except all 40 Assembly Constituencies of Goa.
May 2017 – present
VVPATs being used in all General/Bye-elections to Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies

6
TECHNICAL EXPERT
COMMITTEE (TEC)
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

7
 TEC- HISTORY

TEC constituted for

1st Technical evaluation of upgraded
Expert Committee EVMs Submitted an
(TEC) formed Evaluation Report in 2006

January, 1990 December 2005

April 1990 November 2010

Recommended Latest
use of the EVMs reconstitution
unanimously

8
 Past TECs

Composition of First Technical Expert Committee on EVMs – 1990

1. Professor S. Sampath, Chairman Technical Advisory Committee, Defence Research &

Development Organization DRDO), Ministry of Defence
2. Professor PV Indiresan of the IIT Delhi
3. Dr. Rao C. Kasarabada, Director, Electronic Research & Development Centre (ERDC),
Trivandrum

Composition of Second Technical Expert Committee – Dec 2005

1. Prof P.V. Indiresan, Ex-Director, IIT Madras as Chairman of TEC

2. Prof. D.T. Shahani of IIT Delhi
3. Prof. A.K. Agarwala of IIT Delhi

9
 PRESENT TEC COMPOSITION

4 Eminent Professors from IITs: Renowned Experts in their Fields.

Prof Rajat Moona,
Director IIT Bhilai,
Prof D T Shahani,
Prof Emeritus, IIT-Delhi.
1 2 Former Director General CDAC.

Prof Dinesh K Sharma,

3 Prof Emeritus, IIT Bombay

Prof A K Aggarwala, 4
IIT Delhi

10
TECHNICAL
SECURITY
DESIGN, PROCESS, MANUFACTURING

11
 1. SECURED DESIGN FEATURES

Population

No Radio One Time

Frequency Programmable Real Time Clock
(OTP) chip* Dynamic
transmission or for time and date
Standalone Coding
reception *The Software stamping key
Machine of Key
possible- No burnt on the press
chip cannot be Press
wireless
re-written/
communication modified/erase
possible 12
d
 2. SECURE DEVELOPMENT &
MANUFACTURING
❑ Manufactured by Premium PSUs- M/s BEL & ECIL: Both deal with manufacturing of
sensitive equipment critical to the safety and security of the Nation and have strong
security protocols.

❑ In-house SOFTWARE (SW) Developed. Fully vetted by TEC. Never sub-contracted.

❑ Secure Manufacturing: 3-level Physical/Process access Control, Regular frisking at imp

junctions, prohibition on outside e-gadgets, CCTV Coverage, Access Data and Process
Data logging, alarm and alert generation.

❑ Third Party Testing by Standardization Testing & Quality Certification (STQC)* as

per Standards & Quality Process set by TEC. Software is also tested & checked by
STQC for authentication.
(*STQC is an organization under Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology involved in certifying
organizations and products by independent testing/auditing.)
13
ADMINISTRATIVE
SAFEGUARDS
SECURE HANDLING &
MANAGEMENT OF
EVMS/VVPATs 14
 ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS

1. Stakeholder Participation AT EACH & EVERY

STEP INVOLVING EVMs & VVPATs.
2. Allocation & Secure Movement
3. First Level Checking (FLC)
4. Candidate Setting
5. Randomization
6. Mock Poll
7. Poll Day Checks
8. Poll Closure & Transportation
9. Storage & Security
10. Counting Day Protocol 15
 1. STAKEHOLDER PARICIPATION

Active Participation of & Witness by

Political-Parties/Candidates in All
Processes.
Opening & Sealing First Level Check (FLC)
of EVM Warehouses 1 2 & Candidate Setting.
& Strong-rooms.
List of EVMs after 1st & 2nd
Conduct mock poll 3 randomization shared
and receive mock
poll results Sign on Paper Seals on
5 4 EVMs after all processes Participation
FLC
During

16
 2. ALLOCATION & MOVEMENT

Secured Transportation
Planned Allocation
EVMs are allocated to poll going State ➢ Any Movement of EVMs/VVPATs mandatorily
by the Commission managed through EVM Management System
(EMS)
➢ Only Containerized Trucks or Sealed trucks
Received by District Election Officer used for Transportation
(DEO) who is personally responsible ➢ All Trucks sealed with Lock and Paper Seals
for secured storage ➢ GPS tracking mandatory
➢ All movement under 24X7 Police Escort
➢ Political parties informed in advance about
EVM Management Software for inventory the opening, stocking and sealing of
management of all EVMs nationwide. warehouses while shifting of EVMs/VVPATs
➢ Videography done of shifting process
17
 3. FIRST LEVEL CHECKING (FLC)

➢ FLC in the presence of

representatives of political parties
➢ Fully sanitized hall under videography
and full security
➢ Full functionality and behavioural check
is done
➢ Defective (non-functional) EVMs are
kept aside and not used in election
➢ Recorded in EMS
18
 FLC PROCESS

Electronic Result in Control Photocopies of record

Signing on seals by registers shared with
Unit (CU) is tallied with
Mock Poll on All VVPAT Slip count in front Engineers and political party
EVMs/VVPATs of representatives representatives representatives

Complete physical Additionally 1200 votes

check up (switches, in 1%, 1000 in 2% & 500 CU sealed after EVMs/VVPATs
cable, latches etc) in 2% on randomly FLC using ‘Pink stored in Strong
& functional test selected EVMs & 96
Paper Seal’ Room under 24X7
Votes in each VVPAT.
security
 4. CANDIDATE SETTING

The Process
Insert ballot paper in Mock Poll on Every
the Ballot Unit & Set Seal Ballot Unit EVM + 1000 vote on
Number of Candidates 5% EVMs

Security Measures

1 Done after finalization of the names of contesting

candidates

2 Fully sanitized hall under videography and full security

Done in the presence of candidates or their agents 20

3
 5. RANDOMIZATION

➢ EVMs are Randomized twice using EVM Management System

(EMS).
➢ Only FLC approved EVMs as per EMS get picked up for first
randomisation
1st Randomization 2nd Randomization

• Done after FLC

• To allocate EVMs from district, randomly, to a particular Assembly
Constituency (AC).
• In presence of representatives of political parties.
• List of AC-wise Randomized EVMs shared with political parties. 21
 5. RANDOMIZATION

➢ EVMs are Randomized twice using EVM Management Software

(EMS).
➢ Only FLC approved EVMs recorded in EMS get picked up for
first randomisation
1st Randomization 2nd Randomization

• Done just before ‘candidate setting’.

• To allocate EVMs available in an AC to specific polling
stations.
• In presence of candidates/election agents and list
shared. 22
 5. RANDOMIZATION

PS**1
1st Randomization 2nd Randomization

AC* 1 PS2
District

AC 2
PS(n)

*Assembly Constituency
** Polling Station
AC (n)
23
 RANDOMIZATION- THE FOUNDATION OF
EVM SECURITY

➢ Till first randomization- no one knows which EVM is going to which AC

➢ Till nomination finalisation- no one knows the sequence of names on the

ballot paper

➢ Hence, till candidate setting no one (not even Returning Officer

(RO)/DEO/Chief Electoral Officer (CEO)/Commission) knows which button
on which BU will be assigned to which candidate, making even an attempt
to tamper absolutely futile.

➢ Till 2nd Randomization- no one knows which EVM will go to which PS

➢ Added to this is the 3 stage Randomization of polling station officials. 24

6. POLL DAY MOCK POLL

➢ Before start of actual poll, Mock

poll with at least 50 votes in the
presence of candidates/their
polling agents.

➢ Mock poll data is erased and

shown to the polling agents.

➢ The Presiding Officer issues

the Mock Poll Certificate with
signature of the
representatives of candidates.
25
 7. POLL DAY CHECKS

➢ Polling Agents
➢ Central Armed Police Force (CAPF),
Micro-Observers, Webcasting/CCTV
➢ Frequent visits (Sector Officers
/Senior officers/ Observers)
➢ 2 hourly reporting of votes polled
➢ Media

26
8. POLL CLOSURE & TRANSPORTATION

Poll Closed on EVM by pressing CLOSE button on CU

EVMs sealed in carrying cases & polling agents sign them

EVMs transported back to the reception centres under

armed escort. Candidates’ representatives are allowed
to follow them

27
9. SECURE STORAGE IN
STRONGROOMS TILL COUNTING

➢ Polled EVMs kept in strong room,

sealed in the presence of the
Candidates and Observer

➢ Facilitation for Candidates to watch

the Polled EVM Strong Room 24/7

➢ Starting from FLC of EVMs to

Counting of votes, EVMs are kept in
Strong-room with full 24/7 security

28
 10. STORAGE & SECURITY

• EVM warehouse/strongroom with only one entry point.

• Entry secured by a double lock system with District Election Officer (DEO) & Dy DEO,
each having custody of keys of one lock each.
• 24X7 Armed security.
• The opening & closing of EVM warehouse ONLY in presence of Political party
representatives- advance written intimation mandatory.
• Entire EVM/VVPAT stock managed by ECI through EMS

▪ Post Polling:
• Candidates allowed to put their own seals on locks.
• Two cordoned round-the-clock security for strong rooms having polled EVMs with
CCTV feed to Candidates Camping Area.
• The CAPF secures the innermost perimeter immediately outside the strong room and
the State Armed Police secures the outer perimeter.
• 24/7 security arrangement for unused EVMs/VVPATs also. 29
 11. COUNTING DAY PROTOCOL

• On the day of counting, strong room opened in the presence of

Candidates, RO and Observer under videography.

• Round-wise CUs are brought to the counting tables from

Strongrooms under CONTINUOUS CCTV Coverage.

• Unique ID number of the CU & the signed seals are verified and
shown to the polling agents.

• EVMs & VVPATs are stored back in Strong Room in the presence
of candidates/their representatives till the completion of the
Election Petition period.
30
ELECTION PETITION
PERIOD
REGISTERING COMPLAINT

31
ELECTION PETITION (EP) PERIOD

Election Petitions can be filed within 45 days of result declaration

EVMs & VVPATs remain under sealed conditions till EP position is

ascertained.
EVMs and VVPATs under EP, are kept under safe custody of
DEO (Strong Room) till final disposal of EP.

Remaining EVMs and VVPATs not in EP are now free for re-use.

32
DEBATE AROUND
EVMs-EXPLAINED!
CLARIFICATION OF ALL ISSUES

33
DEBATES AROUND EVM

Remotely
Vote
Altered
Hacked Stuffing
Control
EVM after Poll
Unit
Closure
Display Altered
software
Replaced code
International
Memory Microcon Comparison

Manipula troller or
tion Memory
chips
34
NO POSSIBILITY OF EVM HACKING

Hacking’ is unauthorised access to or control over computer network

security systems for some illicit purpose

In the case of ECI EVMs, the word ‘Hacking’ is not applicable for
following reasons:
➢ The EVM is a stand alone machine and is not connected to any
network through wire or wirelessly
➢ The Software (SW) in the OTP Microcontroller can neither be
read nor modified

35
 NO POSSIBILITY OF REMOTELY
ALTERED CU DISPLAY THROUGH
WIRELESS COMMUNICATION

➢ It is alleged this can be done by either replacing the original

display module with another display fitted with a wireless device
or inserting an extra circuit board which can communicate with
an external unit via a wireless device and tamper the result by
controlling the CU display used for declaring the result

➢ Such a modification would require unfettered access to the

EVM after FLC – Ruled out.

36
 MEMORY MANIPULATION RULED OUT

• It is alleged that voting data can be altered by

clipping a Memory Manipulator Integrated Circuit
(IC) to the memory chip where Vote data is stored.
This would need,
• Full and free access to CUs after the Polling is over-
Ruled Out !!
• Breaking the seals and locks of the strong room in
the presence of two layers of security plus the
representatives of the candidates camping near the
strong room- Ruled Out !!
37
 REPLACEMENT OF MICROCONTROLLER/MEMORY
CHIP or MOTHERBOARD BEFORE POLL/COUNTING
IMPOSSIBLE
Administrative Safeguards
• Chip replacement would require access to EVM Warehouses – Ruled Out
• Any chip replacement before FLC will get caught during FLC
• Chip Replacement after FLC would require access to Strong Rooms and
breaking of EVM Pink Paper seals– Ruled Out

Technical Security
• BUs and CUs communicate only amongst themselves and go into error
mode if connected to any other machine. Thus, any modified EVM (with
microcontroller /memory changed) would not be usable even if
someone is able to hypothetically bypass security arrangements and modify
EVM 38
 TAMPERED SOURCE CODE “TROJAN”
RULED OUT

• It is alleged that Trojan can be introduced in following

manner
• by reprogramming the chip, or
• by the chip manufacturer during fusing of the software.

• Re-programming Ruled Out as these are OTP chips.

• Code tampering by the chip manufacturer Ruled Out
as it will get caught during the code integrity check.

39
 NO POSSIBILITY OF VOTE STUFFING
AFTER POLL CLOSURE

Administrative safeguards
• Poll closed by pressing the “CLOSE” button on the CU after last vote,
Representatives of candidates who are present signs on the seals
• EVM seals checked on counting day

What if seals broken and votes stuffed while transporting?

• EVM does not accept any votes after CLOSE button pressed in CU

What if CLOSE button not properly pressed and Votes Stuffed while
transporting?
• Poll Closure time recorded in the PO’s diary and any votes polled in the EVM after
this time can be identified due to time stamping of key presses
40
DEFECTIVE VS
TAMPERED
41
 DEFECTIVE/NON-FUNCIONING VS
MANIPULATION/TAMPERED
Defective/Non-functioning Manipulation/Tampering
Dictionary meaning- ‘Failing to work or function properly’. Dictionary Meaning-'to interfere in an illegal & disruptive
manner or to make alterations or adjustments, especially
secretly so as to subvert an intended purpose or function'
EVMs/VVPATs being electronic gadgets, can become A tampered EVM must behave in a pre-defined and biased
defective due to a variety of reasons, including, inter alia, manner to favour a particular candidate and this partisan
ageing components, temperature, humidity conditions, behavior of the machine must be replicable/demonstrable.
breakage of plastic / moveable parts etc
Such defects or faults in EVMs are detected during First A tampered EVM must be able to hide the manipulations from
Level Check, EVM preparation process, mock poll before the the wide array of functionaries and processes for it to
start of actual poll and in very few cases during the poll. succeed .
All such defective EVMs are promptly removed from the No evidence of any incident of any EVM Tampering, ever,
election process and replaced with a fully functional EVM. has been produced.
No vitiation of poll process or votes possible. No wrong vote Only allegations, no substance!!!
is ever recorded even in a ‘defective’ EVM.
❖Only 1-2% EVMs become defective/non-functional during polls & replaced with fully functional Units. 42
❖However, No incident of EVM tampering ever found.
 DEFECTIVE EVM PROTOCOL

Defective EVMs
EVMs that fail to function due to any mechanical, structural or physical
defect like faulty switches, broken button, faulty connections etc. However,
these NEVER record Wrong Vote.

• EVMs are checked for defects during FLC, candidate setting, before start of poll
and during poll.

• Serial Numbers and defects of these EVMs are noted and EVMs are sent to the
manufacturers for analysis and repair.

• Manufacturers follow same security protocols during repair as they do for

manufacturing new EVMs. 43
Electronic Voting in Other
Countries
44
VARIOUS FORMS OF ELECTRONIC
VOTING/ INTERVENTIONS USED IN
OTHER COUNTRIES
Electronic Voter Identification
• 14 countries using some form of Electronic/biometric based voter identification
• Brazil, Venezuela, USA, Switzerland, Romania, Belgium, Lithuania, Mongolia,
Bhutan, Kyrgystan, Uganda, Namibia, Kenya, Jamaica.

Electronic Voting (Fully /Partially)

• 18 countries using electronic voting in some form through EVMs (Direct
Recording Machines- DRM), some with Paper Trail.
• India, Namibia, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy,
Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, USA, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela.

Electronic Counting
• 13 countries are using e-technology for counting of votes
• Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Belgium,
Australia, South Korea, Philippines, Mongolia, Bhutan, Namibia.
45
 Country Specific Details

Other countries using EVMs (DRMs):

Namibia, Nepal, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy,

Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, USA, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela

United States of America:

❖Currently, in the USA, the Direct Recording Machines (DRMs) are used in 27 states,
among which paper audit trails are used in 15 states. The other voting methods include:
Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems, Ballot Marking Devices, and the Punch Card Ballot.

46
Why Some Countries
Discontinued Electronic
Voting
47
ECI EVM Foreign EVM
Standalone Mostly networked
Manufactured in Premium PSUs Manufactured entirely by private entities
Verified and certified by an independent Technical No such robust and independent certification/
Experts Committee checks
Data is stored internally and not transferrable by Voting data recorded in the DRM is transferred by
any device means of Compact Disc (CD) etc
Full end to end security protocol and No such protocols, e.g. in Ireland
administrative safeguards for the use, storage,
transportation and tracking
Administrative and physical security as per legal No such legal framework, e.g. in Netherlands
framework across the country.
Voter verifiability and auditability of every vote Lack of such facility in the NEDAP machines- un-
cast Constitutional by German Supreme Court as lacked
public examinability 48
ASPERSIONS VS
CONFIDENCE
Between MAR-DEC 2017

49
 BHIND FINDINGS

Commission’s enquiry found 4 buttons of BU pressed in the following order and

VVPAT printed corresponding slips
Button no Symbol Name of Candidate

03 Handpump Raju Pal

04 Lotus SatyaDev Oanchori

03 Handpump Raju Pal

01 Hand Ambuj Shukla

It is pertinent to mention here that is it completely false to say that the

multiple times slips of lotus were printed during the demo on 31st March
as alleged 50
Between March-May 2017

120 Petitions Received

41 alleging wrong results

17 Related to SEC Evidence Sought from 24

Reply by 3 Evidence by none

51
 EVM CHALLENGE- 2017

• Commission organized an EVM Challenge on 3rd June 2017:

• All National and State Political Parties invited to participate in the Challenge.
• Parties allowed to pick EVMs/VVPATs of their choice from the 5 poll-gone States (Uttar
Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, Manipur), which were securely held in the
Strongrooms under 24*7 armed security.
• Parties given opportunity to demonstrate EVM manipulation/tampering in the votes
recorded in the EVMs/VVPATs of their choice, as variously alleged earlier.

• NO Political Party participated in the Challenge.

• Only 2 parties i.e. NCP & CPI-M reported to venue, ONLY TO UNDERSTAND THE
EVM PROCESS BETTER and were given detailed briefing.

• The credibility and integrity of ECI-EVMs has always remained perfectly intact and
unscathed. 52
 Aspersions in the 5 State Assembly
Elections Nov-Dec 2018:

Allegation/Aspersion Fact Action Taken

1. In Khurai (Madhya Pradesh) some reserve Violation of ECI instructions Returning Officer and
EVMs and VVPATs reached the strong for deposition of all Reserve Assistant Returning Officer
room 48 hours after the polling was EVMs/VVPATs on the same of Khurai were suspended.
completed. day
2. CCTV cameras and an LED display Due to power failure in the An additional LED screen,
installed outside the EVM strong room in area, the recording could not an inverter and a generator
Bhopal, MP did not function from 8.19 am be done. were installed in order to
to 9.35 am on 30th November, 2018- ensure continuous power
allegation of manipulations. supply
3. A Security personnel allegedly found using No manipulation in EVMs Sub-inspector of the 175th
Laptop outside EVM strong room in inside Strongroom possible by battalion of the BSF was
Bemetara district of Chhattisgarh. laptop outside the building. removed from duty
immediately. 53
 Aspersions in the 5 State Assembly
Elections Nov-Dec 2018:
Allegation/Aspersion Fact Action Taken
4. A sector officer with Reserve EVM Sector Officer night halt at a private EVM taken out of election
at a private hotel owned by a hotel-Violation of ECI instruction. system. Sector Officer
candidate in MP However all seals were intact, and the suspended.
Reserve EVM not used.

5. 1 EVM was alleged to be found at a Sector Officer had gone to her house, EVM taken out of election
candidate’s residence in Pali, which was close to the candidate’s system. The Sector Officer
Rajasthan house. Violation of ECI Instructions. was suspended and the
However all seals were intact, and the Returning Officer, Pali was
Reserve EVM not used. transferred.
6. After the polling, 01 reserve EVM Fallen from the jeep while Two officials, one Patwari
was found lying unclaimed on the transporting. Violation of secure EVM and one Inspector were
Highway Number 27 near Mugawali transportation protocol. suspended. The said EVM
village in Baran district (Kishanganj was immediately seized
Assembly) in Rajasthan. and taken out of election 54
PAST JUDGEMENTS

55
 JUDGEMENTS

❑Madras High Court 2001

“There is also no question of introducing any virus or bugs for the reason
that the EVMs cannot be compared to personal computers.”

❑Karnataka High Court 1999

‘This invention is undoubtedly a great achievement in the electronic
and computer technology and a national pride’.

❑Kerala High Court 2002

In one EP the High Court recorded its appreciation on the efficiency of the
mechanism of detecting votes cast by impersonators. Upheld by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2003
56
 Forensic Checking

❑Bombay High Court: Order dated 23.02.2018:

In EP No. 15 of 2014, the Bombay High Court ordered a detailed forensic
examination of the EVMs from CFSL, Hyderabad for checking any
manipulation etc. The CFSL report clearly ruled out any tampering,
alteration or manipulation in the EVMs, the report accepted by Hon’ble
High Court and petition dismissed.

57
 Hon’ble Supreme Court: Dismissed Ballot
Paper Request

❑ Order dated 22.11.2018:

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1332/2018, Nyaya Bhoomi & Anr Vs ECI,
Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the petition requesting for return to
Ballot paper system due to reservations and doubts expressed by many
political parties.

58
 High Court of Madhya Pradesh: Security and
storage protocol of EVMs by ECI endorsed

❑ Order dated 05.12.2018:

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 28016/2018 Naresh Saraf Vs ECI & Anr,
Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh expressed satisfaction at the
security and storage protocols for EVMs and VVPATs established by the
ECI and rejected petition to give directions for any changes.

59
VOTER VERIFIABLE
PAPER AUDIT TRAIL
(VVPAT)
60
 VVPAT

VVPAT- allows the voters to verify that

their votes are cast as intended. 61
 VVPAT

• Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail is an independent system, attached with the
Electronic Voting Machines, that allows the voters to verify that their votes are
cast as intended.

• When a vote is cast, the elector shall be able to view through the transparent
window of the VVPAT, the printed paper slip showing the serial no, name and
the symbol of the candidate of his choice.

• The slip is visible through the VVPAT window after which it automatically gets cut
and falls in the sealed drop box of the VVPAT.

• The life of printed VVPAT Slip is 5 years.

62
• Since June 2017, VVPATs are being used in all Elections.
 VVPAT Complaint – Rule 49MA

In case a voter complains of wrong printing by VVPAT:

• He will report to Presiding Officer

• Presiding Officer will take a declaration explaining that if found false he can be penalized.
• PO will then record in 17A and permit him to cast a ‘test vote’ in presence of PO and Polling
Agents
• If found false PO will record in 17A and 17C so that the test vote is not counted
• If found true then PO will stop poll and report to RO.

• Since the introduction of VVPATs, more than 18 crore voters have cast their votes
with full satisfaction & ONLY 1 (one) complaint recd u/r 49MA, which was also
FOUND TO BE FALSE.

63
 VVPAT RECOUNTING PROCESS

• Counting of votes according to Rule 56C of Conduct of Election Rules,1961.

• After announcement of result any candidate/ his agent may apply in writing to the RO for
counting of paper slips of VVPAT under Rule 56D.

• The RO shall pass a speaking order on whether the slip counting to be allowed.

• Till date, in 16 (Sixteen) instances RO has allowed slip counting since 2017. All counts
matched.

64
 VVPAT RECOUNTING PROCESS

• Since June 2017, 100% VVPAT coverage with EVMs done in all General & Bye elections
to the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies- Goa (Feb 2017), Gujarat, HP, Nagaland,
Meghalaya, Tripura, Karnataka, Mizoram, MP, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Telangana.
Only 1 complaint under 49MA, verified as per law, found incorrect & FIR lodged against
the complainant.

• Mandatory Verification of VVPAT slips of 1 (ONE) randomly selected PS per AC done in

all States- 100% match, as expected, was found.

• So far, VVPAT slip count done in 1500 randomly selected PS and all these counts
matched.

65
 Why Going Back to Ballot not a Solution

1. Retrograde step in the era of Technology when all transactions are done
with technology.

2. Average around 2000 invalid votes in each Constituency when ballots

used.

3. Vote stuffing was very easy with Ballot papers, muscle power used to
rule.

4. Counting of Ballot Papers was always prone to errors.

66
THANK YOU