THIRD DIVISION substitutes. It hired Renato Escarpe of Asian Terminals, Inc.

(ATI) as a crane operator and it

leased ATI's floating crane barge.[9]
[ G.R. No. 195887, January 10, 2018 ]
Thereafter, Ben Line repeatedly made demands for a refund from AALTAFIL and ACE Logistics
BEN LINE AGENCIES PHILIPPINES, INC., REP. BY RICARDO J. JAMANDRE, PETITIONER, V. but respondents refused to do so. Believing it was deceived into renting a less worthy crane,
CHARLES M.C. MADSON AND ALFREDO P. AMORADO, RESPONDENTS. Ben Line filed a complaint-affidavit against respondents before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). On 11 January 2008, the NBI issued a resolution recommending the
DECISION prosecution of respondents for estafa under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code.[10] The
MARTIRES, J.: case was forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 14 December 2010 Proceedings before the OCP and the DOJ
Decision[1] and 25 February 2011 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. In its 23 May 2008 Resolution,[11] the OCP issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of
115492 which affirmed the 15 February 2010[3] and 11 June 2010[4] Resolution of the the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. It opined that there was no misrepresentation in
Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 088-02516. Madson's claim that AALTAFIL owned the required crane. In addition, the OCP found that
THE FACTS respondents neither conspired nor employed machinations against Ben Line in increasing the
amount the latter would have to pay to lease its desired equipment. The resolution reads:
Petitioner Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. (Ben Line) is a domestic corporation engaged in
maritime business. On 19 September 2006, the vessel M/V Ho Feng 7, owned and operated Wherefore, from the foregoing the undersigned respectfully recommends the dismissal of
by Ben Line's foreign principal, had to discharge shipment consigned to La Farge Cement the instant case due to insufficiency of evidence.[12]
Services Philippines, Inc. (La Farge). As such, it needed to hire a crane capable of lifting heavy Aggrieved, Ben Line filed a petition for review before the DOJ.
shipment of approximately 70 metric tons.[5]
In its 25 February 2010 resolution, the DOJ denied Ben Line's petition for review. It noted
Ben Line inquired with AALTAFIL Incorporated whether the latter had the necessary that the petition for review failed to attach clear copies of the assailed resolution. It opined
machinery to handle the unloading of the former's shipment. Through its president, that Ben Line lost its right to appeal because of its failure to comply with the prevailing rules.
respondent Charles M.C. Madson (Madson), AALTAFIL offered its 300-ton crane and stated The resolution reads:
that it was capable of lifting the shipment from M/V Ho Feng 7. The equipment was initially
offered for P1,150,000.00.[6] WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.[13]

On 25 September 2006, Ben Line confirmed with AALTAFIL its intention to hire the crane. Ben Line moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the DOJ in its 11 June 2010
Madson, however, informed that the equipment had been leased to ACE Logistics, Inc. Due resolution. Undeterred, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
to the urgency of the situation, Ben Line contacted respondent Aflredo Amorado (Amorado),
president of ACE Logistics, who said that the crane was available for sub-leasing for the The CA Ruling
amount of P1,995,000.00 with an additional P400,000.00 to be paid directly to AALTAFIL In its 14 December 2015 decision, the CA dismissed Ben Line's petition for certiorari. The
should the radius be more than 16 meters. Thus, a crane rental contract was executed appellate court explained that the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of discretion because it
between Ben Line and ACE Logistics, and the former paid the full amount of P2,395,000.00 in merely applied the rules when it dismissed Ben Line's petition. It noted that Ben Line failed to
consonance with the payment terms agreed upon.[7] comply with Sections 5 and 6 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal after failing to attach clear
When Ben Line informed Madson that it had another small piece of cargo to be lifted, the and legible copies of the resolutions sought to be reviewed. The CA posited that the
latter demanded an additional P200,000.00 because the previously agreed amount covered circumstances did not warrant the relaxation of the rules of procedure. It ruled:
only the lifting of a single heavy cargo. Thus, the total consideration for the use of the crane ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.[14]
amounted to P2,595,000.00: P1,995,000.00 was paid to ACE Logistics and P600,000.00 was
paid directly to AALTAFIL.[8] Ben Line moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its assailed 25
February 2011 resolution. Hence, this present petition raising the following:
On 1 October 2006, the vessel was ready to discharge the cargo. Due to problems with the
crane operator and the crane itself, however, Ben Line was constrained to look for their ISSUES

I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE As a general rule, a petition lacking copies of essential pleadings and portions of the case
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 20 AUGUST 2010 AND IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR record may be dismissed. This rule, however, is not petrified. As the exact nature of the
RECONSIDERATION DATED 6 JANUARY 2011 OF PETITIONER BEN LINE AGENCIES pleadings and parts of the case record which must accompany a petition is not specified,
PHILIPPINES, INC.; AND much discretion is left to the appellate court to determine the necessity for copies of
pleading and other documents. There are, however, guideposts it must follow.
II
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
PETITION FOR REVIEW DATED 26 MARCH 2009 IS NOT MERITORIOUS ON ITS FACE.[15] whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition,
OUR RULING whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.
The petition is meritorious.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
Principally, the issues under the present petition for review before the Court are whether the appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also be found in another document
DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Ben Line's appeal only on procedural already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are
grounds. summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached.
Relevant to the issue is Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, which reads:
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given
Section 5. Contents of the petition. -The petition shall contain or state: (a) the names and due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted
addresses of the parties; (b) the investigation Slip Number (I.S. No.) and criminal case the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interests of justice that the case be
number, if any, and title of the case, including the offense charged in the complaint; (c) the decided on the merits. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
venue of the preliminary investigation; (d) the specific material dates showing that it was
filed on time; (e) a clear and concise statement of the facts, the assignment of errors, and the Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not belittle the compliance with the rules of
reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; and (f) proof of service of procedure. It recognizes that zealous observance of the rules is still the general course of
a copy of the petition to the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned. action as it serves to guarantee the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of
cases.[18] Nevertheless, the Court finds that the CA erred when it did not find the DOJ to have
The petition shall be accompanied by legible duplicate original or certified true copies of the acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Ben Line's petition for review.
complaint, affidavit/sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the parties during
the preliminary investigation/reinvestigation. Initially, the DOJ correctly acted when it dismissed Ben Line's petition for failure to attach
clear and legible copies of the appealed resolution of the OCP. However, it was remiss in its
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Ben Line initially failed to submit clear and legible duty to ensure that cases before it should be resolved on its merits when it denied Ben Line's
copies of the resolutions of the OCP when it filed its petition for review before the DOJ. motion for reconsideration. In accordance with the pronouncements of the Court in Air
Under Section 6 of the 2000 NPS rules, failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 Philippines and in order that the subtantial issues of the case be fully ventilated, the DOJ
constitutes sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Thus, the DOJ decided to dismiss Ben should have reinstated Ben Line's petition for review. It is noteworthy that in its motion, Ben
Line's complaint for failure to comply with Section 5. Line had already attached clear and legible copies of the resolutions appealed from. Further,
It must be remembered, however, that rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the it pointed out that the copies it initially attached in its petition for review before the DOJ
attainment of justice and that their rigid application resulting in techinicalities tending to were provided by the OCP.
delay or frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided.[16] In other words, The present case is comparable with Manila Electric Company v. Atilano (MERALCO)[19] where
procedural rules are set in place to ensure that the proceedings are in order and to avoid the Court ruled:
unnecessary delays, but are never intended to prevent tribunals or administrative agencies
from resolving the substantive issues at hand. In dismissing MERALCO's petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, the Secretary of Justice ruled that after carefully examining the
In Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora (Air Philippines),[17] the Court elucidated that mere petition and its attachments, no error on the part of the handling prosecutor was found to
failure to attach legible copies does not ipso facto warrant the dismissal of a complaint or a have been committed which would warrant a reversal of the challenged resolution. Thus, the
petititon, to wit:
December 17, 2002 DOJ resolution concluded that the challenged resolution was in accord In finding for herein petitioner, the Court does not necessarily rule on whether its version of
with the evidence and the law on the matter. events or legal arguments deserve more consideration than that of the respondents. It simply
corrects the DOJ's inordinate dismissal of Ben Line's petition for review where precisely these
xxx Issues could have been adequately and appropriately resolved.
We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 14 December 2010 Decision and 25 February
legal requirements when it stated its legal basis for denying MERALCO's petition for review 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 115492 are REVERSED and SET
which is Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Department of Justice for further review.
dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended
for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration. SO ORDERED.
IaHCAD

The DOJ resolution noted that MERALCO failed to submit a legible true copy of the
confirmation of sale dated May 30, 2000 and considered the omission in violation of Section
5 of Department Circular No. 70. MERALCO assails the dismissal on this ground as an overly
technical application of the rules and claims that it frustrated the ends of substantial
justice. We note, however, that the failure to attach the document was not the sole reason
of the DOJ's denial of MERALCO's petition for review. As mentioned, the DOJ resolution
dismissed the petition primarily because the prosecutor's resolution is in accord with the
evidence and the law on the matter. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In MERALCO, the DOJ did not only dismiss the petition for review on purely technical grounds
but also found that the resolution of the prosecution were in accord with the evidence and
the law. As such, the issues in the said case were fully ventilated at the DOJ level because not
only did it rule on procedural grounds, but it likewsie adressed subtantive matters. In the
case at bar, however, the DOJ imprudently dismissed Ben Line's petition for review merely on
procedural or technical grounds. It did not resolve the substantive or factual matters even
after Ben Line had substantially complied with the rule on appeal when it filed its motion for
reconsideration.

Nonetheless, respondents assail that the ruling of the Court in Lao v. Co, et al. (Lao)[20] should
be applied in this case. They highlight that the circumstances are similar in Lao where the
Court upheld the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari filed therein for failure of
the petitioner to attach clear and legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof.

A closer scrutiny of Lao, however, reveals that its factual circumstances are not at par with
the present controversy. In the case relied upon by respondents, there was no showing that
petitioner attempted to remedy its failure to attach clear and legible copies of the required
documents. In contrast, Ben Line attached clear and legible copies of the assailed OCP
resolution after its petition for review was initially dismissed by the DOJ. Thus, the guidelines
outlined in Air Philippines are more applicable in that a petition dismissed earlier, due to lack
of an essential pleading or part of the case record, may still be given due course or reinstated
upon showing that petitioner had later submitted the documents required, i.e., when such
documents required are part of a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
THIRD DIVISION preponderance of evidence. It also emphasized the fact that other than her bare allegation,
Papa never adduced any evidence regarding the payments she had allegedly made. The
[ G.R. No. 200469, January 15, 2018 ] MeTC, however, deemed it equitable to award interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, PETITIONER, V. JOSEPHINE L. PAPA, RESPONDENT. per annum only instead of the stipulated interest, penalty, and charges. The dispositive
portion of the MeTC Decision provides:
DECISION WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant
MARTIRES, J.: JOSEPHINE L. PAPA to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,000.00 plus interest at the rate of
12% per annum from February 9, 2006 until the whole amount is fully paid; the amount of
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 21 July 2011 P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and the costs.
Decision[1] and the 1 February 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 112611, which affirmed the 14 October 2009 Decision[3] and the 14 January 2010 Order SO ORDERED.[8]
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 09-545, which in Papa moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the MeTC in its Order, dated 14
turn reversed and set aside the 23 December 2008 Decision[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court May 2009.
of Makati City, Branch 65 (MeTC) in Civil Case No. 90987.
Aggrieved, Papa elevated an appeal before the RTC.
THE FACTS
The RTC Ruling
On 30 March 2006, petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) filed before the MeTC a
complaint[5] for collection of sum of money against respondent Josephine L. Papa (Papa). In In its decision, dated 14 October 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC decision.
its complaint, PSB alleged that Papa obtained a flexi-loan with a face amount of P207,600.00, The trial court ruled that PSB failed to prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the
payable in twenty-four (24) monthly installments of P8,650.00 with interest at 38.40% per existence and due execution of the promissory note. It opined that Papa's apparent
annum. For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note dated 26 July 2005. PSB further admission in her Answer could not be taken against her as, in fact, she denied any liability to
alleged that the promissory note provides additional charges in case of default, to wit: Three PSB, and she never admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note. It
percent (3%) late payment charge per month of the total amount until the amount is fully explained that the fact that Papa interposed payment as a mode of extinguishing her
paid; Twenty-Five percent (25%) Attorney's Fees, but not less than P5,000.00; Ten percent obligation should not necessarily be taken to mean that an admission was made regarding
(10%) liquidated damages, but not less than P1,000.00; and costs of suit. When the obligation the contents and due execution of the promissory note; specifically the amount of the loan,
fell due, Papa defaulted in her payment. PSB averred that as of 27 March 2006, Papa's total interests, mode of payment, penalty in case of default, as well as other terms and conditions
obligation amounted to P173,000.00; and that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to embodied therein. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
meet her obligation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision
On 26 October 2006, Papa filed her Answer.[6] She alleged that PSB had no cause of action dated December 23, 2008 in Civil Case No. 09-945 is reversed and set aside.
against her as her liability had already been extinguished by the several staggered payments
she made to PSB, which payments she undertook to prove. She likewise claimed that there SO ORDERED.[9]
was no basis for the interest and damages as the principal obligation had already been paid. On 10 November 2009, PSB filed its motion for reconsideration,[10] wherein it admitted that it
During the trial on the merits, PSB introduced in evidence a photocopy of the promissory received the copy of the 14 October 2009 RTC decision on 26 October 2009.
note,[7] which the MeTC admitted despite the vehement objection by Papa. Meanwhile, Papa In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa posited, among others, that the
chose to forego with the presentation of her evidence and manifested she would instead file RTC decision had already attained finality. Papa explained that although PSB filed the motion
a memorandum. for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears that service of the said motion was
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for made one (1) day late as PSB availed of a private courier service instead of the modes of
decision. service prescribed under the Rules of Court. As such, PSB's motion for reconsideration is
deemed not to have been made on the date it was deposited to the private courier for
The MeTC Ruling mailing but rather on 11 November 2009, the date it was actually received by Papa.

On 23 December 2008, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of PSB and against Papa. The In its Order, dated 14 January 2010, the RTC denied PSB's motion for reconsideration
MeTC was convinced that PSB was able to establish its cause of action against Papa by ratiocinating that its 14 October 2009 decision had already attained finality, among others.
Aggrieved, PSB filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court before ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE THEREBY FAILING TO ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE
the CA. AND EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.

In her comment,[11] Papa reiterated her position that the 14 October 2009 RTC decision had III.
already attained finality.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
The CA Ruling DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL RESULTING IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENT.[13]
In its assailed decision, dated 21 July 2011, the CA affirmed the 14 October 2009 decision and
the 14 January 2010 order of the RTC. Stated differently, PSB argues that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the RTC
decision had already attained finality; and that the appellate court erred when it ruled that it
The appellate court ruled that the RTC decision had already attained finality due to PSB's failed to prove its cause of action despite Papa's admission regarding the existence of the
failure to serve on Papa a copy of its motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period. loan.
The appellate court noted that in its motion for reconsideration, PSB did not offer any
reasonable explanation why it availed of private courier service instead of resorting to the OUR RULING
modes recognized by the Rules of Court.
PSB insists that it timely filed its motion for reconsideration. It stresses that the records of
The appellate court further agreed with the RTC that PSB failed to prove its cause of action. It the case would disclose that it personally filed the subject motion before the RTC on 10
concurred with the RTC that Papa made no admission relative to the contents and due November 2009, or the last day of the 15-day prescriptive period. PSB also claims that,
execution of the promissory note; and that PSB failed to prove that Papa violated the terms although it deviated from the usual mode of service as prescribed by the Rules of Court when
and conditions of the promissory note, if any. it served the copy of the aforesaid motion by private courier service, there was still effective
service upon Papa considering that she received the motion for reconsideration through her
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: counsel, on 11 November 2009, and nine (9) days prior to its intended hearing date.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch Additionally, PSB contends that the timeliness of the filing of the motion for reconsideration
65 dated 14 October 2009 and its subsequent Order dated 14 January 2010 denying should not be reckoned from the date of the actual receipt by the adverse party, but on the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in Civil Case No. 09-545 are hereby AFFIRMED in actual receipt thereof by the RTC, pointing out that filing and service of the motion are two
toto. With costs against the petitioner. different matters.

SO ORDERED.[12] PSB further argues that, notwithstanding the said deviation, a liberal construction of the rules
is proper under the circumstances and that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules
PSB moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated 1 especially when there appears a good and efficient cause to warrant such suspension.
February 2012.
These arguments deserve scant consideration.
Hence, this petition.
PSB is correct that filing and service are distinct from each other. Indeed, filing is the act of
THE ISSUES presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court; whereas, service is the act of
providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned.[14]
I.
Nevertheless, although they pertain to different acts, filing and service go hand-in-hand and
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT must be considered together when determining whether the pleading, motion, or any other
DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL BY REASON OF PURE TECHNICALITY THEREBY paper was filed within the applicable reglementary period. Precisely, the Rules require every
PREJUDICING THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO RECOVER THE UNPAID LOAN motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties
OF THE RESPONDENT. concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it,[15] effectively making such
II. motion as not filed.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT The kind of proof of service required would depend on the mode of service used by the
AFFIRMED THE LOWER COURTS DECISION DATED 14 OCTOBER 2009 ON THE GROUND THAT litigant. Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ITS CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN IT FAILED TO PRESENT THE
SECTION 13. Proof of Service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission Consequently, PSB failed to comply with the required proof of service by ordinary mail. Thus,
of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB's motion for reconsideration, which, for all intents and
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by purposes, can be effectively considered as not filed.
ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof Since PSB's motion for reconsideration is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the running of
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and considering that PSB's appeal
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu was filed only after the expiration of the 15-day period on 10 November 2009, such appeal
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by has not been validly perfected. As such, the subject 14 October 2009 decision of the RTC had
the postmaster to the addressee. [emphasis supplied] already attained finality as early as 11 November 2009.

In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as equivalent to filing by It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law
ordinary mail.[16] The Court opines that this pronouncement equally applies to service of and not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of
pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration
must attach an affidavit of the person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such or new trial is filed. The court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same
affidavit must show compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides: becomes final by operation of law.[19]

Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy At this juncture, the Court stresses that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial
in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his justice" or, in this case, "good or efficient case" is not a magic wand that will automatically
office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or the rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. [emphasis supplied] reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[20]
This requirement is logical as service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no
registry service exists either in the locality of the sender or the addressee.[17] This is the only Time and again, the Court has reiterated that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing
credible justification why resort to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the
allowed. prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.[21] While
procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools
In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration to Papa's designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the
counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of the interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules
person who sent it through the said private messengerial service. Moreover, PSB's with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked
explanation why it resorted to private courier failed to show its compliance with Rule 13, only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a
Section 7. PSB's explanation merely states: game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[22]
Greetings:
Considering that the RTC decision had already attained finality, there is no longer need to
Kindly set the instant motion on 20 November 2009 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning or soon discuss whether the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that PSB failed to prove its cause of
thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard. Copy of this pleading was served upon action. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
defendant's counsel by private registered mail for lack of material time and personnel to longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
effect personal delivery. [18] conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck
effective service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was not effected down.[23]
due to lack of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an acceptable reason why it WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 21 July 2011 Decision
resorted to "private registered mail" instead of by registered mail. In particular, PSB failed to and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112611
indicate that no registry service was available in San Mateo, Rizal, where the office of Papa's are AFFIRMED.
counsel is situated, or in Makati City, where the office of PSB's counsel is located.
THIRD DIVISION
In the Sheriff's Return,[9] dated 15 May 2009, Sheriff Muriel certified that on 11 May 2009, he
[ G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018 ] served the summons on Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a
INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT certain Amee Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a person of suitable age and discretion, who
OF APPEALS, STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN, introduced herself as one of the secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added that
RESPONDENTS. Ochotorina assured him that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.
He added that he had insisted that the summons be received personally by Bon Huan, but
DECISION Ochotorina refused and told him that Bon Huan was then attending to some business
matters.
MARTIRES, J.:
On 25 June 2009, Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default.[10] To this
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 17 May 2012 motion, respondent again entered a special appearance through Atty. Jacinto on 10 July
Decision[1] and the 6 September 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 2009. The respondents alleged that the second service of the summons was still defective
No. 116221, which nullified the 15 September 2010 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, because Ochotorina did not work for nor was connected with the office of the president of
Branch 167, Pasig City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 71732. Expressions, and that she was neither its president, managing partner, general manager,
THE FACTS corporate secretary, treasurer, nor its in-house counsel.[11]

In the Order,[12] dated 10 February 2010, the RTC granted the motion to declare defendants
in default and allowed Interlink to present evidence ex parte. The trial court was convinced
On 22 July 2008, petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink), represented by its that there was sufficient compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical
president, petitioner Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money entity considering that the summons was received by the assistant/secretary of the
and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a president. The trial court further stated that corporate officers are usually busy and as such,
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and summons to corporations are usually received only by assistants or secretaries of corporate
Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan).[4] Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the officers.
latter's unpaid rentals and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.
On 5 March 2010, the respondents, on special appearance through Atty. Jacinto, filed an
In the Sheriff's Return,[5] dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheriff omnibus motion wherein they prayed that the 10 February 2010 order be recalled. The
Muriel) of the RTC's Branch 167 certified that on 24 September 2008, he served the respondents insisted that the second service of summons did not vest upon the trial court
summons issued in the subject case, together with the copy of the complaint, on the jurisdiction over their persons.[13]
respondents at the office of the defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn
Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to forward the said In its Order,[14] dated 9 August 2010, the RTC denied the respondents' omnibus motion.
documents to her superior. Thereafter, Interlink proceeded with its ex parte presentation of evidence.

On 5 January 2009, Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their The RTC Ruling
failure to file their answer.[6]
In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to prove its
On 6 January 2009, respondents entered a special appearance through Atty. Generosa claims against Expressions and Bon Huan. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Jacinto (Atty. Jacinto)alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over them. They further prayed that Interlink's motion for WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants
declaration of default be denied.[7] ordering the latter to pay the former jointly and severally the following:

a. The sum of PhP600,000.00 for the unpaid use of the 1,000 square meters which
Thus, in its Order,[8] dated 2 March 2009, the RTC denied Interlink's motion to declare defendant has unlawfully occupied for (4) months at the rate of PhP150.00 per
defendants in default. The trial court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance square meter with the interest of 12% per annum from the time of filing of the
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such service defective. Thus, it complaint until full payment;
ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the respondents.
 b. The sum of PhP242,676.00 for the use of the leased premises from June to July
2008 with 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until
full payment; OUR RULING

c. The sum of PhP300,000.00 as actual damages;

d. Costs of suit. The appeal has no merit.

No valid service of summons

SO ORDERED.[15]
It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service
of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In the
Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court absence of service or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
before the CA.[16] defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered
against him is null and void.[18]
The CA Ruling
In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court
In its assailed decision, dated 17 May 2012, the CA annulled the RTC decision. The appellate acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted
court ruled that the second service of summons was still defective, and the trial court did not service of summons.[19]
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents, thus rendering the RTC decision
void. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states: Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.[20] If the defendant is a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 09 domestic private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner,
August 2010 and 10 February 2010 and the Decision dated 15 September 2010 of the general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.[21] It has been held that
Regional Trial Court, Branch 167 of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 71732 are REVERSED and SET this enumeration is exclusive.[22] Service on a domestic private juridical entity must,
ASIDE. therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.[23] If the service of summons is made upon persons other than those officers
Respondent court is instructed to issue alias Summonses on the defendants therein and to enumerated in Section 11, the same is invalid.[24]
direct the Branch Sheriff to serve the same in a valid and effective manner in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court. There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent Bon Huan is its president.
SO ORDERED.[17] Thus, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its
president, Bon Huan, or to its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further undisputed that the questioned second service of
summons was made upon Ochotorina, who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan,
Interlink moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its resolution, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of
dated 6 September 2012. summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court
jurisdiction over Expressions.
Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUE Even assuming arguendo that the second service of summons may be treated as a
substituted service upon Bon Huan as the president of Expressions, the same did not have
the effect of giving the trial court jurisdiction over the respondents.

WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS. defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such
cases, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, such failure would constitute voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with a in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to
competent person in charge.[25] Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual the court for resolution.
method of service, and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service,
parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons.[26] At first glance, the respondents may be seen to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the RTC. Indeed, said omnibus motion, which is essentially a motion to lift order of default,
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court held that before a sheriff may resort to prayed for an affirmative relief which would not be possible if the movant does not recognize
substituted service, he must first establish the impossibility of prompt personal service. To the jurisdiction of the court.
establish such impossibility, there must be at least three (3) attempts, preferably on at least
two different dates, to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one (1) Nevertheless, a reading of the said omnibus motion reveals that the respondents expressly
month or eventually result in failure. The sheriff must further cite why such efforts are stated that the said omnibus motion was filed on special appearance. Further, the
unsuccessful. respondents explicitly objected, in an equivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the
ground of invalid service of summons. Measured against the requirements enunciated
In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was not shown. The 15 May 2009 in Philippine Commercial International Bank, the Court is convinced that the respondents
sheriffs return reveals that Sheriff Muriel attempted to serve the second summons personally never recognized and did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the RTC. A party who makes a
only once on 11 May 2009. Clearly, the efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel were insufficient to special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of
establish that it was impossible to personally serve the summons promptly. Further, Sheriff invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that court.[33]
Ochotorina told him that Bon Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was
assured that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan. From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
respondents either by valid service of summons or by their voluntary appearance.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost Necessarily, the proceedings before the RTC in Civil Case No. 71732 are void with respect to
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious the respondents. Thus, the CA did not err when it nullified the 9 August 2010 and 10
dispensation of justice. They are enjoined to make their best efforts to accomplish personal February 2010 Orders, and the 15 September 2010 Decision of the RTC.
service on defendant.[28] Sheriff Muriel clearly failed to met this requirement.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The 17 May 2012 Decision and
No voluntary submission to the the 6 September 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116221
jurisdiction of the trial court are AFFIRMED.

It must be recalled that the respondents filed an omnibus motion to recall the trial court's SO ORDERED.
order granting Interlink's motion for declaration of default and for allowance of ex
parte presentation of evidence.

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.[29]Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit answer,
for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order
of default with motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission to the trial
court's jurisdiction.[30] This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance,
such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.[31]

As summarized by the Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy[32] a

special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance.
Such special appearance, however, requires that the defendant must explicitly and
unequivocably pose objections to the jurisdiction of the court over his person; otherwise,
THIRD DIVISION As for Norlina's defense, she argued that the charges were only meant to harass her and BDO
as the latter previously filed a criminal case against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their cohorts, for
[ G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018 ] theft, estafa, and violation of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devise
NORLINA G. SIBAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. ELIZABETH O. ALDA, THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN- Regulation Act of 1998.[7] The said case proceeded from the acts of Elizabeth and her co-
FACT, RUBY O. ALDA, RESPONDENT. defendants therein of withdrawing and laundering various amounts erroneously credited by
BDO to Ruby's Visa Electron Fast Card Account (Fastcard) with Account Number 4559-6872-
DECISION 3866-2036, which Elizabeth opened for and in the name of Ruby on April 21, 2006.[8]

VELASCO JR., J.: According to Norlina, when BDO merged with Equitable PCI Bank in May 2007, the former
acquired all of the latter's accounts, products and services, including the Fastcard, which
Nature of the Case functions the same way as a regular Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card but with an
added feature that allows its holders to withdraw local currencies from ATMs overseas
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court bearing the Visa Plus logo. Thus, using her Fastcard at various ATMs in Dubai, United Arab
assailing the October 25, 2016 Decision[1] and the August 9, 2017 Resolution[2] of the Court of Emirates, where she was based, Ruby was able to withdraw the funds sent to her by
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137921. The challenged rulings affirmed the June 9, 2014 and Elizabeth, who was then working in Taiwan.[9]
August 26, 2014 Orders[3] of the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OGCLS-BSP) denying herein petitioner Norlina G. Sibayan's Sometime in September 2008, BDO, however, discovered that from November 15, 2007 to
(Norlina) resort to modes of discovery in connection with an administrative case filed against September 20, 2008, Ruby was able to withdraw the total amount of Sixty Four Million Two
her. Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Seven and 50/100 Pesos
(P64,229,297.50) despite Elizabeth only having remitted the amount of One Million Six
The Facts Hundred Forty Five Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Six Pesos (P1,645,486). BDO conducted an
investigation and discovered that Ruby learned of the erroneous crediting of funds as early as
November 2007 and utilized BDO's system error to successfully launder money by
The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by respondent Elizabeth O. Aida (Elizabeth), transferring funds withdrawn from Ruby's Fastcard Account to various bank accounts in the
through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Ruby O. Aida (Ruby), with the Office of Special Philippines under the names of Elizabeth, Ruby and their friends and relatives.[10]
Investigation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OSI-BSP). Elizabeth charged Norlina, who was
then the Assistant Manager and Marketing Officer of Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO) San The foregoing facts were allegedly admitted by Ruby, as evidenced by her execution before
Fernando, La Union Branch, with unauthorized deduction of her BDO Savings Account with the Philippine Consulate in Dubai of certain documents in BDO's favor, to wit:
Account Number 0970097875, as well as for failure to post certain check deposits to the said
account.[4] 1. Undertaking with Authorization[11] dated October 21, 2008 promising to pay BDO the total
amount of money erroneously credited to her Fastcard account, including all charges, and
The complaint alleged that while Elizabeth did not make any withdrawals from her BDO authorizing BDO to setoff and apply as payment whatever monies or properties to her credit
savings account from 2008-2009, its balance of One Million Seventy One Thousand Five or account on the books of BDO or any other entity;
Hundred Sixty One and 73/100 Pesos (P1,071,561.73) as of July 22, 2008 was reduced to only
Three Hundred Thirty Four and 47/100 Pesos (P334.47) by October 31, 2008.[5] 2. Special Power of Attorney[12] dated October 22, 2008 authorizing BDO to setoff and apply
any money or other property on the books of BDO and/or other entities, banks, and financial
Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks, to wit: 1) United Coconut institutions under her mime or account for the payment of her obligation; and
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 0000005197 in the amount of Two Million Seven Hundred
Forty Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Six Pesos (P2,743,346) issued to her by Ferdinand 3. Deed of Dation in Payment[13] dated October 22, 2008 acknowledging her debt to BDO in
Oriente (Ferdinand), and 2) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0000002688 in the the amount of Php62,670,681.60 and conveying to BDO all of her interests, rights and title in
amount of Two Million Two Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Forty One and the properties described under the List of Properties[14] attached in the said Deed.
891100 Pesos (P2,237,341.89) issued to her by Jovelyn Oriente (Jovelyn) were not posted on
her BDO savings account despite the fact that the said checks were deposited on October 27, Included in the afore-stated List of Properties purportedly ceded by Ruby to BDO are the
2008.[6] following bank accounts:
Bank/Account Number Account Name deposit account may be examined or looked into if it is the subject matter of a pending
litigation. The phrase "subject matter of the action" pertains to physical facts, things, real or
BDO Account No. 0970097875 Elizabeth O. Alda personal, money, lands, chattels, and the like by which the suit is prosecuted. It does not
refer to the delict or wrong committed by the defendant.
UCPB Account No. 2351047157 Ferdinand Oriente
Hence, the Motion for Production of Bank Documents filed by the respondent is DENIED.
BPI Account No. 85890237923 Jovelyn Oriente
Request to Answer Written Interrogatories
Pursuant to the foregoing documents executed by Ruby, BDO debited Elizabeth's savings
account and the proceeds thereof were applied to Ruby's outstanding obligation to BDO. With respect to respondent's Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to Mr.
Thereafter, Ferdinand and Jovelyn, who are relatives of Elizabeth and Ruby, went to BDO San Ferdinand Oriente, Ms. Jovelyn Oriente, and Ms. Elizabeth Aida, the same is DENIED due to
Fernando, La Union branch and presented to Norlina the above-mentioned UCPB and BPI the fact that the aforementioned persons are all witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent
manager's checks, the proceeds of which were also purportedly applied as payment by Ruby will be afforded the right to confront these witnesses during the presentation of the
to BDO. prosecution's evidence. Moreover, this Office cannot compel Elizabeth Aida and Jovelyn
Oriente to answer the written interrogatories since they are out of the country as manifested
After the parties' submission of their respective pleadings, the OSI-BSP issued a by the prosecution.
Resolution[15] dated June 13, 2012 finding a prima facie case against Norlina for Conducting
Business in an Unsafe or Unsound Manner under Section 56.2[16] of Republic Act No. 8791 SO ORDERED.[22]
("The General Banking Law of 2000"), punishable under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 7653
Norlina's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the OGCLS-BSP in its August 26,
("The New Central Bank Act"). The OGCLS-BSP then directed Norlina to submit her sworn
2014 Order.[23]
answer to the formal charge filed by the OSI-BSP.
Assailing that the OGCLS-BSP committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her motions,
Meanwhile, on October 19, 2012, Norlina filed a Request to Answer Written
Norlina filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Interrogatories[17] addressed to Elizabeth, Jovelyn, and Ferdinand. Norlina also filed a Motion
for Production of Documents[18] praying that UCPB and BPI be ordered to produce and allow CA Ruling
the inspection and copying or photographing of the Statements of Account pertaining to
UCPB Account No. 2351047157 and BPI Account No. 85890237923, respectively, alleging that
Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of both accounts. In its October 25, 2016 Decision, the CA upheld the OGCLS-BSP's rulings, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The Orders of Public
Elizabeth, through Ruby, and Ferdinand filed their respective Objections[19] to Norlina's
Respondent dated June 9, 2014 and August 26, 2014 in Administrative Case No. 2012-047 are
request, while Jovelyn's counsel filed a Manifestation[20] stating that the former could not
hereby AFFIRMED.
submit her answer since she is working overseas.

OGCLS-BSP Ruling SO ORDERED.[24]

The CA found that the OGCLS-BSP did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
In its June 9, 2014 Order,[21] the OGCLS-BSP denied Norlina's motions, ruling as follows: Norlina's motion for the production of bank documents and requests to answer written
interrogatories. It highlighted the fact that the proceedings before the OGCLS-BSP is
Motion for Production of Bank Documents summary in nature and to grant Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution of the
case. The CA ruled that Norlina's persistence to utilize modes of discovery will be futile since
xxxx the information she supposedly seeks to elicit are sufficiently contained in the pleadings and
attachments submitted by the parties to aid the OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case before it.[25]
The respondent also alleged that the examination is exempted from the rule on secrecy of
bank deposit because the money deposited in the subject bank accounts is the subject Norlina then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its
matter of litigation. This Office rules otherwise. The present action is an administrative August 9, 2017 Resolution.
proceeding aimed at determining respondent's liability, if any, for violation of banking laws. A
 At the outset, it bears stressing that the proceeding involved in the present case is
Hence, the instant petition. administrative in nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of
the rules on evidence, the same does not hold true for administrative bodies. The Court has
The Issue consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact replicas
of those in administrative investigations.[30] Recourse to discovery procedures as sanctioned
Norlina anchors her plea for the reversal of the assailed Decision on the following grounds:[26] by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP. Hence, We cannot subscribe
to Norlina's tenacious insistence for the OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to the Rules of Court so
I. as not to purportedly defeat her rights.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the nature of the proceedings before the
THERE EXISTS NO SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER SIBAYAN'S OGCLS-BSP is summary in nature. Section 3, Rule 1 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on
REQUESTS TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES. Administrative Cases,[31] states:

A. REQUESTS. TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES MAY BE SERVED ON ANY PERSON, Section 3. Nature of Proceedings. - The proceedings under these Rules shall be summary in
INCLUDING WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, SUCH AS RESPONDENT ELIZABETH, nature and shall be conducted without necessarily adhering to the technical rules of
FERDINAND AND JOVELYN. procedure and evidence applicable to judicial trials. Proceedings under these Rules shall be
confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure to third parties, except as may be provided
B. PETITIONER SIBAYAN'S REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES ARE RELEVANT AND under existing laws.
MATERIAL TO THE CASE A QUO.
The rationale and purpose of the summary nature of administrative proceedings is to achieve
II. an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical
rules.[32] As such, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the
OGCLS-BSP, decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary
PETITIONER SIBAYAN IS ENTITLED TO THE PRODUCTION OF BANK DOCUMENTS PURSUANT evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. [33] To
TO SECTION 1, RULE 27 OF THE RULES OF COURT. require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the proceedings which could defeat
Succinctly put, the pivotal issue to be resolved is whether or not grave abuse of discretion its very purpose.
can be attributed to the OGCLS-BSP in denying Norlina's resort to modes of discovery.
In this light, OGCLS-BSP did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Norlina's request for
The Court's Ruling written interrogatories as the allowance of the same would not practically hasten, as it would
in fact delay, the early disposition of the instant case. We agree with the CA's discussion on
this matter, to wit:
We find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Further to grant the written interrogatories would merely delay the resolution of the issue
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in administrative brought before [the OGCLS-BSP]. The fraud purportedly executed by [Elizabeth], along with
investigations her daughter, her attorney-in-fact, assuming as true, is plain and clear from the records of
the case, specifically the Undertaking and Authorization allegedly executed by Ruby
Throughout the petition, Norlina persistently relies and quotes the provisions of the Rules of admitting the erroneous withdrawal of various amounts from her peso FAST CARD account,
Court[27] on modes of discovery and argues her right to utilize the same. To her eyes, the to wit:
denial of her requests to answer written interrogatories and motion for production of bank
documents deprived her of availing of the rightful remedies which shall bring to the fore xxxx
material and relevant facts for the OGCLS-BSP's consideration.[28] Thus, Norlina postulates
that the OGCLS-BSP would now be forced to resolve the case against her in an arbitrary In Our minds, the defense of fraud[,] is sufficiently contained in the pleadings and
manner.[29] attachments of the parties as to aid the Public Respondent in resolving the case before it.

We disagree. We note that at the time of resolution of [Norlina's] motions, Jovelyn Oriente, one of the
persons requested to answer the written interrogatories, was already out of the country.
While her deposition may nevertheless be taken outside of the country, the same will "The essence of due process is to be heard." In administrative proceedings, due process
definitely delay the resolution of an otherwise summary case.[34] entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of Administrative due process cannot be
Additionally, the denial of the motion for production of bank documents pertaining to 1) fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-
UCPB Account No. 2351047157 and 2) BPI Account No. 85890237923[35] is justified as the type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
bank accounts sought to be examined are privileged. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405, applied."
otherwise known as The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit, provides:
As established by the facts, Norlina was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to explain
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the her side before the OGCLS-BSP. She was allowed to submit her answer and all documents in
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its support of her defense. In fact, her defense of fraud committed by Elizabeth and Ruby is
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely sufficiently contained in the pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid the
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case before it.
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in
cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction Evidently, the information sought to be elicited from the written interrogatories, as well as
of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject the bank documents, are already available in the records of the case. As correctly pointed out
matter of the litigation. by the CA, the grant of Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution of the case. In
Norlina contends, however, that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of the foregoing fine, the OGCLS-BSP's issuance of the assailed orders did not violate Norlina's right to due
accounts and that the latter gave her permission to look into the said accounts as stated in process and was in accord with the summary nature of administrative proceedings before the
the Undertaking with Authorization,[36] Special Power of Attorney,[37] and Deed of Dation in BSP. The opportunity accorded to Norlina was enough to comply with the requirements of
Payment[38] executed by her in BDO's favor. due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually attendant in court hearings
need not be present in an administrative investigation, as long as the parties are heard and
We are not convinced. given the opportunity to adduce their respective sets of evidence.[43]

Records show that the account holder or depositor of UCPB Account No. 2351047157 is Further, even assuming that the pleadings and attachments on record are not sufficient for
Ferdinand Oriente while the account holder or depositor of BPI Account No. 85890237923 is the just resolution of the case against Norlina, the facts, arguments, and defenses put
Jovelyn Oriente.[39] Perforce, the documents executed by Ruby purportedly granting BDO forward in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the information Norlina seeks to obtain
access to the foregoing accounts do not equate to Ferdinand and Jovelyn's permissions. from Elizabeth, Ruby and other witnesses, may be brought to light in a clarificatory hearing
Based on this alone, the denial for Norlina to gain access to these bank accounts is under Section 7 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on Administrative Cases,[44] to wit:
warranted. Section 7. Hearing. - After the submission by the parties of their position papers, the Hearing
Panel or Hearing Officer shall determine whether or not there is a need for a hearing for the
Clearly then, the Requests to Answer Written Interrogatories and Motion for Production of purpose of cross examination of the affiant(s).
Documents were both unnecessary and improper.
If the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer finds no necessity for conducting a hearing, he shall
Norlina was not denied due process of law issue an Order to that effect.

Norlina bemoans that by suppressing her right to avail of discovery measures, the OGCLS-BSP In cases where the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer deems it necessary to allow the parties
violated her right to due process. She maintains that the administrative character of the to conduct cross-examination, the case shall be set for hearing. The affidavits of the parties
proceedings involved is not sufficient to defeat such right.[40] and their witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimony.

Norlina's claims are without merit. All told, the denial of Norlina's motions to resort to modes of discovery did not, and will
definitely not, equate to a denial of her right to due process. It must be stressed that
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial Norlina's fear of being deprived of such right and to put up a proper defense is more
sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him imagined than real. Norlina was properly notified of the charges against her and she was
is decided.[41] This was further expounded in the recent case of Prudential Bank v. given a reasonable opportunity to answer the accusations against her. As correctly ruled by
Rapanot,[42] viz: the lower tribunals, Norlina's attempt to resort to modes of discovery is frivolous and would
merely cause unnecessary delay in the speedy disposition of the case.

Thus, no error or grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the OGCLS-BSP in not granting
Norlina's plea for written interrogatories and production of bank documents. Absent any
showing that the OGCLS-BSP had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such
grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the present case, its
orders dispensing with the need to resort to modes of discovery may not be corrected
by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
October 25, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 137921 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 that judgment be rendered declaring her entitled to redeem the said lot, at the price of
THIRD DIVISION P60,000.00.

[ G.R. No. 196598, January 17, 2018 ] On their part, respondents asserted that prior to the actual sale of Lot 2429, Editha knew that
EDITHA B. ALBOR, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NERVA MACASIL JOINED BY HER the selling price was P600,000.00 and not P60,000.00, as misleadingly alleged in her
HUSBAND RUDY MACASIL AND NORMA BELUSO, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND NOLI BELUSO, complaint. Respondents stated that on 21 April 1997,[6] a certain Atty. Alejandro Del Castillo,
RESPONDENTS. together with Eva Gardose-Asis, representing the heirs of Rosario, conferred with Editha and
her son Bonifacio Albor about the impending sale of Lot 2429. During the conference, Editha
DECISION was apprised of her right of preemption, and Lot 2429 was offered to her for the price of
P600,000.00. This notwithstanding, Editha did not exercise her preemptive right to buy the
MARTIRES, J.: lot; consequently, the sale was consummated between the heirs of Rosario and respondents
on 6 June 1997.
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside
the 24 September 2009[1] and 15 February 2011[2] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in Respondents further claimed that Editha was well-informed in writing regarding the sale of
CA-G.R. SP No. 03895. The assailed CA Resolutions dismissed herein petitioner Editha B. Lot 2429. They alleged that Felisa Aga-in and Teresita Gardose, acting in behalf of the other
Albor's (Editha) appeal from the 8 October 2008 Decision[3] of the Department of Agrarian heirs of Rosario, executed a notice, dated 16 March 1998, informing Editha that respondents
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 13162, for having been filed out of were interested in buying Lot 2429; and that if she so desired, she could still repurchase the
time. property from respondents.
ANTECEDENTS
Finally, respondents averred that they sent Editha a written demand for payment of rentals
reckoned from 1998. Instead of complying, Editha instituted the complaint for redemption.
Editha was the agricultural lessee of a 1.60 hectare riceland portion and a 1.5110 hectare Accordingly, respondents prayed for collection of back rentals, termination of the agricultural
sugarland portion of Lot 2429 located at Barangay Dinginan, Roxas City. Lot 2429 was leasehold agreement, moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-108 (522),[4] registered in the name of
Rosario Andrada (Rosario), married to Ramon Gardose. As agricultural lessee, Editha had In its 30 June 2003 decision,[7] the PARAD found that Editha was not properly notified of the
been paying rent to the agricultural lessors, the heirs of Rosario. On 22 September 2000, the sale. It observed that the 16 March 1998 notice which respondents presented failed to
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Roxas City, invited Editha to appear before the indicate the terms and particulars of the sale. As such, it ruled that Editha's right of
MARO office on 20 October 2000. Editha heeded the invitation and there met respondents redemption did not prescribe for want of a valid written notice.
who informed her that they had purchased Lot 2429 from the heirs of Rosario. No Deed of
Sale, however, was shown to Editha. While the PARAD sustained Editha's right of redemption, it nevertheless resolved to dismiss
her complaint after finding that only P216,000.00 was consigned as redemption price. Citing
On 7 November 2000, Editha was able to obtain from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial jurisprudence on the matter, the PARAD opined that tender of payment must be for the full
Court (RTC) in Roxas City, a document entitled "Extra-Judicial Settlement with Deed of Sale," amount of the repurchase price; otherwise, the offer to redeem would be held ineffectual. It
purportedly executed by the heirs of Rosario. It appears that on 6 June 1997, the heirs of noted that in the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale which Editha herself procured, the
Rosario adjudicated unto themselves Lot 2429 and thereupon sold the same to respondents purchase price stated was P600,000.00, and that such price was never disputed. Hence,
for P600,000.00. Asserting that she had the right to redeem Lot 2429 from respondents, absent evidence to the contrary, there can be no doubt that P600,000.00 was the actual
Editha lodged a complaint for redemption of landholding and damages before the Provincial amount that respondents paid for Lot 2429. The decretal portion of the PARAD's decision
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). reads:

In the main, Editha alleged that under Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,[5] as WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:
amended by R.A. No. 6389, she had the right to redeem Lot 2429 within 180 days from notice 1) DISMISSING the complaint for redemption;
in writing of the sale which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and on the
Department of Agrarian Reform upon registration of the sale. Considering that the said
extrajudicial settlement with deed of sale had not yet been registered with the Register of
Deeds of Roxas City, her 180-period for redemption did not commence. Thus, she prayed
2) ORDERING the defendants, their agents or representatives and any other persons acting appearance. Editha signified her conformity to the motion to withdraw as counsel.
for and in their names to maintain the complainant and the immediate members of her
family in peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the subject land; On 9 December 2008, Editha's new counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Y. Samillano (Atty. Samillano),
filed with the CA a notice of appearance[11] and at the same time moved for an extension of
thirty (30) days, or from 10 December 2008 until 9 January 2009, within which to file the
petition for review. The second motion for extension of time was grounded on heavy
3) ORDERING the complainant to pay the defendants ONE HUNDRED (101) CAVANS of
workload and the need for more time to study the case.
clean palay as back rentals for the riceland portion and TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P2,500.00) PESOS as back rentals for the sugarland portion representing the rentals in
Eventually, Editha's petition for review was filed on 5 January 2009.
arrears for agricultural crop years 1998-1999 to 2001-2002, and thereafter, 50 cavans of
palay and P1,000.00 pesos annually until the execution of this decision;
The Assailed CA Resolutions

In the assailed resolution, dated 24 September 2009, the CA dismissed Editha's petition for
4) ORDERING the parties to seek the assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform review for having been filed out of time. The appellate court ratiocinated that while it may
through its Municipal Office concerned and execute an agricultural lease contract over grant Editha's first motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition,
the subject land; it was devoid of authority to grant her second motion for extension which asked for an
additional time of thirty (30) days.

Editha filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the CA in its 15
5) DIRECTING the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Provincial and/or Municipal February 2011 resolution. Both resolutions denying Editha's petition for review were
Offices to initiate and conduct mediation between the parties, assist them in the anchored on Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, viz:
determination and fixing of agricultural lease rentals and in the execution of agricultural
lease contract; and Section 4. Period of appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
6) DIRECTING further the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Provincial and/or
agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion
Municipal Offices to conduct a survey on the sugarland portion for the determination of
and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the
its exact area in aid of their fixing of rentals.
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days
only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
All claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence. for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

In her bid to undo the CA resolutions, Editha comes before this Court via a Rule 65 petition
SO ORDERED.[8]
for certiorari.
Aggrieved, Editha filed an appeal before the DARAB. On 10 November 2008, Editha's
ISSUE
erstwhile counsel, Atty. Fredicindo A. Talabucon (Atty. Talabucon), received a copy of the
DARAB's 8 October 2008 decision which affirmed in toto the PARAD's ruling.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING EDITHA'S PETITION FOR REVIEW FOR
On 25 November 2008, Editha filed before the CA a motion for extension of time[9] to file a HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
Rule 43 petition for review. She prayed for an additional fifteen (15) days, or from 25
November 2008 until 10 December 2008. OUR RULING

Shortly thereafter, on 3 December 2008, a motion to withdraw as counsel,[10] dated 28

Editha's petition fails.
November 2008, was filed by Atty. Talabucon. It was alleged that Editha decided to engage
the services of another counsel and for said reason, Atty. Talabucon was withdrawing his
Editha availed of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing her case before this Court.
 to finish drafting the petition for review in just one (1) day before the expiration of the 15-
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under day extension granted by the CA. In this accord, Editha contends that the filing of the second
Rule 45; and such is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. motion for extension of time was justified; and that the CA's dismissal of her petition for
As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in review impinged on her substantive right to due process.
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which in essence is a continuation of the The arguments proffered are specious and deserve scant consideration.
appellate process over the original case.[12]
It is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks
On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is a limited form of review and is a to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting
remedy of last recourse.[13] It is an independent action that lies only where there is no appeal an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari will issue they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the
only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory
conclusions of the lower court.[14] As long as the court a quo acts within its jurisdiction, any but jurisdictional as well.[21] The failure to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court
mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the judgment.[22]
the Rules of Court.[15]
It bears stressing that the statutory nature of the right to appeal requires the appealing party
The 24 September 2009 and 15 February 2011 resolutions of the CA were final and to strictly comply with the statutes or rules governing the perfection of an appeal, as such
appealable judgments. In particular, the resolution dated 24 September 2009 dismissed statutes or rules are instituted in order to promote an orderly discharge of judicial business.
Editha's Rule 43 petition for review, while the resolution dated 15 February 2011 denied her In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, the statutes
motion for reconsideration of the earlier resolution. The assailed resolutions disposed of or rules should remain inviolable.[23]
Editha's appeal in a manner that left nothing more to be done by the CA with respect to the
said appeal.[16] Hence, Editha should have filed an appeal before this Court by way of a The Court quotes the relevant portion of Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court:
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[17]
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the
Editha received the 15 February 2011 resolution denying her motion for reconsideration on expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
28 February 2011. Under the rules, she had until 15 March 2011 to file a petition for review fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
on certiorari with this Court. Editha allowed the period to lapse without filing an appeal and, be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
instead, filed this petition for certiorari on 29 April 2011. Certiorari is not and cannot be The provision is straightforward. While the CA enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in granting
made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through a first motion for extension of time, its authority to grant a further or second motion for
fault or negligence.[18] Where the rules prescribe a particular remedy for the vindication of extension of time is delimited by two conditions: First, there must exist a most compelling
rights, such remedy should be availed of.[19] Accordingly, adoption of an improper remedy reason for the grant of a further extension; and second, in no case shall such extension
already warrants outright dismissal of this petition.[20] exceed fifteen (15) days.

Even if the Court looks beyond Editha's procedural misstep, her petition must fail. So narrow is the discretion accorded to the CA in granting a second extension of time that
the word "most" was utilized to underscore the compelling reason demanded by the rule.
Editha imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA and argues that it was too Editha maintains that the filing of the second motion for extension of time was prompted by
technical and constricted in applying the rules of procedure. She insists that Section 4, Rule the sudden withdrawal of her previous counsel. The CA, however, did not appreciate such
43 of the Rules of Court admits of an exception, as the said provision states that a second predicament as a most compelling reason to grant her plea for further extension of time. On
extension may be granted for compelling reason. this score, the Court similarly finds no compelling reason to deviate from the sound
conclusion of the CA.
Editha posits that there is a compelling reason to grant a second extension of time because
on 3 December 2008, Atty. Talabucon suddenly withdrew as her counsel. It was only on 9 Editha's situation is not unique. In Spouses Jesus Dycoco v. CA,[24] petitioner-spouses (Sps.
December 2008 that she hired a new counsel, Atty. Samillano. Having just entered the Dycoco) received on 3 April 2000, a copy of the DARAB decision they sought to assail. Thus,
picture, Atty. Samillano needed more time to study the case, and he could not be expected the Sps. Dycoco had until 18 April 2000 to file an appeal. They filed a motion in the CA
praying for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file their intended petition. The need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case. They should give the
CA granted them an extension of fifteen (15) days, or until 3 May 2000 to file their petition. necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. [30]
Despite the extension, the Sps. Dycoco filed their petition by registered mail only on 8 May
2000. Not surprisingly, their petition was denied due course and dismissed by the CA. [25] Apropos, even if the Court were to believe that Atty. Talabucon's withdrawal was "sudden"
as alleged by Editha, it cannot be gainsaid that the corresponding motion to withdraw as
Like Editha, the Sps. Dycoco erroneously elevated their case to the Court via a Rule 65 counsel was filed with at least seven (7) days remaining from the 15-day extension granted
petition for certiorari. Seeking liberality, the Sps. Dycoco contended that their appeal was by the CA. Ordinary prudence should have impelled Editha to seek the assistance of a new
filed after the extension granted by the CA because, on 10 April 2000, they secured the counsel immediately after signing her conformity to Atty. Talabucon's motion to withdraw as
services of a new counsel who still had to study the voluminous records. In dismissing the counsel. Yet, regrettably, she hired her new counsel only one (1) day before the expiration of
Sps. Dycoco's petition for certiorari, the Court held that: the 15-day extension granted to her. Hence, for failure to exercise vigilance in the
prosecution of her case, Editha must be prepared to accept whatever adverse judgment may
Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament when they decided to change horses in be rendered against her.
midstream and engaged the services of their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week
before the expiration of the period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the services Finally, even on the merits, Editha's petition has no leg to stand on.
of their former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial Adjudicator to
the DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of Both the PARAD and the DARAB found that Editha only consigned the amount of P216,000.00
their new counsel for more time to study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the as redemption price for Lot 2429. As aptly observed in the PARAD's decision, it was Editha
case.[26] herself who secured a copy of the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale from the Clerk of
Court of the RTC in Roxas City. The purchase price stated in the deed of conveyance was
In juxtaposition, it was alleged in the motion to withdraw as counsel that Editha had decided P600,000.00, and the administrative tribunals correctly held that absent sufficient evidence
to engage the services of another counsel; and that for said reason, Atty. Talabucon was to the contrary, it must be accepted the reasonable price of the land as purchased by the
withdrawing his appearance. The Court notes that the motion to withdraw as counsel bore respondents.
Editha's signature[27] which signified her conformity. At this point, the striking parallelism
between the present petition and the case of the Sps. Dycoco becomes manifest. The records The full amount of the redemption once should be consigned m court.[31] As explained
reveal that it was Editha herself who caused her predicament. As such, her petition for in Quiño v. CA:
certiorari cannot escape the same outcome entered by the Court in Spouses Jesus Dycoco v.
CA. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption
Also, it may be well to recall the Court's pronouncement in Cesar Naguit v. San Miguel without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the
Corp.[28] The petitioner Cesar Naguit (Naguit) failed to timely file before the CA his petition repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by
for certiorari against an adverse decision rendered by the National Labor Relations speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
Commission. In his Rule 45 petition for review, Naguit invoked liberality in the construction of contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-
the rules. He argued that the CA should not have dismissed his petition by simply denying his economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price
motion for extension of time to file the same. To support his plea, Naguit asserted that due would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time.[32]
to the unavailability of his former lawyer, he retained the services of a new counsel who had
a heavy workload; and that the records were forwarded to the latter only a week before the The redemption price Editha consigned falls short of the requirement of the law, leaving the
expiration of the period for filing of the petition with the CA.[29] Court with no choice but to rule against her claim.

The Court, unconvinced by Naguit's explanation, reiterated: In fine, there is an abundance of reasons, both procedural and substantive, which has proved
fatal to Editha's cause.[33]
Suffice it to say that workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient
reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed CA Resolutions in CA-G.R.
SP No. 03895 are hereby AFFIRMED.
In addition, it is also the duty of petitioner to monitor the status of his case and not simply
rely on his former lawyer whom he already knew to be unable to attend to his duties as SO ORDERED.
counsel. It is settled that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
EN BANC On November 11, 2011, ROTA, though its counsel, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution[7] in Civil Case No. 10-826 (when defendant Miradora Mejia failed to comply with
[ A.M. No. P-17-3639 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4314-P), January 23, 2018 ] the terms and condition of the Decision dated November 12, 2010). The motion was granted
MA. CECILIA FERMINA T. ROXAS, COMPLAINANT, V. ALLEN FRANCISCO S. SICAT, SHERIFF III, by the trial court on March 9, 2012.[8] On March 12, 2012, the Writ of Execution[9] was issued;
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ANGELES CITY, ordering respondent Sheriff Sicat to cause the execution of the judgment, to levy on the
PAMPANGA, RESPONDENT. goods and chattels of the defendant. After seven months, respondent issued a Levy on
Execution/Attachment Replevin dated October 30, 2012, attaching a real property with a
DECISION land area of 10,841 square meters located in Magalang, Pampanga. The subject property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 502474-R (and registered in the names of
PER CURIAM: defendant Renato Nunag and his wife Juanita Nunag). Complainant stated that after more
than a year of persistent follow-up, respondent finally issued the Notice of Sheriff's Sale
On July 17, 2014, complainant Ma. Cecilia Fermina T. Roxas, Manager and Corporate dated November 4, 2013 and set the Sheriff's Sale on December 10, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.
Secretary of ROTA Creditline Finance Corporation (ROTA), filed a letter-complaint[1] with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)-Legal Office against respondent Allen Francisco S. Complainant narrated that when respondent learned that the property being auctioned for
Sicat, Sheriff III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities(MTCC), Angeles bidding was a resort, he expressed interest to purchase it. Complainant told respondent that
City, Pampanga, charging him with gross inefficiency and gross misconduct relative to Civil he cannot do so because of conflict of interest. In order that respondent would not be able to
Case No. 10-826, entitled ROTA Creditline Finance Corp. v. Arnold Cruz, et al. purchase the property, complainant increased the bid price to P2 million. Respondent issued
the Certificate of Sale at the bid price of P200,539.63, which was the principal amount in the
Complainant Roxas stated that ROTA, a financial institution, has been filing collection cases in Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court on November 12, 2010. Complainant
the courts of Angeles City, Pampanga. Whenever its cases are decided in its favor, ROTA stated that the price was damaging to her, because the outstanding balance of the loan as of
would acquire properties through judicial/extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings. the date of redemption on January [14], 2015 was P715,223.57. Complainant said that
Complainant, as ROTA's manager, would often deal with court personnel, particularly respondent did not ask her the outstanding balance of the loan before the auction sale.
sheriffs, who would frequently ask ROTA for grease money or padulas before they would
serve summonses and other court processes. She claimed that these sheriffs would ask for Moreover, complainant stated that respondent delayed the issuance of the Certificate of
P1,000.00 supposedly to answer for their transportation and meal allowance even though Sale, which she had annotated on the title of the property without reading that the sale price
these expenses are already covered by the Sheriff's Trust Fund. Moreover, sheriffs have been was only P200,539.63. When she received the certified true copy of the title, that was the
observed to report to the office at 11:00 a.m. and they would leave at 3:00p.m. They were only time she saw that the sale price of the said property was only P200,539.63, so she called
sometimes spotted loitering inside Marquee Mall during office hours. They are often respondent's attention to the fact that the outstanding balance of the loan was P715,223.57.
observed to be grossly inefficient in performing their job. Respondent told her that she should have her lawyer amend the Writ of Execution and that
she should send another formal offer. On March 3, 2014, she sent another formal offer with
The complaint against respondent stemmed from Civil Case No. 10-826 for a sum of money a bid price of P720,000.00, since the outstanding balance of the loan was P715,223.57.
filed by ROTA against Arnold Cruz, Renato Nunag and Miradora Mejia before the MTCC, Complainant stated that she was disappointed, because respondent has not issued a new
Branch 2, Angeles City, presided by Judge Katrina Nora S. Buan-Factora. During the mediation Certificate of Sale for the amendment of the annotation on the title of the property.
proceedings of the said case on September 30, 2010,[2] only Ricky Dizon, plaintiff ROTA's
representative, and defendant Miradora Mejia appeared. They entered into a Compromise In his Comment[10] dated October 14, 2014, respondent Sheriff Allen Francisco S. Sicat stated
Agreement,[3] which stipulated that defendants' obligation to the plaintiff is P200,539.00 to that based on the Decision of the MTCC, the amount of the judgment obligation was
be paid in installment at P12,000.00 a month; and in the event that the defendants fail to pay P200,539.63 and there was no stipulation of interest. He explained why the implementation
two monthly installments due, the remaining obligation shall become demandable and the of the writ of execution was delayed. Despite diligent efforts, no available personal
plaintiff is entitled to the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the properties could be found in the name of the defendant (Miradora Mejia) in the writ of
Compromise Agreement. The hearing on the approval of the Compromise Agreement was set execution. Complainant's representative, Ricky Dizon, also informed him that the said
on November 11, 2010.[4] In the hearing of November 11, 2010, only Ricky Dizon and defendant asked for additional time to amicably settle the obligation. When defendants
Miradora Mejia were present and they were the only signatories in the Compromise failed to fulfill their promise to settle the obligation after a reasonable period of time,
Agreement.[5] Miradora Mejia affirmed before the court that she understood and agreed that plaintiff ROTA, through Ricky Dizon, again requested the enforcement of the writ of
she was the only one bound by the Compromise Agreement. On November 12, 2010, the trial execution against the real property of defendant Renato Nunag.
court rendered a Decision[6] approving the Compromise Agreement and ordered the parties
to strictly comply with the terms and conditions thereof.
On October 30, 2012, a Levy on Execution[11] of real property was filed before the Office of by Angelino Felix, Clerk; Rodrigo Malit, Purok Leader; Hon. Jummel Malonzo, Brgy. Captain;
the Register of Deeds for Angeles City. Thereafter, defendant Nunag requested plaintiff- and Ernesto Dionisio, Brgy. Sec. On November 29, 2013, Minutes of the Auction Sale was
complainant for additional time to settle the amount of P200,539.63. Upon learning that issued wherein Ricky Dizon was present and lone bidder of the property sold at
defendants failed to fulfill their promise, respondent issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale [12] dated Php200,539.63 pesos. On record, there are two bid price in the sum of Php2,000,000.00 and
November 4, 2013, setting the auction sale on November 29, 2013. (However, the records Php 720,000.00 the latter offer of bid which was received on March 3, 2014. On January 14,
show, particularly the undated Certificate of Sale[13] and the Certificate of Final Sale[14] dated 2014, [a] Certificate of Sale was issued by Sheriff Allen and it was annotated in the
January 14, 2015, that the auction sale was conducted on November 4, 2013.) Memorandum of Encumbrance on same date with the showing of the assessment form; and
thereafter on January 14, 2015, a Certificate of Final Sale was likewise issued.
Respondent stated that defendant (Miradora Mejia) failed to attend the auction sale despite
due notice. Complainant Roxas manifested that plaintiff ROTA, through complainant, was On March 17, 2014, Ma. Cecilia Fermina T. Roxas wrote to Sheriff Allen regarding the
willing to bid P2 million. He then advised complainant that should plaintiff ROTA bid at P2 annotation on TCT No. 502474-R on the bid price of Php200,539.63 instead of her offered bid
million, she will be obligated to refund whatever amount is in excess of the judgment price [of P720,000.00] which to her is damaging and so, the necessary correction should be
obligation, which complainant was not willing to do. made. Dissatisfied, on July 1, 2014, complainant Ma. Cecilia wrote to OCA-Legal pertaining to
this present incident.
As there were no other bidders during the auction sale, respondent awarded the winning bid
to the complainant in the amount only of the judgment obligation (P200,539.63) and issued On the Civil Case No. 10-826, on January 29, 2015[,] a Motion for Issuance of an Order
the Certificate of Sale on even date. Consolidating Title to the plaintiff was filed by plaintiff through counsel Atty. Reydon P.
Canlas and thereupon on March 27, 2015[,] another Entry of Appearance with opposition to
On March 3, 2014, complainant filed a letter, amending the amount of her previous bid (to plaintiff's motion for issuance of an order to Consolidate Title to Plaintiff was filed by Renato
P720,000.00). Justifying the sale of the property at P200,539.63, respondent stated that the Nunag through counsel Atty. Allan Jocson; and thereafter, the said incident was considered
Sheriff must satisfy the judgment obligation based on the decision. withdrawn by both parties in the Order dated April 16, 2015.
Upon the recommendation[15] of the OCA, the Court issued a Resolution[16] dated December On April 6, 2015, Ma. Cecilia wrote again to Sheriff Allen stating, as there was an overlook on
7, 2015, referring the administrative complaint to the Executive Judge, MTCC, Angeles City, defendant Renato Nunag, who is not a signatory on the Compromise Agreement and she,
Pampanga for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the further, requested to lift the Levy on Execution on Nunag's property with TCT No. 502474-R
records. and cancel the mortgage/annotation on the title c/o the Register of Deeds Pampanga. On
The Investigation Report of Executive Judge Katrina April 8, 2015, a Notice of Lifting or Discharge of Levy on Execution Certificate of Sale was
Nora S. Buan Factora issued by Sheriff Allen and the same was annotated on the Memorandum on Encumbrance
on April 10, 2015.[19]
The Report[17] dated April21, 2016 of Executive Judge Katrina Nora S. Buan Factora,[18] MTCC,
Angeles City, Pampanga, summarized the case, thus: Investigating Judge Factora found that respondent failed to follow the steps for the proper
implementation of the writ of execution, since there was (1) no estimate of expenses; (2) no
On September 30, 2010, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by Ricky Dizon return on the writ of execution; hence, there was no copy of the sheriff’s report furnished to
(representative of the plaintiff ROTA) and Miradora Mejia (Miradora for short and one of the the defendants involved; (3) no liquidation of sums received; (4) no notice given to the
defendants) x x x. The approval of compromise was set for hearing on November 11, 2010, judgment obligor on the sale of the property; and (5) no filing system of the publication and
the Court inquired whether Miradora fully understood that she is the only one bound by the other documentation. In regard to the auction sale, there are discrepancies on the date and
compromise; to which she acceded. On November 12, 2010, [a] Decision based on a circumstances of the auction sale showing a simulated auction sale. Moreover, the discharge
Compromise Agreement was issued by the Court. On November 11, 2011, a motion for of levy on the subject property was without proper motion or court order.[20]
Issuance of a Writ of Execution was filed by plaintiff thru counsel and it was granted on
March 9, 2012; and on March 12, 2012, a writ of execution was issued and received by the Investigating Judge Factora discussed her findings, thus:
Office of the Clerk of Court on March 15, 2012. A. The Implementation of the Writ of Execution
On October 30, 2012, a Levy on Execution was issued by Sheriff Allen Francisco Sicat on TCT In the Order[21] dated March 9, 2012 in Civil Case No. 10-826, MTCC Judge Katrina Nora S.
No. 502474-R and which was annotated in the memorandum of encumbrance on June 14, Buan-Factora (also the Investigating Judge) granted the issuance of a writ of execution
2013. On November4, 2013, Notice of Sheriff['s] Sale was issue[d] by Sheriff Allen wherein against the defendants to enforce the decision dated November 12, 2010 and directed the
the schedule[d] dates of sale are November 29, 2013 and December 10, 2013; and on same Sheriff of the OCC-MTCC, Angeles City "to submit an estimate of cost for the implementation
date (November 4, 2013), Certificate of Postings was made by Sheriff Allen and others signed
of the writ of execution to be approved by this Court and such amount, thereafter, shall be have acted with dispatch so as not to render inutile the effects of the judgment. The nature
deposited/paid by the plaintiff to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC pursuant to of a sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. [28]
Section 10 of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC."
Complainant admitted that they thought the approved Compromise Agreement included
However, the Investigating Judge found that no estimate of expenses was submitted to the Renato Nunag based on the original complaint; hence, the property of Nunag was levied
court for its approval and/or deposited or paid to the Clerk of Court of the OCC-MTCC, upon. However, the Investigating Judge noted that Ricky Dizon was present when the
despite the ruling in Francia v. Esguerrra[22]enumerating the steps to be followed in the Compromise Agreement was approved by the court; hence, Ricky Dizon acted in bad faith
payment and disbursement of fees for the execution of a writ, to wit: when he presented to respondent Nunag's property to be levied upon as he knew that Nunag
was not part of the Compromise Agreement. Nevertheless, as the writ was addressed only to
x x x (1) the sheriff must prepare and submit to the court an estimate of the expenses he Miradora Mejia, this should have prompted respondent to clarify with the court that issued
would incur; (2) the estimated expenses shall be subject to court approval; (3) the approved the writ whether Renato Nunag can be made subject of the implementation of the writ. The
estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court, who is return of the writ of execution every 30 days from its issuance could have clarified to
also the ex-officio sheriff, (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing respondent the involvement of Ricky Dizon and Miradora Mejia or Renato Nunag. However,
sheriff; (5) the executing sheriff shall thereafter liquidate his expenses within the same respondent failed to submit a report in accordance with Section 14,[29] Rule 39 of the Rules of
period for rendering a return on the writ; and (6) any amount unspent shall be returned to Court.
the person who made the deposit.[23]
B. Levy and Sale of Property on Execution
In this case, both complainant and respondent admitted not resorting to the system of
submitting a court-approved estimate of expenses to the OCC MTCC as it is a tedious process, Prescinding from the mistaken belief that Renato Nunag was a judgment debtor, respondent
especially for the sheriffs. It has been a practice for ROTA, through Ricky Dizon, to be charged Sheriff failed to follow the steps for the proper levy and sale of property on execution under
with the expenses without resort to the Sheriffs Trust Fund. Hence, ROTA would issue duly Section 15,[30] Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
acknowledged Cash Vouchers,[24] signed by respondent Sheriff, to defray the expenses for the
implementation of writs and for the purpose of reimbursement from their office. On the The Investigating Judge found that: (1) there was no publication of the notice of sale; (2)
other hand, respondent Sheriff would sign and acknowledge the same even though the there was no raffle for the selection of the newspaper that would publish the notice of sale;
actual money was handled by Ricky Dizon and, likewise, to help Ricky, who; according to (3) the judgment obligor was not given a notice of the sale; and (4) there is a discrepancy in
respondent, would be reimbursed by ROTA for expenses he advanced, and who was in dire the actual date of the sale of the property and circumstances thereof pointing to a simulated
economic distress. Sheriff Luis Gary V. Rosario and Miradora Mejia corroborated the sale.
testimony of respondent that Ricky handled the money and would plead for financial On October 30, 2012, a Levy on Execution/Attachment Replevin[31] was issued by respondent
assistance, respectively.[25] Sheriff without the same being addressed to the Register of Deeds and no copy was
The Investigating Judge stated that the writ of execution was addressed only to Miradora furnished to defendant Miradora Mejia or defendant Renato Nunag, whose property was
Mejia as the sole defendant who signed the Compromise Agreement. Hence, respondent being attached. The Notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on the memorandum of
should have proceeded to implement the writ under Section 9 (a),[26] Rule 39 of the Rules of encumbrance of the title on June 14, 2013, about eight (8) months thereafter. From the time
Court by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount of the issuance of the writ of execution to levy, if defendants were given a copy of the writs
stated in the writ of execution and lawful fees. However, the records revealed that this was issued then, they could have properly registered their objection/opposition to the same.
not actually done as there was no showing of the receipt by Miradora Mejia of the subject Respondent worked under the belief that Renato Nunag was a judgment debtor until Ricky
writ of execution. The same records would show that there was no return of the writ, which Dizon admitted to him that Nunag was not a signatory in the Compromise Agreement, which
should reflect how the writ was initially implemented. Miradora Mejia categorically denied admission annoyed respondent.
that she received any document denominated as writ of execution. She, however, recalled The Investigating Judge found that there was evidence[32] of posting of the Notice of Sheriff's
that she was informed by her house helpers that Ricky Dizon and respondent visited her to Sale, but there was no evidence of the publication thereof. Complainant and respondent,
collect the sum of money. She denied having seen or met respondent until the day Renato however, testified that there was publication.[33]Moreover, ROTA's Cash Voucher[34] dated
Nunag, thru his counsel, filed an opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for the Issuance of an October 9, 2013 in the amount of P12,000.00 showed that the amount was paid directly to
Order Consolidating Title to Plaintiff.[27] Mr. Abner Y. San Pedro (of Angeles Monday Mail) for the publication of the Notice of Sheriff's
The Investigating Judge stated that the allowance of seven months given to defendant Sale. However, the records do not show the raffle for the selection of the accredited
Miradora Mejia to pay up her obligation, as relayed by Ricky to respondent, is not within the publishing company that should publish the Notice of Sheriff's Sale. The Investigating Judge
discretion of respondent to give. As an implementing officer of the Court, respondent should
noted that the levy on execution was made on October 30, 2012, while the disbursement for Pampanga. On April 8, 2015, respondent issued a Notice [to Lift] or Discharge of Levy on
the publication was made on October 9, 2013, almost one (1) year after the levy. Execution[44] addressed to the Register of Deeds of Angeles City. The Investigating Judge
observed that the same did not pass through court motion with due proceedings in order
On the Notice of Sheriff's Sale dated November 4, 2013, there appeared two dates of that the proper discharge would have been noted.
auction: November 29, 2013 and December 10, 2013. Respondent explained that there was a
typographical error in his documents or they were not edited. On the other hand, Further, the Investigating Judge found that the charges of loitering and laziness was not
complainant and her witness, Fermina Roxas, maintained that the November 29, 2013 substantiated by substantial evidence.
auction did not push through and was reset on December 10, 2013, as reflected in the Daily
Collection Report[35] of Ricky. The Investigating Judge also found that per Section 1,[45] Canon III of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, there was no conflict of interest when respondent uttered that he was
The Investigating Judge stated that the apparent discrepancies in the date of the auction sale interested to redeem the subject property. Respondent also denied such interest as it was
point to a simulated sale with documentation. just done in jest and he has no capacity to purchase the subject resort.

Moreover, respondent failed to give a written notice of the sale to the judgment obligor, The Investigating Judge stated that respondent pleaded that the case against him be
because Miradora Mejia denied that she received any document and Renato Nunag opposed dismissed on account of complainant's letter dated April 6, 2015, requesting him to lift the
the consolidation of title. Due process dictates that proper notices be sent to parties Levy on Execution on Nunag's property and to have the annotation on the title cancelled by
adversely affected by the effects of the writs. Section 17,[36] Rule 39 of the Rules of Court the Register of Deeds, and the levy was already lifted and the parties themselves are no
penalizes the officer selling without notice by making him liable to pay P5,000.00 to any longer interested to pursue the case.
person injured thereby, in addition to his actual damages.
The Investigating Judge noted that respondent's infraction is not the first time, as an
In addition, there was a Minutes of the Auction Sale[37] dated November 29, 2013, but administrative case had been filed against respondent and resolved in A.M. No. P-00-1423
complainant maintained there was no auction on the said date and no minutes; but Ricky promulgated on December 10, 2004.
Dizon was made to sign on the minutes belatedly, or sometime in October (2014).[38]
The Investigating Judge recommended that this administrative complaint be re-docketed as a
On the offer of bid, complainant submitted two attempts to bid: P2 million and P720,000.00 regular administrative matter and that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross
(received by respondent on March 3, 2014). However, both bids were refused because inefficiency.
respondent had to stick to the value or amount .due in the Compromise Agreement, which is
P200,539.63.[39] Respondent maintained that even if he would entertain the said bids, On June 20, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution[46] referring the Investigation Report of
complainant was unwilling to pay for the excess; hence, he stuck to the price of the Executive Judge Factora and the Report of Executive Judge Omar T. Viola to the OCA for
Compromise Agreement. The Investigating Judge stated that Section 19,[40] Rule 39 of the evaluation, report and recommendation.
Rules of Court provides for the effects of bidding and the amount bid whether exact or in The Report of the Office of the Court Administrator
excess; and, therefore, respondent should not have refused the offered bid of complainant.
In its Memorandum[47] dated October 6, 2016, the OCA found respondent Sheriff Sicat guilty
The Certificate of Sale, with an auction date of November 4, 2013, was issued and annotated of gross neglect of duty, misconduct and inefficiency in the performance of official duties and
on the title on January 14, 2014. Complainant, thru her counsel, wrote respondent the recommended that he be dismissed from the service.
letter[41] dated March 17, 2014, expressing dissatisfaction as the Certificate of Sale showed
the sale price of only P200,539.63 instead of the second bid price of P720,000.00, allegedly The OCA stated that respondent should be held administratively liable for his failure to follow
resulting in plaintiffs loss of more than P500,000.00. Thereafter, complainant wrote the the procedures in the proper implementation of the writ, particularly: (1) to submit estimate
letter-complaint to the OCA. of expenses; (2) to submit a liquidation report; (3) to submit Sheriffs Return of Writ/Report;
(4) to give notices to the judgment obligor; and (5) to publish a copy of the notice of sale of
The Certificate of Final Sale[42] with an auction date of November 4, 2013 was issued on property on execution. Respondent should also be held administratively liable for the
January 14, 2015, but it was not annotated on the title in view of Renato Nunag's opposition irregularities in the conduct of the auction sale, particularly: (1) discrepancies in the dates of
(that his property could not be levied upon because he was not a party to the Compromise the auction sale and other circumstances of the sale; (2) simulated auction sale; and for the
Agreement). Upon realizing the mistake of attaching the property of Renato Nunag, selling it unilateral discharge of levy without proper court order.
at public auction and annotating the sale on the title of Renato Nunag, complainant wrote a
letter[43] dated April 6, 2015, requesting respondent to lift the Levy on Execution on Nunag's The OCA found, thus:
property and to cancel the annotation on the title through the Register of Deeds for
The records do not show that respondent Sheriff Sicat submitted an estimate of expenses to one Abner Y. San Pedro (of Angeles Monday Mail).[58] The OCA noted that the cash voucher
the trial court for its approval. Also, no amount was deposited to the OCC-MTCC by plaintiff for publication was issued one year after the Notice of Levy on Execution was released on
ROTA for the implementation of the writ. Instead, the parties admitted that they did not October 30, 2012. There was also no proof of any raffle among the accredited publishing
follow the procedure of submitting a court-approved estimate of expenses to the OCC-MTCC companies.
as they found it tedious. Through Ricky Dizon, respondent Sheriff Sicat signed cash vouchers
to defray the expenses incurred in the implementation of the writ. In regard to the alleged irregularity in the conduct of the auction sale, in the Notices of
Sheriff's Sale, both dated November 4, 2013, there appeared two (2) schedules of auction
xxxx sale: November 29, 2013 and December 10, 2013.[59] Respondent asserted that it was a mere
typographical error and he could not recall that there was an auction sale held on December
x x x [Respondent] received sums of money from plaintiff ROTA, through its representative, 10, 2013. Complainant maintained that the November 29, 2013 auction sale did not push
to defray his expenses in the implementation of the writ. The records also do not show that through and was reset to December 10, 2013 and that no minutes of the auction proceedings
he advised plaintiff ROTA that the sheriff’s expenses approved by the trial court should be held on November 29, 2013 was made by respondent. However, when respondent Sheriff
deposited with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff. Furthermore, he never submitted a Sicat learned about the filing of this administrative complaint, he belatedly prepared the
liquidation report to the OCC-MTCC.[48] minutes and asked Ricky Dizon to sign the same sometime in October 2014.[60] To support
The OCA reiterated the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent belatedly her allegation, complainant presented the Daily Collection Report[61] prepared by Ricky Dizon,
implemented the writ of execution, upon the advice of Ricky Dizon,[49] on the property of the which report shows the following:
defendant Renato Nunag (who was, however, not bound by the Compromise Agreement).
Nov. 13, - At the OCC-MTCC Sheriff Sicat re-scheduled the bidding on Dec. 10, 2013.
Moreover, the records do not show that the writ was properly served and no sheriff’s report
2013 Gave me a new copy of the Notice of Sheriff Sale;
was executed to show that it was enforced against defendant Miradora Mejia.[50] The fact
that defendant Mejia denied that respondent Sheriff Sicat tried to collect the debt from Dec. 10, - At the OCC-MTCC Sheriff Sicat advised me to come back by Friday for the
her,[51] it can be presumed that the writ was not actually served/implemented against her. 2013 Certificate of Sale;
Further, the grace period given to defendant Mejia to pay her obligation was not within the
discretion of respondent to allow. The OCA reiterated that the sheriff exercises no discretion Jan. 7, 2014 - Sheriff Sicat advised me to come back tomorrow to get a copy of the Cert.
as to the manner of executing a final judgment. Any method of execution falling short of the of Sale (Nunag property)
requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.[52]
Jan. 13, - At OCC-MTCC get [from] Sheriff Sicat Cert. of Sale TCT # of Renato
The OCA reiterated that respondent Sheriff Sicat implemented the writ without considering 2014 Nunag.[62]
that it was directed only against defendant Mejia. Any uncertainty on his part should have
prompted him to seek clarification from the trial court if indeed the writ could be enforced From the foregoing, the OCA deduced that the November 29, 2013- auction sale was
against defendant Renato Nunag. cancelled. When Ricky Dizon went to respondent's office on November 13, 2013, respondent
advised Ricky Dizon of the cancellation and gave him a new notice of sheriff's sale setting the
Anent procedural lapses, the records show that respondent Sheriff Sicat issued the Notice of auction sale on December 10, 2013 by editing the original notice, but respondent Sheriff Sicat
Levy on Execution/Attachment Replevin dated October 30, 2012 against the property of failed to change the date of the notice. Be that as it may, there is a glaring irregularity
defendant Nunag without furnishing a copy to the Register of Deeds and to defendants Mejia because no minutes of an auction conducted on December 10, 2013 was submitted by
and Nunag. The Notice of Levy of Execution/Attachment was annotated on Nunag's title of respondent. Instead, the records contain minutes[63] [dated November 29, 2013] of an
the property only on June 14, 2014 or eight (8) months after its issuance.[53] Had defendant auction, while the auction sale was actually held on November 4, 2013 as appearing in the
Nunag been earlier informed or given a copy of the writ, he could have immediately undated Certificate of Sale and Certificate of Final Sale dated January 14, 2015.
registered his objection/opposition prior to the annotation of the notice on the title. Instead,
it was only in January 2015, after a Certificate of Final Sale[54] was issued by respondent As pointed out by Executive Judge Factora, the parties could have entered into a simulated
Sheriff Sicat and plaintiff ROTA filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order Consolidating Title sale of property. Records show that no notices were sent to defendants Mejia and Nunag
to Plaintiff[55] that defendant Nunag was notified that the title of his property would be regarding the auction sale that resulted in the issuance of the Certificate of Sale. A Certificate
transferred to ROTA.[56] Thus, he filed an opposition[57] to plaintiff's motion. of Sale was issued without conducting a formal auction sale that was supposedly set on
December 10, 2013. Instead, an undated Certificate of Sale was issued stating that the
Moreover, the OCA reiterated the findings of the Investigating Judge that both parties failed auction sale was held on November 4, 2013.
to present proof that there was publication of the notice of sale. However, a Cash Voucher
dated October 9, 2013 in the amount of P12,000.00, as publication fee, was paid by ROTA to
Moreover, when the parties realized the mistake in levying against the property of defendant writ of execution as discussed by Investigating Judge Factora and the OCA. Such failure makes
Renato Nunag, complainant wrote respondent to correct the situation and to lift the levy respondent liable for gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in the performance of official
against the property of Renato Nunag. Respondent took matters into his own hands by duties.
issuing a Notice [to Lift] or Discharge of Levy on Execution[64] dated April 8, 2015 addressed to
the Register of Deeds of Angeles City, Pampanga, without first submitting the matter to the Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides the duties of sheriffs in the
trial court for proper disposition. The ex parte motion to lift levy or attachment is a implementation of writ, thus:
contentious motion that needs to comply with the required notice, hearing, and service to Sec. 10. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes.
the adverse party as mandated by Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
xxxx
The OCA stated that for failure to perform his ministerial duty in the implementation of the
writ, respondent should be held administratively liable for gross neglect and gross With regard to sheriffs expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or
inefficiency in the performance of official duties. Anico v. Pilipiña[65] held that the failure of decisions or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage
the sheriff to carry out what was a purely ministerial duty, to follow well-established rules in for each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested
the implementation of court orders and writs, to promptly undertake the execution of party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to approval of
judgments, and to accomplish the required periodic reports constituted gross neglect and the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit
gross inefficiency in the performance of official duties. such amount with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to
the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same
The OCA stated that respondent should likewise be held administratively liable for period for rendering a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by the
misconduct for the irregularities in the conduct of the auction sale and his circumvention of court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report
the established rule on motions. shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, the sheriffs expenses shall
Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies be taxed as cost against the judgment debtor.[67]
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct as grave offenses punishable by dismissal from The rule above enumerates the steps to be followed in the payment and disbursement of
the service for the first offense. This is not the first time that respondent Sheriff Sicat has fees for the execution of a writ: (1) the sheriff must prepare and submit to the court an
been administratively held liable. In A.M. No. P-00-1423,[66] dated December 10, 2004, estimate of the expenses he would incur; (2) the estimated expenses shall be subject to court
respondent Sheriff Sicat was found guilty of misconduct and suspended for six (6) months. In approval; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party
the said case, respondent Sheriff Sicat implemented a writ that was not addressed to him. He with the Clerk of Court, who is also the ex-officio sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse
also failed to observe Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in this instance, the the amount to the executing sheriff; (5) the executing sheriff shall thereafter liquidate his
ultimate penalty of dismissal is warranted. expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ; and (6) any amount
The OCA recommended that the instant administrative complaint against respondent Sheriff unspent shall be returned to the person who made the deposit. [68] It is clear from the
Sicat be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be found guilty enumeration that sheriffs are not authorized to receive direct payments from a winning
of gross neglect of duty, misconduct and inefficiency in the performance of official duties, party.[69]
and be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except In this case, respondent did not submit an estimate of the expenses he would incur in the
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality execution of the writ to the trial court for its approval. Instead, he received money from the
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. plaintiff to defray his expenses in the implementation of the writ. Moreover, he did not
The OCA found the charge of conflict of interest, exhibited by respondent for expressing his submit a liquidation report to the OCC-MTCC. Francia v. Esguerra[70] pronounced:
interest to purchase the attached property, to be dismissible for lack of evidence. It also We held in Bernabe v. Eguid that acceptance of any other amount is improper, even if it were
recommended that the charges of absenteeism, tardiness, and loitering be dismissed for lack to be applied for lawful purposes. Good faith on the part of the sheriff, or lack of it, in
of evidence. proceeding to properly execute its mandate would be of no moment, for he is chargeable
The Ruling of the Court with the knowledge that being the officer of the court tasked therefor, it behooves him to
make due compliances. In the implementation of the writ of execution, only the payment of
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA. A careful review of the sheriff's fees may be received by sheriffs. They are not allowed to receive any voluntary
records shows that respondent failed to follow the procedures laid down by Section 14 of payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would be
Rule 39 and Section 10 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in the proper implementation of the inimical to the best interests of the service because even assuming arguendo that such
payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the December 10, 2013, but the undated Certificate of Sale and Certificate of Final Sale dated
suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. In fact, even January 14, 2015 stated that the auction sale was conducted on November 4, 2013. Further,
"reasonableness" of the amounts charged, collected and received by the sheriff is not a respondent failed to give the judgment debtor a notice on the sale of the property; there was
defense where the procedure laid down in Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court has no proof of publication of the notice and of the raffle among the accredited publishing
been clearly ignored. companies for the selection of the newspaper that would publish the notice of sale of
property. All of the foregoing are in disregard of Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
The rules on sheriff's expenses are clear-cut and do not provide procedural shortcuts. A thus:
sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without
observing the proper procedural steps otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty and Section 15. Notice of sale of property on execution.- Before the sale of property on execution,
extortion. And any amount received in violation of Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court notice thereof must be given as follows:
constitutes unauthorized fees.[71]
(a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the time and place of the sale
Moreover, the Investigating Judge reported[72] that respondent never made a return of the in three (3) public places, preferably in conspicuous areas of the municipal or city hail, post
writ in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: office and public market in the municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for such
time as may be reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property;
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. - The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment xxxx
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during (c) In case of real property, by posting for twenty (20) days in the three (3) public places
the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a abovementioned a similar notice particularly describing the property and stating where the
report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the property is to be sold, and if the assessed value of the property exceeds fifty thousand
judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set (P50,000.00) pesos, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week for two (2) consecutive
forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof weeks in one newspaper selected by raffle, whether in English, Filipino, or any major
promptly furnished the parties. regional language published, edited and circulated or, in the absence thereof, having general
circulation in the province or city;
The Rules clearly provide that it is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on
the writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter (d) In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment obligor, at least
until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires[73] Even if the writs are unsatisfied or only three (3) days before the sale, except as provided in paragraph (a) hereof where notice shall
partially satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants, be given at any time before the sale, in the same manner as personal service of pleadings and
may be informed of the proceedings undertaken to implement the writ.[74] Periodic reporting other papers as provided by section 6 of Rule 13.[78]
also provides the court insights on the efficiency of court processes after promulgation of Further, respondent discharged the wrongful levy on the property of Renata Nunag without
judgment.[75] Overall, the purpose of periodic reporting is to ensure the speedy execution of proper court order.
decisions.[76]
Based on the foregoing, respondent is guilty of gross neglect of duty and inefficiency in the
The Court agrees with the Investigating Judge and the OCA that since the writ was only performance of official duties and for misconduct for the irregularities in the conduct of the
addressed to defendant Miradora Mejia, it should have prompted respondent to clarity with auction sale and his circumvention of the established rule on motions.
the court that issued the writ whether defendant Renato Nunag could be made subject of the
implementation of the writ. The Investigating Judge correctly noted that if respondent The Court held in Anico v. Pilipiña:[79]
submitted a report to the court regarding the non-implementation of the writ within 30 days
from its issuance and then reported every 30 days thereafter on the proceedings taken Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. They are tasked to execute
thereon until the judgment was satisfied, respondent could have been clarified about the final judgments of the courts. If not enforced, such decisions become empty victories of the
involvement of Ricky Dizon and Miradora Mejia or Renata Nunag in the Compromise prevailing parties. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with
Agreement, or whether Nunag's property could be subject of levy. due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court's writs and processes and
implementing its order, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their
Moreover, irregularities were found in the conduct and documentation of the auction sale. office and the efficient administration of justice.
Respondent insisted that the auction sale was conducted on November 29, 2013, while the
Daily Collection Report[77] of Ricky Dizon showed that the auction sale was conducted on
We will reiterate that a sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute
the judgment or not x x x Accordingly, a sheriff must comply with his mandated ministerial
duty as speedily as possible. x x x

x x x The long delay in the execution of the judgments and the failure to accomplish the
required periodic reports demonstrate respondent sheriffs gross neglect and gross
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties. Likewise, respondent sheriffs receipt of
the money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over the amount to the clerk of court
is an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty. x x x

Time and again, this Court has pointed out the heavy burden and responsibility which court
personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith.
They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed
or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work in
the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts' good name and
standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they
must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the
court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish
the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. [80]

Section 46, Rule 10, of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct as grave offenses punishable by dismissal from
the service for the first offense.

The Court notes that respondent was previously administratively charged in A.M. No. P-00-
1423,[81] and was with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.