1. Dimagan vs. Dacworks United, Inc.

, 661 SCRA 438, November 28, 2011

Labor Law|Constructive Dismissal|Abandonment
1. Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Elements of .—“Forum shopping exists when a party
repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by, some other court.” The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
2. Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of
an employee to resume his employment; Elements to Constitute Abandonment of Work.-
—“Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment.” To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: “(1) the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee
to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act.” The employer
bears the burden of proof to show the deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any intention of returning.
3. Same; Same; As held in the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. Del Villar,
632 SCRA 293 (2010), the burden falls upon the company to prove that the employee’s
assignment from one position to another was not tantamount to constructive dismissal. In the
case at bar, respondents failed to discharge said burden. In fact, respondents never even
disputed that petitioner was relegated from the position of OIC to supervisor and,
subsequently, to an ordinary technician. Clearly, the reduction in petitioner’s responsibilities
and duties, particularly from supervisor to ordinary technician, constituted a demotion in rank
tantamount to constructive dismissal.
4. Labor Law; Constructive Dismissal; Words and Phrases; Constructive dismissal is
defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of constructive
dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt
compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to
dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is therefore a
dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in
order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
5. Same; Appeals; It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law; Rule that the findings of
fact of the CA are conclusive and binding is not an ironclad.-
—It must be pointed out that the main issue in this case involves a question of fact. It is an
established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law. This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact
of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. This rule, however, is not ironclad. One of the recognized
exceptions is when there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that
of the CA, as in this case. There is, therefore, a need to review the records to determine
which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.

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2. Banaag vs. Espeleta, 661 SCRA 513, November
29, 2011 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court
Personnel|Evidence
1. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; Immorality;
Definition of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.-
—After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court finds respondent
Olivia C. Espeleta guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under Section 46(b)(5), Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which, as defined in Section
1 of CSC Resolution No. 100912 dated May 17, 2010 (Revised Rules on the Administrative
Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct), is “an act which violates the basic norm of
decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society” and “conduct
which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions
of the good and respectable members of the community.”
2. Same; Same; Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order
to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice; Resignation should not be
used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an
administrative sanction.-
—It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of courts of justice.” This Court has thus consistently penalized court
personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately
resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an
easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
3. Same; Same; Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion is required.-
—In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground
to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
4. Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married
man comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct.-
—Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the
purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense
punishable with suspension from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.

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3. Tiong vs. Florendo, 662 SCRA 1, December 12,
2011 Syllabi Class :Administrative
Law|Attorneys|Disbarment
1. Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; It has been consistently held by the Court
that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is
a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession. It is the
bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a
lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or
disbarment.
2. Same; Same; Same.- It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to
cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but
on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot
have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.
3. Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife
manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of
fidelity.-
—Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the
laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust
and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with
Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary
action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney
may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

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4. Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, January 18,
2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Judgments
1. Remedial Law; Judgments; Levy; Writs of Possession; A writ of possession is an
order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or
personal property. We clarified in the case of Motos v. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc., 593
SCRA 216 92009), that a writ of possession may be issued under any of the following
instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (b) judicial
foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person,
not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
2. Same; Same; Judgments; As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of
possession does not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC.
“The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct
clerical errors or mistakes—all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and
laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court’s power with regard to execution of judgments
extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which does not obtain
in this case.
3. Same; Same; Writs of Execution; Sheriffs; It bears to stress that the court issuing the
writ of execution may enforce its authority only over properties or rights of the judgment
debtor, and the sheriff acts properly only when he subjects to execution property undeniably
belonging to the judgment debtor. Should the sheriff levy upon the assets of a third person in
which the judgment debtor has not even the remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the
limits of his authority. A judgment can only be executed or issued against a party to the
action, not against one who has not yet had his day in court.
4. Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in
which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of
possession to property be incidentally affected.
To be sure, in Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation, 399 SCRA 409
(2003), We have previously explained that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a
proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the
title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property
be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery
of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of
title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or
sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court,
such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. In such
event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio
5. Same; Civil Procedure; Lis Pendens; Legal Effects of Filing a Notice of Lis Pendens.-
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter
of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property subject of the litigation to the judgment that
the court will subsequently promulgate. Relative thereto, a notice of lis pendens is proper in
the following actions and their concomitant proceedings: “(a) an action to recover possession
of real estate; (b) an action to quiet title thereto; (c) an action to remove clouds thereon; (d)
an action for partition; and (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting
the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.”
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are
enforceable only against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if
property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s
indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the
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remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 thereof specifically
provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to determine
whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to the
judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate their claim of
ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, “a person other than
the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded
from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim” ****

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5. Gonzales vs. Bugaay, 666 SCRA 493, February 22, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Demurrer to
Evidence
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Being considered a motion to
dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its
judgment.-
—In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment.
Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed
before the court renders its judgment. In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners’
evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While respondents’ motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and
offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never
complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be
deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC’s original Decision stands.

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6. Layug vs. Commission on Elections, 667 SCRA 135, February
28, 2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Motions
1. Constitutional Law; Congress; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the
“members” of the House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
2. Same; Civil Procedure; Motions; A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro
forma.-
—It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed
without the requisite notice of hearing. We have held time and again that the failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
renders the motion defective. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro
forma. None of the acceptable exceptions obtain in this case.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing
of an act involving the exercise of discretion one way or the other. Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides: SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which
should not be a post office box.
—A party may sue or defend an action pro se. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
“(e)very pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.” x x x From the fact alone that the
address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was incorrect, his pretensions regarding the
validity of the proceedings and promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being
in violation of his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to rectify
the error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to conclude that he deliberately stated an
inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the proceedings upon the plea of lack of
due process. As the COMELEC aptly pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of
election laws and procedure by appearing before the Commission by himself or by different
counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he does not receive
mails addressed to him. He cannot thus be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. To rule
otherwise, considering the circumstances in the instant case, would place the date of receipt
of pleadings, judgments and processes within Layug’s power to determine at his pleasure.
This, We cannot countenance.
5. Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Party-List System Act; Section
6 of said Party-List System Act states that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
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registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”-
—Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is
vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said
Act states that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or

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cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled
that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions,
orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction
to hear the instant petition.
6. Same; Same; The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1)
members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.-
—Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who
shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case,
Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees,
Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother
Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the
House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother
Mike’s qualifications.

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7. Re:Pet. for JudicialClemency of Judge Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467, March
06, 2012 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judicial Clemency
1. Administrative Law; Appointments; Disqualifications for appointment to any judicial
post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.-
—Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: “SEC. 5. Disqualification.—The
following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with pending criminal or regular
administrative cases; 2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where
the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted
judicial clemency.”
2. Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.-
—In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA 539 (2007), the Court laid
down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There
must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the
same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2.
Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform; 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4.
There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen
or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other
relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.”

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8. Baño vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 667 SCRA 782, March
12, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Damages|Exemplary
Damages
1. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Gross Negligence; Words and Phrases; Gross
Negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally
with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be effected.-
—In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific Airways Corporation, 629
SCRA 219 (2010), the Court has defined gross negligence as “one that is characterized by
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.”
2. Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary Damages are awarded to serve as a
warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious actions.-
—The CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve
as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious
actions. However, the award should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one party or
to impoverish another. Thus, the Court reinstates the separate awards of exemplary
damages to petitioners in the amount of P50,000.00.

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9. Del Mundo vs. Capistrano, 669 SCRA 462, April 16,
2012 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Practice of Law
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.-
—Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling
one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can
efficiently handle.
2. Same; Same; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who
meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.-
—The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring
lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
in consideration of the surrounding facts.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his
possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his
own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing
of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand.-
—A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As
trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if
not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

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10. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches
72 and 22, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, 672 SCRA 21, June 13, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Speedy Disposition of Cases|Gross Inefficiency
1. Administrative Law; Judges; Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied; delay in case disposition is a
major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system.-
—Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed
is justice denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on
speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system.
2. Same; Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Without an extension granted by the Court, the
failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency
that merits administrative sanction.-
—In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose
his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period
for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
3. Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges
are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.-
—Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within
90 days from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all
judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.

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11. LBP vs. Montinola-Escarilla and Co., Inc., 672 SCRA 261, June 13,
2012 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform Law|Just Compensation
1. Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation; For purposes of determining just
compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character
and price at the time of taking.-
—For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. In the implementation
of R.A. No. 6657, Section 17 provides the manner by which just compensation is
determined, thus: Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation. The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where
there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should
never control the determination of just compensation.

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12. People vs. Matias, 672 SCRA 411, June 13,
2012 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Sexual
Abuse|Penalties
1. Criminal Law; Sexual Abuse; Statutory Rape; Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610
in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age,
the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article
266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua-
—on the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with
either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.—In the case of People v. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA
16 (2011), which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v. Dahilig, 651
SCRA 778 (2011), and People v. Abay, 580 SCRA 235 (2009), the Court explained: Under
Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should
be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
2. Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is penalized with reclusion perpetua.-
—The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor
below 12 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a
punctilious scrutiny of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would
make her 13 years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus,
appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for
sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d). It
bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for sexual
abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion
perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.

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13. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, 672 SCRA 468, June
13, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Interest Rates|Loans
1. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court involves only questions of law and not of facts.-
—At the outset, it should be emphasized that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court involves only questions of law and not of facts. A question of law exists
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a given set of facts while a question of fact
arises when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
2. Same; Interest Rates; Loans; A liability based on a loan or forbearance of money, shall
be subject to legal interest of 12% per annum.-
—Following the Court’s ruling in the iconic case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), the foregoing liability, which is based on a loan or
forbearance of money, shall be subject to legal interest of 12% per annum from the date it
was judicially determined by the CA on March 30, 2009 until the finality of this Decision, and
not from 1975 (the date of the constitution of the mortgage); nor from 1998 (when an attempt
to pay was made) or in 2000 at the time the complaint was filed, because it was the Heirs of
Adolfo and not Bangis who filed the instant suit to collect the indebtedness. Thereafter, the
judgment award inclusive of interest shall bear interest at 12% per annum until its full
satisfaction.
3. Same; Same; No title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.-
—Settled is the rule that no title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, even if acquisitive prescription can be
appreciated in this case, the Heirs of Bangis’ possession being in bad faith is two years shy
of the requisite 30-year uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code.
4. Same; Land Titles; If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether
wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the
certificates of titles were derived.-
—As held in the case of Top Management Programs Corporation v. Luis Fajardo and the
Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City, 652 SCRA 18 (2011): “if two certificates of title purport
to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original
certificates from which the certificates of titles were derived.” Having, thus, traced the roots
of the parties’ respective titles supported by the records of the Register of Deeds of
Malaybalay City, the courts a quo were correct in upholding the title of the Heirs of Adolfo as
against TCT No. T-10567 of Bangis, notwithstanding its earlier issuance on August 18, 1976
or long before the Heirs of Adolfo secured their own titles on May 26, 1998. To paraphrase
the Court’s ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 556 (1998): where two (2)
transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, the one who holds the earlier
title may prevail only in the absence of any anomaly or irregularity in the process of its
registration, which circumstance does not obtain in this case.
5. Civil Law; Antichresis; For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the
Civil Code requires that the amount of the principal and of the interest shall be
specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis shall be void.-
—For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that “the
amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract
of antichresis shall be void.” In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to
produce any document in support of their claim that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis
was an antichresis, hence, the CA properly held that no such relationship existed between
the parties.

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14. Philcomsat Holdings Corp vs. Senate of the Rep. of the Phils., 673 SCRA 611,
June 19, 2012 Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Right to Counsel
1. Constitutional Law; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, provides as follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.”-
—The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been
passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon
any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with
it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
2. Same; Right to Counsel; The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a
person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore
attaches only during such custodial investigation.-
—Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal’s allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed
right to counsel was violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is
specious. The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only
during such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the
public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel.

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15. Ace Navigation Co., Inc. vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 674 SCRA 348, June
25, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Agency
1. Mercantile Law; Bill of Lading; A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing,
signed by a carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of
the consignor, the terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight
to be delivered to the order or assigns of a specified person at a specified place.”-
—A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent,
describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the terms of the
contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight to be delivered to the order or
assigns of a specified person at a specified place.” It operates both as a receipt and as a
contract. As a receipt, it recites the date and place of shipment, describes the goods as to
quantity, weight, dimensions, identification marks and condition, quality, and value. As a
contract, it names the contracting parties, which include the consignee, fixes the route,
destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations assumed
by the parties. As such, it shall only be binding upon the parties who make them, their
assigns and heirs.
2. Civil Law; Agency; An agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts,
unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such
party sufficient notice of his powers.-
—Article 1868 of the Civil Code states: “ART. 1868. By the contract of agency, a person
binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter.” Corollarily, Article 1897 of the same
Code provides that an agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts,
unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such
party sufficient notice of his powers.

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16. Ogawa vs. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, July 09, 2012
Syllabi Class :Evidence|Preponderance of Evidence|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases; “Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of credible evidence.”-
—“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.” From the evidence on record, it is clear
that respondent failed to prove her counterclaim by preponderance of evidence.
2. Evidence; Receipts; Words and Phrases; A receipt is defined as a written and signed
acknowledgment that money or good was delivered or received.-
—A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or good was
delivered or received. Exhibit 1, upon which respondent relies to support her counterclaim,
sufficiently satisfies this definition. However, while indubitably containing the signatures of
both parties, a plain reading of the contents of Exhibit 1 negates any inference as to the
nature of the transaction for which the 1,000,000 Yen was received and who between the
parties is the obligor and the obligee. What is apparent is a mere written and signed
acknowledgment that money was received. There are no terms and conditions found therein
from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be considered an
actionable document upon which an action or defense may be founded.
3. Same; Burden of Proof; It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who
asserts his/her right.-
—It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a
counterclaim, the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant, by the
quantum of evidence required by law, which in this case is preponderance of evidence.

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17. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ochoa, 676 SCRA 551, July 17, 2012
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Autonomy of Local Governments|State Policies

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18. Soller vs. Heirs of Jeremias Ulayao, 677 SCRA 124, July
18, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Procedure|Prescription|Acquisitive
Prescription
1. Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary Judgments; Summary judgments are proper
when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by
the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Viajar v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 (1979), the
Court explained: Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of
cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or
issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment.
Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. x x x [R]elief by summary judgment can
only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary
trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any
doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
2. Same; Prescription; Acquisitive Prescription; In this case, records show that the original
defendant, Jeremias, raised the special and affirmative defense of acquisitive prescription in
his answer, claiming that he was in open, continuous and notorious possession or the
disputed property as, in fact, his house and other permanent improvements are still existing
thereon. As succinctly explained by the CA in its assailed Decision, the defense of acquisitive
prescription inevitably involves the issue of actual, physical and material possession, which is
always a question of fact. The existence of this issue therefore necessitates, for its proper
resolution, the presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which can only be done in
the course of a full-blown trial.

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19. Go vs. People, 677 SCRA 213, July 18, 2012
Syllabi Class :Criminal Procedure|Right of Confrontation
1. Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Depositions; The examination of witnesses must
be done orally before a judge in open court; It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.-
—The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the
“safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the
witness’ credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony.
2. Criminal Procedure; Right of Confrontation; The right of confrontation, on the other
hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1)
to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination,
and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in
People v. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (1980), that the constitutional requirement “insures that the
witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury
charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in
exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the
demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess
his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the
prosecution’s case against the accused.
4. Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; For purposes of taking the deposition in
criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.— When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court,
or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the
trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

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20. Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, 677 SCRA 408, July 24, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Due Process
1. Administrative Law; Presidency; Reorganizations; Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292); Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions
the following actions undertaken for such purpose: (1) Restructure the internal organization
of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/
2. Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply
means having the opportunity to explain one’s side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given
the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard. The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his
written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against
him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of
denial of due process.
3. Administrative Law; Presidency; Presidential appointees come under the direct
disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the
absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority
on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public
officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying
the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation
into matters that require his informed decision.
4. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection of the laws
is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government;
The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that,
in the application of the law, “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.” The equal protection clause,
however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing
substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
5. Ombudsman; Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative
disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any
event, the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.
6. Administrative Agencies; Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to
“investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in
the government” and to “submit its report and recommendations to the President.” The IAD-
ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power
to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is
done for purposes of economy and efficiency.-
—A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must
also be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is
done for purposes of economy and efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of
functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
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In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that
while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC’s operation in the 2010
annual budget, no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

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8. Same; Same; Same; Same; The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a
new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct
anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the
Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of
the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division—the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division—through which ODESLA could take on the additional
functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
9. Same; Same; Same; Same; The distinction between the allowable organizational actions
under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not
only as it affects employees’ tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity
of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was
composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office of the President.” On
the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred,
is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the
Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
10. Same; Same; Same; Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC); The abolition of
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA) is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to
E.O. 292; Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under
his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O.
292. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring
either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand
in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to
take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less
drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another.

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21. Dela Cruz, Sr. vs. Fankhauser, 677 SCRA 744, July 30,
2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Procedure|Execution of
Judgments|Appeals
1. Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgments; Appeals; Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court states that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution; Exceptions.-
—Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution. However, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 (1985), the
Court stated that there are certain instances when an appeal from an order of execution
should be allowed, to wit: It is also a settled rule that an order of execution of judgment is not
appealable. However, where such order of execution in the opinion of the defeated party
varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, or when the
terms of the judgment are not clear and there is room for interpretation and the interpretation
given by the trial court as contained in its order of execution is wrong in the opinion of the
defeated party, the latter should be allowed to appeal from said order so that the Appellate
Tribunal may pass upon the legality and correctness of the said order. (Underscoring
supplied) Recently, the Court En Banc, in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Aumentado, Jr., 625 SCRA 241 (2010), reiterated that there are exceptions to the general
rule that an order of execution is not appealable, one of which is when the writ of execution
varies the judgment.

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22. Civil Service Commission vs. Yu, 678 SCRA 39, July 31,
2012 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Abandonment of
Office|Devolution
1. Local Government Units; Devolution; Words and Phrases; As defined, “devolution” is
the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Specifically, Section 17(i)
of the same Code prescribes the manner of devolution, as follows: (i) The devolution
contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to
the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities. Personnel of said national agencies or
offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose
areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the
said oversight committee: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive
service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be
absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without
any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.
2. Same; Same; View that Dr. Castillo’s manifest inaction to assert a legal right from 1992
up to her retirement from government service in 1996 constituted abandonment by
acquiescence, of whatever legal right she had over the devolved position of Public Health
Officer II (PHO II). Coupled with her acceptance or consent to her re-absorption by the DOH
in the DOH Regional Health Field Office No. IX in Zamboanga City, she effectively
abandoned any legal right she had to the PHO II position devolved to the Province, which
resulted in a vacancy in the said position. This paved the way for the valid appointment in
1994 of Dr. Yu who then was a de jure, not a de facto officer. Having been validly appointed
to a vacant position that was mandatorily and automatically devolved to the Province by
operation of law, Dr. Yu, as correctly pointed out by the assailed ruling of the Court of
Appeals, had a vested right to the position of PHO II that was later re-nationalized and
reclassified as Chief of Hospital II by operation of a subsequent law. As such, she is entitled to
all the corresponding salaries and benefits pertaining to the said office which she had not
received for the period not exceeding the day of her retirement which was on August 24,
2004.
3. Administrative Law; Abandonment of Office; Devolution; View that Dr. Castillo did
indeed abandon her statutory right to the position by acquiescence. Otherwise, there would
have been no vacancy in the said devolved position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu could
be validly appointed.-
—I fully concur with the factual and legal basis of the conclusion reached by the ponencia of
the Honorable Justice Estrella M. Perlas-Bernabe save with respect to her opinion that Dr.
Fortunata A. Castillo (Dr. Castillo) did not abandon the devolved position of Public Health
Officer II (PHO II). With due respect, I maintain contrary view that Dr. Castillo did indeed
abandon her statutory right to the said position by acquiescence. Otherwise, there would
have been no vacancy in the said devolved position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu)
could be validly appointed.
4. Same; Abandonment of Office; “Abandonment of an office is the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and
control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such
circumstance as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete
abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment.
Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation
and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first,
an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or ‘external’ act by which the intention is
carried into effect.”
5. Administrative Law; Detail; Words and Phrases; A detail is defined and governed by
Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus: (6) Detail. A
detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
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appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees
occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there
is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal,
the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the
Commission.

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23. Tumbokon vs. Pefianco, 678 SCRA 60, August
01, 2012 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Disbarment
1. Attorneys; Practice of Law; The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform
their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.
2. Same; Disbarment; We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are
minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and as member of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or
committed under scandalous circumstance, which do not obtain here. Considering the
circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
3. Same; Illegal Money Lending; We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending
not to have been sufficiently established. A “business” requires some form of investment and
a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis. The lending of money to a single person without showing that such service is made
available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed as indicia that
respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
4. Same; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; Respondent did not deny the accusation that
he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll
of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity
or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP’s
finding that respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.”

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24. Dhaliwal vs. Dumaguing, 678 SCRA 68, August
01, 2012 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.-
—Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as payment for the balance of the
purchase price of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used for the purpose,
should be immediately returned. “A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.”

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25. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Lee, 678 SCRA 171, August
01, 2012 Syllabi Class :Actions|Garnishment
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Parties; Section 5, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
court must be impleaded as private respondents.-
—Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in court must be impleaded as private respondents. Upon the
merger of Citytrust and BPI, with the latter as the surviving corporation, and with all the
liabilities and obligations of Citytrust transferred to BPI as if it had incurred the same, BPI
undoubtedly became a party interested in sustaining the proceedings, as it stands to be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case.
2. Actions; Garnishment; Upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes
a “virtual party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby acquires
jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and processes.-
—It is a settled rule that upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a
“virtual party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and t*he trial court thereby acquires
jurisdiction to bind the garnishee to comply with its orders and processes. In Perla Compania
de Seguros, Inc. v. Ramolete, 203 SCRA 487 (1991), the Court ruled: In order that the trial
court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary
that summons be served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the
case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or
any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service
upon him of the writ of garnishment. The Rules of Court themselves do not require that the
garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable.
xxxx Through the service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual party” to,
or a “forced intervenor” in, the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him
to compliance with all orders and processes of the trial court with a view to the complete
satisfaction of the judgment of the court.
3. Same; Same; Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits
belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.-
—Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to
the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. A writ of attachment is
substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the
termination, of a suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente
lite a lien until the judgment of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is established, when
the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy.
4. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a
preliminary attachment or garnishment except on grounds specifically provided in the
Revised Rules of Court.-
—The RTC is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a preliminary attachment or
garnishment except on grounds specifically provided in the Revised Rules of Court, namely,
(a) the debtor has posted a counter-bond or has made the requisite cash deposit; (b) the
attachment was improperly or irregularly issued as where there is no ground for attachment,
or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or insufficient; (c) the attachment is
excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the excess;
(d) the property attachment is exempt from preliminary attachment; or (e) the judgment is
rendered against the attaching creditor.

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26. Castro vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, 678 SCRA 730,
August 22, 2012 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA)
1. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA); The benefits of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) extend only to laborers and employees who are members of the
collective bargaining unit.-
—Settled is the rule that the benefits of a CBA extend only to laborers and employees who
are members of the collective bargaining unit. x x x Petitioners were no longer employees of
PLDT nor members of the collective bargaining unit represented by MKP when the CBA was
signed on March 14, 2001 or when it became effective on November 9, 2000 and are, thus,
not entitled to avail of the benefits under the new CBA. Accordingly, the Court finds no
reversible error on the part of the CA in directing each of the petitioners to return the amount
of P133,000.00 which they respectively received from respondents.

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27. Global Resource for Outsourced workers, Inc. vs. Velasco, 678 SCRA 751, August
22, 2012 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Nominal Damages
1. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A party who has not appealed
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed
decision; Exception.-
—In the case of Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Chua, 550 SCRA 600 (2008), the Court
cited an exception to the rule that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain any
affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed decision. It stated: Indeed, a
party who has failed to appeal from a judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can
no longer obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was already
granted under said judgment. However, when strict adherence to such technical rule will
impair a substantive right, such as that of an illegally dismissed employee to monetary
compensation as provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside the rule to
pave the way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
2. Same; Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts, like an employment
contract, have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith.-
—Obligations arising from contracts, like an employment contract, have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. When the terms
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations governs. However, when the contract is vague and
ambiguous, as in the case at bar, it is the Court’s duty to determine the real intention of the
contracting parties considering the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the latter.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; In case of conflict between the text of
a contract and the intent of the parties, it is the latter that prevails.-
—It should be emphasized that in case of conflict between the text of a contract and the
intent of the parties, it is the latter that prevails, for intention is the soul of a contract, not its
wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would
give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose
of agreements.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Two-Notice Rule; To be totally free from
liability, the employer must not only show sufficient ground for the termination of employment
but it must also comply with procedural due process by giving the employees sought to be
dismissed two notices.-
—To be totally free from liability, the employer must not only show sufficient ground for the
termination of employment but it must also comply with procedural due process by giving the
employees sought to be dismissed two notices: 1) notice of the intention to dismiss,
indicating therein the acts or omissions complained of, coupled with an opportunity for the
employees to answer and rebut the charges against them; and 2) notice of the decision to
dismiss.
5. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; The employers’ failure to observe due process when it
terminated the worker’s employment for just cause did not invalidate the dismissal but
rendered the former liable for nominal damages.-
—The petitioners’ failure to observe due process when it terminated respondents’
employment for just cause did not invalidate the dismissal but rendered petitioners liable for
nominal damages. Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
The amount thereof is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, the Court deems it proper to award to each of the
respondents PhP30,000.00 as nominal damages.

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28. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614,
September 04, 2012 Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Removal of Public Officers|Checks
and Balances|Impeachment
1. Ombudsman; Administrative Law; While the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of
congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist
that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
2. Statutory Construction; A construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.-
—It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part
thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
3. Ombudsman; Administrative Law; Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of
jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them,
including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without
question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.
Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have
prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through
its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President’s assumption of authority,
especially when the administrative charge involved “demanding and soliciting a sum of
money” which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds
reserved for the President’s exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
4. Presidency; Power to Remove; Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint
carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly
provides otherwise—that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President’s power to appoint. Under Section 9,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may
be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI),
while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article
IX(B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on
Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may
be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman
himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed
only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
5. Constitutional Law; Deputy Ombudsman; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770);Impeachment; Paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy
Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may
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be removed through impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”-
—Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from
political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds
provided for the removal of the Ombudsman

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and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for
impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office
for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely,
“culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would
diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It
is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman’s Deputies and
Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on
grounds provided by law.
6. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Administrative decisions in matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or
error of law.-
—The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of
petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP’s conclusion that the imputed
acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public
trust. To say that petitioner’s offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to
constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature’s intent
in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes
that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
7. Constitutional Law; Impeachment; Betrayal of Public Trust; Words and Phrases;
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to
the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption and other high crimes.-
—Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution
added to the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any
violation of the oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension
that “such an overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and
arbitrary exercise by the legislature.” Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that
referred to “all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the
officer unfit to continue in office” could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or
negligence in office.
8. Same; Same; Deputy Ombudsman; Special Prosecutors;—A Deputy Ombudsman and
a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal
from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have
intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and
apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of
impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been
made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their
scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly “overreach” to cover acts that are not
vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
9. Administrative Law; Ineptitude; Neglect of Duty; While the court’s determination of the
propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the
disciplinary authority’s determination of the prosecutor’s administrative liability is based on
whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the
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government’s best interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of
its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining
authority’s finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more
particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong
case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government
finds “grossly disadvantageous,” could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court
approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.

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10. Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Plea bargaining is allowable when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the
crime charged.-
—Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, if the basis for the
allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to
state that in its earlier Resolution promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had
evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that “the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of
strong character that militates against the grant of bail.” Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Major
General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this
juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the “standard of strong evidence of guilt which is
sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.” Hence, in light of the apparently strong
case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hardpressed
not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution’s turnabout in the case.
11. Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; View that the Supreme Court cannot assume that
the independence of the Ombudsman is the same as the independence of the Judiciary.
Neither is the independence of the Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the
National Economic and Development Authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the
Commission on Human Rights.-
—Our Constitution does not impart a fixed and rigid concept of independence among the
offices that it creates. While it declares certain bodies as “‘independent”, we cannot assume
that the independence of the Ombudsman is the same as the independence of the Judiciary.
Neither is the independence of the Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the
National Economic and Development Authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the
Commission on Human Rights. This Court cannot make a “one size fits all” concept of
independence because the Constitution itself differentiates the degree of independence of
these bodies.
12. Same; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770); View that Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act does not violate the Constitution; One of the constitutive principles of
our constitutional structure is the system of checks and balances— a check that is not within
a body, but outside of it.—I agree with the ponencia that Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act
does not violate the Constitution. The constitutional principle of independence does not
obviate the possibility of a check from another body. After all, one of the constitutive
principles of our constitutional structure is the system of checks and balances—a check that
is not within a body, but outside of it. This is how our democracy operates—on the basis of
distrust.
13. Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution prescribes how all public officers and employees, both impeachable and non-
impeachable, may be removed.-
—Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution prescribes how all public officers and
employees, both impeachable and non-impeachable, may be removed. Section 2 provides:
The President, the Vice President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
14. Same; Same; View that Congress, pursuant to Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution and in the exercise of its plenary power, enacted the Ombudsman Act,
conferring on the President the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor as provided in Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.-
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—The Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor are not among the impeachable
officers under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, as expressly provided in Section 2, Article XI of
the Constitution, they “may be removed from office as provided by law.” Congress, pursuant
to this constitutional provision and in the exercise of its plenary power, enacted the
Ombudsman Act, conferring on the President the power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman
and the Special Prosecutor as provided in Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.

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15. Same; Same; View that pursuant to Section 8(2) and Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act,
the legislative intent is to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the President and the Ombudsman in
the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.-
—In view of Section 8(2) and Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act, the legislative intent is to
grant concurrent jurisdiction to the President and the Ombudsman in the removal of the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. An “endeavor should be made to
harmonize the provisions of a law x x x so that each shall be effective.” This is not a hollow
precept of statutory construction. This is based not only on democratic principle but also on
the separation of powers, that this Court should not be so casual in voiding the acts of the
popularly elected legislature unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.
16. Same; Same; —Any reading of the 1987 Constitution does not warrant the conclusion
that all bodies declared by the Constitution as “independent” have exclusive disciplinary
authority over all their respective officials and employees. Unlike the Judiciary where such
exclusivity is expressly provided for in the Constitution, there is no reason to read such
provision in the Ombudsman where the Constitution is silent. On the contrary, the
constitutional provision that non-impeachable officers and employees “may be removed from
office as provided by law” removes any doubt that Congress can determine the mode of
removal of non-impeachable officers and employees of “independent” bodies other than the
Judiciary. An “independent” body does not have exclusive disciplinary authority over its
officials and employees unless the Constitution expressly so provides, as in the case of the
Judiciary.
17. Same; Same; Checks and Balances; A completely “independent” body is alien to our
constitutional system. There is no office that is insulated from a possible correction from
another office. The executive, legislative and judicial branches of government operate through
the system of checks and balances. All independent constitutional bodies are subject to
review by the courts. A fiscally autonomous body is subject to audit by the Commission on
Audit, and Congress cannot be compelled to appropriate a bigger budget than that of the
previous fiscal year.
18. Same; Same; Same; —Clearly, the Ombudsman is not constitutionally empowered to
act alone. Congress can even authorize the Department of Justice or the Office of the
President to investigate cases within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Similarly, the
Ombudsman can investigate public officers and employees ho are under the disciplinary
authority of heads of other bodies or agencies. The cases cited in the ponencia, i.e. Hagad
v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 (1995), and Office the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., 634
SCRA 135 (2010)—illustrate that concurrent jurisdiction does not impair the independence of
the Ombudsman. Duplication of functions may not at all times promote efficiency, but it is not
proscribed y the Constitution.
19. Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; The Ombudsman’s duty to protect the people from
unjust, illegal and inefficient acts of all public officials emanates from Section 12, Article XI of
the Constitution. These broad powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure.
20. Same; Checks and Balances; View that as a checks and balance mechanism, the
Constitution, the Rules of Court, and their implementing laws provide measures to
check on the “independence” granted to the Constitutional Commissions and the
Office of the Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of all legal questions,
may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse of discretion.-
—The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman, by the Constitutional
Commissions, and by the Judiciary shares certain characteristics—they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they
all enjoy fiscal autonomy. For most, if not for all of these “independent” bodies, the framers of
the Constitution intended that they be insulated from political pressure. As a checks and
balance mechanism, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and their implementing laws
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provide measures to check on the “independence” granted to the Constitutional
Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of all
legal questions, may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of
the Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse of discretion. Of course, foisted over
the Members of the Supreme Court is the power of impeachment that Congress has the
authority to initiate, and carry into its logical end a meritorious impeachment case. Such is the
symmetry that our Constitution provides for the harmonious balance of all its component and
“independent” parts.

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21. Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that the absence of a constitutional provision
providing for the removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen does not mean
that Congress can empower the President to discipline or remove them in violation of the
independence that the Constitution textually and expressly provides.-
—The President can appoint Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman and her Deputies, but the Constitution categorically
provides that the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman can only
be removed by impeachment. The absence of a constitutional provision providing for the
removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen does not mean that Congress can
empower the President to discipline or remove them in violation of the independence that the
Constitution textually and expressly provides. As members of independent constitutional
bodies, they should be similarly treated as lower court judges, subject to discipline only by
the head of their respective offices and subject to the general power of the Ombudsman to
dismiss officials and employees within the government for cause. No reason exists to treat
them differently.
22. Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot simply construe Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution to be a blanket authority for Congress to empower the President to remove
all other public officers and employees, including those under the independent constitutional
bodies.-
—While I agree with Justice Carpio’s opinion that the Constitution empowered Congress to
determine the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable officers, we cannot
simply construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution to be a blanket authority for
Congress to empower the President to remove all other public officers and employees,
including those under the independent constitutional bodies. When the Constitution states
that Congress may provide for the removal of public officers and employees by law, it does
not mean that the law can violate the provisions and principles laid out in the Constitution.
23. Constitutional Law; Removal of Public Officers; Ombudsman; View that with the
exception of those who are removable only by impeachment, the Office of the Ombudsman
can investigate and take action against any appointive or elected official for corruption in
office, be they Congressmen, Senators, Department Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or
Barangay Captains.-
—The Constitution has reasons for making the Office of the Ombudsman “independent.” Its
primordial duty is to investigate and discipline all elective and appointive government
officials. Specifically, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution vests in that Office the
absolute power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance of public
officers or employees. This function places it a notch higher than other grievance-handling,
investigating bodies. With the excep

tion of those who are removable only by impeachment, the Office of the Ombudsman can
investigate and take action against any appointive or elected official for corruption in office,
be they Congressmen, Senators, Department Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or Barangay
Captains.
24. Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Impeachment; View that the power to impeach is
a function of check and balance under the Constitution. But the power to remove “public
officers and employees” from office, in the realm of administrative law, is a function of
supervision, if not control.-
—The power to impeach is a function of check and balance under the Constitution. But the
power to remove “public officers and employees” from office, in the realm of administrative
law, is a function of supervision, if not control. Keeping the Deputies in the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor independent as the Constitution commands and
subjecting them to the President’s control or supervision are incompatible ideas.

****

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29. City of Iriga vs. Camarines Sur Electric Co (CASURECO III), 680 SCRA 236, Sept
05, 2012 Syllabi Class :Taxation|Franchise Tax|Words and Phrases
1. Remedial Law; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; RA 9282, which took effect
on April 23, 2004, expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to include,
among others, the power to review by appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction.
2. Same; Same; Franchise tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax
on business, rather than on persons or property.-
—It should be stressed that what the petitioner seeks to collect from CASURECO III is a
franchise tax, which as defined, is a tax on the exercise of a privilege. As Section 137 of the
LGC provides, franchise tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on
business, rather than on persons or property. Since it partakes of the nature of an excise tax,
the situs of taxation is the place where the privilege is exercised, in this case in the City of
Iriga, where CASURECO III has its principal office and from where it operates, regardless of
the place where its services or products are delivered. Hence, franchise tax covers all gross
receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
3. Same; Same; Requisites That Must Concur in Order to be Liable for Local Franchise Tax.-
—To be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that one has
a “franchise” in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its
rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local government
unit.
4. Same; Franchise Tax; Words and Phrases; In National Power Corporation v. City of
Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003), the Court declared that “a franchise tax is ‘a tax on the
privilege of transacting business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by
the state.’ ” It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its
property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the
government. “It is within this context that the phrase tax on businesses enjoying a franchise
in Section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and understood.”
5. Same; Local Taxation; The power of the local government units to impose and collect
taxes is derived from the Constitution itself which grants them “the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the Congress may provide.” This explicit constitutional grant of power to tax is
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy and decentralization of governance. With
this power, local government units have the fiscal mechanisms to raise the funds needed to
deliver basic services to their constituents and break the culture of dependence on the
national government. Thus, consistent with these objectives, the LGC was enacted granting
the local government units, like petitioner, the power to impose and collect franchise tax.
6. Taxation; Cooperatives; Electric Cooperatives; In Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, 403 SCRA 558 (2003), the Court held that the tax privileges granted to
electric cooperatives registered with NEA under PD 269 were validly withdrawn and only
those registered with the CDA under RA 6938 may continue to enjoy the tax privileges under
the Cooperative Code. Therefore, CASURECO III can no longer invoke PD 269 to evade
payment of local taxes. Moreover, its provisional registration with the CDA which granted it
exemption for the payment of local taxes was extended only until May 4, 1992. Thereafter, it
can no longer claim any exemption from the payment of local taxes, including the subject
franchise tax.
7. Void Judgments; A void judgment has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place.-
—Considering that RA 9282 was already in effect when the RTC rendered its decision on
February 7, 2005, CASURECO III should have filed its appeal, not with the CA, but with the
CTA Division in accordance with the applicable law and the rules of the CTA. Resort to the CA
was, therefore, improper, rendering its decision null and void for want of jurisdiction over the
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subject matter. A void judgment has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at
any place. Hence, the fact that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from the CA Decision
was belatedly filed is inconsequential, because a void and non-existent decision would never
have acquired finality.

****

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30. Atilano II vs. Asaali, 680 SCRA 345, September 10,
2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Execution of
Judgments
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; Payment of the full amount of
docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment.-
—Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an
appeal, and the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment. Corollary
to this, the Court has consistently held that procedural rules are not to be disregarded simply
because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
2. Same; Execution of Judgments; Execution of a judgment can only be issued against
one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not
have his day in court.-
—It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a
judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one
who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a
court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.

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31. Velasco vs. Commission on Audit, 681 SCRA 102, September
18, 2012 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Public Officials
1. Administrative Law; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Administrative Order No. 161;
Administrative Order (AO) 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive
benefits under a uniform set of rules.-
—AO 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a
uniform set of rules. It sought to address the dissension and dissatisfaction—which came
about when some department heads granted incentive benefits of varying amounts to their
officials and employees based on the provisions of Sections 31, 35 and 36 (2), Chapter 5,
Subtitle I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987—among those government employees
who received less or no benefits due to lack of funds. It recognized the need to have a
“standard system of incentive pay based on productivity and performance among officials and
employees of the Government.”
2. Same; Same; With regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval
of the subject incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly
negligent for having received the benefits under the circumstances; Being in good faith,
they are therefore under no obligation to refund the subject benefits which they received.-
—With regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval of the subject
incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly negligent for having received
the benefits under the circumstances. The approving officers’ allowance of the said awards
certainly tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees. Being
in good faith, they are therefore under no obligation to refund the subject benefits which they
received.
3. Same; Public Officials; Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted
beyond their scope of authority or where there is a showing of bad faith.-
—Indeed, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his
duties. However, public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted beyond their scope
of authority or where there is a showing of bad faith. Thus, in the case of Casal v.
Commission on Audit, 509 SCRA 138 (2006), the Court held liable the approving officers who
authorized the grant of productivity award in complete disregard of the prohibition declared
by a presidential issuance, ratiocinating that: The failure of petitioners-approving officers to
observe all these issuances cannot be deemed a mere lapse consistent with the presumption
of good faith. Rather, even if the grant of the incentive award were not for a dishonest
purpose as they claimed, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the
directives of the COA amounts to gross negligence, making them liable for the refund thereof.
Similarly in the present case, the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers to abide
with the provisions of AO 103 and AO 161 overcame the presumption of good faith. The
deliberate disregard of these issuances is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. Therefore, the petitioners-approving officers are accountable for the refund of the
subject incentives which they received.
4. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds that Administrative Order (AO) 161
was issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments; There is only one Chief Executive who directs and controls the entire
executive branch, and all other executive officials must implement in good faith his directives
and orders.-
—In the present case, and in line with the pronouncements in Casal v. Commission on Audit,
509 SCRA 138 (2006) and Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366 (1998), the Court finds that
AO 161 was issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments, which Chairman Velasco was duty bound to observe. “Executive officials who
are subordinate to the President should not trifle with the President’s constitutional power of
control over the executive branch. There is only one Chief Executive who directs and
controls the entire executive branch, and all other executive officials must implement in good
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faith his directives and orders. This is necessary to provide order, efficiency and coherence
in carrying out the plans, policies and programs of the executive branch.”

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32. Pilot vs. Baron, 681 SCRA 481, September 24, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Sheriffs|Dishonesty|Grave
Misconduct|Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)

****

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33. The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc. vs. Dakila, 681 SCRA 658, September
24, 2012 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Employer-
Employee Relationship

****

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34. Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. vs. CIR, 682 SCRA 49, September
26, 2012 Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Amnesty|Tax Amnesty Program (R.A. No.
9480)

****

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35. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., 682 SCRA 59, September
26, 2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Indispensable Parties

****

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36. Asso. Marine Off. and Seamen's Union of the Phil vs. Decena, 682 SCRA
308,October 08, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act (R.A.
No. 6552)
1. Civil Law; Contract to Sell; Words and Phrases; It is basic that a contract is what the
law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties. A contract to sell is
defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
itself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
2. Same; Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act (R.A. No. 6552); As we emphasized in
Pagtalunan vs. Dela Cruz Vda. De Manzano, 533 SCRA 242 (2007), “R.A. No. 6552,
otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act, recognizes in conditional
sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller to
cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply an
event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.”
While we agreed that the cancellation of a contract to sell may be done outside of court,
however, “the cancellation by the seller must be in accordance with Sec. 3(b) of
R.A. No. 6552, which requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the full
payment of the cash surrender value of the payments on the property.”

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37. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 683 SCRA 553, October 10,
2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Prescription

****

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38. People vs. De Los Reyes, 684 SCRA 216, October
16, 2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal
Procedure|Appeals
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; With the Court’s pronouncement in the
2004 case of People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and making mandatory
the intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases involving the death penalty,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand
these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in
view of the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997
Decision. However, with the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo,
433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the
CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper
course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an
intermediate review.
2. Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such,
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.-
—It bears to stress that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules, failing
which, the right to appeal is lost.
3. Same; Same; Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in
appellant’s case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right
to seek relief therefrom.-
—Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and
was, in fact, tried and convicted in absentia. There is dearth of evidence showing that he has
since surrendered to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative relief
before the courts. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in
appellant’s case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right
to seek relief therefrom.

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39. Diageo Philippines, Inc. vs. CIR, 685 SCRA 168, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class:Taxation|Excise Taxes|Tax Refund|Words and Phrases|Indirect Taxes|Taxpayer|Tax
Exemptions
1. Same; Tax Exemptions; Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.-
—Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and
based on language in law too plain to be mistaken. Unfortunately, Diageo failed to meet the
burden of proof that it is covered by the exemption granted under Section 130(D) of the Tax
Code. In sum, Diageo, not being the party statutorily liable to pay excise taxes and having
failed to prove that it is covered by the exemption granted under Section 130(D) of the Tax
Code, is not the proper party to claim a refund or credit of the excise taxes paid on the
ingredients of its exported locally produced liquor.
2. Taxation; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The Court has categorically declared that “[t]he
proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the
person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the
burden thereof to another.”-
—The phrase “any excise tax paid thereon shall be credited or refunded” requires that the
claimant be the same person who paid the excise tax. In Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 544 SCRA 100 (2008), the Court has categorically
declared that “[t]he proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the
statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the same
even if he shifts the burden thereof to another.”
3. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code
are taxes on property which are imposed on “goods manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition and to things
imported.”-
—Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on property which are
imposed on “goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or
consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported.” Though excise taxes are
paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from the place of
production or by the owner or importer before the release of imported articles from the
customs house, the same partake of the nature of indirect taxes when it is passed on to the
subsequent purchaser.
4. Same; Same; Same; Indirect Taxes; Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the
liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to
another person.-
—Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on
one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person. When the seller passes
on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the
purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered. Accordingly, when the
excise taxes paid by the supplier were passed on to Diageo, what was shifted is not the tax
per se but an additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the supplier remains the statutory
taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser, actually shoulders the burden of tax.
5. Same; Taxpayer; Words and Phrases; As defined in Section 22(N) of the Tax Code, a
taxpayer means any person subject to tax.-
—As defined in Section 22(N) of the Tax Code, a taxpayer means any person subject to tax.
He is, therefore, the person legally liable to file a return and pay the tax as provided for in
Section 130(A). As such, he is the person entitled to claim a refund.
6. Same; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The person entitled to claim a tax refund is the
statutory taxpayer or the person liable for or subject to tax.-
—The person entitled to claim a tax refund is the statutory taxpayer or the person liable for
or subject to tax. In the present case, it is not disputed that the supplier of Diageo imported the
subject raw alcohol, hence, it was the one directly liable and obligated to file a return and pay
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the excise taxes under the Tax Code before the goods or products are removed from the
customs house. It is, therefore, the statutory taxpayer as contemplated by law and remains
to be so, even if it shifts the burden of tax to Diageo. Consequently, the right to claim a
refund, if legally allowed, belongs to it and cannot be transferred to another, in this case
Diageo, without any clear provision of law allowing the same.

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40. Lopez vs. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Wills|Testamentary Succession|Attestation Clause
1. Civil Law; Wills; Testamentary Succession; Attestation Clause; The law is clear that
the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some
of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.-
—The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission
of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article
809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard
likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject
last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification
and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually
consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by
mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

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41. Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 685 SCRA 216, November 12,
2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Certiorari|Motions to
Dismiss|Interlocutory Orders|Civil
Procedure|Courts|Jurisdiction
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that the nature of an action
and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the
material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and
the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims averred.-
—It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over
such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in
force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to
dismiss the same.
2. Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motions to Dismiss; Interlocutory Orders; As a general
rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.-
—An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss
cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the
motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.

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42. Millan vs. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., 685 SCRA 225, November 12,
2012 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Permanent Total Disability|Temporary
Total Disability
1. Same; Same; Temporary Total Disability; The rule is that a temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period,
declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.-
—Despite the lapse of the 120-day period, petitioner was still considered to be under a state
of temporary total disability at the time he filed his complaint on August 29, 2003, 184 days
from the date of his medical repatriation which is well-within the 240-day applicable period in
this case. Hence, he cannot be said to have acquired a cause of action for total and
permanent disability benefits. To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period,
declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; A seafarer’s inability to resume his
work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness
is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability
benefits in his favor. In Vergara
v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court elucidated on the
seeming conflict between Paragraph 3, Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC (Department Order
No. 004-00) and Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, thus: As these provisions operate, the
seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician
within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as
he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared
fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no
such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to
the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time
such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
3. Same; Same; Same; Instances When a Seafarer may be Allowed to Pursue an Action for
Total and Permanent Disability Benefits.-
—Applying Vergara, the Court in the recent case of C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v.
Taok, 677 SCRA 296 (2012), enumerated the following instances when a seafarer may be
allowed to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits, to wit: (a) The
company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea
duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120- day period and there is no indication that
further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an
extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued
by the company-designated physician; (c) The company-designated physician declared that
he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a
contrary opinion; (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially
permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The
company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but
there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company- designated physician
determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-
SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the
POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g) The company-designated
physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him
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the corresponding benefits; and (h) The company-designated physician declared him
partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.

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43. Gua-an vs. Quirino, 685 SCRA 236, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Presidential Decree No. 27|Reversion|Abandonment of
Landholding|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Abandonment of Landholding; Words and Phrases; As defined in Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a
willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, “to
cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific
economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.”-
—While CLT No. 0-025227 remains in Prisco’s+ name, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to
the fact that Prisco+ surrendered possession and cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto,
not for a mere temporary period, but for a period of 11 years without any justifiable reason.
Such act constituted abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume possession of the
land upon payment of the loan. As defined in DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his
farm household, “to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land
for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.” It is a
ground for cancellation by the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consequently, respondent and/or Prisco’s+ heirs had lost any right to redeem the subject
landholding.
2. Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; Upon the promulgation of P.D. 27,
farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the land they were tilling and given the rights to
possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. Thus, P.D. 27 specifically
prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to the government or by hereditary
succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries.-
—It bears to stress that upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed
owners of the land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for themselves. Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such
landholding except to the government or by hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657
further allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified
beneficiaries. Consequently, any other transfer constitutes a violation of the above
proscription and is null and void for being contrary to law. Relevant on this point is Ministry of
Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979 which provides: “Despite the x
x x prohibition, x x x many farmer-beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their ownership,
rights and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the
same to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of P.D. 27
and therefore null and void.”
3. Same; Same; Reversion; Reversion of the landholding to the former owner is proscribed
under P.D. No. 27.-
—The redemption made by petitioner Aurelia was ineffective and void since reversion of the
landholding to the former owner is likewise proscribed under P.D. No. 27 in accordance with
its policy of holding such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farmers.

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44. Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, November 13, 2012
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law|Writs of Amparo|Evidence|Freedom from Fear|Extraordinary
Diligence

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45. Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Dy, 685 SCRA 567, November
14, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Fraud|Words and Phrases
1. Civil Law; Contracts; The subsequent nullification of title to a property is not a ground to
annul the contractual right which may have been derived by a purchaser, mortgagee or other
transferee who acted in good faith.-
—While it is settled that a simulated deed of sale is null and void and therefore, does not
convey any right that could ripen into a valid title, it has been equally ruled that, for reasons
of public policy, the subsequent nullification of title to a property is not a ground to annul the
contractual right which may have been derived by a purchaser, mortgagee or other
transferee who acted in good faith.
2. Same; Fraud; Words and Phrases; Fraud comprises “anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable
duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an
undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.”-
—To be sure, fraud comprises “anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another.” In this light, the Dys’ and Sps. Delgado’s deliberate
simulation of the sale intended to obtain loan proceeds from and to prejudice Philbank clearly
constitutes fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps. Delgado cannot now be allowed to deny the
validity of the mortgage executed by the Dys in favor of Philbank as to hold otherwise would
effectively sanction their blatant bad faith to Philbank’s detriment.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing short of extraordinary diligence is required of banks
whose business is impressed with public interest.-
—A finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the attendant
circumstances of a particular case. As aptly held in Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of
Estanislao Militar, 494 SCRA 308 (2006), “the diligence with which the law requires the
individual or a corporation at all times to govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of
the situation in which one is placed, and the importance of the act which is to be performed.”
Thus, without diminishing the time-honored principle that nothing short of extraordinary
diligence is required of banks whose business is impressed with public interest, Philbank’s
inconsequential oversight should not and cannot serve as a bastion for fraud and deceit.
4. Same; Loans; Banks and Banking; Extraordinary Diligence; In the case of banks and
other financial institutions, greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued
with public interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before
approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to
conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the
genuineness of the title to determine the real owner(s) thereof.-
—Primarily, it bears noting that the doctrine of “mortgagee in good faith” is based on the rule
that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not
required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is in deference to the public
interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title as evidence of lawful ownership
of the land or of any encumbrance thereon. In the case of banks and other financial
institutions, however, greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued with
public interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before approving a
loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular
inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to
determine the real owner(s) thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular inspection is to
protect the “true owner” of the property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or
claim thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto.

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46. Aldersgate College, Inc. vs. Gauuan, 685 SCRA 646, November 14, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Motions to Dismiss|Intra-corporate
Controversies
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions to Dismiss; In an ordinary civil action, a motion
to dismiss must generally be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint.-
—In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed “within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint” and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party; (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c)
That venue is improperly laid; (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause
of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; (i) That the
claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
2. Same; Same; Same; Intra-corporate Controversies; Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading.-
—Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading. As this case involves an intra-
corporate dispute, the motion to dismiss is undeniably a prohibited pleading. Moreover, the
Court finds no justification for the dismissal of the case based on the mere issuance of a
board resolution by the incumbent members of the Board of Trustees of petitioner
corporation recommending its dismissal, especially considering the various issues raised by
the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have entertained, let alone
have granted the subject motion to dismiss.

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47. Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 686 SCRA 1, November 20, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Judicial Clemency|Accrued
Leaves|Penalties|Forfeiture of Benefits

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48. PSBANK vs. Senate Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35, November
20, 2012 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Courts|Moot and Academic
1. Same; Same; Same; The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29,
2012, as well as his execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts,
whether in peso or foreign currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.-
—Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily when it issued
the assailed subpoena to obtain information concerning the subject foreign currency deposits
notwithstanding the confidentiality of such deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by
events. The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29, 2012, as well as his
execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or
foreign currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.
2. Remedial Law; Courts; Moot and Academic; Courts will not determine questions that
have become moot and academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to
speak of.-
—It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and
academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment
will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of
things, it cannot be enforced. In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 271
SCRA 204 (1997), the Court ruled: It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

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49. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Bajaro, 686 SCRA 39, November
21, 2012 Syllabi Class :Statutes

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50. Great White Shark Enterprises, Inc. vs. Caralde, Jr., 686 SCRA 201, November
21, 2012 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Trademarks|Dominancy Test|Holistic Test

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51. Sutton vs. Lim, 686 SCRA 745, December 03,
2012 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Republic Act
No. 9700

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52. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, December
03, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Principle of Unjust
Enrichment

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53. Crisologo vs. People, 686 SCRA 782, December
03, 2012 Syllabi Class :Civil
Law|Evidence|Payment|Burden of Proof

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54. Ong vs. Basiya-Saratan, 688 SCRA 1, January 07,
2013 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court
Personnel|Clerks of Court
1. Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use
reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk
of court, 18 failing which, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.-
—As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which,
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably
failed to issue the alias writs of execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978
despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard
of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court
without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied
admission of the charges.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Clerks of Court; Clerks of Court are primarily
responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they
cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping
the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and
giving certified copies of records upon request.-
—Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel
to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court like
respondent are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court
processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are
charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes,
entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon request. As such,
they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of
their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.

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55. Dabalos vs. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City (Pampanga), 688 SCRA 64, January
07, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Information|Amendment of
Pleadings
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Amendment of Pleadings; Sec. 14
of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the
present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct
in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.
2. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Their Children; Republic Act No. 9262;
The law on violence against women and their children is broad in scope but specifies
two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of
violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a
woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he
has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2)
it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.-
—Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, (a)
“Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting
qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against
women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and
the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in
physical harm or suffering.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592 (2010) the Court
enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment.-
—In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592 (2010), the Court enumerated the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had
a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or
through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3.
The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
4. Same; Same; Same; Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the
law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship
had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or
dating relationship.
5. Same; Same; Same; TNeither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner
using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe
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sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have
or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting
the protection of women and children.

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56. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, 688 SCRA 437, January
14, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Damages|Actual Damages

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57. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, 688 SCRA 485, January
14, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Contempt

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58. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco againts Associate Justices Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr., Alex L. Quiroz and Samuel R. Martires of the Sandiganbayan, 688 SCRA
498, January 15, 2013 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Execution of Judgments

****

77
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59. Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. Against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon.
Sesinando
E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, 688
SCRA 507, January 15, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Actions

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60. Gontang vs. Alayan, 688 SCRA 659, January 16,
2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Right to Counsel:
1. Attorneys; Right to Counsel; In instances where personal liability on the part of local
government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel. -
The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner
cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v.
RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 553 (1993), the Court ruled that
in instances like the present case where personal liability on the part of local government
officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel, explaining: It
can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in
that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense
would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have
been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without,
however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa
v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions, ‘municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the
extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements
thereof. In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In
one case, We held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in
court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a
private counsel would be proper. And in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a
provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel
when “the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if
due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.

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61. Padillo vs. Rural Bank of Nabunturan, Inc., 689 SCRA 53, January
21, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Labor Law|Bad Faith
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Disease; Article 297 of the Labor Code
contemplates a situation where the employer, and not the employee, initiates the termination
of employment on the ground of the latter’s disease or sickness.-As held in Villaruel vs. Yeo
Han Guan, 650 SCRA 64 (2011), a precedent which the CA correctly applied, Article 297 of
the Labor Code contemplates a situation where the employer, and not the employee, initiates
the termination of employment on the ground of the latter’s disease or sickness, viz.: A plain
reading of the [Article 297 of the Labor Code] clearly presupposes that it is the employer who
terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the
health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the employee who
severs his or her employment ties. This is precisely the reason why Section 8, Rule 1, Book
VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not
terminate the services of the employee unless there is a certification by a competent public
health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.
2. Same; Labor Law; Bad Faith; It is axiomatic that bad faith can never be presumed—it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.—Neither can the grant of an early
retirement package to Lusan show that Padillo was unfairly discriminated upon. Records
show that the same was merely an isolated incident and petitioners have failed to show that
any bad faith or motive attended such disparate treatment between Lusan and Padillo.
Irrefragably also, there is no showing that other Bank employees were accorded the same
benefits as that of Lusan which thereby dilutes the soundness of petitioners’ imputation of
discrimination and bad faith. Verily, it is axiomatic that held faith can never be presumed—it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. This petitioners were unable to prove in
the case at bar.
3. Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse
of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or
duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.-
—While the Court mindfully notes that damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right
under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
following elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in
bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that
none of these elements exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse
of right may he recovered.
4. Same; Company Practice; Words and Phrases; To be considered a company practice,
the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be
shown to have been consistent and deliberate.-—Neither was it proven that there exists an
established company policy of giving early retirement packages to the Bank’s aging
employees. In the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 589 SCRA 376 (2009), it has been pronounced that to be considered a
company practice, the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long period of
time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. In this relation, petitioners’
bare allegation of the solitary case of Lusan cannot—assuming such fact to be true—
sufficiently establish that the Bank’s grant of an early retirement package to her (Lusan)
evolved into an established company practice precisely because of the palpable lack of the
element of consistency. As such, petitioners’ reliance on the Lusan incident cannot bolster
their claim.
5. Same; Retirement; In the absence of any applicable agreement, an employee must (1)
retire when he is at least sixty (60) years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the
company to entitle him/her to a retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary for
every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
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whole year.-
—Simply stated, in the absence of any applicable agreement, an employee must (1) retire
when he is at least sixty (60) years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the company to
entitle him/her to a retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Notably, these age and tenure requirements are cumulative and non-compliance with one
negates the employee’s entitlement to the retirement

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benefits under Article 300 of the Labor Code altogether. In this case, it is undisputed that
there exists no retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement or any other equivalent
contract between the parties which set out the terms and condition for the retirement of
employees, with the sole exception of the Philam Life Plan which premiums had already
been paid by the Bank.
6. Same; Managerial Employees; Confidential Employees; Types of Employees That Are
Prohibited to Self-Organize.-
—In this case, it cannot be said that Padillo belonged to the same class of employees
prohibited to self- organize which, at present, consist of: (1) managerial employees; and (2)
confidential employees who assist persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. Therefore, absent this equitable
peculiarity, termination pay on the ground of disease under Article 297 of the Labor Code
and the Court’s ruling in Abaquin should not be applied.

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62. Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, 689 SCRA 69, January 22,
2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and
even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those
who have reformed their ways.-—From the attestations and certifications presented, the
Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of
age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its
duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case.

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63. Vinzons-Chato vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 689 SCRA 107,
January 22, 2013
Syllabi Class: Election Law|Constitutional Law|House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
1. Election Law; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to
review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, it shall not interfere with
the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.-“It is hornbook principle that
our jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon
showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal”; otherwise, we shall not
interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of
discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or the
exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty.” The acts complained of in these cases pertain to the
HRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise which we find to be well within the bounds of
its authority and, therefore, beyond our power to restrict or curtail.
2. Same; Same; Same; At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the
HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving its members, we cannot substitute our
own judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during
the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of
the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. In any
case, as pointed out by the HRET, the revision proceedings for the remaining 75% protested
clustered precincts had already been conducted from May 2-9, 2012 thereby rendering the
issue moot and academic.
3. Same; Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The
Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the
Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election
contests involving its members is intended to be its own—full, complete and unimpaired. The
Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its exclusive control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules,
as follows: Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions.—The Tribunal shall have exclusive
control, direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.
4. Same; Same; Encryption; Words and Phrases; It bears stressing that the digital
images of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the
CF cards. “Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way
that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that authorized parties can. In an
encryption scheme, the message or information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using
an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with the
use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be encoded. Any adversary
that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine anything about the original
message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a decryption
algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not have access
to.”
5. Same; Automated Election System (AES); Words and Phrases; —Section 2 (3) of
R.A. No. 9369 defines “official ballot” where AES is utilized as the “paper ballot, whether
printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the
votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form.” An automated election
system, or AES, is a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in
the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other
electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under
R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic election
system. A paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010
elections, is the type of AES that “use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,
consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count.” On the
other hand, direct recording electronic election system “uses electronic ballots, records,
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votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component
that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of computer programs, record
voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.”
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64. People vs. Laba, 689 SCRA 367, January 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Entries Made in Official Records

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65. Re: Request of (Ref) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Recomputation of
His Creditable Service for the Purpose of Recomputing His Retirement Benefits, 690
SCRA 242, February 12, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Retirement|Government Service

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66. Martinez vs. People, 690 SCRA 656, February 13, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Searches and Seizures|Warrantless Arrests

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67. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Molon, 691 SCRA 113, February
18, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Illegal Dismissals|Reinstatement|Backwages
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court has the
authority to sift through the factual findings of both the Court of Appeals and the National
Labor Relations Commission in the event of their conflict.-
—Parenthetically, in a special civil action for certiorari, the CA is authorized to make its own
factual determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking
or disregarding evidence which are material to the controversy. The Court, in turn, has the
same authority to sift through the factual findings of both the CA and the NLRC in the event of
their conflict. Thus, in Plastimer Industrial Corporation v. Gopo, 643 SCRA 502 (2011), the
Court explained: In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample
authority to make its own factual determination. Thus, the Court of Appeals can grant a
petition for certiorari when it finds that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by
disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To make this finding, the Court of Appeals
necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own factual determination. In the same
manner, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are
conflicting findings by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. x x x x.
2. Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; An illegally dismissed employee
is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has ordered the reinstatement
of the employee without backwages considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the
employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (2) the employer was in good faith in
terminating the employee. For instance, in the case of Cruz v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 120 SCRA 15 (1983), the Court ruled as follows: The Court is convinced that
petitioner’s guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, we agree with respondent
Minister’s order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be
too drastic. Denial of backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank
officials acted in good faith. They should be exempt from the burden of paying backwages.
The good faith of the employer, when clear under the circumstances, may preclude or
diminish recovery of backwages. Only employees discriminately dismissed are entitled to
backpay. x x x.
3. Same; Quitclaims; A waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the
parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement and the one
accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. The
applicable provision is Article 232 of the Labor Code which reads in part: ART. 232.
Compromise Agreements.―Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor
standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or
the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. x x
x
4. Same; Union Busting; Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting
when the existence of the union is threatened by the employer’s act of dismissing the
former’s officers who have been duly-elected in accordance with its constitution and by-laws.
On the other hand, the term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in
the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization, with the sole exception of Article 257(f) (previously Article
248[f]). As explained in the case of Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global
Communications, 495 SCRA 214 (2006): Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the
workers’ right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-
organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how
unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f) [now Article 257(f)].
5. Same; Same; Same; The employer must prove the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, said ground for termination
would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses
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or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees.-
—Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised
only as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees’ livelihood. It is
justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or
inadequate. Corollary thereto, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence;

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otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers
who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease
out employees. These requirements are: (1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and
likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as
perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written
notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays the retrenched
employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative
to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or
circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair
and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained
among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and
financial hardship for certain workers.
6. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; Words and Phrases;
Retrenchment is defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer through
no fault of the employee and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by management during
periods of business recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls
over shortage of materials. It is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer
to minimize business losses incurred in the operation of its business. Under Article 297 of
the Labor Code, retrenchment is one of the authorized causes to validly terminate an
employment.

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68. People vs. Lamsen, 691 SCRA 498, February
20, 2013 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Conspiracy
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it
was the trial judge who personally heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the
manner in which they testified during trial.-
—Well-settled is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it was the trial judge
who personally heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the manner in which
they testified during trial. Thus, where there is no showing that the trial judge overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then the Court
shall not disturb the assessment of the facts and credibility of the witnesses by the trial court.
2. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may
be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime.-
—It is settled that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred
from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.
It can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts
point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests. As correctly
found by the court a quo and affirmed by the CA, the events surrounding the commission of
the crime would readily establish conspiracy among the accused-appellants in committing
robbery with homicide. Thus, they were correctly convicted of the aforementioned crime.
3. Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Elements of; Words and Phrases;
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.-
—Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is sufficient
for conviction if: [a] there is more than one (1) circumstance; [b] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine
whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is
that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each
and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with the
accused’s innocence.

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69. Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. vs. Episcope, 692 SCRA 227, February
27, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Loss of Trust
and Confidence

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 ****
70. Gotesco Properties, Inc. vs. Fajardo, 692 SCRA 319, February
27, 2013 Syllabi Class :Corporation Law|Liability of Corporate Officers
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Subdivisions and Condominiums; In a
contract to sell, the seller’s obligation to deliver the corresponding certificates of title
is simultaneous and reciprocal to the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price;
Section 25 of PD 957 imposes on the subdivision owner or developer the obligation to cause
the transfer of the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon full payment.-
—It is settled that in a contract to sell, the seller’s obligation to deliver the corresponding
certificates of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to the buyer’s full payment of the purchase
price. In this relation, Section 25 of PD 957, which regulates the subject transaction, imposes
on the subdivision owner or developer the obligation to cause the transfer of the
corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon full payment, to wit: Sec. 25. Issuance of
Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full
payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale
in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a
mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the
buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion
thereof within six months from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or
unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.
2. Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Officers; In the absence of malice and bad
faith, as in this case, officers of the corporation cannot be made personally liable for liabilities
of the corporation which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers, stockholders, and members.-
—The Court finds no basis to hold individual petitioners solidarily liable with petitioner GPI
for the payment of damages in favor of Sps. Fajardo since it was not shown that they acted
maliciously or dealt with the latter in bad faith. Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice
and bad faith, as in this case, officers of the corporation cannot be made personally liable for
liabilities of the corporation which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct
from its officers, stockholders, and members.
3. Same; Same; Rescission of Contracts; Rescission does not merely terminate the contract
and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract
from its inception and restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has
been made.-
—It is noteworthy to point out that rescission does not merely terminate the contract and
release the parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from its
inception and restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been made.
Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of the benefits that each party may
have received as a result of the contract, is thus required. To be sure, it has been settled that
the effects of rescission as provided for in Article 1385 of the Code are equally applicable to
cases under Article 1191.

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 ****

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71. Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, 692 SCRA 339, March 04,
2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Appeals|Certiorari

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 ****
72. Jinon vs. Jiz, 692 SCRA 348, March 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Substantial Evidence
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Practice of Law; The practice of law is considered a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for the profession.-
—The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code. “Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of
the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.”
2. Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.-
—The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court
therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.-
—Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer
of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. “A lawyer’s failure
to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.”
4. Same; Same; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise
due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.-
—Undeniably, “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal
profession, the court and society.”

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 ****
73. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Grageda, 693 SCRA 15, March
11, 2013 Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Public Officers
1. Administrative Proceedings; Public Officers; In order for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent public official or employee.-
—Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over
an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the
respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is
predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once
jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or
employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In fine, cessation from
office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed
against the said officer or employee at the time that he was still in the public service or
render it moot and academic.
2. Same; Same; In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539
(2011), the Court ruled that while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an
investigation against the errant employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case
against Andutan who had already resigned, more so since his resignation or severance of
employment from the service was not availed of to prevent the continuation of the pending
administrative case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.-
—In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court
ruled that while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an investigation against
the errant employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan who
had already resigned, more so since his resignation or severance of employment from the
service was not availed of to prevent the continuation of the pending administrative case or
to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. The Court also dismissed an administrative case filed
against a retired court stenographer for having been initiated over a month after her
retirement from the service. Moreover, in Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, 692 SCRA 8 (2013), the Court
absolved herein respondent, Judge Grageda, from any administrative liability since the
complaint against him was filed after his retirement from the judiciary.

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74. Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), vs. Centeno, 693 SCRA 110, March
11, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Appeals
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; Consolidation of Titles; After consolidation of title in the
purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right
to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.-
—It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon
proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of
a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained
in Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which partly provides.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court.-
—On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent in his Comment,
records show that the RTC had already passed upon petitioner’s title over the subject lots
during the course of the proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already
been established for the purpose of issuing a writ of possession. It is hornbook principle that
absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower
court, its findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court
held that the phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor” contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.-
—In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held that the
phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor”
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property.
Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third
party adversely to the judgment obligor.

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75. People vs. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, March 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Exclusionary Rule|Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
1. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Elements that must
concur for warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate; Paragraph
(b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.-
—For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of
Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.
2. Constitutional Law; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; There being no
lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; “Probable
cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.-
—In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands,
even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same
offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted.
“Probable cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
4. Same; Same; Same; Flight; Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons
for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s
attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily
have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
5. Same; Same; Same; —A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same
offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule
113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the arresting
officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret “personal
knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to
effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. It was
therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on
“personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record,” as this
is unquestionably not what “personal knowledge” under the law contemplates, which must
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be strictly construed.

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76. Tagolino vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 574, March
19, 2013 Syllabi Class :Election Law|House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET)
1. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; The Omnibus Election Code provides for certain
remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office.-
—The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s
bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a
petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are
well-perceived.
2. Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has no authority to review final and executory
resolutions or decisions of the Commission on Elections that it rendered pursuant to its
powers under the Constitution, no matter if such resolutions or decisions are erroneous.-
—So the Court comes to the real issue in this case: whether or not the HRET can review and
reverse a COMELEC decision, involving a member of the House of Representatives, that
had already become final and executory. The HRET has no authority to review final and
executory resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers
under the Constitution, no matter if such resolutions or decisions are erroneous. The parties
cannot by agreement confer such authority on HRET. Neither the HRET nor the Court can
set aside the COMELEC’s final and executory resolutions that paved the way for Lucy
Gomez to substitute her husband.
3. Same; Quo Warranto; Substitution of Candidates; View that the fact that the Petition
for Quo Warranto was filed out of time, there is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the
Petition for Quo Warranto may validly question the validity of the substitution of a candidate
and to discuss the constitutional boundaries of the respective jurisdictions of the Commission
on Elections and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.-
—Regarding the issue of whether a Petition for Quo Warranto is a proper legal remedy to
assail the validity of the substitution of a candidate under Section 77 of the OEC, it suffices
here to state that, under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for a Petition for Quo
Warranto are ineligibility to run for a public office or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. Pertinently, Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides for the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives, states as follows: Section 6. No
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereat for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election. The above-quoted provision refers to the
personal attributes of a candidate. The ponencia did not find any of the above qualifications
absent in the case of respondent Gomez. However, the ponencia attributed the ineligibility of
respondent Gomez to its erroneous assumption that the certificate of candidacy of Richard
Gomez, whom she substituted, should have been cancelled. As explained above, the
COMELEC correctly did not so cancel said certificate, it having found no factual basis to do
so. This being the case and the fact that the Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of time,
there is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo Warranto may validly
question the validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss the constitutional
boundaries of the respective jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET.
4. Same; Disqualification of Candidates; View that since the Commission on Elections did
not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez but only disqualified him from
running in the elections, the substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard Gomez squarely
falls within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which uses the
broad language “disqualification for any cause.”-
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—Since the COMELEC did not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez but only
disqualified him from running in the elections, the substitution by respondent Gomez of
Richard Gomez squarely falls within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), which uses the broad language “disqualification for any cause,” as follows: Section
77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.―If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is

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disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not
later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.
5. Same; View that the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal to entertain the untimely Petition for Quo Warranto assailing the
proclamation of private respondent Gomez would suffice to dismiss outright the instant
petition.-
—The lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET to entertain the untimely Petition for Quo
Warranto assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez would suffice to dismiss
outright the instant petition. Moreover, the substantive issue extensively discussed in the
ponencia of the Honorable Associate Justice Estela Perlas Bernabe, particularly as to the
“divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC
(Certificate of Candidacy) cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution” is inappropriate. Firstly, the
certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, the husband of respondent Gomez, was not
cancelled by the COMELEC. Secondly, the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel said
certificate of candidacy was proper as the COMELEC did not reach any finding that Richard
Gomez deliberately committed a misrepresentation, which is a requisite for the cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
6. Same; View that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court
cannot set aside at will the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules
mandating the timely filing of election contests.-
—The HRET and this Court cannot set aside at will the HRET Rules mandating the timely
filing of election contests. Otherwise, a dangerous precedent will be set that will cause
uncertainty in the application of the HRET Rules and instability in the holding of an elective
post by a proclaimed winning candidate that may aversely affect public service. In view of the
foregoing, I submit that the HRET is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Quo
Warranto filed by Tagolino, after the lapse of the reglementary period prescribed by its own
Rules. The proclamation of respondent Gomez has become incontrovertible or unassailable
after the expiration of ten (10) days from its date.
7. Election Law; Election Protests; View that in Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383 (2004), the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal of the election protest for failure to comply strictly with the
period prescribed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules.-
—This Court has emphasized the importance of compliance with the HRET Rules
prescribing reglementary periods to be observed by the parties in an election contest to
expedite the disposition of election controversies so as not to frustrate the will of the
electorate. In Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383 (2004),
the Court sustained the dismissal by the HRET of the election protest for failure to comply
strictly with the period prescribed by the HRET Rules.
8. Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is not bound by previous
COMELEC pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House.-
—Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements
relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the
HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be
circumvented and rendered nugatory.
9. Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); While it is well-
recognized that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has been empowered by
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the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House, the Supreme Court maintains jurisdiction over it
to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter.-
—Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-
recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of
all contests relating to the election,

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returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over
it to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse
of discretion.
10. Same; Same; Same; Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that if an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.-
—Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and
certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. It states that: Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or
is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official
candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution
is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states
that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. As
defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or
through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law
requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.
11. Same; Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificates of Candidacy; While a
disqualified candidate under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is still considered to
have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose
certificate of candidacy had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all.-
—Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have
been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had
been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a
candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and
thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v.
COMELEC (Talaga), 683 SCRA 197 (2012), the Court ruled that: x x x x While a person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person
whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
12. Same; Same; Certificate of Candidacy; If a candidate states a material representation
in the Certificate of Candidacy that is false, the Commission on Elections is empowered to
deny due to or cancel such certificate.-
—A denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the
OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant
qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.
The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 574
SCRA 782 (2008), where the Court illumined: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due
course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to
the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78
of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
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representation in the CoC that is false the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is fired before

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proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
13. Same; Same; One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to
have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility.-
—Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her
commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under
Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal
laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing
acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the OEC.
Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty
of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the
same, if he or she had already been elected. It must be stressed that one who is disqualified
under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or
her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question,
he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction
brought about by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.

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77. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861, April
17, 2013 Syllabi Class :Local Government Units|Ultra Vires Acts
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper,
two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.-
—It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public
funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in
doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.
2. Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; Case law states that public officials can be
held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires.-
—Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires,
the officers who authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable.
Case law states that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires, as
in this case.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that purpose is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered void and as such,
creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations.-
—Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates
no rights or obligations or any juridical relations. Consequently, given the unlawful purpose
behind the Subject Loans which is to fund the commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant
to the Redevelopment Plan, they are considered as ultra vires in the primary sense thus,
rendering them void and in effect, non- binding on the Municipality. At this juncture, it is
equally observed that the land on which the Agoo Plaza is situated cannot be converted into
patrimonial property―as the SB tried to when it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
2007―absent any express grant by the national government. As public land used for public
use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the administration and control of
the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality has no right to
claim it as patrimonial property.
4. Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; An act which is outside of the municipality’s
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity
but remains within the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation.-
—Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is
created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred
upon it by law. There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen’s
Benevolent Association
v. Township of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361, 368 (2000): There is a distinction between an act
utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic
power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are
ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense
which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the
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interest of equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other
words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra
vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the municipality’s
power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former
belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or
inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive
requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an
actual appropriation and

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certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a) are entered into
by the improper department, board, officer of agent; and (b) do not comply with the formal
requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; A taxpayer need not be a party to
the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to
question contracts entered into by the government.-
—As a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion
of the Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled
that public plazas are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion.
As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the rights of a private
owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not
be exploited for commercial purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran
need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v.
Lara, 608 SCRA 149 (2009), it has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the
contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question
contracts entered into by the government.
6. Local Government Units; Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA); The Municipality’s Internal
Revenue Allotment, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the national
taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation.-
—Although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the
Subject Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that
public funds derived from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a
portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s
IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the
nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although
these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective
during the incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those who succeed
them be effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from
the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt
thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of
public funds when they are under official custody.

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78. Ecole De Cuisine Manille (Cordon Bleu of the Philippines), Inc. vs. Renaud
Cointreau & Cie, 697 SCRA 345, June 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Intellectual Properties|Trademarks|Intellectual Property Code of the Phils
(R.A. No. 8293)
1. Intellectual Properties; Trademarks; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, in order to
register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must have actually used the mark
in commerce in the Philippines for two (2) months prior to the application for registration.-
—Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, in order to register a trademark, one must be the owner
thereof and must have actually used the mark in commerce in the Philippines for two (2)
months prior to the application for registration. Section 2-A of the same law sets out to define
how one goes about acquiring ownership thereof. Under Section 2-A, it is clear that actual
use in commerce is also the test of ownership but the provision went further by saying that
the mark must not have been so appropriated by another. Additionally, it is significant to note
that Section 2-A does not require that the actual use of a trademark must be within the
Philippines. Thus, as correctly mentioned by the CA, under R.A. No. 166, one may be an
owner of a mark due to its actual use but may not yet have the right to register such
ownership here due to the owner’s failure to use the same in the Philippines for two (2)
months prior to registration.
2. Same; Same; Same; Courts will protect trade names or marks, although not registered or
properly selected as trademarks, on the broad ground of enforcing justice and protecting one
in the fruits of his toil.-
—As a final note, “the function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership
of the goods (or services) to which it is affixed; to secure to him, who has been instrumental
in bringing into the market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill;
to assure the public that they are procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and
imposition; and to protect the manufacturer against substitution and sale of an inferior and
different article as his product.” As such, courts will protect trade names or marks, although
not registered or properly selected as trademarks, on the broad ground of enforcing justice
and protecting one in the fruits of his toil.
3. Same; Same; Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 8293); The
present law on trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed with the requirement
of prior actual use at the time of registration.-
—In any case, the present law on trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed with
the requirement of prior actual use at the time of registration. Thus, there is more reason to
allow the registration of the subject mark under the name of Cointreau as its true and lawful
owner.
4. Same; Same; Same; Paris Convention; The Philippines is obligated to assure nationals
of the signatory-countries that they are afforded an effective protection against violation of
their intellectual property rights in the Philippines in the same way that their own countries
are obligated to accord similar protection to Philippine nationals. “Thus, under Philippine law,
a trade name of a national of a State that is a party to the Paris Convention, whether or not the
trade name forms part of a trademark, is protected “without the obligation of filing or
registration.’ ”
5. Same; Same; Trademark Infringement; Foreign marks which are not registered are still
accorded protection against infringement and/or unfair competition.-
—Nevertheless, foreign marks which are not registered are still accorded protection against
infringement and/or unfair competition. At this point, it is worthy to emphasize that the
Philippines and France, Cointreau’s country of origin, are both signatories to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).

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79. Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo, 697 SCRA 425, June
05, 2013 Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Credit|Tax Refund
1. Taxation; Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals; Appeals; Although the RRCTA
does not explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the CTA, Section 1,
Rule 7 thereof reads that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42,
43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular,
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule 42 states that the period for filing a petition for
review may be extended upon motion of the concerned party. Thus, in City of Manila v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., 595 SCRA 299 (2009), the Court held that the original
period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15) days,
which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding
fifteen
(15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the
RRCTA is extendible and as such, CTA Division’s grant of respondents’ motion for extension
falls squarely within the law.
2. Taxation; Tax Credit; Tax Refund; Indeed, it is hornbook principle that a claim for a tax
refund/credit is in the nature of a claim for an exemption and the law is construed in
strictissimi juris against the one claiming it and in favor of the taxing authority. Consequently,
as petitioners have failed to prove that they have complied with the procedural requisites
stated under Section 196 of the LGC, their claim for local tax refund/credit must be denied.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Request for Admission; Once a
party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of any material and relevant matter
of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file and serve
such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted. The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for admission is
served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading.
Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or
denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit
or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the
request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule
in Section 2, Rule 26.
4. Same; Local Government Code; Local Taxation; Tax Credit; Tax Refund; Procedural
Requirements in Order to be Entitled to a Refund/Credit of Local Taxes.-
—A perusal of Section 196 of the LGC reveals that in order to be entitled to a refund/credit of
local taxes, the following procedural requirements must concur: first, the taxpayer concerned
must file a written claim for refund/credit with the local treasurer; and second, the case or
proceeding for refund has to be filed within two (2) years from the date of the payment of the
tax, fee, or charge or from the date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.
5. Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon as every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.-
—Neither did respondents’ failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of
the RRCTA militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review. Respondents’
submission of only one copy of the said petition and their failure to attach therewith a certified
true copy of the RTC’s decision constitute mere formal defects which may be relaxed in the
interest of substantial justice. It is well- settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon as every party litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable
plea of technicalities. In this regard, the CTA Division did not overstep its boundaries when it
admitted respondents’ Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects “in the
broader interest of justice.”
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80. Borromeo vs. Mina, 697 SCRA 516, June 05,
2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Void
Contracts
1. Remedial Law; Theory of the Case; Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain
theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because of the strict application of procedural
rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be
considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable him to properly
meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue or
argument (a) is subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted, which
do not obtain in this case.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it
produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.-
—In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as
his present claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void
source. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous
identification of the subject landholding by the MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the
fact remains that petitioner had no right to file a petition for landholding exemption since the
sale of the said property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void. Proceeding from this, the
finding that petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings is way below the retention limits set
forth by law thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption precisely
because he has no right over the aforementioned landholding.
3. Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership
over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual
tenant-tillers thereon. As held in the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and Development
Corporation v. DAR Regional Director for Region III, 555 SCRA 97 (2008) citing Heirs of
Batongbacal v. CA, 389 SCRA 517 (389). x x x P.D. No. 27, as amended, forbids the
transfer or alienation of covered agricultural lands after October 21, 1972 except to the
tenant-beneficiary. x x x. In Heirs of Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals, 389 SCRA 517 (2002),
involving the similar issue of sale of a covered agricultural land under P.D. No. 27, this Court
held: Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed breach of obligation as an agricultural lessor.
As the records show, private respondent was not informed about the sale between
Philbanking and petitioner, and neither was he privy to the transfer of ownership from Juana
Luciano to Philbanking. As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed
about matters affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it. x x x x In
other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon. Hence, the sale executed by
Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted
provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and must thus be declared null and
void.

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81. Sy vs. Local Government of Quezon City, 697 SCRA 621, June
05, 2013 Syllabi Class :Expropriation|Taking|Just Compensation
1. Civil Law; Excusable Negligence; A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely
warrant a relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should be able to show that
the procedural oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen
fortuitousness which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the
relief sought. The standard of care required is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows
upon his important business. In this accord, the duty rests on every counsel to see to adopt
and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account all court notices sent to him.
2. Same; Same; Just Compensation; The Court cannot sustain the amount of
P5,500.00/sq. m. as just compensation which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The
said valuation was actually arrived at after considering: (a) the September 4, 1996
recommendation of the City Appraisal Committee; (b) several sworn statements made by Sy
himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration for 1996. It is well- settled that the amount of just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. However, the above-stated
documents do not reflect the value of the subject property at the time of its taking in 1986 but
rather, its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must be remanded to the RTC in order
to properly determine the amount of just compensation during such time the subject property
was actually taken.
3. Same; Taking;Notably, the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect
expropriation, did not affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject property in 1986
as the CA, in its January 20, 2012 Decision, suggests. Case law dictates that there is “taking”
when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof. Therefore, notwithstanding the lack of proper
authorization, the legal character of the City’s action as one of “taking” did not change. In this
relation, the CA noted that the City enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on April 12,
1994 and filed its expropriation complaint on November 7, 1996. However, as it previously
admitted, it already commenced with the taking of the subject property as early as 1986.
Accordingly, interest must run from such time.
4. Same; Same; —As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the
same should be computed from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not
from the filing of the complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996. Records show that
the City itself admitted in its Appellee’s Brief filed before the CA that as early as 1986, “a
burden was already imposed upon the owner of the [subject] property x x x, considering that
the expropriated property was already being used as Barangay day care and office.” Thus,
the property was actually taken during that time and from thereon, legal interest should have
already accrued. In this light, the Court has held that: x x x [T]he final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the
time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court[.] x x x (Emphasis
supplied) This is based on the principle that interest “runs as a matter of law and follows
from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish,
as of the date of the taking.”
5. Expropriation; Interest Rates;Based on a judicious review of the records and
application of jurisprudential rulings, the Court holds that the correct rate of legal interest to
be applied is twelve percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum, owing to the nature
of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance. In the case of Republic v. CA, 383 SCRA
611, 622-623 (2002), the Court ruled that the debt incurred by the government on account of
the taking of the property subject of an expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance
which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal interest rate.
6. Attorneys; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; —Be that as it may, procedural rules
may, nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel
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bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. ****

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82. Kapisanang Pagkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Potrero,Inc. vs. Barreno, 698SCRA 79,
June 10, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Forum Shopping
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists “when one
party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely, by some other court.” What is truly important to consider in determining
whether it exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility
of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.

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83. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga, 698 SCRA 103, June
10, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment
1. Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Gross and Habitual
Neglect of Duty;Serious Misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty are just causes
for termination which are explicitly enumerated under Article 296 of the Labor Code.―The
Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of
Gonzaga, sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to prove that he committed serious
misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty to warrant his dismissal from employment.
Such are just causes for termination which are explicitly enumerated under Article 296 of the
Labor Code, as amended: Article 296. Termination by Employer.-
—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious
Misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties; x x x x At any rate, Gonzaga had admitted that he failed to remit his collections
daily in violation of SURNECO’s company policy, rendering such fact conclusive and binding
upon him. Therefore, for his equal violation of Section 7.2.2 of the Code of Ethics (failure to
remit collections/monies), his dismissal is justified altogether.

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84. Caballo vs. People, 698 SCRA 227, June 10, 2013
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Child Prostitution|Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610)
1. Criminal Law; Child Prostitution; Elements of.―Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
pertinently reads: SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.-
—Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following: x x x x (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be;
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), 465 SCRA 465 (2005), the
elements of the foregoing offense are the following: (a) The accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

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85. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Palmares, 698 SCRA 655, June
17, 2013 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just Compensation
1. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Principal Factors Enumerated Under Section 17
of R.A. No. 6657 that Guide Special Agrarian Courts in the Determination of Just
Compensation.-
—The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657,
which enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the
determination thereof: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the
properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5)
the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government
to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any. Pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
49 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula.

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86. Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., 698 SCRA 683, June 18,
2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Practice
of Law

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87. Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 698 SCRA 742, June 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Election Law|Disqualification of Candidates|Certificate of Candidacy
1. Same; Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; While Section 40(a) of the Local
Government Code allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two
(2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to
cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has
the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.―Section 40(a) of the LGC,
applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides: SEC. 40. Disqualifications.-
—The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a)
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And on the other hand, Article 30 of the
RPC reads: ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification.—The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public
office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise
of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as
is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory
construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict between these provisions of law
may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior
convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves
his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law
imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the
convict to run for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which
imposes the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal: ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal―Their accessory penalties.―The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of
the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this
relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for
elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on
the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other
base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes
of a privilege which the State grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to
exercise it for the common good.

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88. Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 104, June 19, 2013

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89. Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217,
June 19, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Judgments|Immutability of Judgments

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90. Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, June 25,
2013 Syllabi Class :Statutes
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997
(R.A. No. 8369);
—At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of
1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court
in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
2. Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative
as though it had never been passed.-
—We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.” However, the seemingly all-inclusive statement of
absolute retroactive invalidity may not always be justified. One established exception is the
doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid Law.
3. Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be said that violence in the
context of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue;
rather, it is a power issue.-
—In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not
be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are
not gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer from double
victimization first by their abusers and second by the judicial system. Incidentally, focusing
on women as the victims entrenches some level of heteronormativity. It is blind to the
possibility that, whatever moral positions are taken by those who are dominant, in reality
intimate relationships can also happen between men.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; VLegal standing
in cases that raise constitutional issues is essential. Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” The fundamental question is “whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
5. Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been
victims of domestic violence.-Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For
one thing, Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in preventing and addressing
the serious problem of violence against women in the context of intimate relationships —
recognized all over the world as one of the most insidious forms of gender discrimination.
For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been victims of
domestic violence. The list of acts regarded as forms of violence come from true-to-life stories
of women who have suffered abuses from their male partners. Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks
women’s full participation in society. Hence, the law grants them needed relief to ensure
equality, protection, and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social,
and economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance, precisely aims to
safeguard “the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life,
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and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over
her life.”
6. Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW); In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined
by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
as equality which requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered
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equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of
men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between
women and men must be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences.
7. Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of the Law; What remedies
does R.A. 9262 especially provide women and children? The law is gender-specific as only
they may file the prescribed actions against offenders, whether men or women, with whom
the victims are or were in lesbian relationships. The definition includes past or present
marital, live-in, sexual or dating relationships. This law also provides for the remedy of a
protection order in a civil action or in a criminal action, aside from the criminal action for its
violation. It makes the process of securing a restraining order against perpetrators easier and
more immediate by providing for the legal remedy of protection orders from both the courts
and barangay officials.
8. Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; —Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The
Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed as a
weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine
society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal
moral status.” Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should be understood as
meant to “reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.” Borrowing the
language of Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his own thoughts, the
Chief Justice said: The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and
enhance the right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation
“of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social prejudice”; and 2)
promo[ting a Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human
beings.
9. Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a
guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality.-
—Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right to equal protection casts another shadow when
the issue raised under it involves persons protected by the social justice provision of the
Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. “It ought to be
construed,” said the Chief Justice, “in consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’
particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people
agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a
genuinely egalitarian democracy.” This means that the weak, including women in relation to
men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.
10. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that men and women are
supposed to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women
and harsh consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief
not available to the latter.-
—This separate concurring opinion will address the issue of equal protection since it presents
the more serious challenge to the constitutionality of the law. Men and women are supposed
to be equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh
consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not
available to the latter. The law, Garcia says, violates his right to equal protection because it is
gender-specific, favoring only women when men could also be victims of domestic violence.
11. Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
rights of other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men members of
the family who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their
own rights and interests.-
—With the objective of promoting solidarity and the development of the family, R.A. No. 9262
provides the legal redress for domestic violence that particularly affects women and their
children. Significantly, the law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human rights of other
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persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men members of the family who
can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and
interests. Consequently, the resulting classification under R.A. No. 9262 is not wholly
intended and does not work an injustice by removing remedies that are available to men in
violence committed against them. The law furthermore does not target men against women
and children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional

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objective, and it does not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification that can be
labeled “suspect” in the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny review, or even the use of an
expanded equal protection perspective, strike me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
12. Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not immediately brought
on by considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality
that in Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.-
—A suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard cannot be solely
based on the circumstance that the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe
that the classification in the law was not immediately brought on by considerations of gender
or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a
marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children. An obvious reason, of course,
why the classification did not solely depend on gender is because the law also covers
children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
13. Same; Same; Suspect Classification; In my view, a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact
of the illegal differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and the
impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future classification. A suspect classification
label cannot solely and automatically be triggered by the circumstance that women and
children are accorded special protection by the Constitution. In fact, there is no place for a
strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has recognized the need for special
protection; where such recognition has been made, congressional action should carry the
presumption of validity.
14. Same; Same; I do not really see any indication that Congress actually intended to
classify women and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262.
Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to
harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic social institution. After sifting
through the comprehensive information gathered, Congress found that domestic and other
forms of violence against women and children impedes the harmony of the family and the
personal growth and development of family members. In the process, Congress found that
these types of violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly
experienced by women and children due to the unequal power relations of men and women
in our society; Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that
block the harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which men are
important component members.
15. Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and
Phrases;When the court uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the constitutionality of a
law, it proceeds from the premise that the law established a “suspect classification.” A
suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases
for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national
origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.
With a suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is applied: the
ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the government carries the burden
of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This approach is unlike the lowest level of scrutiny
(reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the past where the classification is
scrutinized and constitutionally upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law.
Under a reasonableness test, there is a presumption of constitutionality and that the laws
enacted by Congress are presumed to fall within its constitutional powers.
16. Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the reasonableness test has been
consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found
to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development
of the family.-
—My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal protection clause and in applying
a strict scrutiny standard is, among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need these
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measures when we can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s constitutionality using the
reasonableness test. The family is a unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on
an uneven standard where measures beyond what is necessary are extended to women and
children as against the man—the head of the family and the family provider. The use of an
expanded equal protection clause only stresses the concept of an uneven equality that
cannot long stand in a unit living at close quarters in a situation of mutual dependency on

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one another. The reasonableness test, on the other hand, has been consistently applied to
allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be germane to the
purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development of the family. If we are
to deviate from or to modify this established standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully
and for strong justifiable reasons.
17. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View that Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to
unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote
the family’s total development.-
—From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a
measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms of
violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family
ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s total
development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are more
susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the pervasive bias
and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family environment that
traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to
recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one hand, and
women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be
made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in
various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of the family.
18. Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere
provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need
of the victims for instant protection; Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9262, the issuance of a Barangay Protection Order or the pendency of an application for a
Barangay Protection Order shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from
granting, a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order.-
—While judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the
legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government
officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to
the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its
intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial
prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in
connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment
of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. In the case of a BPO, it is a
mere provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need
of the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of appropriate
judicial proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive
protection to the victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the
issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim
from applying for, or the court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been
granted by any court, the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO. The same
Implementing Rules also require that within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a
BPO, the barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO
with the nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC,
the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or
the Metropolitan Trial Court.
19. Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View that a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in
his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
of violence against the family or household members particularly women and their children.-
—A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts of violence against the family or household members particularly women and
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their children. The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section
14 of Republic Act No. 9262: SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue
and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a)
and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte

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determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on
the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by
an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the
time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately
after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect is personal service. The parties may be accompanied by a non- lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
20. Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power
of the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in
this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly
designated as the police power.-
—The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial
and competent tribunal. However, it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the
State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this
case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly
designated as the police power.
21. Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection Order; View that a
protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further
acts of violence against a woman or her child.-
—A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the
availment thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have
immediate and uncomplicated access to the same.
22. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal protection
clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.-
—The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act
No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim
of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical,
social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262,
by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of
protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-
based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and
children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied
in the 1987 Constitution.
23. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); In furtherance
of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against
women and children under this Act has been classified as a public offense, making its
prosecution independent of the victim’s initial participation. Verily, the classification made in
Republic Act No. 9262 is substantially related to the important governmental objectives of
valuing every person’s dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting
children, promoting gender equality, and empowering women.
24. Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits the issuance of
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protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a
hearing; Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of
these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without violating the offender’s right
to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent
protection order may be issued.-

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—The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the
seriousness and urgency of the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Hence, the law permits the issuance of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to
women victims, even without a hearing. The law has granted authority for barangay officials
to issue a protection order against the offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC
may likewise grant an application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other
reliefs, also on the mere basis of the application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these
protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the
victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown
hearing has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these
remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve the objectives of
the law by providing the victims necessary immediate protection from the violence they
perceive as threats to their personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of
other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the victims instant relief from their
situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity and equality.
Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order.
25. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); Preventing
violence against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies,
serves the governmental objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every
person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering
women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women in the Philippines,
Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate
relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or places
where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The law
provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which
are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or
a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a
criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore
were not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that
women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion
that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
26. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-Based Violence; As one of
the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known
as “gender-based violence.”-
—As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to
be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is
otherwise known as “gender-based violence.” Violent acts towards women has been the
subject of an examination on a historic world-wide perspective. The exhaustive study of a
foreign history professor noted that “[f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,” as three great bodies of thought, namely:
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code, which
have influenced western society’s views and treatment of women, all “assumed patriarchy as
natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male superiority.” It cited 18th
century legal expert William Blackstone, who explained that the common law doctrine of
coverture reflected the theological assumption that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before
God; thus “they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband,” a
concept that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the
enactment of the Family Code.
27. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW);Republic Act No. 9262; View that Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed
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therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to condemn discrimination
against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to
eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice.-
—It has been acknowledged that “gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that
seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.” Republic Act

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No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay,
all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and
in practice. Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and
most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. It brings the
women into the focus of human rights concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the
UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women. The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly
acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized
that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
28. Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the
purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity
and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic
violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband,
partner, or father of the victim.-
—The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law,
which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of
women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the
victim. The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure
gender equality, which is quoted as follows: Section
14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
29. Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to
ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.-
—By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted
in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was a mere two years
after it gained independence from the United States of America. In addition, the Philippines is
a signatory to many United Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
30. Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to
test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection
clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review.-
—Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to men, when the
reality is that there are men, regardless of their number, who are also suffering from
domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too wide and liberal to justify the statutory
classification which in effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In
the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the classification in
Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the
intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive intermediate review, the classification in
the challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives, and
(2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
31. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent Philippine
jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications.-
—Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of
scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v.
Camacho, 585 SCRA 36 (2009), this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a
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suspect classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then “the rational basis test was
properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal
protection challenge.”
32. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty of
determining whether other

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agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained within the limits of the
Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.-
—Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for
Prohibition because of petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, should still pass upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact that
not only the petitioner, but the private respondent as well, pray that the Court resolve the
constitutional issue considering its novelty and paramount importance. Indeed, when public
interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with this
Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of
government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the
constitutional issue.
33. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing of a separate
action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of
constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are
inextricably intertwined.-
—The filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration
of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear
that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by
petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial
court, cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the
petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue
of constitutionality will result in an unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a
protection order. If the proceedings for the protection order is not suspended, it does create
the danger of having inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two separate
courts, whether of the same or different levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments
would eventually be the subject of separate motions for reconsideration, separate appeals,
and separate petitions for review before this Court – the exact scenario the policy against
multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, “the law and the courts frown upon
split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions.”
34. Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the
earliest opportunity.-
—The challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
In Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 565 SCRA 624 (2008), we
said: A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so
when the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts will not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation
omitted.) This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court
that can resolve it, such that “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the
trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” The decision upon
the constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued
against petitioner. Such question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an
affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC handling the protection order
proceedings, which was the competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue.
35. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the constitutionality
of the law cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not
technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause
of action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order against the petitioner.-
—For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals
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was precipitated by and was ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO, an
interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited
pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately
even with another branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be
no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of

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action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the
TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a separate action, whether
before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would still have to be the issuance of the TPO,
which is the subject of another case in the RTC.
36. Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial
court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner.-
—The alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have
prevented the trial court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner.
Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance of
a protection order against him.
37. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to
decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not
be considered on appeal.-
—I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with
jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule
that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it
may not be considered on appeal. Section 20 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to
Petition.—
(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the
opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action
which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
38. Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.-
—Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
39. Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and
ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”-
—Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive
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power “is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” As clearly
delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce
all laws

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and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” We have held that “(t)he
mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that
these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
40. Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the
Violence Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.-
—Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows: This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent
bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand.
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties
mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition,
mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the
petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought.
41. Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated.-
—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC
case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
“blank check” issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of
the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is
so. It states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party.—The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the
respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently
where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from
the residence; x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent’s residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property
rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and
appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
42. Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised
of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; “To be
heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings.-
—It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his
side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children,
job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
43. Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence
Against Women and Children may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands
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of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented.-
—The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts

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could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court
shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies
of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no
TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service
of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.
44. Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection
order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The
rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.-
—A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.
Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. “The
scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support.” The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified
by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
45. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).-
—VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has
or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by
the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of
design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
46. Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.-
—There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
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petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor

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differ in its application. Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like “depriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing mental or emotional anguish” are so
vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed
that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
47. Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when
it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.-
—The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all
women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
48. Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of
R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out
in its Declaration of Policy.-
—The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is
to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values
the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State
also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end,
the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and
other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
49. Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women.-
—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-
bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW,
the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence
from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on
the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”
50. Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on
Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”-
—According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as “gender-based violence.” Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men
are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
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nurturers, men’s companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This
perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to
control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling women to
retain power.

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51. Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.-
—The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality.”
52. Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.-
—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974), is instructive: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the
laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
53. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency
of any law.-
—It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of
a statute. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women
and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is
to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.
54. Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It
bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very
purpose of the law against Violence Against Women and Children.-
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—As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not
stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or
invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,
27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Federal
injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from

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prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the
status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however,
that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from
acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of
the law against VAWC.
55. Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is due
to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days
each time until final judgment is rendered.-
—To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended
or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the
parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to
litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
56. Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.-
—That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.
57. Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint.-
—We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-
claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action
that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore,
it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
58. Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,
the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.-
—Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
the petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent
may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
59. Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
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by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”-
—Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute, “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the

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criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA,
3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks
of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.”

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91. Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava, 700 SCRA 174, June
26, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Work-related Illness

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92. Abulencia vs. Hermosisima, 699 SCRA 576, June 26, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Simple Misconduct|Penalties|Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)

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93. De Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614, June 26, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Probable Cause|Determination of
probable cause may be either executive or judicial
1. Same; Same; Once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds
with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue
a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor
to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.―In this
regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the
judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause-
— that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if
the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss
the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence. In
other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his
primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of
arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional
evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.

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94. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 700 SCRA 322, July
01, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Courts|Supreme Court|Appeals
1. Taxation; Excise Taxes;—Under Section 129 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended, excise taxes are imposed on two (2) kinds of goods, namely: (a) goods
manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any
other disposition; and (b) things imported. With respect to the first kind of goods, Section 130
of the NIRC states that, unless otherwise specifically allowed, the taxpayer obligated to file
the return and pay the excise taxes due thereon is the manufacturer/producer. On the other
hand, with respect to the second kind of goods, Section 131 of the NIRC states that the
taxpayer obligated to file the return and pay the excise taxes due thereon is the owner or
importer, unless the imported articles are exempt from excise taxes and the person found to
be in possession of the same is other than those legally entitled to such tax exemption.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; It is hornbook
principle that the Court is not a trier of facts and often, remands cases to the lower courts for
the determination of questions of such character. However, when the trial court had already
received all the evidence of the parties, the Court may resolve the case on the merits instead
of remanding them in the interest of expediency and to better serve the ends of justice.
3. Same; Same; Tax Exemptions;—PAL’s payment of either the basic corporate income
tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties,
registration, license, and other fees and charges, except only real property tax. The phrase “in
lieu of all other taxes” includes but is not limited to taxes that are “directly due from or
imposable upon the purchaser or the seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of said
petroleum products but are billed or passed on the grantee either as part of the price or cost
thereof or by mutual agreement or other arrangement.” In other words, in view of PAL’s
payment of either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax, whichever is lower, PAL is
exempt from paying: (a) taxes directly due from or imposable upon it as the purchaser of the
subject petroleum products; and (b) the cost of the taxes billed or passed on to it by the
seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of the said products either as part of the purchase
price or by mutual agreement or other arrangement. Therefore, given the foregoing direct
and indirect tax exemptions under its franchise, and applying the principles as above-
discussed, PAL is endowed with the legal standing to file the subject tax refund claim,
notwithstanding the fact that it is not the statutory taxpayer as contemplated by law.
4. Same; Same; It may be observed that the propriety of a tax refund claim is hinged on the
kind of exemption which forms its basis. If the law confers an exemption from both direct or
indirect taxes, a claimant is entitled to a tax refund even if it only bears the economic burden
of the applicable tax. On the other hand, if the exemption conferred only applies to direct
taxes, then the statutory taxpayer is regarded as the proper party to file the refund claim.
5. Same; Tax Refunds; Section 204(c) of the NIRC states that it is the statutory taxpayer
which has the legal personality to file a claim for refund. Accordingly, in cases involving
excise tax exemptions on petroleum products under Section 135 of the NIRC, the Court has
consistently held that it is the statutory taxpayer who is entitled to claim a tax refund based
thereon and not the party who merely bears its economic burden.
6. Same; Indirect Taxes; Jurisprudence states that indirect taxes are those which are
demanded in the first instance from one person with the expectation and intention that he can
shift the economic burden to someone else. In this regard, the statutory taxpayer can
transfer to its customers the value of the excise taxes it paid or would be liable to pay to the
government by treating it as part of the cost of the goods and tacking it on to the selling price.
Notably, this shifting process, otherwise known as “passing on,” is largely a contractual affair
between the parties. Meaning, even if the purchaser effectively pays the value of the tax, the
manufacturer/producer (in case of goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for
domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition) or the owner or importer (in case
of imported goods) are still regarded as the statutory taxpayers under the law. To this end,
the purchaser does not really pay the tax; rather, he only pays the seller more for the goods
because of the latter’s obligation to the government as the statutory taxpayer.
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95. Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro, 700 SCRA 547, July 03, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Provisional Remedies|Attachment|Preliminary Attachment
1. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; By its
nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to
realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.-
—By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a
measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency
which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case. In addition,
attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or
constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service
of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.

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96. Caranza Vda. de Saldivar vs. Cabanes, Jr., 700 SCRA 734, July
08, 2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Gross
Negligence|Penalties

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97. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella, 700 SCRA 767, July
08, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of
Employment|Evidence|Substantial Evidence
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Not every form of
misconduct can be considered as a just cause for termination. The law explicitly qualifies
that the misconduct must be both serious and made in connection with the employee’s
work.―Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only
for a valid cause. Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination under Article
282 of the Labor Code, which reads in part: ART. 282. Termination By Employer.-
—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; x x x x Thus, not every form of misconduct can be
considered as a just cause for termination. The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct
must be both serious and made in connection with the employee’s work. As clarified in
Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Fermin, 674 SCRA 310 (2012): Misconduct involves “the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.” For
misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be (1) of grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and (2) connected with the
work of the employee.
2. Same; Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; The employer bears the burden of
proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause ― or any other valid
cause for that matter―forms the basis of the employee’s dismissal from work.―It is well to
stress that the employer bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the
aforesaid just cause-
— or any other valid cause for that matter — forms the basis of the employee’s dismissal
from work. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise. As long as this evidentiary threshold is met, the dismissal
of the employee should, as a general rule, be upheld.

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98. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778, July
08, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Succession

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99. Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 701 SCRA 188, July
15, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Judgments
1. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; A person’s right to the
speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well
as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.-
—A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides: SEC. 16. All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in
nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi- judicial. In this accord, any party to
a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration
of justice.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party
from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal
explicitly declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People, 200 SCRA 806 (1991), citing Banal v. Tadeo,
Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987): The Rules provide: “The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law
against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity
for the damage suffered.” x x x x In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987), we
declared: “While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is
really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law.”
3. Same; Same; Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not
merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but
also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its “salutary objective” is to
assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should
be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
4. Same; Same;—It must be noted, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered
and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

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100. Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin, 701 SCRA 205, July
15, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Loss of Trust
and Confidence

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101. Philippine Tourism Authority vs. Sabandal-Herzenstiel, 701 SCRA 517, July
17, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Action|Forcible Entry
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Forcible Entry; —In an action for forcible entry,
the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed property and that the
defendant deprived him of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. In this case,
respondents failed to establish their prior and continued possession of the subject property
after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary, they even admitted in their answer
to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same by instituting caretakers
and leasing portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to be well-founded,
the MCTC properly adjudged petitioner to have prior possession over the subject property as
against Sabandal- Herzenstiel, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof.
2. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the
exclusion of the lawful possessor-
— as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of force.—
Petitioner’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of respondents’ entry into the
subject property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful
entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor — as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated
— would necessarily imply the use of force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego,
Sr., 663 SCRA 17 (2012): x x x Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding
therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is
necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of
war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents
sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them
through violence and force.

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102. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz, 701 SCRA 682, July
23, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Certification Against Forum
Shopping; The prohibition against forum shopping is different from a violation of the
certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.-
—At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is
different from a violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. In Sps. Ong
v. CA, 384 SCRA 139 (2002), the Court explained that: x x x The distinction between the
prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too
elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping
itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification
requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of
imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and for direct contempt.
2. Same; Same; Same; Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits
involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.-
—Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties,
either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff
who files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending
case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar
pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare
under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
4. Labor Law; Probationary Employees; A probationary employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside
from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article
295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by
the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an
employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the
following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
5. Same; Same; Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
provides that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable
standards upon which the regularization would be based on at the time of the engagement,
then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.: (d) In all cases of
probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards
under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no
standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular
employee. In other words, the employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when
dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must
make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the
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employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a
probationary employee.
6. Same; Same; An employer is deemed to have made known the standards that would
qualify a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted reasonable
efforts to apprise the employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial
period of probation. This goes without saying that the employee is sufficiently made aware of
his probationary status as well as the length of time of the probation. The exception to the
foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in

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nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also, in Aberdeen
Court, Inc.
v. Agustin, 456 SCRA 32 (2005), it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary
employee of the standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee
who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which
there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same light, an employee’s
failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him
constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s nonregularization.
7. Same; Same; Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate
performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a
probationary employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not
be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it
must be observed that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a
management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did in this case —
should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who was
tasked with the vital responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters of her
department.
8. Same; Same; A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee;
the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing
Rules of the Labor Code states that “[i]f the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of
an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it
shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from
the effective date of termination.”
9. Same; Company Policy; A company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract
between the employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 354
(Ky. 2005), it has been held that: [E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to
contractual rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the
policy statements would create contractual rights in the employee, and, hence, although the
statement of policy is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally amended by the employer
without notice to the employee, and contains no reference to a specific employee, his job
description or compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy statement in
pre-employment interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until after his
hiring. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an employer
establishes an express personnel policy and the employee continues to work while the policy
remains in effect, the policy is deemed an implied contract for so long as it remains in effect.
If the employer unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the implied contract are also
thereby changed.
10. Same; Termination of Employment; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an
employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon), 442
SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the
lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
11. Same; Same; If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because
the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative.-
—It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the
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Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement,
the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process
was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with
the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was
initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where
the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause of retrenchment — as
contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of
neglect of duty

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— the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher
amount of P50,000.00.
12. Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Directors; Requisites to Hold Corporate
Directors, Trustees or Officers Personally Liable for Corporate Acts.-
—It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers
attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when
they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a
conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons;
(b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such
issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they
agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are
made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action.
13. Civil Law; Bad Faith; It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it.-
—A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her unfounded assertions on the
matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in their
capacity as Abbott’s officers and employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in
terminating Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign and not allowed to
enter the workplace does not necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient
ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with her termination. On the alleged loss of
her personal belongings, records are bereft of any showing that the same could be attributed
to Abbott or any of its officers. It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and
he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since Alcaraz failed to prove any
malicious act on the part of Abbott or any of its officers, the Court finds the award of moral or
exemplary damages unwarranted.
14. Labor Law; Appeals; View that a labor case finds its way into the judicial system
from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) whose decision is final and
executory; A labor case finds its way into the judicial system from the NLRC whose decision
is final and executory. Finality simply means that the NLRC ruling is no longer appealable;
the legal intent is to confine adjudication of labor cases to labor tribunals with the expertise in
these cases and thereby bring the resolution of the case to a close at the soonest possible
time. When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already final and
unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through a limited review
on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. This has been the mode of review followed since
the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were directly brought to this Court
but only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.
15. Same; Same; View that under Section 65 of the Rules of Court, the sole ground or issue
allowed is jurisdictional-
— the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in ruling on the case; whereas, a Rule 45 review the
Supreme Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the Court of Appeal’s
finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.—Under the Rule
65 review by the CA, Montoya reiterates that the sole ground or issue allowed is jurisdictional
– the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling on
the case. To state the obvious, this kind of review would have made it easier for the CA to
handle the case; in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, it can dismiss labor cases for
lack of grave abuse of discretion as we do in this Court. From the CA, further recourse is
through a Rule 45 review by this Court on questions of law in accordance with prevailing
rulings. The office of a petition for review on certiorari is not to examine and settle factual
questions already ruled upon below. In this review, the Court simply determines whether the
legal correctness of the CA’s finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact
and in law.
16. Same; Probationary Employees; While the respondent might have been hired as a
probationary employee, the petitioners’ evidence did not establish the employers’
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compliance with the probationary employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor
Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the
Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent should be considered a regular employee
and the case should be reviewed on this basis. Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides: ART. 281. Probationary employment.—Probationary employment

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shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an
employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just
cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee. [italics supplied; emphasis ours] Further, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules
of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended, states: Sec. 6. Probationary
employment.—There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his
engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his
fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to
him at the time of engagement. [emphasis supplied]
17. Same; Same; View that a valid probationary employment requires the concurrence
of two requirements; Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a
probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular employee.-
—A valid probationary employment requires the concurrence of two requirements. First, the
employer shall make known the reasonable standard (performance standard) whose
compliance will render the employee qualified to be a regular employee. Second, the
employer shall inform the employee of the applicable performance standard at the time of
his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a
probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular employee. The ponencia
apparently fully agrees with the above statement of the applicable law as it substantially
recites the same requirements, including the consequence that upon failure to comply with
these same requirements, “the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary
employee.” It continues, however, with a twist that effectively negates what it has stated and
admitted about the need to communicate the regularization standards to the employee.
18. Same; Termination of Employment; View that to justify the dismissal of an employee,
the employer carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause and with
the observance of due process prior to dismissal.-
—To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer carries the burden of proving that the
dismissal was for a just cause and with the observance of due process prior to dismissal.
The employer has to discharge this burden by clear, accurate, consistent and convincing
evidence; in case of doubt, the presumption in the employee’s favor under Article 4 of the
Labor Code should apply.
19. Same; Same; View that a probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a
regular employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an
employment.-
—An important legal point that should not be lost in considering this case is that a
probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular employee under the Labor
Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an employment. While the strict
application of Article 282 of the Labor Code may be relaxed because the employee is still
under probation (so that analogous probationary status rules may apply), the same essential
just cause for dismissal must be present and must be proven. In other words, probationary
employment does not mean that the employee is under an “employment at will” situation as
that phrase is understood in American jurisprudence. To reiterate, the fact that the
respondent was still in her probationary period of employment did not lessen the burden of
proof that the law imposed on the petitioners to prove the just cause for her dismissal.
Probationary employees are protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
and they cannot be removed from their position except only for cause.

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103. Province of Cagayan vs. Lara, 702 SCRA 183, July 24, 2013
Syllabi Class :Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)|Quarrying Operations
1. Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160); Quarrying Operations; Section 138(2) of RA
7160 requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his
quarrying operations.―In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he
must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but
also by the local government unit where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2)
of RA 7160 requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of
his quarrying operations, viz.: SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry
Resources.-
—x x x. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued
exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang
panlalawigan.

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104. Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.., 702 SCRA 258, July
24, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Reconstitution of Titles
1. Civil Law; Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution requires that (a) notice of the
petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and
(b) publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing.―At the
outset, the Court notes that the present amended petition for reconstitution is anchored on
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240-
— a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3(a) of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed
by the provisions of Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to the
publication, posting, and notice requirements. Section 10 reads: SEC. 10. Nothing
hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the
petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance,
based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act:
Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and
granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And, provided,
further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to
the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part:
SEC. 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted
on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and
after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity
may require. x x x. The foregoing provisions, therefore, clearly require that (a) notice of the
petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b)
publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing. Substantial
compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears stressing that the
acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with the
requirements of the law.

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105. BPI vs. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 702 SCRA 432, July 29,
2013 Syllabi Class :Corporation Law|Corporate Rehabilitation

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106. Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon, 702 SCRA 587, July
31, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Tax Declaration|Tax Receipts
1. Civil Law; Certificate of Title; As against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area
covered therein, an original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by
the registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail.-
—It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or
may have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land
is bound and title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property
registration decree. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393 (1987), the Court
ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts
which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an
original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners
over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly, respondents’ Decree No. 98992 for
which an original certificate of title was issued should be accorded greater weight as against
the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.
2. Same; Tax Declaration; Tax Receipts; Tax declarations and tax receipts may only
become the basis of a claim for ownership when they are coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property.-
—Tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership
when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records
are bereft of any showing that petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in actual possession of the subject property prior to 1989 as they claim. The tax declarations
and tax receipts are insufficient to prove their proffered theory that their predecessor-in-
interest, Remegio, was the lawful possessor and owner of the foregoing property even
before the last World War. In fact, petitioners altogether failed to prove the legitimacy of
Remegio’s possession and ownership since they failed to present the pertinent deed of sale
or any other evidence of the latter’s title. On the contrary, aside from the LRA certification
and daybook entry which prove the existence of Decree No. 98992, respondents’ possession
of the subject property prior to petitioners’ entry in 1989 was attested to by one Marcelina
Tabora who, as the CA notes, appears to be an unbiased witness. All told, by sheer
preponderance of evidence, respondents have shown a better right to the ownership and
possession of the subject property and hence, must be awarded the same.

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107. Lihaylihay vs. People, 702 SCRA 755, July 31, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Appeals|Sandiganbayan
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Sandiganbayan; It bears pointing out that in
appeals from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be
raised.-
—At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case,
only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on
whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not
conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly
appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. Hence, absent any of the recognized
exceptions to the above-mentioned rule, the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing
matters should be deemed as conclusive.

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108. Sec of the Dept of Finance vs. CTA Second Division), 703 SCRA 187, August
07, 2013 Syllabi Class :Grave Abuse of Discretion
1. Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.-
—It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court
or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act
is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as “grave,” the abuse of discretion must be so patent or
gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or
to act at all in contemplation of law. Finding that this characterization does not fit the CTA’s
exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion attended
its grant of KCTMPC’s motion to release.

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109. Tan vs. Andrade, 703 SCRA 198, August 07, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Property Relations|Conjugal
Properties
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; When the
trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court, and may no longer be reviewed
on Rule 45 petitions.-
—Settled is the rule that when the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the CA,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, and may no longer be
reviewed on Rule 45 petitions. While there exists exceptions to this rule — such as when the
CA’s and RTC’s findings are in conflict with each other — the Court observes that none
applies with respect to the ruling that the subject transaction was one of sale and not an
equitable mortgage. Records readily reveal that both the RTC and the CA observed that there
is no clear and convincing evidence to show that the parties agreed upon a mortgage. Hence,
absent any glaring error therein or any other compelling reason to hold otherwise, this
finding should now be deemed as conclusive and perforce must stand.
2. Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.-
—Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states
that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to
apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x x x
As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal
partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does
not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and
convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

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138
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110. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche vs. Fria, 703 SCRA 258, Aug.
7, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Jurisdiction|Grave Abuse of
Discretion

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111. Delos Santos vs. Commission on Audit, 703 SCRA 501, August
13, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Presumption of
Regularity
1. Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA); Check and Balance; The exercise
of the Commission on Audit’s general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms
that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.-
—At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s, and ultimately the
people’s, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
2. Same; Same; Judgments; It is the general policy of the Supreme Court to sustain the
decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such
as the Commission on Audit, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.-
—It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. In this case, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will
be discussed below.
3. Same; Same; Public Officers; It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians
of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely
guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or
transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of
prescribed documents and necessary records.-
—It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be
liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage,
and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law
and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records.
However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC)
476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a
congressman’s PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 8760 were not followed in the
implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and
regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Absent any showing of bad faith
and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.-
—Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption
must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. CoA
(Reyna), 642 SCRA 210 (2011), the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein,
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notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule
in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending Operations.

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112. J.R.A. Philippines, Inc. vs. CIR, 704 SCRA 94, August
28, 2013 Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Refunds|Tax Credit
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Tax Credit; Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or
tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the claim but also compliance with
all the documentary and evidentiary requirements therefor.-
—Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not
only entitlement to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and evidentiary
requirements therefor. Section 110(A)(1) of the NIRC provides that creditable input taxes
must be evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt, which must, in turn, comply with
Sections 237 and 238 of the same law, as well as Section 4.108.1 of RR 7-95. The foregoing
provisions require, inter alia, that an invoice must reflect, as required by law: (a) the BIR
Permit to Print; (b) the TIN-V of the purchaser; and (c) the word “zero-rated” imprinted
thereon. In this relation, failure to comply with the said invoicing requirements provides
sufficient ground to deny a claim for tax refund or tax credit.

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113. Yalong vs. People, 704 SCRA 195, August
28, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal
Procedure|Venue
1. Same; Criminal Procedure; Venue; The court wherein any of the crime’s essential
and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.―It
is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein
any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in
any of the places where any of its elements occurred-
— in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

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114. Castells vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 704 SCRA 206, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law|Certiorari|Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari

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115. B. Sta. Rita & Co., Inc. vs. Gueco, 704 SCRA 320, August
28, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Parties|Board of Directors

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116. Asian Constn and Devt Corp vs. Sumitomo Corp, 704 SCRA 332, August
28, 2013 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees

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117. Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. vs. Pionilla, 704 SCRA 362, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Illegal Dismissals| Reinstatement
|Backwages

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118. Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay, Leyte vs. Exploration Permit
Application (EXTA-000005-VIII) of Philippine National Oil Company, 704 SCRA 446,
September 02, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Immutability
of Judgments
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; Under the
doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.-
—It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. This doctrine has a two-
fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to
judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be
easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of
procedural law.

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119. First Gas Power Corp vs. Rep of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 453, September
02, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Judicial Stability
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to
have a land registered in his name has the burden of proving that he is its owner in fee
simple, even though there is no opposition thereto.-
—It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land registered in his name
has the burden of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no
opposition thereto. As held in Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13 (1991): The most basic rule in
land registration cases is that “no person is entitled to have land registered under the
Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though
there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. x x x In order that
the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered,
and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon
him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judicial Stability; The doctrine of judicial
stability states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered
with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.-
—As amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in violation of the
doctrine of judicial stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale
for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction — verily, a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment. Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in stark contravention of
this rule, the CA correctly ordered its nullification.
3. Same; Same; Publication; Land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence,
by virtue of the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject property
are deemed to be notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject lots.-
—As the CA correctly pointed out, land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and,
hence, by virtue of the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject
property are deemed to be notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject
lots. In this regard, petitioner cannot, therefore, take refuge on the lack of any personal
knowledge on its part previous to its application. Case law dictates that a cadastral
proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are
precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment.

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120. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Tala Realty Services Corporation,
705 SCRA 208, September 09, 2013
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Principle of Stare Decisis

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121. Cruz vs. Manila International Airport Authority, 705 SCRA 275, September
09, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Appeals

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122. Orola vs. Ramos, 705 SCRA 350, September 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Conflicting Interests|Code of Professional
Responsibility
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Conflicting Interests; It is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited
from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.-
—It is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
2. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.-
—It must be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the
law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that
he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-
client relationship has terminated.
3. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the
latter’s opponent in the same case.-
—Respondent’s justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as
enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to
opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his
representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s
previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if
the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith
and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
4. Same; Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all
concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.-
—Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written
consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent
was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s
counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio — particularly, Karen — and equally secure their express
written consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer
who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it. Accordingly, for
respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

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123. Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, September
11, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Consolidation
of Cases
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Actions; Words and Phrases; A
cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.-
—A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of
action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled
to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that
may be averred by the defendants.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.-
—As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, 524 SCRA 153
(2007), citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC), 440
SCRA 498 (2004): The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may
the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the
sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint
furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless
of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. (Emphasis supplied) Stated
otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the
complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of
action. Lest it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter
is not a ground for dismissal under the same rule.
3. Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; It is a standing rule that issues that require the
contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of
the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss.-
—It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not
be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss, as in this case. Hence, as what is only
required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the Court — in view of the above-stated reasons — finds that the RTC-Pasig
City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal
of the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
4. Same; Same; Cause of Action; Misjoinder of Causes of Action; The rule is that a
party’s failure to observe the conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court results
in a misjoinder of causes of action.-
—The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2
of the Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action: SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of
action.—A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes
of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a)
The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties; (b)
The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules; (c) Where the
causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and (d)
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Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
5. Same; Same; Docket Fees; It has long been settled that while the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal
of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.-

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—Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal
of his complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the
filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided
that the fees are paid within a reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s
insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), should be applied in
this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud
the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.
6. Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; It is hornbook principle that when or two or more
cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle
the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases.-
—It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to
serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus,
resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation
serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts
in two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single suit. The governing
rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which provides: SEC. 1. Consolidation.—When
actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order
a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

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124. Remulla vs. Maliksi, 706 SCRA 35, September 18,
2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Taxpayer’s Suit
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; Jurisprudence dictates that a
taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance.-
—Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to
be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such, Remulla — being a resident-
taxpayer of the Province of Cavite — has the legal standing to file the petition for annulment
of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said ground.
Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed
should not preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it
be misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which
may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant. As observed in Mamba v. Lara,
608 SCRA 149 (2009), the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases where
serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were
involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the annulment of the same on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to question
contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.

****

155
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
125. Bagayas vs. Bagayas, 706 SCRA 73, September 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Partition|Co-ownership|Torrens Title|Collateral Attack
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Partition; Co-ownership; An action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the properties involved.-
—An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. The
determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of
an action for partition. As held in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576
(1989): The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in
the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It
may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if
they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e.,
either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final
one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on
a certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment
pursuant to which the certificate of title was decreed.-
—Jurisprudence instructs that an action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a
certificate of title when its objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment
pursuant to which the certificate of title was decreed. Corollary thereto, it is a well-known
doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification or
fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated in
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., 450 SCRA 315 (2005): It is a well-known doctrine
that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title was procured by falsification or fraud can
only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked
only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration.
Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral
proceeding. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
3. Same; Same; Same; Torrens Title; Collateral Attack; In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 645
SCRA 677 (2011), which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced
that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack.-
—In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677 (2011), (Lacbayan) which is an action for
partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the
Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject
the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in
mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.
As pronounced in Lacbayan: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
156
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to
is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title
referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership
although both are interchangeably used. ****

157
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126. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals, 706 SCRA 213, September
23, 2013 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Agricultural Lands|Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR)|Jurisdiction
1. Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Jurisdiction; The determination of
the land’s classification as either an agricultural or industrial land-
— and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption — must be
preliminarily threshed out before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), particularly,
before the DAR Secretary.―The determination of the land’s classification as either an
agricultural or industrial land
— and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption — must be
preliminarily threshed out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Verily,
issues of exclusion or exemption partake the nature of Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
cases which are well within the competence and jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Towards
this end, the latter is ordained to exercise his legal mandate of excluding or exempting a
property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in
accordance with the law and applicable jurisprudence. Thus, considering too his technical
expertise on the matter, courts cannot simply brush aside his pronouncements regarding the
status of the land in dispute, i.e., as to whether or not it falls under CARP coverage.

****

158
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
127. Heirs of the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang and Salud Adaza-Maglasang vs.
Manila Banking Corporation, 706 SCRA 235, September 23, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Foreclosure of Mortgage|Venue
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons;
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate.―Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found
under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as
practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules
(Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.-
—A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral
security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this
rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his
mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of
the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to
realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the
same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not
be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of
the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from
redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as
security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best
interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.

****

159
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
128. Republic vs. Roque, 706 SCRA 273, September 24, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Justiciable Controversy|Words and Phrases

****

160
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
129. Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr., 706 SCRA 440, September
30, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Burden of
Proof
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Petitioners had the burden of proving their
own allegation.—Petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 206
(1999) citing United States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the
presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on
the part of the local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a)
the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s
non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s
non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action.

****

161
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
130. Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111 of Republic Act.
No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of
Pendency/Non-Pendency of Casels from the Civil Service Commission, 706 SCRA 502,
October 01, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Supervision|Courts|Supreme Court
1. Administrative Supervision; Courts; Supreme Court; Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel.-
—Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in
the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it oversees
the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action
against them for any violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records
pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.
2. Same; Same; Same; A clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be
imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on
retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of
administrative supervision.-
—It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary
administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which
pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the
Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of
the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.
3. Same; Same; Same; A prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative
case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential
appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not
equally apply to retiring court personnel.-
—To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of
pendency/non- pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit
some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the
Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the
administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the
exclusive province of the Judiciary.
4. Same; Same; Same; The provision-
— which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of
pendency/non- pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the Civil Service
Commission — should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.—The Court rules
that the subject provision — which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior
clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC
— should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would
disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance
of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the
CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state
policy of RA 10154.

****

160
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
131. Ventura vs. Heirs of Spouses Eustacio T. Endaya, 706 SCRA 631, October
02, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Contracts to Sell|Words and Phrases
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Words and Phrases; A contract to sell is
defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the
ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions
agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price and/or compliance with the other
obligations stated in the contract to sell.-
—A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his
fulfillment of the conditions agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price and/or
compliance with the other obligations stated in the contract to sell. Given its contingent nature,
the failure of the prospective buyer to make full payment and/or abide by his commitments
stated in the contract to sell prevents the obligation of the prospective seller to execute the
corresponding deed of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from arising. As
discussed in Sps. Serrano and Herrera v. Caguiat, 517 SCRA 57 (2007): A contract to sell is
akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to
transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed.
2. Same; Same; “Contract to Sell” and “Conditional Contract of Sale,” Distinguished.-
—To note, while the quality of contingency inheres in a contract to sell, the same should not be
confused with a conditional contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition will not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the
property may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey
title to the prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale. On the other hand,
in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition renders the sale
absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect of automatically transferring
the seller’s ownership or title to the property to the buyer.

****

161
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
132. Pitcher vs. Gagate, 707 SCRA 13, October 08,
2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal
Ethics|Penalties|Practice of Law
1. Same; Same; The Supreme Court sustains the Office of the Bar Confidant’s
recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent
from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.―The
Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee
received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings
should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and
not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed
liabilities which are purely civil in nature-
— for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement
(such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of
respondent’s receipt of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains
undisputed, the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in
order.
2. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Respondent’s act of advising
complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be
maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary
processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client
to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.―It bears emphasis that complainant’s right over the
properties of her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such,
the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant’s claim of ownership
over the latter’s interest in Consulting Edge-
— i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free ingress
and egress of the employees of the said company — was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same
light, respondent’s act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the
criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes
transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly
violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, in
violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such
courses of action were not only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to
serve his client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the
same regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him — in particular, her trust
that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests
— thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.

****

162
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
133. Tañada, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 188, October 22, 2013
Syllabi Class :Election Law|Commission on Elections (COMELEC)|House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)|Jurisdiction
1. Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its respective members.-
—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective
members: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
2. Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; Case law states that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.-
—Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In
particular, the term “election” refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns”
refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and “qualifications” refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his CoC.

****

163
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
134. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Court of Appeals, 708 SCRA 523, Oct.
23, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Provisional Remedies|Preliminary Injunction

****

164
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
135. Segovia-Ribaya vs. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287, November
13, 2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics

****

165
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
136. People vs. Lamsen, 709 SCRA 522, November
13, 2013 Syllabi Class :Recantations|Affidavits of
Desistance

****

166
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
137. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, November 19, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Separation of Powers|Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF)|Pork Barrel System

****
167
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
138. Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance,
Inc., 710 SCRA 337,November 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgment on the Pleadings

****
168
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
139. Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH and Co. KG (formerly Birkenstock Orthopaedie
GMBH) vs. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp, 710 SCRA 474, November 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Intellectual Property Right|Trademarks

****
169
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
140. Heirs of Romulo D. Sandueta vs. Robles, 710 SCRA 491, November
20, 2013 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Right of Retention

****

170
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
141. Dagala vs. Quesada, Jr., 711 SCRA 206, December
02, 2013 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal
Ethics|Penalties|Penalties

****

171
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
142. Paraguya vs. Escurel-Crucillo, 711 SCRA 275, December
02, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Property|Land Titles|Spanish
Titles

****

172
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
143. Metro Concast Steel Corp vs. Allied Bank Corp, 711 SCRA 479, December 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Extinguishment of Obligations|Fortuitous Events|Words
and Phrases

****
173
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
144. Optimum Development Bank vs. Jovellanos, 711 SCRA 548, December 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Contracts to Sell|Maceda Law|Realty Installment Buyer
Protection Act (R.A. No. 6552)

****
174
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
145. Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 711 SCRA 590, December
04, 2013 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Evidence|Substantial Evidence

****

175
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
146. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. vs. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union-Olalia,
711 SCRA 618,December 09, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Damages|Nominal Damages

****

176
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
147. Philippine Postal Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 711 SCRA 632, December
09, 2013 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Res Judicata

****

177
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
148. Ace Foods, Inc. vs. Micro Pacific Tech Co., Ltd., 712 SCRA 679, December
11, 2013 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Novation

****

178
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
149. The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints vs. BTL
Construction Corporation, 713 SCRA 455, January 15, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees

****
179
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
150. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas, 713 SCRA 475, January
15, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Substantial
Evidence|Words and Phrases

****
189
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
151. Rivelisa Realty, Inc, vs. First Sta. Clara Builders Corp. 713 SCRA 618, January
15, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Quantum Meruit

****

181
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
152. Heirs of Victorino Sarili, The vs. Lagrosa, 713 SCRA 726, January
15, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Builders in Good Faith

****

182
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
153. Union Bank of the Phil vs. Development Bank of the Phil, 714 SCRA 306, Jan.
20, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Compensation|Words and Phrases

****

183
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
154. Marquez vs. Alindog, 714 SCRA 460, January 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage

****

184
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
155. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514, January 22,
2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Certiorari|Small
Claims Cases

****

185
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
156. Marquez vs. Ovejera, 715 SCRA 332, February 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (R.A. No. 6713)|Public Officers|Penalties

****

186
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
157. Quintos vs. Dept. of Agrarian Adjudication Board, 715 SCRA 592, February
10, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Foreclosure of Mortgage

****

187
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
158. Republic vs. De Gracia, 716 SCRA 8, February 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Family Law|Marriages|Husband and Wife|Annulment of
Marriage|Psychological Incapacity

****

188
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
159. Trade and Invt Devt Corp of the Phil vs. Asia Paces Corporation, 716 SCRA 67, Feb
12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Suretyship|Guaranty|Guarantor

****

189
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
160. Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84, February 12,
2014 Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Presumption of
Innocence

****

190
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
161. Ligon vs. Regional Trial Court, br 56, Makati City, 717 SCRA 373, February 26,
2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Contempt|Indirect
Contempt|Words and Phrases

****

191
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
162. GMA Network, Inc. vs. NTC, 717 SCRA 435, February 26,
2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Estoppel

****

192
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
163. Ayungo vs. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation, 717 SCRA 538, February
26, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Hypertension

****

193
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
164. Vales vs. Galinato, 718 SCRA 100, March 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

****

194
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
165. Republic vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., 718 SCRA 153, March
05, 2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Pharmaceutical Products

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195
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166. Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. vs. Sugar Regulatory Admin, 718 SCRA 212, March
05, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Moot and Academic

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196
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167. Marcelo vs. Pichay, 718 SCRA 464, March 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision

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197
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168. People vs. Cadano, Jr., 719 SCRA 234, March 12,
2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Rape|Qualified Rape

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198
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169. Espinas vs. Commission on Audit, 720 SCRA 302, April 01, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Agencies|Commission on Audit (COA)|Extraordinary and
Miscellaneous Expenses (EME)

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199
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170. Lozada vs. Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371, April 02,
2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Venue

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200
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171. Nieves vs. Duldulao, 720 SCRA 437, April 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Ejectment|Failure to Pay Leasehold Rentals|Agricultural
Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844)

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172. People vs. Hallarte, 720 SCRA 582, April 02,
2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Rape

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202
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173. National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 658, April
07, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Immutability of
Judgments

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174. Roque vs. Aguado, 720 SCRA 780, April 07,
2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil
Procedure|Appeals

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204
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175. Republic vs. Transunion Corporation, 722 SCRA 273, April
21, 2014 Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Due Process

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205
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176. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz, 723 SCRA 25, April 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Probationary Employees|Regular Employees|Moral
Damages|Exemplary Damages

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177. Dulang vs. Regencia, 724 SCRA 214, June 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision
1. Administrative Law; Judges; Undue Delay in Rendering Decision; Undue delay in
rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.-
—Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable
either by: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. In imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside
from her aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively
liable for gross inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover, as
correctly observed by Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of this case, her length
of service of more than 17 years should be taken against her instead of being considered a
mitigating factor as she should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an
ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be expeditiously resolved.
Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for
Judge Regencia’s misconduct.
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Prompt disposition of
cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges.-
—Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is
inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice
promptly. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states that “[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods” and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that “[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.”
3. Remedial Law; Rules of Summary Procedure; Being an ejectment case, it is governed
by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the
submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be
issued.-
—Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly
sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper
within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered
judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011. While
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to
prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be
regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and
has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of
their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons.
However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition
of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision.

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178. Office of the Administrator vs. Ampong, 724 SCRA 488, June
04, 2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel
1. Same; Court Personnel; It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should
be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official
duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s
good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official
and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good
name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary.
2. Administrative Jurisdiction; Court Personnel; Administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed
before or after employment in the judiciary.-
—Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the
same case, viz.: It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service.
As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted
the power to “control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.” This
authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly
connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme
Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge
on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their
personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary. x x x That she committed the
dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative
reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed
before or after employment in the judiciary.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Immutability of Judgments; Pursuant to the doctrine
of immutability of judgment, which states that “a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,” Ampong could no
longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the
penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in
its full course. In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and
(c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.
4. Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Leave Credits; Despite Ampong’s
dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should nevertheless be entitled to receive her
accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned provision of the URACCS,
which does not include the forfeiture of the same. It is a standing rule that despite their
dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they
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have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may
not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.
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179. Republic vs. Manalo, 724 SCRA 668, June 04, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Moot and
Academic
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use.-
—A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a moot
question can no longer be enforced.

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180. People vs. Dela Cruz, 724 SCRA 676, June 04, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Moot and
Academic
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use.-
—A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a moot
question can no longer be enforced.

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181. Sahar Int. Trading, Inc. vs. Warner Lambert Co., LLC, 725 SCRA 460, June
09, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Actions|Dismissal of
Actions|Moot and Academic
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Moot and Academic;
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.-
—A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss
it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose
or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.

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182. People vs. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597, June
09, 2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Aberratio
Ictus
1. Same; Aberratio Ictus; The Supreme Court (SC) observes that Maureen’s death is a case
of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was
actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended target.-
—The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal
blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawid’s
intended target. In this regard, Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted
Murder of Vicente; and (b) Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as
species of complex crime defined under Article 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito
compuesto, or a compound crime where a single act produces two (2) or more grave or less
grave felonies. Based on the foregoing, Umawid should have been punished for committing
the complex crime of Murder and Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to
Article 4(1) of the RPC. However, considering that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-
0471 only charged him with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a
complex crime because to do so would be violative of his right to due process.
2. Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; The defense of insanity is in the
nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity.-
—As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance
because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that
he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity,
anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with which he is charged.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act,
i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not
lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of
the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend
credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
3. Same; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), treachery qualifies the killing of a person to the crime of
Murder.-
—Under Article 248 of the RPC, treachery qualifies the killing of a person to the crime of
Murder: Art.
248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be
appreciated: first, the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, second, the means of
execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.-
—The concept of treachery in criminal law is well-established — there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Based on the
foregoing, it may then be deduced that two
(2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the employment of means of
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execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and,
second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the
manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to her tender
age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.-
—Jurisprudence states that an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim
unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery. Likewise, it has been
held that the killing of

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a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because
the weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the absence of any danger to the
accused. With these principles in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and
the CA that treachery was attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show
that Umawid suddenly appeared at the terrace of Vicente’s house and started attacking
Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to evade Umawid’s attacks, resulting in
Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While it was not shown that
Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen, who was
then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a
minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing to Murder.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated even
when the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.-
—Treachery exists in Umawid’s attack on Jeffrey, albeit the Court disagrees with the RTC and
the CA’s finding that Umawid employed means, methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey
incapable of raising a credible defense. While it is true that treachery may also be
appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is
decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate, a review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not
impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawid’s attacks. In fact, Jeffrey was
sufficiently informed of Umawid’s impending assault upon him as he saw the latter charging
at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the house, albeit he was
unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against
Umawid’s attacks — but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he
crouched and covered his head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery may still be
appreciated on account of Jeffrey’s minority, considering that he was just 15 years of age
when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the case of People v. Guzman, 513
SCRA 156 (2007), where it was held that treachery attended the killing of a 17-year old
victim due to his minority.

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183. Crisostomo vs. Nazareno, 726 SCRA 1, June
10, 2014 Syllabi Class :Notarial Law|Notary Public
1. Same; Same; Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public.-
—Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. x x x x
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his
hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of
requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary
public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must
accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification
against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the
erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.-
—Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v.
Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 139 (2002), as follows: The distinction between the prohibition
against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to
be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is
separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is
a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions
but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and
after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct
contempt. x x x. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries
in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and
subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
3. Notarial Law; It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of
the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.-
—Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a
separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in
the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number
of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.
Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
4. Same; Notary Public; Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping
attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a
material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was
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not aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other
forum.-
—Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood,
i.e., that Rudex had not

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commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or
proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability of an
erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 512 SCRA
17 (2007), to wit: Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his
or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and
sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct. (Emphasis supplied) In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a
document containing false statements had his notarial commission revoked and was
disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his
malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of
such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to
revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as
a notary public.

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184. Golden Valley Exploration, Inc. vs. Pinkian Mining Co, 726 SCRA 259, June
11, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Rescission|Reciprocal Obligations
1. Same; Same; Same; The invocation of a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission
effectively puts an end to the contract and, thus, releases the parties from the obligations
thereunder, notwithstanding the lack of a judicial decree for the purpose. In the case at bar,
PMC, through its Letter dated June 8, 1999 to GVEI, invoked Section 8.01, Article VIII in
relation to Section 5.01, Article V of the OA which allows it to extrajudicially rescind the
contract for GVEI’s nonpayment of royalties. Thus, at that point in time, PMC had effectively
rescinded the OA and was then considered to have been released from its legal effects.
Accordingly, there stood no legal impediment so as to hinder PMC from entering into a
contract with CVI covering the same mining claims subject of this case.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal obligations,
either party may rescind the contract upon the other’s substantial breach of the obligation/s
he had assumed thereunder. The basis therefor is Article 1191 of the Civil Code which states
as follows: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party
may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if
the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless
there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is understood to be without
prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. More accurately referred to as resolution, the
right of rescission under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the
reciprocity between parties to the contract. This retaliatory remedy is given to the contracting
party who suffers the injurious breach on the premise that it is “unjust that a party be held
bound to fulfill his promises when the other violates his.”
3. Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked
judicially and cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has
committed a breach of the obligation. This is so because rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental
violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. As a well-
established exception, however, an injured party need not resort to court action in order to
rescind a contract when the contract itself provides that it may be revoked or cancelled upon
violation of its terms and conditions.
4. Same; Same; Same; Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial
rescission, no judicial decree is necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial
rescission immediately releases the party from its obligation under the contract, subject only
to court reversal if found improper.-
—While it remains apparent that PMC had not judicially invoked the other grounds to rescind
in this case, the only recognizable effect, however, is with respect to the reckoning point as to
when the contract would be formally regarded as rescinded. Where parties agree to a
stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, no judicial decree is necessary for rescission to
take place; the extrajudicial rescission immediately releases the party from its obligation
under the contract, subject only to court reversal if found improper. On the other hand,
without a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, it is the judicial decree that rescinds,
and not the will of the rescinding party. This may be gathered from previous Court rulings on
the matter.

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185. Piedad vs. Gurieza, 727 SCRA 71, June 18, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Unlawful Detainer|Actions

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186. Taganito Mining Corp vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 726 SCRA 637, June
18, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Appeals
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Taganito did not appeal the CTA Division’s
partial denial of its claim for refund on the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence
that its suppliers did not avail of the benefits of zero-rating. It is well-settled that a party who
does not appeal from a judgment can no longer seek modification or reversal of the same.
For this reason, Taganito may no longer question the propriety and correctness of the said
partial disallowance as it had lapsed into finality and may no longer be modified. In fine,
Taganito is only entitled to the partial refund of its unutilized input VAT in the amount of
P537,645.43, as was originally granted to it by the CTA Division and herein upheld.
2. Taxation; Tax Refunds; As correctly pointed out by the CTA En Banc, the Court, in the
2010 Aichi case, ruled that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and
jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently,
nonobservance thereof would lead to the dismissal of the judicial claim due to the CTA’s lack
of jurisdiction. The Court, in the same case, also clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive
period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. In other words, the
Aichi case instructs that once the administrative claim is filed within the prescriptive period, the
claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a 30-day period to
file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed
the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.
3. Same; Same; Equitable Estoppel; In the recent case of CIR v. San Roque Power
Corporation (San Roque), 690 SCRA 336, the Court, however, recognized an exception to
the mandatory and jurisdictional treatment of the 120-day period as pronounced in Aichi. In
San Roque, the Court ruled that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 —
wherein the BIR stated that the “taxpayer- claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day
period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review” —
provided taxpayers-claimants the opportunity to raise a valid claim for equitable estoppel
under Section 246 of the NIRC, viz.: There is no dispute that the 120-day period is
mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a judicial
claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two
exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling,
misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific
ruling is applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the
Commissioner, through a general interpretative rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code,
misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the
Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA’s assumption of jurisdiction
over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly authorized under Section
246 of the Tax Code.
4. Same; Same; Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the
rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau of Internal
Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case
was promulgated), taxpayers- claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could
file a judicial claim for refund of excess input Value-Added Tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA). Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to
October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to
the filing of such claim.-
—Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must
therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants
need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess
input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10,
2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.

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****

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187. Rana vs. Wong, 727 SCRA 539, June 30,
2014 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees|Damages

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188. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Capistrano, 728 SCRA 439, July
02, 2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Judiciary
1. Same; Same; Judiciary; The Supreme Court (SC) reminds every employee of the
Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty, considering that the
sacrosanct image of a Court dispensing justice is mirrored in its very own personnel.-
—The Court reminds every employee of the Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a Court dispensing justice
is mirrored in its very own personnel. As pronounced in Re: Falsification of Daily Time
Records of Maria Fe P. Brooks, Court Interpreter, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Br. 96,
and Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39, 473
SCRA 483 (2005): [N]o other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. [The Court has]
repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part
of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Daily Time Records; Under Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9, 2003, it is incumbent upon every
court official and employee to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and
departure from office in their respective Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards.-
—Under OCA Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9, 2003, it is incumbent upon every court
official and employee to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and
departure from office in their respective Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards, viz.: In the
submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards by
Judges and court personnel, the following guidelines shall be observed: 1. After the end of
each month, every official and employee of each court shall accomplish the Daily Time
Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating therein truthfully and accurately
the time of arrival in and departure from the office.
3. Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees
who falsify their Daily Time Records (DTRs) are guilty of dishonesty.-
—Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify their DTRs are guilty of
dishonesty. Further, under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of
official documents, which includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses.
Accordingly, the commission of these acts carries the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service.
4. Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RURACCS) grants the disciplining
authority, the Supreme Court (SC) in this case, the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty.-
—Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service grants the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These factors range, among
others, from the erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high
performance rating. In this case, Capistrano readily admitted to the fact that she indeed
falsified the entries in her April and May 2009 bundy cards, and concomitantly, has expressed
her remorse and promised not to commit the same. Thus, considering too that said infraction
would be Capistrano’s first administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to adopt the
OCA’s recommendation to impose against her the penalty of suspension for a period of six
(6) months, without pay, and not the supreme penalty of dismissal in view of the mitigating
factors attendant herein.
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****

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189. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, Inc., 729 SCRA 12, July
02, 2014 Syllabi Class :International Law|Pacta Sunt Servanda|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; Words and Phrases; Pacta sunt servanda is a
fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in
good faith.-
—The Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and
conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law
that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith. It bears pointing out that the
pacta sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the incorporation
clause found under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that
the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; A petition for prohibition is a special
civil action that seeks for a judgment ordering the respondent to desist from continuing with
the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.-
—A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment ordering the
respondent to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) reads: Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition.—
When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
3. Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; While the Supreme Court (SC), Court of Appeals (CA)
and Regional Trial Court (RTC) have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to “acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,” the petition must be filed “in the
RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Court.”-
—While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to
“acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,” the petition
must be filed “in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Court.” Section 4 of the same Rules provides that: Sec. 4. When and Where
to file the petition.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an
omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall
be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the
petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
4. Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) already ruled in
numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Castaño v. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91
(1906), that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial
Courts (RTC), formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits
of their respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever.-
—The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Castaño
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v. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91 (1906), that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of
the Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised
within the limits of their respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction
whatsoever. Applying previous legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its
complementary provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case
that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of

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injunction and certiorari against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was outside
the territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Arnado, 2
SCRA 782 (1961), a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed
in the CFI of Manila to question the authority of the Regional Administrator and Labor
Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to hear a complaint for sickness
compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to enjoin said respondents from conducting further
proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper
venue, holding that the CFI of Manila had no authority to issue writs of injunction, certiorari,
and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial boundaries. Further, in both Cudiamat
v. Torres (Cudiamat), 22 SCRA 695 (1968), and National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 905 (1968), (NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in
securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to restrain, in Cudiamat, the
implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply of a police call and signal box
system for the City of Manila, and, in NAWASA, the conduct of the public bidding for the
supply of steel pipes for its Manila and Suburbs Waterworks Project. The Court held in both
cases that the injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to restrain acts outside the
province of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
5. Bids and Bidding; Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184, the decisions of the Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) in all stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the
procuring entity through a verified position paper and upon payment of a protest fee.-
—The Court further discerns that the Manila RTC should have dismissed the case outright
for failure of Atlanta to exhaust administrative remedies. Under RA No. 9184, the decisions
of the BAC in all stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the procuring entity
through a verified position paper and upon payment of a protest fee. The necessity for the
complaining bid participant to complete the protest process before resorting to court action
cannot be overemphasized. It is a condition precedent to the court’s taking cognizance of an
action that assails a bid process. When precipitately taken prior to the completion of the
protest process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. While Atlanta may have
written the BAC a letter objecting to some of the terms and conditions contained in the bidding
documents to be used for the rebidding, its action fell short of the required protest. It failed to
follow through with its protest and opted instead to participate in the rebidding with full
knowledge that the IBRD Procurement Guidelines were to be followed throughout the
conduct of the bid. Having failed to observe the protest procedure required by law, Atlanta’s
case should not have prospered with the RTC altogether.
6. Same; While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts
for the procurement of civil works or supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only
after competitive public bidding, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 recognizes the country’s
commitment to abide by its obligations under any treaty or international or executive
agreement.-
—While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts for the
procurement of civil works or supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only after
competitive public bidding, RA 9184 recognizes the country’s commitment to abide by its
obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement. This is pertinently
provided in Section 4 of RA No. 9184 which reads as follows: Sec. 4. Scope and
Application.—This Act shall apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects, Goods and
Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches
and instrumentalities of the government, its department, offices and agencies, including
government owned and/or controlled corporations and local government units, subject to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall
be observed.
7. International Law; International Agreements; In Bayan Muna v. Romulo (Bayan
Muna), 641 SCRA 244 (2011), the Supreme Court (SC) defined an international
agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by
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international law, “whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation,” and further expounded that it
may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification; or (b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that
they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a
narrower range of subject matters than treaties.-

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—In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an
international agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, “whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation,” and further expounded that it may be in
the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification;
or (b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require
legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject
matters than treaties. Examining its features, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the
IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by
the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-
making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by
world governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the
borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and possessed
of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to a
treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH —
following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case
— is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law.

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190. Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Santos, 729 SCRA 35, July
02, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Right to Speedy
Disposition of Cases
1. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The expeditious disposition of
cases is as much the duty of petitioner, being the plaintiff, as the court’s.-
—The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of petitioner, being the plaintiff,
as the court’s. Indeed, respondents, as the defendants, cannot be wearingly denied of their
right to the speedy disposition of the case filed against them. After more than two (2)
decades, respondents certainly do not deserve the agony of going through the same issues
all over again with petitioner, which could have been settled had the latter simply proceeded
to pre-trial and had given the trial court the opportunity to evaluate the evidence, apply the
law, and decree the proper judgment. At the end of the day, the unfortunate fault can fall on
no one’s hands but on petitioner’s. Indeed, there is a price to pay when one trifles with the
rules.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Postponement; The trial court has the
discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial
conference in accordance with the circumstances obtaining in the case.-
—At the outset, it should be emphasized that the trial court has the discretion on whether to
grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance
with the circumstances obtaining in the case. This must be so as it is the trial court which is
able to witness firsthand the events as they unfold during the trial of a case. Postponements,
while permissible, must not be countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds and in
light of the attendant circumstances.
3. Same; Same; Pre-Trial; It is mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases
in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.-
—A pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon
justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of
the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to
realize the paramount objective of simplifying; abbreviating, and expediting trial.
4. Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; The rules of procedure do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the
efficiency of the judicial system.-
—It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the
judicial system. By trifling with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the
order of the trial court to proceed to pre- trial, petitioner only has itself to blame for the
dismissal of its Complaint. The dismissal is a matter within the trial court’s sound discretion,
which, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court hereunder quoted, must
stand absent any justifiable reason to the contrary, as in this case: SEC.
3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unrea- sonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

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191. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sta. Romana, 729 SCRA 387, July
09, 2014 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just Compensation|Interest Rates
1. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is reminded that while it should take into
account the different formula created by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in
arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations
before it do not warrant their application.-
—The Regional Trial Court is reminded, however, that while it should take into account the
different formula created by the DAR in arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not
strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation for the subject land
acquired under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, with
PD 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228 having mere suppletory effects.-
—Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case
where the just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid,
just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD
27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only
apply when there are gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are
superseded.
3. Same; Same; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.-
—For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b)
the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn
valuation,
(e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the
government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
4. Same; Same; Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.-
—Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties
before the trial court for the valuation of the subject land must be based on the values
prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.
5. Same; Same; Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) has allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on
the part of the State; Beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the
landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the
amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013.-
—In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was
deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be
pegged at the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30,
2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due
the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the
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amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

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192. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Beriña, 729 SCRA 403, July
09, 2014 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just
Compensation|Courts|Regional Trial Courts
1. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; The Regional Trial Court is reminded,
however, that while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in
arriving at the just compensation for the subject portion, it is not strictly bound thereto if the
situations before it do not warrant their application.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete, as in this case where payment for the subject portion acquired
under PD 27 has yet to be made, just compensation should be determined and the process
be concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as “Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,” with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory effect. This
means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657
is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
3. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; While the LBP
is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the
land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking, guided by the
records/documents contained in the claim folders, it must be emphasized that its valuation is
considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive. Verily, it is the Regional
Trial Court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of
just compensation and which has the final say on what the amount of just compensation will
be pursuant to the well-settled rule that the determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. This rule notwithstanding, a review of the records, nonetheless, impels the Court to
order the remand of the case to the RTC considering the failure of both the RTC and the CA
to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, in determining
the just compensation for the subject portion.
4. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.-
—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market
value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e.,
(a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
5. Same; Same; Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be
presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject portion must be
based on the values prevalent at such time of taking for like agricultural lands.
6. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation as
may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence.
In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases
where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was
deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be
pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter,
or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall
earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-
MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

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****

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193. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valencerina, 730 SCRA 12, July
14, 2014 Syllabi Class :Statutory Construction
1. Statutory Construction; It is a fundamental legal principle that when two rules apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the
other. Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to administrative
complaints cognizable by the OMB, while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals
from quasi-judicial bodies in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules,
Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in
appeals from a decision of the OMB in an administrative case.
2. Ombudsman; Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Section 7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated
September 15, 2003, provides that the office’s decision imposing the penalty of removal,
among others, shall be executed as a matter of course and shall not be stopped by an appeal
thereto, viz.: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.— Where the respondent is
absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

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194. Aboitiz Trans System Corp vs. Carlos A. Gothong Lines,Inc., 730 SCRA 178, July
18, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Alternative Dispute Resolution|Arbitration
1. Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Arbitration; Disputes do not go to
arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.-
—In Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd., 512 SCRA 148 (2007), the Court explained that
“[d]isputes do not go to arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the
arbitrator’s decision. Necessarily, a contract is required for arbitration to take place and to be
binding.” Furthermore, in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 373
(2001), the Court stated that “[t]he provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising
therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract. As a rule, contracts are
respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them,
their assigns and heirs.” Succinctly put, only those parties who have agreed to submit a
controversy to arbitration who, as against each other, may be compelled to submit to
arbitration.

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195. Mauleon vs. Porter, 730 SCRA 229, July 18, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Immutability of Judgments
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; It is settled that when
a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and unalterable. By this
principle of immutability of judgments, the Court is now precluded from further examining the
MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner’s perceived errors therein, i.e., that her
possession of the subject property was not by virtue of respondent’s tolerance, hence, the
ejectment complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and that the pending
annulment of documents and reconveyance case was prejudicial to the ejectment suit.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Postpone; No party has the right to assume
that his motion to postpone would be approved by the courts.-
—Petitioner’s asseveration that her nonappearance in the March 27, 2009 hearing was due
to her counsel’s assurance that he had duly filed a motion for postponement, which the
MeTC should have purportedly granted, cannot be sustained since no party has the right to
assume that such motion would be approved by the courts. Consequently, absent any
justifiable reason for her and her counsel’s nonappearance at the said preliminary
conference, the Court concurs with the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of discretion can
be ascribed against the MeTC in submitting the case for decision and, subsequently,
ordering petitioner’s ejectment from the subject property.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides for the immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases,
which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and
makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal.-
—No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against the MeTC in issuing the August 18,
2009 Order directing the execution of its Decision. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides for the immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases,
which can only be stayed if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and
makes periodic deposit of rental or other reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal. These requirements
are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue as a matter of right.

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196. Shang Prop Realty Corporation vs. St. Francis Devt Corp, 730 SCRA 275, July
21, 2014 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Unfair Competition|Geographically Descriptive
Term
1. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 123.2 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to
be met in order to conclude that a geographically-descriptive mark has acquired secondary
meaning, to wit: (a) the secondary meaning must have arisen as a result of substantial
commercial use of a mark in the Philippines; (b) such use must result in the distinctiveness
of the mark insofar as the goods or the products are concerned; and (c) proof of substantially
exclusive and continuous commercial use in the Philippines for five (5) years before the date
on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. Unless secondary meaning has been
established, a geographically-descriptive mark, due to its general public domain
classification, is perceptibly disqualified from trademark registration. Section 123.1(j) of the
IP Code states this rule as follows: SEC. 123. Registrability.—123.1 A mark cannot be
registered if it: x x x x (j) Consists exclusively of signs or of indications that may serve in
trade to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin,
time or production of the goods or rendering of the services, or other characteristics of the
goods or services.
2. Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines;
Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines” (IP Code), provides for the rules and regulations on unfair competition. To begin, Section
168.1 qualifies who is entitled to protection against unfair competition. It states that “[a] person who
has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or
services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in
the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same
manner as other property rights.” Section 168.2 proceeds to the core of the provision, describing
forthwith who may be found guilty of and subject to an action of unfair competition — that is, “[a]ny
person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass
off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the
one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result
x x x.”
3. Same; Same; The statutory attribution of the unfair competition concept is well-supplemented by
jurisprudential pronouncements. In the recent case of Republic Gas Corporation v. Petron
Corporation, 698 SCRA 666 (2013), the Court has echoed the classic definition of the term which is
“‘the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of
one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the
public.’ Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on the
general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise
under the impression that they are buying that of his competitors. [In other words], the defendant
gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving
the public that the goods are those of his competitor.” The “true test” of unfair competition has thus
been “whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the
ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the particular trade to which
the controversy relates.” Based on the foregoing, it is therefore essential to prove the existence of
fraud, or the intent to deceive, actual or probable, determined through a judicious scrutiny of the
factual circumstances attendant to a particular case.
4. Same; Same; Geographically Descriptive Term; Words and Phrases; The Court finds
the element of fraud to be wanting; hence, there can be no unfair competition. The CA’s contrary
conclusion was faultily premised on its impression that respondent had the right to the exclusive use
of the mark “ST. FRANCIS,” for which the latter had purportedly established considerable goodwill.
What the CA appears to have disregarded or been mistaken in its disquisition, however, is the
geographically-descriptive nature of the mark “ST. FRANCIS” which thus bars its exclusive
appropriability, unless a secondary meaning is acquired. As deftly explained in the U.S. case of Great
Southern Bank v. First Southern Bank: “[d]escriptive geographical terms are in the ‘public domain’ in
the sense that every seller should have the right to inform customers of the geographical origin of his
goods. A ‘geographically descriptive term’ is any noun or adjective that designates geographical
location and would tend to be regarded by buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of origin
of the goods or services. A geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic location on
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earth, such as continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and addresses, areas of cities,
rivers, and any other location referred to by a recognized name. In order to determine whether or not
the geographic term in question is descriptively used, the following question is relevant: (1) Is the
mark the name of the place or region from which the goods actually come? If the answer is yes, then
the geographic term is probably used in a descriptive sense, and secondary meaning is required for
protection.”

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197. People vs. Viterbo, 730 SCRA 672, July 23, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Chain of Custody Rule
1. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The presentation of the drugs which constitute
the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they
are the same seized items.--The Court concludes that there exists reasonable doubt on the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items, necessitating therefor strict
compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As it has been
established that there was noncompliance with its provisions, i.e., that there was no physical
inventory or photographs of the seized evidence, nor was there any representative from the
media, or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official present during the subject
seizure and confiscation, it is therefore clear that the identity of the prohibited drugs had not
been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, hence, rendering improper accused-
appellants’ conviction. Verily, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti
of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same
seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt becomes a matter of right.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is
therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it
was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.

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198. People vs. Dionaldo, 731 SCRA 68, July 23,
2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal
Law|Damages|Exemplary Damages
1. Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; —Exemplary damages must be awarded in this
case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to
deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Well-settled is the rule that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.-
—Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial
court to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight,
and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case,
or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves
high respect by the appellate court.
3. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; —Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission
of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by
the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more person s come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when
conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual,
rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations.
In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed
from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted
action, and community of interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly
show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime
and that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its
execution, the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among
them.
4. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The Court is, however, constrained to
modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellants have
committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically
charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably,
while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an
appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate
court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
5. Criminal Law; Penalties; Death Penalty; The enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9346 had suspended the imposition of the death penalty.-
—Further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346
had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants
could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused- appellants are not eligible for parole.
6. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral
damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral
shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages
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may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the
kidnap victim’s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the detention
and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to
the family of the victim.

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199. Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. vs. Melecio-Yap, 731 SCRA 244, July
30, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Estoppel
1. Same; Estoppel; Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, an essential element of estoppel is
that the person invoking it has been influenced and has relied on the representations or
conduct of the person sought to be estopped.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. The theory of forgery
advanced by respondents involves a question of fact. While it is not the function of the Court
to undertake a reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case, there are, however, recognized exceptions, among which is when the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting, as in this case.
3. Civil Law; Mortgages; —The settled rule is that persons constituting a mortgage must be
legally authorized for the purpose. In the present case, while Erna appears to be a co-owner
of the mortgaged properties, she made it appear that she was duly authorized to sell the
entire properties by virtue of the notarized SPA dated August 24, 1990.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; Generally, a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, the
presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of
its public character and reduce it to a private document. Hence, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached
to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.
5. Same; Same; Private Documents; Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that “before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either (a) by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.”-
—Having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the execution of the SPA, the
presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents can no longer apply and
the questioned SPA is to be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court which provides that “[b]efore any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either (a) [b]y
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or (b) [b]y evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker.”
6. Civil Law; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it.-
—The Court cannot subscribe to RBCI’s contention that respondents are barred by laches
from laying claim over the subject properties in view of their inexplicable inaction from the
time they learned of the falsification. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In this case, the
complaint for nullification of the SPA was filed before the RTC on April 17, 1996, or barely
three years from respondents’ discovery of the averred forgery in 1993, which is within the
four-year prescriptive period provided under Article 1146 of the Civil Code to institute an
action upon the injury to their rights over the subject properties. A delay within the
prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar
relief. Laches applies only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period. Furthermore, the
doctrine of laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the
more prudent rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly
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by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when by doing so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result, as in this case.

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200. National Trans Corp vs. Alphaomega Integrated Corp, 731 SCRA 299, July
30, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure
1. Same; Same; It is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not appeal
and that a
party who did not appeal the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate
court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought
up on appeal.-
—It must be emphasized that the petition for review before the CA was filed by TRANSCO.
AIC never elevated before the courts the matter concerning the discrepancy between the
amount of the award stated in the body of the Final Award and the total award shown in its
dispositive portion. The issue was touched upon by the CA only after AIC raised the same
through its Comment (With Motion to Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award) to TRANSCO’s
petition for review. The CA should not have modified the amount of the award to favor AIC
because it is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not appeal and that a
party who did not appeal the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate
court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought
up on appeal. The disposition, as stated in the fallo of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s Final
Award, should therefore stand.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a
petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this case, “shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth.”-
—TRANSCO seeks through this petition a recalibration of the evidence presented before the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal, insisting that AIC is not entitled to any damages not only because it
had previously waived all claims for standby fees in case of project delays but had eventually
failed to perform the workable portions of the projects. This is evidently a factual question
which cannot be the proper subject of the present petition. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this case, “shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.” Thus, absent any of the existing
exceptions impelling the contrary, the Court is, as a general rule, precluded from delving on
factual determinations, as what TRANSCO essentially seeks in this case.
3. Same; Same; It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA).-
—The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on the
matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as being well supported by
evidence and properly referred to in the record. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when
affirmed by the CA. The CIAC possesses that required expertise in the field of construction
arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and conclusive, not
reviewable by this Court on appeal.

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201. Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12, August 05,
2014 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics

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202. Heirs of Fransisco I. Narvasa, Sr. vs. Imbornal, 732 SCRA 171, August
06, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Trusts|Riparian Owners|Alluvium

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203. People vs. Piccio, 732 SCRA 254, August
06, 2014 Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Office of the
Solicitor General

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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
204. Benson Industries Emp Union- vs. Benson Industries, Inc., 732 SCRA 318,
Aug 6, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Closure of
Business|Separation Pay

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205. Lagado vs. Leonido, 732 SCRA 579, August 12,
2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court
Personnel

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206. Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin, 733 SCRA 1, August
13, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.-
—The Court likewise rejects the belated claim of res judicata anchored on the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 127995 filed by Domingo as per its Resolution dated
April 28, 1997, which became final and executory on June 16, 1997. As the records disclose,
petitioners never raised this issue in the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 54912 before the CA,
and even in the subsequent proceedings before the RTC and the CA in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
92765. Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled rule that the Supreme Court
(SC) is not a trier of facts and, hence, does not normally undertake the reexamination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) are generally conclusive and binding on the
Court, especially if they do not contradict those of the trial court, as in this case.-
—It is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and, hence, does not normally
undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case, considering that the factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive and
binding on the Court, especially if they do not contradict those of the trial court, as in this
case.
3. Same; Evidence; Handwriting Experts; The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore,
does not mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data
upon which it can form its own opinion.-
—As correctly pointed out by the CA, the authenticity of a signature is a matter that is not so
highly technical as to preclude a judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon
the question of whether the signature on a document is forged or not. The opinion of a
handwriting expert, therefore, does not mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s function
being to place before the court data upon which it can form its own opinion.

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207. Fernandez vs. Botica Claudio, 733 SCRA 133, August
13, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Due Process ;
1. Labor Law; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be
heard or as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.-
—It is undisputed that Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not
only one but two motions for reconsideration from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating
any supposed denial of due process on her part. As held in the case of Angeles v.
Fernandez, 513 SCRA 378 (2007), the availment of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due process. After all, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied in administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, thus, an aggrieved party cannot feign denial of due process where
he had been afforded the opportunity to ventilate his side, as Jose was in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; It is
settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is an indispensable condition before an
aggrieved party can avail of a petition for certiorari.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due
course to respondent’s Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding that the latter still had a
pending motion for reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15, 2010 before the
NLRC. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or
decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a
petition for certiorari. This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors
or mistakes, if any. Hence, the more prudent recourse for respondent should have been to
move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead
of filing a petition for certiorari before the CA. Having failed to do so, her petition for certiorari
was prematurely filed, and the CA should have dismissed the same.
3. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that the mere failure
to serve a copy of the memorandum on appeal upon the opposing party does not bar the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) from giving due course to an appeal.-
—While Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC require the party intending to appeal from the LA’s ruling to furnish
the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has held that the mere
failure to serve the same upon the opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due
course to an appeal. Such failure is only treated as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and,
hence, not a jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal of an appeal. Instead, the NLRC
should require the appellant to provide the opposing party copies of the notice of appeal and
memorandum of appeal.

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208. Grace Christian High School vs. Lavandera, 733 SCRA 498, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Retirement ; One-Half Month Salary
; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Same; One-Half Month Salary; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court
(SC), in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 676 SCRA 463 (2012), has recently
affirmed that “one-half (1⁄2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days
representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining five (5) days for
Service Incentive Leave (SIL).”-
—The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 676 SCRA 463 (2012), has
recently affirmed that “one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days
representing one- twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for [SIL].”
The Court sees no reason to depart from this interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that
the 5 days SIL should be likewise prorated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retirement; Republic Act (RA) No. 7641,
which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing
for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any
retirement plan in the establishment.-
—RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor
Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the
absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that “an employee’s
retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements
shall not be less than those provided” under the same — that is, at least one-half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered
as one whole year — and that “[u]nless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term
one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.”
The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable
agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other
applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by
law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still
superiority in terms of benefits provided.

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209. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lajom, 733 SCRA 511, August
20, 2014 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ;
Expropriation Proceedings ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court would like to emphasize that while the agrarian reform program
was undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless farmers, this undertaking should, however,
not result in the oppression of landowners by pegging the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed,
although the taking of properties for agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation,
it should not be carried out at the undue expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection
under the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform
process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just
compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, as in this case, such just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying
only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded. Records
show that even before Lajom filed a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in May
1993, RA 6657 had already taken effect on June 15, 1988. Similarly, the emancipation patents had
been issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries prior to the filing of the said petition, and both the
taking and the valuation of the subject portion occurred after the passage of RA 6657. Quite
evidently, the matters pertaining to the correct just compensation award for the subject portion were
still in contention at the time RA 6657 took effect; thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, its provisions
should have been applied, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily.
3. Same; Same; Taking; As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just
compensation should be determined at the time of the property’s taking; —As to the
proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation should be determined at the time of
the property’s taking. Taking may be deemed to occur, for instance, at the time emancipation patents
are issued by the government. As enunciated in LBP v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo, 543 SCRA 627
(2008): The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent constitutes
the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee.
It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of
ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.
(Emphasis supplied) Since the emancipation patents in this case had been issued between the years
1994 and 1998, the just compensation for the subject portion should then be reckoned therefrom,
being considered the “time of taking” or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property.
4. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; It must be emphasized that while the LBP
is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the
land reform and, accordingly, the just compensation therefor, its valuation is considered only
as an initial determination and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-settled that it is the RTC,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, which should make the final determination of just
compensation in the exercise of its judicial function. In this respect, the RTC is required to
consider the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
5. Same; Same; —The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its
amendment by RA 9700. While RA 9700 took effect on July 1, 2009, which amended further certain
provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them Section 17, declaring “[t]hat all previously acquired
lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved
pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657], as amended,” the law should not be applied retroactively to
pending cases. Considering that the present consolidated petitions had been filed before the
effectivity of RA 9700, or on December 8, 2008 for G.R. No. 184982 and May 18, 2009 for G.R. No.
185048, Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its further amendment by RA 9700, should
therefore apply.
6. Same; Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Interest Rates; —With respect to the commonly
raised issue on interest, the RTC may impose the same on the just compensation award as may be
justified by the circumstances of the case and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The Court
has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the
payment of just compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the part of the
State. To clarify, this incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it
is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment. Thus,
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legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, just compensation shall earn interest at the new
legal rate of 6% p.a., conformably with the modification on the rules respecting interest rates
introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.

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210. Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Certification Against Forum Shopping ;
1. Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Where the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense-
— the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum
shopping may be relaxed.—Following paragraph 5 of the guidelines as aforestated, there
was also substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement,
notwithstanding the fact that only Lourdes signed the same. It has been held that under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances — as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense — the rule
requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may
be relaxed. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the petition on this score.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Verification; Certification Against Forum Shopping;
Guidelines with Respect to Non-Compliance with the Requirements on or Submission of a
Defective Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping.-
—The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the
requirements on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum
shopping, viz.: 1) A distinction must be made between noncompliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification,
noncompliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against
forum shopping, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special
circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5) The certification against forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Co-Ownership; Article 487 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.-
—Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both Lourdes
and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest
and cause of action as against respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before
the CA indicated that they are the petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their
behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition
constituted substantial compliance with the rules.
4. Same; Civil Procedure; Verification; It is settled that the verification of a pleading is only
a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters
alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the
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correction of the pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules, as in
this case.

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211. Lopez vs. Irvine Construction Corp., 733 SCRA 589, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Suspension of Business Operation ;
1. Same; Same; Suspension of Business Operation; In invoking Article 286 of the Labor
Code, the paramount consideration should be the dire exigency of the business of the
employer that compels it to put some of its employees temporarily out of work. This means
that the employer should be able to prove that it is faced with a clear and compelling
economic reason which reasonably forces it to temporarily shut down its business operations
or a particular undertaking, incidentally resulting to the temporary layoff of its employees.
Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, case law states that the employer
should also bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the
employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. Thus, in the case of Mobile Protective &
Detective Agency v. Ompad, 458 SCRA 308 (2005), the Court found that the security guards
therein were constructively dismissed considering that their employer was not able to show
any dire exigency justifying the latter’s failure to give said employees any further assignment.
2. Labor Law; Project Employees; Case law states that the principal test for determining
whether particular employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as
distinguished from “regular employees,” is whether or not the “project employees” were
assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration and scope of which were
specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. The project could either
be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the
employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the
other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the
regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the
arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent employees from attaining the status of regular
employees, employers claiming that their workers are project employees should not only
prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were
engaged, but also that there was indeed a project.
3. Same; Regular Employees; Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that any employee
who has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee.-
—The NLRC found that no substantial evidence had been presented by Irvine to show that
Lopez had been assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” with its duration and
scope specified at the time of engagement. In view of the weight accorded by the courts to
factual findings of labor tribunals such as the NLRC, the Court, absent any cogent reason to
hold otherwise, concurs with its ruling that Lopez was not a project but a regular employee.
This conclusion is bolstered by the undisputed fact that Lopez had been employed by Irvine
since November 1994, or more than 10 years from the time he was laid off on December 27,
2005. Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee.
4. Same; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; Among the authorized causes for
termination under Article 283 of the Labor Code is retrenchment, or what is sometimes
referred to as a “layoff.”-
—Among the authorized causes for termination under Article 283 of the Labor Code is
retrenchment, or what is sometimes referred to as a “layoff.” x x x It is defined as the
severance of employment, through no fault of and without prejudice to the employee,
resorted to by management during the periods of business recession, industrial depression,
or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls caused by lack of orders, shortage of materials,
conversion of the plant to a new production program or the introduction of new methods or
more efficient machinery, or of automation. Elsewise stated, layoff is an act of the employer
of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation, lack of work, and considerable
reduction on the volume of its business, a right recognized and affirmed by the Court.
However, a layoff would be tantamount to a dismissal only if it is permanent. When a layoff is
only temporary, the employment status of the employee is not deemed terminated, but
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merely suspended.
5. Same; Same; Suspension of Business Operations; Pursuant to Article 286 of the
Labor Code, the suspension of the operation of business or undertaking in a temporary
layoff situation must not exceed six (6) months: ART. 286. When Employment not Deemed
Terminated.—The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a
period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic
duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the

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employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if
he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption
of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. (Emphasis
supplied) Within this six- month period, the employee should either be recalled or
permanently retrenched. Otherwise, the employee would be deemed to have been
dismissed, and the employee held liable therefor.
6. Same; Same; One-Month Notice Rule; In both a permanent and temporary layoff,
jurisprudence dictates that the one (1)-month notice rule to both the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and the employee under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as above
cited, is mandatory.-
—Notably, in both a permanent and temporary layoff, jurisprudence dictates that the one-
month notice rule to both the DOLE and the employee under Article 283 of the Labor Code,
as above cited, is mandatory. Also, in both cases, the layoff, being an exercise of the
employer’s management prerogative, must be exercised in good faith — that is, one which is
intended for the advancement of employers’ interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
7. Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden to prove the validity and legality of the
termination of employment falls on the employer.-
—Although the NLRC did not expound on the matter, it is readily apparent that the supposed
layoff of Lopez was hardly justified considering the absence of any causal relation between
the cessation of Irvine’s project in Cavite with the suspension of Lopez’s work. To repeat,
Lopez is a regular and not a project employee. Hence, the continuation of his engagement
with Irvine, either in Cavite, or possibly, in any of its business locations, should not have
been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project alone. In light of the well-entrenched
rule that the burden to prove the validity and legality of the termination of employment falls
on the employer, Irvine should have established the bona fide suspension of its business
operations or undertaking that would have resulted in the temporary layoff of its employees
for a period not exceeding six (6) months in accordance with Article 286 of the Labor Code.

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212. Omni Hauling Services, Inc. vs. Bon, 734 SCRA 270, September
03, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Regular Employees ;
1. Same; Regular Employees; —Records are bereft of any evidence to show that
respondents were made to sign employment contracts explicitly stating that they were going
to be hired as project employees, with the period of their employment to be co-terminus with
the original period of Omni’s service contract with the Quezon City government. Neither is
petitioners’ allegation that respondents were duly apprised of the project-based nature of
their employment supported by any other evidentiary proof. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that respondents were not clearly and knowingly informed of their employment status as mere
project employees, with the duration and scope of the project specified at the time they were
engaged. As such, the presumption of regular employment should be accorded in their favor
pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code which provides that “[employees] who have
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken [— as
respondents in this case —] shall be considered as [regular employees] with respect to the
activity in which [they] are employed and [their] employment shall continue while such activity
actually exists.” Add to this the obvious fact that respondents have been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of Omni,
i.e., garbage hauling, thereby confirming the strength of the aforesaid conclusion.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may
be ascribed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings
and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence.-
—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia,
its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence.
This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court which provides that “[i]n cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.”
4. Same; Project Employees; —A project employee is assigned to a project which begins
and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may only be
dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of
employees who are hired as “project employees” may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of the project.
5. Same; Same; According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining whether
particular employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as distinguished
from “regular employees,” is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a
“specific project or undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time
they were engaged for that project. The project could either be (1) a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which
is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the
company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
“project” to prevent employees from attaining a regular status, employers claiming that their
workers are project employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of the
employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also that there was indeed a
project.
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213. Philippine Touristers, Inc. vs. MAS Transit Workers Union-Anglo-KMU, 734 SCRA
298, September 03, 2014
1. Same; Same; Same; For purposes of compliance with [the bond requirement under the
2011 National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Rules of Procedure], a motion shall be
accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages, and attorney’s
fees.-
—The absence of grave abuse of discretion in this case is bolstered by the fact that
petitioners’ motion to reduce bond was accompanied by a P5,000,000.00 surety bond which
was seasonably posted within the reglementary period to appeal. In McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707
SCRA 646 (2013), the Court ruled that, “[f]or purposes of compliance with [the bond
requirement under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure], a motion shall be accompanied by
the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages, and attorney’s fees.” Seeing no
cogent reason to deviate from the same, the Court deems that the posting of the aforesaid
partial bond, being evidently more than ten percent (10%) of the full judgment award of
P12,833,000.00, already constituted substantial compliance with the governing rules at the
onset.
2. Labor Law; Appeals; Bond; For an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s (LA’s) ruling to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article 229)
of the Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.-
—For an appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article
229) of the Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
3. Same; Same; Same; While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond
is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA), the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), particularly Section 6, Rule VI thereof, nonetheless allows the
reduction of the bond upon a showing of
(a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.-
— While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, the
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (the Rules), particularly Section 6, Rule VI thereof,
nonetheless allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a
meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in
relation to the monetary award, viz.: SEC. 6. BOND.—In case the decision of the Labor
Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be
in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and
attorney’s fees. x x x x No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious
grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award. The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the
preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) In this regard, it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond
provided thereunder is not a matter of right on the part of the movant and its grant still lies
within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds and the
reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.

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214. Pulgar vs. Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Br 64, 734 SCRA 527, Sept
10, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ; Intervention ;
Actions ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Intervention; Actions; Jurisdiction over
an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.-
—Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.
Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction. In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-
M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a
review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court,
however, finds to be improper since the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the main case
necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the
principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds at that — means that Pulgar had, as a matter
of course, lost his right to intervene.

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215. Sierra vs. Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc., 734 SCRA 694, September
10, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Laches ;
1. Same; Laches; Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.-
—As the records disclose, despite notice on June 19, 1984 of the scheduled foreclosure sale,
petitioners, for unexplained reasons, failed to impugn the real estate mortgage and oppose
the public auction sale for a period of more than seven (7) years from said notice. As such,
petitioners’ action is already barred by laches, which, as case law holds, operates not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to
do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As mortgagors desiring to attack a
mortgage as invalid, petitioners should act with reasonable promptness, else its
unreasonable delay may amount to ratification. Verily, to allow petitioners to assert their right
to the subject properties now after their unjustified failure to act within a reasonable time
would be grossly unfair to PSMB, and perforce should not be sanctioned.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; The rule is that he who alleges mistake
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.-
—Time and again, the Court has stressed that allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence because mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, one who alleges any defect or the
lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear, and convincing
evidence, not merely by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that he who alleges mistake
affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Where mistake or error is alleged by parties who claim to have not had the benefit of a good
education, as in this case, they must establish that their personal circumstances prevented
them from giving their free, voluntary, and spontaneous consent to a contract.
3. Civil Law; Mortgages; Accommodation Mortgagors; Like an accommodation party to a
negotiable instrument, the accommodation mortgagor in effect becomes a surety to enable
the accommodated debtor to obtain credit.-
—There being valid consent on the part of petitioners to act as accommodation mortgagors,
no reversible error was committed by the CA in setting aside the RTC’s Decision declaring
the real estate mortgage as void for vices of consent and awarding damages to petitioners.
As mere accommodation mortgagors, petitioners are not entitled to the proceeds of the loan,
nor were required to be furnished with the loan documents or notice of the borrower’s default
in paying the principal, interests, penalties, and other charges on due date, or of the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, unless stipulated in the subject deed. As jurisprudence
states, an accommodation mortgagor is a third person who is not a debtor to a principal
obligation but merely secures it by mortgaging his or her own property. Like an
accommodation party to a negotiable instrument, the accommodation mortgagor in effect
becomes a surety to enable the accommodated debtor to obtain credit, as petitioners in this
case.
4. Same; Same; Prescription; Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim
of mistake, i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan secured by the mortgage,
the action should have been brought within four (4) years from its discovery.-
—In any event, even assuming that petitioners have a valid cause of action, the four-year
prescriptive period on voidable contracts shall apply. Since the complaint for annulment was
anchored on a claim of mistake, i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan
secured by the mortgage, the action should have been brought within four (4) years from its
discovery.

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216. Co vs. Yeung, 735 SCRA 66, September 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Unfair Competition ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Words and Phrases; Unfair competition is defined
as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or
business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect
of deceiving the public.-
—Unfair competition is defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off
upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another
with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. This takes place where the defendant
gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of
deceiving the public that the goods are those of his competitor. Here, it has been established
that Co conspired with the Laus in the sale/distribution of counterfeit Greenstone products to
the public, which were even packaged in bottles identical to that of the original, thereby
giving rise to the presumption of fraudulent intent. In light of the foregoing definition, it is thus
clear that Co, together with the Laus, committed unfair competition, and should,
consequently, be held liable therefor.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Well-
settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45,
subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of
the trial court’s judgment of the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.-
—The Court’s review of the present case is via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-
settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45,
subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of
the trial court’s judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.
3. Same; Same; Same; Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court and are
deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.-
—Co, who mainly interposes a denial of the acts imputed against him, fails to convince the
Court that any of the exceptions exists so as to warrant a review of the findings of facts in
this case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight
and respect by the Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the
evidence on record. The Court finds that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the
evidence presented by the parties, and have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary
reasons in concluding that Co committed acts of unfair competition.

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217. Almazan, Sr. vs. Suerte-Felipe, 735 SCRA 230, September
17, 2014 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Lawyer’s Oath ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; For misrepresenting in the said
acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is
apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form
of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath.-
—As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted
that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of
Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize
the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is
beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The territorial
limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice: Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term.—A person commissioned as
notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public
has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) Said principle is
equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section 240, Article II states: Sec. 240.
Territorial jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be coextensive
with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be coextensive
with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied) For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he
was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact,
uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is
undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
218. Yupangco-Nakpil vs. Uy, 735 SCRA 239, September
17, 2014 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the legal profession.-
—The Court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted,
mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk
of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar’s reputation.
Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the
Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as
compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would
suffice.

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253
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
219. Puerto Azul Land,Inc. vs. Pacific Wide Realty and Devt Corp, 735 SCRA 333, Sept
17, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgment ; Res Judicata ; Words
and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; “Bar by prior judgment” and “Conclusiveness of judgment,”
Distinguished.-—There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the
other hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res
judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes
parties from re- litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment.-
—Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which
precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. It means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on all points and matters determined in the former suit.” Res judicata has two (2) concepts.
The first is “bar by prior judgment” in which the judgment or decree of the court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies,
and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the
same or other tribunal. The second is “conclusiveness of judgment” in which any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

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220. CIR vs. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company, Inc., 735 SCRA 421,September
17, 2014 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Prescription ;
1. Taxation; Prescription; Once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the one hundred twenty (120)-day period to
end and, thereafter, he is given a thirty (30)-day period to file his judicial claim before the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the
aforementioned 2-year prescriptive period.-
—In CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), 632 SCRA 422 (2010), the Court held
that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the
filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, its nonobservance would
lead to the dismissal of the judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also
clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not
to judicial claims. Succinctly put, once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he
is given a 30-day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-
day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period. However, in
CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque), 690 SCRA 336 (2013), the Court
categorically recognized an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-
day period. It ruled that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid
claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the NIRC. In essence, the aforesaid BIR
Ruling stated that “taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period
before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.”

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221. Pagdanganan, Jr. vs. Sarmiento, 735 SCRA 584, September 17,
2014 Syllabi Class :Pleadings and Practice ;
1. Same; Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally
made, any court record sent to him binds the client, despite an internal arrangement
between them.-
—The Court cannot give credence to Sarmiento’s contention that Atty. Borromeo had been
discharged as counsel even before Sarmiento received the December 30, 2010 Resolution,
considering that Atty. Borromeo never filed a formal withdrawal of appearance prior thereto,
conformably with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe the proper
legal formalities, Atty. Borromeo remained as Sarmiento’s counsel on record. Fundamental is
the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent
to him binds the client, despite an internal arrangement between them terminating their
professional relationship, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from
receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for
certiorari.-
—Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or
resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari, viz.: SEC. 4. When and where to file
petition.—The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not latter than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.
3. Pleadings and Practice; If a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds,
including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is
considered notice to his client.-
—In the present case, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the 60-day reglementary
period for the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from January 12,
2011, the date Atty. Borromeo, Sarmiento’s then counsel of record, had the notice of the
December 30, 2010 Resolution, and not February 10, 2011, the date when Sarmiento was
personally notified thereof. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that if a litigant is
represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be
served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his client.

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222. H.H. Hollero Const, Inc. vs. GSIS, 736 SCRA 303, September 24,
2014 Syllabi Class :Insurance Law ; Prescription ; Final Rejection ; Words
and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Final Rejection; Words and Phrases; “Final rejection” simply means
denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer
of the insured’s motion or request for reconsideration.-
—As correctly observed by the CA, “final rejection” simply means denial by the insurer of the
claims of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured’s motion or
request for reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in
the first instance, as in the two instances above discussed.
2. Insurance Law; Contracts; Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be
construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves
have used.-
—Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and
meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and
unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular
sense.
3. Same; Prescription; Case law illumines that the prescriptive period for the insured’s
action for indemnity should be reckoned from the “final rejection” of the claim.-
—Section 10 of the General Conditions of the subject CAR Policies commonly read: 10. If a
claim is in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration is made or used in support thereof,
or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting on his behalf
to obtain any benefit under this Policy, or if a claim is made and rejected and no action or suit
is commenced within twelve months after such rejection or, in case of arbitration taking place
as provided herein, within twelve months after the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or Umpire have
made their award, all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited. (Emphases supplied) In this
relation, case law illumines that the prescriptive period for the insured’s action for indemnity
should be reckoned from the “final rejection” of the claim.

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257
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223. People vs. Go, 736 SCRA 501, September 24, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Indispensable Parties ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; The absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.-
—While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal
of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of
the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it
remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the
proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is because the absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
224. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Amor, 737 SCRA 509, October
07, 2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ;
1. Same; Court Personnel; It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as
sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the
best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone
any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even
tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not
hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
2. Administrative Law; Grave Abuse of Authority; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of
authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under color
of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or
other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.-
3. Same; Grave Misconduct; Dismissal from Service; To warrant dismissal from service,
the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate grave misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the
former.
4. Same; Same; It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent and say nothing in
the face of false accusations.-—In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent
guilty of the charges against him. As aptly pointed out, respondent’s failure to file a comment
despite all the opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself.
In the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against
him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of
false accusations. As such, respondent’s silence may thus be construed as an implied
admission and acknowledgment of the veracity of the allegations against him.
5. Same; Judges; Gross Misconduct; Insubordination; —The OCA properly found
respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for refusing to comply with the
numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the administrative complaint against
him. Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the
resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. Such willful disobedience and disregard of the
directives of the Court constitute grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. In this case, it is noteworthy that
respondent was afforded several opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of time to
comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but he has failed and continuously refused to heed the
same. This continued refusal to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court is glaring
proof that he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports
to belong.
6. Same; Same; Resignation; It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as
an escape or an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction.-
—The OCA correctly noted that respondent’s automatic resignation due to his filing of a
COC for the 2002 Barangay Elections did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in
determining his administrative liability. It is well-settled that resignation should not be used
either as an escape or an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative
sanction. In this light, respondent’s administrative liability for his acts stands.

259
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****

260
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
225. Re: Anonymous Letter vs. Soluren, 737 SCRA 522, October
08, 2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ;
1. Same; Same; Those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects its honor and dignity and the people’s
confidence in it.-
—As parting words, court employees like Tuzon would do well to constantly keep in mind
that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects its honor and dignity and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution
demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate
nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will
not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
2. Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and
not trifling. The misconduct must imply a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate Grave Misconduct from
Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule, must be manifest in the former.
3. Same; Court Personnel; Court Researchers; The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) correctly found that Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not authorized to receive
any settlement money from party-litigants.-
—The OCA therefore correctly found that Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not
authorized to receive any settlement money from party-litigants. Neither was it shown that
Judge Soluren instructed him to receive the same. Having kept the money in his possession
and exercised control over it, Tuzon evidently overstepped his authority and, thus, committed
a form of misconduct.

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260
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
226. Centennial Guarantee Assu Corp vs. Universal Motors Corp, 737 SCRA 654,
Oct 8, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Suretyship ;
1. Civil Law; Suretyship; That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does
not negate the order of execution pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered
by law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching
the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Verily, in a
contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtor’s obligation so as
to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the
solvency of the principal. Thus, execution pending appeal against NSSC means that the
same course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The same reason stands for
CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently left the country
with his family to evade execution of any judgment against him.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution Pending Appeal; The
execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a
final judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), the existence of “good reasons” for the immediate execution of a judgment is an
indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal.-
—The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a
final judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Rules), the existence of “good reasons” for the immediate execution of a judgment is an
indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances
justifying immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s
chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are altogether nullified. The
“good reason” yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency that will
outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party and one such “good reason” that has been
held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated
party.

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227. Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33, October
08, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Reconveyance ; Prescription ;
1. Same; Same; Prescription; To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an
action for reconveyance, the plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. If
there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession,
the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the
reference point being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. On the
other hand, if the real owner of the property remains in possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him
and in such case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title which is imprescriptible.
2. Actions; Dismissal of Actions; —Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of
action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the
factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the
earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions
of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by
the plaintiff.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements of.-
—A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of
these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
4. Same; Complaints; Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states that the complaint need
only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.-
—It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a
motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and
not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test.
This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint
need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action. A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the
cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other.
5. Civil Law; Reconveyance; An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer
property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.-
—It is evident that petitioner ultimately seeks for the reconveyance to her of the subject
properties through the nullification of their supposed sale to Gran. An action for
reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its
rightful and legal owner. Having alleged the commission of fraud by Gran in the transfer and
registration of the subject properties in her name, there was, in effect, an implied trust
created by operation of law pursuant to Article 1456 of the Civil Code which provides: Art.
1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.

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****

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228. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, October 08, 2014
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law ; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) ; Right to
Privacy ; Sex Videos ;
1. Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing jurisprudence on
the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to
the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that
a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.-
—In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction
and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to
Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules
and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
2. Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); —A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,
or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,
which is defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
data about oneself.”
3. Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data
now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of
the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others,
“[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show
that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of
habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

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229. Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 738 SCRA 120, October
13, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Work-Related Illness ;
1. Same; Same; Same; —Considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as
relative jurisprudential context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the
seafarer’s work- related injury or illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and,
thereafter, his death, as in this case) occurs during the term of his employment, then the
employer becomes liable for death compensation benefits under Section 20(A) of the 2000
POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would not only
transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings of relevant case law but
also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Benefits; The provisions currently governing the
entitlement of the seafarer’s beneficiaries to death benefits are found in Section 20 of the
2000 POEA-SEC. Part A(1) thereof states that the seafarer’s beneficiaries may successfully
claim death benefits if they are able to establish that the seafarer’s death is (a) work-related,
and (b) had occurred during the term of his employment contract.
3. Same; Same; Same; That Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was found to
have been preexisting, hardly impels a contrary conclusion since — as the LA herein earlier
noted — the February 20, 2007 injury actually led to the deterioration of his condition. As
held in More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 189 (1999), “[i]f the injury is the
proximate cause of [the seafarer’s] death or disability for which compensation is sought, [his]
previous physical condition x x x is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease,” viz.: Compensability x x x does not
depend on whether the injury or disease was preexisting at the time of the employment but
rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to
presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer’s] employment had
contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was preexisting at the time of his
employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in
order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition
or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman
brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk
of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a
perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability
for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is
unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any preexisting weakness or
disease.
4. Same; Same; Same; With respect to the second requirement for death compensability,
the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s
death should occur during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after
the termination of his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-
related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is based on a liberal
construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who
stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death,
notwithstanding its evident work-connection. The present petition is a case in point. Here,
Nancing’s repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year employment
contract. Were it not for his injury, which had been earlier established as work-related, he
would not have been repatriated for medical reasons and his contract consequently
terminated pursuant to Part 1 of Section 18(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
5. Same; Same; Liberal Construction; A strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-
SEC, especially when the same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is
not subscribed to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give
maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so
impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in
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favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is one of liberal construction. As enunciated in the
case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47 (2001): The POEA-
Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and
benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment
6. Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; It is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury
or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his
employment.-

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—Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that
medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000
POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of
his employment contract” under Part A(1) of the said provision should not be strictly and
literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely
occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-
related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the
term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the Court reckons that it is by this
method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated
and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborer’s death was
brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his master’s profit,
then it is but proper that his demise be compensated. Here, since it has been established that
(a) the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
employment, (b) his injury or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was
later determined that the injury or illness for which he was medically repatriated was the
proximate cause of his actual death although the same occurred after the term of his
employment, the above mentioned rule should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim
for death benefits should be granted.

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230. Rimando vs. Aldaba, 738 SCRA 232, October 13, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ; Bouncing Checks Law ; Estafa ;
1. Same; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Bouncing Checks Law; Estafa; Essentially, while a
BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered
“separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to
their final adjudication — both as to their criminal and civil aspects — subject to the
prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal
and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and
civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not
necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-
settled that “the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.”

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231. CIR vs. Burmeister andWain Scandi Contractor Mindanao, Inc.,739 SCRA 147, Oct
22, 2014 Syllabi Class :Taxation ;
1. Same; Indeed, it has been pronounced time and again that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government and, consequently, tax laws must be faithfully and strictly implemented as they
are not intended to be liberally construed. Hence, with this in mind and in light of the
foregoing considerations, the Court so holds that the CTA En Banc committed reversible
error when it granted respondent’s claim for refund or tax credit despite its noncompliance
with the mandatory periods under Section 112(D) (now renumbered as Section 112[C]) of RA
8424. Accordingly, the claim for refund/tax credit must be denied.
2. Taxation; In the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Dev’t. Corp. v. CIR (Atlas), 524
SCRA 73, which was promulgated on June 8, 2007, the two-year prescriptive period stated in
Section 112(A) was counted from the date of payment of the output VAT. At that time, the
output VAT must be paid at the time of filing of the quarterly tax returns, which meant within
20 days following the end of each quarter. However, on September 12, 2008, the Atlas
doctrine was abandoned in the case of CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corp., 565 SCRA 154, which
adopted the verba legis rule and counted the two-year prescriptive period from the “close of
the taxable quarter when the sales were made” as expressly stated in the law, regardless
when the input VAT was paid. In the recent case of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation
(San Roque), 690 SCRA 336, promulgated on February 12, 2013, the Court clarified that (a)
the Atlas doctrine was effective only from its promulgation on June 8, 2007 until its
abandonment on September 12, 2008 in Mirant, and (b) prior to the Atlas doctrine, Section
112(A) should be applied following the verba legis rule adopted in Mirant.
3. Same; Tax Refund; Tax Credit; The taxpayer can file its administrative claim for refund or
credit at any time within the two (2)-year prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day
of said period, it is still filed on time. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) will have
one hundred twenty (120) days from such filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the
claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has thirty (30) days
to file its judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA); otherwise, the judicial claim would
be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time and not, as the CTA En Banc puts it,
prescribed.-
—In fine, the taxpayer can file its administrative claim for refund or credit at any time within the two-
year prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is still filed on time. The
CIR will have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 120th
day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file its judicial claim with the
CTA; otherwise, the judicial claim would be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time
and not, as the CTA En Banc puts it, prescribed. It bears emphasis that Section 112(D) (now
renumbered as Section 112[C]) of RA 8424, which is explicit on the mandatory and jurisdictional
nature of the 120+30-day period, was already effective on January 1, 1998. Hence, it is of no
consequence that the Aichi and San Roque rulings were not yet in existence when respondent’s
administrative claim was filed in 1999, so as to rid itself of the said section’s mandatory and
jurisdictional application.
4. Same; Same; Same; The inaction of the CIR on the claim during the 120-day period is, by
express provision of law, “deemed a denial” of such claim, and the failure of the taxpayer to
file its judicial claim within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period shall render the
“deemed a denial” decision of the CIR final and inappealable. The right to appeal to the CTA
from a decision or “deemed a denial” decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory
privilege, not a constitutional right. The exercise of such statutory privilege requires strict
compliance with the conditions attached by the statute for its exercise. Thus, respondent’s
failure to comply with the statutory conditions is fatal to its claim. This is so, notwithstanding
the fact that the CIR, for his part, failed to raise the issue of noncompliance with the
mandatory periods at the earliest opportunity.
5. Same; Same; Same; In the case of Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. CIR, 693
SCRA 456 (2013), the Court ruled that, because the 120+30-day period is jurisdictional, the
issue of whether the taxpayer complied with the said time frame may be broached at any
stage, even on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that the question of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can be raised at any time during the proceedings. Jurisdiction cannot be
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waived because it is conferred by law and is not dependent on the consent or objection or
the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. Therefore, respondent’s contention
on this score is of no moment.
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232. Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. vs. Tito, 739 SCRA 217, October
22, 2014 Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases ;
1. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The expeditious
disposition of cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court.-
—While Sps. Nazal moved to set the case for pretrial on December 9, 1987, no further action
was taken by them after the court a quo failed to calendar the case and set the same for
pretrial. Disconcerting is the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven (11) years, or on
October 20, 1998 to move for the setting of the case for hearing, as they were apparently
compelled to act only upon the threat of being dispossessed of the subject property with the
filing of the unlawful detainer case by the new registered owners, Sps. Lim. Notably, while
under both the present and the old Rules of Court, the clerk of court has the duty to set the
case for pretrial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffs of their own duty to prosecute the
case diligently. Truth be told, the expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the
plaintiff as the court.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Intervention; Case law states that
intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and supplemental to the
existing litigation.-
—Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary
and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily
delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original
party, who is claiming a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear
and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of
an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule,
where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for and,
consequently, the right of intervention ceases.

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233. Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo, 739 SCRA 399, November
10, 2014 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Compromise Agreements ;

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234. Racelis vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc., 740 SCRA 122, November
12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Work-Related Death ;
1. Same; Same; Work-Related Death; In essence, the Supreme Court (SC) held that under
such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his
employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually
causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.-
—Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in
Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-
going vessels. As such, it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and
applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor. Guided by this principle, the Court, in
the recent case of Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 738 SCRA 120 (2014),
recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second
requirement under Section 20(A)(1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that the seafarer’s death
had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative consequences of
a medical repatriation under Section 18(B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that under
such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his
employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually
causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract; Deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s employment contract,
denominated as the POEA- SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract, is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented
by the POEA, called the “Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels,” which are considered to be the minimum
requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers onboard
foreign ocean-going vessels.
3. Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; Case law explains that “[t]he words ‘arising out of’
refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the
words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident
takes place. As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise ‘in the
course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as an
occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes
incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption.-
—While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20(B)(4) of the
same explicitly provides that “[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-
related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not
listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.” In other words,
the 2000 POEA-SEC “has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,]
saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related.
This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32- A of the POEA-SEC as an
occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes
incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption.” This presumption should be
overturned only when the employer’s refutation is found to be supported by substantial
evidence, which, as traditionally defined is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.”

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235. Cosmos Bottling Corp vs. Commission En Banc of the SEC, 740 SCRA 169,
Nov 12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Admin Agencies; SEC; Delegation of Powers; Appeals ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Appeals; This power of review is squarely addressed by Section
11-1, Rule XI of the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rules of Procedure,
which provides that “[a]n appeal to the Commission En Banc may be taken from a decision,
order, or resolution issued by an Operating Department if there are questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law.”-
—Naturally, the aforesaid provision also gives the SEC the power to review the acts
performed by its operating departments in the exercise of the former’s delegated functions.
This power of review is squarely addressed by Section 11-1, Rule XI of the 2006 SEC Rules
of Procedure, which provides that “[a]n appeal to the Commission En Banc may be taken
from a decision, order, or resolution issued by an Operating Department if there are
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.”
2. Administrative Agencies; Securities and Exchange Commission; Delegation of
Powers; As an administrative agency with both regulatory and adjudicatory functions, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given the authority to delegate some of its
functions to, inter alia, its various operating departments, such as the SEC-Corporation
Finance Department (SEC-CFD), the Enforcement and Investor Protection Department, and
the Company Registration and Monitoring Department, pursuant to Section 4.6 of the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC).-
—As an administrative agency with both regulatory and adjudicatory functions, the SEC was
given the authority to delegate some of its functions to, inter alia, its various operating
departments, such as the SEC-CFD, the Enforcement and Investor Protection Department,
and the Company Registration and Monitoring Department, pursuant to Section 4.6 of the
SRC.

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236. S.V. More Pharma Corp vs. Drugmakers Lab, Inc., 740 SCRA 253, Nov
12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Temperate Damages ;
1. Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that “temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.”-
—Considering that respondents palpably suffered some form of pecuniary loss resulting from
petitioners’ breach of contract, the Court deems it proper to, instead, award in their favor the
sum of P100,000.00 in the form of temperate damages. This course of action is hinged on
Article 2224 of the Civil Code which states that “temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty,” as in this case.
2. Civil Law; Damages; Actual Damages; As case law holds, the amount of loss
warranting the grant of actual or compensatory damages must be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party.-
—Since the sales projection on which the CA based its award for actual damages was
derived from figures representing the “alleged unregistered or fabricated sales invoices” of
E.A. Northam from 1990 to 1993 and the “desired profit” of 15-20%, it would therefore be a
legal mishap to sustain that award. As case law holds, the amount of loss warranting the
grant of actual or compensatory damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.
The CA’s finding on respondents’ supposed loss of profits in the amount of P6,000,000.00
based on the erroneous sales projection hardly meets this requirement. Accordingly, it must
be set aside.

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237. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr., 740 SCRA 330, November
12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Compensable Illness ;
1. Same; Same; Compensable Illness; Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or
illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b)
that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s
employment contract.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Burden of Proof; In labor disputes, grave
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The onus probandi falls
on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of
evidence to justify the grant of relief.

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238. Apo Cement Corp vs. Mingson Mining Industries Corp, 740 SCRA 383, Nov.
12, 2014 Syllabi Class :Due Process ;
1. Same; An apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due
process is a jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are
duty-bound to observe. In Salva v. Valle, 694 SCRA 422 (2013), the Court pronounced that
“[a] decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime
directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any
action or proceeding where it is invoked.” The Court sees no defensible reason as to why
this principle should not be herein applied.
2. Due Process; Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Sections 223 (on
preliminary conference), 224 (on hearing), and 227 (on the proceedings before the POA), as
well as Sections 221 (on due course) and 222 (on answers) of DENR DAO 95-23, or the
Implementing Rules of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, clearly require that the parties
involved in mining disputes be given the opportunity to be heard. These rules — which were
already in effect during the time the dispute between the parties arose — flesh out the core
requirement of due process; thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of the same would
oust the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction and, in effect, render its decision null and void.

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239. Mah-Arevalo vs. Mantua, 740 SCRA 567, November 19,
2014 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Judges ; Immorality ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent
engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective testimonies of
complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full
view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to
fiestas and other public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a
result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for
their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to
observe. There is no doubt that engaging in an extramarital affair is not only a violation of the
moral standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors and is, thus,
punishable.
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Halls of Justice; The Halls of Justice may be used only
for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may
not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court
personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.-
—SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be
used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31, 1992 TO: ALL JUDGES AND
COURT PERSONNEL SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE
FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice
may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts
of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the
judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.
3. Same; Same; Immorality; Words and Phrases; Immorality has been defined “to
include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant,
or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.’”-
—The Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality.
Immorality has been defined “to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward
good order and public welfare.’” It is a serious charge which may be punishable by any of the
following: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or

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240. Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Ctr, Inc. vs. Ortiz, 741 SCRA 121, Nov
19, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Doctrine of
Immutability of Judgments ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments; Settled is
the rule that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.-
—A definitive final judgment [— such as the NLRC’s March 24, 2008 Resolution —] however
erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.” Settled is the rule that “[a] decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability
precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon them.-
—To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon
them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” the discretionary
authority must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

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241. Garcia, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 741 SCRA 172, November 19,
2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Technical Malversation ;
1. Criminal Law; Technical Malversation; Technical Malversation does not include, or is
not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.-
—While Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for
Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that the
Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with
Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC, but with Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation
to Article 171 of the RPC, a complex crime. It bears stressing that the elements of
Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of Technical Malversation. In
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his
own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter’s
personal use. On the other hand, in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public
funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other
than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical Malversation
does not include, or is not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
2. Ombudsman; The present Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as the
“Ombudsman Act of 1989,” have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude,
in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints
involving public officials and employees. Hence, as a general rule, the Court does not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings and respects the initiative and independence
inherent in its office, which “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public service.”
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; —Probable cause, for the
purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof. To engender a well- founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to
determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged
should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every
crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal
offense.
4. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of Violation of Section
3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the
offender must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b)
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
5. Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit;—That the Ombudsman had not, in
any manner, mentioned the two (2) CoA AOMs, i.e., AOM Nos. 2005-004-100 (2004) (i.e., the
CoA Memo) and 2004- 26, in its ruling leads the Court to believe that it deliberately failed to
consider the same. As the Court sees it, these are significant pieces of evidence which
should not have been casually ignored. This stems from a becoming respect which all
government agencies should accord to the CoA’s findings. Verily, being the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government, the CoA is vested with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds
and property. As held in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013): [I]t is the
general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one which is constitutionally- created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
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amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.

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242. Layos vs. Villanueva, 743 SCRA 334, December
01, 2014 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Same; Same; It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his
best efforts in the prosecution or defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice
in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the
legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of office and the canons of professional
ethics is an imperative.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence.
As such, he must keep abreast of all the developments in his client’s case and should inform
the latter of the same, as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence.
3. Same; Same; As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of
whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should
notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will
minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In
this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him
has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a wholehearted fealty to the client’s cause.

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243. Javier vs. Lumontad, 744 SCRA 1, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :RemLaw; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Ejectment; Jurisdiction ; MTC;
1. Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; Jurisdiction; Municipal Trial Courts; Even in cases
where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first
level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are
given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
the issue of possession.-
—Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level
courts by express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and
original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. It must be
clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore,
not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; In forcible entry, the complaint
must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been
deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth.-
— As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 662 SCRA 14 (2011), “[t]he invariable rule
is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for
which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in
forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land
or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ
the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession
took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the
defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been
in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as
the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction
over the subject matter.”

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244. Tze Sun Wong vs. Wong, 743 SCRA 567, December
03, 2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Burden of
Proof ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; —Petitioner’s argument is correct in theory
since deliberation by all members of the collegial body is evidently what the rule
contemplates, with the votes of only two (2) members being sufficient for a decision to
prevail. Unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any proof that deliberations were
not conducted by all commissioners before the questioned Judgment was made. The rule is
well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence. Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be given credence. This is
especially so in light of the presumption of regularity, which herein ought to prevail due to the
absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Bustillo v. People, 620 SCRA
483 (2010), states: The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s
act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly
states that decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
(except to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Phils) shall be
appealed to the CA under this rule.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Case law explains that “[a] remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.” In this relation, it has been
recognized that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would
be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x and x x x in case of urgency.” In this case,
petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the Secretary of Justice and thereafter
sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other available
remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an
appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available
to him, the Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of
the plain imminence of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation.
The urgency of such circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
4. Same; Same; Same; “In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with
jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal
committed not merely a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not
enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.”
5. Administrative Agencies; Bureau of Immigration; Petitioner’s certiorari petition before
the CA basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him,
claiming that the same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts
involves factual matters that have already been established during the proceedings before
the BOI Board of Commissioners. In this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is
the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with
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the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments
over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality,
by the courts.” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate
from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.
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245. CBK Power Co Ltd vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 743 SCRA 693, December
03, 2014 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637
(2014), the Court reconciled the pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336
(2013), cases in the following manner: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San
Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was
promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a
judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the
aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the
120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) In this case, records disclose that CBK Power filed its administrative
and judicial claims for issuance of tax credits on March 29, 2005 and April 18, 2005,
respectively or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the
120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, which was timely filed. In view
of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing CBK Power’s claim on the ground of
prematurity and, thus, its ruling must be corrected accordingly.

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246. Martinez vs. Martin, 743 SCRA 719, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Mandamus ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; As case law
defines, a writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed, or from operation of law.-
—As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Being an extraordinary remedy,
mandamus is available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration.

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247. Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership vs. CIR, 744 SCRA 143, December
08, 2014 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; During the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau of Internal
Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the CIR v. Aichi
Forging Company of Asia, Inc. [Aichi], 632 SCRA 422 [2010], case was promulgated),
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period before it
could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input Value-Added Tax (VAT) before the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003
to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to
the filing of such claim.-
—Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court
reconciled the pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA
422 [2010], and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases in the
following manner: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the
rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-
claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund
of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e.,
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory
and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this
case, records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for
refund/credit of its input VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 on December 28, 2009 and March 30,
2010, respectively, or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e.,
from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of
the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is deemed
timely filed. In view of the foregoing, both the CTA Division and the CTA En Banc erred in
dismissing outright petitioner’s claim on the ground of prematurity.

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248. PAGCor vs. De Guzman, 744 SCRA 153, December 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
1. Same; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees,
and as such, formal charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary proceedings
should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors.-
—In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman
to her position. Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to discipline
is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has
the power to discipline or remove De Guzman for any transgressions she may have
committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR may only act through its Board of Directors as a
collective body, which is vested with the power and responsibility to exercise all corporate
powers under the law. Simply put, PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR
employees, and as such, formal charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary
proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter
of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only be availed in the manner
provided by the law and the rules; However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the
strict application of the rules in perfecting an appeal, such as when said appeal is
meritorious.-
—As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as
such, may only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Thus, a party
who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules;
otherwise, the privilege is lost. Therefore, an appeal must be perfected within the
reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory.
However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict application of the rules in
perfecting an appeal, such as when said appeal is meritorious. Verily, strict implementation
of the rules on appeals must give way to the factual and legal reality that is evident from the
records of the case. After all, the primary objective of the laws is to dispense justice and
equity, not the contrary.
3. Administrative Proceedings; Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service; Section
16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in
administrative disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the employee
concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or omissions complained of, and
directing him to answer the charges stated therein.-
—Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)
requires in administrative disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the
employee concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or omissions
complained of, and directing him to answer the charges stated therein, viz.: Section 16.
Formal Charge.—After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall formally
charge the person complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge(s),
a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the
documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a
directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his answer whether or
not he elects a formal investigation of the charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to be
assisted by a counsel of his choice.

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249. Montallana vs. La Consolacion College Manila, 744 SCRA 163, December 08,
2014 Syllabi Class :Corporations ; Liability of Corporate Officers ;
1. Corporations; Liability of Corporate Officers; Circumstances When Personal Liability of
Corporate Directors, Trustees or Officers Attaches.-
—It is a rule that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only
when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of
bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest
resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to
the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold
themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by
specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action. None of these
circumstances, insofar as Mora and Manalili are concerned, were shown to be present in this
case; hence, there is no reason for them to be held liable for Montallana’s backwages.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; “Willful disobedience
by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work” is one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296(a) (formerly
Article 282[a]) of the Labor Code.-
—“Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work” is one of the just causes to terminate an
employee under Article 296(a) (formerly Article 282[a]) of the Labor Code. In order for this
ground to be properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal, the conduct must be willful or
intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude. In
Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., 704 SCRA 56 (2013), “willfulness” was
described as “attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s
act inconsistent with proper subordination.” It is well to stress that it is the employer who
bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause
— or any other authorized cause for that matter — forms the basis of the employee’s
dismissal from work. Failing in which, the dismissal should be adjudged as illegal.
3. Same; Same; Same; The case of an employee who is compelled to apologize for a
previous infraction but fails to do so is not one which would properly warrant his termination,
absent any proof that the refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his employer.-
—Even on the assumption that there was willful disobedience, still, the Court finds the
penalty of dismissal too harsh. It bears to stress that not every case of insubordination or
willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. The
penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his
offense. To the Court’s mind, the case of an employee who is compelled to apologize for a
previous infraction but fails to do so is not one which would properly warrant his termination,
absent any proof that the refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his employer. While
there is no question that teachers are held to a peculiar standard of behavior in view of their
significant role in the rearing of our youth, educational institutions are, in the meantime, held
against a legal standard imposed against all employers, among which, is the reservation of the
ultimate penalty of dismissal for serious infractions enumerated as just causes under Article
296 of the Labor Code. Unfortunately, respondents herein failed to prove the seriousness of
Montallana’s omission by the evidentiary benchmark of substantial evidence. And to add, on
a related note, while La Consolacion’s Administrative Affairs Manual discloses that acts of
insubordination (particularly, that of refusing or neglecting to obey the school’s lawful
directive) are dismissible violations, they are only so if imposed as a third sanction. In the
same vein, records are bereft of any showing that Montallana’s failure to apologize was being
punished as such.

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250. Candelaria vs. People, 744 SCRA 178, December
08, 2014 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Qualified Theft ;
Penalties ;
1. Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Penalties—The imposable penalty for the crime of
Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the stolen
property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC,
as amended, the Court explained in People v. Anabe, 566 SCRA 92 (2008), that the
prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated “estimate.” In the absence of
independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case. In Merida v. People (Merida), 554 SCRA 366 (2008),
which applied the doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator), 344 SCRA 222 (2000), the
Court deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the
commission of its theft, as such evidence would be “unreliable and inconclusive considering
the lack of independent and competent source of such information.”
2. Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310
in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking
of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done
with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse
of confidence.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence;Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices
to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
4. Same; Same; Flight; —Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a
congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria
had perpetrated the same. To be sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that
Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had died before he could testify as to the truth of his
allegation that the former had threatened him with a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a
gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under Candelaria’s
custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason to
explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, as case law
holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted. With
these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or reported back to
work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than
that which points to his guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty
conscience, especially when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence
attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered, Candelaria’s conviction for the crime of
Qualified Theft stands.

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251. Daluraya vs. Olivia, 744 SCRA 193, December 08,
2014 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ;
Judgments ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; In case of an acquittal, the Rules of
Court requires that the judgment state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.-
—In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state “whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine
if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
2. Criminal Law; Civil Liability; Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable; The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.-
—Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused
of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan
v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 (2001), the Court expounded on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows: Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.

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252. CBK Power Company Ltd vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 746 SCRA 93, January
14, 2015 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;
1. Same; Same; Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC pertain to the refund of erroneously or
illegally collected taxes. Section 204 applies to administrative claims for refund, while
Section 229 to judicial claims for refund. In both instances, the taxpayer’s claim must be filed
within two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty. However, Section 229 of
the NIRC further states the condition that a judicial claim for refund may not be maintained
until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner.
2. International Law; Pacta Sunt Servanda; The Philippine Constitution provides for
adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The
time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in
good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. In this
jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of law.
3. Taxation; Tax Refunds;It bears reiterating that the application for a tax treaty relief from
the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief. Since
CBK Power had requested for confirmation from the ITAD on June 8, 2001 and October 28,
2002 before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative claim for refund of its excess final
withholding taxes, the same should be deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-
2000, as in Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 704
SCRA 216 (2013). To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of Section 229 of the NIRC in
providing the taxpayer a remedy for erroneously paid tax solely on the ground of failure to
make prior application for tax treaty relief. As the Court exhorted in Republic v. GST
Philippines, Inc., 707 SCRA 695 (2013), while the taxpayer has an obligation to honestly pay
the right taxes, the government has a corollary duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to
discharge its duty to collect what is due to it; and to justly return what has been erroneously
and excessively given to it.

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253. Briones vs. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Venue;The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils., 559 SCRA 410 (2008), instructs that the
parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising
from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive
venue.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; At the
outset, the Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
[the petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be
considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.”

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254. People vs. Tibayan, 746 SCRA 259, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Estafa ; Ponzi Scheme ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Ponzi Scheme; Words and Phrases; A Ponzi scheme is a type of
investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from
funds contributed by new investors.—To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment
fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds
contributed by new investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest
funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi
schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to
earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a
legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only
as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is
difficult to sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever
larger pool of later investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The
idea behind this type of swindle is that the “con-man” collects his money from his second or
third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Means of Deceit; Elements of.-
—The elements of estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
3. Same; Same; Syndicated Estafa; Elements of.-
—Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as
defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is
committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

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255. Sia vs. Arcenas, 746 SCRA 272, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Dispositive Portions ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Dispositive Portions; It is well-settled that orders
pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of
the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which
gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity. Had the petitioner pursued an action for
ejectment or reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and demolition would have
been proper; but not in a special civil action for mandamus, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; As case law
defines, a writ of mandamus is a “command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done.”
3. Same; Same; Writs of Possession; Words and Phrases; A writ of possession is
defined as a “writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of
land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled
under the judgment.” It may be issued under the following instances: (a) land registration
proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as “The Land Registration
Act”; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (c) extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales. Proceeding therefrom, the issuance of a writ of
possession is only proper in order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific
properties to a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.

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256. People vs. Balute, 748 SCRA 172, January
21, 2015 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Alibi ; Denials
;
1. Same; Alibi; Denials; It is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.”-
—In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was
able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile
phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical
intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as
the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was
correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-
settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter.” This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim — such
as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively —
since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true
culprits.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; —It must be stressed that in criminal
cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is
only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that the Court will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court
below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
3. Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide;—In People v. Ibañez, 698 SCRA 161 (2013),
the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of robbery with homicide
takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to
gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or
by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the]
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to
rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission
of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.

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257.Gonzaga vs. People, 746 SCRA 551, January 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Reckless Imprudence ; Complex Crimes ;
1. Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence
in the use of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused
shall be punished with the penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to
modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prisión correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to
six years of prisión correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
2. Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Words and Phrases; Reckless imprudence, as
defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
3. Same; Same; In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle — a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has
been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either
with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution
or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal
intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the
penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered
likewise at fault.
4. Same; Same; It is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating
a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the
opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other
circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case,
constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and
imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the
curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly
accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
5. Same; Same; Penalties; Complex Crimes;Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC, a complex crime.
Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide,
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

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258. Panay Power Corp vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 746 SCRA 588, Jan.
21, 2015 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ; Tax Credit ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Tax Credit; During the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau
of Internal Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the
CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422, case was promulgated),
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period before it
could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input value-added tax (VAT) before the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003
to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to
the filing of such claim.-
—Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court
reconciled the pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632
SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases
in the following manner: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases,
the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated),
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim
for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period
(i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is
mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied) In this case, records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial
claims for refund/credit of its input VAT on December 29, 2005 and January 20, 2006,
respectively, or during the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from
December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the 120-
day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is deemed timely filed. In
view of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s claim on the
ground of prematurity.

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259. Ruks Konsult and Const vs. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corp, 746SCRA 622,
Jan21, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Quasi-Delicts ; Joint Tortfeasors ; Solidary
Obligations ;
1. Same; Same; Joint Tortfeasors; Solidary Obligations; Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage; Joint tortfeasors are each
liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the
wrongful act themselves.-
—Both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard
was weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely
relied on each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was
done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are
guilty of negligence in the construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held
liable for its collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint
tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, “[j]oint tortfeasors are those
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They
are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight by the
Supreme Court (SC) and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence
on record.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA,
are entitled to great weight by the Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record. Absent any exceptions to this rule — such as when it
is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent
facts and circumstances that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case — such
findings must stand.
3. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence defines
negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.-
—Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is
the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.

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260. Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Zosa, 746 SCRA 632, January
21, 2015 Syllabi Class :Dismissal from Service ; Misconduct ;
1. Dismissal from Service; Misconduct; To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and
not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
2. Administrative Cases; Substantial Evidence; In administrative cases, substantial
evidence is required to support any findings.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that in administrative cases, substantial evidence is
required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is
satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that one is guilty of the act or omission
complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. In cases before the Office of
the Ombudsman, jurisprudence instructs that “the fundamental rule in administrative
proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact
by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately
supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.” Thus, the
Court must make its own factual review of the case when the Ombudsman’s findings are
contradictory to that of the CA, as in this case.

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261. People vs. Matibag, 754 SCRA 529, January 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Murder ; Civil Liability ; Moral Damages ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages;—In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity
in the amount of P100,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are
awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime
and Duhan’s death. Considering further that the crime was committed with treachery,
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is also granted.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals;In the review of a case, the Court is
guided by the long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual findings should not be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or
misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The Court has
carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA’s
factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed,
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court on this score, considering too that it was in
the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.
3. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a
conviction, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a
person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not
Parricide or Infanticide.
4. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. In People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375 (1999), the Court explained that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part
of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001), it was explained that a
frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be
appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time
to prepare for his or her defense.
5. Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of.—This finding of
treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking self-
defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged,
albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission,
the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the
following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
6. Same; Same; Same; Unlawful Aggression; It is well-settled that there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. Jurisprudence states that not
every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. For unlawful aggression
to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming
self-defense.
7. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Special Aggravating Circumstances; Use of
Unlicensed Firearm; If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.-
—As the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
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firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of
penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,
treats the unauthorized use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of
homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance: Section 1. Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: Section 1. Unlawful
Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or

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Ammunition.—x x x. x x x x If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; When Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof
was unauthorized under the purview of Republic Act (RA) 8294 and is equally appreciated
as a special aggravating circumstance.-
—Under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term “unlicensed firearm” has already been
expanded as follows: Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm.—The term
unlicensed firearm shall include: 1. firearms with expired license; or 2. unauthorized use of
licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, when
Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized under the purview of
RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light
of RA 9346, stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.
9. Same; Murder; Civil Liability; Liabilities for Death Resulting from Murder.-
—Case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory
damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d)
exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.

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263. Gadia vs. Sykes Asia, Inc., 748 SCRA 633, January
28, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ;
1. Labor Law; “Project Employees” and “Regular Employees,” Distinguished.-
—Article 294 of the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes a project-based employee from
a regular employee as follows: Art. 294. Regular and casual employment.—The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. x x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) In Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, 734 SCRA 270 (2014), the
Court extensively discussed how to determine whether an employee may be properly
deemed project-based or regular, to wit: A project employee is assigned to a project which
begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may
only be dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of
employees who are hired as “project[-based] employees” may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of the project. According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining
whether particular employees are properly characterised as “project[-based] employees” as
distinguished from “regular employees,” is whether or not the employees were assigned to
carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which were specified
at the time they were engaged for that project. The project could either be (1) a particular job
or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but
which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the
company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
“project” to prevent employees from attaining a regular status, employers claiming that their
workers are project[-based] employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of
the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also, that there was
indeed a project.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; At the
outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered
“grave,” discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Labor Law;—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion
may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached
thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence
is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that “in
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

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264. Concepcion vs. Dela Rosa, 749 SCRA 26, February
03, 2015 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.-
—In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the
same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so
doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be
equally held administratively liable on this score.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Borrowing Money from Clients; Code of Professional
Responsibility;
—Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected: CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession. Rule 16.04 –
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.-
—The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this
“trust and confidence” is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer
from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over
his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias), 477
SCRA 393 (2005), the Court categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a
loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical.

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265. Salita vs. Salve, 749 SCRA 463, February 04,
2015 Syllabi Class :Notary Public ;
1. Same; In the case of Atty. Dela Cruz v. Atty. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407 (2004), the Court
revoked the errant lawyer’s notarial commission and disqualified him from being
commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years for similarly committing gross negligence
in the performance of his duty as a notary public through his failure to ascertain the identities
of the persons executing the Deed of Absolute sale he notarized. Thus, due to the
infractions’ relative comparability, the Court finds it apt to impose the same against Atty.
Salve, thereby effectively modifying the suspension initially recommended by the IBP.
2. Notary Public; Verily, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the
affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.
3. Same; —The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. In doing so, Atty.
Salve, as borne from the records of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all
the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all personally known to him;
(c) they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (d) he inquired into the
voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before
him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful observance
and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Having
failed in this regard, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale
without requiring the personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes
gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.

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266. Umaguing vs. De Vera, 749 SCRA 473, February 04,
2015 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Same; Same; —All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; —Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and
with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and
trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission
as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
3. Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey
the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.-
—The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and
has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
4. Same; Same; Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in
the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his
professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the
law.-
—The final lining to it all — for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its
recommendation — is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election
protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration
as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the
falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the
dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his
professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the
law. Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation
or allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.

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267. Tordilla vs. Amilano, 749 SCRA 487, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Failure to Pay Just Debts ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; —Clearly, under the Rules, the term “just debts” may
refer not only to claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to claims the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor, as respondent in this case. As such, the OCA’s
classification of respondent’s infraction as simple misconduct — instead, of willful refusal to
pay just debts — was therefore erroneous.
2. Administrative Law; Failure to Pay Just Debts; Penalties; Willful failure to pay just
debts is classified as a light offense, with the corresponding penalty of reprimand.-
—Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,”
provides that a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action.
Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section
52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Rules),
defines “just debts” as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims the
existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Under the same Rules, willful
failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, with the corresponding penalty of
reprimand for the first offense.

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268. ReiconRealty BuildersCorp vs. DiamondDragon Realty&Mgt,Inc., 750SCRA37,Feb
04, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Same; Same; —In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 588 SCRA
612 (2009), it was ruled that [a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A certiorari proceeding is, by nature,
an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.-
—On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its
business address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to
show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be
faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in
light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above cited, which
merely entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel. The
underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original
and independent action, and therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in
the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of
serving the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an
appearance for respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement
under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
3. Same; Jurisdiction; Conditional Appearance; —In ordinary civil cases, a conditional
appearance to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
made when said party specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance
directed by the court, not the complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special
appearance but grounds the same on the service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to
him, then that would not be considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his
person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory pleading has nothing to do
with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil
action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons
— same as the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari
petition — which remains material to the matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendant’s/respondents’ person.
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269. Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc., 750 SCRA 55, February
04, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Retirement Pay ; Separation Pay ;
1. Labor Law; Retirement Pay; Separation Pay; The Supreme Court (SC) is not unaware
of its rulings wherein it pronounced that retirement pay and separation pay are not mutually
exclusive (unless there is a specific prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement or
retirement plan against the payment of both benefits); however, with Villena’s entitlement to
retirement pay not included as an issue in an illegal dismissal case which had already been
finally decided, it is quite absurd for Villena to submit a “contemporaneous” claim for
retirement pay on the execution phase of these proceedings. In fine, the plea to include
retirement pay in the execution of the final and executory August 31, 2001 CA Decision and
March 22, 2007 NLRC Resolution, under the phrase “other benefits,” cannot be granted.

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270. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, 750 SCRA 121,
February 04, 2015 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Same; Interest Rates; —The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation
as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court has
allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment
since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12%
interest p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013, until fully paid, interest shall be at 6% p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by
BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process be
concluded under RA 6657. For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market
value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking, or the “time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property,”
such as when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries, as in this case. In addition,
the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
3. Same; Same; Just compensation shall be the price or value of the property at the time it
was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government.-
—While the CA correctly held that just compensation shall be the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government, or on
November 29, 2001, it, departed from the parameters prescribed under DAR AO No. 5,
Series of 1998 in computing the capitalized net income (CNI) in order to arrive at the land
value (LV) for the subject lands. Particularly, under the foregoing AO, the selling price (SP)
for purposes of computing the capitalized net income (CNI) shall be “the average of the latest
available 12-months’ selling prices prior to the date of receipt of the CF by LBP for
processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of Agriculture (DA) and other
appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
4. Same; Same; Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.-
—Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the “time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, upon the issuance of OCT
Nos. C-27721 and 27722 in the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries on November 29,
2001. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the
valuation of the subject lands must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking
for like agricultural lands.
5. Same; Same; All previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by
landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of (Republic Act
[RA] 6657), as amended.-
—The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its
amendment by RA 9700. It bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on July
1, 2009, amending certain provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17,
and declaring “[t]hat all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge
by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657],
as amended,” the law should not be retroactively applied to pending claims/cases. In fact,
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2009 implementing RA 9700 expressly excepted from the
application of the amended Section 17 all claim folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009,
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which shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its
further amendment by RA No. 9700.

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271. People vs. Sumili, 750 SCRA 143, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of
the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving
with moral certainty that they are the same seized items.-
—It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the
presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in
which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of
right, as in this case.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; The dangerous drug presented
in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him.-
—In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment. Note that what remains material for conviction is the proof
that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
corpus delicti. It is also important that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
be preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an
accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement
removes any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides the “chain of
custody rule” outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling
the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value.-
—To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order
to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the
apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an
inventory and take photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom such items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s representative or
counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
While the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as
jurisprudence nevertheless provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will
not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a)
there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure
must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items.

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272. Bonsurbe, Jr. vs. Yerro, 750 SCRA 490, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Provisional Dismissal ;
1. Same; Criminal Procedure; Provisional Dismissals; Requisites of.- The provisional
dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement
thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 8.
Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of
the order without the case having been revived. Under the aforecited provision, a case is
provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur: (a) The prosecution with the
express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin
perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional
dismissal; (b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case; (c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and (d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy;At the outset, it must be borne in
mind that a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has
the effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. In People v. Judge Hernandez, 499 SCRA 688 (2006), the Court explained the
parameters of this rule: As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a
statute clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the
prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case by the
trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of due process
resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is true that double jeopardy will
attach in case the prosecution appeals a [D]ecision acquitting the accused, an acquittal
rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not
really “acquit” and therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy
based on a void indictment. In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against
private respondents for the denial of their right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we
have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial of the accused’s right to a speedy trial
will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court reset the case for trial, the accused can
successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and
cannot be reconsidered.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of
in order to challenge the judgment or order of acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under its classic formulation, grave
abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act
at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.

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273. Yap-Co vs. Uy, 750 SCRA 504, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Actions ; Dismissal of
Actions ;
1. Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Fundamental is the rule that a motion to
dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency of the
pleading.-
—It bears pointing out that while the RTC dismissed the case impliedly by reason of
respondents’ repeated failure to appear in court and prosecute their case, it also inaccurately
expressed the view that such dismissal may properly be taken as its favorable action on
petitioner’s standing motion to dismiss. The Court takes note, however, that the cited motion
to dismiss was not premised on the respondents’ failure to prosecute their case but on the
alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Fundamental is the rule that a
motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency
of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said right. If these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed. In this
case, the Court finds that the subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of
petitioner in procuring her title to the subject property to the prejudice of respondents who
claim to have acquired it first. Thus, outright dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
was improper.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.-
—Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the
time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.” However, the
application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this case since, as
correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend the
scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to
travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is
accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence
and where the interest of justice so requires. Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that
respondents would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the
RTC’s dismissal of the case — on a procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused
by the palpable negligence of their counsel — is sustained. Considering that respondents
appear to have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would better serve the higher
interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting claims to be resolved on the
merits.

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274. De Leon vs. Dela Llana, 750 SCRA 531, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Judgment on the Merits ;
1. Same; Same; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; A judgment on the merits is one
wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to the causes of action and the subject matter.-
—Simply stated, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action
and the subject matter, such as the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab’s January 24, 2006 Decision
which had resolved the substantive issue in Civil Case No. 821 as above explained.
Contrary to respondents’ stance, said Decision was not premised on a mere technical
ground, particularly, on improper venue. This is evinced by the qualifier “granting arguendo”
which opens the discussion thereof, to show that the first ejectment complaint would,
according to the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab, have been dismissed on improper venue
notwithstanding the undated lease contract’s simulated character.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata
(meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from
re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.-
—Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which
precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. It means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on all points and matters determined in the former suit.” Notably, res judicata has two (2)
concepts. The first is “bar by prior judgment” in which the judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or other tribunal, while the second concept is “conclusiveness of judgment”
in which any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same. There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of
judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases,
but no identity of causes of action.

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275. Guevarra vs. The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc., 751 SCRA 144, February
18, 2015 Syllabi Class :Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage ; Redemption ;
1. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Redemption; In addition to the principal and
interest, the repurchase price should also include all the expenses of foreclosure, i.e.,
Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with Section 47 of the
General Banking Law of 2000.-
—In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all the
expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in
accordance with Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000. Considering further that
Sps. Guevarra failed to redeem the subject property within the one-year reglementary
period, they are liable to reimburse TCLC for the corresponding Documentary Stamp Tax
(DST) and Capital Gains Tax (CGT) it paid pursuant to Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Revenue Regulations No. 4-99, which requires the payment of DST on extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of capital assets initiated by banks, finance and insurance companies, as
well as CGT in cases of non-redemption. CGT and DST are expenses incident to TCLC’s
custody of the subject property, hence, likewise due, under the above provision of law.
2. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Rural Banks Act;—In an extrajudicial
foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor may redeem the
property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged to a rural
bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks
Act, or within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale if the land is
mortgaged to parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If the mortgagor fails
to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years
from the expiration of the aforementioned redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, which states: SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.
3. Same; Redemption; The Supreme Court (SC) has rules that redemptions from lending or
credit institutions, like The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc. (TCLC), are governed by
Section 78 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law of
2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper redemption price
when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or credit institution.-—The Court has, however,
ruled that redemptions from lending or credit institutions, like TCLC, are governed by Section
78 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000), which
amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper redemption price when the
mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or credit institution.
4. Interest Rates; In a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed that
stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, hence, illegal and void for being contrary to
morals.-
—The Court notes that the stipulated three percent (3%) monthly interest is excessive and
unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that stipulated interest rates
of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and
exorbitant, hence, illegal and void for being contrary to morals.

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311
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276. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz, 751 SCRA 161, February 18,
2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Two Notice Rule ;
Due Process ;
1. Same; Same; Two-Notice Rule; Due Process; The Court affirms the finding of the CA
that Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the
provisions of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC as above cited, which requires the “two-notice
rule.” As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira, 392 SCRA 371 (2002): An erring seaman
is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain
or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the
reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear
and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are
dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency,
supported by substantial evidence of the findings.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Generally, a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only
questions of law. Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may
generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In this case,
considering that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the CA,
on the other hand, are contradictory, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the
Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; It is well-settled that the
burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies
with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the
employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not
based on mere surmises or conjectures.
4. Same; Same; Insubordination; Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an
employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s
assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

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277. People vs. Palma, 751 SCRA 233, February 18,
2015 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Robbery with
Homicide ;
1. Same; Same; Conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by
reason of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.-
—It is settled that the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their defense
of alibi considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and,
thus, cannot outweigh the testimony of eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants
committed the crime. Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes
place by reason of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Supreme
Court (SC) will evaluate the factual findings of the court below.-
—It is settled that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the
trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the factual
findings of the court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
3. Criminal Law; Robbery With Homicide; Elements of.-
—In People v. Uy, 649 SCRA 236 (2011), the Court explained that the elements for the crime
of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence
or intimidation against persons; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, homicide
was committed. A conviction requires that the robbery is the main purpose and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.

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278. DENR vs. United Planners Consultants, Inc. (UPCI), 751 SCRA 389, February
23, 2015 Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Money
Judgments ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Money Judgments; —Section 26 of PD 1445 expressly provides
that execution of money judgment against the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities is within the primary jurisdiction of the COA, to wit: SEC. 26.
General jurisdiction.—The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of
the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for
a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers
relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as
the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing
to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self- governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, and as herein prescribed, including non¬governmental entities subsidized by
the government, those funded by donation through the government, those required to pay
levies or government share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart
fund or those partly funded by the government. (Emphases supplied) From the foregoing, the
settlement of respondent’s money claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA
despite finality of the confirmed arbitral award by the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR
Rules. Hence, the respondent has to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary
claim. This appears to have been complied with by the latter when it filed a “Petition for
Enforcement and Payment of Final and Executory Arbitral Award” before the COA.
Accordingly, it is now the COA which has the authority to rule on this latter petition.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004; Republic Act
(RA) No. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,”
institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in the
Philippines.-
—Republic Act No. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in
the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme
Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving
cases pending before all courts in the Philippines. Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC was
created setting forth the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (referred
herein as Special ADR Rules) that shall govern the procedure to be followed by the courts
whenever judicial intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases where it is
allowed.
3. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; Execution is fittingly
called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law.-
—Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it
appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a
confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural
mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed
award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege.

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314
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279. Anglo vs. Valencia, 751 SCRA 588, February 25,
2015 Syllabi Class :Legal Ethics ; Attorneys ; Conflict of
Interest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for
a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.-
—As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents’ pronounced liability is not altered by
the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the
termination of attorney- client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client’s confidence once
reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
2. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing parties.-
—In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. As
such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
3. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing parties.-
—In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. As
such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.

****

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280. Benabaye vs. People, 752 SCRA 26, February
25, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal
Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; While it is true that only Benabaye was
able to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. Considering that under Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as abovequoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-
accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for
one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory, Benabaye’s discharge for
the crime of estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the estafa
charge against Tupag is similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal
charge against him as may be warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; —Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended, under
which Benabaye was charged and prosecuted, states: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any
person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished
by: 1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.] x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely: x x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.] The elements of estafa
under this provision are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the
offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c)
the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by
the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
3. Same; Theft; —It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf
of an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a
recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of
the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee- perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in the
case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft,
whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been
transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
4. Same; Estafa; —In Chua-Burce v. CA, 331 SCRA 1 (2000), the Court acquitted therein
petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-Burce) of estafa on the ground that the element of
juridical possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA, 99 Phil. 703
(1956), where a travelling sales agent was convicted of the crime of estafa for his failure to
return to his principal the proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had
occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for
purposes of determining criminal liability for estafa, viz.: There is an essential distinction
between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in
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agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment
to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the
other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right
to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered
without his fault. ****

317
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281. Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc., 752 SCRA 55, February
25, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Strained Relations ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Strained Relations; Separation Pay; —The CA therefore erred in ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC which, in fact, correctly found Tatel to have been
illegally dismissed. Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; this is clearly not the case with respect to the
pronouncement of the NLRC here. In consequence of the foregoing, Tatel is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages. However, as reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case
because of the strained relations between the parties and the fact that Tatel had since been
employed with another company, separation pay is awarded in lieu of reinstatement. On the
matter of the computation of the monetary awards, the Court delegates and defers the same
to the NLRC, being a matter falling within its expertise.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Exceptions.-It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being
bound by the findings of fact made by the appellate court. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited
to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The rule,
however, is not without exception. In New City Builders, Inc.
v. NLRC, 460 SCRA 220 (2005), the Court recognized the following exceptions to the
general rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive
dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain, on the part of
the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to
forego continued employment, or when there is cessation of work because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
4. Same; Same; Abandonment; —In this regard, the Court concurs with the finding of the
NLRC that respondents failed to establish that Tatel abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested
by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to
show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without
any intention of returning. Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
5. Same; Same; Same; Tatel refuted respondents’ allegation that he did not heed their
directive to return to work following his receipt of the November 26, 2009 Memorandum. The
Court finds no compelling reason not to give credence to such rebuff, especially in light of
the filing of the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps
to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have abandoned his work, and the
filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any
suggestion of abandonment. As the Court sees it, it is simply incongruent for Tatel to refuse
any offer of an assignment and thereafter, seek redress by filing a case for illegal dismissal.
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****

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282. People vs. Casas, 752 SCRA 94, February 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Aggravating Circumstances ; Treachery ;
1. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; —Among the qualifying circumstances
thus enumerated in Article 248 is treachery. Under Article 14 of the RPC, “[t]here is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.” In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of
execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be
presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; There can be no self-defense
unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.-
—Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or
Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to
obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was
Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to
bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being
the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot
successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-
defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
3. Same; Same; Same; —It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and
Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against the
latter considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to
flee. It is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away — if and so such was
the case with respect to Eligio — unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor
ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right
to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is
committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-
defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
4. Same; Murder; Elements of.-
—The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was
killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.

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283. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87, March 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :RemedialLaw; CivPro; Parties; IndispParties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable
Parties ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Non-Joinder of
Indispensable Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action; The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.-
—The CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to
implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,
695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of
indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to
wit: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At
any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on
the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the
complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the
nonparty claimed to be indispensable.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Words and
Phrases; An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action
in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Co-Heirs; All the coheirs and persons having an interest in
the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties.-
—With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in
action for partition of real estate.—A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Thus, all the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property
are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the
said parties.
4. Civil Law; Partition; Co-Ownership; In actions for partition, the court cannot properly
issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership.-
—Santiago’s contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs
and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As
correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.
The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for
partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and
finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.

****

321
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284. Cargill Phil, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 753 SCRA 124, March
11, 2015 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; —In the more recent case of Taganito Mining Corporation v.
CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the pronouncements in CIR v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation,
690 SCRA 336 (2013), holding that from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 which refers
to the interregnum when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued until the date of promulgation
of Aichi, taxpayer-claimants need not observe the stringent 120-day period; but before and
after said window period, the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period
remained in force, viz.: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases,
the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated),
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim
for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period
(i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is
mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.

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285. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 753 SCRA 218, March
11, 2015 Syllabi Class: Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Conviction in
Criminal Case;
1. Same; Same; Conviction in Criminal Case; The Court finds it inconsequential that
SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the charge, its
absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee’s liability. Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of
the appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An employee’s guilt or innocence in
a criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his or
her dismissal. It is well-settled that conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just
cause for termination of employment, as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an
employee arising from the same infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which
should not arrest any judgment from one to the other. As it stands, the Court thus holds that
the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued
a patently and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in
turn, means that the CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the
present petition is warranted.
2. Labor Law; Management Prerogatives;The right of an employer to regulate all aspects
of employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives employers the freedom to
regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including
work assignment, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer
of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers. In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
employers. In fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers’ judgment concerning the
conduct of their business. Among the employer’s management prerogatives is the right to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the conduct of its business
or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to assure
that the same would be complied with. At the same time, the employee has the corollary duty
to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or
intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of
service and the dismissal of the employee.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; An employer may terminate
an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in
connection with his work; x x x x Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions must be: (1) reasonable and
lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which the
employee has been engaged to discharge.”
4. Same; Same; Same; —The Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support
the common observation of the NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical
supplies was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were
previous incidents of “hoarding,” it appears that such acts were — in similar fashion —
furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess items found in the concerned
nurse’s possession would have to be confiscated. Hence, the fact that no one was caught
and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called
“hoarding” practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification
behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess medical supplies is immaterial
since it has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. Doubtless, the
deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it
may encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of
discipline that employees are required to observe.

****

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286. Maglente vs. Agcaoili, Jr., 753 SCRA 350, March 18,
2015 Syllabi Class : Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Attorney-Client
Relationship ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or
return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that “while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of
the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.” Since the aforesaid amount was intended to answer for filing fees which is
intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent, the
Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Attorney-Client Relationship; Once a lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to
such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.-It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care,
and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR,
which reads: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
3. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity.-
—Respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client. x x x x Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. Verily, when a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as
in this case. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment, and hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
4. Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension; Jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the
latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted out the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013),
the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one
(1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his
client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,
483 SCRA 212 (2006), the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any
legal service to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose. In
view of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

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****

323
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287. Northern Islands Co., Inc. vs. Garcia, 753 SCRA 603, March
18, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ;
Attachment ;
1. Same; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral,
188 SCRA 692 (1990), the Supreme Court (SC), in view of the nature of a preliminary
attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate
action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of
such action.-
—Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692 (1990), the Court, in view of the
nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the
subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was
only an incident of such action, viz.: Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which
the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of
an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an
independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the
defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit
itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The
consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have
been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed
from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a
separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an
incident of such action.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Notice of Appeal; —Section 9, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.

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288. Olayta-Camba vs. Bongon, 754 SCRA 205, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Penalties ; Suspension from Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension from Practice of Law; —Jurisprudence provides
that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time,
failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon
them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709
SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure
to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino, 483 SCRA 212 (2006),
the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal service to his client
as well as to return the money he received for such purpose. These pronouncements
notwithstanding, there have been instances where the Court tempered the penalty imposed
upon a lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable considerations. In view of the foregoing,
and taking into consideration respondent’s advanced age, medical condition, and the fact
that this is his first offense, the Court finds it appropriate to sustain the recommended penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Negligence; Code of Professional Responsibility; It must be
stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous
demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity.-
—Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned
immediately to the client. As such, a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite
numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity, as in this case.

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289. Dept of Health vs. Philip Morris Phil Manufacturing, Inc., 754 SCRA 452, March 25,
2015 Syllabi Class: Statutory Construction ;
1. Statutory Construction; Where two (2) statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefore should prevail.-
—Finally, it must be stressed that RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively deals
with the subject of tobacco products and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is
broader and more general in scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of
consumers vis-à-vis proper conduct for business and industry. As such, lex specialis derogat
generali. General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and
generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed therefore should prevail.
2. Tobacco Sales Promotions; Statutes; —After a meticulous examination of the above
quoted pertinent provisions of RA 7394 and RA 9211, the Court finds that the latter law
impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of the former with respect to the authority of the
DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotions. At this point, the Court notes that both laws
separately treat “promotion” as one of the activities related to tobacco: RA 7394 defines
“sales promotion” under Article 4(bm), while RA 9211 speaks of “promotion” or “tobacco
promotion” under Section 4(1).
3. Same; Outside RA 7394, “sales promotion” refers to activities which make use of “media
and non- media marketing communication for a predetermined, limited time to increase
consumer demand, stimulate market demand or improve product availability,” “to provide
added value or incentives to consumers, wholesalers, retailers, or other organizational
customers to stimulate immediate sales” and “product interest, trial, or purchase.” Examples
of devices used in “sales promotion” are contests, coupons, freebies, point-of-purchase
displays, premiums, raffle prizes, product samples, sweepstakes, and rebates.

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290. BPI FSavings Bank,Inc. vs. St. Michael Medical Center, Inc., 754 SCRA 493, March
25, 2015 Syllabi Class: Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; While the Court recognizes the financial predicaments of upstart
corporations under the prevailing economic climate, it must nonetheless remain forthright in
limiting the remedy of rehabilitation only to meritorious cases. As above mentioned, the
purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is not only to enable the company to gain a new lease
on life but also to allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings, when so
rehabilitated. Hence, the remedy must be accorded only after a judicious regard of all
stakeholders’ interests; it is not a one-sided tool that may be graciously invoked to escape
every position of distress. In this case, not only has the petitioning debtor failed to show that
it has formally began its operations which would warrant restoration, but also it has failed to
show compliance with the key requirements under the Rules, the purpose of which are vital
in determining the propriety of rehabilitation. Thus, for all the reasons hereinabove explained,
the Court is constrained to rule in favor of BPI Family and hereby dismiss SMMCI’s
Rehabilitation Petition. With this pronouncement, it is now unnecessary to delve on the other
ancillary issues raised herein.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Restoration is the central idea behind the remedy of
corporate rehabilitation. In common parlance, to “restore” means “to bring back to or put back
into a former or original state.” Case law explains that corporate rehabilitation contemplates a
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to
enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims
out of its earnings. Consistent therewith is the term’s statutory definition under Republic Act
No. 10142, otherwise known as the “Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010”
(FRIA), which provides: Section 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the term: x x x x
(gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the debtor to a condition of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically
feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in
the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
3. Same; Same; Same; —A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging
the resolve, determination, earnestness and good faith of the distressed corporation in
financing the proposed rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary
undertakings of the stockholders or the would-be investors of the debtor-corporation
indicating their readiness, willingness and ability to contribute funds or property to guarantee
the continued successful operation of the debtor corporation during the period of
rehabilitation. In this case, aside from the harped on merger of St. Michael Hospital with
SMMCI, the only proposed source of revenue the Rehabilitation Plan suggests is the capital
which would come from SMMCI’s potential investors, which negotiations are merely pending.
Evidently, both propositions commonly border on the speculative and, hence, hardly fit the
description of a material financial commitment which would inspire confidence that the
rehabilitation would turn out to be successful.
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291. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs. Fong, 754 SCRA 544, March
25, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Assignment of Credit ;
1. Same; Assignment of Credit; Case law states that when a person assigns his credit to
another person, the latter is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of
the former.-
—Case law states that when a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is
deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the former. By virtue of the
Deed of Assignment, the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the
assignor and is bound by exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor.
Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor.
The general rule is that an assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action acquires no greater
right than what was possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the latter.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.-
—Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. As such, the stipulations in contracts are binding
on them unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The same principle on obligatory force applies by extension to the contracting party’s
assignees, in turn, by virtue of the principle of relativity of contracts which is fleshed out in
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, viz.: Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The
heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.

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292. People vs. Sorin, 754 SCRA 594, March 25,
2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Object
Evidence ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Object Evidence; —It is well-settled that in criminal
prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus
delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the
same seized items. The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized
from the accused strongly militates against a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as
reasonable doubt persists on the identity of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, the
latter’s acquittal should come as a matter of course.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him.-
—It must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized items have been
preserved. In other words, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an
accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
4. Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that
noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such
noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.-
—Note that while the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid
officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as
jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that
5. Same; Same; Same; Marking; —The Court cannot overemphasize the significance of
marking in illegal drugs cases. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Hence, in People v.
Sabdula, 722 SCRA 90 (2014), the Court acquitted the accused on the ground of failure to
mark the plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; —In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that he did not mark
the plastic sachets which contained the seized drugs, but instead placed the marking on the
“transparent plastic cellophane” wherein he placed the seized sachets. To the Court’s mind,
the act of marking only the cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the
corpus delicti highly susceptible to tampering, switching, planting, and contamination of the
evidence — the very acts which the requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the
cellophane passed hands, it can now no longer be determined with certainty that its contents
have remained intact, especially considering the dearth of testimony from SPO1 Mugot that
the cellophane was tightly sealed or, at the very least, secured.

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293. Ciron vs. Gutierrez, 756 SCRA 110, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class: RemLaw; CrimProcedure ; Preliminary Investigation ; Doctrine of
Noninterference ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Noninterference; —The Court emphasizes that in our
criminal justice system, the public prosecutor, which is the Office of the Ombudsman in this case,
exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court.
Courts cannot interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations
and in the determination of probable cause where the Ombudsman’s discretion prevails over judicial
discretion except when there is grave abuse of discretion, which does not obtain in this case.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Noninterference; —At the outset, it must be stressed that the
Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
the existence of probable cause and to decide whether an Information should be filed. In this relation,
it is settled that the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
3. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; —As already stated, respondents
were accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for issuing the Supplemental Resolutions without
Ortega filing a new complaint before the OCP-Iriga. The essential elements of such crime are as
follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; —In Bañares II v. Balising, 328
SCRA 36 (2000), the private prosecutor attempted to reinstate the criminal cases which had been
dismissed without prejudice by mere motion more than two (2) months after it had notice of the order
of dismissal, without a motion for reconsideration or an appeal having been filed. The Court
explained that an order dismissing a case without prejudice can attain finality if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed and that, in such case, the proper remedy to revive
the case is not to file a motion as the court already lost its power to amend or modify its order.
5. Same; Criminal Procedure; Revival of Actions; Actions; Information; “Complaint” for
purposes of reviving a case must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal
case.-
—The Court is not oblivious to the fact that Bañares II, where criminal cases were involved, uses the
phrase “file a new complaint.” It must be clarified, however, that Bañares II and Ortigas instead, the
action must be instituted anew. Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary
investigation in order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, it must be emphasized that “complaint”
in civil cases is different from a “complaint” in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the
initiatory pleading filed in court, whereas in criminal cases, what is filed in court is an Information and
not a complaint, which is filed before the public prosecutor for purposes of conducting a preliminary
investigation. Thus, “complaint” for purposes of reviving a case must then refer to Informations where
what is involved is a criminal case.
6. Same; Same; Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been
dismissed without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final,
or thereafter, by filing a new Information for the offense. The Court, therefore, disagrees with Ciron’s
view that a new complaint for preliminary investigation had to be filed before the charges against her
could be revived.
7. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Instances When a New Preliminary Investigation
Must be Conducted to Accord the Accused the Right to Submit Counter-affidavits and Evidence.-
—Anent the argument that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled that the
same is only required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-affidavits and
evidence only in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some
of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and
new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from the original accused, other persons
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are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; (c)
if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new
criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of
a principal. Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this case, the Court holds that the OCP-
Iriga, through Beltran and Contreras, need not conduct another preliminary investigation before it can
issue the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent Informations in court.
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294. Paz vs. New International Environmental Universality, Inc., 756 SCRA 284, April
20, 2015 Syllabi Class: Obligations ;
1. Obligations; It is settled that courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations they
voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous.-
—Petitioner’s pleadings, however, abound with clear indications of a business relationship
gone sour. In his third letter dated July 19, 2002, petitioner lamented the fact that Capt.
Clarke’s alleged promise to buy an aircraft had not materialized. He likewise insinuated that
Capt. Clarke’s real motive in staying in the leased premises was the acquisition of petitioner’s
right to possess and use the hangar space. Be that as it may, it is settled that courts have no
power to relieve parties from obligations they voluntarily assumed, simply because their
contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; —It should be emphasized, as it has been
time and again, that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is thus not duty-bound to analyze
again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals. When supported
by substantial evidence, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
exceptions, none of which was established herein.
3. Corporation Law; Obligations; —Section 21 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides
that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation, as such, cannot resist
performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is
bound by his obligation under the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law.
As aptly raised by respondent in its Comment to the instant petition, it is futile to insist that
petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments in respondent’s name and not with Capt.
Clarke’s, whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter’s personal capacity, only because
it was upon the instruction of an employee. Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that all private transactions have been fair and
regular. Hence, it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing with
respect to his business with respondent.

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295. The Plaza, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 756 SCRA 350, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Compromise Agreements ; Cause of Action ;
1. Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Cause of Action; In Genova v. De Castro,
407 SCRA 165 (2003), the Court stated that a party’s violation of a compromise agreement
may give rise to a new cause of action, which may be pursued in a separate action as it is
not barred by res judicata: [P]etitioner’s violation of the terms of the compromise judgment
gave rise to a new cause of action on the part of respondent, i.e., the right to enforce the
terms thereof. When she failed to obtain this by mere motion filed with the trial court, she was
constrained to institute the proper suit for ejectment. The filing of a separate case based on a
cause of action that arises from the application or violation of a compromise agreement is
not barred by res judicata in the first action. Noticeably, Plaza’s Motion for Restitution is not
one of the remedies that can be availed against ALI’s purported violation of the Compromise
Agreement. On the contrary, the same is a new cause of action arising therefrom.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; Compromise
Agreements; The Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the
subject premises, as well as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the
materials salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion is filed
to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an
appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion.”-
—At the onset, it should be pointed out that Civil Case No. 01-1352 — the case from which
the present petition originates — comes before the Court at its execution stage. Notably, the
Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as
well as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials salvaged
therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be
taken from the order denying the motion.” With no such motion having been filed, the RTC is
bound to issue a writ of execution to carry out the said judgment to its full force and effect. In
Far Eastern Surety or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued,
or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
3. Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Judges have the ministerial and
mandatory duty to implement and enforce a compromise agreement.-
—Although the fixing of a period of demolition would have been merely incidental to the
execution of the Compromise Judgment, as it covered, among others, the demolition of the
Building, the parties’ explicit agreement on said period precluded the RTC from resolving
Plaza’s Motion to Fix. As the CA aptly observed, to allow the RTC to fix such period would
allow it to amend a substantial part of the parties’ agreement. Verily, judges have the
ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce a compromise agreement. Absent
any appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify, impose conditions
different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises and
reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their
discretion, as in this case.

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296. People vs. Samuya, 756 SCRA 365, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law; Murder; Damages; Temperate Damages;
1. Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages;—While records do not show that the
prosecution was able to prove the amount actually expended for burial and funeral
expenses, prevailing jurisprudence nonetheless allows the Court to award temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the victim’s heirs as it cannot be denied that they
suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime committed. And lastly, interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid is imposed on all
monetary awards.
2. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-—In order to convict a person charged with the
crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person
was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not
constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
3. Same; Treachery; —Among the qualifying circumstances found in Article 248 of the RPC
is treachery. Under Article 14 of the same Code, there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, 315
SCRA 375 (1999), the Court held that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In
People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001), it was explained that a frontal attack does not
necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the
attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his
or her defense.
4. Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; It is settled that without unlawful
aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.-
—The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense,
either to justify the commission of a crime or to mitigate the imposable penalty. It is settled
that without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. For unlawful aggression to justify or mitigate a crime, the same must be an
actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely threatening
and intimidating attitude, towards the one claiming self¬-defense.
5. Same; Murder; Damages; Civil Liability; Awards in Case of Death Resulting from the
Crime of Murder.-
—On the matter of damages, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of
Murder, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the
crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages
when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with
certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed
with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances.

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297. People vs. Arguta, 756 SCRA 376, April 20,
2015 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Penalties; —Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 provides that “[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended.” Pursuant thereto, accused-appellants should be sentenced with the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; —At the outset, it must be stressed that
in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. Proceeding from the foregoing, the
Court deems it appropriate to modify accused-appellants’ conviction from Simple Rape to
Qualified Rape, as will be explained hereunder.
3. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; —In this case, the Court notes that the rape
occurred during the effectivity of the old rape provision of the RPC, i.e., Article 335, and,
thus, the latter provision is controlling in this case, to wit: Art. 335. When and how rape is
committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime
of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Under this
provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the
victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under
twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed
either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be
Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty.
4. Same; Same; —In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with
a bladed instrument and tied her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her
consent. Jurisprudence holds that force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be
irresistible; as long as the assailant’s objective is accomplished, any question of whether the
force employed was irresistible or not becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from
the lens of the victim’s perception and judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that
something will happen to her should she resist her assailant’s advances. In this regard, case
law provides that the act of holding a bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of
force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same is sufficient to bring
her into submission.
5. Same; Same; Considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-
appellants herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their
conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.-
—The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the courts a quo that
accused- appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a deadly
weapon, as the same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the assessment
and findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and
binding to the Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, as in this case. Nevertheless, considering that the crime was
committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of a bladed
weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified
Rape.
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****

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298. Pabillo vs. Commission on Elections En Banc, 756 SCRA 606, April 21, 2015
Syllabi Class: Bids and Bidding ; Direct Contracting ; Warranty ; Automated Election System
;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is still premature at this point to rule that
performing the auxiliary services will necessarily affect the source code.-
—While I maintain my position that the hardware and software of the PCOS machines are
closely intertwined — the software being embedded on the hardware, I echo the concern that it
is still premature at this point to rule that performing the auxiliary services will necessarily
affect the source code. The initial industry survey, after all, may reveal that these services
may actually be rendered without altering the software’s algorithms, proving the COMELEC’s
fears to be unfounded. Thus, should the COMELEC opt to conduct an initial industry survey,
I implore the Commission to include a technical study to ascertain the veracity of its claim. If
it were to be discovered that the said auxiliary services cannot be performed by entities other
than by COMELEC and Smartmatic¬-TIM without necessarily altering the source code, the
Commission cannot then contract out the said services except to Smartmatic-TIM. This is so
because the rights granted to COMELEC to alter and/or modify the Source Code under
Article 9 of the 2009 AES Contract, to reiterate, is nontransferable and cannot be performed
by any other entity in its stead, lest the Commission contravene Articles 9 and 10 of the 2009
AES Contract, and violate Smartmatic-TIM’s intellectual property rights.
2. Election Law; Automated Election System: Precinct Count Optical Scan Machines;
Words and Phrases; Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) means “a technology wherein an
optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are
inserted to be counted, is located in every precinct.”-
—Indeed, the conduct of the upcoming 2016 Elections is dependent on the functional state of
the existing PCOS machines purchased by the COMELEC. PCOS means “a technology
wherein an optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by
the voter are inserted to be counted, is located in every precinct.” As the AES’s groundwork
mechanism, it is imperative that the PCOS machines, come election day, are of optimal
utility. Following the CAC’s recommendation to reuse the existing technology for the said
elections, the COMELEC proceeded to procure services for the repair and refurbishment of
the PCOS machines. The COMELEC, however, through its Resolution No. 9922, decided to
pursue a direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM, which has now resulted in the
execution of the Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1). Petitioners assail the validity of
the foregoing courses of action mainly for violating the GPRA. Thus, if only to ensure that the
upcoming elections is not mired with illegality at this basic, initial front, this Court, pursuant to
its unyielding duty as final arbiter of the laws, deems it proper to thresh out the above stated
substantive issues, reasonably unfettered by the rigors of procedure.
3. Bids and Bidding; Government Contracts; In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the
established procedure in the grant of government contracts.-
—In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government
contracts. Section 3, Article I of the GPRA — the standing procurement law approved on
January 10, 2003 — states that “[a]ll procurement of the national government, its
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations, government financial institutions and
local government units, shall, in all cases, be governed by these principles: (a) Transparency
in the procurement process and in the implementation of procurement contracts. (b)
Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who
are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. (c) Streamlined procurement
process that will uniformly apply to all government procurement. The procurement process
shall be simple and made adaptable to advances in modern technology in order to ensure an
effective and efficient method.
(d) System of accountability where both the public officials directly or indirectly involved in
the procurement process as well as in the implementation of procurement contracts and the
private parties that deal with government are, when warranted by circumstances, investigated
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and held liable for their actions relative thereto. (e) Public monitoring of the procurement
process and the implementation of awarded contracts with the end in view of guaranteeing
that these contracts are awarded pursuant to the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations, and that all these contracts are performed strictly according to
specifications.”

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4. Same; By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public
the best possible advantages through open competition.-
—By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public the best
possible advantages through open competition. Under Section 5(e), Article I of the GPRA,
public bidding is referred to as “Competitive Bidding,” which is defined as “a method of
procurement which is open to participation by any interested party and which consists of the
following processes: advertisement, pre- bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective
bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluations of bids, post-qualification, and award of
contract, the specific requirements and mechanics of which shall be defined in the [GPRA’s
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)].” Case law states that competition requires not
only bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same
subject matter, and the same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and
not designed to injure or defraud the government. The essence of competition in public
bidding is that the bidders are placed on equal footing which means that all qualified bidders
have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids. Another self-evident purpose
of competitive bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the
execution of public contracts.
5. Same; Government Procurement; It is an established public policy, as well as a
statutory mandate that all government procurement shall be done through competitive public
bidding.-
—It is an established public policy, as well as a statutory mandate that all government
procurement shall be done through competitive public bidding. However, as an exception,
Article XVI of the GPRA sanctions a resort to alternative methods of procurement, among
others, via direct contracting.
6. Same; Direct Contracting; Words and Phrases; —Direct contracting, otherwise known
as “Single Source Procurement,” refers to “a method of Procurement that does not require
elaborate Bidding Documents because the supplier is simply asked to submit a price
quotation or a pro forma invoice together with the conditions of sale, which offer may be
accepted immediately or after some negotiations.”
7. Same; Same; Government Procurement Reform Act;—Under Section 50(a), Article
XVI of the GPRA, direct contracting may be allowed when the procurement involves goods
of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary source — that is, when
patents, trade secrets, and copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the same item. The
applicability of said condition was explicated in the GPPB Manual as follows: This is
applicable when the goods or services being procured are covered by a patent, trade secret
or copyright duly acquired under the law. Under the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 8293), the registered owner of a patent, a copyright or any other form
of intellectual property has exclusive rights over the product, design or process covered by
such patent, copyright or registration. Such exclusive right includes the right to use,
manufacture, sell, or otherwise to derive economic benefit from the item, design or process.
8. Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; Even if it is assumed that
Smartmatic-TIM is the proprietary source of the services or that the intended repair and
refurbishment would necessarily entail a modification of the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) hardware and software of which its existing intellectual property rights cover, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is still not bound to engage Smartmatic-TIM on an
exclusive basis.-
—A perusal of the aforementioned patent and copyright documents reveals that Smartmatic-
TIM’s existing intellectual property rights do not cover the services subject of these cases.
No evidence has been presented to show that it possessed intellectual property rights over
the method, process, system, program, or work of servicing the said PCOS machines for their
repair and refurbishment. Accordingly, Smartmatic-TIM cannot be said to be the services’
proprietary source, thus, negating its purported exclusivity as the COMELEC claims. At any
rate, even if it is assumed that Smartmatic-TIM is the proprietary source of the services or
that the intended repair and refurbishment would necessarily entail a modification of the
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PCOS hardware and software of which its existing intellectual property rights cover, the
COMELEC is still not bound to engage Smartmatic-TIM on an exclusive basis. Based on the
2009 AES Contract, Smartmatic-TIM would grant the COMELEC a perpetual, but
nonex¬clusive license to use, modify, and customize the PCOS systems and software,
including the right to alter and modify the source code itself, for all future elections, when the
latter exercises its option to purchase (which it eventually did), with certain limitations.

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9. Civil Law; Sales; Warranties; —Albeit undefined in our local statutes, a warranty has
been ordinarily considered as an agreement to be responsible for all damages that arise from
the falsity of a statement or assurance of fact. In other words, a warranty promises indemnity
against defects in an article sold. In Ang v. CA, 567 SCRA 54 (2008), a warranty was defined
as “a statement or representation made by the seller of goods, contemporaneously and as
part of the contract of sale, having reference to the character, quality or title of the goods, and
by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then
represents them.”
10. Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; —With the warranty on
manufacturing defects having lost its effect, there is no way that the COMELEC’s
engagement of another service contractor would constitute a breach of that warranty.
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; While Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive manufacturer
and distributor of the PCOS machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence
to show that it is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same.
Smartmatic-TIM’s certification — aside from being self-serving and, thus, of doubtful
probative value — is not evidence of the company’s exclusive capability. A business
dictionary defines “certification” as a “formal procedure by which an accredited or authorized
person or agency assesses and verifies (and attests in writing by issuing a certificate) the
attributes, characteristics, quality, qualification, or status of individuals or organizations,
goods or services, procedures or processes, or events or situations, in accordance with
established requirements or standards.” Paralleled against this definition, the certification
thus operates only as a formal assurance that any work performed by the issuer’s employees
would conform to its own established requirements and standards, for which the client,
based on the issuer’s goodwill and reputation, is led to expect a certain quality of work. With
the COMELEC appearing to rely solely on Smartmatic-TIM’s certification, and more
importantly, absent the conduct of an initial industry survey (which again may, in itself, be
considered as a ground to invalidate the resultant contract as above explained), it remains
uncertain if the repair and refurbishment of the PCOS machines can be accomplished by
other equally capable service providers at more advantageous terms to the government.
With this, the Court concludes that the third condition — similar to the previous two
conditions — which would justify a resort to direct contracting under Section 50, Article XVI
of the GPRA had not been complied with.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; While Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive manufacturer
and distributor of the PCOS machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence
to show that it is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same.
Smartmatic-TIM’s certification — aside from being self-serving and, thus, of doubtful
probative value — is not evidence of the company’s exclusive capability. A business
dictionary defines “certification” as a “formal procedure by which an accredited or authorized
person or agency assesses and verifies (and attests in writing by issuing a certificate) the
attributes, characteristics, quality, qualification, or status of individuals or organizations,
goods or services, procedures or processes, or events or situations, in accordance with
established requirements or standards.” Paralleled against this definition, the certification
thus operates only as a formal assurance that any work performed by the issuer’s employees
would conform to its own established requirements and standards, for which the client,
based on the issuer’s goodwill and reputation, is led to expect a certain quality of work. With
the COMELEC appearing to rely solely on Smartmatic-TIM’s certification, and more
importantly, absent the conduct of an initial industry survey (which again may, in itself, be
considered as a ground to invalidate the resultant contract as above explained), it remains
uncertain if the repair and refurbishment of the PCOS machines can be accomplished by
other equally capable service providers at more advantageous terms to the government.
With this, the Court concludes that the third condition — similar to the previous two
conditions — which would justify a resort to direct contracting under Section 50, Article XVI
of the GPRA had not been complied with.
13. Same; Same; —It has already been resolved that the COMELEC failed to comply with
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any of the conditions by which its selected mode of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would
have been allowed. Meanwhile, it has not argued that any other alternative method of
procurement can be applied. This notwithstanding, the COMELEC attempts to go beyond the
scope of the GPRA and extend Section 52(h)’s application based on two (2) practical
considerations, namely: (a) the alleged tight schedule of conducting a public bidding and
having the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished in time for the 2016

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elections; and (b) the great risk of having the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished by any
third party provider in view of the highly technical nature of the goods.
14. Same; Same; Automated Election System;—At the outset, it should be underscored
that the COMELEC could have already had the PCOS machines inspected and diagnosed by
its own in-¬house personnel as early as the time it had resolved to reuse the same. The
COMELEC’s ITD could have even proceeded to conduct preventive maintenance
procedures, which it admits it is capable of under its memorandum dated May 14, 2014.
15. Same; Same; Same; —In fact, as may be above gleaned, it appears that the COMELEC
could have just procured the “the tools for repair and parts for replacement,” and have the
repair and refurbishment done by its own in-house personnel. Note that a sufficient number of
ITD personnel could have well been trained by Smartmatic-TIM itself on matters related to the
repair, refurbishment, tuning up and maintenance of the PCOS machines, as well as the
electronic transmission facility, pursuant to Item No. 8.2.4, Part V of the 2009 RFP.
16. Same; Same; Same; Smartmatic-TIM’s training obligation-
— an obligation that was incipiently required in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to which all
bidders at that time were subjected to and, in fact, included in the 2009 Automated Election
System (AES) Contract’s project scope — spans both aspects of preventive maintenance
and repair. With this, the Supreme Court (SC) is in a quandary as to why the services
subject of these cases would still have to be procured by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from an outside service provider, let alone under an exclusive direct contracting
arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM.—Clearly, Smartmatic-TIM’s training obligation — an
obligation that was incipiently required in the RFP to which all bidders at that time were
subjected to and, in fact, included in the 2009 AES Contract’s project scope — spans both
aspects of preventive maintenance and repair. With this, the Court is in a quandary as to
why the services subject of these cases would still have to be procured by the COMELEC from
an outside service provider, let alone under an exclusive direct contracting arrangement with
Smartmatic-TIM. Curiously, Smartmatic-TIM has been communicating with the COMELEC
about its proposed extended warranty as early as 2013. Hence, unless the COMELEC was
already bent on pursuing its current deal with Smartmatic-TIM, then the latter’s training
obligation should have been enforced. To the Court’s mind, this would have been the more
prudent course of action: ideally, this would not only narrow down the COMELEC’s task to
the procurement of the necessary tools and replacement parts, but also provide it with a
considerable degree of sustainability by minimizing — if not eliminating — its reliance on
Smartmatic-TIM with respect to the upkeep of the PCOS machines.
17. Same; Same; Same; —Nothing on record convinces this Court that there is no other
service provider which is capable of servicing the PCOS machines without the need to
reverse engineer the same. Neither is this Court convinced that reverse engineering, if done
properly, would impair the machines’ integrity or put “back to zero” the know-how already
accumulated. The bid guidelines may very well qualify the COMELEC’s desired body of
work, and the bidding process itself screens the capability of potential bidders to comply with
the same. As it was in its earlier asseveration, the COMELEC is quick to assume the worst
but its assumptions remain unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the COMELEC’s arguments at this
juncture are denied altogether.
18. Same; Same; Same; —Nothing on record convinces this Court that there is no other
service provider which is capable of servicing the PCOS machines without the need to
reverse engineer the same. Neither is this Court convinced that reverse engineering, if done
properly, would impair the machines’ integrity or put “back to zero” the know-how already
accumulated. The bid guidelines may very well qualify the COMELEC’s desired body of
work, and the bidding process itself screens the capability of potential bidders to comply with
the same. As it was in its earlier asseveration, the COMELEC is quick to assume the worst
but its assumptions remain unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the COMELEC’s arguments at this
juncture are denied altogether.
19. Same; Same; Same; Same; —An extended warranty gives a prolonged warranty to
consumers to provide the additional service of replacing or repairing goods, the defects of
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which are directly related to how the item was manufactured. As an “extension,” the defect to
be repaired should occur within the extended period covered in the agreement. In these
cases, the warranty period for manufacturing defects had, as above discussed, lapsed a long
time ago, or last March 30, 2013, which follows the one

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(1) year warranty period for the PCOS machines, reckoned from March 30, 2012 when the
2012 Deed of Sale was executed.
20. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has failed to
justify its reasons for directly contracting with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the
conditions under Section 50, Article XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act
(GPRA) exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by independently verified and
competent data; and lastly, its perceived “warranty extension” is, in reality, just a
circumvention of the procurement law.-
—There are no qualms about the task of having the PCOS machines repaired and refurbished.
However, there are serious and unignorable legal flaws about how the COMELEC intends to
pursue this undertaking. Bluntly, the COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for directly
contracting with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under Section
50, Article XVI of the GPRA exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by
independently verified and competent data; and lastly, its perceived “warranty extension” is,
in reality, just a circumvention of the procurement law. For all these counts, the conclusion
thus reached is that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a result, its Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended Warranty
Contract (Program 1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts paid to
Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public funds sourced from
taxpayers’ money, should be returned to the government in accordance with the procedures
contained in existing rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these cases does not
prohibit the COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew or other alternative method
of procurement with any service contractor, subject to compliance with the conditions
provided in the GPRA and all the pertinent rules and procedures.
21. Bids and Bidding; Direct Contracting; Warranty; Automated Election System; I
concur with the majority that failure to comply with the set pre¬conditions for direct
contracting, specifically the conduct of an initial industry survey and pre-procurement
conference, is a ground to nullify the Extended Warranty Contract subject of these
consolidated cases, and that the disposition of these cases ought not prohibit the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from resorting to direct contracting anew or resorting to other
alternative modes of procurement with any service provider.
22. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the parties herein agree that the subject “goods”
of the Extended Warranty Contract neither pertain to the PCOS machines nor the software
program, but to the services, particularly diagnostics, preventive maintenance, repair, and
replacement of the PCOS machines previously bought from Smartmatic-TIM. Here, it has
been duly proved that Smartmatic-TIM has proprietary rights over the PCOS machines’
hardware and software, but whether these proprietary rights extend to the services contracted
remains to be seen. It is likewise premature at this point to draw a conclusion on whether or
not Smartmatic-TIM is the sole distributor of the services to be rendered. This is in view of the
fact that the COMELEC, as correctly pointed out by the ponencia, failed to comply with two
key requirements prior to directly contracting with Smartmatic-TIM, namely: the conduct of
(a) an initial industry survey, and (b) a pre-procurement conference. On this point alone, the
Extended Warranty Contract ought to be nullified.
23. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is undisputed that the COMELEC has the right
to reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile, alter, modify, or transmit the technology it
purchased in any form or by any means, but, as can be gleaned, these rights to alter and/or
modify the PCOS machine hardware, and the software embedded thereon, pertain
exclusively to COMELEC. In the same vein, the exception under Article 10 indeed allows for
the exploitation and reproduction of the technology transferred but only if it is performed by
COMELEC itself. To be sure, the provisions, as couched, do not evince that the said rights
mentioned thereon are actually transferrable. On the contrary, the language of the 2009 AES
Contract prohibits the same.

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299. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 757 SCRA 160, April
22, 2015 Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ;
Indispensable Parties ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings.-
—Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality’s
status as an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence
of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the
issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as it has now
come to the fore that any resolution of this case would not be possible and, hence, not attain
any real finality due to the nonjoinder of the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set
aside all subsequent actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court’s,
and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable
parties to the case and its immediate disposition on the merits. With this, the propriety of the
Municipality’s present intervention is now mooted.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit.-
—Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be
joined in a suit, viz.: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties-in-
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “An indispensable party is one whose
interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.” Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; It must be stressed that the failure to implead any
indispensable party to a suit does not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the
complaint.-
—Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to a
suit does not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina
v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., 695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court definitively explained that in instances
of nonjoinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to
dismiss the case: The nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may
be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.

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300. Vergara vs. Sonkin, 757 SCRA 442, June 15, 2015
Syllabi Class : Civil Law ; Quasi-delicts ; Negligence ; Contributory Negligence ;
1. Same; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; —In view of Sps. Sonkin’s
undisputed failure to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building
Code, and in light of the order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an
adequate drainage system within their property, the Court likewise deems it proper,
equitable, and necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as respondent before the
Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal of the portion of her house directly
abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
2. Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Words and
Phrases; — Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin
property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to
receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This
provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands, which
obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which naturally and without the
intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in reservoirs,
etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters, viz.: Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged
to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the
lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of
the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and,
accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden
created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and
constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property,
thereby violating the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708(a)
thereof which reads: Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—(a)
Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety
percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on
Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters
from the property line.
3. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; -In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the
Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are
only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
4. Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; —Anent the issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is
that the same cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause. In this case, the Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor
Sps. Vergara (thru their compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have acted in bad faith in
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pursuing their respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by
the fact that both parties have valid contentions against each other. Thus, absent cogent
reason to hold otherwise, the Court deems it inappropriate to award attorney’s fees in favor
of either party.

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301. Bucal vs. Bucal, 759 SCRA 262, June 17, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ;
Judgments ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a
relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a
case. The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Teston, 545 SCRA 422 (2008), viz.: Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. For the same
reason, this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be available to
petitioners. Verily, both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and
arbitrary judgments. The very essence of due process is “the sporting idea of fair play” which
forbids the grant of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to
be heard. The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was
present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor
filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The
settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari.-
—The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions,
such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there
is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
3. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004; Protection Order; The urgency for resolution also rendered such
filing unnecessary. It should be emphasized that Cherith had already been issued a PPO. As
defined in Section 8 of RA 9262, “[a] protection order is an order issued x x x for the purpose
of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of
this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve
the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently
regain control over her life. x x x.” With a standing PPO issued for the purpose of protecting
not only the woman, but also her child against acts of violence committed by the person
against whom the order is issued — in this case, Manny — the resolution of the issue of
whether or not Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any discernible basis
therefor, is urgent, else Cherith and Francheska be unduly exposed to the very danger which
they are seeking protection from. As the Court sees it, any further delay would substantially
prejudice their interests, thus, allowing a direct recourse to certiorari.

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302. Ace Navigation Company vs. Garcia, 759 SCRA 274, June
17, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In any case, the findings of Dr. Salvador and Dr. Cruz, the company-
designated physicians, should prevail considering that they examined, diagnosed, and
treated Garcia from his repatriation on May 20, 2010 until he was assessed with a Grade 10
disability rating; whereas the independent physician, Dr. Escutin, only examined Garcia
sparingly on April 25, 2011 after he filed his claim for total and permanent disability benefits
before the NLRC on November 8, 2010. Jurisprudence holds that, under these
circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician should be given more
credence for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis,
compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an
examination or existing medical records.
2. Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In a seafarer’s claim for disability, the
onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the
requisite quantum of evidence to justify the relief sought.
3. Same; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Permanent Total Disability; A judicious review of
the records reveals that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain any gainful employment for
more than 120 days after his repatriation; however, this fact does not ipso facto render his
disability total and permanent. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA
610 (2008), the Court held that the company- designated physician is given a leeway of an
additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further
treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. Thus, it
is only upon the lapse of 240 days, or when so declared by the company- designated
physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

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303. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp vs. Bureau of Customs, 759 SCRA 306,
June 17, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In view of respondent’s availment of a wrong
mode of appeal via notice of appeal stating that it was elevating the case to the CA —
instead of appealing by way of a petition for review to the CTA within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy of the RTC’s August 3, 2012 Order, as required by Section 11 of RA 1125,
as amended by Section 9 of RA 9282 — the Court is constrained to deem the RTC’s
dismissal of respondent’s collection case against petitioner final and executory. It is settled
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an appeal within the period
fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative
body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
3. Taxation; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC. In the instant case, the
CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action on the
same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA
under the guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and
thus, stands to be corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8 (2013), the Court held that the
invocation of substantial justice is not a magic wand that would readily dispel the application
of procedural rules.

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304. Province of Leyte vs. Energy Development Corporation, 760 SCRA 149, June
22, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Proofs of Service ;
1. Same; Same; Proof of Service; Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed
before the CA should include proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the purpose of
this rule is to apprise such party of the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party
had already been notified of the same and had even participated in the proceedings, such
purpose would have already been served. Considering that in this case, the CA had already
issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009 directing EDC to file a comment which the latter
had complied with, it cannot be denied that EDC was already aware of the certiorari
proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over its person. The CA,
therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural mishap and
resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Certiorari; In petitions for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution
indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.-
—Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s
initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the
respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction. In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its
Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s
certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the petition, among others.
In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment dated December 14, 2009
to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the
instant case.

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305. People vs. Inciong, 760 SCRA 249, June
22, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ;
Witnesses ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; On this score, this Court has stated that, in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts
and circumstances which would alter a conviction, it generally defers to the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such findings are affirmed by the CA.
This must be so since the trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their
deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.
2. Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression; No self-
defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will
have to prevent or repel.-
—In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. An accused who
invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important
of which is unlawful aggression. Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense,
unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete. No self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since
there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.
3. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.-
—Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
this case, a credible eyewitness account established that accused-appellant, upon meeting
Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak against the latter, leaving him unable to
defend himself or evade the attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant
would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own person, hence, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an unlicensed firearm, a
circumstance alleged in the information, the Court shall no longer delve upon its significance
in this case, the same not having been appreciated by the courts a quo.

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306. Wacoy vs. People, 760 SCRA 259, June 22,
2015 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Homicide ;
Intent to Kill ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be
imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and
Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence of this
circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process and is an
internal state of mind, the accused’s intention must be judged by his conduct and external
overt acts. In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and
Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on
the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely
maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray; Elements of.-
—The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be
several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was
killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a
quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous
affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot
be ascertained.
4. Same; Homicide; Elements of.-
—The crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads:
Art. 249. Homicide.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements of Homicide are the following:
(a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.
5. Same; Same; Intent to Kill; Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide
because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.-
—Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is
different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error
in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is well-settled
that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide
because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.

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307. Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI FS Bank, Inc., 760 SCRA 486, June
29, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Obligations ; Suretyship ;
1. Same; Same; Suretyship; As established through the CSA, Go had clearly bound himself
as a surety to Go Tong Electrical’s loan obligation. Thus, there is no question that Go’s liability
thereto is solidary with the former. As provided in Article 2047 of the Civil Code, “the surety
undertakes to be bound solidarily with the principal obligor. That undertaking makes a surety
agreement an ancillary contract as it presupposes the existence of a principal contract.
Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation,
the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another although it possesses no direct or
personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit therefrom. Let it be
stressed that notwithstanding the fact that the surety contract is secondary to the principal
obligation, the surety assumes liability as a regular party to the undertaking,” as Go in this
case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; General Denial; A general denial does not become
specific by the use of the word “specifically.”-
—A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of
the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above quoted rule. The mere
statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent
allegations of the Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law.
Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated
otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.”
Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad
conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are intended “to suit
plaintiff’s purposes.”
3. Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further
requires that the defendant “sets forth what he claims to be the facts,” which requirement,
likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case. Thus, with said pleading failing to
comply with the “specific denial under oath” requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules,
the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the
due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan obligation to
respondent. To this, case law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority;
that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required
by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by
him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution
of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on
its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were
forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.”
4. Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; Of particular note is the affirmative defense of
payment raised during the proceedings a quo. While petitioners insisted that they had paid,
albeit partially, their loan obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was never
established by petitioners in this case. Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e.,
petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove
nonpayment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof of
nonpayment is not needed for it is presumed. Here, respondent’s possession of the Credit
Agreement, PN, and CSA, especially with their genuineness and due execution already
having been admitted, cements its claim that the obligation of petitioners has not been
extinguished. Instructive too is the Court’s disquisition in Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 495 (1998), on the evidentiary burdens attendant in a civil proceeding

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308. Noble III vs. Ailes, 761 SCRA 1, July 01,
2015 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Same; Same; Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as
in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded
the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is
glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.
2. Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high
standards of legal proficiency and morality.-
—The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public’s faith in the profession.
Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner
beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.
3. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use
of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial
forum. In Buatis, Jr. v. People, 485 SCRA 275 (2006), the Court treated a lawyer’s use of the
words “lousy,” “inutile,” “carabao English,” “stupidity,” and “satan” in a letter addressed to
another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity.
Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered
conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.
4. Same; Same; It must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions such that a lawyer’s words and actions directly affect the public’s opinion of
the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and
uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may
be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.
Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando’s
brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in
his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as
candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his
client.

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309. Alangdeo vs. Do Mogan, 761 SCRA 272, July 01,
2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ;
Injunction ;
1. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; It is well-settled that for an
injunction to issue, two (2) requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be
protected; and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of
said right.-
—In fine, DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners’ structures, has
no legal moorings and perforce was invalidly issued. Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin its
implementation is in order. It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue, two requisites must
concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against which the
injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Here, the two (2) requisites are present:
there is a right to be protected — that is, petitioners’ right over their structures which should
be preserved unless their removal is warranted by law; and the act, i.e., the summary
demolition of the structures under DO No. 05, against which the injunction is directed, would
violate said right.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides for
three (3) ways by which an appeal from the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) decision may be
undertaken, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case.-
—On the preliminary procedural issue, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides for
three (3) ways by which an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken, depending
on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an ordinary appeal to
the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a petition
for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of
law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal,
governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules is filed with
the Court only on questions of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.-
—There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact”
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put,
when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
4. Squatters; Summary Eviction; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; Section
2 of the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter families whose structures
were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, otherwise known as the “Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992,” and squatter families identified by the local government unit (LGU) as
professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates shall be subject of summary
eviction: SECTION 2. Coverage.—The following shall be subject for summary eviction: 1.0
New squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279; and 2.0
Squatter families identified by the LGU in cooperation with the Presidential Commission of
the Urban Poor (PCUP), Philippine National Police (PNP) and accredited Urban Poor
[O]rganization (UPO) as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates as
defined in the Act. Under the Summary Eviction IRR, the term “summary eviction” has been
defined as “the immediate dismantling of new illegal structures by the local government units
or government agency authorized to [demolish] in coordination with the affected urban poor
organizations without providing the structure owner(s) any benefits of the Urban
Development and Housing Program.”
5. Demolition; Building Permits; National Building Code of the Philippines; Under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1096, otherwise known as the “National Building Code of the
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Philippines” (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a building permit,
as well as noncompliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary
demolition, but subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212, Chapter II of
the NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 213 of the same law.-
—While respondents make much ado of petitioners’ lack of building permits, it should be
underscored that under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the “National
Building Code of the Philippines” (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without
a building permit, as well as

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noncompliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary
demolition, but subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212, Chapter II of
the NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 213 of the same law. Indeed, while Section 301,
Chapter III of the NBCP states that “[n]o person, firm or corporation, including any agency or
instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or
demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining a
building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject
building is located or the building work is to be done,” the remedy of summary abatement
against the bare absence of a building permit was not provided for.
6. Same; Building Official; National Building Code of the Philippines; It is the Building
Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority to order the demolition of the
structures under the National Building Code of the Philippines (NBCP).-
—To this, it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the
authority to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP. As held in Gancayco v.
City Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853 (2011): [T]he Building Code clearly
provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the
demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official.

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310. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Flores, Jr., 761 SCRA 323, July
01, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Permanent Total Disability
;
1. Same; Same; Same; Records reveal that after respondent was repatriated on April 18,
2009, he underwent continuous medical care from the company-designated physician. He
was even given an interim disability rating of Grade 7 (moderate residual or disorder) on July
17, 2009, and thereafter, went through further tests and procedures. However, after October
12, 2009, respondent’s treatment stopped without him recovering from his ailment. Notably,
the company-designated physician neither issued to respondent a fit-to-work certification nor
a final disability rating on or before December 14, 2009, the 240th day since respondent’s
repatriation. Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of the 240-day period, the seafarer is
still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company- designated physician
had not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the
conclusive presumption that the seafarer is totally and permanently disabled arises.
Perforce, it is but proper to hold that respondent was permanently and totally disabled, and
hence, entitled to the corresponding benefits stated under the CBA.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; At the outset, the Court notes that
petitioners correctly ascribed error on the part of the CA in holding that respondent’s inability
to obtain gainful employment for more than 120 days after his repatriation, and that the
failure of the company- designated physician to declare him fit to work or to give him a final
disability rating within the same period ipso facto rendered respondent’s disability to be
permanent and total. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610
(2008), the Court held that the company-designated physician is given a leeway of an
additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further
treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. Thus,
it is only upon the lapse of 240 days from repatriation, or when so declared by the company-
designated physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

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311. People vs. Balcueva, 761 SCRA 489, July 01, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ; Qualified Rape ; Death Penalty ; Damages ;
1. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Death Penalty; Damages; In view of prevailing
jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however,
cannot be imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No.
9346, the Court hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.-
—In view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death
which, however, cannot be imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of RA No.
9346, the Court hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00
as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. In addition, the Court imposes interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
2. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Elements of.-
—The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the
victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse
of authority.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Child Witnesses; A young girl would not concoct a
sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the
examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a
public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.-
—As correctly ruled, AAA’s clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she
was indeed raped by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva’s flimsy
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and
identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl would not concoct a
sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the
examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a
public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no
plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave
crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.

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312. Tom vs. Rodriguez, 761 SCRA 679, July 06,
2015 Syllabi Class :Corporation Law ; Board of
Directors ;
1. Corporation Law; Board of Directors; The Court finds that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Tom’s prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The issuance of an injunctive writ
is warranted to enjoin the RTC-Nabunturan from implementing its November 13, 2013 and
December 11, 2013 Orders in the specific performance case placing the management and
control of GDITI to Rodriguez, among other directives. This pronouncement follows the well-
entrenched rule that a corporation exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or
its duly authorized officers and agents, except in instances where the Corporation Code
requires stockholders’ approval for certain specific acts. As statutorily provided for in Section
23 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68, otherwise known as “The Corporation Code of the
Philippines”: SEC. 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all
business conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of
directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no
stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year
until their successors are elected and qualified. Every director must own at least one (1)
share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director, which share shall stand
in his name on the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner of at
least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director shall
thereby cease to be a director. Trustees of non-stock corporations must be members
thereof. A majority of the directors or trustees of all corporations organized under this Code
must be residents of the Philippines.
2. Grave Abuse of Discretion; As traditionally described, grave abuse of discretion refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In Yu v.
Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341 (2011), the Court explained that: The term “grave abuse of
discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.”
3. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Case law holds that the issuance
of an injunctive writ rests upon the sound discretion of the court that took cognizance
of the case; as such, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must
not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.-
—As the existence of grave abuse of discretion in this case relates to the propriety of issuing
a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which, by nature, are injunctive reliefs and
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests, it is important to
lay down the issuance’s requisites, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. Case law holds that the
issuance of an injunctive writ rests upon the sound discretion of the court that took
cognizance of the case; as such, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive
matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.

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313. Re: Report of Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief of Office, Office of Administrative
Services- Office of the Court Administra (OAS-OCA), 762 SCRA 26, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Penalties ; Mitigating Circumstances ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; Under Section 46(D)(1), Rule 10 of
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 1101502 dated November 8, 2011,
otherwise known as the “Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service”
(RRACCS), simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. This notwithstanding, the
disciplining authority, the Court in this case, is granted the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These factors range, among others, from
the erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance
rating.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Human Resource Management Officers;
Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; Under Item XIV(14)(a) of Revised A.C. No.
50-2001, “[f]or appointment by promotion, the performance rating of the appointee for the last
rating period prior to the effectivity date of the appointment should be at least very
satisfactory” — a requirement which Andres is aware of. Nonetheless, he failed to
meticulously check Puerto’s qualifications and indicate in the list of lacking requirements, the
absence of Puerto’s PR form. While applications “with incomplete form or lacking
requirement/s shall still be included in the list to be submitted to the SPB-LC with a notation
as to the lacking form or requirement/s,” subject to subsequent accomplishment/submission
as the SPB-LC may require, Andres likewise erroneously reported Puerto’s performance
rating as “Very Satisfactory” instead of “Satisfactory,” which eventually led to the latter’s
promotion from Clerk III to Sheriff IV, albeit disqualified. From the foregoing circumstances,
Andres was clearly remiss and negligent in performing his assigned tasks as a processor-in-
charge, and is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure of an employee to give
proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or
indifference.”
3. Same; Same; Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise known as the
“Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that “[c]ourt personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence. x x x.” The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the “[j]udicial machinery can only function if every employee performs his
task with the highest degree of professionalism. Court personnel are obligated to perform
their duties properly and with diligence. Any task given to an employee of the judiciary,
however menial it may be, must be done in the most prompt and diligent way.” Andres’
attribution of the mistake to human error and his alleged heavy workload at the time cannot
be given credence because a heavy workload is not a compelling reason to justify failure to
perform one’s duties properly. Otherwise, every government employee charged with
negligence and dereliction of duty would always proffer a similar excuse to escape
punishment, to the prejudice of the government service. Truth be told, it is incumbent upon
every government employee to adapt all reasonable means to cope with the heavy workload,
for the occupation demands no less than full and uncomplaining dedication to the public
service.

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314. Westmont Bank vs. Funai Philippines Corp, 762 SCRA 82,July
08, 2015 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Sheriffs ;
Injunction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Injunction; The Court does not find credence in Sheriff Cachero’s
insistence that while he may have “gotten wind” of the TRO through a cellular phone call, he
was not bound thereby unless an official copy of the TRO was duly served upon him. Settled
is the rule that where a party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction
clearly informing him from what he must abstain, he is “legally bound from that time to desist
from what he is restrained and inhibited from doing, and will be punished for a violation
thereof, even though it may not have served, or may have been served on him defectively.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Failure to State a Cause of
Action; Lack of Cause of Action; “Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of
action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the
factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at
the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented by the plaintiff.”
3. Same; Same; Cause of Action; A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently
avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action.-
—“A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the
part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these
elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action.”
4. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; It bears to stress that “while the facts alleged in the
complaint are hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that
the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
complaint, as well as inferences fairly deductible therefrom.” Verily, the filing of the motion to
dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint “does not admit the truth of mere epithets of
fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere
inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations
of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the
opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a
record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; nor to general averments
contradicted by more specific averments.”
5. Attorney’s Fees; The courts possess the power to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees
whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable.-
—Anent the award of attorney’s fees, it is relevant to note that the stipulations on attorney’s
fees contained in the PNs constitute what is known as a penal clause. The award of
attorney’s fees by the CA, therefore, is not in the nature of an indemnity but rather a penalty in
the form of liquidated damages in accordance with the contract between Westmont and the
original defendants. “Such a stipulation has been upheld by [the] Court as binding between
the parties so long as it does not contravene the law, morals, public order or public policy.”
Nevertheless, the courts possess the power to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable. Thus, in
Trade & Investment Dev’t. Corp. of the Phils. v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corp., 474
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SCRA 510 (2005), the Court equitably reduced the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid
since interests (and penalties) had ballooned to thrice as much as the principal debt. In the
present case, interest alone runs to more than thrice the principal amount of the loan
obligation. In real terms, therefore, attorney’s fees at the stipulated rate of 20% of the total
amount due of over P42,000,000.00, or about P8,400,000.00, is manifestly exorbitant.
Hence, the Court concurs with the

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CA that the amount of attorney’s fees should be equitably reduced to five percent (5%) of the
principal debt, which the Court finds reasonable under the premises.
6. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; In serving the court’s writs and
processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without
affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.-
—It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is
duty- bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant
in the exercise of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of
execution promptly, they are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and
attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as
officers of the court upon whom the execution of a judgment depends, must be circumspect
and proper in their behavior. Anything less is unacceptable because in serving the court’s
writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err
without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.

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315. Dy vs. Yu, 762 SCRA 357, July 08,
2015 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; It bears to stress that power of the court to award attorney’s fees
demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In fact, such
failure or oversight of the trial court cannot even be supplanted by the CA.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata literally
means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.”-
—Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.” Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court state the doctrine of res judicata.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a
subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or
order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.-
—Res judicata comprehends two concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. “For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there
is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as res
judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The res judicata doctrine applies only when a judgment
on the merits is finally rendered on the first complaint; A judgment on the merits
presupposes that trial has been conducted, evidence presented, and issues sufficiently
heard and passed upon.-
—Material to this discourse is the doctrine’s second element, which evokes that the res
judicata doctrine applies only when a judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first
complaint. The term “merits” has been defined as a matter of substance in law, as
distinguished from matter of form; it refers to the real or substantial grounds of action or
defense as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter raised in the course of the
suit. Thus, a judgment on the merits presupposes that trial has been conducted, evidence
presented, and issues sufficiently heard and passed upon. It is a judgment rendered after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal technical point. Stated differently, a judgment is “on the merits” when it
amounts to a legal declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon
the disclosed facts and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.
5. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is the act of a
litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously
or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. To determine whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the element of
litis pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
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in another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two
(or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party’s
commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already exists (either pending or
already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.

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6. Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; As opposed to res judicata which was already hereinabove
explained, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
7. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; With the elements of litis pendentia attendant hereto as
caused by Rosario’s institution of the Annulment Case while the Reconveyance Case was
pending, the conclusion is that forum shopping was committed. Under the last sentence of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.”
8. Civil Law; Reconveyance; Words and Phrases; It is well to point out that an action for
reconveyance
— as in Roberto’s Recovery Case — is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
land owner whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to
compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. By fraudulently
including in his application for the registration of title over Lot 1519 the disputed portion, i.e.,
Lot 1519-A, in his name, Roberto holds the title to said portion in trust for the benefit of
Rosario as the true owner. Indeed, registration does not vest title but merely confirms or
records title already existing and vested. Thus, not being the owner of the subject portion,
Roberto could not have transferred ownership thereof to his children, petitioners Jose and
Alteza.
9. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.-
—With all these considerations in mind, the Court has come to the conclusion that it cannot
precipitately order the summary dismissal of the Annulment Case and set aside the
judgments therein rendered in view of a mere forum shopping infraction as aforediscussed.
To act otherwise would be tantamount to a blatant disregard of substantial justice in the
name of unwarranted technical adherence. Case law dictates that technicalities should never
be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities. As aptly pointed out in Barcelona
v. CA, 412 SCRA 41 (2003), the rule on forum shopping should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all
rules of procedure
— which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. After all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. Accordingly, the partial
nullification of the June 28, 1994 Deed of Donation between spouses-petitioners Roberto
and Chloe and petitioners Jose and Alteza insofar as it concerns Lot 1519-A owned by
Rosario and, now respondents, as her heirs, is in order.

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316. Ang vs. Pacunio, 762 SCRA 411, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Real Parties-in-Interest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic is the rule that no relief can be extended in a judgment to
a stranger or one who is not a party to a case.-
—Having established that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to the instant suit,
the proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of their
complaint. It therefore erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case
and granting one of the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the declaration of the
nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute Sale. In the same vein, the CA erred in awarding
portions of the subject land to various nonparties to the case, such as the Heirs of Gaccion
and Udiaan’s children. Basic is the rule that no relief can be extended in a judgment to a
stranger or one who is not a party to a case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Parties-in-Interest; The rule on real
parties-in- interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an action, the
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party-in-interest.-
—The rule on real parties-in-interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an
action, the plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case,
as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material
interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
of action. In Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, 481 SCRA 348 (2006), the Court expounded on the
purpose of this rule, to wit: Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require
that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid
multiplicity of suits; and 4) discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to
public policy.

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317. Dacles vs. Millenium Erectors Corporation, 762 SCRA 420, July 08,
2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Project Employees ;
1. Same; Same; The repeated and successive rehiring of project employees does not, by
and of itself, qualify them as regular employees.-
—At any rate, the repeated and successive rehiring of project employees does not, by and of
itself, qualify them as regular employees. Case law states that length of service (through
rehiring) is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure, but whether the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, with its completion having
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. While generally, length of
service provides a fair yardstick for determining when an employee initially hired on a
temporary basis becomes a permanent one, entitled to the security and benefits of
regularization, this standard will not be fair, if applied to the construction industry because
construction firms cannot guarantee work and funding for its payrolls beyond the life of each
project as they have no control over the decisions and resources of project proponents or
owners. Thus, once the project is completed it would be unjust to require the employer to
maintain these employees in their payroll since this would be tantamount to making the
employee a privileged retainer who collects payment from his employer for work not done,
and amounts to labor coddling at the expense of management.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.-
—It must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered
“grave,” discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor
disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence, “or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.”
3. Labor Law; Project Employees; For an employee to be considered project-based,
the employer must show that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time
the employee was engaged for such project.-
—For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the
employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration
and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project.
Being assigned to a project or a phase thereof which begins and ends at determined or
determinable times, the services of project employees may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of such project or phase. Consequently, in order to safeguard the rights of
workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent them from attaining regular
status, employers claiming that their workers are project employees should prove that: (a)
the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged;
and
(b) there was indeed a project.

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318. Vicente vs. Acil Corporation, 763 SCRA 1, July 15, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Forum Shopping ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Forum Shopping; Indeed, Vicente’s
protraction of this case should not be countenanced. It is fundamental that every litigation
must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected,
once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he
should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will
result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice. After all, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law,” as Acil in this case.

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319. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. Panogalinog, 763 SCRA 140, July
15, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan should prevail over that
of Dr. Jacinto considering that the former examined, diagnosed, and treated respondent from
his repatriation on May 9, 2010 until he was assessed fit to work on September 15, 2010;
whereas, it appears that the independent physician, Dr. Jacinto, only examined respondent
on October 13, 2010 which was the same day the latter filed his claim for permanent total
disability benefits. While the medical certificate indicates that respondent was under Dr.
Jacinto’s service beginning “September 2010,” no supporting document on record shows this
to be true. In fact, the NLRC even observed that the medical certificate of Dr. Jacinto was
issued after a one-time examination and worse, without any medical support. Case law
dictates that, under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated
physician should be given more credence for having been arrived at after months of medical
attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one
day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
3. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; A seafarer shall be entitled to the payment of
the full amount of disability compensation only if his injury, regardless of the degree of
disability, results in loss of profession, i.e., his physical condition prevents a return to sea
service. Based on the submissions of the parties, this contractual attribution refers to
permanent total disability compensation as known in labor law. Thus, the Court examines the
presence of such disability in this case. Preliminarily, the task of assessing the seaman’s
disability or fitness to work is entrusted to the company-designated physician.
4. Same; Same; Same; Under the Labor Code, there are three kinds of disability, namely: (1)
temporary total disability; (2) permanent total disability; and (3) permanent partial disability.
Section 2, Rule VII of the AREC differentiates the disabilities as follows: SEC. 2. Disability.—
(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days,
except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent
if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in
Rule X of these Rules.
5. Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Recent jurisprudence now holds that
the said 120- day rule is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and
permanent disability benefits in his favor. As clarified by the Court in the later case of
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008): [T]he petitioner has
repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, apparently for its
statement that the respondent in the case “was unable to perform his customary work for
more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.” This declaration of a
permanent total disability after the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot,
however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts. The
specific context of the application should be considered, as we must do in the application of
all rulings and even of the law and of the implementing regulations. Elucidating on this point,
Vergara discussed the seeming conflict between Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC
and Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code on permanent total disability in relation to Section
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2(a), Rule X of the AREC that provided for a 240-day period in case of further medical
treatment, thus: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign- off from his vessel,
must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120
days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He
receives his basic wage

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during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged
by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under
the POEA- Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120
days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer
requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended
up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period
that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods he is
allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period
without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
6. Same; Same; Same; Note that while respondent has the right to seek the opinion of other
doctors under Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC and the CBA, it bears stressing that the
employer is liable for a seafarer’s disability, arising from a work-related injury or illness, only
after the degree of disability has been established by the company-designated physician
and, if the seafarer consulted with a physician of his choice whose assessment disagrees
with that of the company-designated physician, the disagreement must be referred to a third
doctor for a final assessment. No such mandated third doctor was, however, consulted to
settle the conflicting findings of the company-designated physicians (Dr. Lim and Dr.
Chuasuan) and the respondent’s own doctor (Dr. Jacinto).

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320. Marilag vs. Martinez, 763 SCRA 533, July 22,
2015 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; Inasmuch as the court a quo failed to state in the body of its decision the
factual or legal basis for the award of attorney’s fees to the respondent, as required under Article
2208 of the New Civil Code, the Court resolves to delete the same. The rule is well-settled that the
trial court must clearly state the reasons for awarding attorney’s fees in the body of its decision, not
merely in its dispositive portion, as the appellate courts are precluded from supplementing the bases
for such award.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements of. A case is barred
by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
3. Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; To lay down the basics, litis
pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more
than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is
founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in
courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and
make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be sure,
splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res
judicata, as the case may be).
4. Loans; In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt,
through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive,
and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real
estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the
recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor
after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a
deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at
public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
5. Same; While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by
respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct
contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably,
records are bereft of any indication that respondent’s agreement to pay Rafael’s loan obligation and
the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan between Rafael and
petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule
that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a
new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are
abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown here.
6. Foreclosure of Mortgage; As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings
over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for
collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In
fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent’s claim for
return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the
dismissal of petitioner’s collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and
evidentiary support.
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 ****

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321. Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP vs. Visayan Electric
Company, Inc. (VECO), 763 SCRA 566, July 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ;
1. Same; As a final word, while it is the state’s responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy
should not be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes
between labor and capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. Social justice does not mandate
that every dispute should be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be granted to the
deserving and dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution” sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a
jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.
3. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one
day is not a legal justification for noncompliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe
to the theory that the ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari
filed only one-day late. When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one
(61) days, as the Court had previously declared in this wise: [W]hen the law fixes thirty days [or sixty
days as in the present case], we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be
stretched to thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two
days in another case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the
growing confusion resulting from the alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the
solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law is founded on reason, whim and fancy should
play no part in its application.
4. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; True, it is a fundamental doctrine in labor
law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If
the provisions of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall
control. However, as in this case, when general and specific provisions of the CBA are inconsistent,
the specific provision shall be paramount to and govern the general provision. Section 4, Article XVII
of the CBA states that “(a)ny difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or complaint arising
from Company-Union or Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation or application of this
Agreement or regarding any matter affecting Company-Union or Company-Worker relations shall be
considered a grievance.” On the other hand, under Section 13, Article XIV, “(t)he Company agrees
that henceforth there shall be a fair and uniform application of its rules and regulations. It is
understood that disciplinary actions imposed on employee or laborer shall be governed by the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Company as well as those provided for by existing laws on the
matter.”
5. Same; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence; The Court has
consistently held that “x x x loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly,
and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on the
employer’s whims or caprices or suspicions[,] otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the
mercy of the employer. x x x. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained
of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the
employer. In addition, loss of confidence x x x is premised on the fact that the employee concerned
holds a position of responsibility, trust, and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted
with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as handling or care and protection of the
property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which
an employee is penalized.”
6. Same; Same; With the derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to incite,
not just public condemnation of VECO, but antagonism and obstruction against rate increases in
electricity that it may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no dispute that VECO, indeed, had lost
its trust and confidence in Mahilum and his ability to perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and
loyalty expected of an employee entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the rule that an
employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the
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employer. A company has the right to dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self-protection. ****

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322. Comerciante vs. People, 763 SCRA 587, July 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Consti Law; CrimPro; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry
Searches);
1. Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry Searches);
The Court finds respondent’s assertion that there was a valid “stop and frisk” search made on
Comerciante untenable. In People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), the Court had an
opportunity to exhaustively explain “stop and frisk” searches: “Stop and frisk” searches
(sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However,
this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness”
present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern
—based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. x x x x
Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with
a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest
cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same. For warrantless searches, probable cause
was defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.”
2. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants;
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure
becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.-
—Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution
provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; The law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made-
— the process cannot be reversed.—The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and
rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as
follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he
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has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

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4. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; For a
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.-
—For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section
5(b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of
the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5(a), the officer himself
witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.

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323. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, 763 SCRA 632, July
22, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Trusts ; Buyer in Good Faith ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A purchaser in good faith is
one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or
an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in the property.
Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the
seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man
proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look
and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which
an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that
the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
2. Civil Law; Trusts; Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title
to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with
the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be
express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties,
while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.
3. Same; Same; Express Trusts; Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular
words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended.” It is possible to create a trust without using the word “trust” or “trustee.”
Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an
intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an
intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial
whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and
whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.
4. Same; Same; Same; Reconveyance; Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that
the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed, following the
jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is
repudiated. In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the
remaining trustee, sold the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As the
complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on October 17, 1997, or
only a few months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be
said that the same has prescribed.

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324. Central Bicol State Univ. of Agri. vs. Prov of Camarines Sur, 764 SCRA 394,
July 29, 2015 Syllabi:
1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again, the Court has held that although
procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal
system, the Court has, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in
several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.
This is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were given the
chance to argue their causes and defenses. After all, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties, bearing
always in mind the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the
administration of justice.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; As a general rule, a petition for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced
by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a
petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the previous Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reasons and in no case
exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the Court has held that the 60-day
period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. Eventually, in Labao v.
Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), the Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the
strict observance of the 60-day reglementary period: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

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325. Central Azucarera de Bais vs. Siason, 764 SCRA 494, July
29, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ;
Resignation ;
1. Same; Same; Resignation; Verily, Chan’s decision to give Siason a graceful exit rather
than to file an action for redress is perfectly within the discretion of the former; as it is not
uncommon that an employee is permitted to resign to avoid the humiliation and
embarrassment of being terminated for just cause after the exposure of her malfeasance. It
is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the
employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter’s employment
record, as in this case.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Resignation; Resignation is the formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an
employee who is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed
in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no other choice but to disassociate
himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must
be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment. In
illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the
defense of resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned.
3. Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive dismissal exists where there is
cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits.
Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if
it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee
that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. It must
be noted, however, that bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by
the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.

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326. Baron vs. EPE Transport, Inc., 765 SCRA 345, August
05, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Separation Pay; All told, since petitioners’ abandonment was not proven by
respondents in this case, the NLRC correctly ruled that the former were illegally dismissed.
Consequently, the CA committed reversible error when it held otherwise and granted
respondents’ certiorari petition. Thus, following Article 293 of the Labor Code, as amended,
petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However, since reinstatement is no
longer feasible in view of the enmity between the parties, the award of separation pay in lieu
of reinstatement is in order.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.-
—Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and
does not routinely reexamine the evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless,
the divergence in the findings of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of
the CA on the other — as in this case — is a recognized exception for the Court to open and
scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction,
erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that petitioners
were illegally dismissed.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or
quasi-judicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; In a catena of cases, the
Supreme Court (SC) has held that the onus of proving that an employee was not
dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer;
the failure to discharge such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and,
therefore, illegal.-
—In a catena of cases, the Court has held that the onus of proving that an employee was not
dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure
to discharge such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
The doctrine can be traced back to the 1999 case of Barros v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 23 (1999),
where the Court denied the employer’s argument that the seafarer voluntarily terminated his
employment (on the claim that he himself requested repatriation), finding that since the fact
of repatriation was not disputed, “it is incumbent upon [the employer] to prove by the
quantum of evidence required by law that [the seafarer] was not dismissed, or if dismissed,
that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.”
5. Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-
employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for
termination of employment.-
—Abandonment connotes a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to
resume his employment. Notably, “abandonment of work does not per se sever the
employer-employee relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just
cause for termination of employment. The operative act that will ultimately put an end to this
relationship is the dismissal of the employee after complying with the procedure prescribed
by law.” For a valid finding of abandonment, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the
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failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable cause; and (b) clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
6. Same; Same; Same; In this case, no proof was adduced by respondents to prove their
theory of abandonment. Nothing on record would show that petitioners’ absence from work
was deliberate and unjustified, with a clear intent to sever the employment relationship. On
the contrary, such intention is

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belied by the fact that shortly after petitioners ceased from working, they immediately
instituted the complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps to
protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be said to have abandoned his work, for it is well-
settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of
his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. Indeed, it would
be illogical for petitioners to have left their job and thereafter seek redress by filing a
complaint against their employer.
7. Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Voluntary Arbitrators; What was referred
to the grievance machinery was the unfair labor practice case filed by the petitioners before
they were terminated, which contains issues that are different and distinct from their cause of
action for illegal dismissal. It bears to note that Article 223(c) of the Labor Code, as
amended, is explicit that the LA shall refer to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration, as provided in the CBA, those cases that involve the interpretation of said
agreements. Further, Article 272 of the same Code provides that all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, including violations of said
agreement, are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators. As such, petitioners cannot be faulted in invoking the
grievance machinery even after they had been dismissed in compliance with the provisions of
the CBA, to which they were bound.

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327. Apique vs. Fahnenstich, 765 SCRA 399, August 05, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Answer ; Waiver of Defenses ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Answer; Waiver of Defenses; Corollarily, the Court cannot
subscribe to Dominador’s claim for payment of compensation as administrator of the
business affairs of Evangeline based on the principle of quantum meruit, which was not
raised as an affirmative defense or counterclaim in his answer to the complaint. Settled is the
rule that defenses which are not raised in the answer are deemed waived, and counterclaims
not set up in the answer shall be barred.
2. Banks and Banking; Joint Accounts; A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or
more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the
depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil
Code, which provides: Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co- owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
3. Same; Same; The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money
into the account, each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire
balance, and any of them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without
the need or consent of the other, during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account
holders, their right against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the
purpose for which the account was opened and how it will be operated.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Thus, the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in
order to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive
assertions never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one which, if established, will
be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance of the claim. Dominador miserably failed in this
respect.

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328. OKS DesignTech vs. Caccam, 765 SCRA 433, August
05, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ;
Presumptions ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; That respondent was made to believe that her
contract will just be renewed every time it expires was not supported by substantial evidence.
It bears stressing that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where
the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as
more than a mere scintilla. Moreover, Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court carries a
legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law
dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Also, Section 3(p) of the same Rule
equally presumes that private transactions have been fair and regular. It therefore behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs the
same. To add, since the employment contracts were duly acknowledged before a notary
public, it is deemed prima facie evidence of the facts expressed therein and such notarial
documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity that may be contradicted only by
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence, which respondent failed to
show in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is well-
settled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely examine
the evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the
findings of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA, on the other, is
a recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize the records to determine whether
the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in ruling that respondent was not illegally dismissed.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed judicial or
quasi-judicial act is snared with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
4. Labor Law; Fixed-term Employment; Under the foregoing provision, regular
employment exists when the employee is: (a) one engaged to perform activities that are
necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer; or (b) a casual
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with
respect to the activity in which he is employed. Meanwhile, an employee is said to be under a
fixed-term employment when he is hired under a contract which specifies that the
employment will last only for a definite period.
5. Same; Same; Fixed-term employment could not be construed as a circumvention of the
law on security of tenure.-—In light of the foregoing, the Court laid down the following
indicators under which fixed-term employment could not be construed as a circumvention of
the law on security of tenure: (a) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent; or (b) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the
latter.
6. Same; Same; —An examination of the contracts entered into by respondent reveals that
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her employment was clearly limited to a fixed period and did not go beyond such period.
She, however, asserted that she is deemed a regular employee in view of the nature of her
employment as an accountant, an activity that is necessary and desirable in the usual
business or trade of the company. This notwithstanding, case law dictates that even if an
employee is engaged to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual trade
or business of the employer, the same does not preclude the fixing of employment for a
definite period. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of
employment and the nature of the employee’s duties. In St. Theresa’s School of

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Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 110 (1998), it was explained: Article 280 [now,
Article 294] of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a
fixed period provided the same is entered into by the parties, without any force, duress or
improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstance vitiating consent. It does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the
employee consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of
such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of
employment and the nature of the employee’s duties.

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329. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 766 SCRA 447, August
12, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Compromise Agreements ;
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreements; To be considered valid and binding
between the contracting parties, a compromise agreement must be: (a) not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; (b) freely and intelligently
executed by and between the parties; and
(c) compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts.-
—A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. To be considered
valid and binding between the contracting parties, a compromise agreement must be: (a) not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; (b) freely and
intelligently executed by and between the parties; and
(c) compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts. Once entered into, it has the
effect and the authority of res judicata upon the parties. In other words, a valid compromise
agreement may render a pending case moot and academic. However, the parties may opt to
put therein clauses, conditions, and the like that would prevent a pending case from
becoming moot and academic — such as when the execution of such agreement is without
prejudice to the final disposition of the said case. After all, a compromise agreement is still a
contract by nature, and as such, the parties are free to insert clauses to modify its legal
effects, so long as such modifications are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.

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330. AQA Global Construction, Inc. vs. Planters Devt Bank, 766 SCRA 463, August
12, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Third Party Claims ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-Party Claims; The Court would like to take
exception to the CA’s ruling, limiting the remedies of the adverse third party to vindicate his
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property to a terceria and an
independent separate action once a writ of possession had already been issued, as in this
case. In Gagoomal v. Spouses Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444 (2012), the Court ruled that aside
from such remedies, the adverse third party may take other legal remedies to prosecute his
claim, such as invoking the supervisory power of the RTC to enjoin the
enforcement/implementation of the writ of possession, as what petitioners did in this case.
Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process,
and such authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be
invariably involved in the execution, and ensure that it is enforcing its judgment only against
properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor. However, in such instances, the RTC
does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of
finality, and can treat of the matter only as may be necessary to decide the question of
whether or not the person in possession holds the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
If the claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of
possession thereto, the claim will be denied.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Writ of Possession; Words and Phrases; A writ of
possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of
a real or personal property. It may be issued under any of the following instances: (a) land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the “The Land
Registration Act”; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and
(c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; The general rule is that after
the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale becomes the
absolute owner of the property purchased who is entitled to the possession of the said
property; The exception, however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules,
which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages.-
—The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased who is entitled to
the possession of the said property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial
court to issue the writ of possession in his favor. The exception, however, is provided under
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of
real estate mortgages. Under the said provision of law, the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party
is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
4. Same; Same; Same; Where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is occupied by a
party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to
determine the nature of said adverse possession. For the exception to apply, however, the
property need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by him adversely to the
judgment obligor — such as that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who
possess the property in their own right and not merely the successor or transferee of the
right of possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor.
5. Civil Law; Lease; Tenants; In China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008),
the “tenant” contemplated clearly refers to an “agricultural tenant” who: (a)
possesses the property in his own right; and (b) is protected by Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1038 wherein a tenant-tiller of private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice
and/or corn shall not be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farmholding unless
directed by a final decision or order of the court for causes provided by law, which does not
include sale of the land-
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— and not to a “civil law tenant.”—Clearly, the stay of the implementation of the writ of
possession prayed for by Je-An on the basis of such inchoate right would becloud the
integrity and derogate the indefeasibility of the torrens title issued in favor of Plantersbank as
a confirmed owner, which the Court cannot allow. Corollarily, the enforcement of the writ of
possession cannot also be stayed in favor of AQA which merely derived its possession from
Je-An through an unregistered contract of lease. The Court simply cannot subscribe to
AQA’s claim that its status as a tenant renders its possession adverse

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to that of Plantersbank, in consonance with the ruling in China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557
SCRA 177 (2008). In the said case, the “tenant” contemplated clearly refers to an
“agricultural tenant” who: (a) possesses the property in his own right; and (b) is protected by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1038 wherein a tenant-tiller of private agricultural lands
devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn shall not be removed, ejected, ousted or
excluded from his farmholding unless directed by a final decision or order of the court for
causes provided by law, which does not include sale of the land — and not to a “civil law
tenant.”
6. Same; Land Registration; It bears to emphasize that a civil law lease is a mere personal
right. It partakes of the nature of a real right when it is recorded on the title of the lessor only
in the sense that it is binding even as against third persons without actual notice of the
transaction. Under Section 51 of PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Decree, “no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land” until its
registration. In the present case, AQA’s unregistered lease with Je-An is, thus, not binding
on Plantersbank. Consequently, Je-An and AQA cannot be considered third parties holding
the subject properties adversely to KTC, the defaulting debtor-mortgagor. Resultantly, the
general rule, and not the exception, applies to the instant petitions, rendering it the
mandatory and ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of
Plantersbank as the confirmed owner, and of the Sheriff to implement the said writ. As this
Court ruled in St. Dominic Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 577 (1987).

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331. Republic vs. Legal Heirs of Jose L. Africa, 767 SCRA 640, August
19, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Compromise Agreements ;

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332. Bautista vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., 767 SCRA 657, August
19, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Occupational Diseases ;

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333. Marigomen vs. Labar, 768 SCRA 15, August 24, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service ; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations ; Gambling Prohibited by Law ;

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334. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co, Inc. vs. CIR, 768 SCRA 269, August
26, 2015 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;

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335. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp (PDIC) vs. Casimiro, 769 SCRA 110, September
02, 2015 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Probable Cause ;
1. Criminal Law; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements
of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute
certainty.-
—In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez’s statements, as written in her affidavit are
indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that
she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — a high-ranking officer
that may be privy to delicate transactions such as the purported “under-the-table” deal
involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the
elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only
facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not
absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate,
the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary
stage.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Ombudsman; Principle of Non-Interference;
Probable Cause;The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained from interfering with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; Preliminary investigation is merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it.-
—Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or
not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
4. Criminal Law; Direct Bribery; Elements of.-
—As already stated, Apelo was accused of committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has
the following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting
a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (d) that the
crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
5. Same; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.-
—Cu and Zate were accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials, the
elements of which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives
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gifts or presents to a public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or
presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer
liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
6. Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Manifest Partiality; Elements of.-
—All private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The
essential elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging

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administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
7. Remedial Law; Evidence; Preliminary Investigations; Owing to the initiatory nature of
preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course
of its proceedings.-
—It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez’s affidavit as
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the
initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748
SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.

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336. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Bichara, 769 SCRA 139, September
02, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Demotion ;
1. Labor Law; Demotion; Since Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he
should be entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time
of retrenchment in July 1998 up until his compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b)
retirement benefits of a flight purser in accordance with the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) at the time of Bichara’s retirement; and (c) attorney’s fees,
moral, and exemplary damages, if any.-
—It deserves mentioning that since Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he
should be entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of
retrenchment in July 1998 up until his compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b) retirement
benefits of a flight purser in accordance with the existing CBA at the time of Bichara’s
retirement; and (c) attorney’s fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, but only if this
Court, in the Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn. of the Phils. v. PAL, Patria T. Chiong,
and CA, 559 SCRA 252 (2008), case, finally rules that the subject retrenchment is invalid.
Otherwise, he should only be entitled to the above stated salary differential, as well as the
corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Article 297 (formerly
Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The awards of backwages,
and retirement benefits, including attorney’s fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any,
cannot, however, be executed in these proceedings since they are incidents which pertain to
the illegal retrenchment case, hence, executable only when the FASAP case is finally
concluded.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Dispositive Portion; A judgment should
be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-
established rule.-
—A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a
long and well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with
and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity.
3. Same; Same; Same; Immutability of Final Judgments; A companion to this rule is the
principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer
be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of
what court renders it.-
—A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states
that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration,
amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt to insert,
change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments. But like any other rule, this principle has exceptions, namely: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
4. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts when after judgment has been rendered and
the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution
impossible or unjust.-
—It should be pointed out that the principle of immutability of judgments, from which the
above stated rule on writ of executions proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize
circumstances that transpire after the finality of the decision which would render its execution
unjust and inequitable and act accordingly. Thus, in view of the supervening events above
mentioned, this Court deems the award of salary differential to be the just and equitable
award under the circumstances herein prevailing. Jurisprudence holds that courts may
modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts when after
judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances
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transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, as in this case.

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337. Silang vs. Commission on Audit, 770 SCRA 110, September
08, 2015 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Public Officers ; Local
Government Units ;
1. Same; Same; Same; View that the only set of employees who are not obliged to reimburse the
illegally disbursed funds in the present case are its passive recipients, i.e., the ordinary rank-and-file
employees of the LGU of Tayabas, including the UNGKAT members and officers who had no direct
participation in the negotiations. The reason for this conclusion is that they had been mere passive
recipients of good graces and they had (and still have) every right to rely on the presumptions of
regularity and good faith accorded to public officers responsible for the disbursement and
expenditure of public funds. In particular, as mere passive recipients, they did not actively take part in
the CNA, had no responsibility to undertake in carrying out the requirements for union registration
and accreditation, and could not have known the taints of irregularities that the funds released to them
carried.
2. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; —As a
general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for any illegal expenditure of public
funds are personally liable therefor.
3. Same; Same; Same; —Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V, Book II of the LGC states that
the superior officer directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or improper
use or application or deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally
liable with the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the
sum or property so illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited.
4. Same; Same; Same;—Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing Code provides that the
treasurer of the local government unit shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
in supervising the accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and solidarily
liable with them for the loss of government funds or property under their control.
5. Same; Same; Same; —By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of
disallowed salaries, emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not refund such disallowed
amounts if they received the same in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials and
employees who unwittingly received disallowed benefits or allowances are not liable for their
reimbursement if there is no finding of bad faith. In Lumayna v. COA, 601 SCRA 163 (2009), the
Court declared that notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected personnel who
received the said benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the disallowed benefits.
6. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; View that this
liability of government employees and officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds support in the
Local Government Code (LGC), which imputes personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the
official or employee responsible for it.-
—Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative Code expressly provides that persons
who are directly responsible for the illegal expenditures of public funds shall be liable: General
Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found
to be directly responsible therefor. [Emphasis supplied] This liability of government employees and
officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds support in the Local Government Code, which imputes
personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the official or employee responsible for it, viz.:
Section 351. General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.— Expenditures of funds or use of property
in violation of this Title and other laws shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
responsible therefor.
7. Same; Same; Local Government Units;—Under the local government code, an ordinance is
necessary for the use of local funds. The local chief executive prepares the budget proposal, which is
the basis for the budget to be enacted by the local Sanggunian. As a rule, savings generated from
the annual budget revert back to the general fund. DBM Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local
chief executive and the Sanggunian to use savings from released Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash incentives to rank-and-file employees of the local
government, through a CNA.
8. Same; Same; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; —That these approving officers did not
receive any of these funds is not sufficient justification to absolve them from liability. The receipt or
nonreceipt of illegally disbursed funds is immaterial to the solidary liability of government officials
directly responsible therefor. We had the occasion to rule on this point in the recent case Maritime
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Industry Audit v. COA, 745 SCRA 300 (2015), where the Court En Banc held the approving officers
who acted in bad faith to be solidarily liable for the return of the disallowed funds even if they did not
receive any part of the fund.

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338. Halili vs. Justice for Children International, 770 SCRA 241, September
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ;
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts
without need for any express reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor
contract which is imbued with public interest.-
—Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for any express
reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public
interest. Each contract thus contains not only what was explicitly stipulated therein, but also
the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the matter.

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339. People vs. Dionaldo, 770 SCRA 350, September 09, 2015
Syllabi Class: Crim Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal ; Crim Liability ; Civil
Liabilities ;
1. Criminal Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; Criminal Liability; Civil Liability;
The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability,
as well as his civil liability ex delicto.-
—In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained that the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his
civil liability ex delicto. Consequently, Renato’s death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court’s
July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside.
Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is dismissed.

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340. People vs. Dionaldo, 770 SCRA 350, September 09,
2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ;
Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a
relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.-
—With the RTC’s jurisdiction established over the above mentioned causes of action, Vital’s
claim of P500,000.00 due from WBGI’ s acquisition of his shares of stocks should therefore
be offset against the P923,843.59 in arrearages payable to WBGI by ERJ Enterprises owned
by respondents, as prayed for by him. Hence, no amount can be adjudicated in Vital’s favor,
since it is the respondents who, after due computation, would be left liable to WBGI in the net
amount of P423,843.59. This notwithstanding, WBGI cannot recover this latter amount in this
case since it never interposed a permissive counterclaim therefor in its answer. It is well-
settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. WBGI may, however, opt to file a separate collection suit,
including those related thereto (e.g., moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees), to
recover such sum.

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341. WT Construction, Inc. vs. Province of Cebu, 771 SCRA 13, September 16,
2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Interest Rates; The legal interest rate of six percent (6%) shall be imposed from
the finality of the herein judgment until satisfaction thereof.-
—The Court agrees with the CA that the legal interest rate of 6% shall be imposed from the
finality of the herein judgment until satisfaction thereof. This is in view of the principle that in
the interim, the obligation assumes the nature of a forbearance of credit which, pursuant to
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. as modified by Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013),
is subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is a
settled rule that questions of law may be brought before the Supreme Court (SC) on petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.-
—At the outset, it must be pointed out that a determination of whether or not there was a
perfected oral contract between the Province of Cebu and WTCI is a question of fact which is
beyond the scope of the Court’s power in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to certain
exceptions which do not obtain in this case. It is a settled rule that questions of law may be
brought before this Court on petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the
CA, as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed
final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, the Court
affirms the liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI in the amount of P257,413,911.73 which
corresponds to the value of the additional works.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Forbearance; Words and Phrases; The term “forbearance,”
within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or
creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay the loan or debt then due and payable.-
—There is no question that the present case does not involve an obligation arising from a
loan; what is at issue is whether the liability of the Province of Cebu involves a forbearance
of money, based on WTCI’s claim that it merely advanced the cost of the additional works. In
Sunga-Chan v. CA, 555 SCRA 275 (2008), the Court characterized a transaction involving
forbearance of money as follows: The term “forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has
been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given
period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and
payable.
4. Same; Same; Contracts of Service; Liabilities arising from construction contracts do not
partake of loans or forbearance of money but are in the nature of contracts of service.-
—Verily, the Court has repeatedly recognized that liabilities arising from construction
contracts do not partake of loans or forbearance of money but are in the nature of contracts
of service. In Federal Builders, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., 734 SCRA 379 (2014),
the Court ruled that the liability arising from the nonpayment for the construction works,
specifically the construction of a diaphragm wall, capping beam, and guide walls of the
Trafalgar Plaza in Makati City, do not partake of a loan or forbearance of money but is more
in the nature of a contract of service. The Court, therefore, sustains the CA’s ruling that the
rate of legal interest imposable on the liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI is 6% per
annum, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994) (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.).

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342. CIR vs. Nippon Express (Phils.) Corporation, 771 SCRA 27, September
16, 2015 Syllabi Class :Pleadings and Practice ; Prescription ;
1. Pleadings and Practice; Prescription; Although prescription was not raised as an issue,
it is well- settled that if the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred
by prescription, the Court may motu proprio order its dismissal on said ground.-
—The Court has observed that based on the records, Nippon’s administrative claim for the
first taxable quarter of 2002 which closed on March 31, 2002 was already time-barred for
being filed on April 22, 2004, or beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period pursuant to
Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. Although prescription was not
raised as an issue, it is well-settled that if the pleadings or the evidence on record show that
the claim is barred by prescription, the Court may motu proprio order its dismissal on said
ground.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Withdrawal of Appeals; When the case is
deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s
brief may still be allowed in the discretion of the court.-
—A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of
provisions governing the procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA.
Hence, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall suppletorily
apply: Sec. 3. Applicability of the Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court in the Philippines shall
apply suppletorily to these Rules. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court — an adjunct rule to the
appellate procedure in the CA under Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court which
are equally adopted in the RRCTA — states that when the case is deemed submitted for
resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be
allowed in the discretion of the court.
3. Taxation; In matters of taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes,
errors or omissions of its agents for upon it depends the ability of the government to serve
the people for whose benefit taxes are collected.-
—It deserves mentioning that the CIR is not estopped from assailing the validity of the July
27, 2011 Tax Credit Certificate which was issued by her subordinates in the BIR. In matters
of taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its
agents for upon it depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose
benefit taxes are collected.

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343. Gargallo vs. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 771 SCRA 88, September
16, 2015 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; —Anent petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, while respondents have
not been shown to have acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s
demands, it is settled that where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to
protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total award at the time of actual payment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; —The entitlement of overseas seafarers to
disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but also by law and
contract. The pertinent statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Articles 191 to
193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the Rules implementing Title II,
Book IV of the said Code. On the other hand, the relevant contracts are: (a) the POEA-SEC,
which is a standard set of provisions that is deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s contract
of employment; (b) the CBA, if any; and (c) the employment agreement between the seafarer
and his employer. In this case, petitioner executed his employment contract with
respondents during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-SEC; hence, its provisions are
applicable and should govern their relations, and not the 2000 POEA-SEC as held by the
CA.
3. Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; It is only upon the lapse of two hundred
forty (240) days, or when so declared by the company-designated physician, that a seafarer
may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.-
—In the recent case of Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, 759 SCRA 274 (2015), citing
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara), 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court
reiterated that the company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of
240 days from repatriation, to provide the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a
declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240
days, or when so declared by the company- designated physician, that a seafarer may be
deemed totally and permanently disabled, viz.: As these provisions operate, the seafarer,
upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three
(3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no
case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or
totally, as his condition is defined under the [POEA-SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within
this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of
course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical
condition. x x x x As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or
upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration
of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while
the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-
designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the
petitioner was fit to work.
4. Liability of Corporate Officers; Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice and bad
faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such officer cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities.-
—The Court finds no basis to hold respondent Dohle Seafront President Padiz, solidarily
liable with respondents Dohle Manning and Dohle Seafront for the payment of the monetary
awards granted to petitioner, absent any showing that he had acted beyond the scope of his
authority or with malice. Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice and bad faith, or a
specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such officer cannot be made
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personally liable for corporate liabilities.

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344. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hababag, Sr., 770 SCRA 491, September
16, 2015 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ; Market Value ;
Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; In order to be just, the compensation for the land must be what the farmer-
beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based on what the land can produce.-
—Since they generally live on a hand-to-mouth existence, their source of repaying the just
compensation is but derived out of their income from their cultivation of the land. Hence, in
order to be just, the compensation for the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries can
reasonably afford to pay based on what the land can produce. It would therefore be highly
inequitable that in the 30-year allowable period to pay the annual amortizations for the lands,
farmer-beneficiaries would be required to pay for the same income they expect to earn
therefrom on top of the computed market value of the landholdings. Such could not have
been the intent of the State’s agrarian reform program. In fine, the Court cannot sustain the
RTC’s application of the Income Productivity Approach used as one of its bases in arriving at
its decreed valuation. Not only is the same aversive to the jurisprudential concept of “market
value,” but it also deviates from the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657 and thus,
remains legally baseless and unfounded.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; —In the landmark case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989), the Court defined the term “just compensation” as follows:
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is
not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of
the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full [and] ample.
3. Same; Same; Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 enumerates the factors which
must be taken into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to
be awarded in a particular case.-—The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been
conferred with the original and exclusive power to determine just compensation for parcels of
land acquired by the State pursuant to the agrarian reform program. To guide the RTC in this
function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors which must be taken into
consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a
particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the current value of like
properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom;
(d) the owner’s sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by
government assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. Corollarily,
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR translated
these factors into a basic formula, which courts have often referred to and applied, as the CA
did in this case. It, however, bears stressing that courts are not constrained to adopt the said
formula in every case since the determination of the amount of just compensation essentially
partakes the nature of a judicial function. In this accord, courts may either adopt the DAR
formula or proceed with its own application for as long as the factors listed in Section 17 of
RA 6657 have been duly considered.
4. Same; Same; Market Value; Words and Phrases; —To elucidate, in determining the
amount of just compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied the Income Productivity
Approach which approximated the income for the remaining productive life of the crops
therein, without considering the fortuitous events and plant diseases, and with the
expectation that they would be compensated by developments which could be made by the
property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value of the property,
which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between
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one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. In this accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC
which was “based on the principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a property is
dependent on the potential net benefit that may be derived from its ownership.” Clearly, this
approach, which is largely characterized by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the
idea of valuing the expropriated property at the time of the taking. ****

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345. Bartolome vs. Basilio, 772 SCRA 213, October
14, 2015 Syllabi Class :Notary Public ;
1. Notary Public; —A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness.
Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not
take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions. In line with this mandate, a
notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the
very person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
the truth of what are stated therein. By failing in this regard, the notary public permits a
falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Verily, a notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise,
the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
2. Notary Public; —The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a
notary public must observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the
public in the integrity of the notarial system.
3. Notarized Documents; Notarial Certificates; Words and Phrases; —A notarial
certificate, as defined in Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules, requires a statement of the
facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization, viz.: SEC. 8. Notarial
Certificate.—“Notarial Certificate” refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary’s signature
and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by these Rules.
4. Same; Jurat; Words and Phrases; A jurat is, among others, an attestation that the
person who presented the instrument or document to be notarized is personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by the Notarial Rules: SEC. 6. Jurat.—“Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual
on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation
before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
5. Notarial Rules; —Basilio violated Section 2(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules which
prohibits the notarization of a document if the person involved is not personally known to the
notary public or has not identified himself through competent evidence of identity: SEC. 2.
Prohibitions.—x x x x x x x (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document
— (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
6. Notarized Documents; —Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public’s
official acts, he is charged with recording therein the necessary information regarding the
document or instrument notarized. If the document or instrument does not appear in the
notarial records, doubt as to its nature arises so that the alleged notarized document cannot
be considered a public document. Considering the evidentiary value given to the notarized
documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial register is
tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when, in fact, it was
not, as in this case.
7. Same; Notarial Rules; The requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2(h), Rule VI of
the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged before the notary public.-
—It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint
Affidavit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records,
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the requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2(h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies
only to instruments acknowledged before the notary public. Documents like the Joint
Affidavit which contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded
to the Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be no administrative infraction on this score.
Nevertheless, Basilio’s aforediscussed violations of the Notarial Rules are grave enough to
warrant sanctions from the Court.
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346. G.V. Florida Trans, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr., 772 SCRA 579, October
14, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Common Carriers ; Diligence of a Good Father of the
Family ;
1. Same; Same; Same; —Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a
family “connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person
would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether
negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.”
2. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence;—The law exacts from common
carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e.,
extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of
the Civil Code state: Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
3. Same; Same; Same; —In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.” This disputable presumption may also be
overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
4. Same; Same; Same; —It is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier
under the above said provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose
from the negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to
its passengers. In Pilapil v. CA, 180 SCRA 546 (1989), the Court clarified that where the
injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due (1) to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the negligent or willful acts of the common
carrier’s employees with respect to the foregoing — such as when the injury arises wholly
from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to
prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport
business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil
Code should not apply.
5. Same; Same; Diligence of a Good Father of the Family;—Since Battung’s death was
caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which
states that “a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.” Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a
lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the
existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part.

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347. Mallo vs. Southeast Asian College, Inc., 772 SCRA 657, October 14,
2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Abandonment ;
Reinstatement ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; Jurisprudence provides that in instances where
there was neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the employee, the proper
remedy is to reinstate the employee to his former position but without the award of
backwages.-
—In sum, since Mallo was not dismissed and that he never abandoned his job, it is only
proper for him to report back to work and for respondents to reinstate him to his former
position or a substantially equivalent one in its stead. In this regard, jurisprudence provides
that in instances where there was neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the
employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the employee to his former position but without
the award of backwages.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the scope of the Court’s judicial
review is generally confined to errors of law and does not extend to a reevaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the lower courts and/or quasi-judicial agencies had
based their determination.-
—It bears stressing that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the scope of the Court’s judicial review is generally confined to errors of law and does
not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the lower courts
and/or quasi-judicial agencies had based their determination. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded
not only great respect, but also finality, and are deemed binding upon the Court so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. However, in instances where there is a
divergence in the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there is a need for the
Court to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more
conformable to evidentiary facts, as in this case.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; In termination cases, the
onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal
was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would
mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.-
—In termination cases, the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge
such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal. The
records readily show that as early as April 2011, respondents already assigned Mallo a
teaching load for the First Semester of SY 2011-2012 as a Clinical Instructor for SACI
students to be assigned at NCMH, which the latter accepted. Unfortunately, Mallo failed the
qualifying tests at NCMH twice, thus, virtually disqualifying him from performing his work as
SACI’s Clinical Instructor thereat. Despite these developments, respondents were able to
remedy the situation, albeit belatedly, by assigning Mallo as a Clinical Instructor at UDMC
instead, as shown in the Tentative Faculty Loading dated June 24, 2011. In view of the
foregoing, the Court is inclined to hold that respondents never dismissed Mallo from his job.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; —In this case, records are bereft of
any indication that Mallo’s absence from work was deliberate, unjustified, and with a clear
intent to sever his employment relationship with SACI. While respondents claim to have
assigned Mallo as Clinical Instructor at UDMC after failing the qualifying tests at NCMH,
which assignment the latter initially accepted, but eventually declined, there is no proof that
Mallo was informed of such assignment. It bears stressing that a party alleging a critical fact
must support his allegation with substantial evidence for any decision based on
unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process.
5. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Abandonment; Abandonment of position is a
matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain
equivocal acts.-
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—More importantly, Mallo’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with his prior
acts of actively inquiring about his teaching load, negate any intention on his part to sever
his employment. Indeed, it is simply absurd for Mallo to provide continuous service to SACI
for more than three (3) years in order to attain a regular status, only to leave his job without
any justifiable reason and, thereafter, file a case in an attempt to recover the same. To
reiterate, abandonment of position is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred,
much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts.
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348. Maybank Philippines, Inc. vs. Tarrosa, 772 SCRA 670, October
14, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Mortgages ; Default ;
1. Same; Same; Default; In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that:
(a) the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays
performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially,
unless demand is not necessary-
— i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so provides; when
the period is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the
obligation; and where demand would be useless.—In order that the debtor may be in default,
it is necessary that: (a) the obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor
delays performance; and (c) the creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially,
unless demand is not necessary — i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect;
where the law so provides; when the period is the controlling motive or the principal
inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand would be useless.
Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance; it must
further state expressly that after the period lapses, default will commence. Thus, it is only
when demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the aforementioned circumstances, or when
required, such demand is made and subsequently refused that the mortgagor can be
considered in default and the mortgagee obtains the right to file an action to collect the debt
or foreclose the mortgage.
2. Civil Law; Mortgages; Prescription; An action to enforce a right arising from a
mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation to the
mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights
under the mortgage.-
—An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the
payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and
the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in
payment does not necessarily mean delay in the legal concept. To be in default is different
from mere delay in the grammatical sense, because it involves the beginning of a special
condition or status which has its own peculiar effects or results.

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349. People vs. Parba, 773 SCRA 83, October 19, 2015
Syllabi Class :Damages ; Death Due to a Crime ; Damages When Death Results From the
Commission of a Crime ;
1. Damages; Death Due To A Crime; Damages When Death Results From the Commission of
a Crime.-
—On the matter of damages, when death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs of
the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or
compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages;
and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.
2. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-
—In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must
establish the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b)
the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute
Parricide or Infanticide.
3. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.-
—One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. In People v. Gunda, 715 SCRA 505 (2014), it was explained that when the attack
against an unarmed victim is so sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of what the
assailant was about to do, there is treachery.
4. Same; Alibi; To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime.-
—Anent Parba’s alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a
defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
5. Same; Same; A distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5)
kilometers were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was
present at the locus criminis.-
—A distance of one and a half (1 1/2) to two (2) kilometers was held not too far to traverse by
walking. Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five
(5) kilometers were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused
was present at the locus criminis. Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is
not the “physical impossibility” contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi. Moreover,
considering its doubtful nature, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to support
the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
weight in law. Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime, especially in cases where the testimonies of the
witnesses are categorical, consistent and untainted by ill will.

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350. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA
434, October 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Probable Cause ;
1. Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements
of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute
certainty.-
—In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.
Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare
suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of
the merits of a party’s defense or accusations and the admissibility of testimonies and
evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. In sum,
the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of
violating Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint
against them.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently
refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence
of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless,
the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of
grave abuse of discretion.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to
decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The
conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings-
— whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine
whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the
supposed crime that he committed.—In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of
preliminary investigation proceedings — whether by the Ombudsman or by a public
prosecutor — is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an
accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v.
Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in
finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose
of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require
an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
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determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction.
4. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely
based on opinion and belief, a finding of

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probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.-
—Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or
not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence and absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
5. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of Violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA
3019, the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were likewise charged
with violation of Section 3(g) of the same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the
accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence
Rule; In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court
(SC) declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.-
—It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings contained in the
Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in
the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1
(2015), the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
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351. Santiago vs. Tulfo, 773 SCRA 558, October 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; ExtralegalKillings; Enforced
Disappearances;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC’s first paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty,
and security of the person desiring to avail of it, the same section’s second paragraph
qualifies that the protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more concrete cases that involve
protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read
together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly applicable is the statutory
construction rule that “clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this
case, procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.”
2. Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; In the landmark case of Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court has already explained that the writ of
amparo, under its present procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise
known as “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” was intended to address and, thus, is presently
confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed,
while amparo (which literally means “protection” in Spanish) has been regarded as a special
remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters of protection are
not the same in every jurisdiction.
3. Same; Same; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; In
our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the
remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. “Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,”
while “enforced disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851,
otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity,” “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618
(2012), the Court held that it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner
in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation. Notably, the same requirement of government
participation should also apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ of amparo was,
according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to “hold public
authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high
standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to our people. [In this light] [t]he
sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are
threatened or violated, they will find vindication in our courts of justice.” Stated differently, the
writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the government’s
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incredible power in order to curtail human rights abuses on its end.

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352. Leones Vda. de Miller vs. Miranda, 774 SCRA 205, November
10, 2015 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Respondent’s failure to carefully double-check the draft of the
original SPA submitted to him by his secretary led him to notarize a document which did not
reflect the true intent of his client. His attempt to escape administrative sanctions by pinning
the blame on his secretary cannot be condoned as case law instructs that in these instances,
the lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be held accountable for these kinds of
misdeeds. Worse, respondent himself caused the intercalation of the notarized SPA by
inserting handwritten alterations therein which changed its meaning — thus, violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Absent any
competent proof, respondent’s assertion that he was verbally authorized by Magbuhos in
altering the SPA is self-serving and cannot be given any credence.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notary public is empowered to
perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary
public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The
notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be
presented as evidence without need of proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus,
notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public
exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of
the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be
part of illegal transactions.

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353. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Borja, 774 SCRA 228, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service ;
1. Same; Same; Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has been consistently
held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, although not
necessarily related or connected to the public officer’s function. Thus, while the absence of
bad faith may negate criminal liability for graft and corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA
3019, it does not automatically absolve Borja of administrative liability for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, considering that the only question material to the latter is
whether the public officer’s acts tarnished the image or integrity of the public office. At this
juncture, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that a public office is a public trust. As such,
public officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; It is
well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. Such judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become
final at some definite point in time.
3. Administrative Law; Civil Service; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service; While there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the civil service law and rules, it
has been jurisprudentially held to pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the
public office, even if it not be related or connected to the public officer’s function. Among
others, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions such as: misappropriation
of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,
failure to safe keep public records and property, making false entries in public documents,
and falsification of court orders. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court holds that Borja
acted in a manner prejudicial to the best interest of the service. By causing SPCWD to pay
the backwages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja clearly placed said office in a
financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not belong to it, especially
considering that the amount involved and taken from SPCWD’s funds, i.e., P1,942,031.82, is
by no means negligible. In doing so, the integrity of Borja’s office was put in to question, and
SPCWD was placed in a deleterious financial position.
4. Same; The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 had been dismissed upon the Ombudsman’s manifestation that it lacked basis to
prosecute him is of no moment. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of
the criminal case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance
with the rule that a criminal case is separate from an administrative case and each must be
disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case. Moreover, in criminal
cases, the guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt before
a conviction could be had, while liability in administrative cases is only hinged on the lesser
threshold of substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
5. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Besides, the elements
for the commission of graft and corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, are different
from what constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which is an
administrative offense. The following are the essential elements for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019: (1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and (3) That his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
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354. Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.), 774 SCRA 242, November
10, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Regional Trial Courts ;
Jurisdiction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not create a new class of courts.
Its purpose is operational efficiency. In its own words, it was adopted to serve “the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice[.]” It is, thus, but a procedural and administrative
mechanism aimed (to echo the words of the ponencia) “to promote expediency and efficiency
in the exercise of the [Regional Trial Courts’] jurisdiction[.]” Also in its own words, A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC was adopted only “[t]o implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799 [or the Securities Regulation Code].” Thus, in adopting A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, this
court was fully cognizant of how Section 5.2 limited its authority to designate only “in the
exercise of its authority[.]” Indeed, this court could not have intended to overstep the
constitutional limits of its authority.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Special Commercial
Courts;Jurisdiction; Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test,
the suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship and pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under
the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation,
hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court
as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section
5 of RA 8799.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case’s subject matter is different from incidents
pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law, whereas a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself,
is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. In
Lozada v. Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371 (2014), it was recently held that the matter of whether
the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction
as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue
of said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
was transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being
courts of general jurisdiction.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court designated
certain RTC branches to try and decide said SEC cases without, however, providing for the
transfer of the cases already distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus,
on January 23, 2001, the Court issued SC Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 directing the
transfer of said cases to the designated courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June
17, 2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the commercial SEC courts
and the intellectual property courts in one RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special
Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure and to promote expediency. Accordingly,
the RTC branch so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as well as those
involving violations of intellectual property rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed
in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Courts.
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; According to jurisprudence, “it is not the caption but
the allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading
and on the basis of which such pleading may be legally characterized.” However, so as to
avert any future confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state
the action’s nature both in its caption and the body, which parameters are defined in the
dispositive portion of this Decision.
6. Raffle of Cases; Regional Trial Courts; Special Commercial Courts; The erroneous
raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of
procedure-
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— that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate
the jurisdiction which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to
be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign
said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.—
The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a
Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is, an

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incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction
which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper
course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial
case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256. Note that the procedure would be
different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple special commercial
court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the same as a
commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.
7. Same; Same; Same; If the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a
Special Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a
designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the
RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and
then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court,
assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those special branches.
8. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The designation of Special Commercial Courts was
merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line
with the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.-
—The Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the inverse situation of
ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should
then be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter,
the Executive Judge should then order the raffling of the case to all branches of the same
RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal rules, and the payment of the correct
docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a commercial
case only to branches designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated
above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due
to the fact that a particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court
does not shed the RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur
of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129. To restate, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of
commercial cases in line with the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not
made by statute but only by an internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate
rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the
administration of all courts and the personnel thereof. Certainly, an internal rule promulgated
by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason,
the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to the
court’s exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from the concept of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is
therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.
9. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdictions; View that the
ponencia proceeds from the wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over transferred
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cases on all the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs)
and that the designation by the Supreme Court (SC) of Special Commercial Courts concern
only an “exercise of jurisdiction.”
10. Statutory Construction; It is first axiom in legal hermeneutics that a statutory provision
is read as a whole and not in disjointed parts. The rule is as respected as it is ancient. Its
sum and substance has not been diluted no matter how frequent the free paraphrases have
been.
11. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Section 5, Item
5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 did not transfer the cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-
A to all the RTCs. If that was the legislative intention, then the provision should have simply
stated that such cases are “hereby transferred to the Regional Trial Courts.” The complete
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investiture is, however, on “the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its authority may designate the
Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.” If the law is a
general conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the phrase “or the appropriate Regional
Trial Court” is an inutile surplusage and the proviso that “the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that

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shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases” is a purposeless appendage and wasted words. A
general grant to all RTCs renders irrelevant the “Supreme Court’s exercise of authority” on
the matter. Such a general grant renders meaningless the designation by the Supreme Court
of the RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 should therefore be
read to mean that SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is
transferred to the specific RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of
its authority. This is the reading of the Supreme Court as expressed with precision in A.M.
No. 00-11-03-SC dated 21 November 2000 which is aptly titled “Resolution Designating
Certain Branches of Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide Cases Formerly Cognizable by
the Securities and Exchange Commission” “arising within their respective territorial
jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in
the First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions.” This En Banc Resolution opened with a purpose
clause reading “to implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code). This is an unequivocal statement that the Court interprets the
provision to mean that only the RTC Branches that it shall designate to hear and decide
Special Commercial Court cases can exercise jurisdiction over such cases.
13. Same; Same; Same; Same; There has been, as just enumerated, as many iterations by
the court itself of its reading of Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 i.e., that the law
transferred the SEC jurisdiction over the cases listed in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the
particular branches of the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable,
therefore, is the conclusion that all other Branches of the RTCs without the Supreme Court
designation are without jurisdiction over SEC cases. And following unreversed rulings the
other Branches of the RTC before whom a SEC case is filed must dismiss such case for want
of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent such jurisdiction, the non-SEC RTC cannot direct the
case to the “proper” court.
14. Same; Same; Same; Same; Palpably, RTC caseloads and the need to equalize the
caseloads among all branches determine the need for the Court to issue regulations
regarding the Commercial Courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over noncommercial cases. In all,
the RTC Commercial Court has exclusive jurisdiction over commercial cases and can still
exercise jurisdiction over regular cases if, as determined by the Supreme Court, the
caseloads necessitate such exercise. While there may be arguments in favor of a simpler
arrangement whereby all the RTCs in all the Judicial Districts are made Commercial Courts,
such arguments cannot be submitted for resolution by the Court. The settlement is in the
legislature.
15. Same; Same; Same; Same; Plainly, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, as
implemented by the Supreme Court through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily
conferred jurisdiction and not merely an incident related to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.
The ponencia fails to address an equally important precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
jurisdiction is determined by the averments and allegations of the complaint which in this
instance is inarguably a commercial case concerning subscription of shares in a corporation.
From the onset, petitioners, by the filing of their Complaint, supplied the occasion for the
exercise of jurisdiction vested by law in a particular court. In short, petitioners invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC (not as a court of general jurisdiction), and with the allegations in their
Complaint, specifically invoked the RTC designated as a Special Commercial Court under
Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, implemented under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. Petitioners cannot
just simply file their Complaint before the RTC without any specificity, given the allegations
contained therein and the reliefs they prayed for.
16. Same; Same; Same; Same; With the incorrect labeling of their Complaint and the wrong
invocation of the RTC’s regular jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint by the mere filing thereof with the multi sala RTC.
Since petitioners had filed what they labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it pursuant
to the general jurisdiction of the RTC under Sec. 19 of B.P. Blg. 129. The mere filing of the
Complaint before the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the official
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station of the designated Special Commercial Court as what occurred herein, is not
equivalent to the correct and proper filing of the Complaint before the appropriate Regional
Trial Court specially designated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases enumerated
under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Branch 276 of the RTC, to which the Complaint was
consequently raffled, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot order the transfer
of the

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Complaint to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do
so on the basis of authority over the case which it did not have. Neither does it have
authority over a coequal court.
17. Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, We should, as warranted, require from counsels
disciplined knowledge of procedure. Courts should not themselves correct the procedural
mistakes of pleaders. I cannot overemphasize, and ultimately revert to the fact, that subject
matter jurisdiction was conferred by law (Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate
RTC as determined thru the designation by the Supreme Court.
18. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; I concur with the
ponencia’s conclusion that the designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special
Commercial Courts does not work to confer jurisdiction over the branches designated as
such. It was an error for the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, to dismiss the
Complaint filed by petitioners. As the ponencia underscores, Branch 276 should have instead
transferred the case to the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly
designated to perform the Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court’s functions as a Special
Commercial Court. The present Petition must, thus, be granted.
19. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over what the ponencia collectively refers to as
SEC Cases was vested by Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code, in Regional Trial Courts and is not limited to the Regional Trial Court
branches designated by this court as Special Commercial Courts. It is only the legislature
that has the power “to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” As
Congress does not share this power with this court, in relation with these issues, this court’s
competence is limited to “administrative supervision over all courts[,]” as well as the
“[p]romulgat[ion of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]” It
was purely in the exercise of these powers, and not for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction
where previously there was none, that this court designated certain Regional Trial Court
branches as Special Commercial Courts.
20. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which were previously under the jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, was vested in Regional Trial Courts by Section 5.2 of the
Securities Regulation Code.
21. Same; Same; Same; Same; This statutory provision was adopted pursuant to the
legislature’s power under Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution “to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” In contrast, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts, through this court’s November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-
SC, was pursuant to this court’s power under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution to
exercise “administrative supervision over all courts.” A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not work to
confer jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code. A.M. No.
00-11-03-SC itself declares that it was adopted merely “[t]o implement the provisions of Sec.
5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799[.]”
22. Same; Same; Same; Same; The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general
jurisdiction is no bar to designating certain Regional Trial Court branches to focus on certain
types of cases. To the contrary, it is this identity which permits it. Designating branches to
focus on certain types of cases, in order to facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice, is well
within their nature as courts competent to take cognizance of cases not falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal, person, or body. Designating branches as
such balances two considerations: on the one hand, their nature as courts, which because
they have general jurisdiction, can exercise jurisdiction over the specific matter to which they
were assigned; and on the other, their duty to speedily administer justice.
23. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5.2’s qualification that this court’s power to
designate is necessarily only “in the exercise of its authority” is illuminating. It is to say that, in
going about its task of designating, this court cannot act in excess of its constitutional
authority. This affirms the Constitution’s segregation of the competencies of Congress from
those of this court. It affirms the exclusivity of Congress’ power “to define, prescribe, and
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apportion the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” This affirms the reality that, bereft of this power,
this court’s competence is limited to “administrative supervision over all courts[,]” as well as
the “[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning
. . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]”

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355. F & S Velasco Company, Inc. vs. Madrid, 774 SCRA 388, November
10, 2015 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Shares of Stock ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. v. Bitanga, 362
SCRA 635 (2001), instructs that an owner of shares of stock cannot be accorded the rights
pertaining to a stockholder — such as the right to call for a meeting and the right to vote, or
be voted for — if his ownership of such shares is not recorded in the Stock and Transfer
Book.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Shares of Stock; Verily, all transfers of shares of stock
must be registered in the corporate books in order to be binding on the corporation.
Specifically, this refers to the Stock and Transfer Book, which is described in Section 74 of
the same Code.

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356. Tanchuling vs. Cantela, 774 SCRA 406, November
10, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Simulated
Contracts ; Fraud ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Fraud; The undated deed, which serves as a counter-agreement to,
and which was simultaneously executed with, the subject deed, unmistakably evinces
absolute simulation. While Cantela posits that he was tricked into signing the undated deed
as it was supposedly surreptitiously inserted by Sps. Tanchuling into the copies of the
subject deed at the time of their signing, nothing, aside from his self-serving assertions,
support his account. It is well-settled that fraud is never presumed but must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence by the same party who alleges it. Besides, Navarro and Botero, who
equally witnessed the signing of the undated deed, never testified on any irregularity.
Notably, the fact that the undated deed was not notarized is rendered irrelevant by Cantela’s
own admission of the document’s execution, which, unless proven to be fraudulent, must be
presumed to be fair and regular, as in all private transactions.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Simulated Contracts; “Simulation takes place when the parties do
not really want the contract they have executed to produce the legal effects expressed by its
wordings. Simulation or vices of declaration may be either absolute or relative.” Article 1345
of the Civil Code distinguishes an absolute simulation from a relative one; while Article 1346
discusses their effects, as follows: Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or
relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter
when the parties conceal their true agreement. Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or
fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and
is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their agreement.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 657
SCRA 555 (2011), the Court explained that “[i]n absolute simulation, there is a colorable
contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main
characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a
result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from
each other what they may have given under the contract.” In this case, the Court agrees with
the RTC that the subject deed was absolutely simulated. The parties never intended to be
bound by any sale agreement. Instead, the subject deed was executed merely as a front to
show the public that Sps. Tanchuling were the owners of the properties in order to deter the
group of John Mercado from illegally selling the same.

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357. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, November
10, 2015 Syllabi Class :Preventive Suspension ;
1. Preventive Suspension; In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable, and dismissed him from the service. By such dismissal, the questions
raised against the CA’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman
were rendered moot and academic. I join the Majority in saying that the preventive
suspension order, being an ancillary issuance, was dissolved upon the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the administrative charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the preventive
suspension of Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be superfluous, for, as the
Court said in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35 (2012):
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A common requirement
to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration
may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; Exceptions.-
—As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior
to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the
lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Jurisprudence states that
“[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court
or agency. x x x.” In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a
prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions
also apply to a petition for prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of
the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.
4. Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.-
—Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless
proper to resolve the issue on the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
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petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a
court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction
over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point

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out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, as he, in
fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman’s Memorandum.
That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
5. Ombudsman Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any
court (except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, “[i]njunction is a
judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident
in the main action.” Considering the textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension
of an action while the main case remains pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of
a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office’s jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the
exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in
office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
6. Same; On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no
appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This
paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court
which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is
vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase “application for remedy” or the
word “findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The
task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
7. Same; Statutory Construction; As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of
the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In
case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation
of the law.
8. Same; Same; As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the
whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal
against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of remedy”
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase “application for
remedy,” being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term “appeal” by
the disjunctive “or,” refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an
appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are
to be understood in a general sense. By the same principle, the word “findings,” which is also
separated from the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would therefore refer to any finding
made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision. The subject
provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against “the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman,” a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the
Supreme Court on “pure questions of law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
9. Doctrine of Non-Interference; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Congress
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cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45
appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman.-
—Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction on
remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of
procedure

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promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
courts, and not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon,
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the
remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
also increased this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section
27, RA 6770 (as above cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295
SCRA 470 (1998).
10. Same; Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked
as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply
even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power — that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
— clearly strays from the concept’s rationale of insulating the office from political harassment
or pressure.
11. Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari; Note that the CA’s certiorari
jurisdiction, as above stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial
Courts (under Section 21[1], Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts’
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed.
In People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415 (1989), the doctrine was explained as follows: [T]his
concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case,
as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that
case, which is called judicial power.
12. Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court
and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the “totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.” Under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”wor
13. Same; Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the
jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of
the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the
framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-
General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911), the Court elucidated that “[t]he power or authority of the court
over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in
which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting
to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses
jurisdiction of the subject matter.” While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
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pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
14. Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction; A temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures
availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they
are mere incidents in and are

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dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. They are
usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the
parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an
act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full
hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself,
but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent
a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
15. Same; Same; Same; With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when
Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away
from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority.
Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created
under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create,
define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right
since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s right in esse which is
threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation.
16. Political Law; Separation of Powers; That Congress has been vested with the authority
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2,
Article VIII, supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII, supra,
does not result in an abnegation of the Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice, and procedure under Section 5(5), Article VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated,
these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved
under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its
jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through
the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-
vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe,
and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari
jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which
were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered
with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of
procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial
power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption
of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued
therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
17. Same; Judicial Power; It should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in
prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does
not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s
ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the
same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial
power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present
Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court’s inability to regulate what occurs during a
proceeding’s course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is
accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be unclipped.
To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution,
the Court’s duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this,
even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever
variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its
sole prerogative over the same.
18. Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; By nature, a preventive suspension
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order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277 (2005), the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose
is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

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Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive
measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of
the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
19. Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the
issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The
evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first
requirement: (a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) The
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
20. Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking, condonation has been
defined as “[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating
the offender as if there had been no offense.” The condonation doctrine — which connotes
this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon —
is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was
therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
21. Same; Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, 554
SCRA 160 (2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
22. Civil Service; Public Officers; After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the
Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.” Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the
regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.,
710 SCRA 1 (2013), it was explained that: [t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “public office is a public trust,” is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the
people’s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x
x. (Emphasis supplied) The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under
the section of the Civil Service Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
23. Same; Same; For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline,
suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which was
approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992: Section 60. Grounds for
Disciplinary Action.—An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed
from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral
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turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prisión mayor; (e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,
and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as
may be provided in this Code and other

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laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.
24. Same; Same; Related to this provision is Section 40(b) of the LGC which states that
those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position: Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local position: x x x x (b) Those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case.
25. Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases.-
—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office: Section 52.
Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The penalty of dismissal shall
carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed
the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision
only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing
therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of reelection:
Section
66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x. x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall not
exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Reading the 1987
Constitution together with the above cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the
conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
26. Same; Same; Same; The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary
requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he
was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In
this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in
Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to administrative offenses.
27. Same; Same; Same; At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official’s prior term,
and likewise allows said official to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar to People ex
rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), and Montgomery v.
Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled
that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term.
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b) states that the elective local official’s
administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
28. Same; Same; Same; This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted
from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now
rendered obsolete by — the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the
cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 (1999), and
Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), which were all relied upon by the CA. It
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should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution
means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v.
Judicial Bar Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010): Judicial decisions assume the same authority
as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,

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not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.
29. Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. It has also been held that “grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”
30. Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; This Court deems it apt to
clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order
subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its
abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., “‘the moot
and academic principle’ is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.”
31. Same; Same; Same; It would be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its
infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the
condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution
which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be
accountable to the people at all times.
32. Same; Same; Same; The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that
has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first
time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a
situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the
doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the
multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount
public interest is involved.
33. Same; Same; Same; The defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that “for the period of July 2013 to
December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office
were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a
hundred cases of alleged misconduct — involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct — were placed beyond the reach of the
Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.” Evidently, this fortifies the finding that
the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review. In any event, the
abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is
its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and
defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject
of discussion moot.
34. The Ombudsman’s Act; I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my
concurrence with the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770, and of the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The
main opinion has been written well by our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly bent once again. But let me assure my
colleagues in the Majority that if I submit this concurrence, I do not mean to diminish in any
way or degree the forcefulness and correctness of the justification for the declaration. I
simply want to underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down
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for authorizing the undue interference with the prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt
whatever means were allowed by law and procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases
properly cognizable by them.
35. Ombudsman; Preventive Suspension; Administrative Cases; In line with the power
to investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority to
preventively suspend respondent public officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770, which provides: Section
24. Preventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or

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employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt
is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case
is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due
to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
36. Same; Same; It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no authority to
issue the preventive suspension order in connection with criminal investigations of
government officials or employees because such authority rests in the courts in which the
criminal cases are filed.
37. Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; It is clear to me that, based on
the language and the factual milieu of Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), and
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), which both cited Pascual v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959), and of other akin rulings, condonation shall
apply only in case of the reelection of a public officer who is sought to be permanently
removed from office as a result of his misconduct, not while such public officer is undergoing
investigation. Condonation necessarily implies that the condoned act has already been found
to have been committed by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the penalty or
punishment imposed after the conduct of an administrative investigation. Under the
circumstances, the pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could not be
applicable to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending his administrative
investigation because preventive suspension pending the conduct of an investigation was not
yet a penalty in itself, but a mere measure of precaution to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate the charges by precluding the respondent from influencing the witnesses against
him.
38. Same; Same; Same; Suspension; As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA
360 (2006), as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The Court notably stated in
Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that “suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they voted into office” in the context of determining
the propriety of the issuance of the preventive suspension order. In other words, the
statement only served to remind the Ombudsman to issue the preventive suspension orders
with utmost caution in view of the gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent elective
local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of condonation.
39. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order are clearly set forth in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The sole objective of
the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can
be heard fully. The writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and
incomplete evidence; hence, it should not determine the merits of a case, or decide
controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be
settled.

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358. Cayago, Jr. vs. Cantara, 776 SCRA 23, December
02, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ;
Appeals ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order and
prevent needless delays for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The Court
has long declared that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, subject to the court’s
discretion by virtue of which no party can assume that its motion for extension would be
granted. Being discretionary in nature, it behooves upon the appellants to follow up on their
motions and ascertain its status, as the failure to strictly comply with the provisions on
reglementary periods renders the remedy of appeal unavailable. Further, as a purely
statutory right, the appellant must strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules of
Court. However, where strong considerations of substantial justice are present, the stringent
application of technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise of equity jurisdiction as in
cases where petitioners showed no intent to delay the final disposition of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, appeals are perfected
when it is filed within the period prescribed under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Section 1,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the CA taken from a decision of the
RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days, counted from notice of the judgment appealed from or from the denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The original 15- day period to appeal is extendible for
an additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper motion and the payment of docket fees
within the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully comply with the
aforementioned procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period,
renders the petition for review dismissible.

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359. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43, December
02, 2015 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ;
Presumptions ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; In this relation, it should be pointed out that
under Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is
that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and
consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that
private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to
learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these
presumptions. Also, respondent’s possession of the document pertaining to the obligation
strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of
evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing
evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in
respondent’s favor.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Penal Actions; It is noteworthy to mention that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or “greater
weight of the credible evidence,” is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.

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359. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43, December 02, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Security Guards ; Floating
Status ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The security guard must not remain in a floating status for a
period of more than six (6) months; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.-
—To clarify, placing a security guard in temporary “off-detail” or “floating status” is part of
management prerogative of the employer-security agency and does not, per se, constitute a
severance of the employer-employee relationship. However, being an exercise of
management prerogative, it must be exercised in good faith — that is, one which is intended
for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
Moreover, due to the grim economic consequences to the security guard in which he does
not receive any salary while in temporary “off-detail” or “floating status,” the employer-
security agency should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which
the security guard temporarily out of work can be assigned. Furthermore, the security guard
must not remain in such status for a period of more than six (6) months; otherwise, he is
deemed terminated.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; “To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law.”
3. Labor Disputes; Substantial Evidence; “In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion
may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached
thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence
is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that ‘[i]n
cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.’”
4. Labor Law; Security Guards; Floating Status; Case law provides that the concept of
temporary “off-detail” or “floating status” of security guards employed by private security
agencies — a form of a temporary retrenchment or layoff — relates to the period of time when
security guards are in between assignments or when they are made to wait after being
relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one. This takes place when
the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency, resulting in
a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of
guards in its roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security services stipulate
that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to it, even
for want of cause, such that the replaced security guard may be placed on temporary “off-
detail” if there are no available posts under the agency’s existing contracts. As the
circumstance is generally outside the control of the security agency or employer, the Court
has ruled that when a security guard is placed on a “floating status,” he or she does not
receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law.

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361. Narra Nickel Mining and Devt Corp vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp, 777
SCRA 258, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement ;
1. Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; Thus, at least with respect to cases
affecting an FTAA’s validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial power to
adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point, the
FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely
exercised a contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative
action which should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP’s proper
exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and
its Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is unnecessary to delve into the other
ancillary issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is a fundamental rule that the question
of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised the
same. The reason for the rule is that a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid
judgment. Cast against this light, the Court finds that the CA improperly took cognizance of
the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the reason that the OP’s
cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one which could be classified as an
exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA’s jurisdiction over the case. The
jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken against a judgment, final order, resolution
or award of a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions” is explicitly
stated in Section 1 of the said Rule.
3. Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate
the rights of persons before it. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or administrative
in nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.
4. Adjudicate; Words and Phrases; “‘Adjudicate’ as commonly or popularly understood,
means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, or settle. The
dictionary defines the term as ‘to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case)
on the merits of issues raised: x x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.’”
“In the legal sense, ‘adjudicate’ means: ‘[t]o settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense’; and ‘adjudge’ means: ‘[t]o
pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x. Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.’”
5. Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; Principle of Mutuality of Contracts;
With the legal treatment and parameters of an FTAA in mind, it becomes apparent that the
OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that is
purely administrative in nature, and thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication, again, in the
sense above discussed. As one of the contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have
adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party, as in a court case where rights
and duties of parties are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense, the OP’s
cancellation/revocation may be taken as a “decision” but only to the extent of considering it
as its final administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should
employ the conventional import of the phrase “final and executory,” as accorded to proper
judicial/quasi-judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a
party. To reiterate, being a government or public contract, the FTAA is subject to
fundamental contract principles, one of which is the principle of mutuality of contracts which
would definitely be violated if one were to accept the view that the OP, a contracting party,
can adjudicate on the contract’s own validity. The principle of mutuality of contracts is
expressed in Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
6. Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Under Section 45 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2010-21, otherwise known as the “Revised Implementing Rules and
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Regulations of RA 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995” (RIRR), mining contractor may
opt to convert totally or partially his existing mineral agreement, e.g., an MPSA to an FTAA,
by filing a Letter of Intent with the MGB, copy furnished the Regional Office where the area
covered by said mineral agreement is located. Within sixty (60) days from the filing of the
Letter of Intent, the contractor must comply with the requirements for the grant of an FTAA
laid down in Sections 49 to 69, Chapter VII of the RIRR, as well as pay the

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conversion fee. The application for conversion shall be evaluated and eventually, approved
upon compliance. Note that the term of the FTAA arising from such conversion shall be
equivalent to the remaining period of its predecessor-mineral agreement.
7. Same; DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-21; Section 55 of the same DENR
issuance requires a publication/posting/radio announcement of an FTAA application. Any
adverse claim, protest, or opposition to the said FTAA should be filed directly to the Regional
Office, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, or Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office concerned, within ten (10) days from the date of publication or
from the last date of posting/radio announcement. The said adverse claim, protest, or
opposition shall then be resolved by the POA of the DENR, whose ruling may then be
appealed to the proper tribunals. To this, it bears pointing out that Section 55 explicitly
exempts “previously published valid and existing mining claims or FTAA applications
originating from Exploration Permits that have undergone the [publication requirement]” from
the aforesaid publication requirement.

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362. Ebdane, Jr. vs. Apurillo, 777 SCRA 324, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies ;
1. Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Having established that there was no
violation of respondents’ rights to administrative due process, the CA incorrectly exempted
respondents from compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. They
are therefore required to go through the full course of the administrative process where they
are still left with remedies. As case law states, a party with an administrative remedy must not
merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to
its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. If a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
2. Administrative Proceedings; Procedural Due Process; In administrative
proceedings, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of; Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.-
—The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar,
procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard”
does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.

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363. Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., 777 SCRA 347, December
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Abandonment ;
1. Same; Same; Abandonment; To constitute abandonment of work, two (2) elements must
be present: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent
without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the
part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt
act. The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the
employer. The mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return, does
not necessarily amount to abandonment. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot
lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, there must be
clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer- employee relationship.
The operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
2. Labor Law; Security Guards; Temporary Off-Detail; The onus of proving that an
employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on the
employer, and the failure to discharge the onus would mean that the dismissal was not
justified and was illegal. The burden of proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging
and the proof must be clear, positive, and convincing. Specifically with respect to cases
involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment
relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right to security
of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would deprive the
company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service, as
security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary “off-detail” or the period of
time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or
client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue
beyond six (6) months. The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the
security guard can be assigned rests on the employer.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; Jurisprudence has placed upon
the employer the burden of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, that
the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause. In this case, respondents have adequately
discharged this burden, proving that they did not dismiss Tatel. Accordingly, the burden of
proof has shifted to the latter to establish otherwise, which he, however, failed to do. Apart
from mere allegations, Tatel was unable to proffer any evidence to substantiate his claim of
dismissal. On the contrary, records are bereft of any indication that he was prevented from
returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents.
4. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Since Tatel was not dismissed, he is not entitled to
backwages and separation pay. Article 293 of the Labor Code of the Philippines states that
“[i]n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of [an]
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” As such, there being no dismissal in this
case, petitioner is not entitled to either backwages or separation pay.

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364. Nolasco vs. Cuerpo, 777 SCRA 447, December
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Theory of the Case ;
1. Theory of the Case; It is settled that “[w]hen a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse
party.” The Court’s pronouncement in Peña v. Spouses Tolentino, 642 SCRA 310 (2011), is
instructive on this matter, to wit: Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon
v. Court of Appeals, is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. This rule affirms that “courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue.” Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports
to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but
also extrajudicial and invalid. The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and
decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is
conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court
will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and
due process.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal obligations, either party may
rescind
— or more appropriately, resolve — the contract upon the other party’s substantial breach of
the obligation/s he had assumed thereunder. This is expressly provided for in Article 1191 of
the Civil Code which states: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the
rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is
understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing,
in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
3. Same; Contracts; Rescission; “More accurately referred to as resolution, the right of
rescission under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the reciprocity
between the parties to the contract. This retaliatory remedy is given to the contracting party
who suffers the injurious breach on the premise that it is ‘unjust that a party be held bound to
fulfill his promises when the other violates his.’” Note that the rescission (or resolution) of a
contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and
fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the
agreement. Ultimately, the question of whether a breach of contract is substantial depends
upon the attending circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Same; For a contracting party to be entitled to rescission (or resolution) in
accordance with Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the other contracting party must be in
substantial breach of the terms and conditions of their contract. A substantial breach of a
contract, unlike slight and casual breaches thereof, is a fundamental breach that defeats the
object of the parties in entering into an agreement. Here, it cannot be said that petitioners’
failure to undertake their obligation under paragraph 7 defeats the object of the parties in
entering into the subject contract, considering that the same paragraph provides respondents
contractual recourse in the event of petitioners’ nonperformance of the aforesaid obligation,
that is, to cause such transfer themselves in behalf and at the expense of petitioners.

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365. Abadilla, Jr. vs. Obrero, 777 SCRA 457, December
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Procedural Rules and Technicalities ;
1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It should be stressed that procedural rules are not
to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a
party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a
suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful
confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. Procedural rules have their
own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; An order of dismissal, whether correct or
not, is a final order; An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not
interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by
the lower court. A final order is appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule
enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) declaring that “[a]n appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.”
3. Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Given the improper
remedy taken, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has, thus, become final and
immutable and, therefore, can no longer be altered or modified in any respect. The doctrine
of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that had already attained
finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law. As the only
exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3)
void judgments, none of which are obtaining in this case, and considering further that there
lies no compelling reason to relax the rules of procedure, the CA erred when it took
cognizance of respondents’ certiorari petition and rendered judgment thereon.

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366. Filinvest Alabang, Inc. vs. Century Iron Works, Inc., 777 SCRA 519, Dec
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Fixed Lump Sum Contracts ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It must be clarified that Article 1724 of the Civil Code does not
preclude the parties from stipulating on additional works to the project covered by said fixed
lump sum contract which would entail added liabilities on the part of the project owner. In
fact, the said provision allows contractors to recover from project owners additional costs in
fixed lump sum contracts, as well as the increase in price for any additional work due to a
subsequent change in the original plans and specifications, provided that there exists: (a) a
written authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written changes
in work; and (b) written agreement of the parties with regard to the increase in price or cost
due to the change in work or design modification. Jurisprudence instructs that compliance with
these two (2) requisites is a condition precedent for recovery and hence, the absence of one
or the other condition bars the claim for additional costs. Notably, neither the authority for the
changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefor may be proved by any evidence
other than the written authority and agreement as above mentioned.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the
outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable, absent any of the
exceptions recognized by case law. This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact
made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal
and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of
the case, those findings should not be ignored. Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
3. Civil Law; Estoppel; In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner
had issued to respondent a Certificate of Completion and Acceptance signifying that it had
already accepted respondent’s work as up to par. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and
the CA, this factual finding already estops petitioner from withholding the amounts due to
respondent’s purported substandard workmanship. It is settled that “[w]henever a party has,
by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it,” as in this case. Therefore, it is but
proper that petitioner remit to respondent the amounts of P40,880.00 and P227,500.00 it
withheld from the latter.
4. Same; Contracts; Fixed Lump Sum Contracts; In a fixed lump sum contract, the project
owner agrees to pay the contractor a specified amount for completing a scope of work
involving a variety of unspecified items of work without requiring a cost breakdown. The
contractor estimates the project cost based on the scope of work and schedule and considers
probable errors in measurement and changes in the price of materials. Otherwise stated, in
fixed lump sum contracts, the project owner’s liability to the contractor is generally limited to
what is stipulated therein.

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367. Quantum Foods, Inc. vs. Esloyo, 777 SCRA 532, December
09, 2015 Syllabi Class :Grave Abuse of Discretion ;
Syllabi:
1. Grave Abuse of Discretion; It should be emphasized that the NLRC has full discretion to
grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to
be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which clearly is not extant with
respect to the NLRC’s cognizance of QFI’s appeal. Far from having gravely abused its
discretion, the NLRC correctly preferred substantial justice over the rigid and stringent
application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is not a case of grave abuse of discretion
calling for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, warranting the reversal of the CA’s ruling
granting the certiorari petition and the remand of the case to the CA for appropriate action.
2. Labor Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Due Process; In the present case, it
is apparent that the plausible merit of the case was the “special circumstance” or “compelling
reason” that prompted the NLRC to relax the certification requirement and give due course to
QFI’s appeal as it, in fact, arrived at a contrary ruling from that of the LA. It is well to
emphasize that technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before the NLRC. In fact,
labor officials are enjoined to use every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in the
interest of due process. Consequently, the NLRC cannot be faulted for relaxing its own rules
in the interest of substantial justice.
3. Same; Appeal Bonds; Coming now to the bond requirement, while it has been settled that
the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases
involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, in several cases, the Court has
relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified. Thus, the Rules — specifically Section
6, Rule VI — thereof, allow the reduction of the appeal bond upon a showing of: (a) the
existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award.
4. Same; Same; Case law has held that for purposes of justifying the reduction of the appeal
bond, the merit referred to may pertain to (a) an appellant’s lack of financial capability to pay
the full amount of the bond, or (b) the merits of the main appeal such as when there is a valid
claim that there was no illegal dismissal to justify the award, the absence of an employer-
employee relationship, prescription of claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised
in the appeal. In this case, the NLRC held that a liberal application of the requirement on the
timely filing of the appeal bond is justified, finding that
(a) the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond within the reglementary period to appeal and the
subsequent posting of a surety bond constitute substantial compliance of the bond
requirement; and (b) there is merit in QFI’s appeal.

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368. Manansala vs. People, 777 SCRA 563, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Exempting Circumstances ; Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear ;
1. Same; Exempting Circumstances; Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear; To begin with,
“acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear” is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article
12(6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an
accused, the following elements must concur:
(a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c)
the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Falsification of Private Documents; Elements of.-
—The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172(2) of the RPC are: (a)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171(7) of
the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed
with intent to cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under
Article 171(4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.

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369. Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections, 777 SCRA 574, Dec.
16, 2015 Syllabi Class :Election Law ; Right of Suffrage ; Biometrics ;
Biometrics Law ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of biometric registration, therefore, is not an
additional qualification but rather a means to ensure and protect the identity of the voter.
Names are deactivated because these do not correspond to real persons. Thus, there is no
disqualification inasmuch as fictitious names or names of the deceased do not represent real
persons. A ghost cannot be disqualified because it does not exist.
2. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; As early as the 1936 case of The People of the
Philippine Islands
v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, it has been recognized that “[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but
is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or
classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the
evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage
was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the
enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit
classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.”
3. Same; Same;Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current
parameters for the exercise of suffrage: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the
right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by
law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
4. Same; Same; Biometrics; Words and Phrases; RA 8189 primarily governs the process
of registration. It defines “registration” as “the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the [ERB].” As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order “to
systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters.” To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in
modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed into law in
February 2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized
biometrics validation as part of the registration process: Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It
is the policy of the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology. “Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that
provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint,
signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively
require registered and new voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation: Section 3.
Who Shall Submit for Validation.—Registered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation. Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics
Registration.—The Commission shall implement a mandatory biometrics registration system
for new voters. Under Section 2(d) of RA 10367, “validation” is defined as “the process of
taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured.”
6. Same; Same; Same; Deactivation; Words and Phrases; The consequence of
noncompliance is “deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the registration record of the
registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the
validation process as required by [RA 10367].” Section 7 states: Section 7. Deactivation.—
Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for
registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act.
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(Emphases supplied) Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of
validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the law creates
artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an
“obedient group.” If anything, noncompliance by the “disobedient” only rightfully results into
prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection
of the laws,

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which only works “against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
7. Judicial Review; In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers
to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought
to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. As pointed
out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny
to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel. Applying
strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
8. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the
procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a)
personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence
of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a
manner of updating one’s registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-
time registration for new registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified by the fact
that the government is adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the
bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country.
While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being
accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of
voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC
as an administrative institution.
9. Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; The public has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of Republic Act (RA) No. 10367 and its deactivation feature.-
—It deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of
RA 10367 and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February
22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after. Accordingly, dating to the day of its
publications, all are bound to know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences of
10. Judicial Review; Statutes; It is significant to point out that questions relating to the
wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be addressed
to the judiciary.-
—Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries — i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Côte
d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Kenya — in implementing biometrics registration should serve as
warning in adhering to the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the
same such as environmental and geographical challenges, lack of training and skills,
mechanical breakdown, and the need for re- registration. They even admitted that while
biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does not, however,
solve other election-related problems such as vote-buying and source- code manipulation.
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly, petitioners’
submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics
registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that
questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that
should not be addressed to the judiciary.
11. Election Law; Biometrics; In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide
latitude of discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in
this case, was through the establishment of an updated voter registry. In making such
choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily sifted through the policy’s
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Whether RA 10367
was wise or unwise, or was the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that
does not present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the
legislature’s choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding the experience of
foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant failure to address
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equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny.
12. Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections; Aside from committing forum
shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject of a prior petition filed before
this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918, petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day periods
stated therein refer to the

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prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. As already
resolved in this Court’s Resolution dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject
provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather,
it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the
administrative necessities and other exigencies. Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to
enforce and implement election laws, the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its mandate. Perforce, this power includes the
determination of the periods to accomplish certain preelection acts, such as voter
registration.
13. Same; Same; This Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with
the filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the
approval of applications by the ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion
and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary for the generation of the final list of voters
which, in turn, is a prerequisite for the preparation and completion of the Project of Precincts
(POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP contains the number of registered voters
in each precinct and clustered precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities,
provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the names and
locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are assigned. The
POP is necessary to determine the total number of boards of election inspectors to be
constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the election day, the
number of vote counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget
needed. More importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the finalization of the
Election Management System (EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots
and determines the voting jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and
provinces. The EMS determines the configuration of the canvassing and consolidation
system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, the COMELEC should be
given sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections.
14. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Biometrics Law; Republic Act No.
10367 is a valid regulation that assists in the identification of a person for purposes of
ensuring that the right to vote is exercised only by that person. It is also a measure to purge
the voters list of spurious names or ghost voters. Viewed this way, Republic Act No. 10367 is
not a burden on the right of suffrage; rather, it enhances this fundamental right. It provides
mechanisms to ensure the identity of the voter, prevent multiple votes for a single individual,
and deter the casting of ballots in the names of persons who do not actually exist or who, at
the time of the elections, are already deceased.

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370. Fernandez vs. Alerta, 780 SCRA 248, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Moonlighting ; Court
Personnel;
1. Same; Same; Court Personnel; Case law dictates that officials and employees of the
judiciary must serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined
to conduct themselves with propriety even in private life, as any reproach to them is bound to
reflect adversely on their office. As such, Officials and employees are prohibited from
engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours
to ensure full-time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of
justice and in the disposition of cases as required by prevailing rules.
2. Administrative Law; Moonlighting; Words and Phrases;In a number of administrative
cases, officers and employees of the judiciary engaging in any private business, vocation or
profession without prior approval of the Court were adjudged guilty of “moonlighting.” Under
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, “ moonlighting” is
denominated as the light offense of “[t]he pursuit of a private business or vocation without the
permission required under Civil Service rules and regulations.” It is punishable by reprimand
for the first offense, suspension from office for a period of one (1) to thirty (30) days for the
second offense, and dismissal from service for the third offense.
3. Same; Same; Respondent’s engagement was clearly in pursuit of a private business
venture, akin to the services offered by real estate brokers. In dealing and transacting with
external government agencies, more particularly, the Registry of Deeds, she had not only
expended time and effort which should have been devoted to the performance of her official
functions, but she had also tainted the integrity of her office by giving, at the very least, the
impression that she could have wielded her authority or influence in exchange for unofficial
favors. Overall, absent any showing that such conduct was permitted, she violated the rule
against “moonlighting” and hence, being her first infraction therefor, should be meted with the
penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

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371. Cheng vs. People, 780 SCRA 374, January 13,
2016 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Estafa Through
Misappropriation ;
1. Same; Same; View that the dishonor did not alter the character of the transactions as sales but
only rendered Rodriguez an unpaid seller. The relationship between them resulting from the dishonor
was that of a creditor- and-debtor. In a purely debtor-and-creditor relationship, the debtor who merely
refuses to pay or denies the indebtedness cannot be held liable for estafa by misappropriation. The
reason is readily apparent. To convict a person of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, the State must prove that she has the obligation to deliver or return the same money,
goods or personal property received. Considering that the petitioner already became the owner of the
pieces of jewelry, she could dispose of the same, and her disposal of them would not amount to the
misappropriation thereof. In short, the petitioner did not thereby violate any trust or other obligation to
account for the items of jewelry that she already owned.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of.-The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows:
(1) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt
of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. In the
case of Pamintuan v. People, 621 SCRA 538 (2010), the Court had the opportunity to elucidate
further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof needed to sustain a conviction for
the same, to wit: The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words “convert”
and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the
proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate
from the findings of the RTC and the CA as they have fully considered the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in
concluding that Cheng is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by
misappropriation defined and penalized under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court
and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.
4. Criminal Law; Estafa Through Misappropriation; View on the Elements of Estafa Through
Misappropriation.-The elements of estafa through misappropriation are: (a) that personal property is
received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstances involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a
denial on her part that she received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of
another; and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property.
5. Same; Same; I cannot join my distinguished Brethren in the conclusion that the CA correctly
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. My assiduous and thorough review of the records of the trial
convinces me that the real agreement between the parties was a sale of the items of jewelry, not the
supposed agency to sell such items on commission basis as the RTC and the CA concluded. It is
conceded that the text of Exhibit A, Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit A-2 — the documents evidencing the
transactions — seemed to allude to the petitioner’s obligation as one of agency to sell the items of
jewelry on commission basis. Under ordinary circumstances, the literal terms of such documents
would control and be regarded as the manifestation of the true intention of the parties. But to give
outright credence to the interpretation of the evidence as the CA did would be to ignore and disregard
what complainant Rowena Rodriguez had herself declared to be the true nature of the transactions
with the petitioner.
6. Same; Same; The right to a commission only establishes the relation of principal and agent, with
the agent coming under the obligation to turn over to the principal the amount collected minus such
commission. If the agent should retain more than the commission, she would be guilty of estafa
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through misappropriation. Yet, because the transaction between Rodriguez and the petitioner was a
sale, the former effectively transferred to the latter the possession and the ownership of the items of
jewelry. Once the ownership of the jewelry became vested in the latter, she could not misappropriate
the items of jewelry.

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372. Gonzales vs. Marmaine Realty Corporation, 781 SCRA 63, January
13, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Lis Pendens ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled “after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.” In the same vein, case law likewise instructs that a notice of lis
pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are exceptional circumstances
imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b) the litigation was unduly prolonged to
the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; (c)
the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on
the part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a
notation.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed. In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first
before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court
is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the
case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. However, it must be clarified that the
aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is
when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice.
3. Same; Same; Lis Pendens; “Lis pendens,” which literally means pending suit, refers to
the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy
and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of
the court until the litigation is terminated; and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree
by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to
prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (b) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that
the court will promulgate subsequently.

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373. Quisay vs. People, 781 SCRA 98, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Procedure ; Pleadings and Practice ; Information ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of
RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to “[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be
investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused,” he may indeed delegate
his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution
service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this provision that the
City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs
or review prosecutors “authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance, other
action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval,” without
necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor’s authority to act directly in appropriate cases. By
virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang,
Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William
Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.
2. Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Information; Section 4, Rule 112 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint
or information may be filed before the courts, viz.: SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating
prosecutor and its review.—If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused
was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the
record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from
their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. No complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy. x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Thus, as a
general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules.
3. Same; Same; Same; In this relation, People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 (2004), firmly
instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the
same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings.

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374. Cebu People's Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. Carbonilla, Jr., 782 SCRA 418, Jan.
27, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Loss of Trust and
Confidence ;
1. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; Carbonilla, Jr.’s dismissal was also
justified on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. According to jurisprudence, loss of
trust and confidence will validate an employee’s dismissal when it is shown that: (a) the
employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence; and (b) he performs an act that
would justify such loss of trust and confidence. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust:
first, managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to
other officers or members of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file
employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These
employees, though rank- and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employer’s money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and
confidence.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Guided by the foregoing
considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting Carbonilla,
Jr.’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that he
was validly dismissed from employment as CPMPC was able to prove, through substantial
evidence, the existence of just causes warranting the same.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Basic is the rule that an employer may validly
terminate the services of an employee for any of the just causes enumerated under Article
296 (formerly Article
282) of the Labor Code, namely: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and (e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
5. Same; Same; Misconduct; Case law characterizes misconduct as a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be
considered as a just cause for termination, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties
showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it
must have been performed with wrongful intent.

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375. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos, 782 SCRA 441, January
27, 2016 Syllabi Class :Expropriation Proceedings ;
1. Expropriation Proceedings; In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay
in the payment of just compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be
an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned
from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit
of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic, or emancipation patents are
issued by the government, until full payment. To clarify, unlike the six percent (6%) annual
incremental interest allowed under DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994, DAR AO No. 2, Series
of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve percent (12%) annual interest is not
granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages
incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure
of landholdings or properties covered by PD 27 did not take place on October 21, 1972, but
upon the payment of just compensation. Thus, if the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be
settled, just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657.
3. Same; Same; Special Agrarian Courts; As summarized in LBP v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA
543 (2004), the procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657
commences with the LBP determining the initial valuation of the lands under the land reform
program. Using the LBP’s valuation, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. In case the
landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP,
and other interested parties to submit evidence on the just compensation of the land. A party
who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC,
designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation.
4. Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion connotes an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse must be patent and gross.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata means a
matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand, or cause of action. The elements of res judicata are (a) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two
(2) particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
6. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Regional Trial Courts; It bears stressing that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation is vested in the RTC, hence, it cannot be unduly restricted in the exercise of
its judicial function.
7. Same; Same; It is doctrinal that the concept of just compensation contemplates of just
and timely payment. It embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking,
as otherwise, compensation cannot be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

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 ****

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376. Lopez vs. Limos, 782 SCRA 609, February 02,
2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Same; Legal Ethics; The Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to
return the amount of P75,000.00 she received from complainants as legal fees. It is well to note that
“[w]hile the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent- lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified
that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.” Since respondent
received the aforesaid amount as part of her legal fees, the Court, thus, finds the return thereof to be
in order, with legal interest as recommended by the IBP Investigating Commissioner.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to
serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
— as in this case — gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality,
as well as of professional ethics.
4. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR
instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell short
of such standard when she committed the aforedescribed acts of deception against complainants.
Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they
reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to practice law. To aggravate further respondent’s
administrative liability, the Court notes that it repeatedly required her to comment on complainants’
petition, but respondent ignored such commands. Similarly, when the instant case was referred to the
IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, respondent again disregarded the directives of the
Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory conference and to submit a position paper.
Such audacity on the part of respondent — which caused undue delay in the resolution of the instant
administrative case — contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR.
5. Same; Same; Undoubtedly, “[t]he Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight
amounts to a lawyer’s impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal
fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy, and such other becoming conduct essential in the
promotion of orderly, impartial, and speedy justice.” What respondent has done was the exact
opposite, and hence, she must be disciplined accordingly.
6. Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty for respondent, jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s
money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended
the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz, 692
SCRA 348 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return
the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. Finally, in Agot v.
Rivera, 732 SCRA 12 (2014), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his: (a)
failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in connection thereto;
and (b) misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. In this case,
not only did respondent fail to file a petition for adoption on behalf of complainants and to return the
money she received as legal fees, she likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she
had already filed such petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to
complainants. On top of these, respondent showed impertinence not only to the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, but to the Court as well, when she ignored directives to comment on the
complainants’ petition against her and to participate in the investigation of the case. Under these
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circumstances, the Court imposes on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the IBP.

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377. Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, Inc., 783 SCRA 257, February 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Nonjoinder of Indispensable Parties
;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Nonjoinder of Indispensable Parties; In Plasabas v.
Court of Appeals, 582 SCRA 686 (2009), it was held that “the nonjoinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the nonparty
claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner’s failure to comply therewith.” In
this case, while the alleged real owners of the subject properties may be considered as real
parties-in-interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties stand to be
prejudiced, they are not indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its denomination as
an action for “damages” in the complaint’s caption, the action, as may be gleaned from the
pleading’s allegations, is really one for injunction as it ultimately seeks to permanently enjoin
respondent and the other defendants, from restricting petitioners’ access to the subject
properties. The crux of the main case, therefore, is whether or not respondent and said
defendants were justified in preventing petitioners from conducting the relocation survey on
the subject properties. Damages are also sought as ancillary relief for the acts complained
of. These issues can be resolved independent of the participation of the alleged real owners
of the subject properties. Hence, they are not indispensable parties, without whom no final
determination can be had.
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; To be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A
writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing
right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s
right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper
remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the
same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy.
3. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of
the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such
right is being disputed, as in this case. As earlier intimated, preliminary injunction is a
preservative remedy. Preliminary injunction should not create new relations between the
parties, but must only maintain the status quo until the merits of the case is fully heard.
Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the WPI involved
herein. Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves
any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject properties since the
Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired. Time and again, the Court has
repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer
for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented
by injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or
prohibited. An injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done.

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378. Young vs. People, 783 SCRA 286, February 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 ;
1. Criminal Law; Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; In this case, the assailed RTC
Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Significantly, the present case involves public interest as it
imputes violations of RA 9208, or the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,” a crime so
abhorrent and reprehensible that is characterized by sexual violence and slavery.
Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly
sanctioned in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Determination of probable cause
is either executive or judicial in nature. The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor
during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an information in court. At this
juncture, the investigating prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative
of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this
stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the
strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the
necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.
3. Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A judge may dismiss the case for lack of
probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause — that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. Applying the standard set forth in De Los Santos- Dio v. Court of Appeals, 699
SCRA 614 (2013), the evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and
clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination
thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against
petitioners for violation of Sections 4(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6(a) and (c) of RA
9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and,
consequently, maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in
prostitution. In view of this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
4. Same; Special Civil Actions; Motion for Reconsideration; Jurisprudence has carved
out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari petition.-
—Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of
a certiorari petition, the Court finds the OSG’s argument well-taken. In this regard,
jurisprudence has carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari petition,
such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

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379. Security Bank Savings Corp vs. Singson, 784 SCRA 30, February
10, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Length
of Service ;
1. Same; Same; Length of Service; Notably, respondent’s long years of service and clean
employment record will not justify the award of separation pay in view of the gravity of the
foregoing infractions. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked
against the employer. As ruled in Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC,
528 SCRA 146 (2007): Although long years of service might generally be considered for the
award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of
termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor
under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than
twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not
call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and
worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a
justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize
for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to
cleanse its ranks of undesirables.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Separation Pay; As an exception, case law
instructs that in certain circumstances, the grant of separation pay or financial assistance to
a legally dismissed employee has been allowed as a measure of social justice or on grounds
of equity.-
—Separation pay is warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles 298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well
as in cases of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand,
an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the same
Code, being causes attributable to the employee’s fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to
separation pay. The non-grant of such right to separation pay is premised on the reason that
an erring employee should not benefit from their wrongful acts. Under Section 7, Rule I, Book
VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, such dismissed employee is
nonetheless entitled to whatever rights, benefits, and privileges he may have under the
applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or
practice. As an exception, case law instructs that in certain circumstances, the grant of
separation pay or financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee has been allowed as
a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Co. v. NLRC (PLDT), 164 SCRA 671 (1988), the Court laid down the parameters in awarding
separation pay to dismissed employees based on social justice.
3. Same; Same; Same; In the PLDT case, the Court required that the grant of separation
pay as financial assistance given in light of social justice be allowed only when the dismissal:
(a) was not for serious misconduct; and (b) does not reflect on the moral character of the
employee or would involve moral turpitude. However, in the later case of Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Workers Association v. NLRC (Toyota), 537 SCRA 171 (2007), the
Court further excluded from the grant of separation pay based on social justice the other
instances listed under Article 282 (now 296) of the Labor Code, namely, willful disobedience,
gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and commission of a crime
against the employer or his family. But with respect to analogous cases for termination like
inefficiency, drug use, and others, the social justice exception could be made to apply
depending on certain considerations, such as the lengths of service of the employee, the
amount involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the employee, and
the like.
4. Same; Same; Same; The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily
determined by the cause of the dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent’s established act of
repeatedly allowing Branch Manager Pinero to bring the checkbooks and bank forms outside
of the bank’s premises in violation of the company’s rules and regulations had already been
declared by the LA to be gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor
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Code, which finding was not contested on appeal by respondent. It was petitioners who
interposed an appeal solely with respect to the award of separation pay as financial
assistance. As they aptly pointed out, the infractions, while not clearly indicative of any
wrongful intent, is, nonetheless, serious in nature when one considers the employee’s
functions, rendering it inequitable to award separation pay based on social justice. As the
records show, respondent was the custodian of accountable bank forms in his assigned
branch and as such, was mandated to strictly comply with the monitoring procedure and
disposition thereof as a security measure to avoid the attendant high risk to the bank.
Indeed, it is true that the failure to observe the

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processes and risk preventive measures and worse, to take action and address its violation,
may subject the bank to regulatory sanction. It bears stressing that the banking industry is
imbued with public interest. Banks are required to possess not only ordinary diligence in the
conduct of its business but extraordinary diligence in the care of its accounts and the
interests of its stakeholders. The banking business is highly sensitive with a fiduciary duty
towards its client and the public in general, such that central measures must be strictly
observed. It is undisputed that respondent failed to perform his duties diligently, and
therefore, not only violated established company policy but also put the bank’s credibility and
business at risk. The excuse that his Branch Manager, Pinero, merely prompted him towards
such ineptitude is of no moment. He readily admitted that he violated established company
policy against bringing out checkbooks and bank forms, which means that he was well aware
of the fact that the same was prohibited. Nevertheless, he still chose to, regardless of his
superior’s influence, disobey the same not only once, but on numerous occasions. All
throughout, there is no showing that he questioned the acts of Branch Manager Pinero;
neither did he take it upon himself to report said irregularities to a higher authority. Hence,
under these circumstances, the award of separation pay based on social justice would be
improper.

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380. Lee vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 784 SCRA 342, February
17, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Same; Same; Same; That the RTC retained jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal is beyond
cavil, as provided under Section 9, Rule 41 above quoted. As a result of respondent’s failure
to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the RTC decision. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal within the period
and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such
requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory. It bears to stress that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks
to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; In Gipa v. Southern Luzon
Institute, 726 SCRA 559 (2014), citing Gonzales v. Pe, 655 SCRA 176 (2011), the Court
clarified the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees under the above
quoted rule in this wise: [T]he procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not
merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed
period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right,
but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to
the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of
law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for
the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the
Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section
1(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the ground of the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount
of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and
appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.

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381. PCGG vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 785 SCRA 55, February
24, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ;
Preliminary Investigation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation
of the properties in order to support its stance that the loans were undercollateralized is of no
moment. Included in the records of this case is the Executive Summary of the TWG, citing as
evidence numerous documents from PNB showing, on its face, that the loans granted to
HMOI by PNB were under collateralized. Hence, the lack of independent valuation alone is
not sufficient to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence to establish mere probable
cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party’s accusation or defense, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To
justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
3. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. Its elements are: (1) that the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in
relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
4. Same; Same; Section 3(g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its
core element being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The elements of the offense are: (1) that the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
5. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman; It bears
stressing that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to
establish whether there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the
accused. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, the accused committed the crime. Taking into account the quantum of
evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause.

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382. Luriz vs. Republic, 785 SCRA 142, February 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Titles and Deeds ; Reconstitution of Titles ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Notably, these findings should not be taken as an adjudication on the
ownership of the subject lands. As priorly intimated, they are but determinations of whether or not the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is authentic, genuine, and in force and effect at the time it
was lost or destroyed, which, based on case law, are central to resolving petitions for reconstitution
of title. Clearly, a reconstitution of title proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of
title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. In this light, the court does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed certificate, as the said matter should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding for the purpose.
2. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The reconstitution of a
certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land registration
proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was
indeed issued to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest, and such title was in force at the time it
was lost or destroyed. In the present case, the reconstitution petition is anchored on a purported
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 1297 — a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 26. Based on the provisions of the said law, the following must be present for
an order of reconstitution to issue: (a) the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest
therein; (d) the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) the
description, area, and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in
the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Particularly, when the reconstitution is based on an extant
owner’s duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate. Tested
against the foregoing, the Court finds that Luriz was not able to prove that TCT No. 1297 sought to
be reconstituted was authentic, genuine, and in force at the time it was lost and destroyed.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Vesting Order No. P-89; Official Records; Being an official
record of a duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the Philippines at the time it was issued,
Vesting Order No. P-89 is, therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Vesting Order
No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 stated that, after proper investigation, the Philippine Alien Property
Administration had found that the properties particularly described in Exhibit A, i.e., the Transcript of
TCT No. 1297; B[oo]k T-9 P[age] 47, were owned or controlled by “nationals of a designated enemy
country (Japan).”
4. Same; Same; Same; The legal effect of a vesting order was to effectuate immediately the
transfer of title to the US by operation of law, without any necessity for any court action, and as
completely as if by conveyance, transfer, or assignment, thereby completely divesting the former
owner of every right with respect to the vested property. It is worthy to note that under Section 39(a)
of the Trading with the Enemy Act, properties of Japanese nationals vested after December 17, 1941
shall not be returned to their owners, and the US shall not pay compensation therefor. Instead, the
vested properties were to be conveyed to the Republic as part of its overall plan of rehabilitation.
Nonetheless, to safeguard the rights of citizens and friendly aliens — i.e., persons who are not
enemies or allies of enemies — claiming any interest, right, or title to the vested properties, the
Trading with the Enemy Act, both in its original and amendatory provisions, permits the filing of suits
for the recovery of any property vested or seized on or after December 18, 1941, until April 30, 1949
or after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of vesting, whichever is later.
5. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; It is clear that after the
execution of Vesting Order No. P-89 on April 9, 1947, the registered owner, Yoichiro Urakami, was
divested of any title or interest in the vested properties registered in his name under TCT No. 1297,
which was thereby rendered of no force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed, i.e., on June
1988 and, thus, cannot be reconstituted. In addition, the records are bereft of showing that any
citizen or friendly alien made any claim to the vested properties under Vesting Order No. P-89 within
the prescriptive period ending April 30, 1949. Accordingly, the vested properties were transferred by
the Attorney General of the US to the Republic under Transfer Agreement dated May 7, 1953, and
thereafter became the subject of two (2) Presidential Proclamations, namely: (a) Proclamation No.
438 issued by then President Elpidio R. Quirino on December 23, 1953, reserving them for dormitory,
site purposes of the North General Hospital; and (b) Proclamation No. 732 issued by then President
Carlos P. Garcia on February 28, 1961, reserving them, instead, for dormitory site purposes of the

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National Orthopedic Hospital, now POC, which is presently in possession thereof.

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383. Republic vs. Romero II, 785 SCRA 164, February 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Marriages ; Annulment of Marriage ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court can only commiserate with the parties’ plight as their
marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy is not always to
have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it must be limited to cases where there
is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Thus,
absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36 of
the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a
ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt
that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases. Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable,
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court
finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners,
Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations which,
therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part.
Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for
fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in
Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he
categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them.
That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not
mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are
proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution
protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties,
especially where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.

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384. Miano vs. Aguilar, 785 SCRA 338, March 02,
2016 Syllabi Class :Judges ; Motion for Extension of
Time ;
1. Same; Same; The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide
cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Judges must decide cases
and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice deprives litigants
of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied. In light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent is
administratively liable for Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and Undue Delay in
Transmitting the Records of a Case, which are classified as less serious charges under Section 9,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that merit the penalty of (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three
(3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Considering the
circumstances of this case and the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been held
administratively liable, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of suspension for a period
of three (3) months against respondent.
2. Judges; Judicial Ethics; To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public
confidence in the legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence. Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. They are likewise expected
to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and
discharge their duties in accordance therewith.
3. Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; The Court has ruled that when a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our
courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance of the law is more than an
erroneous application of legal provisions. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. To constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative
liability to attach, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance
of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it
amounted to bad faith.
4. Bad Faith; Respondent had already clarified that she issued the said Order merely to inform the
OCA of her inhibition from the subject case, and while it is true that there was no necessity therefor,
respondent’s act in itself is not indicative of bad faith. Moreover, she explained that she had
instructed her Branch Clerk to transmit the records of the Migano case to the pairing judge in RTC-
Alaminos City, only to discover later on that the transmittal letter was not properly attached to the
records, resulting in the delay in its transmittal. Hence, while it may be inferred under the
circumstances that respondent was careless and did not exercise diligence in ensuring that the
records of the Migano case were immediately transmitted to the pairing judge of RTC-Alaminos City
for proper disposition, records are bereft of evidence to show that the resulting delay was deliberately
or maliciously caused as to amount to bad faith. Instead, what is evident in this case is that the delay
was caused by inadvertence and negligence. As such, while it may be considered an unfortunate
error on respondent’s part to hold in abeyance the proceedings in the Migano case and to fail to
promptly transmit the records thereof to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, such error does not
appear to have been tainted with or impelled by bad faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed and the
Court cannot conclude that bad faith attended respondent’s acts when none has been shown in this
case. Consequently, respondent need not be subjected to administrative sanction in this respect.
5. Judges; Motion for Extension of Time; With regard, however, to the delay in the resolution of
pending motions for inhibition within the prescribed period, records are bereft of evidence to show
that respondent filed any request for an extension of time within which to resolve them, which the
Court could have granted. As such, even if the Court were to accept her excuse that her combined
caseload in RTC-Alaminos City, as well as in RTC-Burgos, the courts where she was concurrently
presiding, was indeed heavy, she could have requested an extension of time within which to decide
and dispose of pending cases and justified the same. The Court is not unmindful of the
circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court
allows extensions of time within which pending cases may be disposed of, upon a seasonable filing
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of a request therefor and sufficient justification. For failing to do so, respondent cannot evade
administrative liability.

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385. Espiritu vs. Sazon, 785 SCRA 454, March 02, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ; Preliminary Injunction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It is apropos to reiterate the settled rule that injunctive reliefs are not
granted for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the
possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before the right of
ownership is determined. The reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is
determined in light of the evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be
maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of
the other.
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Words and Phrases; A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to
protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the
trial on the merits. In a sense, it is a regulatory process meant to prevent a case from being
mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
3. Same; Same; Same; In the present case, the CA found that the RTC correctly
appreciated the evidence presented during the hearing on the application for writ of
preliminary injunction. At this point, it bears to stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is
generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to
show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. As such,
the evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the trial court an evidence of
justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case.
Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not
be disturbed unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, which does not obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in the instant case must be upheld, and the status quo — or the last actual,
peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, which is existing at
the time of the filing of the case — must be preserved until the merits of the case can be
heard fully.

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386. Bigler vs. People, 785 SCRA 479, March 02,
2016 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Penalties ;
1. Criminal Law; Penalties; In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect
their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties
imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of
penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief
afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon
the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is
authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void
for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It must be stressed that a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable, absent any of the exceptions recognized by case law. This rule is rooted on the
doctrine that findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect
by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can
otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. Hence, absent
any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Under the doctrine of
finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates
this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final
judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the
same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.

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387. People vs. Comboy, 785 SCRA 512, March 02,
2016 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ;
1. Same; Rape; In this regard, it has been long settled that “a young girl would not concoct a
sordid tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the
examination of her private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a
public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no
plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave
crime of rape, if this crime did not happen,” as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the
trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.-The elements of Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) are:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was
accomplished through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of Rape is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand, Statutory Rape under Article
266-A(1)(d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years
of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or
intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these are not elements of
statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when
the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes that the offended party does
not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, to sustain a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the following:
(a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse
between the accused and the complainant. The foregoing acts of Rape shall be qualified
pursuant to Article 266-B(1) of the RPC if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age;
and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common- law spouse of the parent of the victim.
4. Same; Denials; Alibi; In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a
quo that the prosecution was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her
without her consent on two (2) separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and
the second in February 2008; and (b) attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17,
2009, but was stopped by a reason other than his own desistance, i.e., BBB’s intervention.
Suffice it to say that Comboy’s flimsy defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the perpetrator of the crimes.

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388. Mejorado vs. Abad, 787 SCRA 249, March 09, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ;
Mandamus ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It bears reiteration that the writ of mandamus may only issue if the
party claiming it has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded, and
that it was the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required to accord the same
upon him. Petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of the NCA to cover the amount of his second
claim falls short of this standard, there being no clear and specific duty on the part of the
respondent to issue the same.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; It is settled that mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel
the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is
in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. In Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa City, 722 SCRA 66 (2014), a case cited at length
by petitioner himself, the Court elucidated on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
mandamus.

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389. Equitable Savings Bank (“BDO Unibank, Inc.”) vs. Palces, 787 SCRA 260, March
09, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; Anent the issue of attorney’s fees, it is settled that attorney’s fees
“cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The
power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still, attorney’s fees may not be
awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence
in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.” In this case,
suffice it to say that the CA correctly ruled that the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit
should be deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
2. Civil Law; Sales; Sale on Installments; Article 1484 of the Civil Code, which governs the
sale of personal properties in installments, states in full: Article 1484. In a contract of sale of
personal property the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any
of the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfilment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay; (2) Cancel the sale,
should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments; (3) Foreclose the chattel
mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the vendee’s failure to pay
cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no further action against the
purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall
be void.
3. Same; Same; In this case, there was no vendor-vendee relationship between respondent
and petitioner. A judicious perusal of the records would reveal that respondent never bought
the subject vehicle from petitioner but from a third party, and merely sought financing from
petitioner for its full purchase price. In order to document the loan transaction between
petitioner and respondent, a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage dated August 18, 2005
was executed wherein, inter alia, respondent acknowledged her indebtedness to petitioner in
the amount of P1,196,100.00 and placed the subject vehicle as a security for the loan.
Indubitably, a loan contract with the accessory chattel mortgage contract — and not a
contract of sale of personal property in installments — was entered into by the parties with
respondent standing as the debtor-mortgagor and petitioner as the creditor- mortgagee.
Therefore, the conclusion of the CA that Article 1484 finds application in this case is
misplaced, and thus, must be set aside.
4. Same; Same; Chattel Mortgage; There is nothing in the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage that bars petitioner from receiving any late partial payments from respondent. If at
all, petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s late partial payments in the aggregate amount of
P103,000.00 will only operate to reduce her outstanding obligation to petitioner from
P664,500.00 to P561,500.00. Such a reduction in respondent’s outstanding obligation should
be accounted for when petitioner conducts the impending foreclosure sale of the subject
vehicle. Once such foreclosure sale has been made, the proceeds thereof should be applied
to the reduced amount of respondent’s outstanding obligation, and the excess of said
proceeds, if any, should be returned to her. In sum, the CA erred in ordering petitioner to return
the amount of P103,000.00 to respondent. In view of petitioner’s prayer for and subsequent
possession of the subject vehicle in preparation for its foreclosure, it is only proper that
petitioner be ordered to commence foreclosure proceedings, if none yet has been
conducted/concluded, over the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, i.e., within thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision.

****

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390. Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, March 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Preliminary Investigation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A trial court’s finding of probable cause does not rely on the
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Once the trial court finds the existence of probable
cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, any question on the prosecutor’s
conduct of preliminary investigation has already become moot.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; At the outset, it must be stressed that the
Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information
should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In assessing if the Ombudsman
had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling
— that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or
not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.” In Fenequito
v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), “[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
term does not mean ‘actual or positive cause’ nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry x
x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.”
4. Same; Same; Same; In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case
against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, petitioners were
charged with the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
5. Criminal Law; Plunder; Elements of.-
—Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following
elements:
(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) thereof; and (c) that
the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00). On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c)
that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions. Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the
foregoing elements need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence
becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause — the determinative matter
in a preliminary investigation — implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; It should be pointed
out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
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the prosecution’s evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits. Therefore, “the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level.”

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7. Same; Same; Probable Cause; Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the “technical rules of evidence should not be applied” in the course of its
proceedings, keeping in mind that “the determination of probable cause does not depend on
the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of
testimonies presented.” Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court
declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and
obligations of parties, “probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”
8. Same; Same; State Witnesses; The Court rejects Reyes’s theory that the whistleblowers
and Tuason are the “most guilty” in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs
her claim that the Ombudsman violated Section 17, Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure by granting immunity to them. To begin with, “[t]he authority to grant immunity is
not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the
Ombudsman[,] as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an
accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose
mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The
latter do not, as a rule[,] have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until
after the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the
prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness
only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 [of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure].”
9. Forgery; Anent Reyes’s claim that her signatures in the documentary evidence presented
were false, falsified, and fictitious, it must be emphasized that “[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be
presumed and must be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden
of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery
can only be established by comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have
been forged.” Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to present clear and convincing
evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in light of the following considerations
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos.
212593-94: (a) in a letter dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator Enrile
himself admitted that his signatures, as well as those of Reyes, found on the documents
covered by the COA’s Special Audit Report are authentic; and (b) Rogelio Azores, the
supposed document examiner who now works as a freelance consultant, aside from only
analyzing photocopies of the aforesaid documents and not the originals thereof, did not
categorically state that Reyes’s signatures on the endorsement letters were forged. As there
is no clear showing of forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot
subscribe to Reyes’s contrary submission. Notably, however, she retains the right to raise
and substantiate the same defense during trial proper.
10. Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Supreme Court
(SC) is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of
plunder.-
—Anent Janet Napoles’s complicity in the above mentioned crimes, records similarly show
that she, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of
Senator Enrile’s PDAF. As exhibited in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet
Napoles was informed of the availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the “lead
employee” of the JLN Corporation, would prepare a listing of the available projects
specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the Office of Senator Enrile to
the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to
Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after
the SARO and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napoles’s
NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, which were “ghost projects” that allowed
Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation. Based on the evidence in
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support thereof, the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles
for the charge of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in conspiracy
with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the
aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile’s PDAF, who supposedly abused
his authority as a public officer in order to do so; (b) through this modus operandi, it appears
that Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of “kickbacks” in the
years 2004-2010; and (c) the total value of “kickbacks’’ given to Senator Enrile amounted to
at least P172,834,500.00.

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11. Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; There is probable cause against Janet
Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e.,
Senator Enrile and his chief-of-staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they
would enter into transactions involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile,
among others, has shown manifest partiality and evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing
the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-funded projects — even without the
benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated procurement, in direct violation of existing laws,
rules, and regulations on government procurement; and (c) the “ghost” PDAF-funded
projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of P345,000,000.00.
12. Same; Same; Plunder; Conspiracy; At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Janet
Napoles of her mistaken notion that as a private individual, she cannot be held answerable
for the crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in
those crimes are public officers. While the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public
officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have
conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental
principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In this case, given that the
evidence gathered perceptibly shows Janet Napoles’s engagement in the illegal
hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile’s PDAF, the Ombudsman rightfully charged her, with Enrile
and Reyes, as a coconspirator for the aforestated crimes.
13. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The fundamental test in determining
the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is, whether the facts alleged
therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.-
—There is no merit in Janet Napoles’s assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form
and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place,
and manner of the commission of the crimes charged. “According to Section 6, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a
complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.” In this case, the NBI and the FIO
Complaints stated that: (a) Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the
ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused of Plunder
and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019; (c) they used a certain modus operandi to
perpetuate said scam, details of which were stated therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam,
the Philippine government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount of
P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime between the years 2004 and
2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. The aforesaid
allegations were essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations — one (1) for
Plunder and fifteen (15) for violation of RA 3019 — filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Evidently, these factual assertions already square with the requirements of Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above cited. Upon such averments, there is no
gainsaying that Janet Napoles has been completely informed of the accusations against her
to enable her to prepare for an intelligent defense. The NBI and the FIO Complaints are,
therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.
14. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; It is a fundamental legal axiom that “[w]hen there is
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.”-
—As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must
be first highlighted that they are placed in the same situation as Janet Napoles in that they
are being charged with crime/s principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder
and/or multiple violations of Section 3[e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as private
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individuals on account of their alleged conspiracy with public officers, Senator Enrile and
Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that “[w]hen there is conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all.” Thus, the reasonable likelihood that conspiracy exists between them denotes the
probable existence of the elements of the crimes above discussed equally as to them.
“Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused

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themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests.”
15. Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; The res inter alios acta rule
under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence constitutes a technical rule on
evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings; Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation.”-
—Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on
their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on
evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay
evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during
the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”
This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation
that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the
objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule
should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation,” as in this case.
16. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that there are equally well-
grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as President
of Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI) and member/incorporator of
Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED), as well as
his acts of receiving checks in the name of said Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts, delivering money to Janet Napoles, and
assisting in the delivery of “kickbacks” and “commissions” of the legislators, conspired with
the other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.-
—In the same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for De Asis’s
involvement as a coconspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as violations of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019. A perusal thereof readily reveals that De Asis is the President of KPMFI and a
member/incorporator of CARED
— two (2) among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used in the perpetuation of the
scam particularly involved in the illegal disbursement of Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Moreover, in
the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their
respective Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay they tagged De Asis as one of those who
prepared money to be given to the lawmaker; that he, among others, received the checks
issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money
is withdrawn from the bank, De Asis was also one of those tasked to bring the money to
Janet Napoles’s house. With these, the Court finds that there are equally well-grounded
bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as President of KPMFI
and member/incorporator of CARED, as well as his acts of receiving checks in the name of
said NGOs, depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts, delivering money to Janet
Napoles, and assisting in the delivery of “kickbacks” and “commissions” of the legislators,
conspired with the other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.
17. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime
charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only
after a full-blown trial on the merits.-
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—Certainly, De Asis’s defenses, which are anchored on the want of criminal intent, as well
as the absence of all the elements of the crime of Plunder on his part, are better ventilated
during trial and not during preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point, a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged
is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Hence, for De Asis’s apparent participation in the PDAF scam, the
Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding

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probable cause against him for one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as charged.
18. Same; Same; Probable Cause; Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman)
determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if
a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in
People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95 (2009), delineated the functions and purposes of a
determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the
trial court, on the other: There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive
and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.
19. Same; Same; Same; The option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
is not mandatory and reiterated that the court’s first option x x x is for it to immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.-
—The Court in Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014), clarified that the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information
before it, namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause. The Court went on to elaborate that “the option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated that “the court’s first option x x x is for it
to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause.’” Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu
proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own assessment of the
evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate
dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line with the fundamental doctrine that “once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court.” Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the trial courts in proceeding with
dismissals of this nature: Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must
always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering
the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the
evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can
dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not
hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
20. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is
an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed
to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.-
—No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying
Reyes’s motion to suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for
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certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-
94. Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a mere pendency of a special civil action
for certiorari in relation to a case pending before the court a quo does not ipso facto stay the
proceedings therein, unless the higher court issues a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction against the conduct of such proceedings. Otherwise stated, a petition
for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case
pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an

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original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue
against the public respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has
the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an
injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings before the public respondent. She should
show the existence of an, urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may
be prevented. In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary restraining order
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan
cannot be faulted for continuing with the proceedings before it.
21. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Moot and Academic; View that the Petitions
before the Supreme Court (SC) could also be dismissed for being moot and academic.-
—The Petitions before us could also be dismissed for being moot and academic. When the
Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners after finding probable cause, all
petitions questioning the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, including these Petitions
before us, have already become moot.
22. Same; Same; Probable Cause; The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor
is different from the determination of probable cause by the trial court. A preliminary
investigation is conducted by the prosecutor to determine whether there is probable cause to
file an information or whether the complaint should be dismissed. Once the information is
filed, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case. The trial court then determines the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Any question relating to
the disposition of the case should be addressed to the trial court.
23. Same; Same; Same; Although both the prosecutor and the trial court may rely on the
same records and evidence, their findings are arrived at independently. Executive
determination of probable cause is outlined by the Rules of Court, Republic Act No. 6770,
and various issuances by the Department of Justice. It is the Constitution, however, that
mandates the conduct of judicial determination of probable cause.
24. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; View that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is also not a venue for an exhaustive display of petitioners’ evidence.-
—The conduct of a preliminary investigation is also not a venue for an exhaustive display of
petitioners’ evidence. It is merely preparatory to a criminal action. In Drilon v. Court of
Appeals, 258 SCRA 280 (1996): Probable cause should be determined in a summary but
scrupulous manner to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right of
liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation
of such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity and merits of a party’s
defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.

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391. Republic vs. Tampus, 787 SCRA 563, March 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Persons and Family Relations ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of
active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods
prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden
of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter
is still alive or is already dead.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Judicial Declaration of
Presumptive Death;Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of
the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse
has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The burden
of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41
of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.

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392. Perez vs. Aquino, 787 SCRA 581, March 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Agricultural Leasehold Relationship ;
1. Same; Agricultural Leasehold Relationship; This notwithstanding, petitioner, as the
new owner, is bound to respect and maintain respondent as tenant of the subject land
because of the latter’s tenancy right attached to the land regardless of who its owner may
be. Under the law, the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by
changes in ownership in case of sale, as in this case, since the purpose of the law is to
strengthen the security of tenure of tenants.
2. Agrarian Reform; Right of Redemption; An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his
land, with or without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, subject, however, to the latter’s
right of redemption over the said land. In this relation, Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended,
pertinently provides: Section
12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption.—In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at
a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on
all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale,
and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall
be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
3. Same; Same; Requirements for a Valid Exercise of the Right of Redemption.-
—The right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following
requirements: (a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the
land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale
given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR; (c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural
lessee may be redeemed; and (d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days
from written notice of the sale by the vendee.
4. Same; Same; Case law further holds that tender or consignation is an indispensable
requirement to the proper exercise of the right of redemption by the agricultural lessee.
Thus, an offer to redeem can be properly effected through: (a) a formal tender with
consignation, or (b) a complaint filed in court coupled with consignation of the redemption
price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed that in making a repurchase, it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase. This
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment of the full amount of the repurchase price, i.e., the consideration of the sale,
otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual.
5. Same; Same; Having elected to exercise his right to redeem the subject land by filing a
complaint in court, it behooved upon respondent to comply with the requirements for a valid
and effective exercise of such right, i.e., the filing of the complaint should have been coupled
with the consignation of the redemption price to show his willingness and ability to pay.
Considering that respondent failed to consign the redemption price of P20,000.00 when he
filed the complaint for redemption before the PARAD on January 15, 2002, there was no
valid exercise of the right to redeem the subject land. It bears stressing that while the right of
redemption under Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, is an essential mandate of the
agrarian reform legislation to implement the State’s policy of owner- cultivatorship and to
achieve a dignified, self-reliant existence for small farmers, such laudable and commendable
policy is never intended to unduly transgress the corresponding rights of purchasers of land.
Consequently, the dismissal of the complaint for redemption is in order.

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393. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation vs. Ablay, 787 SCRA 593, March
16, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ;
1. Same; Same; The CA correctly observed that Ablay’s conviction as an accomplice to the
murder of petitioner’s former assistant manager had strained the relationship between Ablay
and petitioner. Hence, Ablay should not be reinstated in the company and, instead, be paid
separation pay, as reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect his efficiency and productivity. In this
relation, it should be clarified that said strained relation should not affect the grant of benefits
in his favor prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains to an offense entirely separate and
distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges against him in the case at bar, i.e.,
taking of the company equipment without authority. Petitioner’s payment of separation pay to
Ablay in lieu of his reinstatement is therefore warranted.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Misconduct is defined
as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text
and meaning of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be serious,
i.e., of such grave and aggravated character, and not merely trivial or unimportant.
Additionally, the misconduct must be related to the performance of the employee’s duties
showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Further, and equally important
and required, the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. In other
words, for serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the
following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
3. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; As a general rule, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if
reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages; Exceptions.-
—As a general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or
separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages. In certain
cases, however, the Court has carved out an exception to the foregoing rule and thereby
ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages on account of the following:
(a) the fact that the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (b) that the
employer was in good faith in terminating the employee.

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394. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Piccio, 789 SCRA 93, April
11, 2016 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Venue ; Libel ;
1. Same; Same; Libel; Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the
complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two (2) places, namely:
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.”-
—Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual
is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published.
2. Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; The authority to represent the State in appeals
of criminal cases before the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) is vested
solely in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is “the law office of the Government
whose specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the
People [of the Philippines] before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the
people as the ends of justice may require.”-
—The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the
CA is vested solely in the OSG which is “the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the
Philippines] before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends
of justice may require.” Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code provides that: Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1)
Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
3. Criminal Law; Venue; Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where
the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction.-
—“Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element
of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article
360 [of the RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No. 4363], specifically provides for the
possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.”

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395. Nulada vs. Paulma, 789 SCRA 111, April 12,
2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ;
1. Same; A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions
whether acting in a public or private capacity.-
—It should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions
whether acting in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in
the legal profession as a whole. In this case, respondent’s conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences.
2. Attorneys; Lawyer’s Oath; By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of
the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As such, he
can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.-
—Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar “to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law x x x.” Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that “[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By taking the lawyer’s oath,
a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional
or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
3. Same; Legal Ethics; Suspension from Practice of Law; In Heenan v. Espejo, 711 SCRA
290 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) suspended therein respondent from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds.-
—In Heenan v. Espejo, 711 SCRA 290 (2013), the Court suspended therein respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 622 SCRA
616 (2010), the same penalty was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless
checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza, 726 SCRA 70 (2014), the Court
meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two
(2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally,
in Wong
v. Moya II, 569 SCRA 256 (2008), respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to
pay his debts, respondent also breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal
advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP’s Orders in the course of its
proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was
suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate
to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

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396. Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova, 789 SCRA 209,
April 12, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Presumption of Regularity ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Case law states that [t]he
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.-
—Bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certificate should be
accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of respondent
Local Housing Board of Taguig City. Case law states that “[t]he presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness,” as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Case law dictates that “[f]or a
party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.”-
—While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal of the
same reveals that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of
injunction be issued to permanently stop “[r]espondents, or any other person acting under
their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of
[p]etitioner’s properties.” More significantly, respondents (with the exception of Casanova as
will be herein discussed) are not asked to be prevented from exercising any judicial or
ministerial function on account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
discretion, which allegation is key in an action for prohibition. Case law dictates that “[f]or a
party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial[, quasi- judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
3. Same; Injunction; Military Reservations; It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that
it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its
allegations. Hence, considering the above discussed allegations, the petition, albeit
denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which means that
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply. Instead, it is Section 21 of RA
7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin
“[t]he implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the
military reservations,” that would govern: Section 21. Injunction and Restraining Order.—The
implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the
military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except
by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
4. Same; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; The title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally.-
—The Court observes that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova’s title as President
and Chief Executive Officer, which is a public office by nature is improper to resolve in this
petition. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally. Also, it has already been settled that
prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. In
fact, petitioner impliedly recognized the impropriety of raising this issue herein by stating that
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“until the final resolution regarding the purported authority of [respondent Casanova], he
should be prohibited from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from issuing notices of
demolition.” Thus, at all events, the foregoing characterization of this action as one for
injunction, and the consequent conclusion that it was properly filed before the Court remain.
That being said, the Court now proceeds to the main issue in this case.

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5. Same; Same; Injunction; Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction
to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.-
—Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should
be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b)
a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ
must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing
rights is not a ground for injunction.
6. Demolitions; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; For another, petitioner
argues against the legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a court
order authorizing the demolition pursuant to Article 536 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of
RA 7279, and not a mere Certificate of Compliance on Demolition. However, contrary to
petitioner’s argument, the Court has already settled, in the case of Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322 (2014), that demolitions and evictions may be
validly carried out even without a judicial order when, among others, government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to
Section 28(b) of RA 7279, which reads: Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be
allowed under the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) When there
is a court order for eviction and demolition.

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397. Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Ngo, 789 SCRA 308, April
12, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ;
Consolidation of Cases ;
1. Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; Case law states that consolidation of cases,
when proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the
resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial;
Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two
(2) or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.-
—In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on Bautista’s
death. As such, it should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case No. 1117-09,
considering that the two cases involve the same property and, as correctly opined by the
court a quo, any adjudication in either case would necessarily affect the other. In this
relation, case law states that consolidation of cases, when proper, results in the simplification
of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible
major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the context of the
present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are
limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of
affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the
courts. Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts
in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single judgment.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Substitution of Parties; Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of
a case by his heirs, provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his
death. As early as in Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), the Court has settled that if
the claim in an action affects property and property rights, then the action survives the death
of a party-litigant, viz.: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the
wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries
to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.

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398. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Lokin, Jr., 790 SCRA 173, April 19,
2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be meted to respondents,
jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts which tend to erode
the public confidence in the courts, put the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice system
into disrepute, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law. In Baculi v. Battung, 658 SCRA 209 (2011), the Court meted the aforesaid penalty to a
lawyer for his disrespect to the courts, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the
integrity of the judicial system itself. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court imposes
upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry. On the other hand,
since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one directly responsible for the making of the subject
checkbook entry, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon him the graver penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the
IBP.
2. Attorneys; Criminal Contempt; Words and Phrases; Criminal contempt is conduct
that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that the indirect contempt case originally filed before the
Sandiganbayan is in the nature of a criminal contempt. “[C]riminal contempt is conduct that is
directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrespute or
disrespect.” “[C]riminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court,
is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against
public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings
to punish it are punitive.”
3. Same; Disbarment; Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents
cannot insist that the filing of an administrative case against them on the basis of the
Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the aforesaid case is premature on the premise that their
conviction has not attained finality. It is well- settled that a disbarment proceeding is
separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite being involved in
the same set of facts. Case law instructs that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the lawyer’s
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them administratively.
4. Same; Legal Ethics; As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that
would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as the subject
checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed corruption against the Sandiganbayan. It is
their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations. This is the very thrust
of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.” Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the aforesaid
Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as
in this case.
5. Same; Same; Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to “at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession” for the strength of the legal profession lies in the
dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the
profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be
reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which
tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to
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the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to
safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor,
prestige, and reputation of the judiciary. In this case, respondents compromised the integrity
of the judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the Sandiganbayan through
the subject checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents also violated Canon 7 of the CPR and,
thus, should be held administratively liable therefor.
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399. William Go Que Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, April
19, 2016 Syllabi Class :Liberal Interpretation ;
1. Liberal Interpretation; It is well to stress that “procedural rules are not to be disdained as
mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party, x x x.
Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality.” Resort to the liberal application of procedural rules remains the
exception rather than the rule; it cannot be made without any valid reasons underpinning the
said course of action. To merit liberality, the one seeking such treatment must show
reasonable cause justifying its noncompliance with the Rules, and must establish that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial justice.
Procedural rules must, at all times, be followed, save for instances when a litigant must be
rescued from an injustice far graver than the degree of his carelessness in not complying
with the prescribed procedure. The limited exception does not obtain in this case.
2. Labor Law; Quitclaims; At the outset, it should be pointed out that in a Resolution dated
July 15, 2010, the CA had already dismissed the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
109427 with respect to private respondents Singson and Pasaqui on account of the
Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they executed in petitioner’s favor subsequent to
the filing of the instant case. Notably, Singson and Pasaqui, thru their counsel, Atty. Perez,
moved that the instant petition be dismissed, without prejudice to the claims of the other
private respondents, Lominiqui and Andales, who are “on the run.” The settled rule is that
legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers’ claims should be treated
and upheld as the law between the parties. In view of the foregoing developments, there is
no longer any justiciable controversy between petitioner and private respondents Singson
and Pasaqui, rendering the instant case moot and academic, and dismissible with respect to
them.
3. Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
states that “[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.” “A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
4. Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Requirements of a Certification Against
Forum Shopping.-
—Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi- judicial agency and to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.” “Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided.
5. Same; Verification; In Fernandez v. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548 (2014), the Court
pronounced that noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein “does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or
correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby.” “Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.” Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification
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requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to
the truth of the allegations in the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427 given the
lack of competent evidence of any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one
of the private respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of
his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt. For the same reason, neither was there
substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement. In
Fernandez, the Court explained that “noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction

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thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or
presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons.’” Here, the CA did not mention —
nor does there exist — any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which
justifies the rules’ relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents
certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.
6. Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Case law states that
“[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative.” On the other hand,
“[t]he certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-
litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora.” The
important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially
called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining
private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient
submissions before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring
anew the submission of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA
patently and grossly ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its
discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.

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400. PNCC SkywayCorp vs. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 790 SCRA 427, April
19, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Grave Abuse of
Discretion ;
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Grave Abuse of Discretion;—All told,
considering that PSC had complied with Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code,
as amended, the indemnity award in favor of the terminated employees was grossly
improper and must therefore be nullified, in this respect, the DOLE Secretary gravely abused
its discretion and the CA erred in ruling otherwise. When, a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is
committed, as in this case.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Closure of Business;—Closure of business is
an authorized cause for termination of employment, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor
Code, as amended, reads: ART. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel.—The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1)-month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and
in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)-month pay or
to at least one-half (1/2)-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphases supplied) In this relation,
jurisprudence provides that “[t]he determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management
which the State does not usually interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be required to
continue operating simply because it has to maintain its workers in employment, and such act would
be tantamount to a taking of property without due process of law. As long as the company’s exercise
of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of circumventing the rights
of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be upheld.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Procedurally, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as
amended provides for three (3) requirements to properly effectuate termination on the
ground of closure or cessation of business operations. These are: (a) service of a written
notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of
termination; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to
the employees of termination pay amounting to one (1)- month pay or at least one-half-
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
4. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an
employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal
damages. In Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court
pronounced that, where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay
the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Proceeding from the same ratio, the
Court modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, 454 SCRA 119
(2005), where it created a distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause,
on the one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the other. In Jaka, it was explained that if
the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 (now, Article 297) of the Labor Code but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should
be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the
employee; if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now, Article 298) of the
Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be
stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause of
retrenchment — as contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just
cause of neglect of duty — the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at
the higher amount of P50,000.00.
5. Same; Same; —Ultimately, it was within PSC’s prerogative and discretion as employer to retain
the services of its employees for one month after the turnover date to SOMCO and to continue
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paying their salaries and benefits corresponding to that period even when there is no more work to
be done, if only “to ensure a smooth transition and gradual phasing in of the new operator, which had
yet to familiarize itself with the business.” Case law teaches that an employer may opt not to require
the dismissed employees to report for work during the 30-day notice period.

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401. Republic vs. Dagondon, 790 SCRA 414, April 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Titles and Deeds ; Reconstitution of Titles ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Verily, case law provides that “[t]he reconstitution of a certificate of
title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the
property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the
provisions of the Torrens System.” Hence, under the aforesaid law, the following must be
present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to
warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was
in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries
of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title. Thus, petitioner correctly pointed out that the applicability of RA 26 in this
case is contingent on the existence of a previously issued OCT which has been lost or
destroyed.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final
Judgments; Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon
finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The mandatory character, however, of the rule on immutability of final judgments was not
designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence,
the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial justice. In Sumbilla v.
Matrix Finance Corporation, 760 SCRA 532 (2015), the Court had the occasion to name
certain circumstances which necessitate a relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final
judgments.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Republic Act (RA) No. 26
governs the process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be
done. Specifically, Section 2 of the said law enumerates in the following order the competent
and exclusive sources from which reconstitution of an OCT may be based, viz.: Section 2.
Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owner’s duplicate of the
certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of
title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or
by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent,
as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A
document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is
given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of
said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document
which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.

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402. Office of the Ombudsman-FIO vs. Faller, 792 SCRA 361, June 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Admin Law; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service ;
Penalties ;
1. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Penalties; Simple
misconduct is classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for a period of
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, while conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense punishable by
suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.
Under Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, if the
respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges, the penalty for the most serious
charge shall be imposed and the other charges shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Likewise, under Section 49 of the same Rules, the maximum of the penalty
shall be imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, as in
this case. Accordingly, the Court concurs with the CA that the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year must be imposed upon Faller, and, conformably with Section 52 of the same Rules,
meted the accessory penalty of disqualification from promotion for the entire period of the
suspension.
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The
misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by
substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
3. Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or
distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance
of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
4. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Faller’s mistakes
and/or the irregularities involved in the contested disbursements which he actually received
resulted in an anomaly that tainted the public’s perception of his office, thereby subjecting
him to administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Jurisprudence states that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office, as in this case.

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403. Eustaquio vs. Navales, 792 SCRA 377, June
08, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Same; As a final note, it must be stressed that “[d]isbarment of lawyers is a
proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court
has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does
so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in
the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if,
through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.”
2. Attorneys; Practice of Law; It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring the authority to practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training,
and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or
rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
3. Same; Same; Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071, otherwise known as the
“Prosecution Service Act of 2010,” provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor.—The
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall: (a) Be the law officer of the province of the
city officer, as the case may be; (b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed
against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or any of his/her
assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and
for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be
enforced by application to any trial court; and (c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province or
city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject
to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof. Verily, a plain reading of the
foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City Prosecutor
requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent’s continuous
discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the
Court’s order of suspension against him.
4. Same; Same; Willful Disobedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Court; Disbarment;
Suspension; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do
so-
— acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit: Section 27.
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.— A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

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404. Facturan vs. Barcelona, Jr., 792 SCRA 389, June
08, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Prosecutors ;
1. Same; Same;Indeed, respondent’s actions and omissions in this case, i.e., his failure to
resolve I.S. No. 04-211 and to turn over the case records thereof despite orders to do so,
appear to have been committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests. As a
lawyer who is also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict
demands and high standards of the legal profession. It bears stressing that a lawyer in public
office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
Accordingly, the Court finds that suspension for a period of one (1) year, as recommended
by the IBP, should be meted upon respondent.
2. Attorneys; The Court concurs with the IBP’s factual findings and recommendation to hold
respondent administratively liable, but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, but
instead, of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The pertinent rules provide: CANON 6 –
THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS. x x x x Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar
only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. In this regard,
Rule 6.02 above quoted is particularly directed to lawyers in the government service,
enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties.
3. Same; Prosecutors; Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses in the
handling of I.S. No. 04-211 and his failure to timely return the case records thereof for further
action, despite the directive to do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely
failed, but obstinately and deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor. Such
refusal, under the circumstances, evidently worked to the advantage of the respondents in I.S.
No. 04-21.1 — which included respondent’s cousin, Elezar — as the absence of the case
records in the office of the Provincial Prosecutor resulted in the delay in the filing of the
appropriate criminal information in court against them. Hence, it is apparent that respondent
used his public position as a prosecutor to advance and protect the private interest of his
relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.

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405. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hababag, Sr., 792 SCRA 399, June
08, 2016 Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ;
1. Same; Same; That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP’s alternative Motion for
Clarification, illumines that the interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or emancipation patents are issued
by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full
payment. However, while the LBP averred that the landowner’s title was cancelled in favor of
the Republic, copies of the Republic’s title/s was/were not attached to the records of these
consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit certified true
copies of the Republic’s title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases, and the latter to
compute the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr.
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the said titles/s.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; In Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, 632 SCRA
727 (2010), the Court had illuminated that the substantiality of the payments made by the LBP
is not the determining factor in the imposition of interest as nothing less than full payment of
just compensation is required. The value of the landholdings themselves should be
equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and that interest is due and
should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after the taking
has been completed.
3. Same; Same; In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court
reemphasized that just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment, and
elucidated that “prompt payment” of just compensation encompasses the payment in full of
the just compensation to the landholders as finally determined by the courts. Hence, the
requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit by the LBP with any accessible
bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR, and its subsequent
release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set forth by RA 6657.

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406. First Mega Holdings Corp. vs. Guiguinto Water District, 792 SCRA 670, June
08, 2016 Syllabi Class :Water Permits ; Permit to Drill ;
1. Same; Permit to Drill; As petitioner in this case — to the imposition of appropriate fines
and penalties, and the stoppage of the use of water, without prejudice to the institution of a
criminal/civil action as the facts and circumstances may warrant.—The drilling of a well and
appropriation of water without the necessary permits constitute grave offenses under Section
82 of the IRR, and shall subject the violator who is not a permittee or grantee — as petitioner
in this case — to the imposition of appropriate fines and penalties, and the stoppage of the
use of water, without prejudice to the institution of a criminal/civil action as the facts and
circumstances may warrant. There having been a willful and deliberate nonobservance
and/or noncompliance with the IRR and the NWRB’s lawful order, which would have
otherwise subjected a permittee or grantee to a summary revocation/suspension of its water
permit or other rights to use water, the NWRB was well within its authority to deny
petitioner’s WPA. To rule otherwise would effectively emasculate it and prevent it from
exercising its regulatory functions.
2. Attorneys; Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; As a general rule,
government- owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings,
and government acquired asset corporations (collectively referred to as GOCCs) are not
allowed to engage the legal services of private counsels. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book
IV of Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,”
is clear that the OGCC shall act as the principal law office of GOCCs. Accordingly, Section 1
of AO No. 130, S. 1994 enjoined GOCCs to exclusively refer all legal matters pertaining to
them to the OGCC, unless their respective charters expressly name the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) as their legal counsel. Nonetheless, in exceptional cases, private counsel
can be hired with the prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or
the Government Corporate Counsel, and the prior written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit (COA). Case law holds that the lack of authority on the part of a private lawyer to file a
suit in behalf of any GOCC shall be a sufficient ground to dismiss the action filed by the said
lawyer.
3. Same; Same; Public policy considerations are behind the imposition of the requirements
relative to the engagement by GOCCs of private counsel. In Phividec Industrial Authority v.
Capitol Steel Corporation, 414 SCRA 327 (2003), the Court held: It was only with the
enactment of Memorandum Circular No. 9 in 1998 that an exception to the general
prohibition was allowed for the first time since
P.D. No. 1415 was enacted in 1978. However, indispensable conditions precedent were
imposed before any hiring of private lawyer could be effected. First, private counsel can be
hired only in exceptional cases. Second, the GOCC must first secure the written conformity
and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be, before any hiring can be done. And third, the written concurrence of the COA
must also be secured prior to the hiring. There are strong reasons behind this public policy.
One is the need of the government to curtail unnecessary public expenditures, such as the
legal fees charged by private lawyers against GOCCs. x x x: x x x x The other factor is
anchored on the perceived strong ties of the OGCC lawyers to their client government
corporations. Thus, compared to outside lawyers the OGCC lawyers are expected to be
imbued with a deeper sense of fidelity to the government’s cause and more attuned to the
need to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive information. Evidently, OGCC is tasked by
law to serve as the law office of GOCCs to the exclusion of private lawyers. Evidently again,
there is a strong policy bias against the hiring by GOCCs of private counsel.
4. Water Permits; Water Controversy; It is well to note that in an application for a water
permit before the NWRB, the presence of a protest converts the proceeding to a water
controversy, which shall then be governed by the rules prescribed for resolving water use
controversies, i.e., Rule IV of the IRR. However, absent a protest, or where a protest cannot
be considered — as in this case where the protestant, a GOCC, was not properly
represented by the OGCC — the application shall subsist. The existence of a protest is only
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one of the factors that the NWRB may consider in granting or denying a water permit
application. The filing of an improper protest only deprives the NWRB of the authority to
consider the substantial issues raised in the protest but does not strip it of the power to act
on the application.
5. Same; Same; Where extraction of ground water is sought, as in this case, a permit to drill
must first be secured from the NWRB. However, before a permit to drill is issued, the NWRB
shall conduct a field

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investigation to determine any adverse effect that may be caused to public or private
interests. Only after it has determined that the application meets the requirements and is not
prejudicial to any public or private interests shall it issue the permit to drill which shall be
regarded as a temporary permit, until the rate of water withdrawal/yield of the well has been
determined and assessed, and the application is finally (a) approved and a water permit is
issued subject to such conditions as the NWRB may impose, or (b) disapproved and
returned to the applicant, stating the reasons therefor. It should be emphasized that it is only
through a duly issued water permit that any person acquires the right to appropriate water, or
to take or divert waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by
law.

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407. Burgos, Jr. vs. Naval, 793 SCRA 120, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Civil Liability ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability;It is noteworthy to point out that
“[t]he extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
where[:] (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted. The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.” In this case, the RTC did not
render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist;
instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby, dismissed the criminal case on
the sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for
the People, thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier intimated, Burgos’s remedy
is to institute a civil case under the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
2. Appeals; Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; Jurisprudence dictates that it is the
OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an appeal on the
criminal aspect of a case. The OSG is “the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the [P]eople before
any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.” Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
provides that: Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyer. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1)
Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
3. Same; It must, however, be clarified that the CA’s dismissal of Burgos’s certiorari petition is
without prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil
aspect of the Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the
parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.

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408. Heirs of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581, June
15, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Property ; Possession ; Tax Declarations
;
1. Same; Same; Same; Tax Declarations; Not only did Jose exercise his right as owner of
the subject land by receiving the fruits thereof, he likewise performed his duties by paying
taxes therefor, evidence of which he presented in court during trial. “Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.”
2. Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Titles; In order for an action for quieting of title to
prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the
property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership,
while equitable title means beneficial ownership.
3. Same; Same; Equitable Title; Words and Phrases; Based on jurisprudence, equitable
title has been defined as “[a] title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on
recognized equitable principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal
title transferred to him. x x x. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he
must show that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer. x x x.”
In this case, Jose’s title to the subject land was derived through a contract of sale, as
evidenced by a notarized document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
18, 1984, whereby the previous owner/s, Corazon, the widow of Alfredo, transferred the
subject land and two (2) other adjoining parcels to Jose for and in consideration of
P6,000.00, for which Jose duly paid the required capital gains tax. That Corazon had the
right to transfer the land by virtue of her ownership thereof was clearly established during the
trial.
4. Same; Same; Possession; Constructive Possession; Article 1477 of the Civil Code
recognizes that the “ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.” Related to this article is Article 1497 of the same
Code which provides that “[t]he thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed
in the control and possession of the vendee.” Article 1498 of the Civil Code lays down the
general rule that the execution of a public instrument “shall be equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred.” However, the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a
prima facie presumption of delivery, which is negated by the failure of the vendee to take
actual possession of the land sold. A person who does not have actual possession of the
thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public
instrument.
5. Same; Same; Same; Case law teaches that “[i]t is not necessary that the owner of a
parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the
act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is
physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights
as owner is in such occupancy,” as the parties in this case. Notably, the fact that
respondents delivered the produce of the land to Jose, which Manuel admitted in open court,
can only be construed as his recognition of Jose’s ownership of the land despite his tenuous
claim that he merely did so because Jose is his brother.

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480
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409. Tiu vs. Dizon, 793 SCRA 595, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Pardon ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon prisoners
under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which “essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by
such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove such acts.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; The object of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. The writ is
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias. In this case,
petitioner is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the offense of selling and
delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended
by RA 7659. He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that he
is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
3. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; It must be emphasized that pardon
is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. A pardon is a
deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential.
4. Same; Same; Same; Conditional Pardon; The executive clemency extended by PGMA on
June 3, 2010 to a number of prisoners including petitioner was made “subject to the conditions
indicated in the corresponding documents.” It is undisputed, however, that no individual pardon
papers were issued in petitioner’s favour, thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him
as incomplete and ineffective, as clarified by Deputy Executive Secretary Aguinaldo. The necessity
for the individual pardon papers is best explained by the nature of a conditional pardon, which is “a
contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect
that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms
of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an
additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound
to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.” The individual
pardon papers, therefore, contain the terms and conditions of the contract of pardon, the compliance of
which is essential to the pardonee’s freedom from recommitment to prison.
5. Same; Colonist Status; As correctly argued by the OSG, the conferment by the Director of
Corrections of a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to reduce the latter’s sentence. Section 5
of Act No. 2489 is clear and unambiguous: “[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment
receiving and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties will automatically have the
sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence of thirty (30) years when receiving the executive
approval for this classification upon which the regular credit now authorized by law and special credit
authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made.”
6. Same; Same; The wording of the law is such that the act of classification as a penal colonist or
trustie is separate from and necessarily precedes the act of approval by the Executive. Under Section
6, Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the BuCor-OM quoted earlier, the Director of Corrections may, upon
the recommendation of the Classification Board of the Bureau of Corrections, classify an inmate as a
colonist. It is crucial, however, that the prisoner not only receives, but retains such classification,
because the grant of a colonist status may, for cause, be revoked at any time by the Superintendent
with the approval of the Director of Corrections pursuant to Section 9 of the same Chapter. It is the
classification of the penal colonist and trustie of the Director of Corrections which subsequently
receives executive approval.
7. Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; The reduction of a prisoner’s sentence is a
partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative
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to extend the same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically under Section 19, Article VII thereof, provides
that the President possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, which petitioner explicitly recognized by applying for commutation of sentence even during
the pendency of his request for the implementation of the conditional pardon.

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482
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410. Tan vs. Cinco, 793 SCRA 610, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Courts ; Jurisdiction ; Voidable Judgments ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Void Judgments; A judgment rendered by a court
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and
produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is
crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Judicial Stability; Doctrine of Non-
interference; In Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 437 (2015), the Court explained the doctrine
of judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the
regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution
order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the
inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law
and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The
remedy, however, is not the resort to another coequal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court
has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

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483
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411. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kho, 793 SCRA 651, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Guidelines in the Remand of Agrarian
Cases;
1. Same; Same; Guidelines in the Remand of Agrarian Cases.-
— While the parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1, Series of
2010, the Court finds a need to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of just
compensation to ensure compliance with the law, and to give everyone — the landowner, the
farmers, and the State — their due. To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the
following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were
issued in the names of the farmer-beneficiaries on May 27, 2002. Hence, the evidence to be
presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject land must be
based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands. 2. Just
compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that
while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the
just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it
do not warrant their application. In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be
inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other
factors or formula in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the acquired property.
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and
based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of
legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just
compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part
of the State.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Case law dictates that when the acquisition
process under PD 27 is still incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation
due to the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under RA 6657, as amended.
3. Same; Same; Fair Market Value; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition,
the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition
cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn
valuation,
(e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the
government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
4. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; The RTC,
acting as a SAC, is reminded that it is not strictly bound by the different formula created by
the DAR if the situations before it do not warrant their application. To insist on a rigid
application of the formula goes beyond the intent and spirit of the law, bearing in mind that
the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies. Therefore, the
RTC must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation of the
factors for just compensation, which cannot be restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR
when faced with situations that do not warrant its strict application. However, the RTC must
explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and
formula.
484
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 ****

485
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
412. Cagayan Electric Power &Lamp; Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO) vs. CEPALCO
Employee’s Labor Union-Associated Labor Unions-Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP), 794 SCRA 95, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Labor-only Contracting ;
1. Same; Same; If at all, it would be the employees of CESCO who are entitled to seek the
foregoing reliefs since in cases of labor-only contracting, “the person or intermediary shall be
considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in
the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.” However, they
have not been impleaded in these cases. Thus, as prayed for by petitioners, the Court must
set aside the portions of the assailed CA Decisions declaring: (a) the workers hired by
CESCO, pursuant to the contracts subject of these cases, as regular employees of
CEPALCO; and (b) the latter responsible to said workers in the same manner and extent as
if they were directly employed by it. This pronouncement not only squares with the rules on
real party-in-interest and legal standing, but also with the precept that no one shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and that strangers to a case are not
bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
2. Labor Law; Labor-only Contracting; Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended,
labor-only contracting is an arrangement where the contractor, who does not have
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,
among others, supplies workers to an employer and the workers recruited are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. Section 5 of
Department Order No. 18-02, Series of 2002, otherwise known as the “Rules Implementing
Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, As Amended” (DO 18-02), provides the following
criteria to gauge whether or not an arrangement constitutes labor-only contracting: Section 5.
Prohibition against labor-only contracting.—Labor-only contracting is hereby declared
prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work
or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work
or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such
contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal; or ii) the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the
performance of the work of the contractual employee. The foregoing provisions shall be
without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of the Labor Code, as amended.
“Substantial capital or investment” refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in
the case of corporations, tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises,
actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or
completion of the job, work or service contracted out. The “right to control” shall refer to the
right reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed,
to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in
reaching that end.
3. Same; Same; Unfair Labor Practices; Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of
ULP when the same is devised by the employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.” Article 259 of the Labor Code,
as amended, which enumerates certain prohibited activities constitutive of ULP, provides:
Article 259. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers.— It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practice: x x x x (c) To contract out services or
functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. x x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) The need to determine whether or not the contracting out of services
(or any particular activity or scheme devised by the employer for that matter) was intended to
defeat the workers’ right to self-organization is impelled by the underlying concept of ULP.

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486
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
413. Del Rosario vs. Ocampo-Ferrer, 794 SCRA 116, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or
Noninterference ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Noninterference; At
the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or
noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court, the various trial courts
of a province or city, having the same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. In
Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 414 (2015), the Court had the opportunity to thoroughly
explain the said doctrine in this manner: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in
the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an
execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all proceedings on
the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has
the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers
and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law
and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The
remedy, however, is not the resort to another coequal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court
has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. x x x
x It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued
against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of
a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. x x x As already mentioned
above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing
court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body.

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414. Ting Trucking vs. Makilan, 794 SCRA 140, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Serious Misconduct ;
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Serious misconduct is
one (1) of the just causes for termination under Article 297 of the Labor Code.-
—Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a
valid cause. Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination under Article 297 of
the Labor Code, which reads in part: ART. 297. Termination By Employer.—An employer
may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work. x x x x Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is
a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To
constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article [297] of the
Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be serious — that is, of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct must
be related to the performance of the employee’s duties showing him to be unfit to continue
working for the employer. Further, the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful
intent. Thus, for serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the
following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the
outset, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from
the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The
Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. The rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted where the findings of
fact of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the CA, on the other hand, are
contradictory, as in this case. There is therefore a need to review the records to determine
whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, in ruling that respondent was not illegally dismissed.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.

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415. Balao vs. Ermita, 794 SCRA 177, June 21, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Amparo Rule ; Writ of Amparo ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural
measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is
expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an
inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action
thereon can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided
that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on
their lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively
hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these
cases.
2. Constitutional Law; Amparo Rule; Writ of Amparo; Under Section 20 of the Amparo
rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not dismiss, the case should it determine that it
could not proceed for a valid cause, viz.: Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases.—The
court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot
proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to
threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo
court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for
further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute
the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the
case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated
list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.

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489
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
416. Philippine Asset Growth Two, Inc. vs. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc. (formerly
First Asia System Technology, Inc.), 794 SCRA 625, June 28, 2016
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In view of all the foregoing, the Court is therefore constrained to
grant the instant petition, notwithstanding the preliminary technical error as above discussed.
A distressed corporation should not be rehabilitated when the results of the financial
examination and analysis clearly indicate that there lies no reasonable probability that it may
be revived, to the detriment of its numerous stakeholders which include not only the
corporation’s creditors but also the public at large.
2. Attorneys; It is a long standing doctrine that where a party is represented by several
counsels, notice to one is sufficient, and binds the said party. Notice to anyone of the several
counsels on record is equivalent to notice to all, and such notice starts the running of the
period to appeal notwithstanding that the other counsel on record has not received a copy of
the decision or resolution.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Generally, the failure to perfect an appeal in
the manner and within the period provided for by law renders the decision appealed from
final and executory, and beyond the competence of the Court to review. However, the Court
has repeatedly relaxed this procedural rule in the higher interest of substantial justice. In
Barnes v. Padilla, 439 SCRA 675 (2004), it was held that: [A] final and executory judgment
can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by
the highest court of the land. However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve
substantial justice[,] considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
4. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Words and Phrases; “Rehabilitation,” Defined.-
—Rehabilitation is statutorily defined under Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise known as the
“Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010” (FRIA), as follows: Section 4. Definition
of Terms.—As used in this Act, the term: x x x x (gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the
restoration of the debtor to a condition of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown
that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way
of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a
going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
5. Same; Same; Corporate Rehabilitation; Case law explains that corporate rehabilitation
contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the
purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be
paid their claims out of its earnings. Thus, the basic issues in rehabilitation proceedings
concern the viability and desirability of continuing the business operations of the distressed
corporation, all with a view of effectively restoring it to a state of solvency or to its former
healthy financial condition through the adoption of a rehabilitation plan.
6. Same; Same; Same; A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging the
resolve, determination, earnestness, and good faith of the distressed corporation in financing
the proposed rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary undertakings of
the stockholders or the would-be investors of the debtor-corporation indicating their
readiness, willingness, and ability to contribute funds or property to guarantee the continued
successful operation of the debtor-corporation during the period of rehabilitation.
7. Same; Same; Same; The failure of the Rehabilitation Plan to state any material financial
commitment to support rehabilitation, as well as to include a liquidation analysis, renders the
CA’s considerations for approving the same, i.e., that: (a) respondents would be able to meet
their obligations to their creditors within their operating cash profits and other assets without
disrupting their business operations; (b) the Rehabilitation Receiver’s opinion carries great
weight; and (c) rehabilitation will be beneficial for respondents’ creditors, employees,
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stockholders, and the economy, as actually unsubstantiated, and hence, insufficient to
decree the feasibility of respondents’ rehabilitation. It is well to emphasize that the remedy of
rehabilitation should be denied to corporations that do not qualify under the Rules. Neither
should it be allowed to corporations whose sole purpose is to delay the enforcement of any
of the rights of the creditors.

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8. Same; Same; Same; The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is not only to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life, but also to allow creditors to be paid their claims from
its earnings when so rehabilitated. Hence, the remedy must be accorded only after a
judicious regard of all stakeholders’ interests; it is not a one-sided tool that may be graciously
invoked to escape every position of distress. Thus, the remedy of rehabilitation should be
denied to corporations whose insolvency appears to be irreversible and whose sole purpose
is to delay the enforcement of any of the rights of the creditors, which is rendered obvious by:
(a) the absence of a sound and workable business plan; (b) baseless and unexplained
assumptions, targets, and goals; and (c) speculative capital infusion or complete lack thereof
for the execution of the business plan, as in this case.

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417. Odiamar vs. Valencia, 795 SCRA 18, June 28,
2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Interest Rates; It is fundamental that for monetary interest to be due, there must be
an express written agreement therefor. Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides that “[n]o
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.” In this relation, case
law states that the lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount bars a
creditor from charging monetary interest and the collection of interest without any stipulation
therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; Judicial Admissions; Having admitted that she
obtained loans from respondent without showing that the same had already been paid or
otherwise extinguished, petitioner cannot now aver otherwise. It is settled that judicial
admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove
them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither
of which was shown to exist in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her admission of
liability and the only material question remaining is the extent of such liability.
3. Civil Law; Obligations; Novation; In S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development
Corporation
v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013), the Court held that to constitute novation by substitution of
debtor, the former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the third
person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the contractual relations. Moreover,
the Court ruled that the “fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has
assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors and not novation.” At its
core, novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must
appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken. Here, the intent to novate was not satisfactorily proven by
respondent. At best, petitioner only manifested her desire to shoulder the debt of her
parents, which, as above discussed, does not amount to novation. Thus, the courts a quo
erred in holding petitioner liable for the debts obtained by her deceased parents on account
of novation by substitution of the debtor.

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418. Puncia vs. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., 795 SCRA 32, June
28, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Damages ; Nominal
Damages ;
1. Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a
just cause, albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements, the former should pay the
latter nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; At the outset, the Court notes
that consolidation of cases is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which involve
a common question of law or fact before the court. It is a procedural device granted to the court as an
aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. The rationale for
consolidation is to have all cases, which are intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court
to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered and in effect, prevent confusion,
unnecessary costs, and delay. It is an action sought to avoid multiplicity of suits; guard against
oppression and abuse; clear congested dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial court in order to
attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
3. Same; Same; Same; In order to determine whether consolidation is proper, the test is to check
whether the cases involve the resolution of common questions of law, related facts, or the same
parties. Consolidation is proper whenever the subject matter involved and the relief demanded in the
different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate
the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together. However, it must be stressed that an essential
requisite of consolidation is that the several actions which should be pending before the court, arise
from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence. As succinctly stated in the rules, consolidation is allowed when
there are similar actions which are pending before the court — for there is nothing to consolidate
when a matter has already been resolved and the very purpose of consolidation, to avoid conflicting
decisions and multiplicity of suits, rendered futile.
4. Same; Same; Same; It should be emphasized that the consolidation of cases is aimed to
simplify the proceedings as it contributes to the swift dispensation of justice. As such, it is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and the latter’s action in consolidation will not be disturbed in the
absence of manifest abuse of discretion tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, which is absent in this case.
5. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Due Process; It is settled that “for a dismissal to
be valid, the rule is that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due process
requirements. Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or
an authorized cause under Articles 297, 298 or 299 (formerly Articles 282, 283, and 284) of the Labor
Code. Procedural due process, on the other hand, mandates that the employer must observe the
twin requirements of notice and hearing before a dismissal can be effected.” Thus, to determine the
validity of Puncia’s dismissal, there is a need to discuss whether there was indeed just cause for his
termination.
6. Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; In the instant case, records reveal that as a Marketing
Professional for Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of seven (7) vehicles from March 2011 to
June 2011. As he was having trouble complying with said quota, Toyota even extended him a
modicum of leniency by lowering his monthly sales quota to just three (3) vehicles for the months of
July and August 2011; but even then, he still failed to comply. In that six (6)-month span, Puncia
miserably failed in satisfying his monthly sales quota, only selling a measly five (5) vehicles out of the
34 he was required to sell over the course of said period. Verily, Puncia’s repeated failure to perform
his duties — i.e., reaching his monthly sales quota — for such a period of time falls under the
concept of gross inefficiency. In this regard, case law instructs that “gross inefficiency” is analogous
to “gross neglect of duty,” a just cause of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code, for both involve
specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his
business.
7. Same; Same; A reading of the Notice of Termination shows that Puncia was dismissed not for
the ground stated in the Notice to Explain, but for gross insubordination on account of his
nonappearance in the scheduled October 17, 2011 hearing without justifiable reason. In other words,
while Toyota afforded Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of gross inefficiency against him, the
latter was completely deprived of the same when he was dismissed for gross insubordination — a
completely different ground from what was stated in the Notice to Explain. As such, Puncia’s right to
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procedural due process was violated.

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419. Ambray vs. Tsourous, 795 SCRA 627, July 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :RemLaw; Evidence; Testimony at a Former Proceeding; Hearsay Evidence
Rule;
1. Same; Same; Testimony at a Former Proceeding; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Notably,
the admissibility of Estela’s former testimony in the present case finds basis in Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the “rule on former testimony” which provides: Section
47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross- examine him. Case law holds
that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in
the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. The reasons for the
admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be introduced in
evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must
establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the
outset, it should be pointed out that, as a general rule, a reexamination of factual findings
cannot be done by the SC acting on a petition for review on certiorari because it is not a trier
of facts and only reviews questions of law. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Finding a confluence of certain
exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains
the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.
3. Forgery; Burden of Proof; As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered
in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized to have been forged.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Handwritings; Manner of Proving Genuineness of
Handwritings.-
—Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom
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the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary
thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over
allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a
witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial
evidence at best.
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420. Logarta vs. Mangahis, 795 SCRA 644, July 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Registration ; Property Registration Decree ;
1. Same; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Thus, the prevailing rule is
that voluntary instruments such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales
are registered by presenting the owner’s duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant
to Sections 51 to 53 of PD 1529. The reason for requiring the production of the owner’s
duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is that, being a willful act of
the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument
and would willingly surrender, present or produce his duplicate certificate of title to the
Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration. The exception to this rule is when
the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender his duplicate copy of the title, in which case
the claimant may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his adverse claim.
2. Civil Law; Property; Adverse Claims; An adverse claim is a type of involuntary dealing
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property by apprising third
persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land. It seeks to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy, where
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Property Registration
Decree. An adverse claim serves as a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding
the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
3. Same; Same; Same; Before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it must be shown that
there is no other provision in law for the registration of the claimant’s alleged right in the
property. In Register of Deeds of Quezon City v. Nicandro, 1 SCRA 1334 (1961), the Court
held that where the basis of the adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale which is
specifically governed by Section 57 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, the filing of
an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee’s right.
Similarly, in L. P. Leviste & Company, Inc. v. Noblejas, 89 SCRA 520 (1979), the Court
emphasized that if the basis of the adverse claim is a perfected contract of sale, the proper
procedure is to register the vendee’s right as prescribed by Sections 51 and 52 of PD 1529,
and not under Section 70 which is ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee’s right
since it does not have the effect of a conveyance.

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421. Century Properties, Inc. vs. Babiano, 795 SCRA 671, July
05, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, a party who has not
appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed
decision. However, jurisprudence admits an exception to the said rule, such as when strict
adherence thereto shall result in the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties
concerned. In Global Resource for Outsourced Workers (GROW), Inc. v. Velasco, 678 SCRA
751 (2012): Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a judgment is deemed to have
acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than what was already granted under said judgment. However, when strict adherence to
such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that of an illegally dismissed
employee to monetary compensation as provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court
set aside the rule to pave the way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides
that “[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.” In Norton Resources
and Development Corporation
v. All Asia Bank Corporation, 605 SCRA 370 (2009), the Court had the opportunity to
thoroughly discuss the said rule as follows: The rule is that where the language of a contract
is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic
facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that
language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and
unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to
mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be
understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one
party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the
terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.
3. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Control Test; Anent the nature of
Concepcion’s engagement, based on case law, the presence of the following elements
evince the existence of an employer-employee relationship: (a) the power to hire, i.e., the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct, or the so called
“control test.” The control test is commonly regarded as the most important indicator of the
presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under this test, an employer-
employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be
used in reaching that end.
4. Same; Same; The existence of employer-employee relations could not be negated by the
mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract.-
—While the employment agreement of Concepcion was denominated as a “Contract of
Agency for Project Director,” it should be stressed that the existence of employer-employee
relations could not be negated by the mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract. In the
case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC (4th Division), 287 SCRA 476 (1998), it was
ruled that one’s employment status is defined and prescribed by law, and not by what the
parties say it should be, viz.: It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management contract and
providing therein that the “employee” is an independent contractor when the terms of the
agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment status of a person is defined and
prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. In determining the status of
the management contract, the “four-fold test” on employment earlier mentioned has to be
applied. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Therefore, the CA correctly ruled that since
there exists an employer-employee relationship between Concepcion and CPI, the labor
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tribunals correctly assumed jurisdiction over her money claims.

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422. Tom vs. Rodriguez, 797 SCRA 60, July 13,
2016 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ;
Corporations ;
1. Mercantile Law; Corporations; The Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction on
the ground that a corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through
its board of directors and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board
resolution or its bylaws. As held in AF Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight
Services, Co., 373 SCRA 385 (2002): Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly
provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be exercised by the board of
directors. Just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts in his behalf, so
may the board of directors of a corporation validly delegate some of its functions to individual
officers or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or acts of a corporation must be made
either by the board of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by the board. Absent
such valid delegation/authorization, the rule is that the declarations of an individual director
relating to the affairs of the corporation, but not in the course of, or connected with, the
performance of authorized duties of such director, are held not binding on the corporation.
As the provisions of the MOA are in direct contravention of the foregoing precepts, which the
Court had earlier espoused in the July 6, 2015 Decision, its execution cannot in any way
affect, change, or render the Court’s previous disquisitions moot and academic. In fact, the
MOA is, clearly and in all respects, contrary to law. Therefore, the writ of preliminary
injunction must stand.

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423. People vs. Cenido, 797 SCRA 102, July 18, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained
that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently, Remedios’s death on March 7,
2014 renders the Court’s July 7, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is
therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Remedios is dismissed.
2. Criminal Law; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; On April
11, 2014, the Court received a Letter dated April 10, 2014 from the Correctional Institution for
Women informing the Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case,
Remedios, on March 7, 2014. In a Resolution dated September 9, 2015, the Court required
the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to furnish the Court with a
certified true copy of Remedios’s death certificate and, in compliance thereto, the same was
submitted by Officer-In-Charge Elsa Aquino-Alabado on February 11, 2016. As Remedios’s
death transpired before the promulgation of the Court’s July 7, 2014 Resolution in this case,
i.e., when her appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, her criminal liability is
totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

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424. Bautista vs. Doniego, Jr., 797 SCRA 724, July 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; For
appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the
petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; (b) he
must have filed his petition for review within the reglementary period; (c) he must have paid
the necessary docket fees; and (d) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in
due time. In this regard, the Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition for
review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the
petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect the appeal, the party
has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. The
law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the
payment of the docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the case.

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425. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), 798 SCRA 250, July 26, 2016
Syllabi Class :Judicial Review ;
1. Judicial Review; I reserve opinion on whether the “exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest” can be a ground for ruling on a case despite it becoming
moot and academic. In my view, a more becoming appreciation of the judiciary’s role in the
entire constitutional order should always give pause to go beyond the issues crystallized by
an actual case with a real, present controversy. Going beyond the parameters of a live case
may be an invitation to participate in the crafting of policies properly addressed to the other
departments and organs of government. I am of the belief that the judiciary should take an
attitude of principled restraint.
2. Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate
actual, ongoing controversies. The requirement of the existence of a “case” or an “actual
controversy” for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, the Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
3. Actions; Moot and Academic; Words and Phrases; An action is considered “moot”
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events. Nevertheless, case law states that the Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved;
third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these four instances as exceptions to the
mootness principle.
4. Same; Same; Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining
whether a case involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness principle.
However, a survey of cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there
should be some perceivable benefit to the public which demands the Court to proceed with
the resolution of otherwise moot questions.
5. Genetically Modified Organisms; Bt Talong; At this juncture, it is important to
understand that the completion and termination of the field tests do not mean that herein
petitioners may inevitably proceed to commercially propagate Bt talong. There are three (3)
stages before genetically modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially available
under DAO 08-2002 and each stage is distinct, such that “[subsequent stages can only
proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is given to engage in the next
regulatory stage.” Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed to be
propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must be secured from the BPI;
(b) it can be shown that based on the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated
article will not pose any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety
studies show that the regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and animal
health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event has
been duly registered with the FPA.
6. Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; It would appear to be more beneficial to
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the public to stay a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong-
— or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for that matter — until an actual and justiciable
case properly presents itself before the Supreme Court (SC).—As the matter never went
beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were
pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-
effects to the already concluded Bt talong field trials that demand an adjudication from which
the public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the right of herein respondents or the
public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is

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therefore more imagined than real. In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public
to stay a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong — or GMOs, for that matter — until an actual
and justiciable case properly presents itself before the Court. In his Concurring Opinion on the
main, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) had aptly pointed out that
“the findings [resulting from the Bt talong field trials] should be the material to provide more
rigorous scientific analysis of the various claims made in relation to Bt talong.” True enough,
the concluded field tests — like those in these cases
— would yield data that may prove useful for future studies and analyses. If at all, resolving
the petition for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of further research and
testing on Bt talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to hinder scientific
advancement on the subject matter.
7. Writs of Kalikasan; It is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing
the merits of field trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt talong
tested, but are now, in fact, rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the regulatory
framework applied to GMO field testing. To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been
superseded by Joint Department Circular No. 1, Series of 2016 (JDC 01-2016), issued by
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR, the Department of
Health (DOH), and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), which
provides a substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002 as will
be detailed below. Thus, to resolve respondents’ petition for Writ of Kalikasan on its merits,
would be tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly exercise for the Court to assess alleged
violations of health and environmental rights that arose from a past test case whose bearings
do not find any — if not minimal — relevance to cases operating under today’s regulatory
framework.
8. Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-
2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being one capable of repetition so as to
warrant review despite its mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that: Section 1.
Applicability.—This Joint Department Circular shall apply to the research, development,
handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment, and management
of genetically modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modern technology,
included under “regulated articles.” As earlier adverted to, with the issuance of JDC 01-2016,
a new regulatory framework in the conduct of field testing now applies.
9. Genetically Modified Organisms; JDC 01-2016 also prescribes additional qualifications
for the members of the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists
that evaluates the risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial, commercial
propagation, or direct use of regulated articles. Aside from not being an official, staff or
employee of the DA or any of its attached agencies, JDC 01-2016 requires that members of
the STRP: (a) must not be directly or indirectly employed or engaged by a company or
institution with pending applications for permits under JDC 01- 2016; (b) must possess
technical expertise in food and nutrition, toxicology, ecology, crop protection, environmental
science, molecular biology and biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding, or animal nutrition;
and (c) must be well-respected in the scientific community.
10. Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the
regulatory framework now applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters involving the
research, development, handling, movement, and release into the environment of genetically
modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology is
substantially different from that which was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it
cannot be said that the present case is one capable of repetition yet evading review. The
essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading review was succinctly explained by the
Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), where the constitutionality of the
Executive Department’s lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013 General
Appropriations Act, known as the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), was
assailed. In that case, the Court rejected the view that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by the Executive Department and
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former President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III’s declaration that he had already “abolished
the PDAF.”
11. Same; Same; At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be
considered before a case is deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would
be subjected to the same action. Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the
subject field tests was too short to be fully litigated. It must be

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emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were issued on March 16,
2010 and June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by
Justice Leonen, respondents filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 —
just a few months before the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing activities
were already over. Obviously, therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the
case could be resolved was due to respondents’ own inaction.
12. Same; Separation of Powers; While the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were averred to be
inadequate to protect (a) the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology since “said regulation failed, among others, to anticipate ‘the public implications
caused by the importation of GMOs in the Philippines’”; and (b) “the people from the
potential harm these genetically modified plants and genetically-modified organisms may
cause human health and the environment, [and] thus, x x x fall short of Constitutional
compliance,” respondents merely prayed for its amendment, as well as that of the NBF, to
define or incorporate “an independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific and socio-
economic risk assessment, public information, consultation, and participation, and providing
for their effective implementation, in accord with international safety standards[.]” This
attempt to assail the constitutionality of the public information and consultation requirements
under DAO 08- 2002 and the NBF constitutes a collateral attack on the said provisions of
law that runs afoul of the well-settled rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be
collaterally attacked as constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.
Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing
to the contrary, in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the
measure had first been carefully studied by the executive department and found to be in
accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.

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426. Grace Park International Corp. vs. Eastwest Banking Corp., 798 SCRA 644, July
27, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Forum Shopping ; Identity of
Causes of Action ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Identity of Causes of Action; With respect to the second and third
requisites of forum shopping, “[h]ornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not
mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata
by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party
cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be
twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Among the several tests resorted to
in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1)
whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of
action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint
in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; At the outset,
it must be emphasized that “[forum shopping] is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. What is important in determining whether [forum
shopping] exists is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Elements of In Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, 716 SCRA 175
(2014),
the Court held that “[t]he test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to
res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.”
4. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; In reference to the foregoing, litis
pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in
some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a
civil action, it refers to the situation where two (2) actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one (1) of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.
5. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Identity of Parties; Anent the first requisite of forum
shopping, “[t]here is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same, or there
is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest is
sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a
community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case even if
the latter was not impleaded in the first case.”
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 ****

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427. Medina vs. Koike, 798 SCRA 733, July 27,
2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure
; Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is
not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders
rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
2. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code-
— which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner
— allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.—At the outset, it
bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads: Art. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
3. Same; Same; Same; The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), the Court
had the occasion to rule that: The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
4. Same; Same; Same; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), it was pointed out that in
order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it
must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering that the validity of the
divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of
Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of
fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

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428. Torrefiel vs. Beauty Lane Phils., Inc., 799 SCRA 470, August
03, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ;
Two-Notice Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Two-Notice Rule; Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that two
(2) written notices are required before termination of employment can be legally effected,
namely: (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss
him.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It should be pointed out that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely reexamine the evidence
presented by the contending parties.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; It is
settled that in employee termination disputes such as the present case, the employer bears
the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal was for a lawful cause. Equipoise is not
enough and the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
4. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; It should be pointed out that while
Torrefiel was essentially a salesman, he did not occupy a position of trust and confidence,
the loss of which is a just cause for dismissal. To recall, there are two (2) classes of positions
of trust: the first class consists of managerial employees or those vested with the powers or
prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial
actions; the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, and the like
who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of money or property.
5. Same; Same; Same; At any rate, even assuming that he regularly handled significant
amounts of money or property, he cannot be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence considering that the basis therefor has not been established. It is settled that for
dismissal based on such ground to be valid, the act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts which was not the case here.

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429. CIR vs. Goodyear Philippines, Inc., 799 SCRA 489, August
03, 2016 Syllabi Class :RP-US Tax Treaty ;
1. RP-US Tax Treaty; Under Article 11(5) of the RP-US Tax Treaty, the term “dividends”
should be understood according to the taxation law of the State in which the corporation
making the distribution is a resident, which, in this case, pertains to respondent, a resident of
the Philippines. Accordingly, attention should be drawn to the statutory definition of what
constitutes “dividends,” pursuant to Section 73(A) of the Tax Code which provides that “[t]he
term ‘dividends’ x x x means any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders out of
its earnings or profits and payable to its shareholders, whether in money or in other property.”
2. Taxation; Tax Refund; Section 229 of the Tax Code states that judicial claims for refund
must be filed within two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty, providing
further that the same may not be maintained until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).
3. Same; Same; The primary purpose of filing an administrative claim was to serve as a
notice of warning to the CIR that court action would follow unless the tax or penalty alleged
to have been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded. To clarify, Section 229 of the Tax
Code — [then Section 306 of the old Tax Code] — however does not mean that the taxpayer
must await the final resolution of its administrative claim for refund, since doing so would be
tantamount to the taxpayer’s forfeiture of its right to seek judicial recourse should the two (2)-
year prescriptive period expire without the appropriate judicial claim being filed.

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430. People vs. Egagamao, 799 SCRA 507, August 03,
2016 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal
Liability ;
1. Same; Same; Upon Egagamao’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused;
the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Under Article 89(1) of the RPC, the
consequences of Egagamao’s death are as follows: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

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431. Tatlonghari vs. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., 799 SCRA 516, August
03, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Amendment of Pleadings ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that bona fide amendments to pleadings should
be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as
it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the
proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; Our rules of procedure allow
a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is
amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to
be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend
his pleading upon prior leave of court.

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432. Nuezca vs. Villagarcia, 799 SCRA 542, August
08, 2016 Syllabi Class :Practice of Law ; Attorneys ;
1. Same; Same; Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.
2. Practice of Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet
the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

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433. Holcim Philippines, Inc. vs. Obra, 799 SCRA 607, August 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Reinstatement ; Backwages ;
1. Same; Same; Reinstatement; Backwages; In Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. v.
Pionilla, 704 SCRA 362 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) ordered the reinstatement of
the employee without backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact that the
dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (b) that the employer was
in good faith in terminating the employee.-
—Meanwhile, anent the propriety of awarding back wages, the Court observes that
respondent’s transgression — even if not deserving of the ultimate penalty of dismissal —
warrants the denial of the said award following the parameters in Integrated
Microelectronics, Inc. v. Pionilla, 704 SCRA 362 (2013). In that case, the Court ordered the
reinstatement of the employee without backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact
that the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (b) that the employer
was in good faith in terminating the employee.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; There is no question that the employer has
the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees for just causes.
This right is, however, subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its
police power. Accordingly, the finding that an employee violated company rules and
regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to determine if the dismissal is justified and, if so,
whether the penalty imposed is commensurate to the gravity of his offense.
3. Same; Same; Time and again, the Court has held that infractions committed by an
employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The
penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee.
4. Same; Same; Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Misconduct is an improper or wrong
conduct, or a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. To constitute a valid cause for dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282
(now Article 297) of the Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be serious, i.e., of
such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant, as in this case
where the item which respondent tried to take out was practically of no value to petitioner.
5. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; As a general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to: (a) reinstatement (or separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable); and (b)
payment of full backwages.
6. Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; Separation Pay; It is settled that
the doctrine on “strained relations” cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor
dispute almost invariably results in “strained relations”; otherwise, reinstatement can never
be possible simply because some hostility is engendered between the parties as a result of
their disagreement. It is imperative, therefore, that strained relations be demonstrated as a
fact and adequately supported by substantial evidence showing that the relationship between
the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary consequence of the
judicial controversy.

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434. Dongga-as vs. Cruz-Angeles, 799 SCRA 624, August
09, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Suspension from Practice
of Law ;
1. Same; Suspension from Practice of Law; Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their
client’s affairs, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, and at the
same time committed acts of misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years.
2. Attorneys; Case law exhorts that, “once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.”
3. Same; It bears stressing that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary
nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client.
4. Same; It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying
true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an
officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to
safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor,
prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.

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435. People vs. Manago, 801 SCRA 103, August 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Warrantless Searches and Seizures ;
1. Same; Same; It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police
officers carte blanche discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search — as opposed to a
mere routine inspection — such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long
as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
2. Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and
seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To
protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
3. Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Searches and Seizures; One of the
recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed.
4. Same; Same; Three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected.-
—There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
5. Same; Same; A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the
setup of military or police checkpoints — as in this case — which, based on jurisprudence,
are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order
and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.

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436. Gargallo vs. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 801 SCRA 135, August
17, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s fees; As a rule, the mere fact of having been forced to litigate to protect one’s
interest does not amount to a compelling legal reason to justify an award of attorney’s fees in
the claimant’s favor. Verily, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that attorney’s fees
may be awarded to a claimant who is compelled to litigate with third persons or incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the
party from whom it is sought only when there is sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of
the latter in refusing to pay.
2. Republic Act No. 8042; Corporate Liabilities; Overseas Filipino Workers; Section 10
of RA No. 8042, as amended, expressly provides for joint and solidary liability of corporate
directors and officers with the recruitment/placement agency for all money claims or
damages that may be awarded to Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). While a corporate
director, trustee, or officer who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation generally
cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter, in deference to the separate
and distinct legal personality of a corporation from the persons composing it, personal
liability of such corporate director, trustee, or officer, along (although not necessarily) with
the corporation, may validly attach when he is made by a specific provision of law personally
answerable for his corporate action, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended, and the pertinent POEA Rules
are deemed incorporated in petitioner’s employment contract with respondents. These
provisions are in line with the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the
workers’ plight, and are meant to assure OFWs immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. Thus, as the law provides, corporate directors and officers are themselves
solidarily liable with the recruitment/placement agency for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to OFWs.
4. Overseas Filipino Workers; Social Security System; The Court cannot subscribe to
respondents’ contention that entitlement to income benefit is applicable only to land-based
employees compulsorily registered with the Social Security System (SSS), considering that
the 2010 POEA-SEC accords upon the manning agency/foreign principal the duty to cover
Filipino seafarers under the SSS and other social protection government agencies.

****

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437. HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. vs. Villastique, 801 SCRA 163, August
17, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Service Incentive Leave ;
1. Same; Same; “Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who
has served ‘within 12 months, whether continuous or broken, reckoned from the date the
employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless
the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in
the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be
considered as one [(1)] year.’ It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or
exhausted at the end of the year. In other words, an employee who has served for one (1)
year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value.”
2. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Case law instructs that the issue of
whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is essentially a
question of fact. It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts, and this rule applies with
greater force in labor cases. Generally, it may only look into factual issues in labor cases
when the factual findings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA are conflicting.
3. Same; Illegal Dismissals; Termination of Employment; Other than the latter’s
unsubstantiated allegation of having been verbally terminated from his work, no substantial
evidence was presented to show that he was indeed dismissed or was prevented from
returning to his work. In the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act proving that
petitioner had dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal dismissal cannot be
sustained, as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural, and of no probative value.
4. Same; Same; Same; Abandonment; Petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary
resignation and/or abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure
to discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of respondent to
resume his employment without any intention of returning. It was incumbent upon petitioner
to ascertain respondent’s interest or noninterest in the continuance of his employment, but to
no avail.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; Hence, since there is no dismissal or
abandonment to speak of, the appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee (in
this case, herein respondent) without, however, the payment of backwages.
6. Same; Same; Same; Separation Pay; Properly speaking, liability for the payment of
separation pay is but a legal consequence of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no
longer viable or feasible. As a relief granted in lieu of reinstatement, it goes without saying
that an award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal
dismissal. This is because an employee who had not been dismissed, much less illegally
dismissed, cannot be reinstated.
7. Same; Service Incentive Leave; The Court has already held that company drivers who
are under the control and supervision of management officers — like respondent herein —
are regular employees entitled to benefits including service incentive leave pay.

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438. People vs. Bagamano, 801 SCRA 209, August 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Rape ; Moral Damages ; Civil Indemnity ; Exemplary Damages ;
1. Rape; Moral Damages; Civil Indemnity, Exemplary Damages; The Court finds it
necessary to modify the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA in order to conform
with prevailing jurisprudence. Hence, accused appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Meanwhile, the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages are affirmed.
2. Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws
the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.
3. Same; Information; It must be stressed that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him to ensure that his
due process rights are observed. Thus, every indictment must embody the essential
elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused,
the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof. Hence, to
consider matters not specifically alleged in the Information, even if proven in trial, would be
tantamount to the deprivation of the accused’s right to be informed of the charge lodged
against him.

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439. Sagun vs. ANZ Global Services & Operations(Mnl), Inc., 801 SCRA 243, August
22, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ;
1. Same; Same; In a contract with a suspensive condition, if the condition does not happen,
the obligation does not come into effect. Thus, until and unless petitioner complied with the
satisfactory background check, there exists no obligation on the part of ANZ to recognize
and fully accord him the rights under the employment contract.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
There is no contract unless the following essential requisites concur: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c)
cause of the obligation which is established.
3. Same; Same; In general, contracts undergo three distinct stages. These are negotiation,
perfection or birth, and consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospective
contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of their
agreement. Thereafter, perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree
upon the essential elements of the contract. Finally, consummation occurs when the parties
fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in the extinguishment
thereof.
4. Same; Same; An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment
the parties come to agree upon its terms and conditions, and thereafter, concur in the
essential elements thereof. In this relation, the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
5. Same; Same; In the realm of civil law, a condition is defined as “every future and
uncertain event upon which an obligation or provision is made to depend. It is a future and
uncertain event upon which the acquisition or resolution of rights is made to depend by those
who execute the juridical act.” Jurisprudence states that when a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its effectivity shall take place only if and when the event which
constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.
6. Same; Same; While a contract may be perfected in the manner of operation described
above, the efficacy of the obligations created thereby may be held in suspense pending the
fulfillment of particular conditions agreed upon. In other words, a perfected contract may exist,
although the obligations arising therefrom — if premised upon a suspensive condition —
would yet to be put into effect.

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440. Almojuela vs. Republic, 801 SCRA 399, August 24,
2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Correction of Entry ;
Civil Registry ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above discussed
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar
involving substantial and controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null
and void.
2. Remedial Law; Correction of Entry; Civil Registry; Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through
an appropriate adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined as one “having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.”
3. Same; Same; Same; A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2)
sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and
another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents the civil registrar, as
well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.

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515
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441. Reyes vs. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, 801 SCRA 485, August
24, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Antichresis ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Antichresis; Elements of a contract of antichresis.-
—Antichresis involves an express agreement between parties whereby: (a) the creditor will
have possession of the debtor’s real property given as security; (b) such creditor will apply
the fruits of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal
amount; (c) the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid
what he owes; and (d) should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically
extinguished proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It should be mentioned that the
remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law, not of fact. While it is not the function of the Court to reexamine, winnow
and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence of the parties, there are, however,
recognized exceptions, among which is when the inference drawn from the facts was
manifestly mistaken, as in this case.
3. Notary Public; Notarized Documents; Generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which
may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that
attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.
4. Same; Same; A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private document. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-
notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document
is preponderance of evidence.

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442. Corpuz vs. Rivera, 801 SCRA 572, August 30,
2016 Syllabi Class :Courts ; Court Personnel ;
1. Courts; Court Personnel; It is well to reiterate that “those in the Judiciary serve as
sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the
best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone
any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even
tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.”
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
3. Courts; Court Personnel; In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera
fell short of the standard required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in
general. Her money-lending activities — which were done even during office hours and
within the court premises — surely put the integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave
the impression that she took advantage of her position and abused the confidence reposed in
her in doing her business.
4. Administrative Law; Simple Misconduct; Under Section 46(D), Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave
offense which merits the penalty of suspension for a period ranging from one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal from service for the second
offense.

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443. Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castillo, 801 SCRA
586, August 30, 2016
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Grave Misconduct ;
1. Same; Same; The Court finds respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct which is classified
as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for first time offenders, with all the
accessory penalties. By jurisprudence, the Court has additionally imposed the forfeiture of all
other benefits, except accrued leave credits, salaries and allowances earned up to the time
of dismissal.
2. Ombudsman; As a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially
when affirmed by the CA. In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what
administrative offense was committed by respondent, the OMB and the CA are one in finding
that respondent committed a misconduct.
3. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to
constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
4. Same; Grave Misconduct; In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an
established rule is properly characterized merely as simple misconduct.

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444. Reyes vs. Nieva, 802 SCRA 196, September 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Good Moral Character ; Sexual Harassment ; Watching
Pornographic Materials ; Penalties ; Suspension from Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Good Moral Character; Sexual Harassment; Watching Pornographic
Materials; Penalties;Suspension from Practice of Law; Jurisprudence provides that in
similar administrative cases where the lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted
penalties ranging from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 517 SCRA 600
(2007), the lawyer was reprimanded for his distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his
female client towards him and kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña, 708 SCRA 13
(2013), the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for
rubbing the female complainant’s right leg with his hand, trying to insert his finger into her
firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and pressing
his finger against her private part. While in Guevarra v. Eala, 529 SCRA 1 (2007), and
Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., 775 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court meted the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs. Here, respondent
exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic materials while
in the office and his acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court deems it proper to impose upon respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Good Moral Character; Good moral character is a trait that
every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as “what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or
the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.” Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely:
(a) to protect the public; (b) to protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective
clients; and (d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
3. Same; Same; Same; Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
4. Same; Same; Same; The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) where he was
engaged at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary — but also because it shrouds the legal
profession in a negative light.—Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent
habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office
premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously,
the Court cannot countenance such audacious display of depravity on respondent’s part not
only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the government agency he works
for — the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary — but
also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the
government service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty. However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase
these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to
the government position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by
himself and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or
come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of
this case, remains. The legal profession — much more an engagement in the public service
should always be held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should be
unwavering exemplars of integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith,
lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken
the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the
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consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this
case.
5. Administrative Proceedings; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Based on a survey of
cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, 793 SCRA 309 (2016), which
was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that: In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof

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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given
credence. (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to
control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be
applied in administrative cases against lawyers.
6. Attorneys; The evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to
preponderance of evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and
essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, “[d]isciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.”

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445. People vs. Lintag, 802 SCRA 257, September 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Same; An examination of the records, however, reveals that as indicated in
the PNP Crime Laboratory’s receiving stamp on the request for laboratory examination, it
was SPO3 Valdez — and not SPO2 Gonzales — who delivered such request and
presumably, the seized plastic sachets as well, to Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano.
This immediately puts into question how SPO3 Valdez came into possession of the seized
items, which was neither explained by the prosecution through the presentation of
testimonial or documentary evidence, nor sufficiently addressed by the courts a quo. Thus,
absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in the chain of
custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this compromises the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. It is settled that in
criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute
the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they
are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of
reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads in part: Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of
the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. x x x. x x
x x To secure a conviction under the aforesaid provision, the prosecution must establish the
concurrence of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Material for
such conviction is proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. “As the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity
of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of
the corpus delicti.”
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; In view of the importance of ensuring that the
dangerous drug seized from an accused is the same as that presented in court as evidence
against him, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides for a “chain of custody rule,” or a
standard protocol which the police officers must adhere to in order to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized contraband. In People of the Philippines v. Sumili, 750
SCRA 143 (2015), the Court explained that, while strict adherence to the said rule is desired,
any deviation from the same is acceptable so long as there is ample justification for the
same and that the evidentiary value of the seized contraband is preserved, viz.: To expand,
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the procedure that the
apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its
integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has
initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs
of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were
seized, or of the accused’s or the person’s representative or counsel, a representative from
the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the
copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes. While the “chain of custody
rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence
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nevertheless provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a)
there is a justifiable ground for such non- compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure
must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items. ****

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446. Sindac vs. People, 802 SCRA 270, September 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Constitutional Law ; Search Warrants ;
Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a consequence of the Sindac’s unlawful arrest, it
follows that there could be no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the
plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of shabu from Sindac. Notably, while it is true that
Sindac: (a) failed to question the legality of the warrantless arrest against him before
arraignment; and (b) actively participated in the trial of the case, it must nevertheless be
clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver ONLY as to any question concerning any
defects in his arrest, AND NOT with regard to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during
an illegal warrantless arrest.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which,
such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; One of the
recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed. A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant.
With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should — as a general rule — be complied with: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a),
Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both
instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
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essential. Under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a
crime has just been committed.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; —Neither has the prosecution established that the
conditions set forth in Section 5(b), Rule 113 — that is, that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it — have been complied with. From the circumstances above
discussed, it is fairly suspect that PO3 Peñamora

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had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Sindac. According to
jurisprudence, “the arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested,” which, however do not obtain in this case.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that “reliable information” alone-
— even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance operations — is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest.—It is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1
Asis had proceeded to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from
previous surveillance operations conducted on Sindac’s alleged drug dealing activities.
Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent circumstances that
would lead to the arresting officer’s “personal knowledge” as described in case law,
unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5, Rule 113. It is settled that
“reliable information” alone — even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance
operations — is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the
accused performs some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, which, as already discussed, is missing in
the instant case.

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447. Egger vs. Duran, 802 SCRA 571, September
14, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorney-Client Relationship ;
1. Same; The Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of P100,000.00 he received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that
“while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around
the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must
be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client
in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.” Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal
fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
2. Attorney-Client Relationship; A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in
January 2014, complainant and Reposo had already forged a lawyer-client relationship with
respondent, considering that the latter agreed to file a petition for annulment of marriage in
their behalf, and in connection therewith, received the aggregate amount of P100,000.00
representing legal fees. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when
a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client’s case and accepts money representing
legal fees from the latter, as in this case. Respondent’s contention that he only has a lawyer-
client relationship with Reposo but not with her husband, the complainant, is belied by the
letter dated April 25, 2014 signed by no less than Reposo herself which shows that she and
complainant jointly sought the services of respondent to work on their annulment case, but
had to eventually withdraw therefrom on account of respondent’s failure to render any actual
legal service despite their agreement and payment of legal fees amounting to P100,000.00.
3. Same; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
4. Same; Respondent admittedly breached this duty when he failed to prepare, much less
file, the appropriate pleading to initiate complainant and Reposo’s case before the proper
court. Respondent’s additional contention that his failure to file the petition was due to
complainant and Reposo’s failure to remit the full acceptance fee of P150,000.00 is not an
excuse to abandon his client’s cause considering that his duty to safeguard his client’s
interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the final
disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. To reiterate, respondent’s act of agreeing
to handle complainant’s case, coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment of
P100,000.00, already established an attorney-client relationship that gave rise to his duty of
fidelity to the client’s cause. Indubitably, respondent’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted him
by complainant and Reposo constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.
5. Same; The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on
a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics.
6. Same; Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their client’s
affairs and at the same time failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite
demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.

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448. Onstott vs. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Assn, Inc., 803 SCRA 280,
September 14, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Legal Interest ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Legal Interest; Words and Phrases; “Legal interest” is defined as interest in
property or a claim cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a legal owner who has legal title
to the property. It must be one that is actual and material, direct and immediate, not simply
contingent or expectant. Moreover, although the taxable person who has actual and
beneficial use and possession of a property may be charged with the payment of unpaid
realty tax due thereon, such assumption of liability does not clothe the said person with the
legal title or interest over the property.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts acquire jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in
a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi,
588 SCRA 612 (2009), it was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of
this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that
a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the
foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.”
4. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Property Relations; Article 160 of the New
Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time element.
Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses.

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449. Felicilda vs. Uy, 803 SCRA 296, September 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Employer-Employee Relationship ; Control Test ;
1. Same; Same; Control Test; The presence of the element of control, which is the most
important element to determine the existence or absence of employment relationship, can be
safely deduced from the fact that: (a) respondent owned the trucks that were assigned to
petitioner; (b) the cargoes loaded in the said trucks were exclusively for respondent’s clients;
and (c) the schedule and route to be followed by petitioner were exclusively determined by
respondent. The latter’s claim that petitioner was permitted to render service to other
companies was not substantiated and there was no showing that he indeed worked as truck
driver for other companies. Given all these considerations, while petitioner was free to carry
out his duties as truck driver, it cannot be pretended that respondent, nonetheless, exercised
control over the means and methods by which the former was to accomplish his work. To
reiterate, the power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. It is not essential
for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, as it is
sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the
outset, it should be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors
of law and does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of evidence upon which the
courts a quo had based its determination. This rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure
therefrom may be warranted where the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC, on the one
hand, and the CA, on the other, are contradictory, as in this case. There is therefore a need
to review the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction,
erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that respondent
was not illegally dismissed.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority
gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
4. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; To ascertain the existence of an
employer- employee relationship, jurisprudence has invariably adhered to the four (4)-
fold test, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employee’s conduct, or the so-called “control test.”-
—To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship, jurisprudence has
invariably adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control
the employee’s conduct, or the so- called “control test.” Verily, the power of the employer to
control the work of the employee is considered the most significant determinant of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. This is the so-called “control test,” and is
premised on whether the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to
control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve that end. It must,
however, be stressed that the “control test” merely calls for the existence of the right to
control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. To be clear, the test does not require that
the employer actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee.

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450. Bulauitan vs. People, 803 SCRA 367, September 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Searches and Seizures ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed
by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is
only upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. In People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003), the
Court held that a departure from the said mandatory rule — by preventing the lawful
occupant or a member of his family from actually witnessing the search and choosing two (2)
other witnesses observe the search — violates the spirit and letter of the law, and thus, taints
the search with the vice of unreasonableness, rendering the seized articles inadmissible due
to the application of the exclusionary rule.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or
on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant
issued in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
give the authorities limitless discretion in implementing the same as the same Rules provide
parameters in the proper conduct of a search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules,
states that: SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses.—No search of a house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

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451. Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. vs. Bacolod Sales Force Union-Congress of
Independent Organization-ALU, 804 SCRA 139, September 21, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review ; Voluntary
Arbitrators ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review; Voluntary Arbitrators;
—Case law holds that the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrators’ or a
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules on questions of fact, of law, mixed questions of fact and
law, or a mistake of judgment. However, in several cases, the Court allowed the filing of a
petition for certiorari from the VA’s judgment to the CA under Rule 65 of the same Rules,
where the VA was averred to have acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Labor Law; Arbitration; In the context of labor law, arbitration is the reference of a labor
dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of
the arbitrator as final and binding. However, in view of the nature of their functions, voluntary
arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity; hence, their judgments or final orders which are
declared final by law are not so exempt from judicial review when so warranted. “Any
agreement stipulating that ‘the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable’ and
‘that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the
arbitrator’s award may be availed of’ cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power of
judicial review which is inherent in courts.”

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452. Manila Doctors College vs. Olores, 804 SCRA 482, October
03, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Separation Pay; The Court deems inconsequential petitioners’ submissions that
respondent had claimed separation pay during the execution proceedings at the NLRC level
and had also alleged strained relations (and therefore, intimated separation pay) in his
pleadings. The Court had previously ruled in Pfizer, Inc. that the circumstance that the
employee opted for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as manifested in her counsel’s
letter had no legal effect, not only because there was no genuine compliance by the
employer of the reinstatement order but also because the employer chose not to act on said
claim. The same observations are made in this case. As aptly pointed out by the CA, there
was “apparent apathy” on the part of petitioners towards the reinstatement order issued by
LA Amansec during the pendency of their appeal therefrom. Hence, for failure of the
petitioners to comply with said order, the CA correctly declared respondent to be entitled to
the payment of his accrued salaries during the period of the appeal until the reversal of the
December 8, 2010 Decision of LA Amansec. The NLRC’s Decision dated December 26,
2012, which deleted the said award on the notion that the same had no more basis in view of
the eventual ruling declaring respondent’s dismissal to be legal, failed to take into account
the provisions of the Labor Code and existing jurisprudence on the immediately executory
nature of reinstatement, as well as the consequences of noncompliance. Palpably, this
smacks of grave abuse of discretion as properly found by the CA. As jurisprudence conveys,
there is “grave abuse of discretion x x x when a lower court or tribunal patently violates x x x
the law or existing jurisprudence.”
2. Labor Law; Reinstatement; Under Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code, “the
decision of the [LA] reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution
for reinstatement x x x.” Verily, the employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing
which, the employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employee’s salary. However, in
the event that the LA’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employer’s duty to
reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is
no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in the payroll. The employee,
in turn, is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the
LA’s decision. Notwithstanding the reversal of the finding of illegal dismissal, an employer,
who, despite the LA’s order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the
pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the
accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time of the
reversal. By way of exception, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages
if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the
part of the employer.

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453. Buenviaje vs. Salonga, 805 SCRA 369, October
05, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ; Attorney’s
Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The
power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be
awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence
in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; Specific performance and “rescission”
(more accurately referred to as resolution) are alternative remedies available to a party who
is aggrieved by a counterparty’s breach of a reciprocal obligation. This is provided for in
Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which partly reads: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations
is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
3. Same; Same; Specific Performance; Words and Phrases; Specific performance is
defined as “[t]he remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract in the specific form in
which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon.” It pertains to “[t]he actual
accomplishment of a contract by a party bound to fulfill it.”
4. Same; Same; Rescission; Resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but o Resolution is defined as the “unmaking of a
contract for a legally sufficient reason x x x.” “[Resolution] does not merely terminate the
contract and release the parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the
contract from its inception and restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract
has been made. Consequently, mutual restitution, which entails the return of the benefits that
each party may have received as a result of the contract, is thus required.” Notably,
resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code “will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very
object of the parties in making the agreement. Ultimately, the question of whether a breach
of contract is substantial depends upon the attending circumstances.”
5. Same; Contracts; Principle of Relativity of Contracts; In this case, it is undisputed that
Sps. Salonga were not parties to the above mentioned contract. Under Article 1311 of the
Civil Code, it is a basic principle in civil law on relativity of contracts, that contracts can only
bind the parties who had entered into it and it cannot favor or prejudice third persons.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their successors in interest, heirs and
assigns. Thus, absent any privity of contract as to them, there is no basis to hold Sps.
Salonga liable for any of the obligations stated under the said contract to sell. At this
juncture, it should be further made clear that the imputation of joint or solidary liability against
a particular person — such as that insistently claimed against Sps. Salonga by Buenviaje —
first presupposes the existence of that person’s obligation. On the active side, the joint or
solidary nature of an obligation is an aspect of demandability; it pertains to the extent of a
creditor’s entitlement to demand fulfillment against any or all of his debtors under one
particular obligation. Based on case law, a solidary obligation is one in which each of the
debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the
satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors. On the other hand, a joint
obligation is one in which each debtors is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt, and
the creditor is entitled to demand only a proportionate part of the credit from each debtor.
6. Same; Partnership; There is no perceptible legal basis to hold them solidarily liable under
Articles 1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code. These provisions, which are found under Section
3, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book IV of the Civil Code on Partnership, respectively state: Article
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1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
the business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is caused
to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the

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partner so acting or omitting to act. x x x x Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with
the partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.
Evidently, the foregoing legal provisions pertain to the obligations of a copartner in the event
that the partnership to which he belongs is held liable. In this case, Buenviaje never dealt
with any partnership constituted by and between Jebson and Sps. Salonga. As previously
mentioned, the subject CTS, which was the source of the obligations relative to the
completion and delivery of Unit 5, solely devolved upon the person of Jebson. As there was
no partnership privy to any obligation to which Buenviaje is a creditor, Articles 1822 and
1824 of the Civil Code do not apply.
7. Same; Contracts; Rescission; Words and Phrases;
Pursuant to Articles 1177 and 1313 of the Civil Code, creditors are given remedies whenever
their debtors perform acts or omissions or enter into contracts that tend to defraud the former
of what is due them. Such remedy comes in the form of rescission under Articles 1381(3) in
relation to Articles 1383 and 1384 of the Civil Code. Rescission (as contemplated in Articles
1380 to 1389 of the Civil Code) is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and
even to third persons, to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract,
even if this should be valid, by restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to
the celebration of the contract. It implies a contract, which even if initially valid, produces a
lesion or a pecuniary damage to someone. In the rescission by reason of lesion or economic
prejudice, the cause of action is subordinated to the existence of that prejudice, because it is
the raison d’être as well as the measure of the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant
makes good the damages caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as
expressly provided in Articles 1383 and 1384.
8. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; In order that moral damages under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 419 SCRA 118 (2004), the Court
explained: While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may
be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts. This is so because moral damages,
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. In Francisco v. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the
anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness
stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral
damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court held that “additional facts must be pleaded and proven to
warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom.”

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454. Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr., 805 SCRA 438, October
05, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Docket Fees ;
Counterclaims ;
1. Same; Same; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; Verily, respondents’ reliance on the
findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the
docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the
counterclaim should not be dismissed for non- payment of docket fees. Instead, the docket
fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in respondents’ favor.
In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, 487 SCRA 339
(2006), citing Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that in instances
where a litigant’s nonpayment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any
intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered
to assess the amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a
judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Period; The CA failed to take into consideration that
March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of
Court provides that: Section 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute,
the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday,
petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the
next working day: Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered
it filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion on the merits. In such an instance, court
procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.
However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may
be had — as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the
ends of justice. In view of the foregoing — as well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the
resolution of the substantive issues on the merits — the Court finds it appropriate to resolve
the substantive issues of this case.
3. Same; Same; Counterclaims; Docket Fees; Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is
determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule
in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
4. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. On
the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
5. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; Permissive Counterclaims
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the
courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to
the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its
nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its
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dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and
(b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

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455. Dumanlag vs. Intong, 805 SCRA 489, October 10,
2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Penalties ; Disbarment ;
Suspension ;
1. Same; Penalties; Disbarment; Suspension; It has been stressed that the determination
of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension, and, in grave cases,
disbarment. In the present case, the Court finds too harsh the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months. After all, respondent did file his mandatory conference brief before the IBP where he
cited the Resolution dated July 19, 2010 of the Court, requiring him to file his comment to the
complaint. He also attended the mandatory conference/hearing scheduled by the IBP,
although he failed to file his position paper despite the directive to do so. Under the
circumstances, and considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, the Court
finds it proper to reprimand him with warning that commission of the same or similar
infraction will be dealt with more severely. This is consistent with the ruling in the recent case
of Andres v. Nambi, 752 SCRA 110 (2015), where respondent therein was found to have
ignored the Court’s resolution directing him to file comment, and to have failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice, as well as
to file his position paper. Since it was also his first infraction, respondent therein was merely
reprimanded by the Court, as in this case.
2. Attorneys; It has been consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption
that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
Thus, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. However, in this case, complainant
failed to discharge the burden of proving his accusations of gross misconduct on the part of
the respondent.
3. Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Complainant’s allegation of force and
compulsion accompanying the letter dated February 8, 2010 is negated by the very words
used therein. Respondent described said letter in the opening paragraph as a “letter request
for [complainant’s] presence.” He then went on to close the letter with “[h]oping for your
[(complainant’s)] preferential and positive action on this matter” and “[m]y highest esteem.”
As aptly pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva in his Report and Recommendation, the
letter was “carefully worded, done in a respectful manner.” There was absolutely nothing on
the face of the letter that would justify complainant’s indignation against any discourtesy or
discrimination against him. The letter was a mere invitation for complainant to attend a
settlement and pre-litigation conference, which respondent, as a lawyer, is obligated to
pursue. Under Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), “[a]
lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.” There was nothing wrong, therefore, with respondent’s efforts to set up a
conference between complainant and his clients.
4. Same; Legal Ethics; Respondent cannot, however, escape accountability for his repetitive
disregard of the resolutions of the Court requiring him to file his comment to the complaint
and to pay the fine imposed upon him for his failure to do so. As correctly pointed out by
Commissioner Villanueva, the Court issued three resolutions dated July 19, 2010, March 9,
2011, and September 28, 2011, requiring respondent to file his comment, to show cause for
his failure to file, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for such failure. But all three were left
unheeded. Respondent ought to know that orders of the court are “not mere requests but
directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.” “He disregarded
the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to obey the laws and the
legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a
lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand
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foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court,” pursuant to Canon 11 of
the CPR, which mandates that “[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers x x x.”

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456. National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE) vs.
MERALCO, 805 SCRA 501, October 10, 2016
Syllabi Class :Rate-fixing ; Public Utilities ;
1. Same; Same; Because of the variances in its premises and assumptions, the ERC’s shift
from the RORB to the PBR methodology should therefore be deemed as a supervening
circumstance that rendered inconsequential this Court’s provisional approval of the rate
increases applied for by MERALCO in Lualhati which was made under the context of the
now-defunct RORB system. Accordingly, the issue of whether or not the ERC should have
first took into account the findings in the COA audit before approving MERALCO’s
applications in ERC Case Nos. 2008-004 RC and 2008-018 RC as directed in Lualhati has
become moot and academic. In Carpio v. CA, 692 SCRA 162 (2013), it was explained that
“[a] case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use,” as the aforesaid issue raised
in this case. For all these reasons, the petition is therefore denied.
2. Administrative Regulations; The rule is settled that “[a]dministrative regulations enacted
by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law x x x and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.” As such,
they “cannot be attacked collaterally. Unless [such] rule is annulled in a direct proceeding,
the legal presumption of its validity stands.”
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The
general rule is that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
raised.-
—The resolution of the instant petition would nonetheless entail a determination of factual
matters which is proscribed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law
may be raised. In this case, petitioners contest the reasonableness of the rates approved by
the ERC inasmuch as it granted MERALCO’s application for the approval of its ARR and
determination of its MAP covering the regulatory period of 2007-2011. In support of their
protest, petitioners presented factual data which purportedly show MERALCO’s strong
financial position for the last 21 years (1987-2007), considering that it had actually earned a
total of P88,960.00 for every P1,000.00 investment, which translates to a gain of 8,896% on
their actual investments. For its part, MERALCO contests petitioners’ “misleading
assertions,” clarifying that petitioners incorrectly assumed that the original value of the
common shares issued is the only investment of the investors, and further maintained that
when net income earned throughout the years are retained by a company as accumulated in
the Retained Earnings account and are used for the company’s continuing operations, it is
considered a reinvestment, and therefore should be an addition to the investors’ investment
in the company.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law provides that the test of whether a question is
one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising
the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.-
—Case law provides that the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. As applied in this
case, in order to assess the reasonableness of the rates approved by the ERC, there is a
glaring need to scrutinize the veracity of the adverse allegations of both parties, which, in
turn, necessitates an examination of the evidence in support thereof. Therefore, the issue on
reasonableness posed in the petition inevitably treads the territory of questions of fact, which
is generally proscribed from review in a Rule 45 petition, as in this case.
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5. Rate-fixing; Public Utilities; Administrative Agencies; It must be stressed that since
rate-fixing calls for a technical examination and a specialized review of specific details which
the courts are ill-equipped to enter, such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative
or regulating authority. Hence, the factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that
have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their
primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. Absent any of

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the exceptions laid down by jurisprudence, such factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court.
6. Same; Same; As determined by the ERC, which was affirmed by the CA, petitioners
failed to sufficiently show that the rates approved in the proceedings below were
unreasonable as they claimed to be. As pointed out by the CA, MERALCO’s rate
applications were approved only after the ERC conducted the necessary proceedings,
received evidence in support of the applications and, thereafter, made an independent
evaluation of the same. Thus, the CA cannot be faulted in sustaining the reasonableness of
the rates approved by the ERC. In Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner,
42 Phil. 621 (1922), this Court articulated that “[t]here is a legal presumption that the fixed
rates are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government,
through its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and unless there
is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere.”
7. Same; Same; It is well to point out that Lualhati is traced from ERC Case Nos. 2001-646
and 2001- 900, which cover MERALCO’s application for rate increase when the ERC was still
adopting the RORB methodology in its rate-setting function. In other words, the need of a
COA audit, under the auspices of the Lualhati ruling, pertained to MERALCO’s rates when it
was still under the RORB system. During the pendency of this case, the ERC shifted to the
PBR methodology, which premises and assumptions are conceptually different from that
followed in the RORB. In particular, under the RORB methodology, power rates were set to
recover the cost of service prudently incurred, i.e., historical costs, plus a reasonable rate of
return. This means that actual and reasonable costs were used for a prescribed test year to
determine the revenue requirement, with the use of the test year assuming that the past
relationship among revenue, costs, and net investment during said test year will continue into
the future. On the other hand, the PBR methodology deviates from the use of historical
costs, and instead, uses projections of operating and capital expenditures to meet projected
demand, thereby enabling the regulated entities to invest in facilities to meet customer
requirements and prescribed service levels. This methodology also features a performance
incentive scheme which provides incentives and penalties to the utility to compel it to be more
efficient and reliable, while maintaining reasonable rates and improving the quality of service
to achieve pre-determined target levels.

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457. People vs. Layag, 806 SCRA 190, October 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Civil Liability ; Separate Civil Actions ;
1. Same; Civil Liability; Separate Civil Actions; Upon Layag’s death pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well
to clarify that Layag’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be
based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action
against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final
Judgments; The Court is constrained to reopen the case despite the finality of the August 3,
2015 Resolution. In Bigler v. People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the Court explained that it has
the power to relax the doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special
or compelling circumstance warranting the same, viz.: Under the doctrine of finality of
judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates
this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final
judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the court has the power and prerogative to relax the
same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
3. Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Under prevailing law
and jurisprudence, Layag’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible
the criminal cases against him. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit: Article 89. How
criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the
death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

****

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458. Magsano vs. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., 806 SCRA 197,
October 17, 2016 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Co-ownership ; Estoppel ;
1. Same; Same; Estoppel; In Estoque v. Pajimula, 24 SCRA 59 (1968), a specific portion of a co-
owned property was sold, albeit a specific portion of a land that was owned in common. I believe that
this is no different from the situation of Susana who sold the entire co-owned property, that is, a
specific parcel of land when she only had an undivided interest therein. Stated differently, the
rationale for not recognizing the effectivity of the disposition over a specific portion equally applies to
the disposition by a co-owner of the entire co-owned or undivided property that is more than the
undivided share rightfully pertaining to the disposing co-owner. Estoque characterizes the contract
entered into by the disposing co-owner as “ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the
specific portion described in the deed.” This characterization makes room for a subsequent
ratification of the contract by the other co-owners or validation in case the disposing co-owner
acquires subsequently the undivided interests of the other co- owners. Such subsequent ratification
or acquisition will validate and make the contract fully effective. Estoque was a decision rendered by
this Court En Banc, and has not been expressly overturned; hence, it remains a sound case law,
which I believe should be the controlling jurisprudence. Even if Article 493 is inapplicable in this case,
I concur in the conclusion that the validity of the mortgage executed by Susana binds her undivided
interest in the subject conjugal property based on the principle of estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the
Civil Code, “[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Preliminarily, the rule is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. While it is not the function of the Court to
reexamine, winnow and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence of the parties, there are,
however, recognized exceptions, one of which is when the inference drawn from the facts was
manifestly mistaken, as in this case.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificate of Title; While the rule is that every
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person
other than the vendor, as in this case, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and
make inquiries concerning the actual possessor. As this Court explained in the case of Sps.
Mathay v. CA, 295 SCRA 556 (1998): Although it is a recognized principle that a person
dealing [with] a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly
settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt
him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of
occupants/tenants thereon, it is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of
land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or
not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in concept of owner. As is the
common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a
safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land
he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not
in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of
the occupant’s possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him
from claiming or invoking the rights of a “purchaser in good faith.”
4. Civil Law; Co-ownership; In sustaining the validity of the mortgage on the subject conjugal
property insofar as the aliquot or pro indiviso share or interest of Susana is concerned, the
ponencia relies on Article 493 of the Civil Code. I believe this is inaccurate. Article 493
provides: ART. 493. Each co- owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. This article recognizes the absolute ownership by a co-owner of his aliquot or
undivided share and his right to alienate, assign or mortgage and even substitute another
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person in its enjoyment. However, the co-owner’s right to alienate is limited to only his
undivided share and does not in any way affect any definite portion of the thing owned in
common since before partition a co-owner will not know what portion of the property will
actually belong to him. ****

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459. People vs. Goco, 806 SCRA 240, October 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ; Marking ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Marking; Verily, marking the drugs or other related items
immediately upon seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody as it is
the starting point in the custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a twin purpose, first
is to give the succeeding handlers of the specimen a reference, and second to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the moment of
seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching,
“planting,” or contamination of evidence. The police officers’ failure to mark the seized items
may lead to the acquittal of the accused based on reasonable doubt.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an
appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What
remains material for conviction is proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. On the other hand, in order to convict an accused
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused
was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession
was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
mirror the content of Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 but adds that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165-
— under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over
the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.—In this relation, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) mirror the content of Section 21 of
RA 9165 but adds that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that
noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 — under justifiable grounds
— will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.
5. Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR. However, their failure to do so
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a)
there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.
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6. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Chain of custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the
moment of seizure, to receipt of the same by the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and
finally to the presentation of the drugs or chemicals in court for destruction. The chain of
custody requirement is strictly applied when the

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evidence sought to be presented is not distinctive and not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard applies to evidence susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination, and substitution or exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule. One of the physical characteristics of shabu is that it
is fungible in nature, and similar in appearance to substances used by people in their daily
activities. As it is not readily distinguishable from other substances, and from other samples of
shabu, the chain of custody requirement must be strictly complied with in order to render it
improbable that the seized items are exchanged with another, or contaminated, or tampered
with.
7. Same; Same; Same; In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution
must identify the persons who handled the seized items from seizure up until their
presentation in court as evidence. To do so, the prosecution must present testimonies about
every link in the chain, in such a way that every person who touched the illegal drugs would
describe how and from whom they were received, where they were and what happened to
them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he or she received them, and
their condition upon delivery. The witnesses must describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there was no change in the condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain of custody
is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized
from the accused.

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460. Toyota Pasig, Inc. vs. De Peralta, 807 SCRA 120, November
07, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Presumptions ;
1. Same; Presumptions; In fact, during the proceedings before the LA, petitioner was even
given the opportunity to submit pertinent company records to rebut respondent’s claims but
opted not to do so, thus, constraining the LA to direct respondent to submit her own
computations. It is well-settled that the failure of employers to submit the necessary
documents that are in their possession gives rise to the presumption that the presentation
thereof is prejudicial to its cause.
2. Labor Law; Wages; In this case, respondent’s monetary claims, such as commissions,
tax rebates for achieved monthly targets, and success share/profit sharing, are given to her
as incentives or forms of encouragement in order for her to put extra effort in performing her
duties as an ISE. Clearly, such claims fall within the ambit of the general term “commissions”
which in turn, fall within the definition of wages pursuant to prevailing law and jurisprudence.
3. Same; Burden of Proof; The allegation of nonpayment of monetary benefits places the
burden on the employer, to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty that it paid said
benefits and that the employee actually received such payment or that the employee was not
entitled thereto.

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461. Sta. Isabel vs. Perla Compañia de Seguros, Inc., 807 SCRA 162, November
07, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Willful Disobedience ;
1. Same; Willful Disobedience; Willful disobedience or insubordination, as a just cause for
the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites,
namely: (a) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by
a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (b) the order violated must have been reasonable,
lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review on Certiorari; To justify the grant
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court
or quasi- judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of
discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Appeals; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

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462. Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., 807 SCRA 176, November
07, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Project Employees ;
1. Same; Project Employees; It is clear that the submission of the termination report to the
DOLE “may be considered” only as an indicator of project employment. By the provision’s
tenor, the submission of this report, by and of itself, is therefore not conclusive to confirm the
status of the terminated employees as project employees, especially in this case where there
is a glaring absence of evidence to prove that petitioners were assigned to carry out a
specific project or undertaking, and that they were informed of the duration and scope of their
supposed project engagement, which are, in fact, attendant to the first two (2) indicators of
project employment in the same DOLE issuance above cited.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In a Rule 45 review, the Court
examines the correctness of the CA’s Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional
errors under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law.
3. Labor Law; Appeals; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor cases, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
4. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; On the procedural aspect, the Court
notes that the issue of the timeliness of the filing of the appeal is a factual issue that requires
a review of the evidence presented on when the appeal was actually filed. Thus, it is
generally not covered by a Rule 45 review.
5. Same; Civil Procedure; Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that where
pleadings are filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp
on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. Based on this
provision, the date of filing is determinable from two sources: (1) from the post office stamp
on the envelope or (2) from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the
timeliness of the filing of the pleadings.
6. Same; Same; The Court previously ruled that if the date stamped on one is earlier than
the other, the former may be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that
the envelope or registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated
before the tribunal where they are presented. When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears
an earlier date but is not authenticated, the Court held that the later date stamped on the
envelope shall be considered as the date of filing.
7. Labor Law; Project Employees; A project-based employee is assigned to a project which
begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may
only be dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of
employees who are hired as project- based employees may be lawfully terminated at the
completion of the project.
8. Same; Same; To safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
“project” to preclude them from attaining regular status, jurisprudence provides that
employers claiming that their workers are project-based employees have the burden to prove
that these two requisites concur: (a) the employees were assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time
they were engaged for such project.
9. Same; Same; The Court previously ruled that although the absence of a written contract
does not by itself grant regular status to the employees, it is evidence that they were
informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees at the
start of their engagement. When no other evidence is offered, the absence of employment
contracts raises a serious question of whether the employees were sufficiently apprised at
the start of their employment of their status as project employees.
10. Same; Section 11, Rule X, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
(Rules) requires the employer to keep all employment records in the main or branch office
where the employees are assigned. It also prohibits the keeping of employees’ records
elsewhere.
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 ****

543
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463. Buenaflor Car Services, Inc. vs. David, Jr., 807 SCRA 191, November
07, 2016 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ;
1. Same; Case law states that “labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the
validity of the dismissal.” Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that enough
substantial evidence exist to support petitioner’s claim that respondent was involved in the
aforediscussed scheme to defraud the company, and hence, guilty of serious misconduct
and/or willful breach of trust which are just causes for his termination.
2. Labor Law; Burden of Proof; Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be
dismissed from employment only for a valid cause. The burden of proof rests on the employer
to prove that the dismissal was valid, failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Misconduct is defined as an
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. For serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the
concurrence of the following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it
must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with
wrongful intent.
4. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; For loss of trust to be a ground for
dismissal, the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence, and there must be
an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. While loss of trust and confidence
should be genuine, it does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, it being sufficient that
there is some basis for the misconduct and that the nature of the employee’s participation
therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
5. Same; National Labor Relations Commission; The NLRC should not have bound itself
by the technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in
deciding labor cases. The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that “[t]he rules of procedure and
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission
shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure x x x.”

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464. Camaso vs. TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc., 807 SCRA 204, November
07, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Docket Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not
necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its
nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its
dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Docket Fees;
—Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the
CA, such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is
required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of such action.

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465. Curammeng vs. People, 808 SCRA 613, November
14, 2016 Syllabi Class :Liberal Interpretation ;
1. Same; Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the
mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would
result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of
justice so requires.
2. Petition for Review; Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Section
2, thereof, provides that such petitions shall be accompanied by, inter alia, material portions
of the record which would support the allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of
non-forum shopping.
3. Appeals; The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; It must be
stressed that since a petition for review is a form of appeal, noncompliance with the
foregoing rule may render the same dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule
that “the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of
the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.”
4. Liberal Interpretation; Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will
tend to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in
the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
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466. Gamboa vs. People, 808 SCRA 624, November 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Case law states that, the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. For indeed, however, noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our
campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be
executed within the boundaries of law.
2. Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to
correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; In this
case, Gamboa was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain
of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized
drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.
5. Same; Same; Same; The saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 applies only where the
prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers or
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) agents, and thereafter explained the
cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.-
—As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out
in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is
justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. The aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of
the IRR of RA 9165 applies only where the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses
on the part of the police officers or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable
grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items have been preserved.
6. Same; Same; Same; When police officers do not turn over dangerous drugs to the
laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify its custodian, and
the latter must be called to testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place
to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved,
which did not take place in this case.

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467. Evangelista vs. Andolong III, 809 SCRA 271, November
16, 2016 Syllabi Class :Damages ; Temperate Damages ;
1. Damages; Temperate Damages; Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court is
convinced that Nanito should have received remittances representing net profits from
respondents, albeit he failed to prove the exact amount he should receive from the latter. In
Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. DMC-Construction Resources, Inc., 743 SCRA 33
(2014), the Court allowed the recovery of temperate damages in instances where it has been
established that some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot be proven
with certainty.
2. Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Also, parties
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense
offered by their opponent. This principle equally holds true, even if the defendant was not
given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
3. Same; Preponderance of Evidence; “Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible
evidence.’ Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”
4. Same; Respondents’ failure to present the documents in their possession-
— whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.—Respondents opted not to shed light
on the issues at hand as they, unwittingly or otherwise, waived their right to present
evidence in this case. In this light, the Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents’ failure to present the documents in their possession — whether such failure
was intentional or not — raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.

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468. Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra, 811 SCRA 392, December
01, 2016 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in
their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice
of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility
or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one’s
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession — would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.” Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally
recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
2. Social Media; Facebook; Words and Phrases; Facebook is currently the most popular
social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion
monthly active users. Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction
and facilitate users to generate and share content. There are various classifications of social
media platforms and one can be classified under the “social networking sites” such as
Facebook. Facebook is a “voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit
information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as
thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another.” Users register at this site, create a
personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a
statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending
on the user’s privacy settings.
3. Same; Same; Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity-— in this case, Facebook — it is first necessary that said user manifests
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility.—To address concerns about privacy, but without
defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user’s profile, as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the
South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this ability
of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but with the cautionary advice that although
Facebook, as stated in its policies, “makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are however not foolproof.” Consequently, before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity — in this case, Facebook
— it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the
user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
4. Same; Same;
Restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one’s circle of
friends. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view
the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Under the circumstances,
therefore, respondent’s claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
5. Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The constitutional right of freedom of
expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their
name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.-
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—Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution,
every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good

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faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they
were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant
and BMGI. Calling complainant a “quack doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplastikan,” “Reyna ng
Payola,” and “Reyna ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence
upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured (“binaboy”) his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a “Frankenstein Factory,” and calling out a boycott of BMGI’s services
all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against
complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and
estafa — which is contrary to one’s obligation “to act with justice.”
6. Same; Same; By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and
BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must
behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the
law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning
complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.
7. Same; Same; That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a
public personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent’s disrespectful
language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent’s remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.

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469. Ayson vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., 811 SCRA 520, December 01, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Verily,
the finding of Fil-Estate and Fairways’ bad faith as well as their liability for moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, are all factual matters which are not within the
ambit of the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In
this regard, it has long been settled that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, save for certain exceptions,
which Fil-Estate and Fairways failed to show in this case — at least regarding this issue.

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470. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 812 SCRA 537, December
06, 2016 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Probable
Cause ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; I submit that the issues raised by
the parties are ripe for adjudication and easily verifiable by the submissions of the parties. To
wait for trial will only unnecessarily prolong the disposition of the case. On this note, Sec. 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a judge “may immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” As borne by the
records, the Ombudsman initially found probable cause to charge petitioners Relampagos, et
al. for sixteen (16) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e), RA 3019 on account of Luy’s testimony that
petitioners are Napoles’ contact in the DBM. Yet, even Luy himself twice admitted during the
September 12, 2013 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that petitioners did not receive any part
of the PDAF.
2. Administrative Cases; Public Officers; The administrative aspect of the cases against
Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA’s audit is clearly separate and distinct from
the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the
latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, 547 SCRA 658 (2008), this Court explained that:
[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in
the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties:
(1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked
separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be
the subject of all three kinds of remedies. x x x x It is clear, then, that criminal and
administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil
cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not
inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings.
3. Same; Same; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, “an audit disallowance may
not necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the
responsible persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper
even without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in
[Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 642 SCRA 210 (2011)] that a proceeding involving an audit
disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary
complaint.” In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its
March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe’s motion to suspend proceedings.
Perforce, Cambe’s petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court
now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause
against all petitioners.
4. Ombudsman; Policy of Non-interference; Time and again, this Court’s consistent policy
has been to maintain noninterference in the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence of
probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This
observed policy is based not only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as
well.
5. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In determining the elements of
the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient
to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.” In
this case, the petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended,
has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section
1(d) thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
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amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the
other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his

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functions. In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence
of these elements is required.
6. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; It should be borne in mind that probable
cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is “merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it.” It
“is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence.”
Therefore, “the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.” Accordingly, “owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings.” In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
“probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay,” and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta
at this stage of the proceedings is improper.
7. Priority Development Assistance Fund; At the forefront are the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen.
Revilla himself requesting the implementing agencies (IAs) to release his PDAF funds to the
identified Janet Lim Napoles (JLN)-controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as
well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the
Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) executed by the legislator’s office, the IA, and the
chosen NGO.-
—The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on
record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements
signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified
JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his
PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All
these documents — even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla — directly implicate him
for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office
as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), 710 SCRA 1
(2013), this Court observed that “the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel would be the authority of legislators — to participate in the post-enactment phases of
project implementation.” “At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, prior
consultations or program menus — have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations.” It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen.
Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their
offices throughout the years.
8. Same; Forgery; Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence
presented were forged, it must be emphasized that “the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on
the issue of forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the
reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its
general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty
to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly
authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved
to be genuine.” Accordingly, Sen. Revilla’s evidence of forgery, including the findings of his
purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the
proceedings. Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly
used mere photocopies of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents in
their handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 565 (1998),
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this Court ruled that “[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature,
one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery,” and that “[a]
comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under
controversy cannot produce reliable results.” Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that
the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be tested. They still
have to authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt,
the prosecution

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should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui’s findings with evidence
of its own. It could all too well present its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut such
findings.
9. Same; Same; The Ombudsman’s own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least
for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect.-
—It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the
veracity of Sen. Revilla’s signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the
March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: “[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima
facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF
documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective
counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish,
were written by one and the same hands.” Verily, the Ombudsman’s own factual finding on
the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be
regarded with utmost respect. “[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence,” as in this case. The Ombudsman’s
finding on the absence of forgery further gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011 Letter
signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The letter evinces on its
face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe’s signatures
appearing on the PDAF documents: After going through these documents and initial
examination, it appears that the signatures and/or initials on these documents are my
signatures or that of my authorized representative.
10. Same; Same; Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers
would sometimes forge the legislators’ signatures, such were made with the approval of
Napoles based on her prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern
that this authorization allows for a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the
documents required for their release need not pass through the legislator’s respective
offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the legislators room for plausible
deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for legislators to
disclaim their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy’s testimony completely
makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to
forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does
not mean that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.
11. Same; Conspiracy; It is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had
personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of Janet Lim Napoles
(JLN) Corporation-
— the epicenter of the entire Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) operation — and
in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the pertinent
documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the Notices of Cash
Allocation (NCAs) with the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and/or facilitate
the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs’)
accounts.—The testimonies of the whistleblowers — which the prosecution submitted before
the Ombudsman — are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they
provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla
was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of
Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen.
Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with Napoles in the plunder of their PDAF.
Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the
conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation — the epicenter of the entire
PDAF operation — and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to
prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of
the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the
NGOs’ accounts.
12. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Evidence; Sen. Revilla opposes the
admission of the whistleblowers’ testimonies based on the res inter alios acta rule. However,
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in Reyes v. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354 (2016), citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1
(2015), this Court had unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers
against Jo Christine and John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also
charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that
technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. This
Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence,

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which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of
Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on
evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay
evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during
the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”
This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation
that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the
objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule
should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation,” as in this case.
13. Remedial Law; Evidence; Independently Relevant Statements; Under the doctrine
of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant.-
—In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during
preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers’ statements as hearsay is
bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. “Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements
are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.” Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the
whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his
co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the
entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy,
who were employees of JLN Corporation and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles
concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, should be given consideration as they are
directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand. To add, the prosecution also
presented Luy’s ledger entries which corroborate his testimony that Sen. Revilla dealt with
Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy’s records disclose that the kickbacks amounted
to “at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007;
P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010.”
14. Same; Same; Witnesses; Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not
personally know Sen. Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone
handing/delivering money to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of
his involvement. Because of their functions in JLN Corporation as above stated, it is evident
that they had personal knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the
select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly, they personally processed the
PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla’s Office, which lasted for a
considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their
testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.
15. Probable Cause; In any case, this Court has resolved that “probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.” The substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers’ testimonies, even if so
regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above mentioned, as
well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same
conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged coconspirators acted in concert to pillage his
PDAF funds.
16. Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Affidavits of Co-respondents;
There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of his corespondents.-
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—This Court would like to dispel the notion that due process rights were violated when Sen.
Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents in the preliminary
investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28.
This matter was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said: Both
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the
affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting

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witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent
with copies of the affidavits of his [corespondents]. The right of the respondent is only “to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in Section 3(b),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in
Paderanga that “Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.” Moreover,
Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only
require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his corespondents. In any
event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen.
Revilla’s requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the
opportunity to comment thereto. Thus, there is more reason to decline his flawed claims of
denial of due process. Case law state that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity
to be heard, which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.
17. Same; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Taking together all of the above
stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend to prima facie establish that
irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and that he had
a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of Office which unquestionably
exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly observed, “[t]he PDAF
was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d]
control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles’] Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and
commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned
out to be ‘ghost projects,’ and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of
Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly
enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.” Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least
P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired through a
combination or series of overt acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen.
Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder. Besides, case law holds that once the trial
court finds probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the
Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his co-petitioners), any question
on the prosecution’s conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.
18. Priority Development Assistance Fund; Cambe was personally identified by the
whistleblowers to have received Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) money for
himself and for Sen. Revilla.-
—There is no dispute that Cambe was Sen. Revilla’s trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff.
By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla’s
office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe’s signatures explicitly appear on
several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla’s
PDAF funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Moreover, Cambe
was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself
and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would go to Napoles’s
office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of P224,512,500.00
representing Sen. Revilla’s “commissions” or “kickbacks” coming from the PDAF scam. The
cash would come either from Luy’s vault or from Napoles herself. In simple terms, Cambe
allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.
19. Same; Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral
role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF. In fact, she
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was tagged as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman,
Napoles would approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and “offer to ‘acquire’ his x x x
PDAF allocation in exchange for a ‘commission’ or kickback amounting to a certain
percentage of the PDAF.” Once Napoles was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla’s
PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically
indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen.
Revilla’s Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own pockets for

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delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the
same on Sen. Revilla’s behalf. Once the SARO and/or the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA)
regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the promised “kickbacks” to
Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles’ NGOs to
undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which turned out to be “ghost” or “inexistent”;
thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.
20. Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF
documents, whistleblowers’ testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report,
as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there
lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima
facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities,
was significantly involved in the aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla’s
PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in “kickbacks.” In the same manner, there is
probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible
that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to “ghost” projects caused undue prejudice
to the government.
21. Same; Same; Conspiracy; It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in
the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the
same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same.-
—That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a
complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the
aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if
they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds
from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In
this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the
systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a
coconspirator for the aforementioned crimes.
22. Same; Same; Whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of
those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even
declared that De Asis, among others, received the checks issued by the implementing
agencies (IAs) to the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and deposited the
same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of
those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’ house.-
—Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator of KPMFI which
was one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of
Sen. Revilla’s PDAF allocations. Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named
De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said
whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among others, received the checks issued by the
IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn
from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’ house.
Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all probability, De
Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.
23. Priority Development Assistance Fund; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman,
whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, they, along with the other staff of
Napoles-
— which includes Lim would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen.
Revilla.— As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas
narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the
other staff of Napoles — which includes Lim — would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the
kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla. The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the
legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that relate to his involvement in the
PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not
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deliver the same as he claims, the act of preparation is still connected to the common
objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause
against him for the crime charged.
24. Same; As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) issued in the
perpetuation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam were issued by the
Office of Relampagos as

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Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and
Bare are all working-
— a finding that they themselves did not dispute.—As pointed out by the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF
scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez,
Paule, and Bare are all working
— a finding that they themselves did not dispute. More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy
positively identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles’ “contact persons” in the DBM; and (b) the
COA Report found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs.
Ostensibly, these circumstances show Relampagos, et al.’s manifest partiality and bad faith
in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the
Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
25. Forgery; Hearsay Evidence; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot tag key documentary
evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings;
otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary
investigation.-
—In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err
in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the
evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this
Court cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at
this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms
followed during preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that “[i]n dealing with
probable cause[,] at the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be proved.” Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the
standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such,
no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in
the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they
were charged.
26. Ombudsman; Principle of Non-interference; View that the courts do not usually
interfere with the Ombudsman in the determination as to the existence of probable cause.-
—As the ponencia points out, the courts do not usually interfere with the Ombudsman in the
determination as to the existence of probable cause. In other words, the Ombudsman
possesses ample latitude to determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a
person. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman’s broad authority is
circumscribed by the need of an upright conduct of a preliminary investigation. This balancing
rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person from “the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed” and to guard the State against the
“burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.”
27. Remedial Law; Evidence; View that ruling in favor of the complainants, the
Ombudsman sweepingly concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her cohorts to
amass ill-gotten wealth at the expense of the State.-
—The majority sustained the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict Revilla for
Plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, for supposedly amassing ill-gotten wealth by
allegedly misappropriating, or supposedly receiving commission for allowing the
misappropriation of the PDAF in conspiracy with and/or by giving unwarranted benefit to
Napoles and her cohorts. As I have previously stated, I cannot concur with the majority
opinion. A look at the evidence that the complainants had presented demonstrates that there
is nary any competent and relevant evidence that can constitute as basis for the finding of
probable cause against Revilla. Ruling in favor of the complainants, the Ombudsman
sweepingly concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her cohorts to amass ill-
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gotten wealth at the expense of the State.
28. Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that the pieces of evidence relied
upon by the Ombudsman do not provide sufficient basis for even a prima facie finding
of probable cause to believe that Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles on: (i) the
list of projects to be chosen by the lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding implementing
agencies (IA) that would implement the project; (iii) the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-
controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that would

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implement the project; and (v) the amount of commission or kickback which the lawmaker
would receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO.-
—Notably, the pieces of evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman do not provide sufficient
basis for even a prima facie finding of probable cause to believe that Revilla negotiated and
agreed with Napoles on: (i) the list of projects to be chosen by the lawmaker; (ii) the
corresponding IA that would implement the project; (iii) the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-
controlled NGO that would implement the project; and (v) the amount of commission or
kickback which the lawmaker would receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO. Indeed, the
Ombudsman’s affirmation of these allegations stands on mere inferences and presumptions.
What is certain is that the Ombudsman surmised Revilla’s involvement with the PDAF scam
from the following: (1) his purported signatures appearing in several documents endorsing
the NGOs affiliated with Napoles; (2) the testimonies of the so-called “whistleblowers” and
(3) the Counter-Affidavits of some of Revilla’s corespondents. As will be discussed, these
are neither relevant nor competent, and do not constitute sufficient bases to sustain the
finding of probable cause to subject Revilla to continuous prosecution.
29. Same; View that the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution especially since the
“whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’ Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to the corresponding implementing agencies (IAs)
along with all other Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Documents.-
—As Revilla maintained all along, his involvement/participation in the release of his PDAF was
limited only to the identification and selection of projects or programs listed in the the GAA and
communicating such selection to the Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance and the
Senate President. Any endorsement made by him does not and cannot sway these IAs to
act per his will and contrary to legal requirements. It is, therefore, perplexing that Revilla’s
involvement in the PDAF scam is hinged on apparently worthless “endorsements” of
Napoles-controlled NGOs. Further, the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution
especially since the “whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the lawmakers’
endorsements of Napoles’ NGOs to the IAs along with all other PDAF Documents. Suñas
testified that they prepared these endorsement letters, upon which Revilla is now being
indicted.
30. Same; In fact, even a cursory glance at some of the PDAF Documents questioned by
Revilla reveals a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an
ordinary person. A prime example is the “endorsement” letter addressed to Gondelina Amata
of the NLDC dated October 23, 2009, supposedly signed by Revilla. Compared to the
standard signatures submitted by Revilla, the signature contained therein lacks the cursive
flourishes of his true signatures and instead contains sharp and blunt strokes. Similarly
noticeable is the variance of the letterheads used in these various endorsement letters, with
some containing supposed bar codes of Revilla’s office, others simply a number.
31. Same; Handwriting Experts; At the very least, the Azores and Pagui findings should
have impelled the Ombudsman to consider the veracity of the signatures on the PDAF
documents given that these experts’ findings uniformly detail discrepancies between the
signatures in the PDAF documents and Revilla’s admitted genuine specimens of writing.
That the Ombudsman failed to even require NBI handwriting experts to study the questioned
signatures renders the immediate dismissal of the two handwriting expert’s certifications
highly suspect. Where the genuineness of the documents is crucial to the respondents’
defense, it is more prudent, as stressed in People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999), to allow
the opinion of handwriting experts.
32. Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; Being uncontroverted and, in fact, confirmed
by the complainants’ witnesses, I submit that this forgery of Revilla’s signatures and the
falsification of the PDAF Documents should have dissuaded the Ombudsman from filing the
Informations against Revilla. Certainly, the finding of probable cause to indict a person for
plunder cannot be based on admittedly falsified documents. While probable cause falls
below proof beyond reasonable doubt in the hierarchy of quanta of evidence, it must
nonetheless be supported by sufficient, credible and competent evidence, i.e., there should
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be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
33. Remedial Law; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule;
Absent any credible proof of Revilla’s actual link or participation in the alleged scheme to
divert his PDAF to Napoles’ NGOs, the Ombudsman should likewise not have accepted hook,
line, and sinker any testimony

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of a participant in the supposed conspiracy. It is basic that an extrajudicial confession binds
only the confessant or declarant and is inadmissible against his or her co-accused. This
basic postulate, an extension of the res inter alios acta rule, is embodied in Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
34. Same; Same; As discussed above, besides the admittedly falsified and forged PDAF
documents, there is no concrete proof showing that Revilla pulled off any “overt act” in
furtherance of the supposed conspiracy with Napoles. Other than saying that without Revilla,
the scheme would have supposedly failed, the Ombudsman has been unable to point to
concrete set of facts to support her conclusion as to the complicity of Revilla to the conspiracy
in question. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman falls short of the threshold
requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the
felony itself. The quantum of evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy is a “facile
device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.” For this
reason, I submit that the testimonies of Revilla’s corespondents cannot be taken against him.
Yet, the Ombudsman repeatedly and freely cited the previously withheld counter-affidavits of
Revilla’s co- respondents in finding probable cause to indict him for Plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
35. Same; Same; Audio Evidence; Electronic Evidence; View that Section 1, Rule 11 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a telephone
conversation, is admissible only if it is presented, explained, or authenticated.-
—A closer look of Cunanan’s testimony, which was a critical part of the Ombudsman’s
Resolutions, bares the infirmity of his claim. While he could have easily asked for a written
confirmation of the authorization given by Revilla to Cambe, Cunanan himself admitted that
he, instead, supposedly sought verification over the telephone. Yet, an audio recording of the
alleged telephone conversation was not presented or even mentioned. Not even a transcript
of the alleged telephone conversation was attached to Cunanan’s Counter-Affidavit. Section
1, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a
telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is presented, explained, or authenticated.
36. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) had previously declared
that the person with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first be reliably
identified before the telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given
probative value.-
—Given that no audio evidence of the telephone conversation was presented, much less
“identified, explained or authenticated,” the occurrence of the alleged telephone conversation
is rendered highly suspect, if not improbable, and any testimony thereon is inadmissible and
of no probative value. But granting, arguendo, that Cunanan did call Revilla’s office, it still
begs the question of how he could have recognized or confirmed the identity of the person
he was speaking with over the phone and not face-to-face. There is no indication, and
Cunanan never even hinted, that he was closely familiar with Revilla’s voice that he can
easily recognize it over the phone in a single conversation. This Court had previously
declared that the person with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first
be reliably identified before the telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given
probative value.
37. Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; View that the Ombudsman should not have
found probable cause to indict Revilla given that: there is nothing but falsified documents,
hearsay testimonies and declarations barred by the res inter alios acta that support the
complaints.-
—For this and for the fact that there is absolutely nothing competent and relevant that can
sway a reasonable man to believe that Revilla had participated in the PDAF scheme, I vote
for the reversal of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict Revilla for plunder
and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 on account of grave abuse of discretion. It must not
be forgotten that the crimes involved in these clases are Plunder and violation of Section
3(e), RA 3019 — two grave charges that can strip a man of his good name and liberty, as in
this case. The Ombudsman should not have found probable cause to indict Revilla given that
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there is nothing but falsified documents, hearsay testimonies and declarations barred by the
res inter alios acta that support the complaints. Worse, the Ombudsman violated the due
process protection of the Constitution in citing affidavits and testimonies not previously
furnished Revilla. Without doubt, the Assailed Resolutions, insofar as it found probable
cause against Revilla, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

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38. Same; Same; Interestingly, the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution of the respondent
Ombudsman did not once mention the examination report of Atty. Pagui, nor did it squarely
address the allegation of forgery. It immediately dismissed the argument by saying: Forgery
is not presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence and the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Further, as gathered from the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution, the fact of Cambe, acting on his own as a public officer, amassing or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) through
any of the means provided under the plunder law or acting in violation of RA 3019 has not
been demonstrated.
39. Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; View that the requisites to bring
a given set of facts under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the
present case.-
—The exception to the res inter alios acta rule, as earlier indicated, in Section 30 of Rule 130
provides: Section 30. Admission by conspirator.—The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
People v. Cachuela, 698 SCRA 161 (2013), succinctly dwells on the application the rule and
its exception, thus: At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissiblin evidence
against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently,
an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his
or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res
inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy, and during its existence, may he given in evidence against the coconspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order
that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
(b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant
was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the
present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the
extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing
the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and
conclusively as the crime itself Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to
insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime. The requisites to bring a
given set of facts under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the
present case.
40. Judicial Review; View that considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach
thus taken by the Ombudsman, I submit that the Supreme Court (SC) should have exercised
its power of judicial review.-
—Considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken by the
Ombudsman, I submit that this Court should have exercised its power of judicial review.
Tolerating the practice of establishing probable cause based on forged or questionable
documents would expose the criminal justice system to malicious prosecution. It will create a
dangerous precedent. It will encourage unscrupulous individuals to file trumped up charges
based on fictitious, spurious, or manipulated documents. Malicious lawsuits designed to
harass the innocent will proliferate, in clear violation of their rights enshrined by no less than
the Constitution. This, I cannot allow.
41. Criminal Law; Plunder; Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that while I
submit that the Court can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion respecting the undue reliance of
the Ombudsman on inadmissible evidence, such as the statements and ledgers submitted by
Luy, I concur with the majority that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the existence of probable
cause to charge Napoles is substantiated.-
—While I submit that the Court can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion respecting the undue
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reliance of the Ombudsman on inadmissible evidence, such as the statements and ledgers
submitted by Luy, I concur with the majority that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the
existence of probable cause to charge Napoles is substantiated. Her argument that no
evidence was presented to show her affiliation to the NGOs and the implementation of the
PDAF-financed projects holds no water. Save for her bare denials, Napoles did not submit
any contrary evidence which would support her claim. On the contrary, the Ombudsman,
through the efforts of the FIO and the NBI, was able to secure the statements of Napoles’
former employees, to independently establish how she set up NGOs and colluded with people
in and out

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of the government to acquire the proceeds of the PDAF of various legislators. Notably, an
employee, Mary Arlene Baltazar, categorically testified having been instructed by Napoles to
forge the signatures of directors in her NGO, as well as the signatures of listed beneficiaries
in the PDAF-funded projects, and to shred documents related to the PDAF scheme.
Counter-affidavits of the public officers from the implementing agencies involved also
admitted having coordinated with Napoles in processing the projects.
42. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; View that a cursory reading of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Field Investigation Office (FIO) complaints would
show substantial compliance with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on sufficiency of
complaint and information.-
—A cursory reading of the NBI and FIO complaints would show substantial compliance with
the above provision. All the accused were specifically named, the designation of the offenses
charged clearly indicated, and the acts allegedly constituting the offenses and where they
were committed enumerated. Considering the offenses charged, it was correctly indicated
that the State is the offended party. As for the date of when the offenses were committed, it
is sufficient if, as here, the approximate period of commission, i.e., span of four years starting
from and ending on, is provided, the exact date of the commission of the crime not being an
element in either Plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
43. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; View that De Asis, as Napoles’ employee, possesses
knowledge of facts and circumstances, which can put one wary of his employer’s nature of
business. Possessing this knowledge while continuously participating in the illegal scheme,
even if instructed by his employer, is tantamount to acquiescence in the illegal act, thus
belying his bona fide claim.-
—The Ombudsman aptly pointed out the inconsistency of De Asis’ acts with the principle of
good faith. Routinely withdrawing and delivering huge sums of cash for Napoles and
producing fictitious list of beneficiaries and liquidation reports would make a reasonable
person doubt the legitimacy of his employer’s business. De Asis, as Napoles’ employee,
possesses knowledge of facts and circumstances, which can put one wary of his employer’s
nature of business. Possessing this knowledge while continuously participating in the illegal
scheme, even if instructed by his employer, is tantamount to acquiescence in the illegal act,
thus belying his bona fide claim.
44. Same; Same; Principal by Indispensable Cooperation; —While preparation or
segregation and the actual delivery are separate acts, they are interconnected with a common
objective. It is immaterial, thus, whether Lim only prepared or segregated the money, actually
delivered it or both. The fact is, there is probable cause to believe that he performed a role in
the consummation of the crime of Plunder. Further, evidence shows that there is probable
cause to believe that Lim cooperated in order to divert the PDAF to their own pockets. By
rendering assistance in the delivery of money, Lim is deemed to have conspired in the illegal
transaction. Under these circumstances, Lim is as much liable as the principal because of
his overt and indispensable cooperation in perpetuating the scam. At this juncture, it is
necessary to state that Revilla is not the only named public officer involved in this issue.
There are others against whom the Ombudsman found probable cause. Thus, Lim, being a
private individual, may be charged with Plunder, there being probable cause to believe that
he acted in concert with some public officers.

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471. Heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr. vs. LBP, 814 SCRA 289, January 11, 2017
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation ; RTC ; Special Agrarian Courts ;
1. Same; Same; Regional Trial Court; Special Agrarian Courts; In LBP v. Kho, 793 SCRA
651 (2016), the Court had succinctly explained the “cut-off rule” in the application of Republic
Act (RA) 9700: It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO No. 1, Series of 2010 which
was issued in line with Section 31 of RA 9700 empowering the DAR to provide the
necessary rules and regulations for its implementation, became effective only subsequent to
July 1, 2009. Consequently, it cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation for
the subject land where the claim folders were undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July
1, 2009, and, as such, should be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to
its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off date set under DAR AO 2, Series
of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, Series of 2009, having made no reference to any
cut-off date with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands under PD No. 27 and
EO No. 228 wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners. Consequently, the
application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those where the claim
folders were received on or subsequent to July 1, 2009. Following the above dictum, since
the claim folder covering the subject land was received by the LBP on December 2, 1997, or
prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent DAR
regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700 instead of
adopting the new DAR issuance. While the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR since the valuation of
property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is
vested with the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and justify in
clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and the applicable
formula.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law;
Case law states that when the acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27
is still incomplete-
— such as in this case, where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled
— just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988.”—Case law states that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete
— such as in this case, where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled
— just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.”
3. Same; Same; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the
time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when
the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of
the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property,
and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

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472. Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Rapiz, 814 SCRA 303, January 11, 2017
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ; POEA-Standard Employment
Contract ;
1. Same; Same; Same; POEA-Standard Employment Contract; It bears noting that as
per respondent’s contract with Jebsens, his employment is covered by the 2010 POEA-SEC. It
is well-settled that the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties and, as such, its provisions
bind both of them. Under Section 20(A)(6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the determination of the
proper disability benefits to be given to a seafarer shall depend on the grading system
provided by Section 32 of the said contract, regardless of the actual number of days that the
seafarer underwent treatment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v.
Quiogue, Jr., 764 SCRA 431 (2015), the Court further clarified that for the company-
designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some
significant act to justify an extension (e.g., that the illness still requires medical attendance
beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days); otherwise, the seafarer’s disability
shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total. Accordingly, the Court laid down
the following guidelines that shall govern seafarers’ claims for permanent and total disability
benefits: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported
to him; 2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent
and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120
days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or
seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to
240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated physician still
fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s
disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

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473. Republic vs. Susi, 814 SCRA 397, January 16, 2017
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Titles and Deeds ; Reconstitution of Titles ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant’s
purported owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the reconstitution petition should be treated as falling
under Section 3(f) of RA 26, and the trial court should require compliance with the requisites under
Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26. In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted
notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13, 2005 Order failed to show that notices were sent
to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an interest in, or who have buildings
or improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as
the owners of adjoining properties. Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the
indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of the reconstitution petition to
actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court with jurisdiction
thereon. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one
having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of
reconstitution is null and void.
2. Civil Law; Estoppel; It is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or
dishonorably with its citizens. Thus, whether or not the OSG’s motion to vacate was the proper
remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the
reconstitution ordered by the RTC which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and,
thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no opposition
was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his
burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also
at that time, she was the registered owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from
assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record,
such petition has no merit.
3. Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The judicial reconstitution of a
Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the
reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the
lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time
of the loss or destruction.
4. Same; Same; Same; RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the source of the petition for
reconstitution. Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and requirements for
sources falling under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13
lay down the procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c),
3(d), 3(e), and 3(f). Thus, before the court can properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or
authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe the above
procedures and requirements prescribed by the law. In numerous cases, the Court has held that the
noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the trial court of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null
and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of
the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority to proceed is
conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. As such, the court upon which the
reconstitution petition is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record
and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements.
5. Same; Same; Same;Records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation
dated December 5, 2005, had already called the court’s attention to its Report dated March 1, 1995
in the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88, expressing serious doubts on the authenticity
of Susi’s duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other titles over the subject land. It is well to
point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into
account the LRA’s report. Notably, both the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the
petition for reconstitution before Branch 77 was filed on the basis of Susi’s purported owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi’s prior reconstitution petitions,
as stated in the LRA’s Report, were anchored on an owner’s duplicate certificate bearing a different
serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed, a perusal of the said certificates of title, which were
attached to the Republic’s motion for reconsideration of the CA’s Decision dated February 13, 2014,
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reveals that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that
Susi did not refute the existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her
comment to the said motion. ****

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474. Republic vs. Galeno, 815 SCRA 191, January
23, 2017 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ;
1. Same; Same; Case law states that the “absence of opposition from government agencies
is of no controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the
decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s.”
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The contents of the certifications are
hearsay because respondent’s sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was
incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably,
while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner interposed no objection
to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court below, it should be
borne in mind that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value
unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent’s
documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of
objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.

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475. Ramos vs. People, 815 SCRA 226, January 23, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Aggravating Circumstances ; Use of Unlicensed Firearm ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5)
gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not
the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b)
assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was
licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this
matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in
killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this
respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court
competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.- To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the
following elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
4. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Unlicensed Firearm; Under Section 1 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.”-
—Under Section 1 of RA No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed
the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The
onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the
prosecution.

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476. Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan, Jr., 816 SCRA 243, January
30, 2017 Syllabi Class :Due Process ; Administrative Due Process ;
1. Same; Same; Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow deprived of due process by
either of the labor tribunals, such defect was cured by: (a) NPI’s filing of its motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC; (b) the NLRC’s subsequent issuance of its Resolution
dated August 30, 2013 wherein the tribunal considered all of NPI’s arguments as contained
in its motion; and (c) NPI’s subsequent elevation of the case to the CA. In Gonzales v. Civil
Service Commission, 490 SCRA 741 (2006), the Court reiterated the rule that “[a]ny
seeming defect in [the] observance [of due process] is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration,” and that “denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party
who [was] afforded the opportunity to be heard x x x.” Similarly, in Autencio v. Mañara, 449
SCRA 46 (2005), it was held that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the
party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
2. Labor Disputes; Grave Abuse of Discretion; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
3. Due Process; Administrative Due Process; The observance of fairness in the conduct
of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial type hearing is not
always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.

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477. Ubas, Sr. vs. Chan, 816 SCRA 659, February 06, 2017
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Negotiable Instruments Law ; Complete and Delivered
Instruments ;
1. Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; Complete and Delivered Instruments;
Respondent’s defense that the subject checks were lost and, thus, were not actually issued
to petitioner is a factual matter already passed upon by the RTC. As aptly pointed out by the
trial court, it would have been contrary to human nature and experience for petitioner to send
respondent a demand letter detailing the particulars of the said checks if he indeed
unlawfully obtained the same. In fact, it is glaring that respondent did not present Engr.
Merelos, the project engineer who had purportedly lost the checks, to personally testify on the
circumstances surrounding the checks’ loss. Further, Unimasters’ comptroller, Murillo,
testified during trial that “she came to know that the lost checks were deposited in the account
of [petitioner as] she was informed by the [o]ffice[r]-in-charge of the drawee bank, the Far
East Bank of Tacloban, City Branch.” However, there was no showing that Unimasters
and/or respondent commenced any action against petitioner to assert its interest over a
significant sum of P1,500,000.00 relative to the checks that were supposedly lost/stolen.
Clearly, this paucity of action under said circumstances is again, inconsistent with ordinary
human nature and experience. Thus, absent any cogent reason to the contrary, the Court
defers to the RTC’s findings of fact on this matter. In Madrigal
v. CA, 456 SCRA 247 (2005), it was explained that: The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court, which [has]
more opportunity and facilities to examine these matters. This same Court has declared that
it is the policy of the Court to defer to the factual findings of the trial judge, who has the
advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to determine their demeanor
whether they are telling or distorting the truth. Besides, Section 16 of the NIL provides that
when an instrument is no longer in the possession of the person who signed it and it is
complete in its terms, “a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is
proved,” as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Words and Phrases; Cause of
action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. In this case, petitioner’s cause of action is anchored on his claim that respondent
personally entered into a contract with him for the delivery of construction materials
amounting to P1,500,000.00, which was, however, left unpaid. He also avers that
respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of said obligation because the subject
checks issued to him by respondent were dishonored on the ground of stop payment. As
proof, petitioner offered in evidence, among others, the demand letter he sent to respondent
detailing the serial numbers of the checks that were issued by the latter, including the dates
and amounts thereof. He also offered the dishonored checks which were in his possession.
3. Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits
in evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a presumption that the credit has not
been satisfied arises in [his] favor.- Jurisprudence holds that “in a suit for a recovery of sum
of money, as here, the plaintiff- creditor [(petitioner in this case)] has the burden of proof to
show that defendant [(respondent in this case)] had not paid [him] the amount of the
contracted loan. However, it has also been long established that where the plaintiff-creditor
possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a
presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in [his] favor. Thus, the defendant
is, in appropriate instances, required to overcome the said presumption and present
evidence to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against him.” This
presumption stems from Section 24 of the NIL, which provides that: Section 24.
Presumption of Consideration.—Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have
been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party thereto for value.
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 ****

570
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478. Re: Complaint of Aero Engr. Darwin A. Reci Against Court Administrator Jose
Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia Relative to
Criminal Case No. 05- 236956, 817 SCRA 14,February 07, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Substantial Evidence ;
1. Same; Substantial Evidence; It is settled that the quantum of evidence necessary to find
an individual liable for the aforesaid offenses is substantial evidence, or “that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.” Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required
in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs.
2. Administrative Law; Dereliction of Duty; Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross
or simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence “refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is
the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their
own property.” It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to
perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an
employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a
“disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.”

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479. Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 818 SCRA 83, February 15, 2017
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Marriages ; Annulment of Marriage ;
Psychological Incapacity ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for
divorce manifest themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the
context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help
and support. In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Opinions; An expert opinion is not absolutely
necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The evidence need not necessarily
come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related
to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of the marriage. In other words, the
Republic v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), guidelines continue to apply but its application
calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be clear, however, the totality of the
evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), laid
down: gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In sum, Dr. Tayag’s assessment, even when taken
together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility,
and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties’ marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more
than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of the marital obligations; it is
not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a
married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person
— an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage — which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

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480. Arabani, Jr. vs. Arabani, 818 SCRA 245, February 21,
2017 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Judges ; Sexual
Harassment ;
1. Same; Judges; Sexual Harassment; The distasteful act by Judge Arabani of making a
drawing of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showing it to an employee of the court of
which he is an officer constitutes sexual harassment. It is an act that constitutes a physical
behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd insinuation. To the Court’s mind, Judge
Arabani deliberately utilized this form of expression, i.e., drawing, to maliciously convey to
Sheldalyn his sexual desires over her; hence, his conduct cannot be classified as a mere
display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under Section 53(C)(4), Rule X of
CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, such as one who is caught watching or reading pornographic
materials. Rather, Judge Arabani’s behavior should be classified as an analogous case
(Section 53[B][5]) of verbal abuse with sexual overtones under Section 53(B)(4) of the same
issuance, which thus, qualifies the same as a less grave offense.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Daily Time Records; Dishonesty is
defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity.” As correctly ruled by the OCA, Abduraji and Rahim are guilty of dishonesty by
committing irregularities in the punching of Rahim’s bundy card/DTR on three (3) occasions,
i.e., on the subject incidents. The punching of a court employee’s DTR is a personal act of
the holder which cannot and should not be delegated to anyone else. Moreover, every court
employee has the duty to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of his arrival at and
departure from the office. Thus, case law holds that falsification of DTRs is an act of
dishonesty and is reflective of respondent’s fitness to continue in office and of the level of
discipline and morale in the service, rendering him administratively liable in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules.
3. Same; Same; Same; Falsification of Official Documents; Under Section 22, Rule XIV
of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents (such as DTRs) and dishonesty
are both grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time
offenders. Nonetheless, while it is the Court’s duty to sternly wield a corrective hand to
discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, it also has the
discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy, taking in mind that the
objective for discipline is not their punishment, but the improvement of the public service, and
the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.
4. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Mitigating
Circumstances; Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. Among the circumstances
jurisprudentially held as mitigating include, among others, the erring individual’s admission of
guilt, remorse, high performance rating, and the fact that the infraction complained of is his/her
first offense. Thus, in several cases involving first time offenders, as Abduraji and Rahim in
this case, the Court has reduced the imposable penalty of dismissal to suspension of six
(6) months without pay. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopts the penalty
recommended by the OCA, and accordingly suspends Abduraji and Rahim for a period of six
(6) months without pay.
5. Same; Court Personnel; Insubordination; Words and Phrases; Insubordination is
defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have
obeyed, and imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the Judge. In this case, the Court finds to be likewise well-taken the OCA’s
recommendation for the dropping of the said charges against Abduraji and Rahim
considering the perceived absence of intent on their part to deliberately defy Judge Arabani’s
authority as the head of office. However, they should be reprimanded for their failure to
comply with Judge Arabani’s memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in
writing, which constitutes a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, a light
offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
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6. Same; Same; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; Penalties;
Reprimand; Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is only a light offense
punishable with reprimand for the first offense. Nonetheless, in addition to such
noncompliance, Rodrigo likewise failed to secure the signature of Judge Arabani on his
bundy cards for the months of March to September 2010 when they are required to be
certified correct by the Presiding Judge. Rodrigo’s avowed reason for his failure to leave his
bundy cards on the designated rack having been found to be unjustified, the forfeiture of his
entire salary for the said months should have been in order, if not for the Certification dated
October

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5, 2010 issued by Mirad, Clerk II/Timekeeper of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu, certifying
the number of absences incurred by Rodrigo for the months of April through September 2010,
which Judge Arabani submitted, thus, impliedly admitting that Rodrigo was present on the
working days not so indicated therein.
7. Same; Vacation Leave; The grant of vacation leave (VL) shall be at the discretion of the
head of department/agency.-
—The failure of Rodrigo to specify the number of working days of leave applied for and the
inclusive dates in his leave application filed on April 12, 2010, which merely indicated the type
of leave as “SPL [special privilege leave] & VL” (vacation leave), is not a mere formal defect
that may be remedied by the expedience of subsequently stating the specific dates of leave.
It must be pointed out that leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an official or
employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of
the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of
department/agency.
8. Same; Same; While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso
facto render an employee administratively liable, the unauthorized leave of absence
becomes punishable if the absence is frequent or habitual.-
—While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso facto render an
employee administratively liable, the unauthorized leave of absence becomes punishable if
the absence is frequent or habitual. An officer or employee in the civil service shall be
considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5
days monthly leave credit under the Leave law at least three (3) months in a semester or at
least three (3) consecutive months during the year.
9. Same; Court Personnel; Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours. Court personnel should strictly observe
the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof to inspire public
respect for the justice system. Thus, court officials and employees are at all times behooved
to strictly observe official time because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored
in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge
to the last and lowest of its employees. Loafing results in inefficiency and nonperformance of
duty, and adversely affects the prompt delivery of justice.
10. Same; Penalties; Frequent Unauthorized Absences; Section 23(q), Rule XIV of the
Civil Service Rules punishes “[f]requent unauthorized absences, loafing or frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours” with suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second
offense. Records are bereft of showing, however, that Rodrigo had been previously found
guilty of such offense. Consequently, the Court deems it proper to impose upon him the
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension. The OCA’s recommendation for the
forfeiture of salary for the months of February (sic; not the month complained of) and March,
2010 must be, therefore, modified accordingly.

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481. Yap-Paras vs. Paras, 820 SCRA 116, March 13,
2017 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Practice of Law ;
Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent,
prevailing case law shows that the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of
six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an
additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of
law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on
respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from the
practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras, 804
SCRA 189 (2016). In Sanchez v. Torres, 741 SCRA 620 (2014), the Court ruled that the
penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been
previously disbarred. Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer’s administrative
liability for recording purposes in the lawyer’s personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held
that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said
penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner,
the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in
view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes.
That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and
academic.
2. Attorneys; Formal Investigation; Generally, the IBP’s formal investigation is a
mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling
reasons, as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues
raised. Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative
case to the IBP for further proceedings. However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as
well as respondent’s own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a Court
order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised
before it even without the IBP’s factual findings and recommendation thereon.
3. Same; Practice of Law; According to jurisprudence, the “practice of law embraces any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles,
practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience.” During the
suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing
law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer’s suspension is not automatically lifted upon
the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait
for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of
law. In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent’s suspension period became
effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Thereafter,
respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and
without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new
clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without
waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held
administratively liable therefor.
4. Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension from Practice of Law; Willful Disobedience;
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of
a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts
which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law, to wit: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
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or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
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482. People vs. Alejandro, 820 SCRA 189, March 13,
2017 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ; Qualified
Rape ;
1. Same; Same; Qualified Rape; On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case
No. 73- SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that
accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the
conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article
335 of the RPC states that if the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as
when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this
instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn his appeal
prior to the promulgation of this decision.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, “an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.”
3. Criminal Law; Homicide; Elements of.- —To successfully prosecute the crime of
homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that
the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without
medical intervention or attendance.
4. Same; Rape; Elements of.-
—The elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b)
said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the
victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under
twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed
either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
(2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher
penalty.

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483. People vs. Macapundag, 820 SCRA 204, March 13, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain
why the inventory and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of
seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless
arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the
presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a representative from the
DOJ, the media and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies of
the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the seized
items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police
officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the
procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an
appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing
tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-— Macapundag was charged with illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. On the other hand, the
prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object
identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
4. Same; Same; It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond reasonable doubt.-
—Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
5. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain
of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized
drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.

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484. Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta, 820 SCRA 286, March
14, 2017 Syllabi Class :Election Law ; Canvassing of Votes ;
1. Election Law; Canvassing of Votes; The Court notes that the CA failed to determine
Mamalinta’s administrative liability on the third act she was accused of committing, i.e., the
premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an incomplete
canvass of election returns. In Nasser Immam v. COMELEC, 322 SCRA 866 (2000), the
Court ruled that a complete canvass of votes is necessary in order to reflect the true desire
of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning candidates on the basis of incomplete
canvass is illegal and of no effect.
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Dismissal from the Service; Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also
have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
3. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Gross Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; As
compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give
proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference,
Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious
indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
4. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service; Meanwhile, certain acts
may be considered as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service as long as they
tarnish the image and integrity of the public office and may or may not be characterized by
corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. In Encinas v.
Agustin, Jr., 696 SCRA 240 (2013), the Court outlined the following acts that constitute this
offense, such as: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report
back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making
false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders.
5. Same; Dismissal from the Service; Duress; Intimidation; The double proclamation
and the unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing, the Court agrees with the CA that
Mamalinta should not be held administratively liable for the same to warrant her dismissal
from the service, as such acts were committed while under duress and intimidation. In People
v. Nuñez, 276 SCRA 9 (1997), the Court defined duress as follows: Duress, force, fear or
intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. To be available as a defense, the
fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm
must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a
defendant could shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or
because of a threat of a third person.
6. Same; Same; Same; “[D]uress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one’s own life. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote
fear. A threat of future injury is not enough. It must be clearly shown that the compulsion
must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.”
7. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Administrative Proceedings; The CA did not
err in considering Mamalinta and Mato’s Joint Affidavit — as well as the Minutes of the
MBOC dated May 14 and 15, 2004 and the Report dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by
Peñafiel — although they were not formally offered as evidence during the investigation
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before the COMELEC. As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied in administrative proceedings. Hence, in proper cases such as this, the procedural
rules may be relaxed for the furtherance of just objectives. Thus, the CA did not err in taking
these documents in consideration.

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484. Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta, 820 SCRA 286, March
14, 2017 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Intra-Corporate Controversies ;
Docket Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Docket Fees; Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action as one incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section
7(b)(3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of
Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04- 02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Obiter Dictum; Words and Phrases; In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court had the opportunity
to define an obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects as follows: [An obiter dictum] “x x x is
a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way,
that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an
adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res
judicata.”
3. Same; Same; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Filing Fees; Verily, the deletion of
Section 21(k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7(a) [fees for actions
where the value of the subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for actions
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7(b)(3) [fees for all other
actions not involving property] of the same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate
controversies for the determination of the correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a
dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court’s recognition that the
subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary
estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum) implying that
all intra- corporate cases involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary
estimation.
4. Same; Same; Retroactivity of Laws; While the Court is not unaware that the
amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came after the
filing of the complaint subject of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given
retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the resolution of the instant consolidated
petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive
law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA, 373 SCRA 524 (2002), the Court thoroughly explained the retroactive
effectivity of procedural rules, viz.: The general rule that statutes are prospective and not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a retroactive
law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or
creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but
only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes.” The general rule against giving statutes retroactive
operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does
not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions — those which have accrued or are
pending. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
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The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural
statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.”

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486. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 821 SCRA 41, March
20, 2017 Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Quasi-Contracts ; Solutio Indebiti ;
1. Civil Law; Quasi-Contracts; Solutio Indebiti; Records reveal that BPI’s payment of the
proceeds of the subject check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared,
when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated therein. Such
payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the
quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in relation to Article 2163 of
the Civil Code. Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the damages and attorney’s
fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its satisfaction. Consequently,
respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand — or on June 27, 1997, the
date when BPI informed respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the
return of its proceeds — until fully paid.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;
As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition
does not allow the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts. Case law
provides that “there is a ‘question of law’ when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue
raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether
the supposed error was one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same;
rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence,
in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.” Where there is no dispute as to the
facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question
of law. However, if the question posed requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is
factual.
3. Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; It is settled that in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having
to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of evidence’ or ‘greater
weight of credible evidence.’ Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence.
4. Same; Same; Witnesses; Aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any
corroborative evidence to support his claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was
subject to BPI’s presentment of the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check.
Amado’s unsubstantiated testimony is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon. In
fact, the RTC did not lend any credence to Amado’s testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it
should be borne in mind that the “findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve
great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and
has the unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and
attitude under gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility
was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment,” as in this case.
5. Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Anent the subject check,
while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that generally,
the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under
inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as “[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror.” In order to fall under the
aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
6. Same; Same;It should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the
evidence presented by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter’s
formal offer of evidence. It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may
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validly be considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case, since it
was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during the trial. ****

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487. Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132, March
20, 2017 Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.-
—Anent the issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. In this case, the Court finds no justification for the award of attorney’s
fees to either party. Accordingly, any award for attorney’s fees made by the courts a quo
must be deleted.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-trial; At the outset, it must be emphasized that a
pretrial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the
parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More
significantly, a pretrial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-
Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pretrial in civil cases
in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.
3. Civil Law; Void Contracts; It is settled that “the declaration of nullity of a contract which is
void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found
before the execution thereof.” Pursuant to this rule, since the Deed of Sale involving the
subject land stands to be nullified in view of the parties’ stipulation to this effect, it is
incumbent upon the parties to return what they have received from said sale. Accordingly,
Erlinda and the rest of petitioners (as Pedro’s heirs) are entitled to the return of the subject
land as stipulated during the pretrial. To effect the same, the Register of Deeds of Makati
City should cancel TCT No. 180286 issued in the name of Teresita, and thereafter, reinstate
TCT No. 131753 in the name of Pedro and Erlinda and, restore the same to its previous
state before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated
thereon. On the other hand, respondents, as Teresita’s successors-in-interest, are entitled to
the refund of the additional P50,000.00 consideration she paid for such sale. However, it
should be clarified that the liability for the said amount will not fall on all petitioners, but only
on Erlinda, as she was the only one among the petitioners who was involved in the said sale.
Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), the amount of P50,000.00 shall
be subjected to legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
4. Same; Builders in Good Faith; The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used
in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the
land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the
defect in his title or mode of acquisition. “The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in
the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.” On the other hand, bad faith may only be attributed to a landowner when
the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.
5. Same; Same; In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the
landowner and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if
both of them were in good faith, viz.: Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of
the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the
owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had
acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
6. Same; Same;Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good
faith (or in bad faith, pursuant to the aforecited provision), the landowner is given two (2)
options under Article 448 of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate the
improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the
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necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (b) he may
sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that of the
improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.

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488. Sebastian vs. Cruz, 821 scra 150, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Titles and Deeds ; Reconstitution of Titles ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution
proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA, 725 SCRA 273 (2014), the Court reiterated the rule
that when the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in
fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that
rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Void Judgments; Under Section 2, Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim. In case of absence, or lack of jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the
case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter,
the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor
bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not
a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows
that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Requisites that Must be
Complied With for an Order for Reconstitution to be Issued.
—From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an
order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
(b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.

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489. Navarra vs. People, 821 SCRA 179, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Social Security System ; Mandatory
Contributions ;
1. Social Security System; Mandatory Contributions; Prompt remittance of Social
Security System (SSS) contributions under Section 22(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282 is
mandatory.-
—A plain reading of the Information reveals that petitioner, as FENICS’s President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors at that time, is charged for violation of Section 22(a), in
relation to Section 28(h) and (f), of RA 8282 for FENICS’s failure and/or refusal to remit its
employees’ SSS contributions to the SSS during the period from July 1997 to June 2000.
Section 22(a) of RA 8282 states: Section 22. Remittance of Contributions.—(a) The
contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten
(10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within
such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit
such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the
SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three
percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed
expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions
shall be made quarterly or semi- annually in advance, the contributions payable by the
employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of
an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded
to his employer. x x x x Verily, prompt remittance of SSS contributions under the aforesaid
provision is mandatory. Any divergence from this rule subjects the employer not only to
monetary sanctions, i.e., the payment of penalty of three percent (3%) per month, but also to
criminal prosecution if the employer fails to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b)
deduct monthly contributions from the salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit to the
SSS its employees’ SSS contributions and/or loan payments after deducting the same from
their respective salaries/wages. In this regard, Section 28(f) of RA 8282 explicitly provides that
“[i]f the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to
the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.” Notably, the aforesaid punishable acts are
considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent
are rendered immaterial.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Preliminarily, the Court notes that
petitioner assails the validity or regularity of the Information filed against him on the ground
that it allegedly did not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out by the CA,
petitioner never raised such issue prior to his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records
shows that petitioner only raised the same after he was convicted by the RTC and the case
was already on appeal before the CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his failure to object to
the alleged defect in the Information before entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such
defects, especially since objections as to matters of form or substance in the Information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Hence, petitioner can no longer be allowed to
raise this issue before the Court.

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490. People vs. Toukyo, 821 SCRA 190, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ;
1. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Upon Toukyo’s
death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. Notably, there is no civil liability that arose
from this case, there being no private complainant to begin with.

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491. Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Rowie A. Quimno, Utility Worker I, MCTC
of Ipil- Tungawan- RT Lim, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, 822 SCRA 476, April 17,
2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Absence Without Official Leave ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A court employee’s continued absence without leave disrupts the
normal functions of the court.-
—Indeed, prolonged unauthorized absence causes inefficiency in the public service. A court
employee’s continued absence without leave disrupts the normal functions of the court. It
contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The Court stresses that a court personnel’s conduct is laden
with the heavy burden of responsibility to uphold public accountability and maintain people’s
faith in the judiciary.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Absence Without Official Leave; Quimno
should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence
since February 2016.-
—Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum
Circular No. 13, Series of 2007, states: Section 63. Effect of absences without approved
Leave.—An official or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at
least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL)
and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x. x
x x x (Emphasis supplied) Based on this provision, Quimno should be separated from
service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence since February 2016.

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492. City of Davao vs. Olanolan, 822 SCRA 481, April 17,
2017 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ;
Mandamus ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal
treasurer, at the option of the barangay, and any officer of the local government unit whose
duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be
accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of
the law. Moreover, “[t]he city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned,
shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to ensure that the said
barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.” Hence, given the
COMELEC’s ruling revoking respondent’s election and proclamation as Punong Barangay of
Brgy. 76-A, which in fact, was later on validated by no less than the Court, petitioner could
not have been faulted for not automatically releasing the funds sought for by respondent in his
mandamus petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; “Mandamus is
defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In Special
People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 (2013), the Court explained that the
peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be
compelled.
3. Same; Same; Same; Considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong
Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the
SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. In
fact, it should be pointed out that respondent’s motion for reconsideration before the Court
was altogether denied with finality even prior to his filing of the mandamus petition, i.e., on
June 28, 2005. This means that, for all legal intents and purposes, respondent could not
have even relied on the supposed effectivity of the SQAO during the pendency of his motion
for reconsideration, because at the time he filed his mandamus petition, the Court’s March
31, 2005 Decision against him had already attained finality. Therefore, stripped of the
technical niceties, the Court finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance
of the legal act to be compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus
petition.
4. Same; Same; Same; Petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release
the funds prayed for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled
that “[m]andamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to
control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the
power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain
circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not
controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.”

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493. MetroBank vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 822 SCRA 496, April
17, 2017 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Prescriptive Period ;
1. Same; Same; It may be gleaned that final withholding taxes are considered as full and final
payment of the income tax due, and thus, are not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the two
(2)-year prescriptive period commences to run from the time the refund is ascertained, i.e.,
the date such tax was paid, and not upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or
excessive payment of taxes. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Metrobank’s final
withholding tax liability in March 2001 was remitted to the BIR on April 25, 2001. As such, it
only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial claims for refund. However,
while Metrobank’s administrative claim was filed on December 27, 2002, its corresponding
judicial claim was only filed on September 10, 2003. Therefore, Metrobank’s claim for refund
had clearly prescribed.
2. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Section 204 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, provides the CIR with, inter alia, the authority to grant tax refunds. Pertinent
portions of which read: Section
204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.—
The Commissioner may — x x x x (C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received
or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when
they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon
proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the
taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years
after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an
overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
3. Same; Same; A claimant for refund must first file an administrative claim for refund before
the CIR, prior and judicial claim before the CTA. Notably, both the administrative and judicial
claims for refund should be filed within two (2)-year prescriptive period indicated therein, and
that the claimant is allowed to file the latter even without waiting for the resolution of the
former in order to prevent the forfeiture of its claim through prescription. In this regard, case
law states that “the primary purpose of filing an administrative claim [is] to serve as a notice
of warning to the CIR that court action would follow unless the tax or penalty alleged to have
been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded. To clarify, Section 229 of the Tax Code —
then Section 306 of the old Tax Code — however does not mean that the taxpayer must
await the final resolution of its administrative claim for refund, since doing so would be
tantamount to the taxpayer’s forfeiture of its right to seek judicial recourse should the two (2)-
year prescriptive period expire without the appropriate judicial claim being filed.”
4. Same; Prescriptive Period; As aptly put in CIR v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184 (1992),
“payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered [as] mere installments of the
annual tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative
figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income, should be
treated as advances or portions of the annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of
the calendar or fiscal year. x x x Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period x x x should
be computed from the time of filing of the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax.” Verily, since quarterly income tax payments are treated as
mere “advance payments” of the annual corporate income tax, there may arise certain
situations where such “advance payments” would cover more than said corporate taxpayer’s
entire income tax liability for a specific taxable year. Thus, it is only logical to reckon the two
(2)-year prescriptive period from the time the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income
Tax Return was filed, since it is only at that time that it would be possible to determine
whether the corporate taxpayer had paid an amount exceeding its annual income tax liability.

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494. Fuentes vs. People, 822 SCRA 509, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ; Nominal Damages ;
1. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; The Sandiganbayan awarded her P200,000.00 as
nominal damages occasioned by Fuentes’s non-issuance of a Business Permit to Triple A.
As defined under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are “recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract
and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.” In this
case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to the
suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not proven
with certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper.
2. Criminal Law; Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019; Elements of.-
—As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as
follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b)
that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c)
that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
3. Same; Same; Manifest Partiality; Evident Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; There is
“manifest partiality” when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to
favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, “evident bad faith” connotes
not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or
ill will or for ulterior purposes.
4. Same; Same; Bad Faith; As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal
mayor’s prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to
Sections 16 and 444 (b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power to
issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke
is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse
issuance is premised on noncompliance with the prerequisites for said issuance. In the
exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe due process in that it must afford the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
5. Same; Same; Damages; Fuentes’ acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in
Valenzuela’s favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which
effectively barred Triple A from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such
Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably,
such suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging
in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was
also not issued a Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only
in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A’s favor. Under prevailing case law, “[p]roof of
the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit
received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.”
6. Same; Same; Penalties; As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Fuentes, Section
9(a) of RA 3019 states that the prescribed penalties for violation of the aforesaid crime
includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen
(15) years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
correctly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

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 ****

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495. Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Baya, 822 SCRA 564, April
17, 2017 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Mergers of
Corporations ;
1. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Mergers of Corporations; Sumifru’s contention that it
should only be held liable for the period when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged with
the latter and not with AMSFC is untenable. Section 80 of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines clearly states that one of the effects of a merger is that the surviving company
shall inherit not only the assets, but also the liabilities of the corporation it merged with.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive
dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because ‘continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay’ and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting
to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment. In Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corp., 700 SCRA
668 (2013), the Court held that the burden is on the employer to prove that the transfer or
demotion of an employee was a valid exercise of management prerogative and was not a
mere subterfuge to get rid of an employee; failing in which, the employer will be found liable
for constructive dismissal, viz.: In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the
burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an employee are for valid and legitimate
grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered
a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not
unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in
rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Failure of the employer to
overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to
unlawful constructive dismissal.
4. Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; Separation Pay; In light of the
underlying circumstances which led to Baya’s constructive dismissal, it is clear that an
atmosphere of animosity and antagonism now exists between Baya on the one hand, and
AMSFC and DFC on the other, which therefore calls for the application of the doctrine of
strained relations. “Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be
a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the
grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.”
Thus, it is more prudent that Baya be awarded separation pay, instead of being reinstated, as
computed by the CA.

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496. Daplas vs. Department of Finance, 823 SCRA 44, April
17, 2017 Syllabi Class :Gov’t Employees ; SALN ; Simple
Negligence ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in
accomplishing her SALN. Simple Negligence is akin to Simple Neglect of Duty, which is a
less grave offense punishable with suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months, for the first offense. Since the penalty of suspension can no longer be
imposed on account of petitioner’s resignation, and considering that she readily admitted her
omissions which do not appear to have been attended by any bad faith or fraudulent intent,
the Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month and one (1) day of petitioner’s last salary is reasonable and just under the
premises.
2. Government Employees; Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth; The
requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in order to
promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government
officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, i.e., RA
6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit a sworn
statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and
business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from nondisclosure of such matters.
3. Same; Dishonesty; Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false
statement of any material fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in
order to secure his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to
imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.
4. Same; Misconduct; Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule
of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be
manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly
characterized as simple misconduct only. Most importantly, without a nexus between the act
complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily
fail.
5. Same; Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth; Dishonesty; Indeed, the failure
to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would
normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-
declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an
offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only
when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly
disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to
properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.
6. Same; Same; Same;—It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the
acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus, in several cases where the source of the
undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court deemed the same an “explained
wealth” which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a
wrong, and having accounted for the source of the “undisclosed wealth,” as in this case,
petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere
negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.
7. Same; Same; Simple Negligence; Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is
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required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when
there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. An act done in good faith, which constitutes
only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, as in the present case,
is merely Simple Negligence. ****

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497. Dimapilis vs. Commission on Elections, 823 SCRA 451, April
18, 2017 Syllabi Class :Certificate of Candidacy ;
1. Certificate of Candidacy; A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have
not been a candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot
give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC
essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray votes, and are not considered in
determining the winner of an election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and
entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position.
2. Election Law; A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of
the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is
eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of
his knowledge. To be “eligible” relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being
elected to an office. Conversely, “ineligibility” has been defined as a “disqualification or legal
incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position.” In this relation, a
person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for
the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds
for disqualification under the law.
3. Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the
1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x.” The Court had previously ruled that
the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal
conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52(a), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from
service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal
case should not apply here.
4. Same; Same; Same; As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the
final and executory OMB rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it
is incumbent upon the COMELEC to cancel petitioner’s CoC as a matter of course, else it be
remiss in fulfilling its Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election. Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner’s
claim of denial of due process because even though the special circumstance extant herein
calls for the outright cancellation of his CoC in the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative
function, it even allowed him to submit his Verified Answer cum Memorandum to explain his
side, and to file a motion for reconsideration from its resolution.
5. Public Officers; Dismissal from Service; In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing
petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28, 2010, which date
was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the
October 2010 Barangay Elections. As above stated, “[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service]
shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise
provided in the decision.” Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to have not
been effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and win for two [2]
consecutive elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from holding public office had already rendered him ineligible to run for any elective local
position. Bearing the same sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this
administrative penalty should likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on
the term of any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from
the same final OMB rulings, and therefore had already attached and consequently, remained
effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his later reelection in
2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have been validly reelected so as to avail of the
condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was successfully
invoked by virtue of reelections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic
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pending administrative cases.

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498. Bilag vs. Ay-Ay, 824 SCRA 78, April 24, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek to quiet title over lands
which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-R must be dismissed
on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the case renders it without authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the
merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without jurisdiction is null
and void, and without any binding legal effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to
discuss the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence has
consistently held that “[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear,
try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by
law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief
of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
only power it has is to dismiss the action.” Perforce, it is important that a court or tribunal
should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented
before it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void,
and without any binding legal effects.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Director of Lands; Since the subject lands are untitled
and unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands
who has the authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized
its lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents’ action for quieting of title. In
Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, 719 SCRA 552 (2014), the Court ruled that the trial court therein
correctly dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for lack of
authority to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property,
which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation.

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499. Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., 824 SCRA 125, April
24, 2017 Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed corporation are not
without remedy as they may still submit their claims to the rehabilitation court for proper
consideration so that they may participate in the proceedings, keeping in mind the general
policy of the law “to ensure or maintain certainty and predictability in commercial affairs,
preserve and maximize the value of the assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights
and respect priority of claims, and ensure equitable treatment of creditors who are similarly
situated.” In other words, the creditors must ventilate their claims before the rehabilitation
court, and any “[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the distressed corporation
shall be sufficient to support a finding of indirect contempt of court.”
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Corporate Rehabilitation; Words and Phrases; [C]ase
law has defined corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets
of an insolvent corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency.
It contemplates the continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and liquidity.
3. Same; Same; Same; Verily, the inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and
means to minimize the expenses of the distressed corporation during the rehabilitation
period by providing the best possible framework for the corporation to gradually regain or
achieve a sustainable operating form. “[It] enable[s] the company to gain a new lease in life
and thereby allow creditors to be paid [t]heir claims from its earnings. Thus, rehabilitation
shall be undertaken when it is shown that the continued operation of the corporation is
economically more feasible and its creditors can recover, by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan, more, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if
it is immediately liquidated.”

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500. People vs. Culas, 825 SCRA 552, June 05, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ; Civil
Liability Arising from Crime ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability Arising from Crime;Upon accused-appellant’s death
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery
of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant’s civil liability in connection with
his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case,
AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Under prevailing
law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment.

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501. Olympia-Geronilla vs. Montemayor, Jr., June 05, 2017 A.M. No. P-
17-3676 Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Simple Neglect of Duty ; Words
and Phrases ;
1. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases;
—Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task
expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference, a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense
under Section 46(D) of the RRACCS. However, the Court, in several cases, imposed the
penalty of fine in lieu of suspension as an alternative penalty in order to prevent any undue
adverse effect on public service which would ensue if work were otherwise left unattended
by reason of respondent’s suspension. Therefore, the Court imposes on Atty. Centron the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Engraved in jurisprudence is the rule
that the sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial. Once the writ is placed in
his or her hands, a sheriff is obligated to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter
and with reasonable promptness, taking heed of the prescribed period required by the Rules.
In this case, Sheriff Montemayor’s mandated task was to implement the MCTC’s Decision in
favor of complainants. However, instead of doing so, he substituted his own judgment and
acted on his own belief that a specific portion of the subject property should be excluded from
the execution. He refused to demolish the house of defendant Aceveda and vehemently
insisted that the subject property must first be resurveyed, unduly causing delay in the
implementation of the MCTC Decision, to the prejudice of the prevailing parties, i.e., the
complainants. Sheriff Montemayor’s failure to enforce the alias writ of execution and writ of
demolition clearly renders him liable for dereliction of duty. He overstepped his authority and
conveniently overlooked the ministerial nature of a sheriff’s duty in the execution of
judgments. Instead of enforcing the MCTC’s orders, he exercised his discretion and
supplanted his own judgment for that of the court’s. To reiterate, the duty of a sheriff to
execute a writ is purely ministerial, and he has no discretion to delay the execution thereof.
Absent any instruction by a court to the contrary, he is mandated to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness in implementing the writ. If for any reason, he cannot do so in part or
in full, his duty is outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which, unfortunately,
he likewise failed to observe.
3. Same; Same; Same;
—As regards the amount of P15,000.00 that Sheriff Montemayor had admittedly received
from complainants as additional expenses for the cancelled demolition and which he claimed
had been distributed among the Mangyans who voluntarily vacated the premises, the Court
concurs with the OCA’s finding that the said money was beyond the ambit of allowable fees
that a sheriff may receive in the implementation of writs. Moreover, Sheriff Montemayor failed
to observe the following procedure laid down in Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
with respect to sheriff’s expenses: (1) the sheriff is required to secure the court’s prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process; (2) the
requesting party shall deposit such amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex- Officio Sheriff,
who shall disburse the same to the executing sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same
period for rendering a return on the process or writ; and (3) any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the requesting party who made the deposit.
4. Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Extortion;
—Indisputably, the sum of P15,000.00 received by Sheriff Montemayor without the approval
of the court cannot be considered as lawful sheriff’s fees. As such, his receipt thereof is
tantamount to an unlawful exaction for which he must be held liable for grave misconduct
and dishonesty. A sheriff’s conduct of unilaterally demanding sums of money from a party-
litigant purportedly to defray expenses of execution, without obtaining the approval of the trial
court for such supposed expense and without rendering an accounting constitutes
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dishonesty and extortion and falls short of the required standards of public service. Such
conduct threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice.
5. Same; Grave Misconduct; Dishonesty;
—Grave misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses each punishable by dismissal on the
first offense under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (RRACCS). Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
likewise a grave offense which

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carries the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, and
dismissal on the second offense. However, as records show that Sheriff Montemayor had
been previously meted the penalty of dismissal, the Court instead imposes on him the
penalty of fine in the amount of P40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the
monetary value of his accrued credit leaves, if sufficient; otherwise, he shall pay the amount
directly to the Court.
6. Same; Court Personnel; Simple Neglect of Duty;
—Similarly, Atty. Centron should be held administratively liable for her failure to take a more
decisive action against Sheriff Montemayor’s unwarranted refusal to enforce the MCTC’s
Decision in favor of complainants. Although she may have advised and/or reminded him with
respect to the performance of his duties, her apparently lackadaisical attitude in this matter
evinces a similar failure on her part to perform her duty of effectively supervising him.
Moreover, instead of taking Sheriff Montemayor’s stance that a resurvey should be
conducted on the subject property based on his groundless belief that a portion thereof
should be excluded from the judgment, she should have firmly reminded him of his
mandated ministerial task of implementing writs promptly and expeditiously, and that he had
no discretion with regard to the merits of the judgment. Atty. Centron’s failure in this respect
renders her administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.

****

595
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
502. Mitsubishi Corp-Manila Br vs. CIR, June 5, 2017 G.R. No.
175772 Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refund ;
1. Same; Same; A revenue memorandum circular is an administrative ruling issued by the
CIR to interpret tax laws. It is widely accepted that an interpretation by the executive officers,
whose duty is to enforce the law, is entitled to great respect from the courts. However, such
interpretation is not conclusive and will be disregarded if judicially found to be incorrect.
Verily, courts will not tolerate administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining
consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to implement, as in this case. Thus, Item
B(3) of RMC No. 42-99, an administrative issuance directing petitioner to claim the refund
from NPC, cannot prevail over Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC, which provide that claims
for refund of erroneously collected taxes must be filed with the CIR.
2. Political Law; Executive Agreements; Exchange of Notes; In this case, it is fairly
apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was erroneously collected
from petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same had already been assumed
by the Philippine Government by virtue of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese
Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes is considered as an executive
agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate concurrence. In Abaya v.
Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720 (2007): An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement
that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed
by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats
the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes
is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the
process of legislative approval. It is stated that “treaties, agreements, conventions, charters,
protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of
notes” all refer to “international instruments binding at international law.” x x x x Significantly,
an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
3. Taxation; Exchange of Notes; Tax Assumption Provision; Paragraph 5(2) of the
Exchange of Notes provides for a tax assumption provision whereby: (2) The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines will, itself or through its executing agencies or
instrumentalities, assume all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in the Republic of the Philippines
on Japanese firms and nationals operating as suppliers, contractors or consultants on and/or
in connection with any income that may accrue from the supply of products of Japan and
services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the Loan. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied) To “assume” means “[t]o take on, become bound as another is bound, or put
oneself in place of another as to an obligation or liability.” This means that the obligation or
liability remains, although the same is merely passed on to a different person. In this light,
the concept of an assumption is therefore different from an exemption, the latter being the
“[f]reedom from a duty, liability or other requirement” or “[a] privilege given to a judgment
debtor by law, allowing the debtor to retain [a] certain property without liability.” Thus,
contrary to the CTA En Banc’s opinion, the constitutional provisions on tax exemptions
would not apply.
4. Same; Same; Same; As explicitly worded, the Philippine Government, through its executing
agencies (i.e., NPC in this case) particularly assumed “all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in
the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and nationals operating as suppliers,
contractors or consultants on and/or in connection with any income that may accrue from the
supply of products of Japan and services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the
[OECF] Loan.” The Philippine Government’s assumption of “all fiscal levies and taxes,”
which includes the subject taxes, is clearly a form of concession given to Japanese suppliers,
contractors or consultants in consideration of the OECF Loan, which proceeds were used for
the implementation of the Project. As part of this, NPC entered into the June 21, 1991
Contract with Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner’s head office in Japan) for the
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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
engineering, supply, construction, installation, testing, and commissioning of a steam
generator, auxiliaries, and associated civil works for the Project, which foreign currency
portion was funded by the OECF loans. Thus, in line with the tax assumption provision under
the Exchange of Notes, Article VIII(B)(1) of the Contract states that NPC shall pay any and
all forms of taxes that are directly imposable under the Contract: Article VIII(B)(1) B. FOR
ONSHORE PORTION. 1.) [The] CORPORATION (NPC) shall, subject to the provisions
under the Contract [Document] on Taxes, pay

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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
any and all forms of taxes which are directly imposable under the Contract including VAT,
that may be imposed by the Philippine Government, or any of its agencies and political
subdivisions.
5. Same; Tax Refund; It bears stressing that the CIR had already acknowledged, through
its administrative issuances, that Japanese contractors involved in the Project are not liable for
the subject taxes. In RMC No. 42-99, the CIR interpreted the effect of the tax assumption
clause in the Exchange of Notes on petitioner’s tax liability, to wit: The foregoing provisions
of the Exchange of Notes mean that the Japanese contractors or nationals engaged in
EOCF-funded projects in the Philippines shall not be required to shoulder all fiscal levies or
taxes associated with the project. x x x x x x x x x Since the executing government agencies
are mandated to assume the payment of [income taxes] under the Exchange of Notes, the
said Japanese firms or nationals need not pay taxes due thereunder. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) The CIR subsequently affirmed petitioner’s non-liability for taxes and
entitlement to tax refunds by issuing Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 24-2005
addressed to specified BIR offices. The RMO provides: Pursuant to the provisions of [RMC]
No. 32-99 as amended by RMC No. 42-99, Japanese contractors and nationals engaged in
OECF-funded projects in the Philippines shall not be required to shoulder the fiscal levies or
taxes associated with the project. Thus, the concerned Japanese contractors are entitled to
claim for the refund of all taxes paid and shouldered by them relative to the conduct of the
Project. You are, therefore, directed to expedite/prioritize the processing of the claims for
refund of Japanese contractors and nationals so [as] not to delay and jeopardize the release
of the funds for OECF-funded projects. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Therefore,
considering that petitioner paid the subject taxes in the aggregate amount of
P52,612,812.00, which it was not required to pay, the BIR erroneously collected such
amount. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to its refund.
6. Same; Same; The NIRC vests upon the CIR, being the head of the BIR, the authority to
credit or refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the government. This specific
statutory mandate cannot be overridden by averse interpretations made through mere
administrative issuances, such as RMC No. 42-99, which — as argued by the CIR –– shifts
to the executing agencies (particularly, NPC in this case) the power to refund the subject
taxes: 3. In cases where income taxes were previously paid directly by the Japanese
contractors or nationals, the corresponding cash refund shall be recovered from the
government executing agencies upon the presentation of proof of payment by the Japanese
contractors or nationals.

****

598
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
503. Edron Const Corp vs. Provincial Govt of Surigao Del Sur, 826 SCRA 47, June
05, 2017 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Dismissal of Actions ;
1. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A judicious review of the records reveals that
respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or
as a defense petitioners’ non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph
4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its
Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later after the Answer, or on May 24, 2010, to
support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action.
However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments supporting it can no
longer be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before the
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” More importantly, such
matter/defense raised in the motion does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from raising such
issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order dated August 11,
2010 denying the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said issue/defense
in its Decision dated December 28, 2010 and Order dated September 16, 2011.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Waiver of Defenses; Except for the defenses of:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res
judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a
motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof.-
—Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads: Section 1. Defenses and objections not
pleaded.— Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence
on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by
a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. It may be
gleaned from the said provision that except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription,
other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not
specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, such defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is
already estopped from relying upon the same in further proceedings.

****

599
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
504. RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES ALLEGING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES OF A
CERTAIN ATTY. CAJAYON INVOLVING CASES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY., 826 SCRA 74, June 06, 2017
Decisions Involving Cases Filed in the CA-CDO to the Highest Bidding Clients.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Substantial Evidence ;
1. Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence;
—Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of
proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not
obliged to prove their exception or defense. The same goes with administrative cases
disciplining for grave offense court employees or magistrates. The evidence against the
respondent should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.
2. Administrative Complaints; Attorneys; Judges; Under the Rules of Court, administrative
complaints both against lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as well as Justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which
may substantiate said allegations.

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600
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
505. Judaya vs. Balbona, 826 SCRA 81, June 06,
2017 Syllabi Class :Court Personnel
1. Court Personnel; Those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service
and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the
norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in
the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting
its image in the eyes of the public.
2. Government Employees; Resignation; Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the
precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from service does not render moot the administrative case against him. The
Court’s pronouncement in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., 533 SCRA 622 (2007), is instructive on
this matter, to wit: In [OCA] v. Juan [(478 Phil. 823, 828-829 [2004])], this Court categorically
ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing
administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of
any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. A case becomes moot
and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not
moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the
most severe of administrative sanctions — that of separation from service — may no longer
be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is
later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification
to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
3. Same; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be
grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either
to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office. In order to differentiate [grave] misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.
4. Same; Same; Same; Illegal Solicitation; In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently
held that the acts of soliciting and receiving money from litigants for personal gain constitute
Grave Misconduct, for which the court employee guilty thereof should be held
administratively liable, as in this case.
5. Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent,
the Court notes that Grave Misconduct is classified as a grave offense punishable by
dismissal from service for the first offense. “Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal from
service carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service
eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any;
and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and - controlled corporation or government
financial institution.” In this instance, since respondent had earlier resigned, the penalty of
dismissal from service could no longer be imposed. Nevertheless, such penalty should be
enforced in its full course by imposing the aforesaid administrative disabilities upon him.
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601
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
506. People vs. Jao, 157, June 07, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused
Pending Appeal ;
1. Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; While
Jao’s criminal liability remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with respect to Catigtig
in view of his supervening death pending appeal. As already adverted to, in a letter dated
February 9, 2016, the Bureau of Corrections informed the CA that Catigtig had already died
on August 7, 2015, attaching thereto a duplicate copy of Catigtig’s Certificate of Death
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General. Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code, states: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is
totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. In People v. Egagamao, 799 SCRA 507 (2016), the Court
eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities,
as follows: From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: 1. Death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore.” Thus, upon Catigtig’s death pending appeal of his conviction, his criminal
liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared closed and
terminated.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs; Elements
of.-
—For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must
be proven that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally
or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the
accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed
even without consideration. On the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that the accused is in possession of an item
or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such possession is not authorized by
law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

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602
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
507. Festin vs. Zubiri, 827 SCRA 181, June 19,
2017 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Admin case
1. Same; The Court stresses that a lawyer’s primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation. Indeed, a lawyer must champion his
client’s cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his
failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes
designed to afford due process to all stakeholders.
2. Attorneys; The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board’s resolution is merely
recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer; The IBP Board’s
resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The
amendment stresses the Court’s authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his ethical
duties under the CPR. Hence, any final action on a lawyer’s administrative liability shall be
done by the Court based on the entire records of the case, including the IBP Board’s
recommendation, without need for the lawyer-respondent to file any additional pleading. On
this score, respondent’s filing of the present petition for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to
the current rule, the IBP Board’s resolution and the case records were forwarded to the
Court. The latter is then bound to fully consider all documents contained therein, regardless
of any further pleading filed by any party — including respondent’s petition for review, which
the Court shall nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the merits of this case and
determine respondent’s actual administrative liability.
3. Same; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 1 of the CPR
mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.
Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct
themselves with fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules,
and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; “Manifestation” and “Motion,” Distinguished.-
—A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise
indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court,
rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court
other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of
service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse
party. Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap
of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or
object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due
process.
5. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically
bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society. His
obligation to represent his client is not without limits, but must be “within the bounds of the
law” pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair
and honest means to attain their clients’ objectives.
6. Same; The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its
sound judicial discretion, it may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would
achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer. In light of the foregoing discussion,
the Court deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months
is sufficient and commensurate with respondent’s infractions.

****

603
Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
508. Baguio vs. Lacuna, 827 SCRA 195, June 19, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Simple Neglect of Duty ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Penalties; Section 46(D) of Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that simple neglect of duty is
categorized as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second
offense. While the Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its
errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, the Court also has the
discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in several
administrative cases, the Court has restrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating facts, such as, length of service in the judiciary, the acknowledgment
of infractions and feelings of remorse, and family circumstances, among others. In this case,
apart from respondent’s long service in the government, it has been observed during the
administrative investigation, and as admitted by complainant, that the latter’s working habits
had greatly improved and had since complied with her duties.
2. Court Personnel; Stenographers; The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied
under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 17. Stenographer.—It shall be
the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court either in the morning or in
the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or
afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it
shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty.
The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which such notes are received by him. When such
notes are transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each page
thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied) x x x x Under the
aforecited provision, stenographers are enjoined to immediately deliver to the clerk of court
all the notes taken during the session of the court, which are to be attached to the record of
the case. In this regard, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90 requires
stenographers to transcribe their notes and attach the transcripts to the record of the case
within a period of twenty (20) days from the time they were taken, thus: 2. (a) All
stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts
to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken.
3. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Heavy Workload; In the case
at bar, it is undisputed that respondent failed to comply with the twenty (20) day period in the
transcription of the stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10, and
hence, guilty of violating Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90. The heavy
workload proffered by respondent in her attempt to be exonerated from liability is not an
adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance of her duties. To allow otherwise
would permit every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty to
resort to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment.
4. Same; Public Officers; It bears stressing that a court stenographer performs a function
essential to the prompt and fair administration of justice. The conduct of every person
connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. All public officers are accountable to the
people at all times and must perform their duties and responsibilities with utmost efficiency
and competence. As administration of justice is a sacred task, the Court condemns any
omission or act which would erode public faith in the judiciary. A public office is a public trust,
and a court stenographer, without doubt, violates this trust by failing to fulfill his duties.
5. Same; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and
Phrases; While respondent admitted to incurring delay in the performance of her duties,
records show that she nonetheless completed the same in time for the calendar of cases.
Under the circumstances, her failure to timely transcribe the stenographic notes was
correctly found by the Executive Judge to constitute simple neglect of duty, which is defined
as a disregard of, or a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee,
simple neglect of duty signifies carelessness or indifference.
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 ****

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509. Rizalado vs. Bollozos, 827 SCRA 205, June
19, 2017 Syllabi Class :Administrative Complaints ;
Judges ;
1. Same; Same; The Court concurs with the OCA’s opinion in this case that if Guzman, et al.
indeed believed that respondent’s issuances pertaining to G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case
Nos. 92-368 and 92-
409) were tainted with irregularity, they should have availed themselves of the appropriate
judicial remedies and refrained from filing these administrative cases against respondent. It
bears to stress that respondent is legally clothed with judicial discretion in the disposition of
cases, which involves the exercise of judgment. As a judge, he must be allowed reasonable
latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts,
and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. “To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would
be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is
only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith
that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.”
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Bias and Partiality; It is well-settled that “in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. x x x. Bare allegations of bias and partiality are not
enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and
without fear or favor. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of
bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or
order itself.”
3. Administrative Complaints; Judges; It has been held that “the filing of an administrative
complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have
gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.” “The law
provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities
which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion
for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which
may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are[, inter alia,] the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.”
Relative thereto, “disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking
of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.”

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510. Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. vs. Manzano, 827 SCRA 253, June 19, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It deserves
mentioning that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law are addressed. It is not the Court’s function to analyze or weigh the
evidence (which tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate court
as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined to the review of errors of law that may have
been committed in the judgment under review. “The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; It is a fundamental rule that “[t]he
acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the
[prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts
or omission imputed to him.”
3. Criminal Law; Civil Liability; In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, 800 SCRA 39
(2016), the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa cases under
paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise charged), stating
that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa
and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist.
4. Same; Same; Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery
of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the
estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from
the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission
constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil
action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Words and Phrases;A presumption is an
assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. It is an inference
of the existence or nonexistence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of
other facts. However, a presumption is not evidence, but merely affects the burden of
offering evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case.
Apart from Rafael’s admission, petitioner further admitted that: (a) Moreland directly paid
Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did not actually see and was unaware to
whom Moreland gave this check; (b) it did not ask Moreland to issue the check for the
payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; (c) it would not have dealt with
Manzano had she not been Metroland’s employee; and (d) it has several lawyers and an
accountant at its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate business
and is familiar with brokerage transactions.

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511. Montecillo vs. Gatchalian, 828 SCRA 222, June
28, 2017 Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar
instances where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or
failing to update clients about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the practice
of law for six (6) months. In Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Cabanes, 700 SCRA 734 (2013), a
lawyer was suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 471 SCRA 111 (2005), a lawyer was
likewise suspended for not attending pretrial, failing to inform clients about the dismissal of
their case, and failing to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 638 SCRA 336
(2010), a lawyer suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing
despite due notice, which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with
these cases, the Court agrees with the IBP’s recommendation to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for six
(6) months.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost
diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. A lawyer owes
fidelity to the clients’ cause and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Consequently, he is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote one’s full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for free. The relevant provisions of the CPR read
thus: CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
– A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
3. Same; Same; Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer’s duties of competence and
diligence include not merely reviewing cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of
properly representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to
prod him to do so. A lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to disciplinary
action.
4. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; The Court likewise finds
respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial court’s
adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients
regarding the status of a case as expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR: Rule 18.04
– A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information. To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for
their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay about matters
essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to
immediately notify complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the
complainants not inquired with the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to
appeal. For this reason, respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under Rule
18.04 of the CPR.

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512. People vs. Monroyo, 828 SCRA 416, June
28, 2017 Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Denials ;
1. Criminal Law; Denials; It should be emphasized that Monroyo only proffered the defense
of denial, which the courts a quo, found to be too shallow and insignificant so as to impel
BBB to falsely charge her uncle and publicly disclose that she was raped. Case law edifies
that “[d]enial cannot prevail over
[a] private complainant’s direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial
is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a
categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Preliminarily, although the three
Informations designated the crime committed only as “Acts of Lasciviousness,” the facts
alleged therein pertain not only to violations of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5(b)
of RA 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” It is settled that a designation in the information of the
specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to the law violated
does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting
the crime charged. As the Court had ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of
the legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the information. In the present case, the recital of facts in the
Informations constitute violations of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in
relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
3. Criminal Law; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements of Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—
Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by
prisión correccional. Its elements are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
4. Same; Child Abuse Law; Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse; The elements
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. In Quimvel v. People, 823
SCRA 192 (2017), the Court held that the allegation of “force and intimidation” is sufficient to
classify the minor victim as one who is “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Lewd; Words and Phrases; Common to both legal provisions is
the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness. The term “lewd” is commonly defined as
something indecent or obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual
desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is a mental process that
can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be
interpreted as lewd or lascivious.
6. Remedial Law; Evidence; Findings of Fact; Verily, AAA’s testimony is worthy of full
faith and credence as there is no proof that she was motivated to falsely accuse Monroyo of
the crimes charged. To this, it may not be amiss to state that in several cases, the Court has
observed that no young and decent girl (like AAA in this case) would fabricate a story of
sexual abuse, subject herself to undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and
humiliation, if she is not impelled by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who
assaulted her. Ultimately, the credibility of AAA’s testimony, as well as Monroyo’s opposite
account involves findings of fact which the Court does not generally review. Case law
dictates that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are
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binding on the Court barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance, of which there are none in this case.
7. Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for scrutiny on any question, even one not raised by the parties
as errors, and that the appeal confers the appellate court with full jurisdiction over the case,
enabling the court to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the

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penal law. Thus, given that the circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and
proven in this case, the Court examines Monroyo’s criminal liability for Qualified Rape as
charged.
8. Criminal Law; Qualified Rape; The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions
are: (a) the victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age;
(b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
(c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.
9. Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Factual Findings; —As in the
Acts of Lasciviousness cases, the Court defers to the findings of fact of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA. Jurisprudentially settled is the principle that if a victim’s testimony is
straightforward, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility
and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Putting more emphasis, the
factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded
great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, as in this case.

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513. Cariaga vs. Sapigao, 436, June 28,
2017 Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ;
Remand of Cases ;
1. Same; Remand of Cases; Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga’s petition
before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP
ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ,
while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may
already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved Cariaga’s petition
on the merits insofar as the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed are
concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case be remanded
to the CA for resolution on the merits. “However, when there is already enough basis on
which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this case — the Court may
dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice.” In view of the foregoing —
as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on the merits — the Court finds it
appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the “2000 NPS Rule on Appeal,” which governs
the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of,
inter alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be
appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ. However, this procedure was
immediately amended by the DOJ’s Department Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000,
entitled “Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain
Cases.” x x x x x x In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (“2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL”), all
petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in
the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor concerned who
shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with the pertinent rules prescribed in
the said Department Circular. The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the
Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the entire
National Prosecution Service and in the interest of justice, review the resolutions of the
Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases.

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514. Zaragoza vs. Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc., 828 SCRA 452, June 28,
2017 Syllabi Class :Interest Rates ;
1. Interest Rates; Considering that all the requisites of a suit for unlawful detainer have
been complied with, petitioner is justified in ejecting respondent from the subject land. Thus,
the rulings of the RTC-Br. 23 and the CA must be reversed and set aside, and accordingly,
the MTCC ruling must be reinstated. However, in light of prevailing jurisprudence, the rental
arrearages due to petitioner shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
computed from first demand on May 24, 2011 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. The other amounts awarded by the MTCC, i.e.,
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P50,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of suit shall
likewise earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until
fully paid.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Requisites for Bringing an
Action for Unlawful Detainer.- For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor
must show that: first, initially, the defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by
virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal,
either due to the latter’s violation of the provisions of the said lease contract or the
termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in possession of the leased
premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there
must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within
one (1) year from the last demand.

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515. Belmonte vs. People, 828 SCRA 463, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Findings of Fact ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Findings of Fact; It should be mentioned that
findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and involve the credibility of witnesses,
are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative,
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions are made from such findings. This rule finds even
more stringent application where the findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. After
all, as the trier of facts, the RTC has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
manner of testifying and, as such, is a better judge of their credibility.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain
of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized
drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.
4. Same; Same; Same; It is important to note that while the “chain of custody rule” demands
utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provides that
noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for
such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
5. Same; Same; Same; By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a
continuous chain of custody which preserved the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of
the items confiscated from the accused, notwithstanding the absence of the representatives
from the media and the DOJ at the time of the arrest and the taking of inventory. The
absence of media representatives at the time Ominga prepared the inventory was sufficiently
explained by her during her cross-examination when she testified that when contacted, the
media representatives told them that they were still far from the area and would not be able to
arrive on time. As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the DOJ
clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office for him to
go to the PDEA office to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the crime. While
this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the
fact that this is not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under varied field conditions,
the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always
be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Rebotazo, 698 SCRA 452 (2013), the
Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, noncompliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized or confiscated inadmissible.

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516. Borja vs. Miñoza, 828 SCRA 647, July 03,
2017 Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of
Employment ;
1. Same; Same; In this case, records show that respondents wasted no time in filing a
complaint against petitioners to protest their purported illegal dismissal from employment. As
the filing thereof belies petitioners’ charge of abandonment, the only logical conclusion,
therefore, is that respondents had no such intention to abandon their work. Therefore, since
respondents were not dismissed and that they were not considered to have abandoned their
jobs, it is only proper for them to report back to work and for petitioners to reinstate them to
their former positions or substantially-equivalent positions. In this regard, jurisprudence
provides that in instances where there was neither dismissal by the employer nor
abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the employee to his former
position, but without the award of backwages. However, since reinstatement was already
impossible due to strained relations between the parties, as found by the NLRC, each of
them must bear their own loss, so as to place them on equal footing. At this point, it is well to
emphasize that “in a case where the employee’s failure to work was occasioned neither by his
abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the
employer; each party must bear his own loss.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Well-
settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme
Court (SC) being bound by the findings of fact made by the appellate court;
Exceptions.-
—Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by
the findings of fact made by the appellate court. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The rule, however,
is not without exception. In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 460 SCRA 220 (2005), the
Court recognized the following exceptions to the general rule, to wit: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive
dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain on the part of the
employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego
continued employment, or when there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and
a diminution in pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his job under the circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Abandonment; To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b)
a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.-
—The Court finds that respondents did not go on AWOL, or abandon their employment, as
petitioners claimed. To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the
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failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not
sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal
of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Abandonment
is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
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517. Disciplinary Board, LTO vs. Gutierrez, 828 SCRA 663, July 03, 2017
Syllabi Class:Admin Proceedings ; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service ;
1. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; In this case,
records show that the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the LTO’s
issuance of a Show Cause Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), a Show Cause Memorandum
emanating from the disciplining authority or its authorized representative is sufficient to
institute preliminary investigation proceedings, to wit: Section 16. How conducted.—Within
five (5) days from receipt of the complaint sufficient in form and substance, the person/s
complained of shall be required to submit his/her/their counter-affidavit/comment. Where the
complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, the disciplining authority or his authorized
representative shall issue a show cause memorandum directing the person/s complained of
to explain why no administrative case should be filed against him/her/them. The latter’s
failure to submit the comment/counter-affidavit/explanation shall be considered a waiver
thereof and the preliminary investigation may be completed even without his/her counter-
affidavit/comment.
2. Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Procedural Due Process; “The essence
of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. ‘To be heard’ does not mean only
verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.”

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518. Geñorga vs. Heirs of Julian Meliton, 828 SCRA 673, July
03, 2017 Syllabi Class :Register of Deeds ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Register of Deeds; Jurisdiction; It bears to stress that the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds is only ministerial in nature. Thus, the RD-
Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title longer
than what is reasonable to perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved
subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration on TCT No. 8027, it
must return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to
establish a better right to the possession of the said owner’s duplicate title as against
respondents.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Partition; Preliminarily, it is well to point out that
the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when Julian sold different portions
thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale
reveals that definite portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers took
possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same in their names, and
paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents who never disputed
the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there is, in this case, a
partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the
segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their
names upon compliance with the requirements of law.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Register of Deeds;
Section 58 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree,” provides the
procedure for the registration of deeds or conveyances, and the issuance of new certificates
of titles involving only certain portions of a registered land, as in this case. Said provision
reads: Section 58. Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion of Land.—If a deed or
conveyance is for a part only of the land described in a certificate of title, the Register of
Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate to the grantee until a plan of such land showing
all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the corresponding technical
descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree.
Meanwhile, such deed may only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the grantor’s
certificate of title, original and duplicate, said memorandum to serve as a notice to third
persons of the fact that certain unsegregated portion of the land described therein has been
conveyed, and every certificate with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of
showing the grantee’s title to the portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the
corresponding certificate in his name. Upon the approval of the plan and technical
descriptions, the original of the plan, together with a certified copy of the technical
descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding
certificate of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee
for the portion conveyed, and at the same time cancel the grantor’s certificate partially with
respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the grantor so desires, his certificate may be
cancelled totally and a new one issued to him describing therein the remaining portion:
Provided, however, that pending approval of said plan, no further registration or annotation of
any subsequent deed or other voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion
conveyed shall be effected by the Register of Deeds, except where such unsegregated
portion was purchased from the Government or any of its instrumentalities. If the land has
been subdivided into several lots, designated by numbers or letters, the Register of Deeds
may, if desired by the grantor, instead of cancelling the latter’s certificate and issuing a new
one to the same for the remaining unconveyed lots, enter on said certificate and on its
owner’s duplicate a memorandum of such deed of conveyance and of the issuance of the
transfer certificate to the grantee for the lot or lots thus conveyed, and that the grantor’s
certificate is canceled as to such lot or lots. (Emphases supplied) In this relation, Section 53
of PD 1529 requires the presentation of the owner’s duplicate title for the annotation of
deeds of sale.

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