IAEA-TECDOC-478

COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA

FOR
USEIN
PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT

A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1988
 The IAEA does not normally maintain stocks of reports in this series.
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COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA
FORUSE

IN PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT

IAEA, VIENNA, 1988
IAEA-TECDOC-478
ISSN 1011-4289

Printed IAEA Austria

bythe

in

October 1988
 FOREWORD

Generic component reliability data indispensable

is

inay
probabilistic safety analysis. It is not realistic to assume that all
possible component failures failure modes modeled PS A would

and

ina

be
available from operating experience specific plant
the

ofa

ina
statistically meaningful way.
The degree that generic data is used in PSAs varies from case to case.
Some studies totally based generic data while others generic
are

on

use
data as prior information to be specialized by plant specific data. Most
studies, however, finnaly use a combination where data for certain
components come from generic data sources others from Bayesian

and
updating.
The IAEA effort to compile a generic component reliability data base
aimed at facilitating the use of data available in the literature and at
highlighting pitfalls which deserve special consideration. It was also
intended complement fault tree event tree package (PSAPACK)
to

the

and

and
to facilitate its use.
Moreover,it should noted, that IAEA recently initiated
be

the

has

a
Coordinated Research Program in Reliability Data Collection, Retrieval and
Analysis. this framework issues identified most affecting
In

the

as

the
quality existing data bases would addressed.
of

be

This report presents the results of a compilation made from the

specialized literature includes reliability data components
and

for

usually considered PSA.

in

This report prepared under framework IAEA's Programme

was

the

of

on

Probabilistic Safety Assesment by Mr. Bojan Tomic, Division Of Nuclear

Safety - Reliability and Risk Assessment (NENS-RRA). Mr Luis Lederman
(NENS-RRA) project officer.
wasthe
 EDITORIAL NOTE
In preparing this material for the press, staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency
have mounted and paginated the original manuscripts and given some attention to presentation.
The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of the Member States
or organizations under whose auspices the manuscripts were produced.
The this book particular designations countries territories does imply
usein

of

of

or

not

any

judgement publisher, IAEA, legal status such countries territories,

bythe

the

astohe

of

or

of

their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.

The mention of specific companies or of their products or brand names does not imply any
endorsement recommendation part IAEA.
or

onthe
ofthe
 Please be aware that all the Missing Pages
in this document were originally blank pages
 CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 9

1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................

1
2. USE OF THE DATA BASE ............................................................................ 12

stand-alone ................................................................................
2.1Usea

12
2.2. with PSAPACK computer code package .............................................
Use

the

12
3. DATA BASE FORMAT ................................................................................. 13

3.1. Record form ..........................................................................................

13
3.2. Coding system ....................................................................................... 15
3.3. Generic failure mode definitions and usage .................................................... 16

4. COMPONENTS OF THE DATA BASE ............................................................. 17

4.1. Component groups ..................................................................................

18
4.2. Component types ....................................................................................

18
4.3. Selection applicable data .......................................................................
of

18
5. DATA SOURCES FOR THE DATA BASE ......................................................... 20

5.1. General characteristics .............................................................................. 20

5.1.1. Plant specific data ......................................................................... 20
5.1.2. Data extracted from reporting systems ................................................
5.1.3. Data based expert opinion, nuclear non-nuclear experience ............. 20
on

and

21

5.2. Characteristics of single data sources ........................................................... 22

5.2.1. WASH 1400 Reactor Safety Study .....................................................
2

5.2.1.1. General .........................................................................

2

5.2.1.2. Data sources ...................................................................

2

5.2.1.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................

inthe

24

5.2.1.4. Source independence .........................................................

24

5.2.2. Swedish Reliability Data Book .......................................................... 25

5.2.2.1. General ......................................................................... 25
5.2.2.2. Data sources ................................................................... 25
5.2.2.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 26
5.2.2.4. Special features ............................................................... 27
5.2.2.5. Source independence .........................................................
27

5.2.3. NUREG 2815, Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedure Guide .................. 27

5.2.3.1. General ......................................................................... 27
5.2.3.2. Data sources ...................................................................
28

5.2.3.3. Special features ...............................................................

28

5.2.3.4. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 29

5.2.3.5. Source independence ......................................................... 29
5.2.4. NUREG 2728 IREP (Interim Reliability Evaluation Program
Procedure Guide) .......................................................................... 29
5.2.4.1. General ......................................................................... 29
5.2.4.2. Data sources ................................................................... 29
5.2.4.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................

inthe

30
5.2.4.4. Special features ...............................................................

30
5.2.4.5. Source independence ......................................................... 30
5.2.5. IEEE Standard 500 ........................................................................ 31
5.2.5.1. General .........................................................................

31
5.2.5.2. Data sources ...................................................................

31
5.2.5.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 32
5.2.5.4. Special features ............................................................... 33
5.2.5.5. Source independence ......................................................... 33
5.2.6. Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant PSA .................................................. 34
5.2.6.1. General ......................................................................... 34
5.2.6.2. Data sources ...................................................................

34
5.2.6.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................
inthe

34
5.2.6.4. Special features ............................................................... 34
5.2.6.5. Source independence ......................................................... 35
5.2.7. NUREG/CR 4550 Vol. 1, Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from
Internal Events: Methodology Guidelines ............................................. 35
5.2.7.1. General .........................................................................

35
5.2.7.2. Data sources ...................................................................

36
5.2.7.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 36
5.2.7.4. Source independence ......................................................... 36
5.2.8. NUREG/CR 4550 Vol. 3, Surry NPP ................................................ 36
5.2.8.1. General ......................................................................... 36
5.2.8.2. Data sources ................................................................... 37
5.2.8.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 37
5.2.8.4. Special features ............................................................... 37
5.2.8.5. Source independence ......................................................... 37
5.2.9. Sizewell Preconstruction Report .............................................
BPWR

38

5.2.9.1. General ......................................................................... 38

5.2.9.2. Data sources ................................................................... 38
5.2.9.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 39
5.2.9.4. Special features ............................................................... 39
5.2.9.5. Source independence ......................................................... 39
5.2.10. Oconee Nuclear Power Plant PRA ..................................................... 39
5.2.10.1. General ......................................................................... 39
5.2.10.2. Data sources ...................................................................
40

5.2.10.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................

inthe

41

5.2.10.4. Special features ...............................................................

41

5.2.10.5. Source independence ......................................................... 41

5.2.11. Old PWR reactor .......................................................................... 42
5.2.11.1. General .........................................................................
42

5.2.11.2. Data sources ................................................................... 42

5.2.11.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................
inthe

42

5.2.11.4. Special features ............................................................... 42

5.2.11.5. Source independence ......................................................... 43
 5.2.12. Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) assessment ............................................

43
5.2.12.1. General .........................................................................

43
5.2.12.2. Data sources ...................................................................

43
5.2.12.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................

inthe

43
5.2.12.4. Special features ............................................................... 44
5.2.12.5. Source independence ......................................................... 44
5.2.13. Zion Nuclear Power Plant .........................................................

PS

4
5.2.13.1. General ......................................................................... 44
5.2.13.2. Data sources ................................................................... 45
5.2.13.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 45
5.2.13.4. Special features ...............................................................

46
5.2.13.5. Source independence .........................................................

46
5.2.14. NUREG documents with rates ...................................................

LER

46
5.2.14.1. General ......................................................................... 46
5.2.14.2. NUREG 1205 ................................................................. 47
5.2.14.3. NUREG 1331 ................................................................. 48
5.2.14.4. NUREG 1363 ................................................................. 48
5.2.14.5. NUREG 1740 .................................................................

49
5.2.14.6. Source independence .........................................................

50
5.2.15. In-Plant Reliability Data Base (IPRD) nuclear plant components .....
The

for

51
5.2.15.1. General ......................................................................... 51
5.2.15.2. NUREG 2886, the pump component ..................................... 51
5.2.15.3. NUREG 3831, diesel generators (DG), batteries, battery chargers
and inverters ................................................................... 52
5.2.15.4. Source independence .........................................................

53
5.2.16. EPRI NP-2433, Diesel generators data ............................................... 53
5.2.16.1. General .........................................................................

53
5.2.16.2. Data sources ................................................................... 53
5.2.16.3. Data available IAEA Data Base ...................................
inthe

54
5.2.16.4. Source independence ......................................................... 54
5.2.17. German Risk Study (phase ....................................................
The

A)

54

5.2.17.1. General .........................................................................

54
5.2.17.2. Data sources ...................................................................
54

5.2.17.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base ................................... 55

5.2.17.4. Source independence ......................................................... 55

PROBLEM AREAS CONNECTED WITH DATA BASES FOUND

6.

THE

INTHE

LITERATURE .............................................................................................
56

6.1. Component boundary ...............................................................................

56

6.2. Failure mode .........................................................................................

57

6.3. Operating mode ......................................................................................

58

6.4. Operating environment .............................................................................

59

6.5. Problems specifically related with in-plant data collection .................................. 59

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. DATA SOURCES FOR THE IAEA DATA BASE ............................ 61

APPENDIX GENERIC FAILURE MODE DEFINITION CODES .................

2.

AND

65
APPENDIX COMPONENT GROUPS IAEA DATA BASE .....................

3.

INTHE

73
APPENDIX COMPONENT TYPES IAEA DATA BASE ........................

4.

INTHE

7
APPENDIX 5. COMPLETE LISTING OF THE IAEA DATA BASE ....................... 95
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to the needs of Member States conducting or planning to

initiate probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) IAEA carried

the

outa
compilation component reliability data from publicly available
of

the
literature.
work undertaken under framework IAEA's PS A Programme
The

was

ofthe
with an effort which amounted to 7 man months.
The IAEA Data Base Version 1.0 consist of about 1000 records compiled
from 21 different data sources (listed in Appendix 1) and include all data
for nuclear power plant components usually modelled in PSAs.
No attempt was made to interpret or adapt the information contained in
original sources. Therefore records IAEA Data Base
the

the

ofthe

are
established directly from the information from the sources surveyed. A
peer review was conducted at the end of the compilation and all records
have been verified. The possibility of errors is, however, not to be
excluded and the prompt notification of any errors encountered by the
users to the IAEA is highly appreciated.
Two of the data sources namely, Heavy Water Reactor and Old PWR have
been compiled IAEA framework various activities including
bythe

inthe

of

workshops technical assistance missions Member States. Therefore

and

to

their accuracy cannot be verified. They are included in the Data Base only
for illustrative purposes.
The Data Base compiled IBM compatible personal computer using
is

for ona

dBASE software available distribution form

I

andits

in

of

diskettes which obtained upon request from IAEA Division

canbe

the

of
Nuclear Safety. On diskettes it can be distributed in dBASE III format (in
this case dBASE software needed Data Base)
the

HI

is

foruseth

orin

the plain textual format (any full screen editor can be used).
This report describes detail Data Base format, including
in

the

the

record form and associated coding system. It also described each data
source surveyed briefly qualifies special features each.
and

of

Problem areas connected with data bases found in literature are also
highlighted report.
inthe

Appendix 2 to the report provides detail description and definition of

major generic failure modes considered during compilation of the Data
Base.
Two appendices provide listing component groups types
ofthe

and

together with associated codes. These appendices help user

the

in

selecting the most appropriate components according to codes.

Finally, all Data Base records sorted in alphabetic order of
components are listed in last Appendix.
1. INTRODUCTION

Reliability data are an essential part of a probabilistic safety

assessment. The quality of data can determine the quality of the study as
a whole.
Component failure data originating from the plant being analyzed would
be most appropriate. However, reliance experience plant
the

on

athe

is
rarely possible, mainly owning to the rather limited operating experience
and usually small number of recorded failures. The use of generic
component reliability data therefore unavoidable.
is
relatively large amount component reliability data available
A

of of

is
in open literature today. Some these data were used studies;
the

inPSA
others were collected from sources, such as nuclear or conventional
operating experience, industrial military records.
and

and

All these data scattered throughout many different publications.

are

Some easily obtainable, others readily available

arenot

and

maynotbe

to
the user. To faciliate the use of generic data from the existing
literature by PSA analysts IAEA has compiled the data available from a
number different sources.
of

The other reason compilation have data base part

for

isto
athe the

as

of
the PSAPACK code package (developed IAEA). PSAPACK package
isthe
used to perform of Level 1 of the PSA, including event tree and fault tree
analysis.

11
2. USE OF THE DATA BASE

IAEA's Component Reliability Data Base used ways:

The

canbe

intwo
alone as data source, and as a part of the PSAPACK.

2.1. stand-alone
Usea

The IAEA Data Base compiled using dBASE commercial software;

was

I
this software package is therefore needed to use the Data Base alone.
Using the dBASE software one can browse through records, list them,
and retrieve information stored to the screen or print it in different
ways. With dBASE III commands it is possible to select individual records
or groups records with given common characteristics (for example
of

source, component type etc.).

The purpose of the Data Base for stand-alone use is to have readily
available several data sources for each single conponent. The data base
can also used assessing total ranges data (extremes).
be

for

of

One of the peculiarities of the Data Base is that failure rates (as
well upper lower bounds) stored character format
as

and

are

inthe

(instead of numerical), so direct calculation is not possible. The reason

for it is that dBASE III software does not allow numbers to be presented
in exponential format.

2.2. Use with the PSAPACK computer code package

For use with PSAPACK code package the IAEA Data Base is stored in
textual format, what means that each record is presented as a 900
character line. PSAPACK includes small interface code which enables
a

viewing of each single record in the Data Base. After assessing the most
appropriate record particular analysis, retrieved stored
for

its

and

in

the small data base. At this point the user can append or change any data
point. Failure rates (or probabilities) stored in the newly formed small
data base are then automatically used in the analysis. More detail about
use with PSAPACK can be found in its users manual.

12
3. DATA BASE FORMAT

3.1. Record form

With many different sources providing different types information,

of
it was necessary to define a unique record form which would enable
inclusion of information in a systematic and consistent manner. The second
objective have system which enable easy information overview
wasto

can
and retrieval.
The record form was defined as having 21 lines, presenting 10
categories of information (table 1).

Table Record categories

1. code l; 1 line
2. component type 4 lines
3. operating mode 1 line
4. operating environment 1 line
5. failure mode 2 lines
6. failure rate 5 lines
7. repair time 1 line
8. source 2 lines
9. component boundary 1 line
10.comments 3 lines.

Every record code which unique combination

1.

has

isa

of5
alphanumeric characters. detail description coding system
A

ofthe

is
presented later.
2. Component type described lines, namely: type, subtype,
is

in4

detail type 1 and 2. Type characterizes a basic component type (e.g.

"pump", "valve" ). Subtype characterizes more specifically the component
category (e.g. motor driven pump, solenoid operated valve, pressure
sensor, AC motor). Some of the components do not have information at this
level (e.g.battery charger). Detail type contains information about
1

the

system where the component belongs or other detail characteristics as

voltage, or pipe diameter etc. Valve types (e.g. gate, butterfly, etc.)
are also included in this line. "General" means that further
characterization possible. Detail type last entry
isnot

2isthe

ofthe

component description. Usually, very detailed information about component

type is not available. When information is available on component size or
about the system to which the component belongs this is found in this
line.
Operating mode next category. Operating mode
3.

isthe

isa

particularly important characteristic pumps (standby, alternating

for

or

running). For other components this information is of less importance.

Precise, information of that type are seldom found in data sources. When
the component operating mode is obvious, (e.g. safety injection pump is a
standby pump) this information included. other cases "all" operating
is

In

modes default value chosen.

wasthe

4. Operating environment is the next entry which, similar to the

previous one, seldom found data sources. obvious that volatile
is

in

Itis

environment should influence component failure rate, very

the

but

few

sources address that fact. For example TT?RR 500 provides multiplication

13
factors most components listed environments like high

for

of

andfor
radiation, temperature humidity.

or
WASH 1400 provides different failure rates pumps motors

for

and

in
extreme, post accident environment. Failure rates are, particularly in the
cases where the operating experience is the basis for determining the
failure rate, usually based normal operating environment.

on
When addressing component operating environment, some sources

ofthe
define "normal NPP environment" as the usual one.
A default value "normal" was chosen in all cases where no other
environmental condition indicated.
was
failure mode category presented entries,
5.Ihe

is

intwo

one
describing "generic" failure mode other presenting failure mode found

and
in the original source. Details about the failure modes are discussed in
Appendix Briefly, generic failure mode assigned because
#2.

was

the
coding system was not able to cope with the number and differences in
failure modes found sources. original failure mode was, however
inthe

Ihe

left record users' clarification.

inthe

for

failure rate presented entries. first entry

6.The

is

in5

The

is
the failure rate description, containing information about failure

the
rate (mean or median), upper and lower bounds (percentiles of the
distribution, low and high or maximal and minimal values), and defining
the failure rate hour (operational standby) demand.
asper

or

orpe

The
failure rate entry provides the actual numerical value for the mean,
median, best estimate value, upper lower bound entries provides
or

and

respective numerical values. If the error factor is available it is given

in fifth line. Upper lower bounds error factors always
the

and

and

arenot

available. When not available, n/a (meaning not available) is written.

7. Repair time is the next category. It indicates the average repair

time associated with a component failure. It is also rarely found in
generic sources. Some sources provide duration based on recorded repair
times, others consider repair time mean value several maintenance
as

of

durations on a particular component. For the real case generic information

of this kind is not of much use.

8. Information regarding source of data is presented in two lines,

one indicating the exact source (name of publication, page #., table #.)
and second information about the ultimate source of data (e.g. expert
opinion, operating experience).
Component boundary main problem area when using generic data
9.

isa

sources. Very sources provide adequate information about component

few

boundary. The best information is found in the Swedish Reliability Data

Book, where a sketch showing exact component boundaries is provided for
each component. Whenever exact boundary information available,
isnot

"detail available" written.

not

is

Comment entries last category record. Usually

10.

inthe areth

ofa

al

the information found sources considered relevant written

and

are

here. data source generic source updated with specific plant

Ifthe

isa

operating experience, the prior source and/or mean and operating

experience (total population covered, number demands operational
of

or

time, number failures) used updating recorded. Additional failure

of

in

is

14
rates relevant to the component ( e.g. failure rate with or without
command faults) are also included in the comment lines.
Practically all information which could be used to clarify failure
rates, failure modes or component description are written. The comment
category is an integral part of each record and it is very important to
consider information included there when choosing record further

any

for
calculation comparison.
or

The complete record form is shown in Table 2 below.

Table Complete record form

2:
MODE 10 spaces
TYPE
65"

SUEŒYPE
65"

DETAIUTY
65"

65 "

OPMDDE
30"

OPENVIRO 65 "

GENEAIIMOD 50 "
EAIIMODE 50 "

ERATEDESCP 37 "
FAHKATE 10 "
UPBOUND
10"

IOWBOÜND 10 "
ERRORPCTOR
10"

REPAIKIM 10 "

SOURCE 30 "
UIHSOÜRCE 65 "

OCMMENIS 65 "
ŒM4ENTS1 65 "
OCMMEWIS2
65"

3.2. Coding system

Coding system area where PSAPACK code mostly influenced

isthe

the

the

IAEA Data Base structure. In accordance to the PSAPACK requirements, each

record code could have alphanumeric characters. fifth
upto4

The

character code character describing source

inthe

isthe

the

buthe

PSAPACK does this information.

notuse

Some of the fault tree analysis codes included in the PSAPACK limit
identification of basic event to eight alphanumeric characters. It was
felt that at least 4 characters are needed for further identification of
components (including its physical position for eventual common cause or
dependency analysis). Therefore only 4 characters were used for basic
component identification and failure mode description.

15
 Three positions were used code conponent type. There

to

the

isa
hierarcliical structure associated with components' coding.
The first character of the code define the category to which the
conponent belongs There distinct conponent categories.

to.

are2
The next hierarchical level is the conponent group level. There are
between groups each category, totaling more than conponent
1and0

in

10
groups. Each group unique alphanumeric characters code. List

has

two

of
conponent groups is provided in Appendix 3.
The lowest hierarchical level component type. IAEA Data Base

isthe
contains more than different conponent types. Each conponent type
420

has
a unique three alphanumeric character code (list of component types and
associated codes given Appendix
is

in

5).
Some of the conponent groups do not have subdivisions, in these cases
the component type is defined on the second hierarchical level. The word
"general" is sometimes used to describe that the failure rate in that
particular record general irrespectively detailed
isfor

use

ofthe
conponent type. In these cases the third character of the code is "A"
meaning that no information about detail type is available for the
particular conponent.
As there is no space in the coding system for operating mode or
environment, sometimes the same component is coded differently because of
operating conditions (e.g. motor driven pump (general) is coded
'EMB'when alternating operating mode, and'FMR'when running
in

in
mode).
The next position code describes conponent failure mode.
inthe

the

Originally, there were more than 100 different failure modes coming from
various sources. code them positions were required.
To

alof

two

Asthe

generic failure modes were designed, character sufficient

one

was

describe conponent failure mode. to

the

Appendix provides inclusive list generic failure modes

2

an

of

and

associated codes.
The last position of the code is describing the source of data. The
list source codes provided Appendix
of

is

in

1.

3.3. Generic failure node definitions usage

and

More than 100 failure modes were identified during the data base
compilation. Such a high number of failure modes caused problems not only
in coding but also makes any failure rate conparison difficult and
sometimes impossible. other side, majority failure modes
Onthe

the

of

differ only in wording (e.g. 'fail to run'; 'failure to run'; 'failure

during operation' describing running failure punp Therefore,
of

).

aset

of generic failure modes was defined (covering practically all component

failure modes accounted for in PSAs) and each of the original failure
modes was listed under one of the generic categories.
Details about generic failure mode definition process rather
and

definition of each of the major failure modes are found in Appendix 2.

16
4. COMPONENTS OF THE DATA BASE

IAEA Data Base contains about 1000 records. More than

The

430
different components addressed, having average failure modes.

forthe are

on

of 2.
There main reasons existence such high number
aretwo

of

a
component types (high compared about components vised average

to

50

in
PSA). The first is the relatively large number of sources, so sometimes
the same component is defined in different way (more or less detail). A
second reason is that the primary objective of some of the data sources
was not PSA. Therefore components in these sources are defined with
greater detail (sizes of valves etc.) causing distinction between
components..
Components found IAEA data base divided four major
inthe

canbe

in
categories :
mechanical components
electrical components
instrumentation control equipment
and

(I&C)
emergency power sources
Mechanical components category include following component

the
categories (unique first character code respective category
ofthe

for

is
given brackets)
in

-piping
(F)

-heat exchangers (H)

-control rods drive mechanisms
and

(O)

-pumps (P)
-HVAC and air handling equipment (Q)
-valves (V)
-strainers/filters (Y)
-other mechanical equipment
(J)

Electrical equipment category include following:

-transformers
(T)

-relays (R)
-motors (M)
-conductors
(C)

-batteries and chargers (B)

-circuit breakers (K)
-other electrical equipment (E)
Instrumentation control equipment category consist following:
and

of

-sensors
(A)

-instrumentation (channel) (I)

-transmitters (L)
-signal conditioning systems
(N)

-switches
(S)

-other I & C equipment (U)

Emergency power sources category include diesel generators

andgs

turbine driven generators.

(D)

17
 4.1. Component groups

Each above listed categories contain several component groups

ofthe
(up 10). Component groups defined aggregation
to

are

asthe

ofthe
component having similarity second level. examples component

onthe

The

of
groups are 'motor operated valves', 'diesel driven pumps', 'flow sensor'
and 'main power transformer'. Group is also a second hierarchical level in
the component coding system. There are more than 100 component groups in
the IAEA data base.

4.2. Component types

Component detailed type is the lowest hierarchical level. Sometimes

the component group is equal to the component detailed type. In other
cases components group different sizes, system they belong
inthe

are

in
to, detailed design characteristics etc. The population of each group as
well as the level of detail vary substantially.

4.3. Selection applicable data

of

The selection of data for a particular study greatly depends on the

type study, status system plant) analyzed (planned, design
of

of

(or

in
process, operational) and level of resolution needed. Data selected for
the study should as close as possible match analysis requirements and
major characteristics of data sources (including characteristics pertinent
to ultimate source).
When selecting data user consult Chapter this manual
the

hasto

6of

where the basic information about each of the sources included are
presented. user aware that data from single source
The

hastobe

the

could be based on several different ultimate data sources (e.g. operating

experience and expert opinion). Therefore in addition to the description
source found manual, ultimate data source entry each
ofthe

inthe

the

in

record provides additional guidance. Sometimes information found in

comment lines can also help in data selection.
In general recommended that sources having characteristics
its

similar plant under consideration should selected.

tohe

be

Another important point data selection type analysis

in

isthe

ofthe

intended (point estimate or uncertainty analysis). Inclusion of

uncertainties limit available data to sources which have either confidence
limits or upper and lower bounds. Out of 1000 records in the Data Base,
about have upper bound, less than include lower bound. Error
70

and

650

factors found about records.

are

in

30

If analysis require generic repair time, further limit

the

it

available data. Repair time given about records. Problem with

is

in

320

the repair time is that it is unequally distributed (e.g. few sources

include repair time).

18
 faciliate selection particular component user should

To

the

ofa

the
consult Appendices 3 and 4, vfoere ccwponent groups and types are listed in
alphabetical order together with respective two or three character codes.
After selecting component type which applicable case

the

is

forthe
studied, user locate particular record code.
the

can

byits
Most components listed have more than failure mode.
ofthe

one

Itis
expected that component types failure mode needed contained

and

inPSAare
in IAEA Data Base. suggested that prior final fault tree
the

Itis

to
construction, analyst familiarize himself with the information available.

19
5. DATA SOURCES FOR THE DATA BASE

5.1. General characteristics

Ore objectives data base compilation have data

ofthe

ofthe

wasto
from many different sources. Twenty one sources were chosen for inclusion.
The amount of information contained in the various sources, however,
differ substantially. Some sources provide different

ofthe

upto180
records, while one source was cited in only two of the records.
All the sources can be put into three basic categories. Each category
show some unique characteristics. However, some of the sources belong to
more than category, since data contained were derived from different
one

ultimate sources.
The three categories are now described, followed by a description of
the characteristics of each single data source.

5.1.1. Plant specific data

Two basic subgroups exist inside this category. first plant

The

is
specific data drawn directly from sources available at the plant
(logbooks, maintenance records, work orders, etc.), and the second one is
when generic data is updated with plant specific information.
The first subgroup is normally considered to be the best source of
data plant analyzed, this necessarily case when
forthe

but

isnot

the

one

uses these data another plant. Generally, this source that

at

isa

is
rarely found literature. only source IAEA Data Base
inthe

The

inthe

fully in this category is NUREG 4550 (Vol.3, Surry NPP) and this provides
only ten records.
second subgroup generic data updated with single plant
The

isof

operating experience. This procedure usually applied either when

is

limited plant specific data are available, or when available data could
tend overestimate underestimate component reliability. fact,
to

or

In

in

most of the recently completed PSA studies (which are not using generic
data bases) component reliability data derived this manner.
are

in

NP The

IAEA Data Base includes several sources this kind (e.g. Oconee PRA,
of

Zion source identified "Old PWR").

NPRAand

as

5.1.2. Data extracted from reporting systems

A widely known NPP event reporting system is the Licensee Event Report
System used in the USA. Safety significant events occurring at NPPs have
to be reported, and it is therefore possible to identify component
failures related these events. Identification component failures
to

of

is

not always straightforward, and other means of identifying the components

involved have to be used.
The IAEA Data Base includes four sources this kind. These
of

are

NUREG/CR-1205, NUREG/CR-1363, NUREG/CR-1331 and NÜREG/CR-1740. All these

sources provide failure rates assessed from licensee event reports.

20
 Simirar based rates failure rates

inawytohe1ER

areth
published Swedish "Reliability Data Book", which provides

inthe

the
reliability parameters derived from Swedish LERs, system (The

theATV
Swedish Thermal Power Reliability Data System) information provided

and

by
the plant staff.
The advantage of reliability parameters derived in this manner are
that the actual component population covered is very large which
guarantees more reliable statistics. However, 1ER systems are event
oriented component oriented, actual component failure could
andot

so

be
misinterpreted or overlooked. In addition, some component failures are not
reported in the system because the failures either caused no safety
significant event or were not required to be reported. Furthermore, a
small percentage of events is not reported because of the plant
personnel's general attitude to the reporting system. All these factors
may lead possible overestimates component reliability.
to

of
Another problem area operating time number demands
isthe

andthe

of
on component. Operating time usually estimated basis
the

is

onthe

of
reactor operating time, number demands estimated
andthe

of

is

asn
average also based on the operating time. Assessment of these parameters
(instead of recording them) opens a possibility of substantial errors.
This can drive calculated failure rates in either direction.
Compilations of this kind tend to underestimate differences in
component design, operational practices environment, which
and

is
sometimes very important information and can greatly influence component
reliability.
To conclude, reliability parameters found in this type of source
should used with care studies.
be

inPSA

5.1.3. Data based on expert opinion, nuclear and non-nuclear

experience

Categories in this group include single expert opinion, aggregate

expert opinion, aggregation of several non-nuclear sources, aggregation of
expert opinion and other sources and aggregation of operating experience
of several NEPs. Even single data source usually includes several
a

of

these categories. Aggregation of data (if properly performed) provides

more reliable data than single expert opinion or a single source.
most widely known representative this category i
The

of

isthe
K

Standard 500. 1977 version mostly includes expert opinion, while

Its

the

1984 version also includes nuclear and non-nuclee&r experience. Other

examples data sources which included IAEA Data Base are:
of

are

inthe

NUREG/CR-2728 Interim Reliability Evaluation Program Procedure Guide,

(which adopted the data base from EQG-EA-5887), NUREG/CR-2815
Probabilistic Safety Analysis procedure guide (data from expert opinion
combined with IREP data base) Sizewell assessment (operating
the

experience, including nuclear and other industrial sources).

The WASH-1400, Reactor Safety Study, (a combination of expert opinion
and non-nuclear nuclear sources) also belongs this category
and

to

andit

is important mention that still widely used source. sources

to

its

Two

21
 included in the IAEA Data Base (NURBG 2886 and NUREG 3831) provide
component failure rates derived from operating experience of a limited
group of plants. Another example is the Shoreham NPP PRA-GE data, which
draw data only from General Electric operating plants.
the quality and reliability of data in this category can vary
substantially, depending on the ultimate source, the method of collecting
raw data and the methods used to derive failure rates.
Although expert opinion is sometimes considered to be a low quality
data source, it is iirportant to mention that is proved several times to be
in very good agreement with data from actual operating experience.

5.2. Characteristics single data sources

of

In addition to the general characteristics of the data sources

described in the previous paragraph, each data source included in the IAEA
Data Base show some unique characteristics. To facilitate proper use of
the data base and to avoid misinterpretation due to limited knowledge of
the ultimate data source, some characteristics of each data source are
presented. Sources which seem more important, simply widely used
tobe

or
or cited more often, are described in greater detail.

The data sources used compilation IAEA's Generic

forthe

ofthe

Component Reliability Data Base are listed in Appendix 1 (in alphabetical

order).

5.2.1. WASH 1400 Reactor Safety Study

5.2.1.1. General
WASH 1400 was the first and is the most widely known
probabilistic safety study performed. Considerable effort was made in
the study develop data needed. Although study rather
to

the

the

is

old, even today sometimes still used source data.

its

as

of

5.2.1.2. Data sources

The data used study were derived from different sources,

inthe

including reports, handbooks, industrial operating experience

andNP

experience. Ultimate data sources included the US Department of

Defense (Navy, Air Force), NASA data, general industrial operating
experience and nuclear power plant experience.
The log normal distribution was used to describe data variability
(the log normal distribution is also used in most of the data
sources). normal distribution parameter distribution
ina Log

isatwo

and

two points defined range determine unique distribution.

end

In

study range selected, lower being bound

the

the90%

was

the

end

5%

22
and the upper 95% bound. This definition of range implies that there
is probability that data value would within this range.
a90%

the

be
The ultimate data sources considered represent a variety of
applications conditions, with some sources apparently being more
and
applicable than others. However, data sources are in general within
one orders magnitude.
ortw

of

Since order of magnitude accuracy was required, endpoints were

determined to the nearest half integer on the exponent scale
(i.e.lE-1 or IE-1.5). The half integer on the scale corresponds to
the assignment of 3 or 1 for the significant figure (i.e. IE-1 or
3E-2).
The actual range was assessed after a number of iterations,
involving a large number of components. Data points selected came
from various sources (including nuclear experience), and the range
was chosen to cover approximately 90% of the points. The actual
determination of the range required data plotting with a decision
made on the weight of each data point. The assessment decisions were
based on the experience of individuals involved in reliability
studies and NPP operation. Because of the order of magnitude
accuracy, components were generally classified only according

to
their generic types. When available, actual nuclear plant experience
was used as the principal basis for determining and checking the
assessed range.
Sources, other than commercial nuclear experience, which provide

the
data points used range assessment divided into categories:
in

canbe

two

general sources special sources. Some sources which provide most

and

of

of
the data points are:
1. System Reliability Service, UKAEA (all service publications)
2. Reliability Engineering Data Services Failure Rates, AVOO
Corp.1962 (Contains failure rates assessment for primary military
hardware)
3. FARADA, Converged Failure Rate Data Handbook, Fleet Missile
System Analysis Evaluation Group Annex, current issues
and

al

(contains failure rate assessment derived from Army, Navy,

US

Air

Force NASA sources)

and

4. Failure Data Handbook Nuclear Power Facilities, Liquid

for

Metal Engineering Center, 1969, (compilation of failure rates

derived from test and research reactor operating experience)
5. National Reactor Testing Station Idaho: Failure History
1968-1972.
Commercial reactor operating experience was examined to serve as
important data assessment data ranges. Sources failure
foran

of

for

examinations included 1971-73 incident files and reports of operating

occxirrences, Nuclear Safety Information Center files, environmental
reports, individual technical reports and other pertinent sources. In
particular, year period (January -December 1972) used
aone

was

to

evaluate summarized averaged nuclear data statistics.

the

and

23
 Out of a total number of 700 failures reported that year, the number
of failures and abnormalities that occurred at plants operational for the
full year (eight EWRs and nine BWRs) and that were safety related was 303.
These failures were categorized generic component into classes.

in by

A
statistical evaluation performed order estimate failure rates

was

to
and demand probabilities.
The pertinent environment for all components, except pumps, is that of
standard nuclear power plant operational conditions. The assessed ranges
should cover variations occurring that environment. Failure pump

and in

ofa
to also assessed extreme temperature pressure conditions
runwas

characteristic severe accident. for

ofa

The advantage of the data in WASH-1400 is that a variety of different

ultimate sources were considered in the assessment process. Nuclear
operating experience also considered (although limited scope)
was

in

and
the assessed range was checked for applicability.
The disadvantage process lies obvious difference
ofthe

inthe

in
ultimate data sources. difference comes from variety
The

the

of
applications, maintenance practices, design differences, etc. Another
problem different methods collecting reporting data,
isthe

of

component definitions environmental related factors. However, and

and

and

by
assessing ranges instead point values, these differences made
of

canbe
less important.
data from WASH-1400 were widely used afterwards, many reports
The

and
on nuclear components reliability data provide some kind comparison

of
with WASH-1400 data components analyzed.
on

During the review process of WASH-1400 it was concluded that the

ranges (confidence levels) several components were narrow; other
of

to

words, confidence levels tended towards overconfidence. Some of the later in

PSA studies (Zion example) used WASH-1400 confidence limits,
PSfor

instead bounds, they used limits but

of5%and9

the

asthe20%nd8

bounds, implying that with a 40% probability the true value lies outside
these bounds.

5.2.1.3.Data available in the IAEA Data Base

In IAEA Data Base, 'failrate' median value from WASH-1400

the

isthe

Appendix Tables 4-2, 'upbound' value 'lowbound'

3,

4-1and

isthe95%

and

is the 5% value, thus representing 90% confidence levels. The error factor
for assumed lognormal distribution found in the records is the upper limit
of the range divided by the median, and since the median is a geometric
midpoint, it is also equal to the median divided by the lower limit.

5.2.1.4. Source independence

WASH-1400 is the source widely used as a prior in data updating or for

the comparison of failure rates derived fron other ultimate data sources.
Therefore, terms independence, WASH-1400 data have been repeated
in

of

many times and also influenced most of the data bases compiled since. All

24
the data sources IAEA Data Base which rely fully

inthe

dont

on
operational experience are more or less dependent on WASH-1400 data.

5.2.2. Swedish Reliability Data Book

5.2.2.1.General

The Swedish Reliability Data Book which provided the data for the IAEA
Data Base 1985 updated version. compiled ASEA-ATOM
isthe

Itwas

by

for
the Nuclear Safety Board Swedish utilities Swedish Nuclear Power
of

and
Inspectorate. The main aim of the compilation was to provide (or improve)
failure data for reliability calculations as a part of the safety analysis
for Swedish NPPs.

5.2.2.2. Data sources

The sources information were following:

of

the

-Failure reports in the ATV system (the Swedish Thermal Power

Reliability Data System)
-Licensee Event Reports Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
tohe

-Information provided by the operation and maintenance staff of

each plant.
In order obtain well defined basic data, reports covering startup
to

periods periods when reporting found satisfactory were

and

was

notbe

excluded. Also, the annual refueling outage and other extended shutdowns
were included component statistics.
not

in

Altogether about 35 reactor years of BWR operating experience were

analyzed. following NPP's were covered study: Barsebäck
The

inthe

land

2; Forsmark Oskarshamn Ringhals only plant

1and2;

1and2;

1.The

PWR

covered in the study is Ringhals 2, with about 4.5 years of operating

experience (ATV reports) analyzed in the Ringhals 2 Safety Study. Another
reactor years experience analyzed using same sources
1.5

of

was

the

asfor

BWR plants.
The total number of ATV reports analyzed was 3575. Of these 590
represent critical failures. addition, Licensee Event Reports were
In

60

analyzed.
The Data Book presents reliability parameters for pumps, valves,
control rods drives, electrical components instrumentation.
and

and

Components included are mainly those belonging to safety related systems.

The number demands used calculating probabilities failure
of

for

of

per demand has been obtained from the test interval defined in Technical
Specification from other demands connected with plant disturbances
and

(e.g. scram).

25
 The operating time needed for failure rate calculations was estimated
from the operation profiles of the plant together with readings of
operating time (e.g. pumps).
The repair time which appears in the Data Base is calculated as the
arithmetic mean of the repair times given in the failure reports.

Two types failure probabilities were determined:

of
Failure rate (lambda), stating probability component

for the

ofa
failing unit time (applicable components continuous
per

in
[running] and intermittent [alternating] operation)
-Failure per demand (q) stating the probability that a component
does work when demanded.
not

Basic assumptions applicable statistical models estimating

to

for
parameters were following:
the

Each individual component is assumed to have a constant failure

rate within the interval studied. This leads to a Poisson
distribution for time related failures and Binomial distribution
for demand related failures.
Failure rate probability vary analyzed population
and

forthe

(for whatever reason). The failure characteristic in question is

therefore looked upon stochastic variable having suitable
as

distribution.
The observed failure data similar components were assumed
for

to
be stochastically independent.

variation parameters within observed population

The

of

the

of

components is described in a double parametric distribution. A gamma

distribution chosen failure rates Beta distribution
was

for

and

forthe

variation of failure probabilities.

5.2.2.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

sets data available IAEA Data Base. composite

Two

of

are

in

Oneis

value of all BWR plants, and other is Ringhals 2 PWR. In the IAEA Data
Base 'failrate' is the mean value, while 'upbound' represents 95% of the
distribution. Since percentile most distributions
the5

of

ofthe

is

very small, it is not presented in the original tables. It is therefore

suggested that the interval from the origin to the 95th percentile should
be regarded measure uncertainty around mean value.
as

ofthe

the

comment lines most records IAEA Data Base

Inthe

of

ofthe

inthe

which originated from Swedish Data Book, values alpha beta

the

for

and

(abbreviated respectively), parameters uniquely

as'ndb

the

describing the distributions, are found. These parameters were obtained

using different methods, namely:

26
 Maximum Likelihood Method;
The
The Weighted Marginal Mentent Method;
and Weighted aPriori Moment Method.
the
These parameters could be used for a Bayesian estimate of the failure
rate probability specific component. procedure
orthe

fora

The

is
relatively simple thanks to the choice of gamma and beta as prior
distributions. Posterior distributions then same kind mean

are

The ofthe

and
values these distributions easy calculate. detailed
of

are

to
procedure can be found in paragraph 5.2. of the Swedish Data Book.

5.2.2.4. Special features

One of the great advantages of the Swedish Data Book is its component
boundary definitions. For most of the components found in the Data Book,
sketches indicate the exact interface points.
The components in the Swedish Data Book (mostly pumps and valves) are
also allocated very specific categories accordance with their main
to

in

design characteristics or sizes.

Generally this source considered very good, sense
is

tobe

inthe

of
the total number studied (for most of the components), the number of
recorded failures definitions components failure mode.
andthe

of

and

As with other sources which draw data from plant

the

theraw

experience collected in either event or failure reporting systems, the

exact number of demands or operating time (for standby or alternating
components) is estimated rather than recorded. The error is usually on the
conservative side.

5.2.2.5. Source independence

regards independence, Swedish Reliability Data Book

As

the

is

completely independent of all the other sources included in the IAEA Data
Base.

5.2.3. NUEEG 2815, Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedure Guide

5.2.3.1. General

Appendix C of NUKEG 2815 provides a generic data base which includes

about 40 component types (commonly found in PSA studies), with appropriate
failure modes. data base generated from estimates produced
The

was

the

at

a two days Reliability Data Workshop held at NRC in Washington in April

1982.

27
 This data base is meant for general use, in cases where plant specific
data are lacking. The level of detail is therefore not high. Component
types represented in NUKEG 2815 are basically generic categories broad
enough to accommodate general use. The same applies to the failure modes
assigned.

5.2.3.2. Data sources

Participants at the workshop were experts in data analysis and risk

assessment and represented the NRC, utilities, national laboratories and
nuclear consulting firms. each component failure mode nominal

For

a
failure rate value and an error factor representing an approximate 90%
upper bound lower bound value were generated. Failure rates
and10%

and
error factors generated in this way were combined with failure rates and
error factors given in the IREP users' guide (NUREG/CR-2728). The results
of that combination were failure rates given NURBG 2815
the

in

and
reproduced in the IAEA Data Base.
The procedure combination expert generated estimates
forthe

of

and
IREP values follows:
was

(1) For the given component failure mode, the maximum nominal value
and maximum error factor were selected from sources.
the

thewo

(2) The selected nominal value was then multiplied and divided by the
appropriate error factor to obtain upper the 90% and lower the 10% bounds.
(3) truncated uniform distribution (i.e. flat scale)
tohew A

log

onthelg

fitted bounds mean value then calculated.

was

and

was

For most components, expert estimates and IREP values agreed. Where
there disagreement, either nominal value error factor,
was

inthe

ofthe

it was by a factor of three or less. In these cases generic values were

conservatively biased largest assigned error factors.
andhte

5.2.3.3. Special features

some components there description what included

For

ofthe

isa

of

is

in the component boundary considered. However, precise interface points

and other information for most of the components are not available. This
is a general characteristic of all the sources not directly linked to
operating experience. future this data source, component
boundary shall considered component were 'off-the-shelf7
For

useof

the
be

asifthe

an

item.
The same thing applies to the operating environment. It is
recommendable to consider a normal nuclear power plant environment.
It is important to mention that all the failure rates in NUREG 2815
are defined as per hour values. For the standby components starting
failures are defined per hour standby, while for operating components (as
well failures standby components run) operating time
as asfor

of

to

the

is

used basis.

28
 This source does not give a generic repair time in the sense of a mean
duration. Instead, it is suggested that the maximum allowed unscheduled
downtime given in the plant technical specification should be used.
Although it is not clearly stated, expert estimates seems to be
consensus estimates. Consensus is considered to be the highest ranking of
all group expert estimates.

5.2.3.4. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe
In the IAEA Data Base 'failrate' is the mean value of the truncated
log uniform distribution, while 'upbound' is the maximum and 'lowbound'
the minimum bound of the truncated log uniform.

5.2.3.5. Source independence

This source closely linked with IREP data base. As its major ultimate
source is expert opinion, it can be expected that the experts estimates
were relatively highly influenced by other data bases which were published
prior this. Also there high probability that same experts were
to

isa

the

contributing to the other data bases, as well (for example TTTKR 500 1984).
Therefore NUREG 2815 data have considered relatively highly
tobe

dependent on other US sources published at that time or before.

5.2.4. NUREG 2728 IREP (Interim Reliability Evaluation Program

Procedure Guide)

5.2.4.1. General

The IREP Procedure Guide provides generic data base which used
a

was

for screening calculations preliminary point estimates. level

for

Asthe

of resolution given plant specific data greater than that

bytheusof

is

with generic data, dominant accident sequences were evaluated using plant
specific data whenever possible.

5.2.4.2. Data sources

The IREP generic data base has been adapted from information contained
in the EGG-EA-5887 (A.J.Oswald et al.rGeneric Data Base and Models chapter
of NREP Guide, EG&G Idaho, June, 1982). Nominal values from this
the

report were taken medians. Associated means were calculated from

as

the

medians error factors (representing bounds), assuming

and

10%and9

log normal distribution.

The IREP generic data base contains failure rates demand
and

probabilities for classes of equipment commonly found in NPP's (about 40).

Four types of values are found in the data base:

29
 Component standby failure rates, which are the reciprocals of the mean
time to failure of components that are normally in standby;
Component operating failure rates, which reciprocals

areth

ofthe
mean time to failure of components that are normally operating;
Demand failure probabilities selected standby component types such

for
as valves and pumps.
Error factors each failure rate demand failure probabilities

for

and
representing upper and lower bounds on the value of reliability
parameters. These bounds represent a range of values for each parameter
that parameter reasonably expected assume.
the

can

be

to
5.2.4.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

The IREP generic data base contains failure rates and demand
probabilities for classes of equipment commonly found in NPPs (about 40).
full data found this source reproduced IAEA Data
The

setof

in

is

inthe
Base.
The IAEA Data Base contains the mean value of the lognormal
distribution 'failrate' error factor.
as

and

5.2.4.4. Special features

The failure rates are in units of failures per hour. The demand
probabilities represent failures per demand of the component. The median
and error factor define normal distribution that describes
alog

the
uncertainty reliability parameter failure mode,
inthe

forthe

ifthe

error factor interpreted representing 90th percentile region

is

as

of
the parameter.
Demand probabilities in the IREP data base require further
explanation. Although they are listed as demand probabilities, in reality
they were originally generated multiplying failure rates half
by

byone

of

the assumed test period (one month). demand probabilities should

The

therefore taken true demand probabilities, which depend only

notbe

as

on

the number of cycles between standby and operation. For components whose
test period substantially different from month five
isnot

one

(upto

or

six months), the demand probability is considered to be adequate for use.

5.2.4.5.Source independence

IREP data base data base from NUREG 2815 heavily

The

andthe

are

interdependent, because draws data fron other. These

one

the

the

two

sources should be used one at a time; they should not be mixed. Other
dependences commented on in the paragraph describing dependence of NUREG
2815 are also applicable here.

30
 5.2.5. iHUH Standard

50
5.2.5.1. General
TKKF. Standard included IAEA data base 1984
The

50

inthe

isthe
edition, which follow first, 1977 edition Standard.

isa

uptohe

inthe ofthe
TERR richest source information considered IAEA Data
50isthe

of
Base. provides reliability data electrical, electronic sensing
It

for

and
components, as well as for mechanical equipment. The data contained in it
are intended either nuclear system reliability analysts
fortheus

or
design engineers.

5.2.5.2. Data sources

Standard draws data from variety sources.

50

of

Asita
follow up to the 1977 edition, some of the data come directly from there.
Among the other sources, the most important are:
(1) Corps of Engineers (HND) R/M Data Base, Ground Stationary
Equipment, Rep.No.16, 04/12/73
(2) Non electric Parts Reliability Data (NPRD-2) , Summer 1981,
Reliability Analysis Center, Rome Development Center, Air
Griff Force Base, 13441.3
isAr

NY

(3) NUREG/CR-2232 Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) ,

1980, Annual Report of Cumulative System and Component
Reliability.
All NUREG/CR publications providing reliability parameters derived
the

from 1ER reports (NUREG/CR 1205, 1331, 1363, 1740) are also included here.
Also included NUREG/CR 2886 IPRD report pumps.
isthe

on

In addition, a number of other reports providing data about particular

components well some in-plant sources architect-engineer
as

as

ofthe

and

companies provide input for the TTCRR 500.

data some component categories (annunciator modules,

The

for

ofthe

batteries and chargers, circuit breakers, relays, motors and generators,

heaters, transformers, valve operators, instruments, controls and sensors
and conductors) partly resulted from analysis estimates made
was the

of

by

over experts. collection expert opinions performed

20

The

of

bythe

extensive multistep DELJFHI method. (The Delphi method is a formal way of

collecting information establishing feedback system written
by

for

communication of data and information among the group of professionals.

Detailed information about method found TKKK
)Itis the

anditsuecb

in

50

(1984) Appendix elsewhere. important mention that

,

Band

to

individual experts were instructed to estimate data only when statistical

sources of data remained unavailable to them. In some cases, the data
developed (for respective categories) represent either recorded data
or

the best collective judgement of a group of specialists.

To summarize, the raw data from which the values appearing in the TKKE
were synthesized were found following forms:
50

inthe

31
 1. Statistical operating data from nuclear power plants
2. Statistical operating data from fossil fired generating
stations other data from large industries (such

and

asthe
chemical industry)
3. Statistical failure data from transmission grids

and
industrial plants, with use of judgement to estimate the
population from which failures were observed that

the

so

a
failure rate could be calculated.
4. Data on failure and population estimated by individuals
familiar with operating failure histories specific
of the

and

of
generic types devices.
5. Data extracted from published sources for other industries
which were judged to have some level of applicability to
components nuclear power generating stations.
of

stated that average data included TEKE

Itis

onthe

80%ofthe

inthe
resulted from statistical data first three categories
50

inoefth
mentioned above.

5.2.5.3. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

i KKK 500 provides the data for a variety of components found in NPPs.
Intended use of data from the TRKF; 500 is in the area of general
reliability calculation and not ESA studies in particular. Therefore the
level of detail is much greater than elsewhere.
iKKK utilize hierarchical structure group component
The

50

to

in

categories. The broadest hierarchical breakdown is 'chapter', which

identifies general component category (example 'chapters'
a

of

are

transformer, driven equipment and conductors). There are 17 chapters and

respective component categories included in the TFRR 500. The second
breakdown level is called 'section'; the division into sections is based
on functional or physical differences between components. The third level,
when present, is called 'subsection'. The 'item or equipment' description
is last hierarchical level. either third fourth level,
the

Itcanbe

or

depending on the existence of "subsection" level.

For each data entry there failure mode defined. general,
isa

In

failure modes divided into three categories: catastrophic, degraded

are

and incipient failures. These categories are sometimes subdivided into the
more detailed modes, which heavily depend each component category.
on

Al

three categories are summed together under the 'all modes' numerical
value. Detailed discussion of the failure mode is provided in Appendix A
and in the preface of each data chapter of 'KKK standard 500.
i KKK 500 provides single data entries, but also the composite values
on the hierarchical levels where the composite value provides a certain
overview.
Failure rates presented with three data points: recommended value,
The are

high value value. recommended value should used

andlow

be

and to

determine best estimate. high values represent best

the

The

andlow

32
worst data points and can be vised as a range estimate (visually they should
not be interpreted as specific confidence bounds) . Two types of data are
found in the i KKK 500. One is failure rate in terms of failures per 1E+6
hours, other terms failures 1E+6 cycles. cyclic
andthe

is isn

of

per

Ihe
failure rate used specific instances describe demand

in

to
probabilities. Some data entries provide recommended values only.

ofthe
In addition to failure rates, the outage times are sometimes found in
the TFRR data sheets. Outage tiroes divided into three categories:
50

are
out service duration, restoration time repair time. Consistently
of

and
with the failure rates, recommended, high and low value (representing the
highest and lowest data points) are presented.
The TTraR standard 500 provided about 180 records for IAEA Data Base.
These records cover whole spectrum components found NPPs
180

the

of

in

and
usually taken into account in PSA studies. Most of the records in the IAEA
data base come from the identifiable ultimate data source that seems to be
the most applicable for PSA use. In several cases, where deemed
appropriate, composite values were included give user

to

the

an
illustration of the expected range of data. In all cases the comment lines
provide information about data.
the

Failure modes considered where those which interest

areof

forPSA
studies. In most cases these are catastrophic failure modes and in a few
cases degraded failure modes. Whenever available, failure rate

the

is
given for precisely defined failure modes (for example, a short to
ground) . Sometimes the failure rate is given for catastrophic (or
degraded) mode and in comment lines it is stated what is being considered
in that failure mode. For some of the components only the 'all modes'
failure mode was available without indication of the proportion of
catastrophic, degraded and incipient failures in the total. If the
component considered major interest studies,
was

tobef

forPSA

itwas

then included in the IAEA Data Base.

For uniformity throughout the data base, the failure rates and demand
probabilities are presented as per hour and per cycle (being equivalent to
per demand) values, respectively. Whenever available, repair time
the

for

particular component included IAEA Data Base. repair time

a

was

inthe

The

in the IAEA data base is always the recommended value from TFRR 500.

5. 2. 5. 4. Special features
The TEEE 500 draws information from a variety of sources, so the
failure data items conditions discussed individual
arefoth

and

inthe

sources.
The special feature of the TKRR standard 500 is an environmental
factor matrix provided for the number of components included. The
multipliers for high temperature, humidity and radiation are taken from
the 1977 edition Standard. They included IAEA Data Base.
of

arenot

inthe

5.2.5.5. Source independence

mentioned, TEEE contains several sources which also
As

"

50

are

individually included IAEA Data Base. addition, other sources

inthe

In

providing operating experience NPP's draw information from

atUS

the

the

33
same population of plants (although in a different manner), so the data
points statistically independent.

arenot
Some of the data points originating from expert opinion also cannot be
considered independent. Although they collected Delphi

are

byuseofth
method, bias expert opinion should properly considered.

in

be
Some of the other sources in the IAEA Data Base also use the TKRE 500
data priors Bayesian updating (Oconee ERA, example). these
for

in

for

In
cases dependences should properly considered.

be
5.2.6. Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant

PSA
5.2.6.1. General
At time study Shoreham NPP, operating history
the

ofthePSA

for

was available, thus several sources of generic BWR operating experienceno

were used to provide a surrogate basis for failure data. Among several
data sources considered in the study, of special interest for inclusion in
the IAEA Data Base General Electric collection operating
wasthe

of
experience.
General Electric has collected and evaluated BWR operating experience
data on a wide variety of components to estimate their failure rates. This
source pertinent BWRs lists specific components which data
is

to

and

are usually available elsewhere. on

not

5.2.6.2. Data sources

Detailed information about the ultimate data source as well as about

the methodology used to evaluate data and derive reliability parameters is
not available. It is clear that GE collected operating experience, but it
is clear weather form licensee event reports (1ER)
not

itwasnhe

of

or

otherwise.

5.2.6.3. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

complete data available from source included

The

setofGE

the

was

in

the IAEA Data Base. That is about 25 records, containing mean failure
rates valves (M3V, check, valve), pumps, motors, heat exchangers
for

ADS

and a variety of instrumentation and control equipment.

5.2.6.4. Special features

The same set of GE data was used in the PRA study for the limerick
NPP, where comparison between data, WASH-1400 data data from
the

GE

and

the analysis of lERs (LER rates) was made. Many of the data from the three

34
sources similar there generally good agreement between

are

and

is

al
three sources.
Another important feature of the GE data is the concept of treatment
of demand related failures. The constant hourly failure rate is used for
components in standby. The probability of failure is then calculated by
multiplying failure rate by one half of the scheduled test interval (e.g.
monthly, annually).
Quantification of the fault trees in the Shoreham PSA was done using
four data sources, following hierarchy:
andithe

1. 1ER rates
2. data
GE

3. WASH-1400
4. TKKE (1977).
50

5.2.6.5. Source independence

ultimate data source clear sense number

Asthe

isnot

(inthe

of

of
plants, time interval covered means data collection) strictly
the the

and

of

defining dependence simple.

isnot

The source is said to contain the data based on operating experience

of GE BWR plants, and since these plants are also considered in estimation
of rates, there relatively high dépendance between this source
1ER

is

and
NUREG documents with rates.
1ER

This is also the case with IPRD (In-Plant Reliability Data,

NUREG/CR-2886 and NUREG/CR-3831) sources, which contain data drawn from
operating experience of a couple of BWR plants.

5.2.7. NUREG/CR 4550 Vol.1, Analysis of Core Damage Frequency From

Internal Events: Methodology Guidelines

5.2.7.1. General

NUREG 4550 Vol.1 summarizes methodology accident sequence

the

for

analysis reference plants examined part NUREG 1150 program.

for

as

of

Chapter VIII provide generic data base which used when reasonable
was

plant specific data were available.

not

Generic data base NUREG 4550 updated ASEP (Accident Sequence

in

isthe

Evaluation Program) data base which was originally used to calculate

accident sequence frequencies light water reactors. updated
for10

Itwas

in April 1984 June 1985. last update occurred August 1987 using
and

The

in

information from the Risk Methods Integration Evaluation Program. Data in

the IAEA Data Base comes from this last update.

35
 5.2.7.2. Data sources

ASEP data base formed from broad information base. number

was

ab

of
PSA studies and other sources of information were reviewed and ranges
established. Some examples of the sources that were used are the
following:
HWASH 1400
-NUKEG/CR 1659 Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application
Program (all plant analysis)
-IREP Procedure guide plant analysis

and
-Zion
NPS

-Limerick Generating Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment,

Rev. Philadelphia Electric June 1982
4,

Co.
-Oconee PRA
-IEEE Standard 1984
50

HNUREG/CR 3226 Station Blackout Accident Analysis, Sandia

National Laboratory, May, 1983
-NUREG/CR 1032 Evaluation Station Blackout Accidents

of

at
Nuclear Power Plants NRC, May 1985

5.2.7.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

The complete set of component reliability data provided in the source

is included IAEA Data Base. source provide about records,
inthe

The

20
addressing components like pumps, valves, DCs, batteries etc.
ASEP data base provide parameters each component, mean value
two

for

and normal distribution error factor. Although several sources were

log

reviewed for each component, the mean value is always taken from a single
source which is then identified in the comment lines of each record. Also
all additional information found in the original source are also included
in comment lines.
the

5.2.7.4. Source independence

As there operating experience behind this source, heavily

isno

its

influenced sources which were reviewed. Practically

byalthe

al

available US data sources were used in compilation of ASEP data base.

Therefore this source should be considered greatly dependant to all of the
others.

5.2.8. NUREG/CR 4550 Vol.3 Surry NPP

5.2.8.1. General
NUREG/CR 4550 document containing accident sequence
isthe

the

analysis for Surry Unit 1 NPP. This is one of the reference plants being
examined part NUREG 1150 work, which will document risks
as

of ofthe

for

selected group nuclear power plants.

36
 The accident sequence quantification performed using generic

was

as
well plant specific data. inclusion IAEA Data Base only
as

For

in

the
plant specific data were interest. There data records from this

of

are10
source IAEA Data Base.
inthe

5.2.8.2. Data sources

The ultimate data source is plant operating experience. Whenever plant

specific operating experience sufficient where potential plant

was

(or
specific cannon cause failures were identified), these data were used

for
quantification. However, it is not clear what kind of in-plant records or
other means were used to derive information. It is difficult to judge
about the quality of the data or the operating experience behind them.

5.2.8.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

The complete set of plant specific data provided in the source was
included in the IAEA Data Base. The data cover different kinds of pumps,
diesel generators strainers.
and

The failure rate given is a median value together with an error factor
(assuming lognormal distribution). Failure rates defined hour
are

asper
values, while starting failures are defined as per demand probabilities.

5.2.8.4. Special features

The failure mode for auxiliary feedwater pumps (motor and turbine
driven) is called 'failure to start/run' and is defined as per demand
probability. It was not possible to identify the eventual mission time
associated with this failure mode. unclear what proportion
Itis

ofthe

failure probability to assign to starting failure and what (if any) to

running failure.
As with other sources this kind (PSA studies), component
of

the

boundary is not strictly defined, but can be assessed in accordance with

the fault tree entry.
The operating mode found in the IAEA Data Base was determined in
accordance with the function of each component.
There was no indication either of the operating environment of the
components listed. However, a normal nuclear power plant environment was
assumed.

5.2.8.5. Source independence

As case with other sources which draw data from single

isthe

US

plant (or group of plants), there is a relatively high dependence to HER

37
rates, because each nuclear power plant contributing

US

is

tohe1ER
system. Hie level of dependency is difficult to asses without knowing the
ultimate source data plant.

of

athe
5.2.9.Sizewell B PWR Preconstruction Report

5.2.9.1. General

This report provides list component failure rates that were used

of
in the safety assessment of the proposed PWR nuclear power plant at
Sizewell data used safety assessment were assigned
intheUK.T

for

to
each conponent failure mode based overview several data
and

ona

of
sources.
The items which were identified as having the highest contributions
for the failure probability of the safeguards systems were the following:
non-return valves (check), relief valves, M3Vs, pneumatic valves, pumps
(motor and turbine), diesel generators, fan coolers and circuit breakers.
For each these components appropriate failure modes were assigned.
of

5.2.9.2. Data sources

Several data sources were used to assess failure rates. These were:
1. Westinghouse Reliability Data Base. A major survey of
failure rates for selected components associated with
Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)
2. UKAEA System Reliability Service, which provides a
comprehensive review of reliability information and provides
generic data for use in safety and availability assessment.
Many of the data relate mainly to typical industrial
applications.
3. WASH-1400, Reactor Safety Study.
4. Other sources including Electricité France (EdF)
de

sources, safety related occurrence 1967-74, Nuclear

USIWR

Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) 1978 others.

and

It should noted that ultimate data sources variety

be

the

are

of

sources information, coming from different areas collected

of

and

in

different ways. However, it seems that no formal statistical data

assessment procedure was used to obtain failure rates. Engineering
judgement seems utilized that purpose.
tobe

for

Data from source No.l (Westinghouse) proprietary, were

are

and

not

available, difficult judge which data source most influenced

soit

to

the assessed failure rates.

38
 5.2.9.3. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe
full data available source reproduced IAEA
The

setof

inthe

is

inthe
Data Base. Conponent failure rates demand probabilities mean

and

are
values.
addition data utilized calculations, every record
In

tohe

in

ofthe
IAEA Data Base originated from this source contains available

althe
information which served basis failure rate determination.

as

for

The
ultimate source of the data as well as the particular values are included
in comment lines every record.
the

of

Altogether there are 22 records in the IAEA Data Base drawing

information from this source.

5.2.9.4. Special features

There is no component boundary definition included in the document. As

the purpose of the report was to provide data for preliminary calculations
detailed component boundary definition is not necessary.
The operating environment is considered to be a normal power plant
environment, except coolers, which stated that
forthean

for

its

failure rates are applicable to fan coolers operating in a post-LOCA/SLB

(Loss Coolant Accident/Steam Line Break) environment.
of

5.2.9.5. Source independence

One basis failure rate assessment Westinghouse data base.

for

wasthe

It is assumed that this data base takes into account the subset of
failures considered rates NUKEG documents.
intheLER

in

Also, WASH-1400 sources considered failure rate

isonefth

inthe

assessment, partial dependence will have considered here.

so

tobe

However, failure rates assessed formal method,

as

arenot

byan

and

it clear which source most influenced process, some

isnot

the

of

dépendance mentioned could be negligible.

Some of the records in the IAEA Data Base provides data from UKAEA
SRD.This values applicable either reactors general
are

toFWR

ort

industrial use. Data items characterizing industrial use can be considered

completely independent other data IAEA Data Base.
ofalthe

inthe

5.2.10. Oconee Nuclear Power Plant PRA

5.2.10.1. General
In the Oconee PSA much effort was put into the development of the data
base. data base developed according Bayesian methodology
The

was

to

to

39
ocntoine generic information (obtained from industry experience) with plant
specific data fron Oconee plant records.

the
Plant specific failure data were contained with generic failure rate
distributions using stage Bayes theorem. Although generic

theon

the
prior data used were discretized truncated log normal failure rate
distributions, the updated distributions are not necessarily log normal
and should not be considered as such.
The mean values updated distributions ware used quantify

ofthe

to

the
system and sequence models. The discretized form of updated distribution
(which is the direct output of the updating process) was used in the
propagation of the uncertainty for the dominant cut sets of the dominant
sequences identified in the analysis.

5.2.10.2. Data sources

The first step in developing the data base was development of the
generic data base. After defining coroponents failure modes which

and

for
data were needed, all available data were thoroughly reviewed, analyzed
and tabulated.
The generic failure rate distributions developed Oconee

for

ERA
contain, each case, range information embodied
in

the

of

inthe
literature. Each distribution was presented as a lognormal distribution.
The median value of the each distribution was almost always taken
directly from one of the published data summaries. The range factor (ratio
of 95th percentile to the median) was in most cases subjectively assigned.
The 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution represent realistic
bounds for expected or observed component failure rates.
Plant specific failure data were derived from three in-plant sources,
namely:
Work requests (WR) written whenever maintenance required
is

any piece of equipment in the plant; on

Incident reports (IR), prepared for any event that may be a
candidate license event report other
for

toheNRCrf

utility purpose (in general, IRs are written only for events
affecting systems equipment addressed Technical
the

or

in

Specifications)

Licensee event reports, which actually condensed versions

are

of

IRs.
These information sources were analyzed for the period 10 January 1975
to 30 June 1980. Each of these sources has its unique advantages and
disadvantages. Further explanation these aspects found Oconee
of

canbe

in

PRA, Chapter 5.1.

In addition to data on failures, information on success as well as
operating time and number of demands was needed. Sources which provide
failure data provide information about successes. component
dont

Forthe

demand data, periodic test reports control room operating logbooks

andthe

40
were the most important sources. Component service hours needed to develop
plant specific time related failure rates, were derived from records

of
annual operating times for large motor driven components, normal plant
operating procedures system lineups periodic tests.

and

and
5.2.10.3.Data available in the IAEA Data Base

Practically all the data given in the Oconee PRA are reproduced in the
IAEA Data Base, making 54 records.
The values appearing records mean, 95th percentile inthe

areth

the
and peroentile updated distributions failure rate,
the5

ofthe

forthe
the upper bound lower bound, respectively. addition,
andthe

In

inthe
comment lines, information regarding generic prior (the exact source of
the mean and respective distribution percentiles) together with recorded
plant experience (number of failures, number of demands or operating time)
is provided.
Some records also contain repair times. repair time
ofthe

the

The

is
usually the mean of updated maintenance durations for particular
components found Table Oconee PRA.
as

in

5.ofthe

5.2.10.4. Special features

The definitions components their boundaries exist

ofthe

and

dont

in

the formal sense. However, component boundary -be directly assessed

the

can

from the fault trees.

Neither information found about environmental effects
wasny

and

applicability failure rates different component environments. Normal

of

to

nuclear power plant environment was considered instead.

Some of the records in the IAEA Data Base contain information about
component operating modes drawn from knowledge of the usual operating mode
for particular components. In most cases 'all' operating modes were
considered.

5.2.10.5. Source independence

As one of the data sources for the Oconee plant specific failure data
was 1ER reports, there is a certain interdependence with 1ER rates
(NUREGs).

Data included in the IAEA Data Base are products of an updating

process, so dependence on the prior is obvious and in some cases extreme
(where operating experience is sparse). As the generic distribution was
developed each component question, generally possible
for

in

itsno

to

indicate dependence particular generic sources; this should therefore

on

be assessed on record by record basis. As mentioned, each record contains

information about prior (mean value and distribution percentiles) uses in
the updating process.
41
 5.2.11. reactor

OldïWR
5.2.11.1. General
lÄider this name data base compiled updating generic data

isa

by

the
with plant specific operating experience, ïhis source useful

was

for
inclusion because contains rather extensive plant specific operating

it
experience.
This data source provides very detailed component divisions,
especially seme support systems rarely found studies.
in

of

inPSA
Ihis data been compiled IAEA framework various
has

bythe

inthe

of
activities (workshops, technical assistance missions etc.) therefore

and
its accuracy cannot verified.
be

5.2.11.2. Data sources

Plant specific operating experience was extracted from the plant

operating records.

5.2.11.3. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

Ihis source provided more than records IAEA Data Base. Each
and5th 10

tohe

record contains mean value 95th percentiles updated

and

ofthe

failure rate distribution. Comment lines of each record provide

information about mean generic distribution which used
the

of

and was
as

prior updating well exact number component failures

of in

orthe as

asthe

of

number demands operating time recorded assessed).

(or

Some records provide repair times, which usually mean

ofthe

are

the

of maintenance duration.
the

5.2.11.4.Special features

The special feature of this source is the availability of failure

rates for support systems like heating, ventilation and air conditioning
(HVAC) components, different compressors, etc.
No detailed component boundary descriptions, information about
or

operating mode or environment was available. In some of the records the

component operating mode was assessed from knowledge of the particular
components function NPP.
inthe

42
 5.2.11.5. Source independence

Plant specific data completely independent other

are

ofalthe
sources in IAEA data base, and the failure and success data provided in
the comment lines therefore used statistically independent

can

be

as
evidence.
Generic data used as the prior in updating process are dependent to
other sources in the IAEA Data Base, but it is not possible to assess the
magnitude dependence.
of

5.2.12. Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) assessment

5.2.12.1. General
The source included in the IAEA Data Base under this name provides
data compiled from accumulated operating experience. This second

isthe
largest source in the IAEA Data Base, yielding more that 150 records. The
source gives a rather detailed division into component sizes (valves) and
functions (pumps). The total amount of operating experience used to assess
failure rates substantial.
is

This data been compiled IAEA framework various

has

bythe

inthe

of

activities (workshops, technical assistance missions etc. therefore

)and
its accuracy cannot verified.
be

5.2.12.2. Data sources

The ultimate data source is operating experience assessed from the

comprehensive overview of the plant records. In a few cases details of
operating experience given, these data assessed
arenot

and

maybe

onthe

basis of engineering judgement.

5.2.12.3. Data available in IAEA Data Base

The data on each component found in the source are reproduced in the
IAEA Data Base.
As mentioned, there are more than 150 records from this source in the
IAEA Data Base, addressing about 70 component types divided into
mechanical, electrical instrumentation control categories.
and

and

For

most component mean values, confidence limits

ofthe

95%and

are

included.

Also, factor (called source error factor) indicating

a

inthe

the

ratio between 95th percentile median given most

the

andthe

is

in

ofthe

records records having confidence limits original source).

(inal

inthe

43
 The mean time to repair is given for most of the œnponents and in
most of the cases it is the actual recorded time; however, in some cases
it conservatively estimated.
was
The comment lines of each record form provide information about the
total population considered, the cumulative component operating time and
the number failures recorded. failure mode 'all modes',
of

Ifthe

is
usually in the comment lines it is stated which failure modes are
considered under 'all modes'. Characteristics of the contribution of each
particular failure mode to 'all modes' in terms of dominant or negligible
contributions are also provided in the comment lines.

5.2.12.4. Special features

One of the special features of this source is the cumulative failure

mode 'all modes' which simply adds several single failure modes in the
cases where breakdown possible. Usually five failure modes
twor was

outf
considered under modes, three significant, while others
al

are

the
are practically negligible. An 'all modes' failure rate is, therefore
always provided, together with failure modes having significant failure
rates.
For some of the components (for example pumps classified according to
their function) the source does not provide a breakdown into detailed
failure modes; only 'all modes' failure rate therefore provided
is

inthe
IAEA Data Base.
All failure rates given hour values.
are

asper

In the original source, failure rates were given as occurrences per

1000 component operating years. To be consistent in the IAEA Data Base,
failure rates presented hour values.
are

asper

This source also rather detailed division into categories

has

according dimension (valves). However, details about component

to

boundaries were available.

not

The operating mode and environment are also not known, so all
operating modes normal power plant environment considered
and

is

throughout.

5.2.12.5. Source independence

This source considered completely independent
is

tobe

ofalthe

other sources in the IAEA Data Base.

5.2.13. Zion Nuclear Power Plant

PS

5.2.13.1. General
This source data base compiled from Zion Probabilistic
isthe

NP

Safety Study. consists generic data updated with plant specific

It

of

44
operating experience. Almost the full set of data found in the source is
reproduced in the IAEA. Data Base.

5.2.13.2. Data sources

The generic sources used priors updating were WASH-1400,

asthe

in
500 (1977) and NUKEG documents.
The mean values for most of the pumps, valves and diesel generators
were taken from NUREG documents. population variability obtained

The

was
by taking the 95%/5% ratio from WASH-1400 as the 80%/20% ratio for the
generic distribution. This approach broadens original WASH-1400

the
distributions substantially.
The data for electrical, electronic and sensing components were taken
from TKKK 500 (1977) . The 'recommended' value from TKKK 500 was taken as
the median, and the 'maximum' value as the 80th percentile of the
population variability curve. These two values were used to generate the
20th percentile.
In some cases where there were no applicable data in NUKEGs or in the
TKKE 500, WASH-1400 95th percentile values were used
the

5thand

asthe
20th and 80th percentiles of the population variability curve.
The primary source of component failure data used for updating was the
licensee event reports. compilation lERs submitted Zion
A

ofal

by

and 2 from initial criticality ( 20 June and 25 December, respectively) to NFP1

December 1979 provided the basic event description from which the
corresponding failure rates were assessed.
A number of other sources were used for specific items requiring more
detailed information than was available in lERs. These sources included
control room logs, component maintenance records, testing records
internal event reporting documents (deviation reports) . and

The operating time number demands corresponding failures

or

of

tohe

derived from afore mentioned sources were assessed from

the

the

operational history, considering total time, time power, number

on

of

tests in accordance with the technical specification, etc.

5.2.13.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

Zion PSS provide 38 records to the IAEA Data Base. All the data points
except those for which no plant specific data exist were included in the
IAEA Data Base.
failure rate values included IAEA Data Base updated
The

inthe

are

mean values.
The comment lines of each record contain information about the exact
prior used in updating for particular components, including source and
exact failure mode different than failure mode Zion data base).
(if

in

In

the cases where prior mean variability ranges were taken from
the

andthe

different sources, information both included.

on

was

45
 Plant specific information regarding the operating time or the number
of demands and the corresponding number of failures is also provided in
the comment lines of each record.

5.2.13.4. Special features

As with the other sources that are PSA studies, component boundaries
are defined fault trees.
in

The operating environment is not clearly stated and the normal power
plant environment was assumed for all records.

5.2.13.5. Source independence

This source is highly dependent on its priors (WASH-1400, TKKF! 500 and
NUREG documents) respective components.
for

sources plant specific data plant LERs, there

Asthe

of

are

isan
additional dependency to the NUREG documents which draw the raw data from
LERs.

5.2.14. NUREG documents with rates

1ER

5.2.14.1. General

In the IAEA Data Base there are four sources based on the raw data
drawn from reports USA. These are:
1ER

inthe

1. NUREG/CR-1205, Data Summaries Licencee Events Reports Pumps

of

of

at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants EG&G Idaho, Inc., January 1982
2. NUREG/CR-1331, Data Summaries Licensee Event Reports Control
of

of

Rods Drive Mechanisms Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, EG&G

and

atUS

Idaho, February 1980.

3. NUREG/CR-1363, Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Valves
at US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, EG&G Idaho, Inc., October 1982.
4. NUREG/CR-1740, Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Selected
Instrumentation and Control Components at US Commercial Nuclear Power
Plants, EG&G Idaho, Inc., July 1984.
All these sources have common characteristics and therefore are
treated together.
The common characteristic of these sources is that the ultimate data
source is the operating experience of group of plants, collected through
the Licensee event report system. The population size, operating time or

46
 number demands needed evaluate recorded failures statistically,

of

to

vas
judged from the information available.
Because process judgement involved, component failure

ofthe

of

the
rates estimated should interpreted only tentative gross indicators

be

as
of the true failure rates. It is necessary for the individual analyst to
validate the applicability of the 1ER derived failure rates in each case
separately.

5.2.14.2. NUREG 1205

NUKEG/CR-1205, providing rates pump components drew

forthe
information from LERs from 1 January 1972 to 30 September 1980. In that
period a total of 1103 pump faults were discovered. Of these, 552 faults
were classified as pump failures, while the remaining 551 were identified
command faults.
as

For the purpose of the report the pump component is defined as the
pumping unit, prime mover, coupling associated mechanical control.
and

Al
the failures this category considered pump failures, while
in

are

tobe

any fault outside this boundary considered command fault.

is

tobe

In this source pumps classified according their prime mover

are

to
(motor, turbine or diesel driven) and by operating mode category (running,
alternating standby). Operating mode category assessed basis
and

is

onthe
of the system to which the pump belongs. (Detailed definitions of
boundaries and an explanation of operating modes can be found in the
source.)

NUKEG/CR-1205 define four failure mode categories: 'leakage/rupture';

'does not start'; 'loss of function' and 'does not continue to run'.
The final rates from this source standby failure rates,
1ER

are

operating failure rates and demand failure rates, calculated as failures

per hour demand. Operating rates were estimated
orpe

for

'leakage/rupture',for 'loss function' 'does continue

of

andfor

not

not to

run'. Standby rates were estimated failure mode 'does start'.

forthe

Operating 1ER rates were estimated as the aggregation of failure modes

'leakage/rupture', 'loss of function' and 'does not continue to run'.
All 1ER rates were calculated with and without command failures
(except for 'leakage/rupture' for alternating pumps).
In addition to 1ER rate estimate, multipliers for 95% and 5%
confidence limits given most data points.
are

for

Data available in the IAEA Data Base

There are nine records containing information from this source in the
IAEA Data Base.
As failure modes 'leakage/rupture', 'loss function' 'does
the

of

and

not continue to run' were aggregated in original source, only the

aggregate value was included in the IAEA Data Base (it was felt that only
this is of importance for PSA uses).

47
 Each record from NUKBG/CR-1205 IAEA Data Base contains

inthe

the1ER
rate estimate (point value) upper lower bounds calculated from

andthe

and
mean value using multiplication factors. All values do not include command
faults.
In the centrent lines of each record the respective population and
number failures used calculate rates given. respective
of

to

1ER

are

The
rates with command faults also included comment lines.
1ER

are

inthe
1ER rates failures start given failures demand. When
for

to

are

in

per
available, failure rate terms number failures hour standby

in

of

of

per
are also given in the comment lines.

5.2.14.3. NUREG 1331

The 1ER rates on control rods and drive mechanisms (CREM) were derived
from events between January 1972 April 1978. that period
1

and30

In

504
failures were discovered.
Control drive mechanism defined control rod,
rodan

was

asthe

the
drive mechanism (electric hydraulic BWR), housing
forEWRand

for

the
containing drive mechanism parts connecting control
the

andl

the

rodt
the drive mechanism. cables piping external drive mechanism
The

or

were not considered to be part of the CREM. tohe

Altogether, 12 failure modes were identified during the 1ER search.

these were considered relevant were included IAEA
Sixof

tobe

and

inthe

Data Base. These are: 'failure to insert at least 96% during scram';
'failure to inset during normal shutdown'; 'fails to move during power
changes/testing'; 'dropped rod'; 'uncoupled/overtravelled rod' and
'improper rod movement'. The first three of these are defined as failure
per demand; others are defined as failures per hour standby.

Data available in the IAEA Data Base

This source provided 10 records to the IAEA Data Base. Each record
contain rate mean value failrate confidence
the1ER

asthe

and95%

bound as the upper and lower bound, respectively.

Generally, rates without command faults. Whenever available,
the

are

rates with command faults are provided in the comment lines. When the
failure rate defined numbers failures demand, standby
is

in

of

per

the

hourly failure rate provided comment lines.

is

inthe

5.2.14.4. NUREG 1363

Failure rates in this source were derived from LERs submitted between
1 January 1976 and 31 December 1980. The total number of events considered
failures or command faults in that period was 4209. Of these, 3233 events
were considered failures, while other were considered
tobe

the

976

tobe

command faults.

48
 Seven categories valves were considered rate assessment.

of

for1ER
These are:
-motor operated valves;
-remote operated plus motor operated valves;
-air operated valves; check valves;
-manual operated valves;
-safety valves (FWR) and
-relief valves (BWR).
Of these, 'remote operated plus motor operated valves' is a special
category. Some lERs specify valve type, provided
ofthe

dinot

the

but
information to permit their classification as remote operated. As most of
the remote operated valves safety systems motor operated,

in

are

its
believed that most failures reported actually failures motor
ofthe

are

of
operated valves. Therefore, this category should be a more realistic
representation of 1ER rates for motor operated valves.
From lERs, failure modes were identified valves. Detailed
the

for
descriptions definitions each them found source.
and

of

of

are

purpose deriving rates, valve component defined inthe

Forthe

of

1ER

the

is
as the valve body and all its internal parts, the valve operator and any
attached functional accessories (e.g. limit or torque switch) that are
needed to make the entire assembly functional. Supply systems to the valve
operator (such electrical, hydraulic) considered
as

airo

are

outside the bounds. Failures involving supply systems are considered to be tobe
command faults to the valve assembly.
For most of the valve categories and failure modes, 1ER rates with and
without command failures provided.
are

Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

This source provides 17 records to the IAEA Data Base, addressing all
valve categories except motor operated valves. mentioned, category
As

the

'remote operated MDV' better represent failure rates,

and

MOV

anditws

included as motor operated valves.

The rate given each record failrate, while
1ER

is

in

asthe

95%and

confidence limits are given as the upper and lower bound, respectively.
The rates given without command faults.
are

In the comment line of each record the 1ER rate with oommand faults is
given. In cases where the 1ER rate is defined as per demand value, the
standby hourly rate (when available) is also provided.
In most cases overall rate given (all vendors). Where seemed
the

is

it

to be important, IWR and BWR rates were distinguished.

5.2.14.5. NUREG 1740

NUREG/CR-1740 is a summary of the evaluation of lERs submitted between

January 1976 December 1981 that pertain electrical
1

and31

to

and

49
electronic components instrumentation control systems. Owning

in

and

to
the limited availability of the component population, 1ER rates were
estimated only for I & C components that are parts of the channel that
performs the reactor trip. In this period 6764 faults were found; 6180
were classified as actual failures while the rest were identified as
command faults.
1ER rates were estimated following components:

forthe
-sensors;
-transmitters;
-signal conditioning systems;
-comparators and bistables;
-switches and radiation monitors.
Also major components analog systems were combined, depending
the

of
upon the parameter they were monitoring, to form the instrument channel.
1ER rates were then estimated following analog instrument

forthe
channels:
-nuclear core flux;
-temperature;
-flow;
-level and pressure.
In the digital systems, switches were considered a channel and 1ER
rates were estimated level pressure/vacuum switches.
for

and

Two failure modes were assessed each component: reduced capability

for

and inoperable. Reduced capability failure mode describes event where

an
the component operational, does perform function within
is

but

not

its

defined limits. Example these events instrument drift,

of

are

outf
calibration or spurious operation.

Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

This source provide records IAEA Data Base. Half describe

28

tohe

single components, while the rest provide instrument channel data. 1ER
rates (point estimates) are found in the failrate line, while 95% and 5%
confidence limits given upbound lowbound, respectively.
are

in

and

Contrary to other 1ER sources, point estimates and confidence limits from
this source include command faults.
In the comment lines of each record, the failure rate point estimate
without command faults given.
is

5.2.14.6. Source independence

All NUREG rates sources draw data from plant experience.

1ER

raw

In

terms of statistics they are completely independent.

Several sources included in the IAEA Data Base use failure rates
derived from prior data updating process. Interdependence
1ERas

in

in

those cases obvious.

is

50
 5.2.15. In-Plant Reliability Data Base (IPRD) Nuclear Plant

The

for
Components

5.2.15.1. General

There are two sources from IPRD in the IAEA Data Base. These are:
1. NUREG/CR-2886 In-Plant Reliability Data Base for Nuclear Plant
Components: Interim Data Report, the Pump Component, Oak Ridge
National Lab. December 1982.
2. NOREG/CR-3831 In-Plant Reliability Data Base Nuclear Plant

for
Components: Interim Data Report, Diesel Generators, Batteries,
Chargers Inverters, Ridge National Lab. January 1985.
and

Oak

The objective IPRD develop comprehensive, component

ofthe

wasto

a
specific data base for probabilistic risk assessment and for other
statistical analysis relevant to component reliability evaluation.
Contrary rates, primary sources data were plant
to1ER

the

of

in
maintenance files, including all corrective maintenance actions on each
component.

5.2.15.2. NUREG 2886, the pump component

Failure rates for the pump components were derived from maintenance
and repair records from six NPPs (two PWR and four BWR) providing 27
reactor years of experience. About 4000 records were collected. The total
population pumps about 1500.
ofal

is

From data collected, point estimate confidence limits (95%

and

and5%)
were calculated time demand related failures.
for

and

The approach taken when defining the pump boundary considers a 'super'
component pumping function. means that failure pump component
or

It

ofthe

includes failures pump impeller, shaft, motor, local switches

of

and

instrumentation control circuitry. Command faults (such loss

and

as

of

steam) are considered to be outside the boundary.

The pump population divided according operating mode (running,
was

to

alternating and standby) and driver (motor driven, turbine driven and
diesel driven). Point estimate failure rates and the ranges were assessed
for each of these.

Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

This source provided seven records IAEA data base. IAEA

tohe

Inthe

Data Base failure rates are given in form of point estimate and upper and
lower bounds form confidence limits. comment lines
in

of

Inthe

information regarding population size, number of failures and total

operational time number demands included.
or

of

are

Normal nuclear power plant environment assumed records.

was

foral

51
 5.2.15.3. NUREG 3831, diesel generators, batteries, battery chargers

and
inverters

For these components, about 700 relevant maintenance and repair

records from five plant were collected, covering a time-span of 33 years.
The components considered defined having following

are

as

the
boundaries:

DG: general criterion is to include local systems and components that

are integral to starting and sustaining the electrical generating
capability of the diesel generator. Detailed description of interface
points are to be found in the original source.

Battery: the boundary is defined to include the battery container, the

seismic design battery rack straps, internal parts including
and
plates electrolyte, terminal connections including cables with
and

lugs, posts connectors, switches meters normal

or

andy

or

forthe
operation of the battery.

Battery charger: (only static battery chargers are included) the

boundary is defined to include the connecting feeder breaker to the
alternating current (AC) source (motor control center or bus) and the
connecting output breaker direct current (DC) bus. Included
tohe

in
the boundary between these two points are the electronic and non
electronic components within the charger enclosure, and the associated
instrumentation, control protective devices, including meters,
and

relays, fuses, switches circuit breakers.

and

Inverter: boundary defined include electronic

the

is

to

al

the ando

electronic components within inverter unit, rectifier,

the

the

static transfer switch, associated instrumentation local control

and

and protective devices (meters, relays, fuses, switches circuit

and

breakers).
All the failures in the source were divided into three categories in
accordance with the failure severity (catastrophic, degraded and
incipient). Only catastrophic failures seems interesting from
tobe

the

point of view of PSA analyst.

The source provides aggregate failure rates well plant
as

asthe

specific failure rates. IAEA Data Base only aggregate rates

Forthe

the

were interest because relatively short operating periods

of

ofthe

andthe

sparse failure data for single plants.

special feature this source definition failure
A

of

isthe

theDG sthei na ofDG

modes. failure mode 'failure start' includes initial running

The

to

time minutes, because considered that minutes time

of30

itwas

30

needed warm This source also uniquely defines

fortheDG

up.

running failure mode by splitting it into two categories, namely 'failure

52
to run once started' and 'improper operation'. The first includes all
failures which prevent from continuing after initial

The theEG

torun

30
minute warra-^up period. second used cover cases where

oneis

to

theDG
was tripped owning to local problems (running hot is one example), but in
emergencies would continue running. source suggested that combining
it

The
these would allow comparison failure rate with failure
forDG two

in the

ofthe
rates failure found other sources.
torun
Both running failure rates included IAEA Data
oftheDG

are

inthe
Base. They are marked with an asterix to indicate that they are not
comparable with other sources. additional record combining these

An

twois
also provided.

Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe

This source provided eight records to the IAEA Data Base. Each record
contains recommended failure rates demand probability) value, high
(or

and
and low value as the upper and lower bounds, respectively. Some of the
records contain repair times which are ranges of recorded medians.
comment lines each record contain information regarding
The

of

the
population observed, number recorded failures corresponding
the

of

andthe
number of demands or operating times.

5.2.15.4. Source independence

There moderate interdependence between this source NUREG
is

and

sources because in a number of cases the same failures are accounted for 1ER
in both.

5.2.16. EERI NP-2433, Diesel generators data

5.2.16.1. General
The objective of this project was to provide high quality data on
diesel generators risk assessment. What makes this source
forusein

interesting inclusion IAEA Data Base methodology

for

inthe

isthe

and

sources of raw data.

5.2.16.2. Data sources

The raw data were collected from a variety of sources, including:
-utility supplied accounts of diesel start attempts and failures;

-data obtained by project personnel through on-site inspection of

plant operator logs, test records maintenance logs;
and

53
 -data collected from four plants TRFR personnel through review

by
of plant maintenance records.
addition licensee event reports were searched

-In

the

for
supporting information.
For starting failures, data from 13 nuclear plants were used,
representing diesel years, with 6910 demands. Running failures were
123
calculated for two plants (three reactors) only.

5.2.16.3. Data available in the IAEA Data Base

Only two records in the IAEA Data Base are drawn from this source. One
is the aggregate value for DG failures to start (13 plants), which is
represented point value. second failure calculated
as

The

isthe

torun
for Peach Bottom 2 & 3 plants, and, in addition to the point value, 95%
and confidence limits given.
5%

are

exact number demands related failures well

The

of

and

as

asthe
population size are given in the comment lines.

5.2.16.4. Source independence

This is the only source in the IAEA data base which reflects DG
operating experience population plants. Therefore
ofthe

ofUS

itcanbe
considered independent of all the other sources except Zion NPP PSS and
TERR which partially based data from same population.
50

are

on

the

5.2.17. German Risk Study (phase

The

A)

5.2.17.1. General
The principal objective German Risk Study assess
ofthe

wasto

onef

the German nuclear plants using WASH-1400 methodology. Originally

the

it

was intended to use the failure rates and probabilities from WASH-1400,
but later, owning certain differences, data exclusive
to

asetof

for

use

was developed.

5.2.17.2. Data sources

Three sources were used obtain reliability data study.

to

the

forthe

These were:
-review of the relevant literature
-review of operating experience from NPPs Biblis and Stade
-failure effect analysis for part of the I & C component.

54
 Weighting factors each data sources were assessed from

for

ofthe

the
available information for each component.
The components which data were assessed defined

for

the

arenot

and in
detail accommodate differences design, operational other
to

in
parameters.
log normal distribution was used throughout the study for the failure
rates of components.

5.2.17.3. Data available IAEA Data Base

inthe
This source provided about 36 records to the IAEA Data Base. Each
record has either a mean or a median value and the error factor associated
with it. Comment lines usually provide more detailed information on the
ultimate source data.
of

5.2.17.4. Source independence

Failure data which originated entirely from operating experience

of
German plants are independent from all other sources in the IAEA Data
Base. Failure rates obtained literature review many cases based
by

arein

on similar sources as WASH-1400 failure rates. In this case the dependence

is rather high.

55
 PROBLEM AREAS CONNECTED WITH DATA BASES

6.

THE
FOUND IN THE LITERATURE

When using a generic data base one has to be aware of possible

problem areas. Considering areas where misinterpretation occur,

the

of can
following areas have been identified following order
the

inthe
importance:
-component boundary definition
-failure mode definition
-operating mode definition
-operating environment definition
Even when deriving failure rates from raw data from the plant being
analyzed, these are issues which can lead to substantial errors.
During the development of the IAEA Data Base insights were gained in
how different data bases address each these issues. These insights

onef
and possible ways avoiding solving such problems addressed next.
of

or

are
6.1. Component boundary

It is obvious that a main source of misinterpretation is the component

boundary definition. Some of the experts agree that variations in
component boundaries primary reason failure rate fluctuation
areth

for

between sources. Although that statement seems to be too rigid, component

boundaries could, depending on the particular component, change failure
rates substantially.
therefore interesting how different sources address this
Itis

tose

issue.
Probably best defined component boundaries Swedish
the

areinth

Reliability Data Book, because practically each component category has a

sketch exactly indicating the component boundary and points of interface
with other systems components. Usually, component boundary,
or

inthe

local control protection any) included.

and

(if

are

Some of the /NUREG/ documents also have adequately defined component

boundaries, with precise definition of interface points.
Other sources defining component being "off-the-shelf"
are

as

an

item. This interesting remarkable definition, assumes

isan

and

buti

that "off-the-shelf" items have the same meaning everywhere, what is not
necessarily case components.
the

foralthe

Data bases which are part of PS As, usually do not provide detailed
definition of the component boundary. This is understandable, because
these sources were compiled specific use. When performing data
for

updating, component boundary gain importance because need

ofthe

for

matching the prior with the plant specific operating experience.

56
 The sources which base their failure rate upon combination

the

of
nuclear non-nuclear experience even expert opinion) provide

and

(or

dont
detailed boundary description. The level of similarity of different
sources combined is not known, but it can be expected that certain
differences would exist.
For the sources mostly based on expert opinion, the question of
strictly defined boundary becomes a more academic one. However, cases like
lube oil being part of diesel or breaker included or not in a pump
boundary must be addressed to avoid significant (orders of magnitude)
variations in the failure rates.
One way of avoiding serious problems with component boundary
definitions is to define 'generic' component boundaries. That, of course,
does not help in already existing data sources, but could save
considerable trouble in the future. However, this is mainly applicable to
data collection efforts undertaken during performance PS A.

the

ofa

In
that case component boundaries should reflect two, sometimes opposite,
requirements: level detail needed wanted) system model
the

of

(or

bythe
and the level of detail of plant records where raw data are retrieved
from.
There generally three major interfaces defined connection
are

tobe

in
with the component boundary definition, namely:
-mechanical interface (incl.cooling system,lubricating
system, etc. where appropriate)
-power supply interface
-control system interface

6.2. Failure mode

Component failure mode is another problem area, although of a

different character than boundary definition. Failure modes found
the

in

various sources show significant difference even when describing basically

the same failure. For example, in the sources which were included in the
IAEA Generic Data Base over 100 different failure modes were found.
Difference between some this failure modes basically wording
of

is

in

(e.g. fail to run vs. failure to run) and it is therefore easy to

understand that they describe the same failure. In other cases it is
sometimes difficult understand exact failure mode compare
to

the

and

it

among sources.
To compare failure modes also enhance IAEA Generic Data
and

to

the

Base coding system, considerable effort was undertaken to define generic

failure modes.
Details about generic failure mode definition process as well as
definitions for 18 major generic failure modes is found in Appendix 2.

57
 6.3. Operating mode

Component operating mode importance active components, while

isof

for
generally have much less meaning for passive components. Even for active
components there are cases where the operating mode has more or less
importance, depending primarily mechanism

onthewayd

ofhwte
failure occurs.
Obviously operating mode is of great importance for pumps and other
components which perform their function continuously moving. These

by
components have operating modes defined three categories:

in
standby,
alternating and
running (operating).
For components which perform their function changing between discrete
states, (e.g. valves), operating mode as defined above is actually status
of system they belong Operating mode pertinent component
the

to.

tohe
itself should be normally open or normally closed position.
The majority of the sources do not define the component operating
mode. only sources which define operating mode some NUREG
The

are

ofthe
LER sources.

PSA studies used as the data sources usually define the system where
the component is located. For most of the systems it is possible to
determine the operating mode, what could be used for defining active
components operating mode.
Although not directly connected with the operating mode, one very
important characteristic which sometimes is overlooked is the duration of
the operation. For standby components, if the failure rate is determined
based operating experience, based recorded operation during
on

its

on

test performance, what is usually one or several hours. In the real case,
particular components required operate times which
are

to

for

substantially differ from the one which was the base for the failure rate
determination. Most of the sources do not address that problem.
When modeling standby components, failures during standby must be
accounted for. Failures occurring during standby are not revealed until a
test or an actual component demand, therefore are usually included in the
model demand related failure. this cases demand related
as

In

the

failure should comprise those failures whose mechanism is purely related

demand (e.g. high current motor windings during start) also
tohe

to

and

failures related to the time which the component spent in a standby

condition.
However,if data base provides only demand related failure rate without
indication how long is the component in standby between two demands, this
overlooks fact that component failure during standby time related
the

is

and could vary substantially with variation in time between tests or

actual demands.
Some sources recognized this fact provide hourly failure
ofthe

and

rate for standby condition. On the other hand that approach is a possible
source error, because normally impossible distinguish between
of

its

to

time demand related failures.

and

58
 6.4. Operating environment

As mentioned earlier, component operating environment rather

the

is
poorly defined most sources. Most sources address

in

ofthe

ofthe

dont
ib at all, while some of them are defining environment as the normal power
plant environment. This definition could basically hold normal

for
operation accidents which change environmentally affected
or

dont
parameters. However, when performing PS A interested predict

oneis

to
the outcome of accident in environments, that could in certain cases
change component failure rates substantially.
WASH 1400 source which provides separate failure rate post
isa

for
accident situation for pumps and motors. The IEEE Standard 500 lists the
environment multipliers most components included,
for

ofthe

for
environmental effects like high radiation, humidity, temperature and
pressure.
Environmental effects could obviously affect component failure rate in
different manners, therefore careful consideration should be given to this
issue. Data from plant operating experience assume normal environment,

a
because operating experience data normally either from normal
are

operation or from test data, both of which are quite different from
accident conditions.
On the other hand, the number and types of components affected by post
accident conditions usually rather limited. extent that
are

The

of

is
greatly dependent on plant design and type of accident.
Other type of extreme environment condition which can occur in NPP-s
are high temperature condition occurring after the failure of room cooling
systems. For most of electronic components or systems it is relatively
easy accurate predict effects extreme environment
and

to

the

of

and

experimental data is available. For mechanical components like pumps, high

temperature condition consequently accelerated failure rates
and

are

relatively more complicated to predict.

6.5. Problems specifically related with in-plant data collection

In addition to the problems encountered in defining component

boundaries failure modes, means acquiring data plant
and

the

of

raw

athe

have the greatest impact on the quality of the reliability data derived.
There are basically two sources for raw data at the plant. These are
logbooks maintenance work orders. Both have advantages
and

and

disadvantages.
Deriving data from maintenance work orders usually easier
raw

the

is

and less time consuming (especially when work orders computerized).

are

Because every work order respond, in principle, to an abnormal occurrence,

events related to each single component could be easily compiled. The
quality information found work orders generally very
of

inthe

is

not

good, because work order forms are filled by the personnel actually
performing the work. Cases such as work orders open for months or years
and work done component identified being done another
one

as

on

are

common. Logbooks, especially those filled by control room personnel, are

59
more accurate, deriving data from them extremely time

but

raw

is
consuming.
Even if the raw data are drawn from the logbook or maintenance
records, it is still not certain whether all the failures of a certain
component have been reported. both sources searched,

If

are

the
probability of failures not being reported is lower. However, it is still
possible and it can result in an overestimate of component reliability.
understandable that quality component failure data
Itis

the

of

is
directly related quality plant records. plant
tohe

ofthe

Ifthe

has
dedicated collection system for reliability data in place, this would
obviously best possible source data.
beth

ofraw
The problem even worse demand related failures, when actual
is

for

the
number of demands is not readily available and has to be assessed on the
basis of average time on power or calendar time. If a component is started
for testing purpose, usually known weather started
its

not

it
immediately or after a number of trials.
Operating experience running (operational) failures involving
for

standby systems is usually limited to a running time of about 1 hour

(usual test running time). However it is often used (in analysis) as the
long term failure rate, without evidence that long term failure
any

the
rate is equal or comparable to the calculated short term rate.

60
 Appendix 1
DATA SOURCES IAEA DATA BASE

FORTHE
This Appendix provides alphabetic listing sources which were

an

of
used in the compilation of the IAEA Data Base. The full name of the source
is identified with a character which is part of the code. This character
appears position code each record.
onthe5

inthe

SOURCE NAME of CODE

1. HWR assessment

2. EPRI-NP-2433, Diesel-Generator Reliability Nuclear power

at
Plants:Data Preliminary Analysis, Science Application, Inc.,June,
and

1982.
R

3. German Risk Study (Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke), GRS, FRG,

1979.
G

4. IEEE Standard 500, IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of

Electrical, Electronic, Sensing Component, and Mechanical Equipment
Reliability Data for Nuclear-Power Generating Stations, Appendix D,
Reliability Data Nuclear-Power Generating Stations, IEEE 1984.
for

5. NUREG/CR-2728 Interim Reliability Evaluation Program Procedure

Guide, Sandia National Laboratories, January 1983.
I

6. NUREG/CR-1205 Data Summaries of Licencee Events Reports of Pumps at

U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Idaho, Inc.,January 1982
EG&

7. NUREG/CR-1331 Data Summaries of Licencee Event Reports of Control

Rods and Drive Mechanisms at US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, EG & G
Idaho, Feb, 1980.
C

NUREG/CR-1363 Data Summaries Licencee Event Reports Valves

8.

of

of

at US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, EG & G Idaho,Inc.,October 1982.

V

61
 9. NUREG/CR-1740 Data Summaries of Licencee Event Reports of
Selected Instrumentation Control Components Commercial

and

atUS
Nuclear Power Plants, EG & G Idaho,Inc.,July,1984.
M

10. NUREG/CR-2815 Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedure Guide,

Brookhaeven National Laboratory, August 1985.
B

NUREG/CR-2886 In-Plant Reliability Data Base Nuclear Plant

1.

for
Components: Interim Data Report, the Pump Component, Oak Ridge
National Lab, December 1982.
D

12. NUREG/CR-3831 In-Plant Reliability Data Base for Nuclear Plant

Components: Interim Data Report, Diesel Generators, Batteries,
Chargers and Inverters. Oak Ridge National Lab, January 1985.
N

13.NUREG/CR 4550 Vol.1 Analysis of Core Damage Frequency From Internal

Events: Methodology Guidelines September 1987.
J

14. NUREG/CR 4550 Vol.3, Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from

Internal Events :Surry, Unit 1. Sandia National Laboratory, November
1986.
A

15. NASC 60, OCONEE PRA, A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconne

Unit Nuclear Safety Research Center, EPRI, Duke Power
3,The

and

Co..June, 1984.
O

16. Old PWR reactor

H

17. Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment,

Science Application, Inc.,
S
PWR/RX Sizewell PWR Pre-Construction Safety Report,
18.

312

'B

Component Failure Data for PWR System Reliability Assessment, NNC, UK,
June, 1982.
U
19. RKS 85-25 Reliability Data Book for Components in Swedish Nuclear
Power Plants, RKS, SKI Sweden
T

62
20. WASH-1400, Reactor Safety Study, Assessment Accident U.S.

An

of

in
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NRC, October 1975

US
W

21. Zion Nuclear Power Station, Probabilistic Safety Study,

Commonwealth Edison Co., 1981.
Z

63
 Appendix 2
GENERIC FAILURE MODE DEFINITION AND CODES

generic failure modes developed cover practically

Asetof

was

to
every failure which is accounted for in PSAs. Appendix 2 provides detail
of definition process, specific definitions each major
the

of

ofthe
generic failure modes coding generic failure modes.
andthe

of
1. Definition process
During the process of developing the generic failure modes the
following considered:
was

-The development of failure modes was to a great extent oriented

towards component operation.
-During the definition process two distinctive models were considered:
-demand related failure rates (failure probabilities)

and and
-time related failure rates (subdivided operating

in
standby related)
-Three effects of failures were considered in the definition process:
-loss function component
of

ofthe

-change state without command

of

the

-failure to change state with command

-Another topic which to a certain extent influenced the determination
of generic failure modes requirement system analyst
areth

ofthe

onhw

to model (define) a particular event in fault trees.

-Finally, failure modes which found various sources
althe

are

inthe

were considered to determine the final list of failure modes.

Altogether 26 failure modes were defined. 18 of them are considered to
be major importance, while rest only single component related
of

the

are

(e.g. 'overheated' pertinent electric heaters only), very

is

tohe

or

unique like control rod 'fail to insert'. These failure modes are self
explanatory, so a detailed definition process was not necessary for them.
Major failure modes were described defined general
and

and

usefor

each them suggested. enable data base user follow

of

was

To

the

to

the

logic of placing particular failure mode under one of the generic

categories, information major failure modes included below.
on

is

List of failure modes and associated codes is provided at the end of

the Appendix.

65
 2. Definitions of major failure modes

ALL MODES

Characterizes failure which could possibly occur certain

ANY

on
components. Integrates: critical, degraded and incipient failures but
their respective contribution to the total is not always known.
It is used in cases where detailed failure mode definition or data for
particular failure mode is not available. It indicate that the
component is or should be taken out of service under normal operation
conditions.

2. DEGRADED

Failure which causes component perform function

the

not

its

inthe
expected manner, or expected (designed) capacity but, which is not a
catastrophic failure.
Usually pertinent components.
toI&C

Time related, operation standby

or

3. FAILURE CHANGE POSITION

TO

Characterizes failure components move required

of

to

toanew

position.
Usually pertains to components which perform its function by changing
(moving) between discrete states (valves, breakers) change
two

(or

state discretely between two end points - regulating).

Applicable to components which perform its function by moving from one
state other limited situations where required
tohe

but

tohe

the

final state is irrelevant or characterized by other means, or not

defined.
Demand related failure.
Failure to change state with command.

4. FAILURE TO REMAIN IN POSITION

Characterizes failure of components to remain in the required

position.

66
 Usually pertinent to components which perform its function by changing
state between two discrete states (valves, breakers), or charge state
regulating between two end points.

Used two-state components which required remain position

for

are

to

in
during a mission time. Failure would cause move to opposite positions.
Required position irrelevant, characterized other means

is

by

ornt
defined at all.
Time related, operational standby.

or
Change of state without command.

5. FAIL TO CLOSE

Characterizes failure of a component to move to a new, closed

position.

Subset failure mode FAIL CHANGE POSITION.

of

TO

Used components which perform their function moving from

to for

by

one
state another, closing necessary complete
butis

is

to

the
mission.
Demand related failure.
Failure change state with command.
to

6. FAIL TO OPEN

Characterizes the failure of a component to move to a new, open

position.
Subset failure mode FAIL CHANGE POSITION.
of

TO

Opposite from FAIL CLOSE

TO

Used for components which perform their function by moving from one
state to another, when opening is necessary to complete mission.
Demand related failure.
Failure to change state with command.

7. FAIL TO FUNCTION

One general failure modes, applicable mainly components

ofthe

to

which move (macroscopically) perform their function,

dont

to

(battery transformer, I & C equipment) or which have a complex

function such as air-cooler, M-G sets etc. FAIL TO HUN does not
adequately characterizes component failure mode these cases.
the

in

67
 Characterizes failure components function required

the

of

to

in
manner either continuously when demanded.

or
Used components which perform their function without movement

for

on
macroscopic level, components which characterized
a

an andfor

are

by
providing output given input command (continuously tiine).

ora

in
This failure mode is also applicable (and being used) as a composite
failure mode pump able perform function pump fail

fora

not

to

its

(
start, run, ruptured during operation fail accomplish
to

or

to

the
mission for any other reason)
Time related - operational.
Demand related
Loss of function of the component.

8. SHORT GROUND
TO

Characterizes ground connections of any component where electric

current is isolated on a higher-than-ground voltage.

Applicable electrical components which

tohe

orI&C

inayw

conduct, transfer or modify electric current. Subset of failure mode

SHORT CIRCUIT.

Used for components which are unable to perform their function or can
cause disturbance other equipment when isolation ground
to

to

is
broken and a power to ground circuit is formed.
Time related failure operation or standby,
loss of function of component.

9. SHORT CIRCUIT

Characterize connections between more conductors

twor

(or

conducting materials) which are normally isolated (insulated).

Applicable to practically all electrical and I & C components.
Used for components which are unable to perform their function, or
cause disturbance other equipment when insulation between
to

two

normally separated conductors disappear and a short circuit is

formed.
Time related failure, operation or standby.
Loss of function of the component

68
10. OPEN CIRCUIT

Characterizes disconnection (isolation) electric circuit.

an
Applicable practically electrical components.
to

al

andI&C
Used conponents which disabled perform their function when
for

are

to
electric conductor becomes internally isolated (insulated).
Time related failure, operation or standby.
Loss of function of component.

11. FIDS/RUPTURE

Unique failure mode applicable piping.

to

Characterizes plugging or rupture of a pipe segment in manner that

the required flow through that segment cannot be established or
maintained.
Applicable kinds pipes (but IAEA data base used only
toal

of

in

for
piping from source 'WASH-WOO').
Time related failure, operation standby.
or

Loss of function of the component.

12. PLUG

Characterizes any means of preventing flow in a required direction

not caused by normal operation of component.
Applicable most components through which flow
to

ofthe

of

liquid/steam/gas flow is established or maintained. It is of

particular interest to components whose internal parts can become
loose prevent normal flow (valves) depositions reduce flow
and

or

can

below required level (filter/strainers).

Characterize means preventing flow required direction
any

of

in

not

caused by normal operation of component.

Time related failure, operation or standby.
Loss function component.
of

of

Change state without command.

of

69
 13. SHJRIOÜS FUNCTION

Characterizes failure of components to retain their current status,

e.g. to change state without being called to.
Complement FAIL REMAIN POSITION, applicable

to

TO

IN

and

to
components which perform their function other means

by

andotby
changing state between two distinctive states.
Used for components which perform their function by being in a
certain (usually dormant) state, but failure will cause changing
state (operation of component).
Time related failure, standby or operation
Change of state without command.

FAIL
14.

TOHUN

Characterizes failure component continue operation (usually

ofa

to

rotating movement) during required mission time.

athe

Applicable to all components which perform their function by

continuous movement.
Time related failure, operational.
Loss of function.

15. FAIL TO START

Characterizes failure components start when demanded.

the

of

to

Applicable to all components which perform their function by

starting and subsequently continuously moving (rotating).
Demand related failure.
Loss of function of component.

16. OTHER CRITICAL FAULTS

Characterizes failures that would cause component FAIL

the

the

to

TO FUNCTION if demanded before repair.

Uniquely defined failure modp taken from Swedish Reliability Data
Book.

70
 Applicable sensors representing sensor failures discovered prior

to
to an actual demand.
Time related failure, standby.
loss function.
of
LEAKAGE/EXTERNAL LEAK
17.

Characterizes a failure of component boundary to remain intact (to

retain liquid). conponent performs another function, (e.g.
Ifthe

pump) this failure will necessary prevent that other function.

not
Applicable components which retain liquid means.
toal

byan

Not
necessarily a catastrophic component failure. This failure mode
sometimes overlap with failure mode RUPTURE. It was not possible to
strictly separate this two failure modes in all cases.
In the IAEA data base its used almost entirely in cases of external
leak.
Time related failure, standby operation.
or

Loss function component (partial).

of

of

RUPTURE
18.

Characterizes a large breach in liquid retaining boundary.

Applicable to all components which retain liquid by any means. It

is always catastrophic component failure. component
a

Ifthe

performs some other function, only retain liquid (pump),

not

to

this failure will completely prevent the component from

functioning.
Used in the IAEA Data Base in cases where the original failure mode
rupture. Sometimes rupture also refers component internal
was

to

(e.g. valve), and there is a possibility of overlapping between

this failure mode and failure mode INTERNAL LEAK.
Time related failure, operational or standby.
Loss function component
of

of

71
 3. Failure modes associated codes

and
Generic failure modes respective codes

and
FAILURE MDDE FAILURE MDDE CODE

ALL MDDES A
DEGRADED
B

FAIL TO CHANGE POSITION C

FAIL TO REMAIN IN POSITION D
FAIL TO CLOSE E
FAIL TO FUNCTION F
SHORT GROUND
TO

SHORT dRCCJrr
H

OPEN CIRCUIT I
PLUG/RUPTÜRE
J

SPURIOUS FUNCTION K
FAIL OPEN
TO

PLUG Q
FAIL TO RUN R
FAIL TO START S
RUPTURE
T

OTHER CRITICAL FAULTS X

LEAK Y

LîoPPFiyUNCOUPLEiyOVERTRAVELED ROD 1
FAIL INSERT
TO

IMPROPER MOVEMENT 3
CONTROL ROD FAILURE 4
OVERHEATED 5
LEAKAGE (SHELL) 6
LEAKAGE (TUBE) 7
INTERNAL LEAK 8

Generic failure modes as proposed in the IAEA Generic Data Base are
one number possible ways defining them. therefore,
ofa

of

of

Itis,

not

unique and it would be indeed possible to define them in other ways.

72
 Appendix 3
COMPONENT GROUPS IN THE IAEA DATA BASE

This Appendix provides listing component groups associated

al a

of

inthe and
codes. main listing include component groups found IAEA
The

Data Base. There are also separate listing for mechanical, electrical,
instrumentation and control and emergency power sources categories.

73
**************************************************** IA instrumentation NS signal conditioning system
1C instrumentation channel analog MM signal modifier
RELIABILITY DATA BASE ID instrumentation channel digital solid state devices

UE
YT intake screen strainer

YS
Listing of components groups and codes El inverter SO switch digital chanel
JL lube cooler switch flow

oil

SF
**************************************************** UM manual control device switch level

si
cooler MA motor si switch limit
MS motor servo SM
QAair

UN annunciator switch manual

BT battery MG motor generator switch pressure

SP
BC battery charger FX orifice ST switch temperature
QB blower fan EB paneIboard switch torque

SU
CB bus JP penetration switch contacts

SC
CC cable FE piping expansion joint tank

JT
KA circut breaker FN piping nozzle TA transformer
KG circut breaker generator FR piping rupture diaphragm transformer auto

T
KC circut breaker molded type FS piping straight section TI transformer instrument
JE clutch FT piping tees transformer main power generator or unit

TM
QC compressor FW piping welds TV transformer regulating
NK computational module EP power supply TE transformer station service including excitation
OC control rod pump diesel driven transformer station start auxiliary

PD

TX

and
00 control rod and drive mechanism PM pump motor driven TU transformer substation
OR control drive PT pump turbine driven LF transmitter flow
rod

contrôler pump without driver transmitter flow, level, pressure

PW

LA
DC

EC converter AR radiation monitors transmitter level

L
QD damper UR reactor scram system transmitter pressure

LP
DE diesel engine rectifier transmitter temperature
ER

i_T
DG diesel generator emergency AC RW relay JU turbine
QF cooler containment RA relay auxiliary VA valve operated

air
fan

KS feeder(ABZUEIG) RC relay control VE valve explosive operated

filter RP relay power valve hydraulic operated
VH
YF

KT fuse RR relay protective VX valve manual

DT turbine driven generator emergency RT relay time delay VM valve motor operated
gas

AC

FY gasket RY relay coil valve piston operated

VP

EG generator RX relay contacts VC valve self operated

HX heat exchanger AC sensor core flux valve solenoid operated
VD

JH heater AF sensor flow VU valve without operator

EH heater electric AL sensor level wire
CU

hvac unit annulus ventilation AP sensor pressure

QV

UI indicating instrument AT sensor temperature

**************************************************** VM valve motor operated ********************* **************************
VP valve piston operated
RELIABILITY DATA BASE VC valve self operated RELIABILITY DATA BASE
VD valve solenoid operated
Mechanical components groups and codes VW valve without operator Electrical components groups and codes

**************************************************** ****************************************************
OA air cooler BT battery
QB blower fan BC battery charger
JE clutch CB

bus
QC compressor CC cable
control KA circut breaker
OC

rod

control drive mechanism KG circut breaker generator

0

rodan

OR control rod drive KC circut breaker molded type

QD damper EC converter
OF fan cooler containment KS feeder(ABZWEIG)
filter KT fuse
YF

FY gasket EG generator
HX heat exchanger EH heater electric
JH heater El inverter
QV hvac unit annulus ventilation MA motor
YT intake screen MS motor servo
JL lube cooler MG motor generator
oil

FX orifice EB paneIboard
JP penetration EP power supply
FE piping expansion joint rectifier

ER
FN piping nozzle RW relay
FR piping rupture diaphragm RA relay auxiliary
FS piping straight section RC relay control
FT piping tees RP relay power
FU piping welds RR relay protective
PD pump diesel driven RT relay time delay
PM pump motor driven RY relay coil
PT pump turbine driven RX relay contacts
PU pump without driver TA transformer
YS strainer TT transformer auto
JT tank TI transformer instrument
JU turbine TM transformer main power generator unit

or
VA valve operated TV transformer regulating
air

VE valve explosive operated TE transformer station service including excitation

VH valve hydraulic operated TX transformer station start auxiliary

and
VX valve manual TU transformer substation
CU wi re
**************************************************** ****************************************************

RELIABILITY DATA BASE RELIABILITY DATA BASE

Instrumentation control equipment groups codes Emergency power sources groups and codes

and

and
**************************************************** ****************************************************
UN annunciator DE diesel engine
NK computational module DG diesel generator emergency

AC
UC contrôler DT gas turbine driven generator emergency AC
UI indicating instrument
UM manual control device
AR radiation monitors
UR reactor scram system
AC sensor core flux
AF sensor flow
AL sensor level
AP sensor pressure
AT sensor temperature
NS signal conditioning system
NM signal modifier
UE solid state devices
switch digital chanel
SD

SF switch flow
switch level
SL

SI switch limit
SM switch manual
SP switch pressure
switch temperature
ST

switch torque
SQ

SC switch contacts
LF transmitter flow
LA transmitter flow, level, pressure
LL transmitter level
LP transmitter pressure
LT transmitter temperature
 Appendix 4
COMPONENT TYPES IN THE IAEA DATE BASE

This Appendix provides a listing of all component types and the

associated three character code found in the IAEA Data Base. As in the
Appendix 3, a main list and separate listings of mechanical, electrical,
instrumentation and control and emergency power sources categories is
given.

77
 **************************************************** KDC circut breaker DC
00
KBF circut breaker feed breaker

bus

AC
RELIABILITY DATA BASE KFT circut breaker fixed type including molden case
KGB circut breaker generator Manufactured by BBC
Listing of components types and codes KAH circut breaker high power (leistungschalter)
KIA circut breaker indoor AC application
************************************************* KID circut breaker indoor application

DC
OAA cooler KIS circut breaker isolation
air

UNA annunciator KMT circut breaker metal clad

UNS annunciator module solid state KCT circut breaker molded type
BTA battery KM3 circut breaker motor operated 380 V
BTV battery circut breaker outdoor application

KOA

AC
125V

BTL battery lead acid KRP circut breaker reactor protection

BTN battery nickel cadmium JEM cluch mechanical
BTW battery (power system) cell JEE clutch electrical
wet

BCA battery charger QCM compressor MSIV compressor

air
BC1 battery charger 120 V QCC compressor containemnt air control
8CR battery charger rectifier OCI compressor instrument

air
battery charger solid state QCP compressor pumpback (annulus ventilation)
BCS

QBF blower NKA computational module

fan

blower ventilator circulating DCS control rod clustered silver, indium, cadmium control rods
QBV

air

fan

CDA bus OCC control rod cruciform, boron carbide control rods
CB5 500V OCB control rod BWR application
bus<=

CB2 control type

OCK

rodKWUPR
bus120VAC,

CB1 OCR control rod single control rod assembly

bus120VDC

CB3 bus 380 V COB control rod and drive mechanism BUR-s
CB6 ODE control rod and drive mechanism PUR-s
bus6kV

CBD ORA control rod drive

busDC

CBB bare outdoor switchgear ORL control drive lead screw roller drive mechanism

rod

nut
bus

CBH bus high voltage,indoor voltage >= 4 kV ORM control rod drive BUR appliaction mechanical insertion function
CBI bus insulated switchgear bus 601-15 kV ORH control drive application hydraulic scram function

rod

BUR
CBL voltage indoor voltage UCA contrôler
buslow

<=60V

CBM metal entclosed UCE contrôler electronic

bus

CCC cable control copper conductors UCP contrôler pneumatic

CCP cable power ECE converter

E/S
CCS cable signal (supervisory) ECS converter square root
circut breaker QDA damper
KA

circut breaker 4.16 QDP damper Automatic backdraft, paralel blade

KA4

kV

KA6 circut breaker 6 kV QDO damper Modulating, opposed blade, 36X48 inches
KAL circut breaker QDT damper shut off, position paralel blade

two
60V

KAM circut breaker Voltage between 6 and 10 kV QDC damper containment fan coolers system
 QDH damper manual (HVAC) ICF instrumentation channel analog flow
DEA diesel engine ICI instrumentation channel analog level
DEI diesel engine No.2 fuel oil, stroke, in-line ICP instrumentation channel analog pressure

4
DEV diesel engine no.2 fuel oil,4 stroke, block ICT instrumentation channel analog temperature

V
DCA diesel generator emergency AC IDL instrumentation channel digital level
DG4 diesel generator emergency AC 4160 V AC IDP instrumentation channel digital pressure
QFV fan containment ventilation Yan YTS intake screen service water system
QFC cooler containment EIA inverter
fan

QFH fan cooler reactor building cooling units El I inverter instrument

KSF feeder(ABZWEIG) EIS inverter solid state 120 volts AC
YFM filter liquid, mechanical restriction EIZ inverter static single phase
UCF flow contrôler EIX inverter static three phase
XTA fuse all voltage levels UEY isolating diode assembly
DIG turbine driven generator emergency JLC lube oil cooler
gas

AC
FYA gasket UMC manual control device pushbutton
EGS generator steam turbine driven MAA motor
AC

EGD generator MPH motor emergency coolant injection pump motor

DC

HP
HXA heat exchanger motor emergency coolant injection pump motor

HPL

LP
HXR heat exchanger residual heat removal motor service water pump motor

HX

MPS

LP
HXS heat exchanger secondary component cooling MPF motor auxiliary boiler feed pump motor

HX
HXH heat exchanger tube horisontal shell tube MPC motor circulating water pump motor
U

and
HXD heat exchanger U tube shell and tube plus steam drum MPE motor condensâte extraction pump motor
HXV heat exchanger tube veritcal shell tube MPZ motor emergency service water pump motor
U

and

HXC heat exchanger helical coil HPX motor end shield tank cooling pump motor
HX6 heat exchanger straight tube horizontal shell tube
and MPB motor generator main lube oil pump motor
HXZ heat exchanger straight tube radiator type MPM motor main moderator pump motor
HXH heat exchanger straight tube vertical shell and tube MPQ motor powerhouse upper level service water pump motor
EHT heat tracing pipe heater MPP motor primary heat transport feed circut pump motor
EHA heater air heater MPV motor primary heat transport pump motor
JHF heater feedwater HPW motor shutdown cooling water pump motor
EHP heater pressurizer heater MAC motor AC
OVA hvac unit annulus ventilation MAI motor induction

AC
hvac unit auxiliary building MAS motor split phase
QVX

AC
hvac unit battery room ventilation MAW motor synchronous single phase
OVB

AC
QVC hvac unit cable spreading room MPK motor boiler feed pump
QVR hvac unit control room ventilation MSS motor servo
QVE hvac unit electric eqiupment area ventilation MGX motor generator
QVI hvac unit intermediate building MGA motor generator AC 220 V
DIE indicating instrument electronic MGD motor generator D-C
IAA instrumentation MGR motor generator D-C rotating converter
ICC instrumentation channel analog core flux FXA orifice
g FXT orifice, test valve, flow meter
EB1 paneI board 120 V AC
JPE penetration electrical
JPP penetration piping
FSS pipe (nuclear grade ) straight section diameter size less than 1 inch
piping diameter
FS3

<=3"
FSM piping diameter
FES >3"
piping elbow inches

4-6
FEA piping expansion joint
FE3 piping expansion joint corrugated steel

3"40PSI
FNA piping nozzle
FNS piping nozzle spray
FRL piping rupture diaphragm 10-16 inches
FSA piping straight section
FTA piping tees
FTL piping thermowell 6-10 inches
FWS piping welds less than 4" conecting weld
EPA power supply
PWW pump
PUA pump auxiliary boiler feed pump
pump centrifugal
PWC

PWD pump centrifugal horisontal flow 22-820

l/s

PWB pump centrifugal horizontal flow 22-820 l/s

PWE pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900 l/s
PWF pump condensate extraction pump
PWP pump positive displacement
PDA pump diesel driven
pump diesel driven containment spray pump
PDC

PHA pump motor driven

PMX pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump
PMD pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal flow rate 130-200 kg/s;head.7MPa
PHO pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 30 kg/s; head 2.2-6.7 MPa
PMM pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9 MPa
PMN pump motor driven centrifugal horizontal flow rate: 40-60kg/s; head .5-.7MPa
PMP pump motor driven centrifugal reactor coolant pump flow rate 1036-2347 kg/s; head .3-.4

MPa
PMW pump motor driven centrifugal flow rate 75-150 kg/s; head 1.3-1.8
wet

MPa

PMQ pump motor driven centrifugal,horisontal vertical flow rate 120-240 kg/s;head 1.2-1.8
and

MPa
PMH pump motor driven charging/high pressure injection
PME purap motor driven component cooling
PMC pump motor driven containment spray
PHG pump motor driven electrical equipment area ventilation cooling pump
 PHF pump motor driven emergency feedwater pump
PMV pump motor driven high pressure injection
PHI pump motor driven high pressure(> 20 bar) applicable to HHSI.CVCS and auxiliary feedwater pumps
PMZ pump motor driven include CCW,SW,RHR,boric acid transfer,boron injection recirc.
PMT pump motor driven include containment spray.standby liquid control
PMJ pump motor driven includes reactor coolant,reactor recirculating.CW,feedwater,cond.
PUL pump motor driven pressure applicable ESUS, CCWS.LHSI/RHR, CSS, boric acid transfer pumps

low

<20bar

to
PHL pump motor driven low pressure injection
PUM pump motor driven main feed pumps
PUR pump motor driven main steam relief hydraulic pump
PUE pump motor driven primary component cooling water pump
PUB pump motor driven primary service water booster pump
PUX pump motor driven primary service water pump
PUP pump motor driven reciprocating(positive displacement) flow rate 2.5-3.9kg/s; head 8.7 MPa;
pump motor driven recirculation pump
PUZ

PUW pump motor driven residual heat removal pump

PMS pump motor driven safety injection pump
pump motor driven screw flow rate kg/s; head
PUS

50

0.3MPa
PUF pump motor driven secondary component cooling water
PMK pump motor driven secondary service water
PUC pump motor driven service water pump used in charging pump cooling system
PUV pump motor driven well water pump
PTA pump turbine driven
PTF pump turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
PTC pump turbine driven centrifugal pump flow rate 240 kg/s; head 1.8 MPa
PTX pump turbine driven emergency feedwater pump
PTS pump turbine driven high pressure > 20 bar include CVCS,emergency charging system,aux.feedwater pumps
ARS radiation monitors BWR main steam line
URS reactor scram system
ERE rectifier excitation rectifier over
60V

ERP rectifier precipitator rectifier over 600 V

ERS rectifier static
RUA relay
RAA relay auxiliary
RCL relay control
RCA relay control AC
RCD relay control DC
RCE relay control electromechanical
RPH relay power 300-460 A
relay power 40-60
oRPL

A
 relay protective
°RA

RRO relay protective overload protection

RRS relay protective switchgear protection
RRV relay protective voltage protection
RTA relay time delay
RTB relay time delay bimetallic
RTF relay time delay pneumatic
RTS relay time delay solid state
RYA relay coil
RXA relay contacts
ACA sensor core flux
AFA sensor flow
ALA sensor level
ALR sensor level reactor water level
APA sensor pressure
APR sensor pressure reactor containment sensor
and

APD sensor pressure difference

ATA sensor temperature
NCA signal comparator bistable
NSA signal conditioning system for core flux,level,flow,pressure,temperature general
NMA signal modifier
NMT signal modifier current-current transducer
NMP signal modifier current-pneumatic transducer
NMV signal modifier current-vol tage transducer
NMS signal modifier square root extractor
NMO signal modifier voltage-pneumatic transducer
UEH solid state devices high power application
DEL solid state devices low power application
ECM static converter for reactor main coolant pumps
YSD strainer service water (charging pump cooling system) duplex
YSF strainer/filter
switch digital chanel pressure/vacuum, pressure,level
SOA

SFA switch flow

SLA switch level
SIA switch limit
switch limit electronic
SIE

SNA switch manual

SPA switch pressure
switch temperature
STA

SQA switch torque

 switch contacts

SC
JTF tank storage FUST
JTR tank storage RUST
EBA terminal board
TAA transformer
TAZ transformer 220/120

V
TA5 transformer 50/6 kV
TA6 transformer 6kV/380 V
TA8 transformer 8 kV / 6 kV
TAD transformer dry 4 kV/600 V
TAE transformer dry 600 V/208 V
transformer auto liquid filled, single phase
TS

TTT transformer auto liquid filled, three phase

TIP transformer instrument potential
TIC transformer instrument transformer current transformer
TSA transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, single phase
transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, single phase 146-242
TS4

or

kV
transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, single phase 2-30
TS2

or

kV
TMA transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, three phase
or
transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, three phase 2-30
TM2

or

kV
TM5 transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, three phase 347-550 kV
TM4 transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, three phase 46-242 kV
TS5 transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, single phase 347-550 kV
TVR transformer regulating 120 V AC
TET transformer station service including excitation type, three phase
TES dry
transformer station service including excitation type,single phase voltage levels
dry

al
TEG transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, single phase <=40 kV
TEH transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, three phase <=-40

kV
TXA transformer station start and auxiliary Voltage levels: 130/6 kV, 70/6 kV, 20/6 kV
transformer substation liquid filled, single phase
TUS

TUT transformer substation liquid filled, three phase

Iff transmitter flow
LAD transmitter flow, level, pressure
ILL transmitter level
LPP transmitter pressure
LXR transmitter présure difference
LTT transmitter temperature
JUC turbine combustion
JUP turbine steam driven
JUS turbine steam driven condensing, single stage, 500-999
HP
oo JUN turbine steam driven condensing 1000-5000
-t*.

no

HP
JUH turbine steam driven non condensing, multi stage, less than 500 HP
JUH turbine turbine/HPCI assembly
VUO valve ADS depressurization valve
VUA valve angle valve
VWB valve ball valve
VUT valve butterfly valve
VUO valve condenser steam discharge valve
VUP valve diaphragm
VWF valve flow control 1/2 inch, air fixed flow
VUG valve gate
VWL valve globe valve
VWE valve high pressure shifting valve (steam dump)
VUN valve needle valve
VWU valve nozzle valve
VWJ valve plug valve
VUX valve pressure regulating
VWZ valve pressure regulating 2-6 inches
VRB valve primary relief valve BWR
VRA valve relief
VRH valve relief main steam atmosferic relief valve
VR6 valve relief safety diameter between inches
&

2and6

VR8 valve relief & safety diameter larger than 6 inches

VR2 valve relief & safety diameter less than 2 inches
VSA valve safety
VWV valve vent 3/4 inch, float operated,tank vent
VA1 valve operated
air

VAR valve air operated all systems except raw water return line
VAP valve air operated purge isolation
VAQ valve air operated raw water return line
VAZ valve operated turbine stop valve
air

VA! valve operated vent isolation

air

VAE valve operated (ESF systems valves only)

air

PWR+B

VAT valve operated butterfly diameter larger than inches

air

24

VAB valve air operated general (BUR application)

VAU valve air operated general (PUR application)
VAK valve operated globe diameter between inches
air

2and6

VAL valve operated globe diameter less than inches

air

VWH valve air operated turbine governor valve

VWW valve composite design
by

VEA valve explosive operated

VHA valve hydraulic operated
VXA valve manual
VXE valve manual PUR + BUR (ESF systems valves only)
VXT valve manual butterfly all systems except HVAC
VXG valve manual gate diameter between 12 and 24 inches
VXH valve manual gate diameter between 2 and 6 inches
VXI valve manual gate diameter between inches

6and12
VXS valve manual gate diameter less than inches

2
VMA valve motor operated
VMC valve motor operated Chemical and volume control system valves
VMB valve motor operated except condenser circulating water

al
VMJ valve motor operated all except for use in CVCS and CCS systems
VMD valve motor operated condenser circulating water valves
VME valve motor operated containment spray system valves
VMI valve motor operated main steam isolation valve
VM1 valve motor operated (ESF systems valves only)
BWR

VMM valve motor operated MSIV (FD-Schnellschlusschieber) gate

VMH valve motor operated PUR (ESF system valves only)
VMS valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 12 and 24 inches
VMU valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

2and6
VMT valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

6and12
VMF valve motor operated control
v

VMG valve motor operated gate diameter between inches

12and4
VML valve motor operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches
VMO valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension 1QO< DN < 200 mm
VMM valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension 200mm
VMK valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension<=100 mm >
VMR valve motor operated regualting
VSO valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer or main steam line) with one pilot valve
VST valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer or main steam line) with two or three pilot valves
VPA valve piston operated
VPT valve piston operated butterfly used in HVAC
VAG valve pneumatic operated isolation hydraulic scram system valve,pipe dimension <100 mm
VAH valve pneumatic operated isolation pipe dimension <=100mm
VPR valve power operated relief PORV
VUC valve remote operated PORV block valve
VCA valve self operated check
VCE valve self operated check ECCS systems
&RH

VCF valve self operated check ESF systems valves

VCS valve self operated check diameter betweeen inches
2nad6
 VCL valve self operated check diameter between 12 and 24 inches
VCT valve self operated check diameter between inches

6and12
VCH valve self operated check diameter larger than 24 inches
VCB valve self operated check diameter less than inches

2
VCM valve self operated check main steam check valve
VCJ valve self operated check pipe dimension > 100mm
VWI valve self operated check pipe dimension 500mm, (main steam system)

60m
VC1 valve self operated check pipe dimension <=100

m
VCW valve self operated check swing
VCN valve self operated check testable
valve self operated check tilting disc
VCZ

VSC valve self operated code safety valve

VUK valve self operated pilot valve
VSD valve self operated pressurizer safety valve short inlet piping
VSB valve self operated primary safety valve
VSM valve self operated safety main steam
VSP valve self operated safety valves PWR
WA valve self operated vacuum valve
VCU valve self operated (motor operated) stop check
VSR valve self operated (pilot operated) safety valve (pressure relief system) pipe dimensions 125,150,300 mm
VRR valve self operated (pilot power operated) pressurizer relief
or

VWM valve self operated, motor operated (redundant closure) stop chech pipe dimension 500mm, 600mm (main steam system valve)
VDA valve solenoid operated
valve solenoid operated systems, except HVAC
VO

al

VDH valve solenoid operated used KVAC

in

wire
CWA

CWC wire control circut typical circut, several joints

 ****************************************************
HXH heat exchanger tube horisontal shell tube

and
HXD heat exchanger U tube shell and tube plus steam drum
RELIABILITY DATA BASE HXV heat exchanger U tube veritcal shell and tube
heat exchanger helical coil

HXC
Mechanical components types and codes HXB heat exchanger straight tube horizontal shell tube

and
HXZ heat exchanger straight tube radiator type
**************************************************** HXM heat exchanger straight tube vertical shell and tube
QAA air cooler JHF heater feedwater
blower OVA hvac unit annulus ventilation
QBF

fan
08V blower ventilator air circulating fan QVX hvac unit auxiliary building
JEM cluch mechanical QVB hvac unit battery room ventilation
JEE clutch electrical QVC hvac unit cable spreading room
QCM compressor MSIV air compressor QVR hvac unit control room ventilation
compressor containemnt control OVE hvac unit electric eqiupment area ventilation
QC

QCI compressor instrument airair QVI hvac unit intermediate building

compressor pumpback (annulus ventilation) YTS intake screen service water system
QCP

DCS control rod clustered silver, indium, cadmium control rods JLC lube cooler

oil
OCC control rod cruciform, boron carbide control rods FXA orifice
OCB control rod BWR application FXT orifice, test valve, flow meter
control type JPE penetration electrical
OCK

rodKWUPR

OCR control single control assembly JPP penetration piping

rod

rod

ODB control rod and drive mechanism BWR-s FSS pipe (nuclear grade straight section diameter size less than inch

1
control drive mechanism PWR-s piping diameter
ODE

rodan

FS3

<=3"
ORA control drive FSM piping diameter
rod

>3"
ORL control rod drive lead screw roller nut drive mechanism FE5 piping elbow inches

4-6
ORM control rod drive BWR appliaction mechanical insertion function FEA piping expansion joint
ORH control rod drive BWR application hydraulic scram function FE3 piping expansion joint corrugated steel

3"40PSI
QDA damper FNA piping nozzle
damper Automatic backdraft, paralel blade FNS piping nozzle spray
OP

QOO damper Modulating, opposed blade, 36X48 inches FRL piping rupture diaphragm 10-16 inches
damper shut off, position paralel blade FSA piping straight section
0T

two

QOC damper containment fan coolers system FTA piping tees

QDM damper manual (HVAC) FTL piping thermowell 6-10 inches
QFV containment ventilation FWS piping welds less than 4" conecting weld
fan

Yan

QFC cooler containment PWW pump

fan

QFH cooler reactor building cooling units PWA pump auxiliary boiler feed pump
fan

YFM filter liquid, mechanical restriction pump centrifugal

PWC

FYA gasket PWD pump centrifugal horisontal flow 22-820 l/s

HXA heat exchanger PWB pump centrifugal horizontal flow 22-820 l/s
oo HXR heat exchanger residual heat removal PWE pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900 l/s
HX

-4 HXS heat exchanger secondary component cooling HX PWF pump condensate extraction pump
 PWP pump positive displacement
PDA pump diesel driven
PDC pump diesel driven containment spray pump
PMA pump motor driven
PMX pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump
pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal flow rate 130-200 kg/s;head
PHD

.7MPa
pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal vertical flow rate kg/s; head 2.2-6.7
PMO

and

30

MPa
PMM pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9 MPa
PMN pump motor driven centrifugal horizontal flow rate: 40-60kg/s; head .5-.7MPa
PMP pump motor driven centrifugal reactor coolant pump flow rate 1036-2347 kg/s; head .3-.4 MPa
PMW pump motor driven centrifugal flow rate 75-150 kg/s; head 1.3-1.8

wet

MPa
PMQ pump motor driven centrifugal,horisontal vertical flow rate 120-240 kg/s;head 1.2-1.8

and

MPa
PMH pump motor driven charging/high pressure injection
PME pump motor driven component cooling
PMC pump motor driven containment spray
PMG pump motor driven electrical equipment area ventilation cooling pump
PMF pump motor driven emergency feedwater pump
PMV pump motor driven high pressure injection
PMI pump motor driven high pressure(> bar) applicable HHSI,CVCS auxiliary feedwater pumps
20

to

and
pump motor driven include CCW,SU,RHR,boric acid transfer,boron injection recirc.
PMZ

PMT pump motor driven include containment spray,standby liquid control

PMJ pump motor driven includes reactor coolant,reactor recirculating.CW,feedwater,cond.
PUL pump motor driven low pressure <20 bar applicable to ESUS, CCUS,LHSI/RHR, CSS, boric acid transfer pumps
PML pump motor driven low pressure injection
PUH pump motor driven main feed pumps
PUR pump nntor driven main steam relief hydraulic pump
PUE pump motor driven primary component cooling water pump
PUB pump motor driven primary service water booster pump
PUK pump motor driven primary service water pump
PUP pump motor driven reciprocatingCpositive displacement) flow rate 2.5-3.9kg/s; head MPa;

8.7
PUZ pump motor driven recirculation pump
pump motor driven residual heat removal pump
PUW

pump motor driven safety injection pump

PMS

PUS pump motor driven screw flow rate 550 kg/s; head 0.3 MPa
PUF pump motor driven secondary component cooling water
PMK pump motor driven secondary service water
PUC pump motor driven service water pump used in charging pump cooling system
PUV pump motor driven well water pump
PTA pump turbine driven
PTF pump turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
PTC pump turbine driven centrifugal pump flow rate 240 kg/s; head 1.8 MPa
 PTX pump turbine driven emergency feedwater pump
pump turbine driven high pressure include CVCS,emergency charging system,aux.feedwater pumps

PTS

>20bar
YSD strainer service water (charging pump cooling system) duplex
TSF strainer/filter
JTF tank storage FWST
JTR tank storage RUST
JUC turbine combustion
JUP turbine steam driven
JUS turbine steam driven condensing, single stage, 500-999

HP
JUN turbine steam driven condensing 1000-5000

no

HP
JUM turbine steam driven non condensing, multi stage, less than 500 HP
JUH turbine turbine/HPCI assembly
VWO valve ADS depressurization valve
VWA valve angle valve
valve ball valve
VWB

valve butterfly valve

VWT

VWD valve condenser steam discharge valve

VWP valve d i aph ragm
VWF valve flow control inch, fixed flow
1/2

air

valve gate
VUG

VUL valve globe valve

VUE valve high pressure shifting valve (steam dump)
VUN valve needle valve
VUU valve nozzle valve
VUJ valve plug valve
VUX valve pressure regulating
VUZ valve pressure regulating 2-6 inches
VRB valve primary relief valve
BUR

VRA valve relief

VRM valve relief main steam atmosferic relief valve
VR6 valve relief & safety diameter between 2 and 6 inches
VR8 valve relief & safety diameter larger than 6 inches
VR2 valve relief safety diameter less than inches
&

VSA valve safety

VUV valve vent inch, float operated,tank vent
3/4

VA1 valve operated

air

VAR valve air operated all systems except raw water return line
VAP valve air operated purge isolation
valve operated water return line
VAQ

air

raw

oo valve operated turbine stop valve

VAZ

air
 VAI valve air operated vent isolation
VAE valve operated (ESF systems valves only)

air

PWR+BU
VAT valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches
VAB valve operated general (BUR application)

air
VAU valve operated general (PUR application)

air
VAK valve air operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches
VAL valve air operated globe diameter less than 2 inches
VUH valve air operated turbine governor valve
VWU valve composite by design
VEA valve explosive operated
VHA valve hydraulic operated
VXA valve manual
VXE valve manual PUR + BUR (ESF systems valves only)
valve manual butterfly systems except HVAC
VXT

al

VXG valve manual gate diameter between inches

12and4
VXH valve manual gate diameter between inches

2and6
VXI valve manual gate diameter between inches
VXS 6and12
valve manual gate diameter less than 2 inches
VMA valve motor operated
VMC valve motor operated Chemical and volume control system valves
VMB valve motor operated all except condenser circulating water
VMJ valve motor operated all except for use in CVCS and CCS systems
VMD valve motor operated condenser circulating water valves
VME valve motor operated containment spray system valves
VMI valve motor operated main steam isolation valve
VM1 valve motor operated BUR (ESF systems valves only)
VMM valve motor operated MSIV (FD-Schnellschlusschieber) gate
VMH valve motor operated (ESF system valves only)
PUR

VMS valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

12and4

VMU valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 2 and 6 inches

VHT valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 6 and 12 inches
VMF valve motor operated control
v

VMG valve motor operated gate diameter between 12 and 24 inches

VML valve motor operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches
VMO valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension 100< DN < 200 mm
VMN valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension > 200mm
VMK valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension<=100
m

VMR valve motor operated regualting

valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer main steam line) with pilot valve
VSO

or

one

VST valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer or main steam line) with two or three pilot valves
 VPA valve piston operated
VPT valve piston operated butterfly used in HVAC
VAG valve pneumatic operated isolation hydraulic scram system valve,pipe dimension <100 mm
VAH valve pneumatic operated isolation pipe dimension <=100mm
VPR valve power operated relief PORV
VUC valve remote operated PORV block valve
VGA valve self operated check
VCE valve self operated check ECCS & RHR systems
VCF valve self operated check ESF systems valves
VCS valve self operated check diameter betweeen 2 nad 6 inches
VCL valve self operated check diameter between inches

12and4
VCT valve self operated check diameter between 6 and 12 inches
VCH valve self operated check diameter larger than 24 inches
VCB valve self operated check diameter less than 2 inches
VCM valve self operated check main steam check valve
VCJ valve self operated check pipe dimension 100mm

>
VUI valve self operated check pipe dimension 500mm, (main steam system)

60m
VC1 valve self operated check pipe dimension <=100 mm
VCW valve self operated check swing
VCN valve self operated check testable
VCZ valve self operated check tilting disc
VSC valve self operated code safety valve
VWK valve self operated pilot valve
valve self operated pressurizer safety valve short inlet piping
VSD

VSB valve self operated primary safety valve

VSM valve self operated safety main steam
VSP valve self operated safety valves PWR
WA valve self operated vacuum valve
VCU valve self operated (motor operated) stop check
VSR valve self operated (pilot operated) safety valve (pressure relief system) pipe dimensions 125,150,300

m
VRR valve self operated (pilot power operated) pressurizer relief
or

VUM valve self operated, motor operated (redundant closure) stop chech pipe dimension 500mm, 600mm (main steam system valve)
VDA valve solenoid operated
VDO valve solenoid operated all systems, except HVAC
VDH valve solenoid operated used in HVAC
**************************************************** KIA circut breaker indoor AC application
KID circut breaker indoor application

DC
R E L I A B I L I T Y DATA BASE circut breaker isolation

KIS
KMT circut breaker metal clad
Electrical components types codes KCT circut breaker molded type

and
KM3 circut breaker motor operated

380V
************************************************* KOA circut breaker outdoor AC application
BTA battery KRP circut breaker reactor protection
BTV battery ECE converter E/S
125V

BTL battery lead acid ECS converter square root

BTN battery nickel cadmium KSF feeder(ABZWEIG)
BTU battery (power system) wet cell fuse voltage levels

KTA

al
BCA battery charger EGS generator steam turbine driven

AC
BC1 battery charger EGD generator
120V

BCR battery charger rectifier

DC
EHT heat tracing pipe heater
battery charger solid state
EHA heater heater
BCS

CBA bus

air
EHP heater pressunzer heater
CB5 bus <= 500V
EIA inverter
CB2
El inverter instrument
bus120VAC,

CB1 bus 120 V DC

I
EIS inverter solid state 120 volts AC
CB3 bus 380 V
C86 EIZ inverter static single phase
EIX inverter static three phase
bus6kV

CBD bus DC
CBB bare outdoor switchgear MAA motor
bus

CBH bus high vol tage,indoor voltage >= 4 kV MPH motor HP emergency coolant injection pump motor
CB1 bus insulated switchgear bus 601-15 kV MPL motor emergency coolant injection pump motor

LP
CBL voltage indoor voltage motor service water pump motor

MPS

LP
buslow

<=60V

CBH bus metal entclosed MPF motor auxiliary boiler feed pump motor
CCC cable control copper conductors MPC motor circulating water pump motor
CCP cable power MPE motor condensate extraction pump motor
CCS cable signal (supervisory) MPZ motor emergency service water pump motor
KAA circut breaker MPX motor end shield tank cooling pump motor
KA4 circut breaker 4.16 kV MPB motor generator main lube oil pump motor
KA6 circut breaker MPM motor main moderator pump motor
6kV

KAL circut breaker 600 V MPQ motor powerhouse upper level service water pump motor
KAM circut breaker Voltage between MPP motor primary heat transport feed circut pump motor
6and10kV

KDC circut breaker DC MPV motor primary heat transport pump motor
KBF circut breaker feed breaker MPW motor shutdown cooling water pump motor
bus

AC

KFT circut breaker fixed type including molden case MAC motor AC
KGB circut breaker generator Manufactured by BBC MAI motor AC induction
circut breaker high power (leistungschalter) MAS motor AC split phase
KAH
 HAW motor AC synchronous single phase TTS transformer auto liquid filled, single phase
MPK motor boiler feed pump TTT transformer auto liquid filled, three phase
MSS motor servo TIP transformer instrument potential
MGX motor generator TIC transformer instrument transformer current transformer
HGA motor generator TSA transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, single phase

AC20V
MGD motor generator D-C transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, single phase 146-242

TS4

or

kV
MGR motor generator rotating converter transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, single phase 2-30

TS2

or

kV
D-C
EB1 paneIboard transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, three phase

THA

or
120VAC
EPA power supply TM2 transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, three phase 2-30 kV
ERE rectifier excitation rectifier over 600 V TM5 transformer main power generator unit liquid filled, three phase 347-550

or

kV
ERP rectifier precipitator rectifier over TM4 transformer main power generator or unit liquid filled, three phase 46-242 kV

60V
rectifier static transformer main power generator unit transformer liquid filled, single phase 347-550

TS5

or

kV
ERS

RWA relay TVR transformer regulating

120VAC
RAA relay auxiliary TET transformer station service including excitation dry type, three phase
RCL relay control TES transformer station service including excitation dry type,single phase all voltage levels
RCA relay control AC TEG transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, single phase <=40 kV
RCD relay control DC TEH transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, three phase <=-40

kV
RCE relay control electromechanical TXA transformer station start and auxiliary Voltage levels: 130/6 kV, 70/6 kV, 20/6 kV
RPH relay power 300-460 A TUS transformer substation liquid filled, single phase
RPL relay power 40-60 TUT transformer substation liquid filled, three phase
A

RRA relay protective CWA wire

RRO relay protective overload protection CWC wire control circut typical circut, several joints
RRS relay protective switchgear protection
RRV relay protective voltage protection
RTA relay time delay
RTB relay time delay bimetallic
relay time delay pneumatic
RTP

relay time delay solid state

RTS

RYA relay coi I

RXA relay contacts
ECM static converter reactor main coolant pumps
for

EBA terminal board

TAA transformer
TA2 transformer 220/120 V
TA5 transformer 50/6 kV
TA6 transformer 6kV/380 V
TA8 transformer
8kV/6

TAD transformer dry 4 kV/600 V

TAE transformer dry 600 V/208 V
U)
**************************************************** SIA switch limit
SIE switch limit electronic
RELIABILITY DATA BASE SMA switch manual
SPA switch pressure
Instrumentation and control equipment types and codes STA switch temperature
SOA switch torque
**************************************************** SCC switch contacts
UNA annunciator IFF transmitter flow
annunciator module solid state LAO transmitter flow, level, pressure
UNS

NKA computational module LLL transmitter level

UCA contrôler LPP transmitter pressure
contrôler electronic LXR transmitter présure difference
UCE

UCP contrôler pneumatic LTT transmitter temperature

UCF flow contrôler
UIE indicating instrument electronic
UEY isolating diode assembly
manual control device pushbutton
UMC

ARB radiation monitors main steam line

BUR

URS reactor scram system

ACA sensor core flux
AFA sensor flow
ALA sensor level
ALR sensor level reactor water level
APA sensor pressure
APR sensor pressure reactor and containment sensor
APO sensor pressure difference
ATA sensor temperature
NCA signal comparator bistable ****************************************************
NSA signal conditioning system for core flux,level,flow,pressure,temperature general
signal modifier RELIABILITY DATA BASE
NMA

NMT signal modifier current-current transducer

NMP signal modifier current-pneumatic transducer Emergency power sources types and codes
NMV signal modifier current-vol tage transducer
NMS signal modifier square root extractor ****************************************************
NHO signal modifier voltage-pneumatic transducer DEA diesel engine
UEH solid state devices high power application DEI diesel engine No.2 fuel oil, 4 stroke, in-line
UEL solid state devices power application DEV diesel engine no.2 fuel oil,4 stroke, V block
low

SOA switch digital chanel pressure/vacuum, pressure,level DCA diesel generator emergency

AC
switch flow diesel generator emergency 4160
SFA

DG4

AC
VAC
SLA switch level DTG gas turbine driven generator emergency AC
 Appendix 5
COMPLETE LISTING OF THE IAEA DATA BASE

This Appendix provides complete listing of the IAEA Data Base. Records
listed alphabetical order component types.
are

in

of
Each record listed following format:
is

in
Record code Component type
CompJaoundary; Generic mode; Op.environment

FM;Op.
Failure rate: Mid point; High; Low; Repair time; Error factor
Source; Ultimate source; Original

FM
Comments

If some of the entries in the record are eather blank or indicated as

not available (n/a), then they are deleted in the printout. For example,
for tJNSFE' 'annunciator module solid state') only recommended
(its

value was available in the source. Since high and low bound, error factor
and repair time are not available, single value with prefix 'rec'
(abbreviation recommended) included printout.
for

is

inthe

95
°^ QAAFB air cooler
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-6/hr max: 4.0E-5/hr mm: 3.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: experts judgement and IREP data
Comment :

QAAFI air cooler

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Not consensus data. ANO-1 IREP study plant specific

UNAFE annunciator general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail operate demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.8E-7/hr high: 1.5E-5/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.2
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.41 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different kinds of annunciators and different sources including non-nuclear.
Principal reference:IEEE (1977)
50

UNAKE annunciator general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: operates spounous or false response
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 5.6E-7/hr high: 1.lE-5/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.2
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.41 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate coomposite value different kinds annunciators different sources including non-nuclear.
is

of

of

Principal reference: IEEE (1977) and

50

UNSFE annunciator module solid state general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: f a i l to function Original failure mode- fail to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.1E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.40 Ultimate source: operating experience

Comment: Reference NUREG 2232 (1980)
:
UNSKE annunciator module solid state general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: operates spourious false response

or
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.7E-6/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.40 Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Reference NUREG 2232 (1980)

:
BTABN battery
Component boundary: battery,container,terminal connections incl.lst breaker connect. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: inadequate output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.2E-6/hr high: 7.5E-6/hr low: 4.9E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 4-7 hours
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.A6) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 51.Operational time 1.564.315 No.of failures

hrs

5.
Repair time range medians.
is

BTAFN battery of
Component boundary: battery,container,terminal connections incl.lst breaker connect. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output
to

no
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 6.4E-7/hr high: 3.0E-6/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

4-7
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.A6) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 51.Operating time 1.564.315hours No of failures 1. High and low chi-square estimates.
Repair times range of median

BTAFO battery
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.2E-8/hr 95%: 2.5E-7/hr 5%: 8.E-10/hr REPAIR TIME: 11.2 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:lEEE 500(1977)(pg104),rec=median; max=80% of distribution. Operating experience: 96.426 hours of operation, no failures.
Repair time mean updated component maintenance duration.
is

of

BTAFT battery
Component boundary: battery only Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failed effective output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-2/d 95%: 6.8E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.41 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Demand failure rate is based on refueling outage testing interval Operating experience: Total pop.129.No of demands 531.Number of
failures 7. a=0.0346; b=2.59
VO
oo BTAFZ battery
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.6E-8/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Pnor:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.104) lead-acid batteries,stationary type Failure mode "catastrophic". Operating experience:2.0E+5 hours,
no failures.

BTVFH battery 125 V

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during opeartion
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.2E-7/hr 95%: 1.7E-6/hr 5%: 5.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 7.5E-7/hr. Operating experience 4.1E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

BTAAJ battery general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: hardware failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: There is no specific failure mode assigned for this component in the source ASEP used IREP Procedure Guide value of 1.0E-6/hr
assesed monthly system test.

BTLFE battery lead acid

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic (no output given challenge)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.6E-6/cy high: 7.2E-6/cy lou: 2.7E-6/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.85 Ultimate source- expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite of several sources.

BTLFE battery lead acid

Component boundary detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment, normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic (no output given challenge)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.0E-8/hr high: 3.0E-8/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.85 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite several sources. Tot.failure rate batteries estimated 1.6E-6/oper.hr,but 99.< failures
is

of

of

is

tobe

of
were discovered through testing,what gives 6E-9/hr emergency oper
BTNAE battery nickel cadmium
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.6E-7/hr high: 9.9E-6/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.91 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite IEEE (1977) NPRD-2. Catastrophic faulure rate negligable, modes

is

of

50

and

is

soal

FRis
dominated by degraded mode.

BTWFB battery (power system) wet cell

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to provide proper output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-6/hr max: 1.0E-5/hr mm: 8.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment: Assumes out-of-specification cell replacement

BTWF1 battery (power system) wet cell

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to provide proper output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Assumes out-of-specification cell replacement

BTWFW battery (power system) cell

wet

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: emergency load condition Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure provide proper output
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial,nuclear experience,expert opinion
Comment: Batteries constantly charged their open circut output tage monitored, failures like shorts ground internaly
are

and

vol

is

so

to

or
are detected quickly. Only significant failure mode is one listed

BCAFB battery charger

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode- fail to function Original failure mode- failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-7/hr max: 4.0E-6/hr mm: 3.0E 7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :
BCAFI battery charger
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

BCAFZ battery charger

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-7/hr
OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg90) rectifiers,stationary type. Prior failure mode "all modes"
Operating experience: 2.0E+5 hours operation,no failures

of
BC1FH battery charger
120V

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.7E-6/hr 95%: 1.3E-5/hr 5%: 1.7E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 5.6 hours
Source: Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPUR

Comment: Generic mean 1.9E-5/hr. Operating experience 2E+5 hours of operation, 1 failure.

BCSFO battery charger SCR type

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure moder fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.3E-5/hr 5%: 3.0E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.1 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Pnor:IEEE 500 (1977)(pg93), rec=median; max=95% of distribution. Operating experience: 96.426 hours of operation, 1 failure.
Repair time is mean of updated component maintenance duration.

BCA battery charger general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: hardware failure
al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3

Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: There specific failure mode assigned this component source. ASEP used IREP Procedure Guide value 1.0E-6/hr
isno

for

inthe

of
assuming monthly system test.
BCRFE battery charger rectifier
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.9E-7/hr high: 1.2E-5/hr low: 6.0E-8/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.66 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite different types voltage levels.

is

of

and
BCSFN battery charger solid state general
Component boundary: charger, connecting breakers(feeder & output),protect.& controls Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output

to

no
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.5E-6/hr high: 1.8E-5/hr low: 1.4E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 5-10 hours
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.A12) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.70. Operating time 2.183.975 hours No.of failures 12.
Repair time is range of medians.

QBFAE blower
fan

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.5E-6/hr high: 2.8E-6/hr low: 2.3E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

1.5
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1249 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of different sources, different types, designs and applications of fans, (non nucelar application)
referencerCorps of Engineers,R/M data base; NPRD-2

QBVAE blower ventilator circulating

air

fan

Component boundary: detail Include driver Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.5E-6/hr high: 3.4E-6/hr low: 1.9E-6/hr

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1260 Ultimate source: expert opinion and experience
Comment: reference: company
A/E

"B

CBAAB bus
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-8/hr max: 2.0E-7/hr min: 6.E-10/hr

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data
and

Comment :
o
N» CBAAI bus
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

CB2FH bus 120 V AC , 220 V AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-7/hr 95%: 6.8E-7/hr 5%: 6.3E-8/hr
Source: Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experiecne
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 5.0E-7/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+6 hours of opeartion, no failures.

CB1FH bus 120 V DC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.2E-7/hr 95%: 9.2E-7/hr 5%: 6.9E-8/hr
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 5.0E-7/hr. Operating experience 4.1E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
CB3FH
bus380V

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.7E-7/hr 95%: 7.5E-7/hr 6.3E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 5.0E-7/hr. Operating experience 9.5E+5 hours operation, failures.
of

no
CB6FH bus 6 kV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.1E-7/hr 95%: 8.5E-7/hr 5%: 6.6E-8/hr

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 5.0E-7/hr. Operating experience 5.4E+5 hours operation, failures.
of

no
CB5HT bus Voltage <= 500V
Component boundary: bar, measurement Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal

bus
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short circut
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.2E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.50 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Op.exp.:total pop.254. Op. time 748E+4 hours, 2 failures. a=0.00952,-b=29400. Critical failures ocuried at two plants only.
This is only faiImode experienced(no interruption or ground cnts.

CBDFO
busDC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.2E-7/hr 95%: 8.3E-7/hr 3.E-10/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977}(pg.185),rec=median;max=80%distribution Operating experince: 2.89E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
Repair time mean updated maintenance duration(bus panel)
is

of

or
CBBFE bus bare outdoor switchgear
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.3E-7/hr high: 2.0E-6/hr low: 4.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.804 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
50

Comment: Reference : IEEE 500 (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include open circut, short line to
line and short to ground.

CBAAJ general
bus

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: hardware failure
al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

5
Source: NUREG 4550,Vol.1, tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: There specific failure mode assigned this component source. ASEP used IEEE value 1.3E-7/hr assuming monthly
isno

for

inthe

of
system test.

CBHFO high voltage,indoor voltage

bus

>=4kV

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.2E-7/hr 95%: 1.5E-6/hr 5%: 3.1E-9/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.188),rec=median;max=80% distribution Operating experience:4.34E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

of

no
Repair time is mean of updated maintenance duration (4kV bus).
CBIAE bus insulated switchgear bus 601-15 kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.9E-7/hr high: 3.0E-7/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.810 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE 493 (1980)

CBLFO voltage indoor voltage

buslow

<=60V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-7/hr 95%: 8.3E-7/hr 1.8E-9/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:IEEE 500 (1977)(pg.188),rec=median;max=80% of distribution Operating experience:2.17E+6 hours of operation, no failures.

CBMFE bus metal entclosed

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 8.0E-8/hr high: 4.0E-7/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.811 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion
Comment: Reference: IEEE 500 (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include open circut,short line to
line short ground.
and

to

CBHIZ bus metal entclosed

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-8/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior: IEEE 500(1977)(pg188), metal entclosed bus.Prior failure mode "open circut"
Operating experience: 3.0E+6 hours of operation, no failures

CCCGE cable control cable copper conductors

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short ground Original failure mode: short line ground
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.4E-6/hr high: 4.4E-6/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.773 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
50

Comment: Failure rate 1000 circut feet Reference :IEEE (1977)

per

50
CCCHE cable control cable copper conductors
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short line to line
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.lE-6/hr high: 1.9E-6/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.773 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation

50
Comment: Failure rate is per 1000 circut feet Reference: IEEE 500 (1977)

CCPIE cable power cable

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.6E-7/hr high: 1.9E-6/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.747 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite different types, isolation voltage levés power cables.
is

of

and

of
Failure rate 1000 circut feet.
per

CCPGE cable power cable general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short ground Original failure mode: short tine ground
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.2E-6/hr high: 8.8E-6/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.747 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite different types,isolât voltage levels power cables.
is

of

ionad

of
Failure rate 1000 circut feet.
per

CCPHE cable power cable general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short line line

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 7.1E-7/hr high: 5.3E-6/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.747 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different types, isolation and voltage levels of power cables.
Failure rate is given per 1000 circut feet.

CCSGE cable signal (supervisory) general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short to ground Original failure mode: short line to ground
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.5E-6/hr high: 4.3E-6/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr
OR

rec•

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.778 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation

50

Comment: Failure rate per 1000 circut feet Reference : IEEE 500 (1977)
CCSHE cable signal (supervisory) general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short line to line
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 9.5E-7/hr high: 1.7E-6/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.778 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Failure rate per 1000 circut feet Reference: IEEE 500 (1977)

KA4AF circut breaker 4.16

kV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.1E-7/hr 95%: 1.1E-6/hr 5.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
OR

5%:

1.4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.422. Cum.operating time 25.3E+6 hours. failures."All modes incl:1)fails short circut,2)spurious operation,3)other.

18

2)&3
about equal, 1)negligable(no failure recorded).

KA4CF circut breaker 4.16

kV

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-4/d
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR

Comment: Operating experience or some other basis for failure rate determination is not provided.

KA4DF circut breaker 4.16 kV

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spurious operation
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-7/hr 95%: 6.9E-7/hr 2.4E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
OR

5%:

1.6
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.422. Cumulative operating time 25.3E+6 hours. 10 failures.

KA6CH circut breaker

6kV

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.9E-3/d 95%: 6.4E-3/d 1.0E-3/d
OR

5%:

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands. failures.
348

2
KA6DH circut breaker

6kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: fail during opérâtion(transfer open)

to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.5E-7/hr 95%: 8.lE-7/hr 5%: 3.4E-8/hr
Source: Ultimate source: Generic data updated with plant operating experience

OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 8.3E-7/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+6 hours of opeartion, no failures.

KALAF circut breaker

60V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-7/hr 95%: 3.3E-7/hr 5%: 1.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.690. Cum.operating time 43E+6 hours. 8 failures." All modes" incl:1)fails short circut,2)spurius operation,3)other. 2) & 3)
equal in value, 1) negligable (no failures occured)

KALCF circut breaker

60V

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.0E-4/d
OR

Source: data Ultimate source: assesement

HWR

HWR

Comment: Operating experience or some other basis for failure rate determination is not provided.

KALDF circut breaker 600 V

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spurious operation
to

in

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-7/hr 95%: 2.2E-7/hr 5%: 4.6E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.0 REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.690. Cumulative operating time 43E+6 hours.4 failures.

KALCT circut breaker Voltage

<=60V

Component boundary: breaker Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-3/d 95%: 7.3E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.53 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.730. No.of demands 11471. No.of failures 21.Critical failures reported at 5 plants.
a=0.0299; b=16.3
o
oo KALDT ci reut breaker Voltage <= 660 V
Component boundary: breaker Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spourious change position

to

in

of
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.53 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.730. Operational time 2250E+4 hours. No.of failures 8. Critical failures reported at 4 plants.
a=0.0117; b=32900

KAMCT circut breaker Voltage between

6and10kV
Component boundary: breaker Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-3/d 95%: 4.3E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.52 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.278. No.of demands 1760.No.of failures Critical failures occured plants.

3.

at3
a=0.0208; b=12.2

KAMDT circut breaker Voltage between

6and10kV

Component boundary: breaker Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: spourious change of position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.2E-7/hr 95%: 3.8E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.52 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(7BUR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.278.Operational time 932E+4 hours No.of failures Critical failures occured plants

3.

at3
a=0.0145; b=45200

KAMDU circut breaker low voltage (11 kV and below)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spurious operation
to

in

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr

Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.14) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial expereince nad data
Comment: Assesment based on U data item, literature source and 3 SRS data items.(3.5E-7/hr op.ex 357E+6 hrs-mdustnal use)(4.1E-7/hr,op.ex
185E+6hrs)(6.6E-7/hr,op.ex.1.5E+6hrs).

KAMEU circut breaker low voltage (11 kV and below)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.14) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial expereince data
B

nad

and
Comment: Data sources do not distinguish between failure modes, so the sources and data used to derive givenb value are the same as for
circut breaker spurious operation.
KAMOU reut breaker voltage below)

ci

low

(1kVand
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.14) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial experience data

and

and
Comment: Data sources distinguish between failure modes, sources data used derive given value same

dont

sothe

and

to

areth

asfor
circut breaker spurious operation.

KA4DO circut breaker AC 4 kV

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.9E-8/hr 95%: 2.5E-7/hr 5%: 2.0E-9/hr
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148).Failure mode"spourious operation" Component: Indoor design AC c/b.rec=50%;max=95% of distribution.
Operating experienced.88E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

2
KA4EO circut breaker AC 4 kV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.9E-4/d 95%: 1.6E-3/d 5%: 5.4E-5/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg 148). rec=median;max=80% distribution. Operating experience: 1193 demands, failures.

of

2
KA400 circut breaker AC 4 kV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-4/d 95%: 6.7E-4/d 1.5E-5/d
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148)."Failure to open" includes combined IEEE modes"fail to open" and "fail to interrupt on opening".rec=
median;max=95%of distrib(combined).0p.ex.1192 demands, no faillir.

KALDO circut breaker AC voltage <= 600 V

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer open
to

in

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-7/hr 95%: 8.5E-7/hr 5%: 4.5E-8/hr

Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148),indoor AC c/b.rec=50%;max=80% of dis Failure mode "spourious opérât ion".Same prior as for high volt.cb
Operating experienced.04E+6 operating hours, 2 failures.
KDCDO reut breaker
ci

DC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-7/hr 95%: 4.2E-7/hr 5%: 2.E-10/hr
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg150),rec=median; max=80% of distribution. Operating experience: 9.16E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

KBFDZ circut breaker feed breaker

bus

AC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-7/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148) AC breaker interior design, spurious operation. Operating experience: 9.1E+5 hours of operation,
no failures.

KBFEZ circut breaker feed breaker

bus

AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148) breaker interior design,fails close. Operating experience: 3120 demands, failures
AC

to

5
KBFOZ circut breaker feed breaker
bus

AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.3E-4/d
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
NPS

Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148) breaker interior design,fail open. Operating experience:3120 demands, failure.
AC

to

1
KFTAE circut breaker fixed type including molden case
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.9E-7/hr high: 3.6E-6/hr low: 2.5E-7/hr

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.133 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

Comment: Given value is composite of breakers with differrent voltage and current levels
KAACB ci reut breaker general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to transfer
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment:

KAACW circut breaker general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure transfer

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/d 95%: 3.0E-3/d 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial and military expereince and data
Comment: Demand probability based presence proper input signal.

is

on

of
KAADB circut breaker general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: spourious trip
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-5/hr max: 2.0E-4/hr min: 6.0E-7/hr
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

KAADW circut breaker general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature transfer
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 3.0E-6/hr 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial military experience data
I

and

and
Comment :

KA4CI circut breaker general size 4 kV and smaller

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure transfer
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment :
to KA4DI ci reut breaker general size 4 kV and smaller
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spounous trip

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: failure mode "spurious trip" rate given terms probabilityC failures demand)"
For

is

in

of

per
KGBOG circut breaker generator breaker Manufactured by BBC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fait to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 6.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 5
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience (mainly conventional power plants)
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. years operation, failures. Time related rate derived from conventional plants

50.16

of

no

is
conservât we,because there is much less demands in NPPs.

KGBOT circut breaker generator breaker Voltage

=20kV
Component boundary: breaker,local control,central control,surrounding equipment Operating mode: operating (closed) Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-2/d 95%- 3.6E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 15
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.51 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (5 BWR plants)
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.8.No.of demands 295. No.of failures 3. There is not reported any SPURIOUS FUNCTION of gener,
breaker in 19E+4 operational hours. a=0.7; b=65

KAHEG circut breaker high power (leistungschalter)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

6
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources. original text this component called"Leistungschalter ohne
is

of

In

is
Abzweig", 'Abzweig"seems obsolete.
but

tobe

KAHOG circut breaker high power (leistungschalter)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment, normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 2.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 11

Source- German Risk Study (tb.F3.7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources. comment high power circut breaker fail close
is

of

Se

at

to
KIAAE circut breaker indoor application

AC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.4E-7/hr high: 6.5E-7/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.120 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Reference:IEEE 500 (1977)

KIDAE circut breaker indoor application

DC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.4E-7/hr high: 4.0E-7/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.121 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation experience
50

and
Comment: Reference:IEEE 500 (1977)

KISOH circut breaker isolation breaker

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.5E-4/d 95%: 2.1E-3/d 5%: 4.0E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 6.5E-4/d. Operating experience 72 demands, no failures.

KMTAE circut breaker metal clad

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.4E-7/hr high: 5.2E-7/hr low: 2.0E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.141 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite breakers with different voltage current levels
is

of

KCTAE circut breaker molded type and

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.1E-6/hr high: 2.9E-6/hr low: 3.1E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.1 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.124 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite and include different numbers of poles (1,2,3) and current levels.
KM3DH reut breaker motor operated
ci

380V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer open

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.9E-7/hr 95%: 4.9E-7/hr 2.4E-8/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic datda updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 8.3E-7/hr. Operating experience 4.5E+6 hours of opeartion, no failures.

KOAAE circut breaker outdoor application

AC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.2E-7/hr high: 1.3E-6/hr low: 6.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.122 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Reference: IEEE 500 (1977)

KRPOZ circut breaker reactor protection breakers

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.8E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.148), breaker indoor design.Prior failure mode "catastrophic failure".
AC

Operating experience:612 demands, 5 failures

JEMFU cluch mechanical

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial military expereince data
I

and

and
Comment: Demand probability based presence proper input signal.
on

of

JEEDW clutch electrical

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature disengagement
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial military experience
I

and

Comment :
JEEFW clutch electrical
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial and military experience and data
Comment: Demand probability is based on presence of proper control signal

QCMRH compressor MSIV compressor

air
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.3E-3/hr 95%: 5.9E-3/hr 5%: 2.7E-3/hr REPAIR TIME: 4.5 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 9.8E-5/hr. Operating experience 3640 hours of operation, 18 failures. Repair time is mean of 42 maintenance
events.

QCMSH compressor MSIV compressor

air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.5E-3/d 95%: 4.9E-3/d 5.9E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

756

2
QCCRH compressor containemnt air control
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.5E-3/hr 95%: 4.5E-3/hr 8.2E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 39.7 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 9.8E-5/hr. Operating expereince 1533 hours operation, failures. Rapair time mean maintenance

of

is

of2
events.

QCCSH compressor containment air control

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.9E-3/d 95%: 2.0E-2/d 2.3E-3/d
OR

5%:

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 190 demands, 3 failures.
ON QCIRH compressor instrument air
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-4/hr 95%: 4.5E-4/hr 5%: 2.8E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 35.4 hours
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 9.8E-5/hr. Operating expereience 1.3E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance

of

48

is

of165
events(outage of 1).Outage of 2: 3 events, 4.5 hours repair time.

QCISH compressor instrument

air
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.4E-2/d 95%: 3.1E-2/d 1.6E-2AJ
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic eman 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

948

24
QCPRA compressor pumpback (annulus ventilation)
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.9E-5/hr 95%: 7.3E-5/hr 2.8E-6/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 2558 hours operation, failures.

of

no
QCPSH compressor pumpback (annulus ventilation)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.lE-2/d 95%: 1.5E-2/d 5.3E-3/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.
560

NKAAE computational module

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr high: 5.8E-4/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.705 Ultimate source: expert opinion experience
50

and

Comment: Failure rate is composite value of 19 different types of computational modules.

Reference NUREG 2232 (1980)
OCR2W control

rod
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: reactor
Generic failure mode: fail insert Original failure mode: failure insert

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 5%: 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from US nuclear operating expereince
Comment: Given value is for single scram rod.

OCSAE control clustered silver, indium, cadmium control rods

rod
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment:

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.3E-7/hr high: 4,OE-7/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

120
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1267 Ultimate source: expert judgement exepnence
50

and
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

OCCAE control rod cruciform, boron carbide control rods

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment:
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.3E-7/hr high: 4.0E-7/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1268 Ultimate source: expert judgemenet and exepnence
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232 cruciform rods are found in Indian Point 1, Palisades,Yankee Rowe

OCB4T control application

rodBWR

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment:

Generic failure mode: control rod failure Original failure mode: control rod failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-5/d
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.26 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced plants)

BWR
Comment: Total pop.918. No.of demands operational time 36091. no.of failures plant only). a=0.00128; b=46.1
per

1.(atone
OCK2G control type
rodKWUPR

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a

Generic failure mode: fail insert Original failure mode: failure insert
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-90) Ultimate source: german plants operating experience
Comment: Operating experience: 5.1E+6 control rod hours, no reported failures.Per demand probability is 7.0E-5/d (EF 4), calculated
from about 14000 insertions without failures.
oo OCR2H control rod single control rod assembly
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to insert Original failure mode: fail to fully insert on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-5/d 95%: 7.9E-5/d 5%: 2.8E-6/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-5/d. Operating experience 1150 demands, fasilures.

no
ODB1C control drive mechanism BWR-s
rodan

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,aU parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: dropped/uncoupled/overtraveled Original failure mode: uncoupled/overtraveled

rod

rod
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.9E-7/hr 95%: 4.1E-7/hr 5%: 2.1E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.268) Ultimate source: plant reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: LERs from 01.72.to 04.78.

OOB3C control drive mechanism BWR-s (GE)

rodan

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: inproper movement Original failure mode: improper rod movement
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.7E-8/hr 95%: 1.6E-7/hr 5.1E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.282) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: failure rate is based on personnel errors only

ODB2C control rod and drive mechanism BWR-s (GE)

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: fail insert Original failure mode: failure insert during normal shutdown
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-5/d 95%: 7.1E-3/d 5%: 4.1E-6/d
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.218) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: standby hourly rate 2.3E-8/hr
is

ODS2C control rod and drive mechanism BWR-s (GE)

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,alI parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: fail insert Original failure mode: failure insert least during scram
to

to

toa

96%
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.4E-5/d 95%: 1.0E-4/d 5%: 2.6E-5/d
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.202) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: command faults. With command faults 1.1E-4/d. Standby hourly rate 7.5E-8, with command 1.5E-7.
W/o

w/o
ODT3C control drive mechanism BWR-s (GE)

rodan
Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting Operating mode: standby Operating environment:

CR&DM
Generic failure mode: inproper movement Original failure mode: rod fails to move during power changes/testing
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-6/d 95%: 8.5E-6/d 9.2E-8/d

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.234) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: Standby hourly rate 1.1E-8/hr. LERs from 01.72 to 04.78.

ODE2C control drive mechanism PWR-s

rodan
Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting Operating mode: standby Operating environment:

CR&DM
Generic failure mode: fail to insert Original failure mode: failure to insert to at least 96% during scram
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d 95%: 1.2E-4/d 1.1E-5/d
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.202) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: LERs from 01.72 through 04.78. Standby hourly rate 6.6E-8/hr.

ODE3C control rod and drive mechanism PWR-s

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting Operating mode: standby Operating environment:

CR&DM
Generic failure mode: inproper movement Original failure mode: rod fails to move during power changes/testing
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-5/d 95%: 9.6E-5/d 5%: 5.5E-6/d
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.234) Ultimate source: plant reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: command faults. With command faults 7.6E-4/d. Standby hourly rate 4.2E-8/hr, with command 1.0E-6/hr
W/o

w/o
ODP1C control rod and drive mechanism PWR-s
Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: dropped/uncoupled/overtraveled Original failure mode: dropped
rod

rod
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.2E-7/hr 95%: 4.8E-7/hr 2.0E-7/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.255) Ultimate source: plant reports evaluation
US

LER
Comment: command faults. With command faults 2.2E-6/hr
W/o

ODP2C control rod and drive mechanism PWR-s

Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,all parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: fail insert Original failure mode: failure insert during normal shutdown
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 95%: 6.4E-5/d
OR

:n/a

Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.218) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: standby hourly rate 6.3E-8/hr (upper confidence limit) failures recorded
95%

no
ODP3C control rod and drive mechanism PWR-s
Component boundary: control rod,drive mechanism,housing,alI parts connecting CR & DM Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: inproper movement Original failure mode: improper rod movement
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-7/hr 95%: 4.5E-7/hr 1.6E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1331 (1980) (pg.282) Ultimate source: US plant LER reports evaluation
Comment: failure rate is based on personnel errors only LERs from 01.72. to 04.78.

ORLAE control drive lead screw roller drive mechanism

rod

nut
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment:

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.5E-6/hr high: 4.6E-6/hr low: 2.1E-6/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1270 Ultimate source: exeprt judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

ORMAE control rod drive magnetic jack latch drive mechanism

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment:
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 7.8E-7/hr high: 1.7E-6/hr low: 3.9E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1271 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

ORM2T control rod drive BUR appliaction mechanical insertion function

Component boundary: motor,drive nut,drive mechanism,logic,protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: fail to insert Original failure mode: failure of mechanical insertion function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.6E-4/d 95%: 3.9E-3/d
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.26 Ultimate source: plant operating experience(7 plants), reports, LERs

BUR

ATV
Comment: Total pop.918. No.of demands per operational time 126453. No.of failures 84.No failures reported of scram and insertion
function (occuring simultaneously). a=0.0791; b=119

ORH2T control rod drive BUR application hydraulic scram function

Component boundary: drive mechanism, protection and logic, control equipment Operating mode: standby Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: fail to insert Original failure mode: failure of hydraulic scram function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-5/d
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.26 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants)

(7BWR
Comment: Total pop. 918. No.of demands operational time: 36091 number failures Critical failure occured plant only
per

of

1.

atone
a=0.00167; b=60.1
ORAAE control drive general

rod
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment:
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.6E-6/hr high: 4.3E-6/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1265 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: references: NUREG 1331, NUREG 2232 Given value composite diffrerent sources types

is

of

and

ofCR
drives.

UCEAF contrôler electronic

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.9E-6/hr 95%: 8.6E-6/hr 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.6

8
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Population known. Cum.operating time 1.8E+6 hours.9 failures. failure mode comment contrôler pneumatic.
not

Se
UCAAE contrôler general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.1E-7/hr high: 5.6E-4/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.725 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Faliure rate composite value contrôler types. Reference NUREG 2232 (1980).
is

of10

UCPAF contrôler pneumatic

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.4E-7/hr 95%: 1.3E-6/hr 5%: 3.3E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.8 REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Population not known.Cum.operating time 7.7E+6 hours. 5 failures. "All modes"to be used instead:1)faiI.to operate,2)spurious,3)
erratic operation. No data available for this failure modes.

ECEFS converter E/S general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.2E-6/hr
OR

Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment :
(O
ECSfS converter square root general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.2E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment :

QDAFB damper
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

QDAFI damper
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

QDPAE damper Automatic backdraft, paralel blade

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: .6 hours

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1229 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference: Corps of engineers R/M data base

QDOAE damper Modulating, opposed blade, 36X48 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.8E-6/hr high: 2.7E-6/hr low: 1.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

.6
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1228 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference: Corps of engineers R/M data base
 QDTAE damper shut off, two position paralel blade
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1227 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: reference: Corps of Engineers R/M data base, Ground Stationary equipment. Report No 16, 04/12/73

QDCFZ damper containment fan coolers system

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.9E-3/d
OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363 operated valves(PWR),failed operate(mean WASH 1400 operated valves,fails operate(distrib.).

air

to

and

air

to
Operating experience 1150 demands, failures.

3
QDMDH damper manual (HVAC)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normally open Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed
to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-8/hr 95%: 1.1E-7/hr 5%: 1.6E-9/hr
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 4.2E-8/hr. Operating experience 9.9E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

DEIAE diesel engine No.2 fuel oil, 4 stroke, in-line

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 6.5E-3/hr high: 6.5E-2/hr low: 6.5E-4/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.828 Ultimate source: exeprt judgement experience

50

and
Comment: Reference: NUREG 2232

DEVAE diesel engine no.2 fuel oil,4 stroke, block

V

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.7E-3/hr high: 1.0E-2/hr low: 2.0E-3/hr

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.827 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

to
K)
DEARU diesel engine general
Component boundary: complete plant including starters pumps,fuel syst. Operating mode: emergency condition Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/hr 95%: 3.0E-3/hr 3.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial experience expert opinion

and
Comment: Diesel engine mentioned this source engine used emergency generator.Because possible variance redundancy

in

is

torun

AC

of

in
of equipment,fai Irate separated engine whole plant
aux

is

for

and
DGARB diesel generator emergency

AC
Component boundary: SEE IREP OG failure to start Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run, given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/hr max: 2.0E-2/hr mm: 6.0E-5/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opnion aggregation and IREP data
Comment: Failure to run is failure to run for more than 1/2 hour, given start.
Failure rate is applicable to emergency condition.

DGARE diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails while running
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.0E-4/hr high: 8.8E-3/hr low: 2.0E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 11.5 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1218 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite value of IEEE 500 (1977) and several nuclear sources including NUREG 1362 (1980).

DGARG diesel generator emergency

AC

Component boundary: DG,governor,fuel system,start ing system,cooling,controls Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.5E-3/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

2
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-86) Ultimate source: German plants operating experience
Comment: Operating experience:35 units observed for 2.5 years.Exact time known for 11 units(avr.76 hr/y),50 hr/y considered for the rest.
Tot.op.time:3740 hr.No.of failures 17.SHORT OPERATING TIME RATE.

DGARH diesel generator emergency

AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during first hour operation
torun

of

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.7E-3/hr 95%: 3.7E-3/hr 1.3E-3/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

6.8
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.7E-2/hr. Operating experience 1177 hours operation, failures.
of

2
DGARI diesel generator emergency

AC
Component boundary: SEE failure to start, same source Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Failure to run is failure to run more than 1/2 hour,given start.

DGARJ diesel generator emergency

AC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-3/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VII1.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic value from Reliability Power System Study (NUREG/CR-2989) which contain industry wide analysis.

the

ofAC
DGARR diesel generator emergency
Component boundary: detail AC Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure continue
torun

to

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-3/hr 95%: 2.9E-3/hr 5.4E-4/hr
OR

5%:
Source: EPRI NP-2433(1982) (table 3-1) Ultimate source: operating experience(utility supplied data) Peach Bottom

2&3
Comment: Failure rate calculated Peach Bottom plants only. Total expereince 32.9 years. No.of failures
is

for

2&3

5.
DGART diesel generator emergency
AC

Component boundary: DG,control & protection equipment,servi ce systems Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spourious stop
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.5E-3/hr 95%: 2.4E-2/hr REPAIR TIME: 20 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.40 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports,LERs,

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.20. Operational time 1440 hours No.of failures 8. a=0.338; b=60.8
Critical failures reported on 5 plants.

OGARU diesel generator emergency

AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure continue operation
torun

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/hr

Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.13) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial expereince data
B

and

and
Comment: Assesment based on W data item.WASH 1400 and 3 SRS data items, (3.0E-3/hr)(1.3E-3/hr op.exp.8.7E+6hours) (1.4E-3/hr applicable
to average industrial use).
K)
DGARW diesel generator emergency AC
Component boundary: complete diesel generator plant Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure given start

torun

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-3/hr 95%: 3.0E-2/hr 3.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 21 hours

OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: nuclear non-nuclear experience

and
Comment: Repair time mean maintenance duration. plant with specific ation which limits outage time hours, mean maintenance

is

For

the

to24
duration is 13 hours.

DGARZ diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-3/hr
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPS

Comment: Prior: mean NUREG 1362, DG does not continue to run,w/o command, montly testing.Distribution WASH 1400, DG failure to run
Operating experience: operating time 1340 hours, failures.

6
DGASA diesel generator emergency AC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 7.lE-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

4.1
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating expreince

NP
Comment:

DGASB diesel generator emergency

AC

Component boundary: IREP failure start Operating mode- standby Operating environment: normal
SE

DG

to

Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean • 6.UE-5/hr max: 4.0E-4/hr mm: 3.0E-5/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation IREP data

and
Comment: Failure to start is failure to start, accept load and run for 1/2 hour.

DGASE diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fails start
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.6E-2/cy high: 4.0E-1/cy low: 3.0E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 11.5 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1218 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite value of IEEE 500 (1977) and several nuclear sources including NUREG 1362 (1980).
 DGASG diesel generator emergency AC
Component boundary: DG,governor,fuel system,start ing system,cool ing, controls Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-2/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-86) Ultimate source: German plants operating experience
Comment: Starting failure include failures which happed during initial running time.
Operating expereince: ca.810 demands, 24 failures.

DGASH diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-2/d 95%: 1.5E-2/d 6.1E-3/d
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
OldPUR

Comment: Generic mean 2.1E-2/d. Operating experience 1068 demands, 11 failures.

DGASI diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: engine,gen.coupling,governor,out.breaker,exciter,lube & fuel oil Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: BOUNDARY contd.starting system,intake and exaust air. Excluded: starting air compressor and accumulator,fuel storage & transfer
load sequencer synchroiser.FaiImode incl. running hour.
&

for1/2
DGASJ diesel generator emergency
AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic value from Reliability Power System Study (NUREG/CR-2989) which contain industry wide data.
the

ofAC

DGASR diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY pt.est: 1.7E-2/d
OR

Source: EPRI NP-2433(1982) (table S-1) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant utility supplied data,13 plants)

or
Comment: Failure demand based 123.5 years experience 6910 diesel demands.
per

is

on

of

and

NJ
to
oo DGAST diesel generator emergency AC
Component boundary: DG,protection & control equipment,servi ce systems Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.7E-3/d 95%: 2.9E-2/d REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

20
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.40 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(7BUR
Comment: Operating experence:total pop.20. No.of demands 2090. No.of failures 16. a=0.552; b=67.7
Critical failures reported on 6 plants.

DGASU diesel generator emergency

AC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-2/d
OR

:
Source: Sizeuell (PWR/RX312 pg.13) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial expereince data
B

and

and
Comment: Assesment based on W data, WASH 1400,and SRS data,2.6E-2/d out of 1567 demands and 1.3E-2/d out of 5500 demands.

OGASW diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: complete plant,including starters,pumps and fueling system Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-2/d 95%: 1.0E-1/d 1.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment:

DGASY diesel generator emergency

AC

Component boundary: DG,control & protection equipment, service systems Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.40 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (1 PWR plant-Ringhals 2),ATV reports
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.4. No.of demands 492. No.of failures

6.
No failures recorded operating hours.
outf164

OGASZ diesel generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start demand
to

to

on

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-2/d

Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant operatig expereince
Comment: Prior:mean NUREG 1362,DG fails to start, w/o command, montly test Distribution WASH 1400,DG fail to start.
Operating expereince 1693 deamnds, 30 failures.
 DG4RN diesel generator emergency AC 4160 V AC
Component boundary: DG.all local systems and components needed for start & operation Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fait to run Original failure mode: fail to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 6.5E-3/hr high: 2.3E-2/hr low: 2.4E-3/hr REPAIR TIME: 3-8 hours
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.12) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Failure rate combined failure modes "fail run" and"inproper operation" because that comparable with other data

is

to

wayits
sources.

DGXRN* diesel generator emergency 4160

AC

VAC
Component boundary: DG,all local systems and components needed for start & operation Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail run* Original failure mode: fails once started

to

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.6E-4/hr high: 1.8E-3/hr low: 1.6E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

3-8
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.AD Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 14.Operational time 2801. No.of failures

1.
Repair time is the range of median.

DGYRN* diesel generator emergency AC 4160 V AC

Component boundary: DG,atl local systems components needed start operation Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

and

for

&
Generic failure mode: fail to run* Original failure mode: inproper operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 6.1E-3/hr high: 2.lE-2/hr low: 2.2E-3/hr REPAIR TIME: 3-8 hours
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.AD Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Op.experience:pop.17.0p.time 2801 hours.No.of failures 17.High represent range plant spec.means.FMODE incl.fail supply

&low

of

to
withinspec.time and autom.termination.Not consider.fai I.in emerg.

DG4SN diesel generator emergency 4160

AC

VAC

Component boundary: DG,all local systems and components needed for start & operation Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.9E-3/d high: 1.4E-2/d low: 4.0E-4/d REPAIR TIME: 3-8 hours
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.AD Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.14. No.of 2801. No.of failures

8.
Repair time range medians.
is

of

QFVRH containment ventilation

fan

fan

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.1E-5/hr 5%: 1.9E-6/hr

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience.
K) Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 2.6E+5 hours of operation, 1 failure.
U)
o QFVSH Containment ventilation
fan

fan
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-4/d 95%: 7.8E-4/d 5%: 5.0E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

873

no
QFCRZ cooler containment cooler
fan

fan
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failduring operation

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.5E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
NPS

Comment: Prior: WASH 1400 electric motor failure run,extreme environnent Operating experience 1.52E+5 hours operation, failures.

to

of

no
QFCSZ cooler containment cooler
fan

fan

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior: WASH 1400 Electric motor failure to start Operating experience: 1155 demands, 2 failures.
Given value includes motor failures only.

QFCRU fan cooler containment fan coolers

Component boundary: détail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: post LOCA/SLB enviroment
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure continue operation
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-6/hr to

Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.14) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear expereince data
B

and
Comment: only source cited assesment data Westinghouse data item.
The

forthe

of

is

PUR

QFCSU fan cooler containment fan coolers

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: post LOCA/SLB enviroment
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start change speed)
to

to

(or

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-3/d

Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.14) Ultimate source: ultimate data source is not known
Comment: Since no data is available for fan coolers fail to start,low pressure motor driven pump data were used.Given value is a
stdby frate for fans to change from nrml to post fault oper.mode
QFCSO fan cooler reactor building cooling unit
Component boundary: low speed windings,detaiI n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.7E-3/d 95%: 1.2E-2/d 7.8E-4/d REPAIR TIME: 40.5 hours

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience

NPRA
Comment: Prior: motor driven pump failure from NUREG 1205(1980).80%/20% ratio =10.Operating experience:237 demands, failures.

3
Repair time mean plant spec.update maintenance duration.

is

of

of
QFHRO cooler reactor building cooling units
fan

Component boundary: high speed windings,detaiI n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-5/hr 95%: 2.4E-5/hr 5%: 1.3E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 40.5 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:median from NUREG 1635 (1980).Only plants reporting coolers failure were B&W.Data motors=5.3E-6/hr blower 1.7E-6

for

andfor
combined 7E-6 used as median.Op.experience 81.351 op.hrs,1 failur

QFLRO fan cooler reactor building cooling units

Component boundary: low speed windings, detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: operational failure
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.5E-6/hr 95%: 2.4E-5/hr 5%: 4.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 40.5 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating expermce
Comment: Same prior as for high speed windings. Operating experience: 24.175 hours of operation, no failures.
Repair time is mean of plant spec.update of maintenance duration.

KSFCG feeder(ABZWEIG) general

Component boundary: circut breaker, fuse, connecting cable Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail open close
to

to

ort
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: ABZWEIG in German terminology indicate the path which is used to feed the electricity to final consumer(component-pump). It
usually consist circut breaker,fuse connecting cables.
of

and

YFMAE filter liquid, mechanical restriction

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment- normal
Generic failure mode- modes Original failure mode- modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2 7E 6/hr high: 5.3E-6/hr low: 1 3E 6/hr

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1404 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and

Comment- reference- NUREG 2232

W
Is) UCFFS flow contrôler general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.2E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BUR operating experience
Comment:

KTAAF fuse all voltage levels

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.lE-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

2
Source: data Ultimate source: known
HWR

not
Comment: "all modes" sould used instead of:1)premature open. 2)fails short circut,3)faiIs open circut.However, operational data
FM

be

no

or
other sources which were bases for fail.rate determ.are given.

KTAKB fuse general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: premature open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment:

KTAKG fuse general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: premature opening
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment:

KTAKI fuse general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: premature open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment:
 KTAKW fuse general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: premature open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 3.0E-6/hr 5%: 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial and military experience and data sources
Comment :

KTAOW fuse general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/d 95%: 3.0E-5/d 3.0E-6/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial and militay experience and data
Comment:

DTGAE gas turbine driven generator emergency AC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.8E-3/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1225 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and experience
Comment: Source: Gas Turbine Manufacturer A. One cycle=one start attempt

FYAYG gasket
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leakage

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 4.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

8
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources.
is

of

EGSRE generator steam turbine driven

AC

Component boundary: detail n/a , does not include driver. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail once started
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 7.2E-7/hr high: 1.5E-6/hr low: 4.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.257 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977)
50

OJ
OJ
EGSSE generator steam turbine driven

AC
Component boundary: detail n/a, does include driver. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

not

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.5E-7/hr high: 9.5E-7/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.257 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977)

EGDRE generator general

DC

Component boundary: detail n/a, does not include driver. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail once started
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.4E-7/hr high: 2.4E-5/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.272 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate composite different sources.
is

EGDSE generator DC general of

Component boundary: detail n/a, does include driver Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
not

al
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.3E-7/hr high: 1.3E-5/hr low: O.OE-0/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.272 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different sources.

HXCTH heat exchanger primary component cooling HX

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture/excessive leakage during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-6/hr 95%: 3.8E-6/hr 3.2E-7/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.0E-6/hr. Operating experiencel.36E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
HXRTH heat exchanger residual heat removal HX
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture/excessive leakege during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.9E-6/hr 95%: 5.0E-6/hr 3.2E-7/hr
OR

5%:

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.0E-6/hr. Operating expereince 1.43E+4 hours operation, failures.
of

no
 HXSTH heat exchanger secondary component cooling

HX
Component boundary: detail n.a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture/excessive leakage during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-6/hr 95%: 3.8E-6/hr 3.2E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.0E-6/hr. Operating experience 1.36E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

HXHAE heat exchanger tube horisontal shell tube

and
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.8E-6/hr high: 7.6E-6/hr low: 2.9E-6/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1359 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

HXHAF heat exchanger tube horisontal shell tube

U

and
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-5/hr 95%: 1.9E-5/hr 6.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.6

24
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Component population 107.Cumulative component operating time 90E+4 hours.No.of failures 10.Failure mode"aU modes"include:
1)plugged,2)external,3)internal leak, 4)inadequate heat transfer

HXDAE heat exchanger U tube shell and tube plus steam drum
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.7E-6/hr high: 2.7E-4/hr low: 6.2E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1357 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

HXVAE heat exchanger U tube veritcal shell and tube

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 9.3E-6/hr high: 1.4E-5/hr low: 6.5E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1358 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and

Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

OJ
u» HXVAF heat exchanger tube vertical shell tube
ON

and
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-5/hr 95%: 5.2E-5/hr 5%: 3.1E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 24 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HUR operating experience
Comment: Componet population 98.Cumulative componet operating time 105E+4 hours.No.of failures 42.Failure mode "all modes" include:
1)external.2)internal leak,3)plugged,4)inadequate heat transfer

HXA6B heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage(shell) Original failure mode: shell leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment :

HXA6I heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage(shell) Original failure mode: shell leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert judgement
Comment :

HXA6J heat exchanger general

Component boundary: deatil n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage (shell) Original failure mode: Rupture (Leakage)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed form several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic value from IREP Procedure Guide.
the

HXA7B heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage (tube) Original failure mode: tube leak(per tube)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-9/hr max: 2.0E-8/hr min: 6.E-11/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data
and

Comment :
HXA7I heat exchanger general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage (tube) Original failure mode: tube leak (per tube)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert judgement
Comment:

HXAOJ heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: blockage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: NUREG 4550,Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: value taken from single plant study.

PSA
Comment: ASEP used generic value from GE's LaSalle's PSA.

HXAYS heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.7E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment :

HXAYZ heat exchanger general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.1E-7/hr
OR

Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant operating experience
NPS

Comment: Prior NPRDS page 34. (mean4.6E-6/hr, distribution engn.judgement) Operating experience 2.36E+5 hours, no failures.Plugged shell and
/or tube side=negligible(engn.judgement).8.35E+4 hrs,no failures.

HXCAE heat exchanger helical coil general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 8.7E-6/hr high: 5.6E-4/hr low: 1.4E-6/hr

OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1352 Ultimate source: expert judgement operating experience
50

and

Comment: reference: NUREG 2232 Given value is composite of different helical coil heat
exchangers
 HXBAF heat exchanger straight tube hon'sontal shell tube
o

and
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-5/hr 95%: 2.8E-5/hr 1.4E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 24 hours

OR

5%:

1.4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating exprience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Component population 120. Cumulative component operating time 119E+4 hours.No.of failures Failure mode "all modes"include:

24.
1)plugged,2)external,3)internal leak, inadequate heat transfer

4)
HXBAE heat exchanger straight tube horizontal shell tube

and
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.2E-6/hr high: 7.3E-6/hr low: 2.lE-6/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1363 Ultimate source: expert judgement operating experience
50

and
Comment: reference .-NUREG 2232

HXZAF heat exchanger straight tube radiation type

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

alt
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.1E-5/hr 1.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.1

24
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Component population 46.Cumulative component operating time 69.8E+4 hours.Mo.of failures 3. Failure mode "all modes" include:
1)pluged,2)external,3)internat Ieakage,4)inadequate heat transfer

HXZAE heat exchanger straight tube radiator type

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.2E-6/hr high: 7.2E-6/hr low: 1.6E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1361 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

Comment: reference: NUREG 2232 and

HXMAE heat exchanger straight tube vertical shell tube

and

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.3E-5/hr high: 3.7E-5/hr low: 1.4E-5/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1362 Ultimate source: expert judgement operating experience
50

and

Comment: reference : NUREG 2232

 HXMAF heat exchanger straight tubes vertical shell tube

and
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-4/hr 95%: 1.5E-4/hr 8.3E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 24

OR

5%:

1.3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince

HWR

HWR
Comment: Component population 38.Cumulative component operating time 31E+4 hours.No.of failures 34. Failure mode "all modes" include:
1)plugged,2)external,3)nternal leak, 4)inadequate heat transfer

EHTFE heat tracing pipe heater

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failed heat

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 5.6E-7/hr high: 1.6E-6/hr low: 2.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.310 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate composite sources. Reference: IEEE 500(1977) NUREG 2232 (1980)
is

oftw

and
EHA5E heater air heater general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: overheated Original failure mode: overheated
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.5E-7/hr high: 3.6E-6/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.5 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.288 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate comosite different types sizes heaters different sources including non-nuclear sources.
is

of

and

of

and
EHAFE heater heater general
air

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failed heat
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec • 1.lE-6/hr high: 1.6E-5/hr low: 7.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.5 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.288 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different types and sizes of heaters and different sources including non-nuclear application.

JHFAE heater feedwater heater

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.3E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

54

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1387 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference: Nuclear unit productivity analysis, EPRI report
No46

W
EHPFE heater pressurizer heater
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: catastrophic

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.2E-6/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.286 Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Catastropic failure mode include "Won't heat" and "Other" failure modes.
Reference:NUREG 2232 (1980)

QVARH hvac unit annulus ventilation

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.2E-5/hr 95%: 7.9E-5/hr 4.4E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 21.6 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 4.2E+5 hours of operation, 31 failure. Repair time is mean of 59 maintenance
events.

QVXRH hvac unit auxiliary building

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.lE-5/hr 95%: 7.4E-5/hr 4.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

10
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 3.5E+5 hours of operation, 22 failures. Repair time is mean of 77 maintenance
events.

QVXSH hvac unit auxiliary building

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-3/d 95%: 3.7E-3/d 5%: 4.2E-4/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating expereince
Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience demands, failures.
635

QVBRH hvac unit battery room ventilation

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.2E-6/hr 95%: 1.2E-5/hr 2.9E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

5.1
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant opearting experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operaing experience 2.7E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenace events.
of

is

of
QVBSH hvac unit battery room ventilation
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-4/d 95%: 8.7E-4/d 5%: 5.0E-5/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience

OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience 376 demands, no failures.

QVCRH hvac unit cable spreading room

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.7E-5/hr 5%: 3.4E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 5.1 hours
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours of operation, 2 fai lures.Repair time is mean of 6 maintenance events

QVCSH hvac unit cable spreading room

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5.0E-5/d
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience 189 demands, no failures.

QVRRH hvac unit control room ventilation

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.5E-5/hr 95%: 4.7E-5/hr 1.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 46.9 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 9.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.7E+5 hours of operation, 4 failures. Repair time is mean of 7 maintenance
events.

QVRSH hvac unit control room ventilation

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-3/d 95%: 9.6E-3/d 1.4E-3/d
OR

5%:

Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experince
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 8.1E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

394

2
to QVERH hvac unit electric eqiupment area ventilation
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.4E-5/hr 95%: 9.6E-5/hr 5%: 4.9E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 28.6 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 2.6E+5 hours of operation, 21 failures. Repair time is mean of 50 maintenance
events.

QVESH hvac unit electrical equipment area ventilaton

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-4/d 95%: 7.8E-4/d 5%: 5.0E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experince
Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience 1174 demands, failures.

no
QVIRH hvac unit intermediate building
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-5/hr 95%: 3.0E-5/hr 5%: 4.5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 25 hours
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 7.9E-6/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance events

of

is

of
QVISH hvac unit intermediate building
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5.0E-5/d
OR

Source: 5%:
Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience demands.no failures

207

QVASH hvacunit annulus ventilation

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-4/d 95%: 4.5E-4/d 5%: 4.4E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.8E-4/d. Operating experience 3189 demands,no failures.
UIEFT indicating instrument electronic general
Component boundary: not clear Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: faulty measurement
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.7E-7/hr 95%: 3.1E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.39 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATv reports, LERs

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 280. Operational time 1040E+4 hours. No.of failures 8. a=0.0315; b=41100
Critical failures reported plants.

on5
IAABW instrumentation general
Component boundary: includes transmitter, amplifier and output device Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: shift in calibration
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/hr 95%: 1.0E-4/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from military experience data testing facilities

and

and
Comment: The data for shift in calibration incorporate a variation of drift magnitude, an may be very pessimistic if used for instrumen
tarion with wide tolerance bands.

IAAFI instrumentation general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

IAAFU instrumentation general

Component boundary: includes transmitter, amplifier and output device Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial and military experience and data
Comment: The relatively large error factor associated with instrumentation reflects wide variation in configuration from application to
application.

ICCBM instrumentation channel analog core flux

Component boundary: Complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.8E-6/hr 95%: 6.4E-6/hr 5%: 5.3E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
19)

US

LER

Comment: Overall rate,with command- faults. W/o command faults 5.3E-6/hr

-t*.
Ji. 1CCFM instrumentation channel analog core flux
Component boundary: Complete instr.channel(sensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.2E-6/hr 95%: 9.0E-6/hr 7.5E-6/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

19)

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate with command faults. W/o command faults 7.5E-6/hr.

ICFBM instrumentation channel analog flow

Component boundary: comlete instr.channel(sensor,trensmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.2E-6/hr 95%: 6.2E-6/hr 5%: 4.3E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate with command faults. command faults 4.9E-6/hr.

W/o
ICFFM instrumentation channel analog flow
Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: inoperable
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.5E-6/hr 95%: 5.4E-6/hr 5%: 3.8E-6/hr

Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate with command faults.W/o command faults 4.2E-6/hr. PWR rate about 4 times higher than 8WR.

ICLBH instrumentation channel analog level

Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.7E-6/hr 95%: 8.0E-6/hr 5%: 5.6E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
19)

US

LER
Comment: Not applicable to BWR. Overall PWR rate with command faults. W/o command faults 6.2E-6/hr.

ICLFM instrumentation channel analog level

Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: inoperable
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.5E-6/hr 95%: 5.4E-6/hr 5%: 3.8E-6/hr

Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: applicable BWR.Overall rate with command faults. command faults 4.1E-6/hr.
Not

to

PWR

W/o
ICPBM instrumentation channel analog pressure
Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capacity
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.2E-6/hr 95%: 9.8E-6/hr 5%: 6.8E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: applicable BWR. Overall rate with command faults. command faults 7.8E-6/hr.

Not

to

PWR

W/o
ICPFM instrumentation channel analog pressure
Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.6E-6/hr 95%: 6.0E-6/hr 3.5E-6/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Not applicable to BWR. Overall PWR rate with command faults. W/o command faults 3.8E-6/hr.

ICTBM instrumentation channel analog temperature

Component boundary: complete instr.channeKsensor,transmitter,cond.system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.8E-6/hr 95%: 8.8E-6/hr 5.2E-6/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: applicable BWR. Overall rate with command faults. command faults 6.7E-6/hr.
Not

to

PWR

W/o
ICTFM instrumentation channel analog temperature
Component boundary: complete instr.channneKsensor,transmitter,cond. system,bistable) Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-5/hr 95%: 1.7E-5/hr 5%: 1.2E-5/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Not applicable to BWR. Overall PWR rate with command faults. W/o command faults 1.3E-5/hr.

IDLBH instrumentation channel digital level

Component boundary: level switch Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 6.9E-6/hr
OR

5%:

Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Level switch is considered a channel.Not applicable to PWR. BWR rate with command faults. W/o commad faults 6.8E-6/hr
IDLFM instrumentation channel digital level
Component boundary: level switch Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.7E-6/hr 95%: 3.8E-6/hr 1.9E-6/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

19)

US

LER
Comment: Level switch considered channel. applicable PWR. rate with command faults. command faults 2.4E-6/hr.

is

Not

to

BWR

W/o
IDPBH instrumentation channel digital pressure
Component boundary: pressure switch Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.3E-6/hr 95%: 8.0E-6/hr 5%: 6.6E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 19) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Pressure switch considered channel.Overall rate with command fault. command faults 7.1E-6/hr.
is

W/o
BWR rate about 5 times higher than PWR.

IOPFM instrumentation channel digital pressure

Component boundary: pressure switch Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.1E-7/hr 95%: 7.0E-7/hr 5%: 2.3E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
19)

US

LER
Comment: Pressure switch is considered a channel.Overall rate with command faults. W/o command faults 3.7E-7/hr.
BWR rate tvice rate.
is

PWR

YTSQH intake screen service water system

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-6/hr 95%: 9.0E-6/hr 5%: 6.5E-7/hr
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 6.2E-6/hr. Operating expereince 1.36E+5 hours of operation, no failres.

EIAAJ inverter general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: hardware failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: There is no specific failure mode assigned for this component in the source. ASEP used IPRD (NUREG 3831) value of 1.0E-4/hr
assuming montly system test.
EIAFB inverter general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.0E-5/hr max: 4.0E-4/hr min: 3.0E-5/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment:

EIAFI inverter general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

EIAFZ inverter general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-5/hr
OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior: WASH 1400, solid state devices, high power application failure mode "fails to function".Operating experience:
3.04E+5 hours operation, failures.
of

EIIFO inverter instrument inverter

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: operational failure
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-5/hr 95%: 4.8E-5/hr 4.9E-6/hr REPAIR TIME:
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Not possible to identify prior source. Prior mean 1.3E-4/hr. Oper exp:3.37E+5 hours of operation,9 failures.

EISFN inverter solid state volts

120

AC

Component boundary: inverter,transfer switch,rectifier,feeder breaker,prot.& control Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.lE-5/hr high: 1.9E-4/hr low: 8.5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

4-8
Source: NUREG 3831 (1985) (tbl.A18) Ultimate source: operating experience (plant records)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.31. Operating time 985.505 hours No.of failures 21.
Repair time range medians.
is

of
oo EISFT inverter static
Component boundary: inverter,reversing switch,associated cables, transformer,breaker Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: loss of effective output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.2E-6/hr 95%: 2.6E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

13
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.43 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(4BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience: Total pop.10. Operational time 38.5E+4. No.of failures 2. Only one critical failure; a=0.224; b=43100

EISFY inverter static

Component boundary: inverter, reversing switch, associated cables,transformer,breaker Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: loss of effective output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 11 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.43 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (Ringhals

2PUR)
Comment: operating experience: Total pop. Total operational time 17.29E+4 hours.No.of failures

4.

2.
EIZFE inverter static single phase
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output
to

no
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.0E-6/hr high: 1.2E-5/hr low: 3.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.276 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Reference IEEE 500(1977)

EIXFE inverter static three phase

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.0E-6/hr high: 3.0E-5/hr low: 1.9E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.277 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977)
50

UEYFO isolating diode assembly

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-6/hr 95%: 6.8E-6/hr 5%: 4.1E-7/hr
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:Diode,high power application, MIL-HDBK 217C, all failure modes. High power value =20Xlow power va lue.Opérât ing experience:
3.86E+5 hours operation, failure.
of

1
JLCFS lube cooler

oil
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fails operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment:

UMCFF manual control device pushbutton

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source not known. Number of demands in time not known.
Repair time conservatevly estimated to be 3 hours.

UMCKF manual control device pushbutton

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-7/hr
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR

Comment: Ultimate data source known.

not

MPHAF motor HP emergency coolant injection pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-5/hr 95%: 2.9E-5/hr 5%: 1.1E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 223 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population not known. Cumulative component operating time 63.9E4 hours. 11 failures.

MPLAF motor LP emergency coolant injection pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr 95%: 2.1E-5/hr 5%: 5.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.8 REPAIR TIME: 210 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experince
Comment: Population not known. Cumulative component operating time 57.5E+4 hours. 6 failures.
(SI
O MPSAF motor service water pump motor

LP
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.8E-6/hr 95%: 2.1E-5/hr 5.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 200 hours

OR

5%:

1.9
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HUR

HWR
Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 51.1E+4 hours. failures.

not

5
MPFAF motor auxiliary boiler feed pump motor
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-5/hr 95%: 1.5E-5/hr 8.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 274 hours
OR

5%:

1.3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HUR

HUR
Comment: Population not known. Cum.operating time 2.7E+6 hours. 31 failures.

MPCAF motor circulating water pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.7E-6/hr 95%: 1.8E-5/hr 3.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.0 REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

452
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HUR operating experience
Comment: Population known. Cum.operating time 51.9E+4 hours. failures.
not

4
MPEAF motor condensate extraction pump motor
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-6/hr 95%: 3.6E-6/hr 5%: 1.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 161 hour

1.4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HUR

HUR

Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 7.7E+6 hours. failures.
not

19
MPZAF motor emergency service water pump motor
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.2E-5/hr 5%: 5.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.4 REPAIR TIME: hours

150
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population not known. Cumulative component operating time 2.3E+6 hours. 18 failures.
MPXAF motor shield tank cooling pump motor

end
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-5/hr 95%: 2.7E-5/hr 5%: 6.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.9 REPAIR TIME: 211 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experiecne

HWR

HWR
Comment: Population known. Cumulative operating time 38E+4 hours. failures.

not

5
MPBAF motor generator main lube pump motor

oil
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-5/hr 95%: 2.8E-5/hr 5%: 6.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.9 REPAIR TIME: 211 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Populaton not known. Cum.operating time 38E+4 hours.5 failures.

HPMAF motor main moderator pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
n/a
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-5/hr 95%: 3.4E-5/hr 7.3E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.0

27
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

WRU
Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 27E+4 hours. failures.
not

4
MPQAF motor powerhouse upper level service water pump motor
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-5/hr al

95%: 2.4E-5/hr 5.2E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.0

263
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population known. Cum.operating time 38E+4 hours.4 failures
not

MPPAF motor primary heat transport feed circuit pump motor

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.lE-5/hr 95%: 2.3E-5/hr 5%: 5.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.9 REPAIR TIME: 154 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population known. Cum.operating time 45.7E+4 hours. failure
not

5
N) MPVAF motor primary heat transport pump motor
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-5/hr 95%: 2.9E-5/hr 5%: 8.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.7 REPAIR TIME: hours

170
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population not known. Cum.operating time 45.6E+4 hours. 7 failures.

MPWAF motor shutdown cooling water pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-5/hr 95%: 3.1E-5/hr 8.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 184 hours
OR

5%:

1.8
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 38E+4 hours. failures.
not

6
MACRE motor AC general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail once started
torun

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.2E-6/hr high: 3.0E-3/hr low: O.OE-0/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.8 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.220 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different types and voltage levels.

MAIRE motor induction

AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail to run once started
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr high: 1.6E-3/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.229 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite of different voltage and power levels.

MASAE motor split phase

AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.6E-6/hr high: 1.5E-3/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.242 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

Comment: Failure rate composite voltage levels

is

oftw
MAWAE motor AC synchronous single phase
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail to run once started
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.0E-7/hr high: 8.4E-7/hr tow: 5.6E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.241 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment :

MAWSE motor synchronous single phase

AC
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 5.5E-7/hr high: 6.6E-7/hr low: 4.4E-7/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.241 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Number of starts in time not known.

MDAAE motor DC general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.5E-5/hr high: 3.7E-4/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.245 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure mode is compsite of two types of DC motors

MPKAF motor boiler feed pump motor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-5/hr 95%: 2.6E-5/hr 9.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.6

194
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Population known. Cumulative operating time 65E+4 hours. failures

not

10
MAARG motor general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail to run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 2.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data

Comment: Failure rate is combination of number of generic data sources including non-nuclear.
MAARS motor general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fails given start

torun

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment:

MAARU motor general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run, given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/hr 95%: 3.0E-5/hr 5%: 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial and military expereince and data
Comment: Applicable only to motors that function independently of pumps and valves.

MAASG motor general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 8
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination number generic data sources, including nuclear.
is

of

of

no
MAASW motor general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial military expereince data
I

and

and
Comment: Demand probability is based on presence of proper input signal Applicable only to motors that function independently of
pumps and valves

MAXRW motor general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: extreme (post accident)
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run, given start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/hr 95%: 1.0E-2/hr 1.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from mi Iitary,research & test reactor and limited NPP
Comment: Applicable only motors that function independently pumps valves
to

of

and
MSSFE motor servo general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail to position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.6E-7/hr high: 5.5E-7/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.248 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite.

is
MSSFE motor servo general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.5E-7/hr high: 5.5E-7/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.248 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate is composite. Number of demands in time not known.

MGXAE motor generator

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.0E-5/hr high: 5.6E-5/hr low: 2.8E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

2.5
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.278 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite non-nuclear sources. References: Corps engineers data base NPRD-2
is

oftw

of

R/M

and
MGAFH motor generator AC 220 V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.4E-5/hr 2.5E-6/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.6E-5/hr. Operating experience 5.4E+5 hours of operation, 3 failures.

MGDFB motor generator D-C

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data and
Comment :
 MGDFI motor generator
O\

D-C
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

MGRFT motor generator D-C rotating converter

Component boundary: DC motor, generator,excitât ion,rotation regulator,fuse,cables. Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: loss effective output

to

of
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.1E-5/hr 95%: 7.2E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

14
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.44 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: operating experience:total pop.42.Operational time 147E+4 hours No.of failures 31.a=0.711; b=33700. groups rot. converters:

of
regulation of main coolant pumps(NNS);supply batt.secured AC net

FXAQB orifice
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plug
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-7/hr max: 4.0E-6/hr min: 3.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: Given data are WASH 1400 data as alternate data are not available. WASH data are per demand. Calculated number
of demands per unit time is not known.

FXTQU orifice, test valve, flow meter

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: failure remain open (plug)
to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: ultimate data source not known
Comment :

FXTTW orifice, test valve, flow meter

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from reports and experts opinion
Comment :
EB1FO panelboard 120 V AC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: operational failure

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.8E-7/hr 95%: 8.3E-7/hr 3.E-10/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Pricr:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.185) buswork, failmode"fai lure during operation". Operating experience:3.86E+5 hours,no failures.

DC
Repair time is mean of updated maintenance duration(bus or panel)

JPEAE penetration electrical

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1342 Ultimate source: expert opinion and experience
Comment: reference : NUREG 1730

JPPAE penetration piping

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1343 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference NUREG 1730

FSSTF pipe (nuclear grade ) straight section diameter size less than 1 inch
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-9/hr 95%: 2.0E-9/hr 7.E-10/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

1.6
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population 7.3E+4 meters.Operating time 8.5E+9 meter-hours.No.of failures Data include contribution from pressure boundary

10.

al
components(nozzle,fittings,valve bodies).

FSMTF pipe (nuclear grade) straight section diameter sizes between inches
1and6

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.E-11/hr 95%: 3.E-10/hr 5%: 2.E-11/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expreince
Comment: Population:13E+4 meters.Operating time 1.5E+10 meter-hrs. failure. Data include contribution from pressure boundary
1

al
components(nozzle,fittings,valve bodies).
oo FS3JW piping <= 3" diameter
Component boundary: pipe section(average lenght between two discontinuities-valves) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture/plug Original failure mode: rupture/plug
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-9/hr 95%: 3.0E-8/hr 5%: 3.E-11/hr ERROR FACTOR: 30
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial experience and expert opinion
Comment: Given value pipe section. Given value applicable standby actve pipes.

isper

to

and
Assesment based on rupture only.

FSMJW piping diameter

>3"

Component boundary: Pipe section(average lenght between two discontinuities-valves) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: rupture/plug Original failure mode: rupture/plug
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.E-10/hr 95%: 3.0E-9/hr 5%: 3.E-12/hr ERROR FACTOR: 30
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial expereince and expert opinion
Comment: Given value pipe section. Applicable high quality piping. Given value applies standby
isper

to

to
and active pipes. Assesment based on rupture only.

FE5AE piping elbow inches

4-6

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.9E-5/hr high: 1.9E-3/hr low: 6.3E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1319 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference NUREG 2232

FEATH piping expansion joint

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture/excessive leakage during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.9E-8/hr 95%: 1.7E-7/hr 1.0E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 1.6E-6/hr. Operating experience 6.83E+6 hours of operation, no failures.

FE3AE piping expansion joint 3 " 400 PSI corrugated steel

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1325 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference:NUREG 2232
FNAAE piping nozzle
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.8E-5/hr high: 2.2E-3/hr low: 1.8E-6/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1328 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: Given value composite diffrerent sizes, reference :NUREG 2232

is

of
FNSQO piping nozzle spray nozzle
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged (50%)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.4E-4/d 95%: 9.0E-4/d 5%: 9.5E-6/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: engineering judgement,extrapolation ofdata of small pipe plugging
Comment: Applicable plugging approximately spray nozzles single header. assumed that water flow
tohe

of

50%ofthe

ofthe

Itwas

no
test performed verify that spray nozzles open.
are

to

are
FRLAE piping rupture diaphragm 10-16 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.3E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1327 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: reference :NUREG 2232

FSAAE piping straight section general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 9.4E-6/hr high: 1.8E-3/hr low: 4.5E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1314 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: Given value composite different piping sizes, reference NUREG 2232
is

of

FTAAE piping tees general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.9E-5/hr high: 2.2E-3/hr low: 1.7E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1321 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: G9ven value composite diferent sizes reference: NUREG 2232
is

of

of.
o\
o FTLAE piping thermowell 6-10 inches
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.8E-5/hr high: 7.3E-5/hr low: 1.8E-6/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1324 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference :NUREG 2232

FUSAE piping welds less than conecting weld

4"
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.2E-5/hr high: 2.3E-3/hr low: 7.6E-6/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1326 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference:NUREG 2232

EPAFE power supply general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output
to

no
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.4E-6/hr high: 2.0E-6/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.660 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation

50

Comment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977)

EPAFS power supply general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.2E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBUR
Comment:

PWAAF pump auxiliary boiler feed pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby? Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.6E-5/hr 95%: 1.3E-4/hr 5%: 4.8E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 11 hours
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population: unknown.Cumulative component operating time 14.5E+4 hours. No.of failures 11. FM "all modes" is not defined,but prob.
incl:1)external leak,2)start,3)run failure,4)less than rated outp
PWCRE pump centrifugal
Component boundary: detail n/a. Sometimes include driver. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails while running
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.1E-6/hr high: 5.8E-4/hr low: O.OE-0/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.890 Ultimate source: expert opinion, selected plant data
Comment: Given value composite several sources, different pump types sizes operating modes.More specific data included elswere

is

of

and

and
PWCSE pump centrifugal
Component boundary: Detail n/a.Sometimes include driver Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fails to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.7E-3/cy high: 2.5E-1/cy low: O.OE-0/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.893 Ultimate source: expert opinion,selected plant data.NUREG 2886,1205,2232,NPRD-2
Comment: This value is composite of several sources, different pump types and operating modes.More detailed data are included elswere.

PWDBF pump centrifugal horisontal flow 22-820 l/s

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: less than rated output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-5/hr 95%: 2.1E-5/hr 5%: 1.2E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 18
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Population 44.Cumulative component operating time 226E+4 hours. failures.

35
PWDSF pump centrifugal horisontal flow 22-820 l/s
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: start failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 2.7E-6/hr 5%: 3.4E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.4 REPAIR TIME: 21 hour
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expreince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Number of starts per operational time is not known. Population 44.Component cumulative operational time 226E+4 hours,
no.of lures
fai

2.

PWBRF pump centrifugal horizontal flow 22-820 l/s

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: running failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.2E-6/hr 95%: 9.7E-6/hr 4.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.5

10
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population 44. Component cumulative operating time 226E+4 hours. No.of failures 14.
PWBYF pump centrifugal horizontal flow 22-820

l/s
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.4E-5/hr 95%: 3.0E-5/hr 1.9E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

5%:

8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population Cumulative component operating time 226E+4 hours. failures

4.

54
PWEBF pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900

l/s
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: less than rated output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-5/hr 95%: 1.8E-5/hr 1.1E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 12
OR

5%:

1.3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Population 62. Cumulative component operating time 296E+4 hours. 110 failures.

PWERF pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900 l/s

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: running failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-6/hr 95%: 7.0E-6/hr 5%: 2.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.5 REPAIR TIME: 15 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Population 62.Cumulative component operating time 296E+4 hours. failures.

13
PWESF pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900 l/s
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: start failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.5E-6/hr 5%: 1.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.8 REPAIR TIME: hours

9
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Number starts operational time known. Population Cumulative component operating time 296E+4 hours.
of

per

isnot

62.

No.of failures 1.

PWEYF pump centrifugal vertical flow 70-1900 l/s

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-5/hr 95%: 4.3E-5/hr 5%: 3.1E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: hours

5
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Population 62. Cumulative component operating time 296E+4 hours. No.of failures 110.
PWFAF pump condensate extraction pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-5/hr 95%: 6.8E-5/hr 4.4E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 16.3

OR

5%:

1.2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience

HWR

HWR
Comment: Population: unknown.Cumulative component operating time 100E+4 hr No.of failures 55.FH"all modes" is not defined,but probbably incl
Dexternal leak,2)start,3)run fai lure,4)less than rated output.

PWPRE pump positive displacement

Component boundary: Variable. Sometimes includes driver. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fails while running

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.9E-6/hr high: 2.4E-4/hr low: 0.00
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.855 Ultimate source: expert opinion,selected plant data,NUREG 2886,2232
50

Comment: Given value composite several sources,different pump types sizes operating modes.More specific data included elswere
is

of

and

and
PWPSE pump positive displacement
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fails to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.9E-2/d high: 1.6E-1/d low: 0.0 REPAIR TIME: 7.3 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.855 Ultimate source: expert opinion,selected plant data
Comment: Given value composite several sources, diferent pump types, operating modes.More detailed data which given IEEE500
is

of

and

are

in
regarding pumps included NUREG 2886 data.
are

in

PDAFP pump diesel driven

Component boundary: incl.mech.control,governor,emergency tripping,blower,lube oil sys Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: does not operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-2/d 95%: 3.5E-2/d 4.3E-3/d
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.403) Ultimate source: US plant LER report evaluation
Comment: Pop.4.No failures 4.W/O command faults.With command faults 4.8E-2.Failmode"does operate"ine l :leakage/rupt,loss funct.
of

not

of
failure to start and does not continue to run.Stdby hr.rate 3E-5.

PDARI pump diesel driven

Component boundary: pump,diese I,lube system,fuel oil,suction exhaust,start Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
oil

and

ing

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure given start
torun

torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR: 30

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :
 PDASB pump diesel driven
•^

Component boundary: Pump,diesel,lube oil system,fuel oil,suction and exhaust,start ing Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion agrégation and IREP data
Comment:

PDASD pump diesel driven

Component boundary: pump,shaft,diesel,local instrumentation control circutry Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

and
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fails to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.1E-2/d 3.0E-1/d 4.0E-3/d
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2886 (1982) (tbl.19) Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR 4BUR)

&
Comment: Pop.24. catastrophic demand related failures demands. Upbound lowbound largest smallest rate
9

of427

and

are

and

ofthe
functional aggregates of selected pumps classified by driver

PDASI pump diesel driven

Component boundary: pump,diesel,lube system,fuel oil,suction exhaust,start ing
oil Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

and

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

PDASP pump diesel driven

Component boundary: inc1.rnech.control,governor,emergency tripping,blower,lube oil sys Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: does start
to

not
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (table Ultimate source: plant report evaluation
15)

US

LER

Comment: Pop.4 (PWR BUR). failure. command faults.U command faults 3.0E-2/d. Standby hourly rate with command faults 6.5E-5/hr
&

W/o

PDCRZ pump diesel driven containment spray pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.9E-2/hr

OR

Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant experience
NPS

Comment: Prior:WASH 1400 pumps (w/o motor),fai lure to run, normal environ. WASH 1400, DieseKengine only),fai lure to run.
Operating experience: hours operation, failures.
3

of

2
 PDCSZ pump diesel driven containment spray pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.2E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior:NUREG 1205(diesel pump,stdbyXH),WASH 1400(diesel plant??). (D).0p.exp.183 demands,1 failure. N-1205 population of 4 include
ZION diesel pumps only failure occuring.FaiIrate low?

and

to
PDASJ pump diesel driven general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fails start

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic value from LERs. Failure start incl.two types failure:circut breaker command faults (3.0E-2)
the

to

of

and
pump hardware faults(3.0E-3).

PWWRG pump general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alt Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure
torun

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.9E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3.7
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-72) Ultimate source: generic data,including non nuclear application and experience
Comment:

PWWSG pump general

Component boundary: pump with driver Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start al
Original failure mode: failure start

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
:

7
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-71) Ultimate source: generic data including non-nuclear application
Comment: Assuming 4 weeks test interval, failure rate is about twice the recorded operational experience.

PMAFP pump motor driven

Component boundary: pumping unit,motor,coupling,mech.control.Excl.MCC,breakers,ect Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: does not operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: ,2.4E-3/d 95%: 1.9E-3/d 5%: 2.8E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.387) Ultimate source: US plant LER report evaluation
Comment: Failmode incl.:does start,leak/rupt.,loss funct.,does continue run.Pop:596;No.of failures:76.U/o command fail.W.com.
not

of

not

to

faults 6.2E-3.Stdby hourly rate 4.7E-6,w 1.2E-5.per stdby

w/o

hr.

OS
Wl
PMASP pump motor driven
Component boundary: pumping unit,motor,coupling,mech.controlExcl.MCC,breakers,ect Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: does not start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 5.1E-4/d 95%: 7.lE-4/d 5%: 3.4E-4/d
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.362) Ultimate source: plant report evaluation

US

LER
Comment: Overall data, includes all types of reactors,LER-s from 1972 to 1980.Ttl.pop.596. No.of failures 91.W/o command faults.
W command faults 3.0E-3. Stdby hourly rate 1.0E-6

PMASZ pump motor driven

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.2E-4/d
OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant specific experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1205(tbl.14)standby system does start,w/o comman (mean),and WASH 1400 table 2-1,electric motor failure strt

not

to
for distribution. Experience:3138 demands,3 failures

PMBRP pump motor driven

Component boundary: pumping unit,coupling,motor,mech.control.Excl.MCC,breakers Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: does not operate given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.8E-5/hr 95%: 2.0E-5/hr 5%: 1.6E-5/hr
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.340) Ultimate source: plant report evaluation

US

LER
Comment: Overall data (PWRSBWR)LER from72 to 80.Ttl pop.720,no.of fail 110 W/o command faults(w.command faults 2.1E-5).F.mode does not
operate incl:leakage/rupt.Is.of function,does not cont.to run

PMBSP pump motor driven

Component boundary: pumping unit,motor,coupling,mech.control.excl.MCC,breacker ect. Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: does not start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.4E-4/d 95%: 5.1E-4/d 5%: 2.3E-4/d
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.305) Ultimate source: plant report evaluation
US

LER

Comment: Overall data,include all types of reactors, LER-s from 1972 to 1980. Total pop.720 pumps.Total No.of failures 18.W/o command fit
W.command faults 1.4E-3/d.Stdby hourly rate 1.4E-6/hr.

PMRRP pump motor driven

Component boundary: pumping unit,motor,coupling,mech,control.Excl.MCC,breakers Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
ect

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: does operate given start
torun

not

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 5.3E-6/hr 95%: 6.9E-6/hr 4.1E-6/hr

OR

5%:

Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.292) Ultimate source: plant report evaluation
US

LER

Comment: Overall data(PWR&BWR)LER from 72 to 80.TtI.pop.209,no of fail.12 W/o command faults(w.command faults 1.4E-5).Fmode"does not
operate"incl:leakage/rupt,Is of function,does not cont.to run
 PMURB pump motor driven
Component boundary: pump and motor,exclusdes control circuts Operating mode: alt Operating environment: extreme
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure run, given start

torun

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/hr max: 2.0E-2/hr min: 6.0E-5/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion agrégation IREP data

and
Comment: Extreme operating environment caractérise interface with heavy chemical environment-boric acid.

PMURI pump motor driven

Component boundary: pump motor excludes control circuts Operating mode: Operating environment: extreme

and

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Extreme operating environment caracterised with interface with heavy chemical environment-boric acid.

is
PMURW pump motor driven
Component boundary: detail n/e, including motor Operating mode: Operating environment: extreme, post accident inside containment

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure given start
torun

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/hr 95%: 1.0E-2/hr 1.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from test & resesarch reactors and military experience
Comment :

PMYRB pump motor driven

Component boundary: pump motor, excludes control circuts Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure run, given start
torun

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/hr max: 5.0E-4/hr min: 2.0E-6/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion agrégation IREP data

and
Comment:

PMYRI pump motor driven

Component boundary: pump motor, exclude control circuts Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: failure given start
torun

torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

CT\
Os
00 PMYRS pump motor driven
Component boundary: pump motor Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

and

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.9E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment: From the data tables it is assumed that the given value include failure fot pump to start and to continue running.

PMYRW pump motor driven

Component boundary: detail n/a, include motor Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-5/hr 95%: 3.0E-4/hr 5%: 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial and military experience and data
Comment:

PMYSB pump motor driven

Component boundary: including motor,excluding control circutry Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion agrégation & IREP data
Comment:

PMYSI pump motor driven

Component boundary: including motor, excluding control circutry Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

PMYSW pump motor driven

Component boundary: detail n/a, including motor Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/d : 3.0E-3/d : 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial end military expereince and data
Comment:
PMXRZ pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.9E-5/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Pnors:NUREG 1205 alternating system,does not operate given start (mean) and WASH 1400 pump(w/o motor)fai lure to run(distrib).
Opearting experience:3800 hours operation, failure.

of

1
PMXSA pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start/run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 5.6E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

2.
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol .3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry NPP operating experience (test data")
Comment: It was not possible to identify failure mode as appear in table. It seems to cover starting failure and initial running failure.

PMXSZ pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater

Component boundary: DETAIL n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.0E-3/d
OR

Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
NPS

Comment: Priors: NUREG 1205(tb.14) standby system,does start, comm (mean)and WASH 1400(tbl.III 2-1)electnc motor failure start

not

w/o

to
(distnbution)Experience: 462 demands,4 failures

PMXRH pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.9E-5/hr 95%: 1.7E-4/hr 8.9E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

5.
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source- generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 5641 hour operation, failure. Repair time mean maintenance
of

is

of27
events.

PMXSH pump motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5 4E-3/d 95%: 1.1E-2/d 5%: 1.5E-3/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPUR

Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

42

3
-0
o PMHRZ pump motor driven centrifugal charging pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience

NPS
Comment: Pnors:NUREG 1205,Alternating sys.,motor driven,does operate given strt(M); WASH 1400,pumps,faiI run,extreme environment(D)

not

to
Operating experience:7.6E+4 hours operation, failures

of

no
PHDRT pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal flow rate 130-200 kg/s;head .7 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse,protection,controls Operating mode: runmg Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spourious stop

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-5/hr 95%: 1.0E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 18 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.2 Ultimate source: plant experience,(6 plants), reports, LERs, plant inform.

BUR

ATV
Comment: Operating experemce: total pop. Operating time 18.1E+4 hours failures. a=0.315; b=13800. Critical failures occured plan

16.

at3
ts.

PHOST pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 30 kg/s; head 2.2-6.7 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,swich,fuses,protection,controls Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-3/d 95%: 8.3E-3/d REPAIR TIME:
OR

2hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.7 Ultimate source: operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports,LERs,plant infor.
Comment: Data derived from observation of 12 components,696 demands(per op.time),1 failure occuring(critical)
Critical failures occured plant only. a=0.116;b=80.3
atone

PMMRT pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: spourious stop
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean • 1.7E-5/hr 95%: 8.4E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 10 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.5 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants),ATV reports,LERs
Comment: Operating expenence:Total pop.66. Operational time 78.6E+4 hours faui lures. a=0.21; b=12700. Critical failures occured
13

at6
plants.

PMMST pump motor driven centrifugal horisontal and vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse,protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.9E-3/d 95%: 2.1E-2/d REPAIR TIME:
OR

10hr

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.5 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs
(7BUR

Comment: Operating experience: total pop 66.Other data not known. Critical failures occured at 6 plants.
PMNRT pump motor driven centrifugal horizontal flow rate: 40-60kg/s; head .5-.7MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor, breaker,fuses,protect ion,control s Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spourious stop

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-5/hr 95%: 1.1E-4/hr REPAIR TIME:

OR

1hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.1 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.14. operating time 28.8E+4 hours 8 failures. a=0.0527; b=19000. Critical failures occured at 4
plants.

PHMSY pump motor driven centrifugal horizontal vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9

and

HPa
Component boundary: pump,transmision,motor,breaker,fuses,protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 24 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.5 Ultimate source: plant operating experience Ringhals 2 PWR
Comment: components observed, other information available
10

not
PMPRT pump motor driven centrifugal reactor coolant pump flow rate 1036-2347 kg/s; head .3-.4 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuses,protection,controls Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spourious stop
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.7E-6/hr 95%: 1.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 5 hr

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.4 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experoence: total pop. 38.Operating time 112E+4 hours. No.of failures a=0.0671; b=25100. Critical failures occured

3.

at
3 plants.

PMWRT pump motor driven centrifugal wet flow rate 75-150 kg/s; head 1.3-1.8 MPa
Component boundary: pump.trasmission,motor,breakers,fuses,protect ion,control s Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: spourious stop
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.8E-5/hr 95%: 1.9E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 18 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.3 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience: total Operating time 27.2E+4 hours failures. a=1.93; b=24900. Critical failures occured
po14.

19

at6
plants.

PMWRY pump motor driven centrifugal wet flow rate 75-150 kg/s; head 1.3-1.8 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse,protect ion,control s Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spurious stop
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-4/hr REPAIR TIME:

OR

24hr

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.3 Ultimate source: plant operating experience,Ringhals 2 PUR
Comment: Operating experience: total Operating time 2.56E+4 hours failures.
po2.

3
-0
ro PMMRY pump motor driven centrifugal, honsontal and vertical flow rate 75-250 kg/s; head .3-.9 MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuses,protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: spurious stop

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.1E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 24 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.5 Ultimate source: plant operating experience(Rmghals PWR)

2
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.10. Operating time 8.67E+4 hours failures.

7
PMNRY pump motor driven centrifugal,honsontal flow rate 40-60 kg/s;head .5-.7 Mpa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse,protect ion,control Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal

s
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: spounous stop
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.9E-5/hr REPAIR TIME:
OR

3hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.1 Ultimate source: plant operating experience. Ringhals

2PWR
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.2 Operational time 4.32E+4 hours failures.

3
PMQST pump motor driven centnfugal.honsontal vertical flow rate 120-240 kg/s;head 1.2-1.8

and

MPa
Component boundary: pump,motor,transmission,swich,fuse,prtection,controls Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.1E-3/d 95%: 2.1E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 3 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.8 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.18. No.of demands 784. failures. a=0.387; b=75.4 Critical failures occured plants.

at2
PMHRH pump motor driven charging pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.7E-4/hr 95%: 3.4E-4/hr 5%: 2.0E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 16 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr.Operating experience 1.3E+5 hours of operation, 38 failures. Repair time is mean of 168 recorded
maintenance events(short single pump outage).Long outage=667 hrs.

PMHSH pump motor driven charging pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-3/d 95%- 2.6E-3/d 5%: 1.4E-4/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.
59

no
PMHRA pump motor driven charging/high pressure injection
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 5.5E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.9
Source: NUREG 4550/vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry NPP operating experience
Comment: Charging pump provide makeup seal cooling flow normal operation serve high pressure injection/

RCS

andRPS

in

and

as
recirculation pump following accident.

PMHSA pump motor driven charging/high pressure injection

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.1E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3.5
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating experience

NP
Comment: Charging pumps provide normal makeup cooling flow normal operation serve high pressure injection

RCS

andRCP

in

and

as
recircutation following accident.

PMERZ pump motor driven component cooling

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-6/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant specific experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1205,alternaing system,does not operate given start, (Mean) and WASH 1400 pump(w/o motor) failure to run (Distrib).
Operating experience:?.6E+4 operation,no failures.
hrsof

PMCRH pump motor driven containment spray

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-5/hr 95%: 7.8E-5/hr 5%: 2.8E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 6.6 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance
209

of

no

is

of16
events.

PMCRZ pump motor driven containment spray

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-5/hr
OR

Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1205,alternat ing system,does not operate given start (mean) and WASH 1400, pump(w/o motor),failure to run(distrib.)
Operating expereince:66 hours of operation,no failures
PMCSH pump motor driven containment spray
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.1E-3/d 95%: 9.0E-3/d 5%: 1.7E-3/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 634 demands, 4 failures.

PMGSH pump motor driven electric equipment area ventilation cooling pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-3/d 95%: 3.2E-3/d 2.0E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

329

no
PMGRH pump motor driven electrical equipment area ventilation cooling pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.7E-5/hr 95%: 7.4E-5/hr 2.2E-5/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.3E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

7
PMFRO pump motor driven emergency feedwater pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: operational failure

torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-5/hr 95%: 6.0E-5/hr 5.9E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 20.9 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source- generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Pnor:mean NUREG 1205(1980),alternating pump,80%/20% based distribut ion. Same prior injection pumps.0p.exper:15 op.hrs,

onRS

as
no failures.Repair time is mean generic maintenance duration.

PMFSO pump motor driven emergency feedwater pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode- fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.8E-4/d 95%: 1.4E-3/d 1.4E-5/d REPAIR TIME: 20.9 hours
OR

5%:

Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source, generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:mean NUREG 1205(1980),standby pump,80%/20% ratio based on RSS distnb.0p.expereince:18 demands, no failures.
Repair time mean generic component maintenance duration.
is
PMARJ pump motor driven general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used the generic values developed in the Station Blackout Study (NUREG/CR 3226).

PMASJ pump motor driven general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fails to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used geenric values developed Station Blackout Study (NUREG/CR-3226). Value fails start included types

in

for

to

two

of
failures:Pump hardware (4.0E-4/d) and circut br.command(2.5E-3).

PMISU pump motor driven high pressure (>20 bar) applicable to HHSI,CVCS and auxiliary feedwater pumps
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-3/d
Source: Sizewell (PUR/RX312 pg.9) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial experience data
B

and

and
Comment: Assesment based data,WASH 1400,EOF data data items applies HHSI.RHR auxfeed(4.0E-3/d) other CVCS
onW

and2SR

one

to

and

and

to
and CCWS (2.0E-3/d).

PMVRO pump motor driven high pressure injection

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: operational failure
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.4E-6/hr 95%: 2.0E-5/hr 5%: 4.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 21.5 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:Mean NUREG 1205(1980),alteranting pump,80%/20% ratio based on RSS.Op.experience: 38.787 hours of operation, no failures.
Repair time is mean of updated component maintenance duration.

PMVSO pump motor driven high pressure injection

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.4E-4/d 95%: 2.1E-3/d 5%: 6.0E-5/d REPAIR TIME: 21.5 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:Mean NUREG 1205(1980).standby pump,80%/20% ratio based on RSS distribution.Operating experience: 530 demands,1 failure.
Repair time mean updated component maintenance duration.
is

of
PMIRU pump motor driven high pressure(> applicable HHSI,CVCS auxiliary feedwater pumps

20bar)

to

and
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to continue operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.0E-5/hr

OR

:
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.10) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial experience data

and

and
Comment: Assesement based on U data and 3 SRS data items. Two of them applies to RHR.HHSI and auxfeed ( 5.0E-5/hr and 1.0E-5/hr) and
onet CVCS CCWS (2.0E-5/hr).

PMZSD and
pump motor driven include CCW,SW,RHR, boric acid transfer,boron injection recirc
Component boundary: pump.shaft,motor,swiches,local control instrumentation Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

&
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fails to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.3E-3/d 6.0E-4/d 5.0E-2/d
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2886 (1982) (tbl.19) Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR & 4BWR)
Comment: Pop.102. 22 catastophic demand related failures of 4148 demand Upbound & lowbound are largest and smallest rate of func.aggreg.
of pumps class.by driver type.Include altern.and stdby pumps
the

PHZRD pump motor driven include CCU,SU,RHR,boric acid transfer,boron injection recirc.
Component boundary: pump,shaft motor swiches,local control and instrumentation Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fails while running
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.7E-5/hr 3.0E-4/hr 1.0E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2886 (1982)(tbl.18 & 19) Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PUR & 4BWR)
Comment: Pop.102.33 catastrofic failures of 1.24E+6 population hours Upbound and lowbound identical as running pumps(see comment).

PMTSD pump motor driven include containment spray,standby liquid control

Component boundary: pump,shaft,motor,swiches,local control and instrumentation Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failsre to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-3/d 6.0E-4/d 5.0E-2/d
OR

Source: NUREG 2886 (1982)(tbl.18 Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR 4BUR)
&19)

&
Comment: Pop.95.31 catastrophic demand related failures of 5456 demands Up & lowbound derived from funct.aggregation.FaiIrate is based on
1 demand/month.(actual times higher)very conservative
2-3

PMJRO pump motor driven includes reactor coolant,reactor recirculating,CU,feedwater,cond.

Component boundary: pump,shaft,motor,swiches,local control instrumentation Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
&

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails while running
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.2E-5/hr 3.0E-4/hr 1.0E-6/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2886 (1982)(tbl.18 Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR 4BWR)
&19)

&
Comment: Pop.79. catastrofic time related failures 1.6E+6 operating hours.Upbound lowbound largest smallest rate
35

of

and

areth

and

of
funct.aggregation by driver.
PMCSA pump motor driven inside spray recirculation
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start/run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.6E-2/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

1.8
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry NPP operating experience (test data)
Comment: possible identify failure mode table. seems cover starting failure initial running failure

Itwasno

to

in

It

to

and
(during test)

PULRU pump motor driven pressure applicable ESWS, CCWS,LHSI/RHR, CSS, boric acid transfer pumps

low

<20bar

to
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to continue operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-5/hr
OR

:
Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.11) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment: Assesment based data,4 data itemsCI .2E-4/hr pumps) (6.8E-6/hr CCVI),(5.6E-6/hr cond.extraction),(3.5E-6/hr cond.cool.
onU

EOF

ESW
itemsdndustnal use)(2.1E-4{1E5hrs} 1.8E-5<:5E5hrs».
),2SR

and
PULSU pump motor driven low pressure <20bar applicable to ESUS, CCWS, LHSI/RHR, CSS, boric acid transfer
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-3/d
OR

Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.11) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment: Assesement based on W data,WASH 1400, EOF data item(1.8E-4/d out of 16800 demands) and two SRS data items (4.0E-3/d for HHSI,RHR
and auxfeed) and (2.0E-3/d for CVCS and CCWS).

PHLRO pump motor driven low pressure injection

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.7E-5/hr 95%: 9.5E-5/hr 2.5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Pnor:mean NUREG 1205(1980),alternating pump.80%/20% ratio based on RSS.Same prior as for HPI pump.Op.experience: 11.287 op.hrs,
1 failure.Repair time is mean of generic maintenance duration.

PMLSO pump motor driven low pressure injection

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.7E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 1.4E-5/d REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
OR

5%:

Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operational experience
NPRA

Comment: Pnor:mean NUREG 1205(1980),standby pump,80%/20% ratio based on RSS distnb.Same prior as for HPI pump.Op.exp.223 demands,no fail
Repair time is mean generic component maintenance duration.
-J
oo PMKRO pump motor driven low pressure service water
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-5/hr 95%: 5.6E-5/hr 4.1E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.5 hours

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience

NPRA
Comment: Prior: mean NUREG 1205(1980),alternating pump,80%/20% ratio based RSS. Op.experienced?.991 hours operation,2 failures.

on

of
Repair time mean plant spec.update maintenance duration.

is

of

of
PMKSO pump motor driven pressure service water
low
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.5E-4/d 95%: 1.3E-3/d 1.4E-5/d REPAIR TIME: 10.5 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: mean NUREG 1205(1980), standby pump,80%/20%ratio based RSS. Op.expereince: demands, failures.

on

61

no
Repair time is mean of plant spec.update of maintenance duration.

PUMRU pump motor driven main feed pumps

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to continue operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.0E-4/hr
OR

Source: Sizewell B (PUR/RX312 pg.8) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment: Assesment based data, CEGB data item,EOF PWRdata(3.1E-4/hr 4.2E+6 hrs) data items(7.4E-4/hr)and(1-7E-3/hr
onW

outf

and2SR
based operating experience 2.5E+5 hr).
on

PURSH pump motor driven main steam relief hydraulic pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.9E-4/d 95%: 1.2E-3/d 2.6E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 5636 demands, 3 failures.

PUERH pump motor driven primary component cooling water pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-5/hr 95%: 2.5E-5/hr 3.9E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
OR

5%:

Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.7E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance
of

is

of14
events.
 PUESH pump motor driven primary component cooling water pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-3/d 95%: 5.2E-3/d 5%: 1.7E-3/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 1840 demands, 7 failures.

PUBRH pump motor driven primary service water booster pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.4E-5/hr 95%: 1.0E-4/hr 5%: 2.8E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 12.1
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 9.2E+4 hours of operation, 7 failures. Repair time is mean of 17 maintenance
events.

PUBSH pump motor driven primary service water booster pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-3/d 95%: 3.7E-3/d 5%: 2.2E-4/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 222 demands,no failures.

PUKRU pump motor driven primary service water pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fails during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-5/hr 95%: 9.2E-5/hr 2.7E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 17.4 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.6E+5 hours of operation,10 failures. Repair time is mean of 46 maintenance
events.

PUKSU pump motor driven primary service water pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-3/d 95%: 2.3E-3/d 3.9E-4/d
OR

5%:

Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 1909 demands, failures.

2

VO
00
o PMCRO pump motor driven reactor building spray
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: operational failure

torun
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-5/hr 95%: 6.0E-5/hr 5%: 5.9E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 28.6 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Pnor:mean NUREG 1205(1980),alternating pump,ratio of 80%/20% is based on RSS distnb.Same as for injection pumps.Op.exp.40 hrs
of operation,no failures.Repair time is mean maintenance duration

PMCSO pump motor driven reactor building spray

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.1E-3/d 95%: 1.8E-2/d 5%: 1.1E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 28.6 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Pnor:Mean NUREG 1205(1980),80%/20% based distribution. Same prior injecton pumps.Op.experience: dem.3 failures

is

onRS

asfor

140
Repair time mean plant spec.update maintenance duration.
is

of

of
PUPST pump motor driven reciprocating(positwe displacement) flow rate 2.5-3.9kg/s; head 8.7 MPa;
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,swich,fuse,protection,control Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-3/d 95%: 2.lE-2/d REPAIR TIME: 7 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.10 Ultimate source: plant operating exepenence plants)

(7BWR
Comment: Operating expenence:total pop 22. No.of demands 1238. 5 failures a=0.186; b=46. Critical failures occured at 3 plants.

PUZRH pump motor driven recirculation pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-5/hr 95%: 1E-5/hr 2.8E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 4.2 hours
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source- generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr Operating experience 56 hours of operation, no failures. Repair time is mean of 14 maintenance
events.

PUZSH pump motor driven recirculation pump

Component boundary, detail n/a Operating mode- all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d 95%: 2.5E-3/d 1.3E-4/d
OR

5%:

Source: Old PUR Ultimate source- generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.
684

no
 PUWRH pump motor driven residual heat removal pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-4/hr 95%: 2.4E-4/hr 5%: 2.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 4.8 hours
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience

OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+4 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance event

of

is

of2
(short duration). Long duration maintenance 6.1E+3 hours??

PUWRZ pump motor driven residual heat removal pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.5E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbt.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1205 alternating system,does operate given start (mean) WASH 1400,pump(w/o motor),failure run(distrib-).

not

and

to
Operating experienced.25E+4 operation, failures.

hrsof

no
PUWSH pump motor driven residual heat removal pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.5E-3/d 95%: 1.7E-2/d 7.1E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 58 demands, 1 failure

PMSRH pump motor driven safety injection pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fail during operation
torun

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-5/hr 95%: 7.8E-5/hr 5%: 2.8E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 4.8 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 272 hours of operation, no failures. Repair time is mean of 21 recorded
maintenance events.

PMSRZ pump motor driven safety injection pump

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-5/hr
OR

Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1205,alternating system,does operate given start WASH 1400,pump (w/o motor),fail run(distrib.)
not

(M)and

to
oo Operating experience: hours operation, failures.
46

of

no
oo
PMSSH pomp motor driven safety injection pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.4E-3/d 95%: 1.3E-2/d 5%: 3.7E-3/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 719 demands,/ failures.

PUSRY pump motor driven screw flow rate kg/s; head

50

0.3MPa
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,breaker,fuse,protect ion,control Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: spourious stop
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 32 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.6 Ultimate source: plant operating experience Ringhals 2 PWR
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. Operating time 12.97E+4 hours failures.

4
failure start recorded this component.
No

to

PUSST
on
pump motor driven screw flow rate 750kg/s;0.2MPa;
Component boundary: pump,transmission,motor,swich,fuses,protection,controls Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-3/d 95%: 1.4E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.6 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plant), reports, LERs

(1BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.7. No.of demands 399. 1 failure. a=0.164; b=65.2

PUFRH pump motor driven secondary component cooling water

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.6E-5/hr 5%: 1.3E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 73.8 hours
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance
of

no

is

of7
events.

PUFSH pump motor driven secondary component cooling water

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fait start Original failure mode: fail start demand
to

to

on

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-3/d 95%: 3.9E-3/d 5%: 2.3E-4/d

Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 193 demands, no failures.

 PMKRH pump motor driven secondary service water
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.5E-5/hr 95%: 8.6E-5/hr 5%: 2.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 32.5 hours
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience

OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours operation, failures. Repair time mean maintenance

of

is

of17
evens.

PMKSH pump motor driven secondary service water pump

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-3/d 95%: 3.8E-3/d 2.3E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with paint operating experience
OldPUR

Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 203 demands, no failures.

PMKRZ pump motor driven service water

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-6/hr
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
NPS

Comment: Priors:NUREG 1205,alternat ing system,does operate given start (mean) WASH 1400, pump(w/o motor),failure run(distrib).

not

and

to
Operating expreince:1.52E+5 hours of operation.no failures

PUCRA pump motor driven service water pump used in charging pump cooling system
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail to run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.6E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

1.6
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol 3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating experience

NP
Comment :

PUCSA pump motor driven service water pump used in charging pump cooling system
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fail start
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 5.9E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3.5

Source: NUREG 4550/Vol 3,tbl.iv.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating expereince

NP

Comment:

oo
oo
PUVRH pump motor driven well water pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure node: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-5/hr 95%: 8.0E-5/hr 5%: 2.8E-6/hr
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.4E-5/hr. Operating experience hours, failures.

108

no
PUVSH pump motor driven well water pump
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-3/d 95%: 8.4E-3/d 5%: 5.3E-4/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-3/d. Operating experience 192 demands, 1 failure.

PTAFP pump turbine driven

Component boundary: incl.mech.contol,governor,trip-throt.vlv,lube oil sys,bearing Ib Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: does not operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 2.1E-2/d 95%: 2.3E-2/d 1.8E-2/d
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.397) Ultimate source: US plant LER report evaluation
Comment: Overall data,includes types reactors,LER 72-80. Ttl.pop. 92.U/0 command faults.With command faults 5.0E-2.FaiImode include
al

of

fail to start,leak/rupt,loss of function,does not cont. to run

PTASD pump turbine driven

Component boundary: pump,shaft,turbine,local instrumentaion and control Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: fails start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-2/d : 3.0E-2/d : 2.0E-3/d
Source: NUREG 2886 (1982) (tbl.19) Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR & 4BWR)
Comment: Pop.11. 5 catastrofic demand related falures in 469 demands. Upbound and lowbound are the largest and smallest failure rate of
functional aggregate selected pumps classified driver
the

of

by

PTASP pump turbine driven

Component boundary: Incl .mech.control.governor,trip-throt.vlv,lube sys,bearing Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
oiI

Ib
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: does start
to

not

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 9.6E-3/d 95%: 1.2E-2/d 8.0E-3/d

OR

5%:

Source: NUREG 1205 (1982) (pg.372) Ultimate source: US plant LER report evaluation
Comment: Overall data,including types reactors,LER 72-80. Ttl.pop. command faults.With command faults 2.5E-2. Standby hour
al

of

92.W/o

rate command 1.9E-5/hr, with command faults 5.1E-5/hr.

w/o
 PTRRD pump turbine driven
Component boundary: pump,shaft.turbine,local control instrumentation Operating mode: running Operating environment: normal

and
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails while running
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/hr 2.0E-4/hr 8.0E-5/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2886 (1982) (tbl.19) Ultimate source: plant operating experience-maintenance records(2PWR & 4BWR)
Comment: Pop.11.21 catastrofic time related failures in 2.08E-5 op.hours. Upbound and lowbound are the largest and smalest rate of the
functional aggregates selected pumps classified driver

ofthe

by
PTYRB pump turbine driven
Component boundary: pump, turbine,steam and throttle valve, governor Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-5/hr max: 1.0E-4/hr min: 8.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and IREP data
Comment:

PTYR1 pump turbine driven

Component boundary: pump,turbine,steam and throttle valves, governor Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to run given start
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

PTYSB pump turbine driven

Component boundary: pump, turbine, steam and throttle valves, governor Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/hr max: 5.0E-4/hr min: 2.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and IREP data
Comment: Failure mode includes under and over speed

PTYSI pump turbine driven

Component boundary: pump, turbine, steam and throttle valves, governor Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Failure mode includes under overspeed
and

oo
oo
PTFRZ purop turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.6E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Prior:NUREG 1205("turbine driven pump failure during operation similar motor driven).

is

to
Operating experience:1900 hours of operation, no failures.

PTFSA pump turbine driven auxiliary feedwater

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: fail to start/run
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 7.1E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

4.6
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry NPP operating experience
Comment: possible identify failure mode appear table.
Itwasno

to

as

in
PTFSZ pump turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.3E-2/d
OR

Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
NPS

Comment: Prior:NUREG 1205,standby system(w/o command) does not start(Mean) Distribution based on engineering judgement.
Operating experience: 231 demands, 6 failures.

PTCSY pump turbine driven centrifugal pump flow rate 240 kg/s; head 1.8 MPa
Component boundary: auxiliary equipment not included Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 8 hr
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.9 Ultimate source: plant operating experience Ringhals

2PWR
Comment: One observed component, 30 demands per operational time, one failure recorded.

PTXSO pump turbine driven emergency feedwater

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail start Original failure mode: failure start
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.8E-2/d 95%: 5.8E-2/d 5%: 1.2E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 24.5 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:mean NUREG 1205(1980),standby pump.80%/20% ratio based on RSS distribution.Op.experience: 113 demands,6 failures.
Repair time is mean of plant spec.update of maintenance duration.
 PTXRO pump turbine driven emergency feedwater pump
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.9E-4/hr 95%: 4.0E-3/hr 5%: 4.lE-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 24.5 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating expreience

NPRA
Comment: Prior:mean NUREG 1205(1980),alternating pump.80%/20% ratio =100 Operating experience:94 hours of operation,! failure.
Repair time is mean of plant spec.update of maintenance duration.

PTARJ pump turbine driven general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-3/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUERG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP value is taken from IREP Procedure Guide.

PTASJ pump turbine driven general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: fails to run
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic value from IREP Procedure Guide.The value for fails to start incl.two types of fai lures:circut breaker command
faults(2.0E-2) pump hardwared .OE-2).
and

PTSRU pump turbine driven high pressure include CVCS,emergency charging system,aux.feedwater pumps
>20bar

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to run Original failure mode: failure to continue operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-5/hr
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.12) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear industrial experience
B

and
Comment: Assesment based on W data and SRS data item relevant for PWR (5.0E-5/hr).

PTSSU pump turbine driven high pressure > 20 bar include CVCS,emergency charging system and aux.feedwater pumps
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to start Original failure mode: failure to start
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-2/d
Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.12) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment: Assesment based data data item relevant (1.0E-2/d
onW

andSR

forPWR

oo
oo PDARJ pupm diesel driven general
oo
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail Original failure mode: fails

torun

torun
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.0E-4/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: ASEP used generic values from LERs.

ARBBM radiation monitors BUR main steam line

Component boundary: radiation channel Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.6E-6/hr 95%: 1.2E-5/hr 5%: 7.4E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 18) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: BWR rate with command faults. W/o command faults 9.1E-6/hr.

ARBFM radiation monitors BWR main steam line

Component boundary: radiation channel Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: inoperable
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-6/hr 95%: 8.4E-6/hr 5%: 4.3E-6/hr

Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
18)

US

LER
Comment: rate with command faults. command faults 5.6E-6/hr.
BWR

W/o

URSFI reactor scram system

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure scram
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert judgement
Comment:

EREFE rectifier excitation rectifier over

60V

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.3E-6/hr high: 3.6E-6/hr low: 3.2E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.421 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure node "no output" consist of:1)automatic removal by protective circutry; 2)manual removal; 3)open circut
 ERPFE rectifier precipitator rectifier over

60V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.4E-6/hr high: 4.1E-6/hr low: 3.6E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.422 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Falure mode output" consist of:1)automatic removal protective circutry; 2)manual removal; 3)open circut.

"no

by
ERSFT rectifier static
Component boundary: rectifier, fuse(380V side), tap. Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: loss of effective output
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-6/hr 95%: 5.8E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

16
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.42 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Critical failures are: burned connections,failed fans,unstable electronics.Op.experience: total pop.140.Op.time 427E+4 hours.
No.of failures a=0.0324; b=23000 Critical failures plants
6.

at3
RAADE relay auxiliary all types
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spounous operation
to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY high : n/a : 1.5E-5/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.195 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite different voltage levels switchgear auxiliary relays.
is

of

of
RAAEE relay auxiliary types
al

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY high 7.0E-6/cy
OR

:n/a

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.195 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of different voltage levels of switchgear auxiliary relays

RAAOE relay auxiliary types

al

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY high 8.9E-6/cy
OR

:n/a

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.195 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of different voltage levels of switchgear auxiliary relays

oo
RCAAE relay control AC control relay
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.0E-7/hr high: 4.3E-4/hr low: 4.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.186 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of 4 AC control relays voltage levels.

RCDAE relay control DC control relay

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.6E-7/hr high: 2.1E-4/hr low: 2.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.191 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of 3 DC control relays voltage levels.

RCLDE relay control types

al

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spourious operation
to

in

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.0E-8/hr high: 2.5E-4/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.183 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite control relays diffrerent voltage levés both groups.Reference IEEE 500(1977)
is

ofACandD

and

in
RCLEE relay control all types
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.9E-6/cy high: 5.6E-6/cy low: O.OE-0/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.183 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggergation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of AC and DC control relays and different voltage levels in both groups.

RCLOE relay control all types

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.1E-6/cy high: 4.4E-6/cy low: O.OE-0/cy
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.183 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value composite control relays different voltage levels both groups. Reference IEEE 500(1977)
is

ofACandD

and

in
RCEAF relay control electromechanical
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-7/hr 95%: 4.2E-7/hr 5%: 2.7E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience

HWR

HWR
Comment: Population not known.Cumulative operating time 172.2E+6 hours. 59 failures.
Repair time is conservatively estimeted to be 3 hours.

RCECF relay control electromechanical

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure energise

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

RCEEF relay control electromechanical

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure of NO contacts to close when energised
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Data based on 48 V DC relays commonly used in control circuts. Ultimate source is not known(oper.exper. or expert).No.of demands
in time known. Same failure rate contacts open"
isnot

for"NC

to
RCEOF relay control electromechanical
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure contacts open when de-energised
to

ofNO

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 3.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Data based relays used control circuts. Ultimate data source known(op.exper. expert). demands time
on48VDC

in

not

or

Nof

in
is known. Same failure rate close".
not

for"NCt

RWAFW relay general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to energize
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial military experience data
I

and

and
Comment: Due to available data,failure rates of "failure to energise" include failure of normaly open contacts to close. Generally,
relay and contacts failure rates should not be combined together.
 RWCDW relay general
to

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normally closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: failure cnts opening,given energised

to

in

ofNC

by

not
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 3.0E-7/hr 5%: 3.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear expereince

I
Comment:

RWOEW relay general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normaly open Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure of NO contacts to close,given energised
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial military experiecne data
I

and

and
Comment: Available data do not completely sepaarte causes of failures,so failure modes are not necessary independent.Fai l to energise incl
this failure mode.Relay contacts rates should added.
ude

&

notbe
RPHFG relay power 300-460 A
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: loss main function
to

of
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 15
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources
is

of

RPLFG relay power 40-60 A

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: loss main function
to

of
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 9.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Filure rate is combination of several generic data sources.

RRADE relay protective types

al

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: spourious operation
to

in

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.0E-8/hr high: 2.4E-4/hr low: 0.0 REPAIR TIME: .55 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.164 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of all types and voltage levels of protective relays.References IEEE 500 (1977) and
IEEE 493 (1980)
 RRAEE relay protective types

al
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fails to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.0E-6/cy high: 6.0E-6/cy low: 8.5E-7/cy REPAIR TIME: .55 hours

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.164 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment: Given value composite types voltage levels protective relays.

is

ofal

and

of
RRAOE relay protective types

al
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.3E-7/cy high: 1.1E-6/cy low: 1.2E-7/cy REPAIR TIME: .55 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.164 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of all types and voltage levels of protective relays. References IEEE 500 (1977) and IEEE 493(1980)

RROAE relay protective overload protection

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 7.3E-7/hr high: 1.8E-6/hr low: 1.lE-7/hr REPAIR TIME: .5 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.168 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value composite current temperature protection relays
is

of

and

RRSAE relay protective switchgear protection

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.5E-7/hr al

high: 6.0E-4/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 61 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.179 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite voltage level voltage level
is

oftwAC

andoeDC

RRVAE relay protective voltage protection

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 9.9E-7/hr high: 2.2E-6/hr low: 5.5E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.172 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of over and undervoltage protective relays.

vo
RTAAF relay time delay
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-6/hr 95%: 2.9E-6/hr 5%: 1.4E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Populaton known. Cumulative operating time 9.2E+6 hours. failures. Reapir time conservatively estimated hrs.

not

18

is

tobe3
RTBCB relay time delay bimetallic
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fails transfer

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr max: I.OE-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment :

RTBCI relay time delay bimetallic

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fails transfer
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion nuclear experience

ando
Comment: Data source MIL-HDBK 217B. Fail transfer rates available non-bimetallic time delay relays.
is

to

arenot

for
RTADB relay time delay general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature transfer
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-6/hr min: 2.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

RTADI relay time delay general

Component boundary: detali n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature transfer
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment :
RTPAE relay time delay pneumatic
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.9E-7/hr high: 6.0E-4/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.206 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of AC an DC category of time delay pneumatic relays

RTSAE relay time delay solid state

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.6E-6/hr high: 1.OE-3/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.201 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of 3 AC relays voltage levels and 1 DC relay voltage category.

RYAFB relay coil

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failed open or short
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

RYAFI relay coil

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failed open or short
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

RYAHF relay coil

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Data based on 48 V DC relays used in control circuts. Ultimate data source(operating experience or expert) not known.
RYAHW relay coil
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short to power
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate data source known

not
Comment :

RYAIF relay coiI

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Data based on 48 V DC relays used in control circuts Ultimate data source (operating experience or expert) is not known.

RYAIW relay coil

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: coil open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 1.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate data source not known
Comment :

RXAHF relay contacts

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short circuted
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Data based relays used control circuts. Ultimate data source(operating experience expert opinion) known.
on48VDC

in

or

isnot
RXACB relay contacts general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to transfer
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-6/hr 2.0E-8/hr
OR

m:

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment:
 RXACI relay contacts general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to transfer
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: failure mode include failure to transfer open or close

RXAHW relay contacts general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short across NO/NC contact
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed form nuclear and military expereince and data
Comment :

ACABM sensor core flux general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-7/hr 95%: 2.1E-7/hr 1.1E-7/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
18)

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate, with command faults. W/o command faults 1.4E-7/hr. PWR rate is 6 times higher than BWR.

ACAFM sensor core flux general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: inoperable
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.9E-7/hr 95%: 3.5E-7/hr 2.2E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 18) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate(BWR PUR) with command faults, command faults 2.5E-7/hr. rate order magnitude higher.
+

w/o

PWR

is

of
AFAFT sensor flow general
Component boundary: sensor only (not clear) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-3/d 95%: 7.6E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.32 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(3BWR
Comment: Operating expenence:total pop 34.No.of demands 990. No.of failures 1.a=0.0192; b=5.83
Critical failures reported at one plant.

vo
vo AFAKT sensor flow general
oo
Component boundary: clear Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

not

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-6/hr 95%: 2.3E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

2
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.32 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports,LERs

(7BUR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.134.Operational time 500E+4 hours No.of failures 22. a=0.18; b=41900
Critcal failures reported on 4 plants.

AFAXT sensor flow general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: other critical faults Original failure mode: other critical faults
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-7/hr 95%: 4.9E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

2
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.32 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 134.Operational time 500E+4 hours No.of failures 2. a=0.0148; b=37000
Critical failures reported plants.

ALAFT sensor level general on2

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure function
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.lE-4/d REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.34 Ultimate source: plant operating expereince plants),ATV reports,LERs

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 552.No.of demands 38.904. No.of failures a=0.00191; b=9.24

4.
Critical failures reported plants.
on3

ALAKT sensor level general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
al

Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spourious function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.2E-7/hr 95%: 4.6E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.34 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.478. Operating time 1500E+4 hours No.of failures a=0.0648; b=79400.

13.
Critical failures reported on 4 plants.

ALAXT sensor level general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
al

Generic failure mode: other critical faults Original failure mode: other critical faults
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.7E-7/hr 95%: 1.6E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.34 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 571. Operational time 1940E+4 hours. No.of failures 13. a=0.0205; b=30600
Critical failures reported plants.
on5
ALRFS sensor level reactor water level
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: reactor

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fails operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.9E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment :

APAFT sensor pressure general

Component boundary: pressure sensor, excuding valves,piping ect. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure function

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.0E-4/d REPAIR TIMS: hours
OR

2
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.28 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports,LERs

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.294. No.of demands 14.305, no.of failures 6. a=0.0124; b=17.8
Critical failures reported by 4 plants.

APAKT sensor pressure general

Component boundary: pressure sensor only, excluding piping, valves ect. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spourious function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.7E-7/hr 95%: 2.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.28 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced plants),ATV reports, LERs

BWR
Comment: Operating exprience:total pop.720. Operational time:2750E+4 hours no.of failures a=0.0215; b=24600

24.
APAKY sensor pressure general
Component boundary: pressure sensor only, excluding piping,valves ect. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function original failure mode: spourious function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.8E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.28 Ultimate source: plant operating experience(1 plant-Ringhals

PWR

2)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.34.Operational time 113.1E+4 hours failure recorded.

1
APAXT sensor pressure general
Component boundary: pressure sensor only, excluding piping, valves ect. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: other critical faults Original failure mode: other critical faults
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.28 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATv reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.720.Operational time:2750E+4 hours no.of failures a=0.00595; b=32700

5.
Critical failures reported by 3 plants.
O APAXY sensor pressure general
o
Component boundary: pressure sensor only, excluding piping,valves ect. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: other critical faults Original failure mode: other critical faults
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.8E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.28 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced PWR plant-Ringhals 2)
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.34.Operational time 113.1E+4 hours 1 failure recorded.

APRFS sensor pressure reactor and containment sensor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment: failure rate data comparison (table A.2-1),under this component category failure mode,pressure switch failure
Inthe

and

to
operate from WASH 1400 is included.

APDFT sensor pressure difference general

Component boundary: pressure difference sensor, excluding piping,valves ect. Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.lE-3/d 95%: 2.6E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.30 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 4.No.of demands 198. No.of failures 1. a=0.216; b=42.6
Critical failures reported plant only.
one

APDKT sensor pressure difference general

Component boundary: pressure difference sensor, excluding all piping, valves ect. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.2E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.30 Ultimate source: plant operating experienceC plants),ATV reports, LERs

7BWR
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.206. Operational time 313E+4 hours failure. a=0.00467; b=14600

1
Critical failure reportred only on one plant.

APDKY sensor pressure difference general

Component boundary: pressure diference sensor, excluding all piping,valves ect. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.'5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.30 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced PWR plant-Ringhals 2)
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.12. Operational time 39.91E+4 hours. 1 failure.
ATABH sensor temperature general
Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.4E-7/hr 95%: 1.2E-6/hr 4.4E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

18)

US

LER
Comment: Not applicable to BWR. Overall PWR data . Same value with and w/o command faults.

ATAFM sensor temperature general

Component boundary: sensor only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-6/hr 95%: 2.4E-6/hr 5%: 1.2E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 18) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Not applicable to BUR.Overall PWR data. Same value with and w/o command faults.

ATAFT sensor temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to function
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-3/d 95%: 1.1E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.36 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(5BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.57. Number of demands 2160. No.of failures 4. a=0.061; b=32.9
Critical failures reported on 1 plant.

ATAKT sensor temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: sourious function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.1E-7/hr 95%: 1.8E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.36 Ultimate source: plant operating experence plants)

(7BWR
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.728. Operational time 2250E+4 hours. No.of failures a=0.0210; b=29500

16.
Critical failures reported on 6 plants.

NCABM signal comparator bistabile core flux,flow,level,pressure,temperature

for

Component boundary: bistabile only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-6/hr 95%: 1.4E-6/hr 1.1E-6/hr
OR

5%:

Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
18)

US

LER

Comment: Comparators/bistables recive output from the conditioning systems in turn provide inputs to logic matrices.BWR core flux and flow
only. Overall rate with command faults. command 1.1E-6/hr.
W/o
NCAFH signal comparator bistable for core flux,level,flow,pressure,temperature
Component boundary: bistable only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.2E-7/hr 95%: 6.8E-7/hr 4.0E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

18)

US

LER
Comment: Comparators/bistables recive input from the conditioning systems in turn provide input to logic matrices.BWR core flux nad flow
only. Overall rate with command faults. command 4.3E-7/hr.

W/o
NCABE signal comparator bistable general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.4E-7/hr high: 1.1E-6/hr low: 4.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.628 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "degraded" incIude:1functioned improper signal
50

at

I
level; 2)premature delayed action
or

NCAFE signal comparator bistable general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.0E-6/hr high: 3.5E-6/hr low: 1.0E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.628 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
50

Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include functioned without signal;
50

1
2)no function with signal.

NCAFI signal comparator bistable general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-7/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment: IREP data base define failure mode this component. Failure operate most logical accordance
dont

for

to

isthe

oneadis
with other sources. Reference: HIL-HDBK 217C

NSABM signal conditioning system core flux,level,flow,pressure,temperature general

for

Component boundary: computational modules,summation amplifiers,power supply ect. Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capacity
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-6/hr 95%: 2.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.6E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 18) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Conditioning system is defined as conglomeration of components that recive output from sensing device and develop input for
comparator.Overall rate,with command faults.W/o command 1.7E-6/hr
 NSAFM signal conditioning system core flux,level,flow,pressure,temperature general

for
Component boundary: computational modules,summat ion amplifiers,power supply Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic fai lure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-6/hr 95%: 3.7E-6/hr 5%: 3.lE-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

18)

US

LER
Comment: Conditioning system is defined as conglomeration of components that recive output from sensing device and develop input for
comparator.Overall rate,with command faults.W/o command 3.2E-6/hr

NMTAF signal modifier current-current transducer

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.7E-6/hr 95%: 6.3E-6/hr 5%: 3.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 6.6E+6 hours. failures."All modes" should used instead 1)no output
not

31

be
2)high,3)low output,4)no change output with change input.

in

of
NHPAF signal modifier current-pneumatic transducer
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 7.3E-6/hr 95%: 3.1E-5/hr 5%: 5.7E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 4.3 REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population known. Cum.operating time 9.5E+4 hours.No failures Repair time estimated. "All modes" include:1)no output,2)high
not

is
3)low output,4)no change output with change input.
in

NMVAF signal modifier current-voltage transducer of

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-5/hr 95%: 2.9E-5/hr 5%: 1.8E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: hours

3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Population known. Cumualtive component operating time 2.3E+6 hours. failures."All modes include:1)no output,2)high,3)low
not

52
output,4) no change in output with change in input.

NHABE signal modifier general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.4E-7/hr high: 1.6E-6/hr low: 3.5E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.627 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
K> Conment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977)
O
OJ
to
NMAFE signal modifier general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: catastrophic

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.0E-7/hr high: 5.7E-7/hr low: 1.3E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.627 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation

50
Comment: Referenfce IEEE (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include Dzero maximum output;

50

or
2)no change in output with change in input.

NMSAF signal modifier square root extractor

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.1E-6/hr 95%: 6.8E-6/hr 3.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.3

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HUR operating experience
Comment: Population known.Cum.operating time 6.2E+6 hours. failures "All modes"include following:1)no output,2)high,3)low output,4)no
not

32
change output with change input.Data available this
in

not

fot

FM
NMOAF signal modifier voltage-pneumatic transducer
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-6/hr 95%: 7.1E-6/hr 5.7E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
OR

5%:

2.8
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HUR

Comment: Poulation not known. Cum.operating time 67.5E+4 hours. 1 failure. "All modes" include following failure modes:1)no output,2)high,
3)low output,4)no change output with change input.
in

of

UEHFB solid state devices high power application

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment: NUREG 2815 do not define failure mode for this component. Failure to operate is the most logical one, and it is in
accordance with other sources

UEHFI solid state devices high power application

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: IREP data base do not define failure mode for this component. Failure to operate is the most logical one and is in accordance
with other sources.
 UEHFW solid state devices high power application (current voltage >=28

>=1Aor

V)
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-6/hr 95%: 3.0E-5/hr 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience and from military data
Comment: available data permit separation causes fail ures cases, hence solid state devices failure modes

The

dont

ofthe

of

inal

are
not independent.Large errorfctor due to differece in application.

UEHHW solid state devices high power application (current >=1A or voltage >=28 V)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: fails shorted
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 5%: 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience and military data
Comment: The available data do not permit separation of causes of failure hence failure modes are not independent and should not be combine
d.Large error factor due to difference in application.

UELFB solid state devices low power application general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment: NUREG 2815 define failure mode this component. Failure operate most logical one, accordance
dont

for

to

isthe

andis
with other sources.

UELFI solid state devices low power application general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: IREP data base define failure mode this component. FAilure operate most logical accordance
dont

for

to

isthe

oneadis
with other sources. Reference: MIL-HDBK 217C

UELFW solid state devices power application general

low

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating'mode: all Operating environment: normal

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 5%: 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear military expereince data
I

and

and
NJ Comment: Failure modes are not independent. The relativly large error factor reflect variation form aapplication to application.
o
UELHW solid state devices power application general

low
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: fails short
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 1.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from military expereince expert opinion

and
Comment: Failure modes independent. relativly large error factor reflects variation from application application.

arenot

The

to
ECHFT static converter for reactor main coolant pumps
Component boundary: rectifier,inverter,contiuous voltage equipment,transformer Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: loss effective output

to

of
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.1E-5/hr 95%: 1.4E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

28
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbt.54 Ultimate source: plant operating exeprience(2 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 16.Operational time 19.7E+4 hours No.of failures 8. a=0.67; b=16500

YSDQA strainer service water strainer (charging pump cooling system) duplex strainer
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alternating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 2.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating expreince

NP
Comment: Normal environment this case incude water environment.
in

raw

YSFQB strainer/filter general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-5/hr max: 2.0E-4/hr min: 6.0E-7/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: clear fluids. Contaminated fluids fluids with heavy chemical buren should considered plant specific bases.
For

and

be

on
YSFQI strainer/filter general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment: Given value is for clear fluids only. Contaminated fluids or fluids with a heavy chemical burden should be considered on plant
specific bases.
 SDABM switch digital chanel pressure/vacuum, pressure,level
Component boundary: digital channel Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.5E-6/hr 95%: 8.3E-6/hr 6.8E-6/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

18)

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate with command faults. W/o command 7.1E-6/hr Pressure/vacuum and level applicable to BWR, and pressure
applicable to PWR. BWR rate 5 times higher than PWR.

SDAFM switch digital channel pressure/vacuum, pressure, level

Component boundary: digital channel Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.3E-6/hr 7.7E-7/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

18)

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate with command faults. W/o command 8.9E-7/hr. Pressure/vacuum and level switches applicable to BWR, pressure
applicable to PWR.BWR rate is order of magnitude higher than PWR.

SFABF switch flow

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: erratic operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

4
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR

Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

SFAFF switch flow

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

4
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate source data clear.
of

isnot

SFAKF switch flow

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

Source: data Ultimate source: assesment

HWR

HWR

Comment: Ultiamte source data known.

of

isnot

to
O
N)
O
oo SFAFE switch flow general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: function with signal

to

no
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 9.8E-7/hr high: 1.8E-6/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

.6
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.578 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite include some non-nuclear suorces

is

and
SFAFS switch flow general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fails operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.6E-7/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment:

SFAKE switch flow general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.6E-7/hr high: 1.6E-6/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.578 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite and include some non-nuclear sources.

SFXFE switch flow general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no function with signal
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec; h: 1.0E-8/cy gh;: 4.0E-8/cy ow:: O.OE-0/cy REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.578 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate composite.
is

SFXKE switch flow general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.0E-8/cy high: 5.0E-8/cy low: O.OE-0/cy REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.578 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

Comment: Failure rate is composite.

SLABF switch level
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: erratic operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.2E-7/hr

OR

:
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HUR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source known.

isnot
SLAFF switch level
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

SLAKF switch level

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

4
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

SLAKE switch level general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.6E-6/hr high: 3.0E-6/hr low: 7.7E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.5 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.589 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure rate is composite.

SLXFE switch level general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no change of output with change of input
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.0E-8/cy high: 6.0E-8/cy low: O.OE-0/cy REPAIR TIME: 1.5 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.589 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure rate composite.
is
SIAAF switch limit
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-6/hr 95%: 4.0E-6/hr 5%: 2.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.4 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Population known. Cumulative component operating time 29.8E+6 hours. failures. "All modes" inclüde:1)fai lure operate,2)

not

10

to
spurious,3)erratic operation. No data for other FM are given.

SIEKT switch limit electronic

Component boundary: limit switch only Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spourious operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.7E-7/hr 95%: 4.0E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

2
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.38 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 249. Operational time 816E+4 hours. No.of failures 7.a=0.0481; b=62700. Critical failures at 3
plants. critical failures "failure operate demand".
No

for

to

on
SIAFB switch limit general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-6/hr max: 4.0E-6/hr min: 8.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment: Where limit switch uses part pump/valve, switch failure rate included pump/valve rate
is

as

of

is

in
SIAFI switch limit general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Where limit switch is used as part of pump/valve,switch failure rate is included in pump/valve failure rate

SIAFW switch limit general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial military experience data
I

and

and
Comment: The data do not uniquely separate the causes of failure, hence failure modes are not necessary independent. Failure to operate
includes failures contacts.
of
SMACF switch manual
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.6E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

3
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment

HWR

HWR
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known. Number of demands in time is not known.
Repair time consevatively estimated to be 3 hours.

SMAKF switch manual

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-7/hr
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR
Comment: Ultimate data source known.

isnot
SMACB switch manual general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure transfer
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-6/hr min: 2.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table c.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment:

SHACI switch manual general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure transfer
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

SMACW switch manual general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to transfer
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/d 95%: 3.0E-5/d 3.0E-6/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial and military expereince and data
Comment :
to SPAAF switch pressure
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.7E-6/hr 95%: 8.1E-6/hr 4.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 4 hours

OR

5%:

1.4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Population not known. Cumualtive component operating time 3.9E+6 hours. 22 failures. "All modes" incl:1)spurious,2)erratic oper.,
3)failure operate.Contrib.of 2)is negligable,1)&3) about equal

to
SPAFB switch pressure
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-7/hr max: 1.0E-6/hr min: 8.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment :

SPAFF switch pressure

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.1E-6/hr 95%: 5.UE-6/hr 2.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

1.5
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Operational data for this failure mode are not given, but probbably included in "all modes

SPAKF switch pressure

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-6/hr 95%: 4.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.4E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:

1.6
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Operational data this failure mode given, probbably included "all modes
for

arenot

are

in
SPAFE switch pressure general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no function with signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.0E-7/hr high: 1.9E-6/hr low: 1.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.6
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.556 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Value composite include some non-nuclear sources this component failure rate hour cycle given.
is

and

For

per

andper

is
 SPÄH switch pressure general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

SPAFW switch pressure general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 5%: 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial military experience data

and

and
Comment: Data do not uniquely separate causes of failures, hence failure modes are not necessary independent. Failure to operate
includes failure contacts.
of
SPAKE switch pressure general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.0E-8/hr high: 3.1E-7/hr low: O.OE-0/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.6
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.556 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Value is composite and include some non-nuclear sources. For this component failure rate per hour and per cycle is given.

SPXFE switch pressure general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no function with signal
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.4E-7/cy high: 3.0E-7/cy low: 3.0E-8/cy REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.556 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Value composite include some non-nuclear sources. this component failure rate hour cycle given.
is

and

For

per

andper

is
SPXKE switch pressure general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.4E-7/cy high: 8.0E-7/cy low: 1.0E-8/cy REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.556 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Value is composite and include some non-nuclear sources. For this component failure rate per hour and per cycle is given.

U)
K)
STABF switch temperature
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: erratic operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-7/hr

OR

:
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

STAFF switch temperature

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.3E-7/hr
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

STAKF switch temperature

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: spurious operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.5E-7/hr
Source: data Ultimate source: assesment
HWR

HWR

Comment: Ultimate data source is not known.

STAOS switch temperature

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fails to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.3E-7/hr
OR

Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A,2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBUR
Comment :

STAFE switch temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no function with signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.2E-7/cy high: 2.4E-7/cy low: 2.0E-8/cy REPAIR TIME: .5 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.534 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Composite value this component failure rate hour cycle given.
For

per

andper

is
 STAFE switch temperature general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: function with signal

to

no
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.0E-7/hr high: 3.9E-7/hr low: 5.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: .5 hours

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.534 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment: Given value composite. this component failure rate hour cycle given.

is

For

per

andper

is
STAFS switch temperature general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.3E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BUR operating experience
Comment:

STAKE switch temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.3E-7/hr high: 4.5E-7/hr low: 6.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.5
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.534 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of different types and data sources for temperatre switches.
For this component failure rate hour cycle given.
per

andper

is
STXKE switch temperature general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: spurious function Original failure mode: functioned without signal
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.4E-7/cy high: 2.9E-7/cy low: 2.0E-8/cy REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

.5
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.534 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite. For this component failure rate per hour and per cycle is given.

SQAFB switch torque general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-7/hr max: 1.0E-6/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data
and

Comment: Where torque switch is used as a part of pump/valve, switch failure rate is included in pump/valve rate

to
K)
SQAFI switch torque general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Where torque switch used part pump/valve, switch failure rate included pump/valve failure rate

is

as

of

is

in
SQAFW switch torque general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY meidan: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and military experience and data sources
Comment: Data do not uniquely separate the causes of failure,hence failure modes are not necessary independent. Failure to operate include
failures of contacts.

SCAHU switch contacts general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short across NO/NC switches
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear military experience data
I

and

and
Comment: Data do not uniquely separate causes of failures, hence failure modes are not necessary independent.

SCCDW switch contacts general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: normally closed Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: failure of NC cnts by opening,given no sw.opérât.
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-8/hr 95%: 3.0E-7/hr 3.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate data source is not known
Comment: data uniquely separate causes failure,hence failure modes necessary independent.
The

dont

the

of

arenot

SCOCW switch contacts general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normally open Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure of NO cnts to close,given switch operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 1.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate data source known
I

isnot

Comment: Data uniqely separaet causes failure, hence failure modes necessary independent.
dont

of

arenot
 SCACS switch contacts {relay HFA>
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: coil fails operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-7/hr

OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating expereince
Comment: It was not possible to identify this component and failure mode in other sources.

SCAOS switch contacts {relay HFA>

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open* Original failure mode: coil fails to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.0E-8/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment: It was not possible to identify this component and failure mode in other sources.

JTFTH tank storage FWST

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.6E-8/hr 95%: 7.4E-8/hr 5%: 7.E-10/hr
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-8/hr. Operating expereince 1.36E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
JTRTH tank storage RWST
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.7E-8/hr 95%: 7.6E-8/hr 5%: 7.E-10/hr
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-8/hr. Operating experience 1.36E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

EBAHB terminal board general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short adjacent circut
to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-7/hr max: 2.0E-6/hr min: 6.0E-9/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data
and
Comment: Given value terminal
isper

KJ
K)
oo EBAHI terminal board general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short to adjacent circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Given value terminal

isper
EBAHW terminal board general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short adjacent circut

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: UASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate source not known
Comment: Data do not permit unique separation of failure modes between wires and terminal boards, so should not be combined. Data for
terminal boards given cases where unique effects exsist.
are

for
EBAIB terminal board general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-7/hr max: 2.0E-6/hr min: 6.0E-9/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment: Given value terminal
isper

EBAII terminal board general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Given value is per terminal

EBAIU terminal board general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open connection
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 1.OE-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: ultimate data source not known
Comment: Data permit unique separation failure modes between wires terminal boards, should combined.Data
dont

of

and

so

notbe

for
terminal boards are given for cases where unique effects exsist.
TA2FH transformer 220/120

V
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-6/hr 95%: 5.2E-6/hr 5%: 5.1E-7/hr
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.6E-6/hr. Operating experience 5.4E+5 hours of operation, 2 failures.

TA5FH transformer 50/6

kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-6/hr 95%: 2.5E-6/hr 5%: 2.8E-7/hr
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.6E-6/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

TA6FH transformer 6kV/380

V

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fail during operation
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.9E-7/hr 95%: 1.lE-6/hr 8.6E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 6.9E-7/hr. Operating expereince 8.2E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

TA8FH transformer 8 kV / 6 kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-6/hr 95%: 2.5E-6/hr 5%: 2.8E-7/hr

Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.6E-6/hr. Operating experience 1.4E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
TADFO transformer kV/600
dry4

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: operational failure
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.8E-7/hr 95%: 1.2E-6/hr 5%: 2.lE-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.300), rec=median;max=80% distribution Operating experience: 4.34E+5 hours operation, failures.
of

of

no
Repair time is mean generic maintenance duration.
NJ
to TAEFO transformer V/208

dry60

V
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-7/hr 95%: 7.8E-7/hr 5%: 5.7E-9/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operational experience

NPRA
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500 (1977) pg.299.rec=median; max=80% of distribution. Operating experienced.2E+5 hours of operation, no failures.
Repair time mean generic maintenance duration.

is
TTSFE transformer auto transformer liquid filled, single phase all voltage levels
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrophic)

to

no
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.5E-7/hr high: 2.0E-6/hr low: 1.3E/7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.397 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating exeprience
Comment: Given value is composite of 7 diffrerent voltage levels See failure mode comment IEEE main transformer composite

TTTFE transformer auto transformer liquid filled, three phase all voltage levels
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.5E-6/hr high: 2.7E-6/hr low: 4.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.405 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: given value is composite of 7 diffrerent voltage levels Failure mode"no output" include Dautomatic removal by protective
circutry;2)manual removal;3)open circut.Dominant contrib.

#1)
TAAAB transformer general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.0E-7/hr max: 4.0E-6/hr min: 3.0E-7/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data

and
Comment :

TAAAI transformer general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :
 TAAFG transformer general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fait to function Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 5
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: table F3,7-1 failure mode missing. Failure mode "failure operate" assumed bases generic sources

Inthe

is

to

was

onthe

of
included."Failure to operate" include "open" and "short" circut.

TAAHW transformer general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short primary to secondary
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 3.0E-6/hr 5%: 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial and military expereince and data
Comment:

TAAIW transformer general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut, primary to secondary
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-6/hr 95%: 3.0E-6/hr 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial military experience data
I

nad

and
Comment:

TABFZ transformer general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: fail during operation
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-6/hr

Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
NPS

Comment: Prior:IEEE 500(1977)(pg.300) transformer 601V-15kV, prior failure mode="all modes"

Operating experience:3.OE+5 hours operation,1 failure.
of

TA6FT transformer general Voltage <= 6 kv

Component boundary: transformer,relay protection,coolers,supervision,monitors Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: interruption
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.9E-7/hr 95%: 3.5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 10 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.47 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 129.0pertional time 379E+4 hours No.of failures Critical failures occured plants only.

3.

atwo
a=0.0345; b=43600
ro
KJ
K)
TM2FO transformer high voltage outdoor
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-6/hr 95%: 3.5E-6/hr 1.5E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 10.8 hours

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data upgraded with plant operating experience
Comment: Prior:IEEE 500 (1977)(pg.315),rec=median;max=80%.FM"catastrophic' "seems to include load side protection).Op.exp. 81.900 hours
of operation,no failures. Repair time generic maintn.duration.

is
TICFE transformer instrument transformer current transformer voltage levels

al
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output (catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.6E-7/hr high: 4.9E-7/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.417 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation opertiong experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of two diffrerent voltage levels Failure mode "no outpuf'include no output due to: 1) open circut
2)shorts.

TIPFE transformer instrument transformer potential transformer all voltage levels

Component boundary: detil Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.2E-7/hr high: 1.0E-6/hr low: 2.7E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.414 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggreagtion and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite diffrerent voltage levels. Failure mode output include output to:1) open circut
is

oftw

no

no

due
2)short.

TSAFE transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, single phase all volatge levels
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.8E-7/hr high: 1.8E-6/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.348 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: This is a composite value of all voltage levels of main, liquid filled single phase transformers. Failure mode include:1)autom.
removal; 2)manual removal; 3)open circut. #1) is dominant.

TS2FE transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, single phase voltage 2-30 kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrofic)
to

no

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.2E-7/hr high: 3.9E-7/hr low: 9.5E-8/hr

OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.347 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

Comment: Failure mode includes output to:1) automatic removal protective circutry; 2)manual removal; open circut.
no

due

by

3)
 TS4FE transformer main power generator unit transformer liquid filled, single phase voltage 146-242

or

kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.2E-7/hr high: 6.2E-7/hr low: 2.5E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.350 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience

50

and
Comment: Failure mode "no output" include: Dautomatic removal by protect, circutry 2)manual removal; 3)open circut.
#1) is order of magnitude higher than #2) and #3).

TS5FE. transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, single phase voltage 347-550 kV
Component boundary: detil n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.2E-6/hr high: 1.9E-6/hr low: 5.3E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.352 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Failure mode output" include: automatic removal protec. circutry; 2)manual removal; 3)open circut.
"no

1)

by
#1) is order of magnitude higher than #2) and #3).

TMAFE transformer main power generator unit transformer liquid filled, three phase voltage levels
or

al
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.8E-7/hr high: 1.6E-6/hr low: 1.0E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.354 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value composite voltage levels. Failure mode include:1)automatic; 2)manual removal; 3)open circut
is

ofal

order magnitude higher than #3).

#1)is

of

#2)and

TM4FE transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, three phase voltage 146-242 kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrophic)
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.1E-6/hr no

high: 1.5E-6/hr low: 5.0E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.358 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure mode "no output" include: 1) automatic removal; 2)manual removal; 3) open circut.
Dominant contributor is #1) (more than order-of-magnitude)

TM2FE transformer main power generator unit transformer liquid filled, three phase voltage 2-30
or

kV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.4E-7/hr high: 5.1E-7/hr low: 1.8E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.355 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

to Comment: Failure mode "no output" include: Dautomatic removal; 2)manual removal; 3) open circut.
K>
OJ Domina contributor #1).
Int

is
ro
TM5FE transformer main power generator or unit transformer liquid filled, three phase voltage 347-550 kV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.4E-7/hr high: 1.4E-6/hr low: 4.3E-7/hr

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.360 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Failure mode output" include: automatic removal; manual removal; open circut.

"no

1)

2)

3)
order magnitude higher than #3).
#1)is

of

#2)and
TM5FT transformer main transformer Voltage= 400kV,130kV
Component boundary: transformer,coolers,relay protection,supervision,monitors Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: interruption

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.5E-6/hr 95%: 1.8E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

38
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.45 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop. 10.Operating time 28.8E+4 hours. No.of failures Most frequent failures cooling failures

1.

are

fan
which are not critical failures of the transform.a=0.195;b=56200

TVRFO transformer regulating 120 V AC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: operational failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-6/hr 95%: 4.2E-6/hr 4.4E-9/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: IEEE 500 (1977)(pg.298)Failure mode "catastrophic failure" Operating experience: 48.213 hours of operation, no failures
rec=median; max=80% distribution
of

TETFE transformer station service including excitation dry type, three phase all voltage levels
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.0E-7/hr high: 1.4E-6/hr low: 1.1E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.330 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of three different voltage levels Failure mode include: 1) automatic removal; 2) manual
removal; open circut. Dominant contributor #1).
3)

is

TESFE transformer station service including excitation type,single phase voltage levels
dry

al

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.7E-7/hr high: 2.3E-6/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.326 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and

Comment: Given value composite three diffrerent voltage levels. Failure mode include: Dautomatic removal; manual removal;
is

of

2)
3)open circut. Dominant contributor is #1).
 TEGFE transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, single phase voltage level (0-40

al

kV)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrophic)

to

no
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.2E-7/hr high: 1.1E-6/hr low: 8.6E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.318 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of three diffrerent voltage levels. Falure mode include: 1)automatic removal; 2)manual removal
3)open circut. dominant contributor is #1).

TEHFE transformer station service including excitation liquid filled, three phase voltage levels (0-40

al

kV)
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrophic)

to

no
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.1E-7/hr high: 8.1E-7/hr low: 5.4E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.322 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
Comment: Given value is composite of threr diffrerent voltage levels. Failure mode include: Dautomatic removal; 2)manual removal:
3)open circut. Dominant contributor #1).

is
TXAFT transformer station start auxiliary transformer Voltage levels: 130/6 70/6 20/6
and

kV,

kV,

kV
Component boundary: tramsformer,coolers,relay protection,supervisions, monitors Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: interruption
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.1E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.46 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating expenence:total pop. 17.Operational time 51.2E+4 hours No.of failures 1.
a=0.101; b=51800

TUSFE transformer substation liquid filled, single phase all voltage levels
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: output(catastrophic)

to

no
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 5.1E-7/hr high: 2.6E-6/hr low: 9.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.380 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation operating experience
50

and
Comment: failure mode comment IEEE main transformer composite Failure mode output" include:!)automatic removal; 2)manual
se

50

"no
removal; 3)open circut. Dominant contributor #1).
is

TUTFE transformer substation liquid filled, three phase voltage levels

al

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output(catastrophic)

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.0B-7/hr high: 1.9E-6/hr low: 3.1E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) og.388 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation and operating experience
to Comment: Given value composite voltage level Failure mode output include: Dautomatic removal; 2)manual
to
is

ofal

"no

l/l removal; 3)open circut. Dominant contributor #1).

is
N>
K)
LFFBE transmitter flow general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.5E-6/hr high: 2.8E-6/hr low: 6.3E-7/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.577 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "degraded" include: Derratic; 2)high; 3)low output

50
LFFFE transmitter flow general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: catastrophic

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.5E-6/hr high: 2.8E-6/hr low: 6.2E-7/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.577 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include:1) zero maximum output;
50

or
2)no change output whit change input. Dominant #1).
in

in
LFFFT transmitter flow general
Component boundary: transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: signal failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-6/hr 95%: 1.9E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.33 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(5BUR
Comment: Operating experience: total pop.97. Operational time 358E+4 hours. No.of failures a=0.101; b=30200

12.
Critical failures reported on 5 plants.

LADBF transmitter flow, level, pressure (DP cells)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: erratic output
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.3E-7/hr 95%: 1.1E-6/hr 5%: 2.3E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.4 REPAIR TIME: hours

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR assesment
Comment: Operational data this given,but probbably included in"all modes".Degraded failure rate should incl.this,high
for

FMarenot

andlow
output. Combined failure rate mean=2.0E-6/hr,95%=3.0E-6/hr.

LADFF transmitter flow, level, pressure (DP cells)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: no output

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-6/hr 95%: 1.6E-6/hr 9.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.3

3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Operational data for this failure mode are not given,but probbably included in "all modes".Catastrophic failures are this
and "no chng in output with eh.." summed together mean=1.9E-6/hr.
 LADAF transmitter flow, level, pressure (DP cells)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.1E-6/hr 95%: 4.8E-6/hr 3.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 3 hours

OR

5%:

1.2
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Population known.Cum.component operating time 28.5E+6 hours. failures. "All modes"incl:1)no output,2)high,3)low output,4)

not

16
chng out.with chng m.,5)errratic. equally contribute.

no

in

Al
LADBM transmitter flow, level, pressure general
Component boundary: transmitter only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: reduced capability
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-6/hr 95%: 3.6E-6/hr 5%: 3.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table 18) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate, w command faults. W/o command faults 3.2E-6/hr. Only the flow transmitters from BWRs are included.
PWR rate is two orders of magnitude higher than BWR.

LADFM transmitter flow, level, pressure general

Component boundary: transmitter only Operating mode: operating Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: inoperable
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-6/hr 95%: 2.3E-6/hr 5%: 1.6E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 1740 (1984) (table Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
18)

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate, with command faults. W/o command faults 1.7E-6/hr. Only the flow transmitter for BWR.
PWR rate almost orders magnitude higher than BWR.
is

two

of

LLLBE transmitter level general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.1E-6/hr high: 2.4E-6/hr low: 6.0E-6/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.588 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "degraded" include Derratic; 2)high; output
50

3)low
all contribute about equal given rate.
to

LLLFE transmitter level general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: catastrophic
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.4E-6/hr high: 3.0E-6/hr 1E-7/hr

OR

rec•

low7

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.588 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
N) Comment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977) Failure mode"catastrophic" include: Dzero or max output; 2)no
change in output whit change in input Both about equal.
Ni
NJ LLLFT transmitter level general
00
Component boundary: level transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: signal failure

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.8E-6/hr 95%: 2.0E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.35 Ultimate source: plant operating experience( 5 BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.72. Operational time 289E+4 hours No.of failures

1.
a=0.188; b=49500

LPPBE transmitter pressure general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 6.4E-7/hr high: 1.2E-6/hr low: 1.5E-7/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.552 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
50

Comment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977) Failure mode include: Derratic; 2)high; 3) low output.
About equal contribution.

LPPFE transmitter pressure general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: catastrophic
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.8E-7/hr high: 1.7E-6/hr low: 2.0E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.552 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
50

Comment: Reference IEEE (1977) Failure mode "catastrophic" include: Dzero max.output; 2)no
50

or
change in output with change in input. About equal contribution.

LPPFT transmitter pressure general

Component boundary: pressure transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: signal failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-6/he 95%: 1.0E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

2
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.29 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LErs

(5BWR

ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.203.Operational time 820E+4 hours no.of failures

15.
a=0.0558; b=30500

LPPFY transmitter pressure general

Component boundary: pressure transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
al

Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: signal failure
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 5 hours

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.29 Ultimate source: plant operating exprience (1 PWR plant-Ringhals 2) ,ATV reports
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.12.Operational time 39.91E+4 hours failure
1
 LXRFY transmitter pressure difference general
Component boundary: pressure difference transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: signal failure
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 2 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.31 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plant-Ringhals reports

(1PWR

2),ATV
Comment: Operating experience:total pop.72.Operational time 239.5E+4 hours No.of failure

2.
LXRFT transmitter présure difference general
Component boundary: pressure differernce transmitter only Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: signal failure

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-6/hr 95%: 8.3E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.31 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience:total pop 132. Operational time 558E+4 hours No.of failures 8. a=0.0942; b=66200
Critical failures reported plants

on4
LTTAF transmitter temperature
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.9E-6/hr 95%: 9.2E-6/hr 2.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.7 REPAIR TIME: 3 hours
OR

5%:
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Population not known.Cum.component operating time 1.4E+6 hours. 7 failures.

LTTBE transmitter temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: degraded Original failure mode: degraded
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.7E-7/hr high: 3.2E-6/hr low: 1.8E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.531 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation

50

Comment: Reference IEEE 500(1977) Failure mode "degraded" include: Derratic; 2)high; 3)low output.
#1) and #2) order of magnitude higher than #3).

LTTFE transmitter temperature general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail function Original failure mode: catastrophic
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.7E-7/hr high: 3.3E-6/hr low: 1.9E-7/hr

OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.531 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation
Comment: Reference IEEE 500 (1977) Failure mode include: Dzero or max.output 2)no change of output
with change of input. Dominant contributor is #1).
N>
K)
W
o LTTFT transmitter temperature general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: signal failure
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-6/hr 95%: 1.5E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.37 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Operating experience: total pop. 132. Operational time 289E+4 hours. No.of failures a=0.0579; b=20900

8.
Critical failures reported on 5 plants.

JUCAE turbine combustion general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.7E-4/hr high: 2.0E-3/hr low: 2.0E-5/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.840 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of different sources, NUREG 2232, EPRI report No.AP 2321 Mar.82, EPRI Journal Mar.82 pp 37.
Include combustion
gasndoil

JUSAE turbine steam driven condensing, single stage, 500-999 HP

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.0E-4/hr high: 1.6E-3/hr low: 1.0E-4/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.834 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference: NUREG 2232

JUPAE turbine steam driven general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.1E-4/hr REPAIR TIME: 81 hours

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.835 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: Given value is composite of several different sources,EPRI report No.46,Aug.76,EPRI report No.2205,Feb.82, EPRI Journal,Mar.82,pp37
Value is composite of different application as well.

JUNAE turbine steam driven non condensing 1000-5000 HP

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.0E-4/hr high: 1.0E-2/hr low: 1.0E-6/hr

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.832 Ultimate source: expert judgement exeprience
50

and

Comment: reference: NUREG 2232 (?)

 JUMAE turbine steam driven non condensing, multi stage, less than 500 HP
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.0E-4/hr high: 2.0E-3/hr low: 2.0E-5/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.833 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: reference :NUREG 2232

JUHFS turbine turbine/HPCI assembly

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to function Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2.1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment:

VWOCS valve depressurization valve

ADS

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.0E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham,PRÄ dataCtb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience
GE

ofBWR
Comment:

VUAAE valve angle valve

Component boundary: detail (generally excludes driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.3E-6/hr al high: 2.3E-3/hr low: 2.5E-7/hr

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1203 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: Reference:NUREG 2232. Given value is composite of different sizes and operators of angle valves.FM"all modes"is sum of catastrophic
(failed to operate,plugged,ext.leakage),degraded and incipient.

VWBAE valve ball valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.4E-6/hr high: 8.8E-4/hr low: 4.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.3 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1042 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: References:NUREG 2232,Corps of engineers,R/M data base,NPRD-2. Given value is composite of different sources,sizes and operators
of ball valves.Per cycle value 6.0E-5/cy.FM comment angle
se

vl

SJ
OJ
K)
OJ
VWTAE valve butterfly valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.2E-6/hr high: 3.5E-4/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

rec:

1.9
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1050 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: references:see ball valve. FM see comment angle valve Given value is composite of diffrerent sources and differrent
sizes and operators of butterfly valves.

VWOAF valve condenser steam discharge valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.3E-5/hr 95%: 3.1E-5/hr 5%: 1.7E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 12 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating exeprience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.24.Operating time 126E+4 hours.29 failures, "all modes" incl; 1)external,2)internal leak,3)fail to close,4)fail to open,5)limit
switch,6)faulty indication,7)out of calibration,8)unspecified

VWDEF valve condenser steam discharge valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.2E-6/hr 95%: 7.3E-6/hr 1.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
OR

5%:

2.0
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.24. Cumulative operating time 126E+4 hours.4 failures. Number of demands per operating time is not known.

VWDOF valve condenser steam discharge valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.1E-5/hr 3.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
OR

5%:

1.7
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.24.Cumulative operating time 126E+4 hours. 8 failures. Number of demands per operating time is not known.

VWDYF valve condenser steam discharge valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.8E-6/hr 95%: 9.4E-6/hr 5%: 2.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 42 hours

1.8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.24. Cumulative component operating time 126E+4 hours. No.of failures
6.
 VWPAE valve diaphragm
Component boundary: detail n/a (generally exclude driver) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.8E-6/hr high: 6.2E-5/hr low: 1.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

.9
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1099 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: ref:Corps of Engineers R/M data base,NPRD-2,NUREG 0666 Given value is composite of different sources,operators, sizes
and applications of diaphragm valves. FM see comment angle valve.

VWFAE valve flow control 1/2 inch, air fixed flow

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 5.5E-6/hr high: 1.0E-5/hr low: 2.0E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 1 hour
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1039 Ultimate source: expert judgement(delphi procedure) experience
50

&
Comment: reference: R/m data base FM see comment angle valve.

VUGAE valve gate

Component boundary: detail (generally exclude driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 1.9E-6/hr high: 4.6E-5/hr low: 1.7E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

3.
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1109 Ultimate source: expert judgement exprience
50

and
Comment: ref:Corps Engineers data base,NPRD-2,NUREG 2232 Given value composite different sources,operators, sizes
of

R/M

is

of
applications gate valves.FM comment angle valve.
and

of

se

VWLAE valve globe valve

Component boundary: detail n/a (generelly exclude driver) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.5E-6/hr high: 1.7E-4/hr low: 1.8E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

1.7
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1138 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: references:same gate valve Given value composite différèrent sources,application,sizes
as

is

of

and operators of globe valves. FM see comment angle valve.

VWECG valve high pressure shifting valve (steam dump)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: not functioning
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 4.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: This type valve should switch over seconds. trials swich properly cases.That gives even higher rate
of

30

In126

itdno

in12

K>
U) but given value is assesed to be adequate for emergency cases.
OJ
W
VWNAE valve needle valve
Component boundary: detail (generaly exclude driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.2E-6/hr high: 4.2E-4/hr low: 9.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: .8 hours

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1164 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: ref:see globe valve Given value is composite of different sources,applications,sizes
and operators of needle valves. FM see comment angle valve.

VWUAE valve nozzle valve

Component boundary: detail (generally exclude operator) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 5.4E-6/hr high: 6.5E-4/hr low: 3.2E-7/hr
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1195 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience
50

and
Comment: reference:NUREG 2232 Given value is composite of different sizes and operators of
nozzle valves. comment angle valve.
FMse

VUKET valve pilot valve pressure relief system pilot valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to reclose
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-3/d 95%: 6.8E-3/d
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.22 Ultimate source: operating experienced BWR plants),ATV reports,LERs,plant inform.
Comment: Population 55. Number of demands 845. 1 failure. Critical failure at one plant.
a=0.0684;b=57.7

VWKOT valve pilot valve pressure relief system pilot valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.3E-3/d 95%: 4.7E-2/d to

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.22 Ultimate source: operating experience plants)

(7BWR
Comment: Total population demands operational time. failures Critical failures reported plants.
5.84

per

on4
a=0.13;b=15.6

VWJAE valve plug valve

Component boundary: detail n/a (generally excludes operator) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.6E-6/hr high: 3.2E-3/hr low: 1.4E-7/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

1.2
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1175 Ultimate source: expert judgement and experience
Comment: reference:see needle valve. Given value composite different sources,applications,sizes,
is

of

operators plug valves. comment angle valve

and

of

FMse
 VWXAF valve pressure regulating
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: alt Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.6E-6/hr 5%: 1.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: 10 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince

HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.1064.Cum.oper.time 73.7E+6 hours.98 failures."Alt modes" incl Dexternal leak,2)fail to operate,3)faiI to open,4)fail closed,
5)out of calibration,6)unspec.6) dominant,3)&4)negligable(1 fail)

VWZAE valve pressure regulating inches

2-6
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.9E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

rec:

1.3
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1037 Ultimate source: expert judgement(delphi procedure) experience
50

&
Comment: reference: data base comment angle valve.
R/M

FMse
VWXCF valve pressure regulating valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-7/hr 95%: 1.9E-7/hr 6.8E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.7

5
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1064. Cum.operating time 73.7E+6 hours. 8 failures. Number of demands in operating time is not known. Failure rate for this FM
is order magnitude higher than "fail open".
of

for

to
VWXYF valve pressure regulating valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.7E-7/hr 95%: 3.9E-7/hr 5%: 1.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.4 REPAIR TIME: hours

8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1064. Cum.operating experience 73.7E+6 hours.20 failures.

VRBDV valve primary relief valve

BWR

Component boundary: valve body internals,operating mechanism Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: premature open
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.5E-6/hr 95%: 4.9E-6/hr 2.3E-6/hr

OR

5%:

Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.478) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
US

LER

Comment: command faults. With command faults 3.9E-6/hr Includes safety relief valves (ADS ordinary relief
W/o

alBWR

and
valves)
to
W
VRBEV valve primary relief valve BWR
Component boundary: valve body and internals, operating mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to reseat
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.lE-3/d 95%: 4.7E-3/d 2.1E-3/d

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.482) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: See comment relief failure to open.Standby hourly rate 3.0E-6/hr. U/o command faults. With command faults 3.2E-3/d.Standby hourly
rate with command faults 3.2E-6/hr.

VRBOV valve primary relief valve

BWR
Component boundary: valve body and interna Is,opérât ing mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.9E-3/d 95%: 1.1E-2/d 5%: 6.8E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.474) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Incl.all safety-relief vlv(ADS ordinary relief).W/o comm. command 1.1E-2/d.No.of demands test operational demand
BWR

and

is1

and
equal tot.no.of forced manual scrams.Rate 8.7E-6/hr stdby.
to

and

VRAAE valve relief

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.3E-6/hr high: 2.4E-6/hr low: 1.2E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: .6 hours
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1029 Ultimate source: expert judgement(del phi procedure) & exeprience
Comment: This values composite diffrerent sources different types sizes relief valves. Valve operators any)
are

of

and

and

of

(if

are
not identified.

VRADW valve relief

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: premature open
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/hr 95%: 3.0E-5/hr 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial(SRS) and mil.expereince and data
Comment:

VRAOW valve relief

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/d 95%: 3.0E-5/d 3.0E-6/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial(SRS) I.experience data
I

andmi

and
Comment :
 VRHOH valve relief main steam atmosferic relief valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d 95%: 7.0E-3/d 5%: 3.6E-4/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: genric data updated with paint opearting experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 199 demands, 1 failure.

VR68F valve relief & safety diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-7/hr 95%: 4.6E-7/hr 5%: 5.7E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 26 hours

2.4
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.242. Cumulative operating time 13.8E+6 hours. 2 failures.

VR6EF valve relief safety diameter between inches

&

2and6
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to reseat
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-7/hr 95%: 4.6E-7/hr 5%: 5.7E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.4 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.242. Cumulative operating time 13.8E+6 hours. failures. Number opening cumulative operating time known.

of

in

isnot
VR6AF valve relief & safety diameter between 2 nad 6 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.6E-6/hr al

95%: 3.4E-6/hr 2.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.3

14
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.242.Cum.opérât ing time 13.8E+6 hours.36 failures."All modes" incl:1)fail to reseat,2)external,3)internal leak,4)out of calibr.
5)unspecified.5)is dominant, all other about equal.

VR88F valve relief safety diameter larger than inches

&

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-7/hr 95%: 1.2E-6/hr 5%: 1.5E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.4 REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.96. Cumulative operating time 5.5E+6 hours. 2 failures.

N>
to
U)
oo VR8AF valve relief & safety diameter larger than 6 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-6/hr 95%: 3.1E-6/hr 5%: 1.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: hours

8
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HUR
Comment: Pop.96. Cum. opérât ing time 5.5E+6 hours.10 lures."All modes" incl:1)mternal leak,2)out calibration, 3)unspecif led.

fai

of
1) & 2) identical, 3) 3 times larger.

VR28F valve relief & safety diameter less than 2 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.4E-7/hr 95%: 3.3E-7/hr 5%: 1.7E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.4 REPAIR TIME: hours

7
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HUR
Comment: Pop.1667. Cumulative component operating time 109E+6 hours. failures.

26
VR2EF valve relief safety diameter less than inches
&

2
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail reseat
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-8/hr 95%: 8.0E-8/hr 5%: 2.3E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.8 REPAIR TIME: hours

7
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1667. Cumulative component opearting time 109E+6 hours. No.of failures 4. Number of opening in cumulative time is not known.

VR2AF valve relief & safety diameter less than 2 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.5E-7/hr 95%: 1.1E-6/hr 8.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 7 hours
OR

5%:

1.2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.1667. Cum.operating time 109E+6 hours failures."All modes mcl:1)fail reseat, 2)external,3)internal leak,4)out calibr
103

to

of
5)unspecifled. 5)dominant, 1),2) significantly lower.
and4)

VRAEI valve relief valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close, given open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:
 VRAOI valve relief valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

VSADE valve safety

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 3.0E-6/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1040 Ultimate source: expert judgement(del phi procedure) & experience
Comment: reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.

VSAOE valve safety

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 4.0E-3/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1040 Ultimate source: expert judgement(delphi procedure) & experience
Comment: reference EGG-EA -5B16 1982.

VSADU valve safety valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: spounous opening
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.2E-5/hr REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

4
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.21 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.139. Operational time 404E+4.NO failures Critical failures reported plants. a=0.102; b=50300
of

7.

on4
Leakage generally equals spurious opening (conservative approach)

VWVAE valve vent 3/4 inch, float operated,tank vent

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.1E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.2 hours
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1035 Ultimate source: expert judgement, operating experience
50

Comment: reference:Corps Engmeers(HND) Data Base, Ground Stationary Equipment,Re.No. 16,04/12/73.

of

R/M

to
W
•Ft
O VARDH valve operated systems except water return line

air

al

raw
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-7/hr 95%: 2.7E-7/hr 1.4E-8/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-7/hr. Operating experience 3E+6 hours of operation,no failures.

VAPDH valve operated purge isolation valve

air

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer open

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-7/hr 95%: 5.0E-7/hr 1.5E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-7/hr. Operating experience 4.7E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
VAPEH valve operated purge isolation valve
air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.3E-3/d 95%: 4.4E-3/d 8.4E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

756

3
VAPOH valve operated purge isolation valve
air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-3/d 95%: 2.4E-3/d 5%: 4.6E-4/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience 756 demands, 1 failure.

VAQDH valve operated water return line

air

raw

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.5E-6/hr 95%: 1.2E-5/hr 7.7E-7/hr
OR

5%:

Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-7/hr. Operating experemce 1.4E+5 hours operation, failures.
of

3
 VAZEH valve operated turbine stop valve

air
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-4/d 95%: 2.2E-4/d 3.0E-5/d

OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience

OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 1.3E-4/d. Operating experience 1680 demands, no failures.

VAIDH valve air operated vent isolation valve (annulus ventilation)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.2E-7/hr 95%: 5.5E-7/hr 1.6E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-7/hr. Operating experience 2.4E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
VAIEH valve air operated vent isolation valve (annulus ventilation)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-3/d 95%: 2.2E-3/d 5%: 2.8E-4/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPUR

Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures

362

no
VAIOH valve operated vent isolation valve (annulus ventilation)
air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-2/d 95%: 2.0E-2/d 5%: 4.0E-3/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience 362 demands, 6 failures.

VABCV valve operated (ESF systems valves only)

air

BWR

Component boundary: valve body & internals,operator,funct.accesories(limit,torque sw) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.6E-3/d 95%: 5.2E-3/d 5%: 1.1E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.426) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: With command faults. No failures recorded in w/o comand faults category, 95% confidence bound is 1.3E-3/d. Standby hourly rate
with command 1.2E-6/hr, w/o command (95%) 5.9E-7/hr.

N)
to
-U VAWCV valve operated (ESF systems valves only)
Ni

air

PWR
Component boundary: valve body & interiors,operator,functional accesories(eg.limit sw Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-3/d 95%: 2.2E-3/d 6.0E-4/d

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1363 <1982) (pg.422) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: command faults. With command faults 2.1E-3/d. Standby hourly failure rate command 5.6E-7/hr, with command
W/o

w/o
9.8E-7/hr.

VAEYV valve air operated PUR + BUR (ESF systems valves only)
Component boundary: valve body & internaIs,operator,funct.access(limit,torque sw) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leak externally
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 3.1E-7/hr 5%: 1.8E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.430) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate. BUR rate is twice larger than PWR rate.

VAAEH valve air operated all systems

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-3/d 95%: 1.8E-3/d 5%: 6.9E-4/d
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience 4970 demands, 6 failures.

VAAOH valve air operated all systems

Component boundary: detail.n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.4E-4/d 95%: 1.4E-3/d 3.5E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience 4970 demands, failures.
3
VAT8F valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-7/hr 95%: 7.6E-7/hr 5.7E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.8

4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HUR

HWR

Comment: Pop.70.Cum.opérât ing time 632E+4 hours. No.of failures 1. Data based on experience with control valves.
 VATAF valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.2E-5/hr 95%: 3.6E-5/hr 5%: 2.8E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.1 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.70.Cum.opérât ing time 623E+4 hours.No of failures 199.Failure mode mclude:1)faiI to operate,2)external,3)internal leak,4)fault
indication,5)plugged,6)unspecifled.Contrib.of 3)&5) negligable.

VATCF valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.2E-6/hr 95%: 9.3E-6/hr 5%: 5.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: hours

6
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.70.Cum.opérât ing time 623E+4 hours.No.of failures 45.No.of demands known.Data based expereince with control valves.FM

not

on
include actuator failures supply acuator.

butnoair

to
VATQF valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-7/hr 95%: 7.6E-7/hr 5.7E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 12 hours
OR

5%:

2.8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.70.Cum.operating time 623E+4 hours.No.of failures Data based experience with control valves.

1.

on
VATYF valve air operated butterfly diameter larger than 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean . 1.lE-5/hr 95%: 1.3E-5/hr 5%: 8.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 2 hours

1.2
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop. Cum. opérât ing time 623E+4 hours. failures Data based experience with control valves.
70.

No.f

6.

VA1DW valve operated general on

air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: failure remain open(plug)
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 1.0E-7/hr to ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: ultimate source not known(sources presenting plug per demand)
Comment: Plug probabilities are given per demand and per hour since phenomena is generally time dependant , but plugged conditions may
discovered only upon demand. comment valve/demand.
be

SeFM

air

U)
VAACB valve air operated general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment:

VAACG valve air operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to open or to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.3E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 23
Source: German Risk Study (pg.P3-76) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources. Compared with other valve types failure rate seems high
is

of

tobe
VAACI valve operated general
air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

VAACJ valve operated general

air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fails operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: NUREG 4550,Vol 1,Tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Generic value developed Station Blackout Study(NUREG/CR-3226). types failures included failure rate: valve
in

Two

of

are

inthe
hardware faults(1.0E-3) and command circut faultd.OE-4).

VAACO valve operated general

air

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-3/d 95%: 3.1E-3/d 5%: 3.2E-4/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:NUREG 1363, air-op valves,failure demand,w/o command 80%/20% ratio=10.Operating experience; 1349 demands, failures.
PWR

on

3
 VAACU valve air operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-6/hr
Source: Sizewell B (PUR/RX312 pg.8) Ultimate source: assesed from nucelar experience and generic data
Comment: Assesment based on W data item and WASH 1400 dataCfaiIrate cited is not one which appears in WASH 1400).For montly testing, peak
probability 4.3E-3/d, what pessimistic compared W-1400.

is

is

to
VAACW valve operated general
air

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-4/d 95%: 1.0E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial and military expereince and data
Comment: Failure operate includes changing state from open closed closed open.
to

to

or

to
VAACZ valve operated general
air

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.4E-3/d
OR

Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Priors: NUREG 1363 air operated valve(PWR),faiI to operate(mean) and WASH 1400 air operated valve, fails to operate (distrib.)
Operating experience: 1540 demands, 3 failures.

VAADO valve operated general

air

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.0E-7/hr 95%: 2.3E-6/hr 5%: 3.9E-8/hr
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:WASH 1400,air-op valves,f.to remain open.5%=20%;95%=80%. demand rate converted hrly rate assuming d.in days.

Per

to

45
Operating experience:!.94E+5 hours operation,1 failure.
of

VAADW valve air operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: failure to remain open (plug)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 5%: 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience (incl.test research reactors)
I

&
Comment: Failure to remain open refers to reduction of flow to unusable level due to foreign material or gate failure. Not included in
N) data is inadvertent or false signal driving valve closed.
to
A
c\ VAADZ valve operated general

air
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed,plugged

to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.1E-7/hr
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating exprience

NPS
Comment: Prior:UASH 1400,air operated valve,failure remain open(plug). demand daysused convert hourly rate.

to

in45

to

to
Operating experience: 2.13E+6 hours operation, failures.

of

no
VAATW valve air operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.OE-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from US nucelar experience
Comment :

VAAYJ valve air operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fails from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Value is based on NRC LER data summary (1.0E-7/hr) and assuming monthly system test (720 hrs).

VABCE valve operated general (BWR application)

air

Component boundary: detail n/a(generally excludes operator) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.0E-3/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1027 Ultimate source: expert judgement (delphi procedure) & experience
Comment: reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.

VABYE valve air operated general (BWR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1027 Ultimate source: expert judgement (delphi procedure) experience
50

&
Comment: reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.
 VAWCE valve operated general (PWR application)

air
Component boundary: detail n/a (generally excludes driver) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.0E-3/cy

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1026 Ultimate source: expert judgement (delphi procedure) & experience
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B16 1984.

VAWYE valve operated general (PWR application)

air
Component boundary: detail (generally exclude driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1026 Ultimate source: expert judgement (delphi procedure) & exeprience
Comment: reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.

VAKAF valve air operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-6/hr 95%: 4.8E-6/hr 3.4E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.2

10
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.343. Cum.oper.time 22.4E+6 hours.91 failure."AI l modes" incl: Dfail to operate,2)externa1,3)interna I leak,4)faulty indication,
5)spurious opeartion,6)limit switch,7)unspec.1)&7)dominant cntrib

VAKCF valve air operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-6/hr 95%: 2.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: hours

1
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.343. Cum.operating time 22.4E+6 hours. 34 failures.Number of demands in operational time is not known.FM include actuator
failures,but not air supply.Based on expereince with control v.

VAKYF valve air operated globe diameter between 2 nad 6 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.7E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 5%: 4.5E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.5 REPAIR TIME: 11 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.343. Cum. operating time 22.4E+6 hours. 15 failures. Based on experience with control valves.

to
*.
-J
to
4>.
oo VAL8F valve operated globe diameter less than inches

air

2
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-7/hr 95%: 5.7E-7/hr 2.6E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 27 hours

OR

5%:
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.420. Cum.operating time 32.1E+6 hours. 11 failures. Data based on experience with control valves.

VALAF valve operated globe diameter less than inches

air

2
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.4E-6/hr 95%: 3.3E-6/hr 2.3E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 10 hours
OR

5%:

1.2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.420. Cum.ope rat ing time 32.1E+7 hours.78 failures."All modes" incl:1)fail operate,2)external,3)internal leak.4)unspecified.

to
About equal contribution.Data based expereince with control

on

v.
VALCF valve operated globe diameter less than inches
air

2
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.9E-7/hr 95%: 1.3E-6/hr 7.5E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
OR

5%:

1.3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HUR

HWR

Comment: Pop.420.Cum.operating time 32.1E+6 hours. 31 failure.No.of demand in operational time is not known.FM include actuator failures,but
not power suppy actuator.Data based control valves.
to

on

VALYF valve air operated globe diameter less than 2 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.0E-7/hr 95%: 6.4E-7/hr 5%: 2.6E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 11 hours

1.5
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.420. Cum.operating time 32.1E+6 hours.13 failures. Data based experince with control valves.

on
VAHEH valve air operated turbine governor valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.lE-4/d 95%: 2.2E-4/d 5%: 3.0E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.3E-4/d. Opearting experience 1680 demands, no failures.
 VWWAE valve composite by design
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.8E-6/hr high: 3.2E-3/hr low: 3.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

rec:

1.4
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1041 Ultimate source: expert judgement(delphi procedure) experience

50

and
Comment: This value is composite of all data on valves, grouped by design caractenstic. It is given for illustrative purposes.
cycle(demand)rate 7.6E-5/cy. comment angle valve.

Per

it

FMse
VEACJ valve explosive operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fails operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources.
Comment: The same value as for motor operated valves. Values dveloped in Station Blackout Study were used. Two types of failure are incl.
valve hardware (5.0E-4) command circuts faults (2.5E-4).

and
VEAYJ valve explosive operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fails from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Same value motor operated valves. Value based data summary (1.0E-7/hr) assuming monthly test interval.
asfor

onNRCLE

and
VHACJ valve hydraulic operated general
Component boundary, detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: NUREG 4550,Vol.1,tbl VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: The same values as for air operated were assumed. Two types of failure included: valve hardware faults (1.0E-3/d) and command
circut faults (1.0E-4).

VHAYJ valve hydraulic operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode- leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fail from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: NUREG 4550,Vol.1, tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Values assumed to be the same as for air operated valves. Value is based on NRC LER data summary (1.0E-7/hr) assuming monthly
to test interval
VXADH valve manual
Component boundary: deatil n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-8/hr 95%: 4.3E-8/hr 5%: 1.4E-9/hr
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR
Comment: Generic mean 4.2E-8/hr. Operating experience 1.8E+7 hours of operation, no failures.

VXEYV valve manual systems valves only)

PWR+B(ESF
Component boundary: valve body and interiors,opérât ing mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-8/hr 95%: 5.7E-8/hr 5%: 5.9E-9/hr
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.458) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall data about equal.
PWRandB

VXECV valve manual PWR + BWR (ESF systems valves only)

Component boundary: valve body and interiors, operating mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.3E-5/d 95%: 1.6E-4/d 5%: 2.1E-5/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.454) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: Overall data about equal. Standby hourly rate 2.9E-8/hr.
PWrandBR

VXTDH valve manual butterfly systems except HVAC

al

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.1E-8/hr 95%: 9.8E-8/hr 1.5E-9/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.2E-8/hr. Opearting experience 2.2E+6 hours, no failures.

VXGAF valve manual gate diameter between inches

12and4

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.4E-6/hr 95%: 2.9E-6/hr 2.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.2

10
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.520.Cum.operating time 34.6E+6 hours.84 failures."All modes" incl:1)fail to operate,2)external,3)internal leak,4)faulty indie.
5)plugged,6)unspecified. 2)is dominant,5) times lower.
40
 VXGCF valve manual gate diameter between 12 and 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.3E-7/hr 95%: 6.7E-7/hr 2.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 14 hours

OR

5%:

1.5
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience

HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.520. Cumulative operating time 34.6E+6 hours.15 failures. Number demand operational time known.

of

per

isnot
VXGYF valve manual gate diameter between 12 and 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-6/hr 95%: 1.8E-6/hr 5%: 1.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: hours

6
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.520. Cumulative operating time 34.6E+6 hours.49 failures.

VXH8F valve manual gate diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.5E-7/hr 5%: 8.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 8 hours

1.3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop. 3546. Cum.operating experience 2.5E+8 hours. failures.

26
VXHAF valve manual gate diameter between 2 and 6 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-6/hr al

95%: 1.3E-6/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.

6
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop 3546.Cum.opérât ing time 2.5E+8 hours.278 failures."All modes" incl:1)external,2)internal leak,3)fail to operate,4)plugged,5)
unspecified. 1) is dominant, 4) is negligabled failure only)

VXHCF valve manual gate diameter between 2 nad 6 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate
to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-7/hr 95%: to

1.6E-7/hr 9.lE-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
OR

5%:

1.3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.3546. Cum.operating time 2.5E+8 hours. 30 failures. Number of demands per operating time is not known.

to
N)
LU
K) VXHYF valve manual gate diameter between inches

2nad6
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.4E-7/hr 95%: 7.3E-7/hr 5.6E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

5%:

1.

4
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.3546. Cumulative component opearting time 2.5E+8 hours. No.of failures 160.

VXIAF valve manual gate diameter between 6 and 12 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all mode Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.4E-6/hr 95%: 2.6E-6/hr 5%: 2.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.1 REPAIR TIME: hours

7
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.1179.Cum.opérât ing time 84.2E+6 hours.199 failures."All modes incl:1)external,2)internal leak,3)fail to operate,4)faulty indie.
5)plugged,6)unspecified.Dis dominant,3),4) times lower

and5)2
VXICF valve manual gate diameter between 6 and 12 inches
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.2E-7/hr 95%: 3.2E-7/hr 1.5E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 9 hours
OR

5%:

1.4
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.1179. Cum.operating time 84.2E+6 hours.18 failures. Number of demands per operational time in not known.

VXIYF valve manual gate diameter between inches

6and12

Component boundary: detail, n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-6/hr 95%: 2.lE-6/hr 1.3E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
OR

5%:

1.2
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1179. Cumulative component operating time 84.2E+6 hours. No.of failures 122.

VXSAF valve manual gate diameter less than inches

2

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.4E-7/hr 95%: 5.7E-7/hr 5.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hurs
OR

5%:

1.

6
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.19351. Cumulative operating time 1.3E9 hours. 707 failures. "All modes" incl:1)external,2)internal leak,3)fail to operate,
4)plugged,5)unspecified.1) and 5) dominant,4) negligable.
 VXSCF valve manual gate diameter less than 2 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.3E-8/hr 95%: 4.2E-8/hr 2.6E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 2 hours

OR

5%:

1.3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience

HUR

HWR
Comment: Pop.19351. Cum.operating time 1.3E+9 hours. failures. Number demands operating time known.

43

of

per

isnot
VXSYF valve manual gate diameter less than inches

2
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-7/hr 95%: 2.4E-7/hr 5%: 1.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.1 REPAIR TIME: hours

3
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.19351 -Cum.operating time 1.3E+9 hours. 286 failures.

VXACB valve manual general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-7/hr max: 1.0E-6/hr min: 8.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion IREP data

and
Comment: Failure to operate is dominated by human error. Rate is based on one actuaton per month

VXACG valve manual general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to open or to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.7E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 12
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-79) Ultimate source: generic data and operating experience
Comment: Both generic and specific sources were combined for this failure rate.

VXACI valve manual general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Failure to operate is dominated by human error Hourly rate 3.ÛE-7 (EF 10) is based on one actuation per month

to
Ut
CO
(O
t-rt
.*>. VXADO valve manual general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.9E-8/hr 95%: 2.4E-7/hr 5%: 4.8E-9/hr
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience

NPRA
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363,failure of internals of manual valves. Operating experience: 3.09E+6 hours of operation, 1 failure.
95%/5% ratio is 100, indicating high degree of uncertanty.

VXADW valve manual general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: failure to remain open(plug)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 5%: 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from US nuclear expereince (including test & research R)
Comment: Failure to remain open refers to reduction of flov to unusable level due to foreign material or agte failure.

VXAYJ valve manual general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fails from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1.tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Value based on NRC LER data summaries (1.0E-7/hr) assuming monthly test interval (720 hrs).

VXBCE valve manual general (BWR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failed to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 6.0E-5/cy
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1019 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation (delphi method) & operating exeprience
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B16 82.Data Summaries Valves Commercial
ofLER

atUS

NP
VXBYE valve manual general (BWR application)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 3.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1019 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation(delphi procedure)&operating experience
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B16 82.Data Summaries Valves Commercial NPP.
ofLER

atUS
VXPCE valve manual general (PWR application)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failed to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 7.0E-5/cy

OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1018 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi method)
Comment:

VXPYE valve manual general (PWR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a (generally excludes operator) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 2.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1018 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi method) and experience
Comment:

VHCCZ valve motor operated Chemical and volume control system valves
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Priors: NUREG 1363,MOV+remote(PWR)(w/o command)fail to operate(M) and WASH 1400 MOV, fails to operate (distrib).
Operating experience:1720 demands, failures.
7
VMBCO valve motor operated except condenser circulating water
al

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.4E-3/d 95%: 7.7E-3/d 5%: 4.5E-3/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experince
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363, failure of MOV and remote operated on demand. Operating experience: 6725 demands, 42 failures.

VMJCZ valve motor operated except CVCS systems

al

forusein

andCS

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-3/d
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) .Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1363 MOV+ remote(PWR)(w/o command)fail operate(M) WASH 1400 failed operate (distrib.).
to

and

to
Operating experience: 11310 demands, 14 failures.
(O
Uï
VMDCO valve motor operated condenser circulating water valves
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-1/d 95%: 1.6E-1/d 2.7E-2/d

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating exper'ence
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363,failure of MOV and remote operated on demand. Operating experience: 30 demands, 5 failures.

VMECZ valve motor operated containment spray system valves

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.7E-3/d
OR

:
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
NPS

Comment: Pnors:NUREG 1363 MOV+remote (PWR)(w/o command),fai operate WASH 1400 MOV, fails operate (distrib.).

Ito

(H)and

to
Operating experience: 1647 deamnds, failures.

10
VMIEH valve motor operated main steam isolation valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean . 2.4E-3/d 95%: 4.5E-3/d 5%: 6.9E-4/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.3E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

714

no
VM1CV valve motor operated BWR (ESF systems valves only)
Component boundary: valve body and its internal parts,motor,functional accesones Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.8E-3/d 95%: 7.4E-3/d 6.2E-3/d
OR

Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.398) 5%:

Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation
US

LER
Comment: W/o command faults. With command 9.6E-3/d.Standby hourly failure rate:w/o 3.1E-6/hr; with 4.4E-6/hr.LEr rates from 'unknovn remote
and MOV what better represent MOV population.

VMMCG valve motor operated MSIV (FD-Schnellschlusschieber) gate

Component boundary: main valve without pilot valve Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to open or to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 6.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience

Comment: Bases for failure rate is 112 operating demands without failure.
 VMHCV valve motor operated PUR (ESF system valves only)
Component boundary: valve body & internals,motor.functional assecones(limit swich) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.1E-3/d 95%: 4.9E-3/d 5%: 3.4E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.398) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: W/o command faults. With command faults 6.2E-3/d.Standby rate 1.9E-6/hr. LER rate from 'unknown remote and motor operated
what better represent MOV population.

VMHQV valve motor operated (ESF systems valves only)

PWR+B
Component boundary: valve body & interna Is,motor,functional assecories(limit swich) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original fai lure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.1E-9/hr 95%: 3.8E-8/hr 4.E-10/hr
OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.406) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: Overall rate. LER rate from 'unknown remote and MOV what better represent MOV population. W/o command faults. With command faults
7.3E-8/hr.

VMHYV valve motor operated (ESF systems valves only)

PWR+B

Component boundary: valve body interiors,motor,functional assecones(limit switch) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
&

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leak externally
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-7/hr 95%: 2.1E-7/hr 5%: 8.7E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.414) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: LER rate from 'unknown remore and MOV what better represent MOV population.? WR and BWR rates identical.

VMS8F valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

12and4
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original fai lure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.5E-7/hr 95%: 7.8E-7/hr 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.3

14
Source: data Ultimate source: opearting experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.95.Cum.operating time 8E+6 hours.No.of failures 2.Data based experemce with isolating valves vith either electric

on

or
pneumatic opeartor.

VMSAF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

12and4

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.9E-6/hr 95%: 6.3E-6/hr 3.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 30 hours
OR

5%:

1.3
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.95.Cum.operating time 8E+6 hours.No.of failures 39 Failure mo incl:1)fail to operate,2)external leak,3)internal leak,4)faulty
to indication,5)unspecifled. Failure rate dominated by 1) and 5).
to
ty> VMSCF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 12 and 24 inches
oo
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.6E-6/hr 95%: 3.8E-6/hr 1.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

5%:

1.4

10
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: URU operating experience
Comment: Pop.95.Cum.opérât ing time 8E+6 hours.No.of failures 21.No.of demands not known.Failure mode "fail operate" include actuator

to
failure but not loss of power.Data from isolation valves.

VMSYF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

12and4
Component boundary: deatil Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-7/hr 95%: 6.4E-7/hr 4.6E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
OR

5%:

3.1
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.95.Cum.operating time 8E+6 hours.No.of failures LData based on experience with isolating valves with either pneumatic or
electric valve operator.

VMUAF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.4E-7/hr 95%: 1.3E-7/hr 4.3E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 15 hours
OR

5%:

1.7
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operataing expeience
Comment: Failure mode "all modes" include Dfail operate.2)external leak,3)faulty indication,4)unspecified. Failure rate dominated
to

is
by 3) and 4).Total pop.157. Oper.time 10.8E+6hrs.8 failures.

VMUCF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

2and6

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.1E-8/hr 95%: 4.3E-7/hr 5%: 3.4E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.7 REPAIR TIME: 1 hour
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.157.Cum.operating time 1080E+4 hours.1 failure.No.of demands time known.Data based expereince with isolating valves
in

not

on
(electr.or pneum.operator).FH.incl.failure of actuator, w/o comm.

VMUYF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

2and6

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.1E-8/hr 95%: 4.3E-7/hr 5%: 3.4E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.7 REPAIR TIME: hour

1
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Data based on experience with isolating valves with either electric or pneumatic operator. Pop.157.Cum.operating time
10.80E+6 hours. No.of failures 1.
VMT8F valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

6and12
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.2E-6/hr 5%: 4.2E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience

HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.165.Cum.operating time.12.95E+6 hours.No.of failures Data based experience with isolating valves with either electr

9.

on
or pneumatic operator.

VMTAF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

6and12
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.8E-6/hr 95%: 8.2E-6/hr 5.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.2

4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

WRU
Comment: failure mode"aU modes" include:1)faiI to operate,2)external leak 3)internal leak,3)faulty identification,4)unspecified.Failure
rate dominated 5).Tot.pop.165.12.9E+6op.hrs.89 fail.
is

by1)and

VMTCF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between 6 and 12 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.6E-6/hr 95%: 4.6E-6/hr 2.9E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.3

3
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.165.Cum.opearting time 12.95E+6 hours.No.of failures 47. No.of demands not known.Failure mode include actuator failure,but
not loss of power.Data based on experience with isolation valves.

VMTYF valve motor operated butterfly diameter between inches

6and12

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.7E-7/hr 95%: 9.1E-7/hr 5%: 2.5E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.8 REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.165.Cum.operating expeirence 12.95E+6 hours.No.of failures 6. Data based on experience with isolating valves with either electr
or pneumatic operator.

VMFCT valve motor operated control valve

Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,relays,logic automation Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-2/d 95%: 1.6E-1/d REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.20 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced plants), reports

BWR

ATV
Comment: Total pop.69.No.of demands per operational time 2012.No of failures 22. a=0.0971; b=3.75 Critical failures reported at 5
plants.
to
o\
o VMGAF valve motor operated gate diameter between inches

12and4
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.1E-6/hr 95%: 4.8E-6/hr 5%: 3.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: 15 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HUR

HWR
Comment: Pop.356.Cum.opérât ing time 29.1E+6 hours. faiLures."All modes incl:1)fail operate,2))external,3)internal leak,4)faulty indi.

120

to
5)unspecified. 1),2) and 5) dominant, 3)significantly lower.

VMGCF valve motor operated gate diameter between inches

12and4
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.2E-6/hr 95%: 2.7E-6/hr 1.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hour
OR

5%:

1.2

21
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HUR
Comment: Pop.356. Cum.operating time 29.1E+6 hours.63 failures. Number of demands in operational time is not known. "Fail to operate" incl.
actuator failure,but power supply actuator.
not

to
VMGYF valve motor operated gate diameter between 12 and 24 inches
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-6/hr 95%: 1.6E-6/hr 9.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.356. Cum.opérât ing time 29.1E+6 hours.35 failures.

VM1DW valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: failure remain open (plug)
to

in

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 5%: 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear expereince (incl. test research reactors)
I

&
Comment: This failure mode is given per demand and time related since phenomena is time related,but may be deceted
only upon a demand

VMA8B valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detaiI n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak* Original failure mode: internal leakage(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-7/hr max: 7.0E-7/hr min: 1.E-10/hr
:

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion IREP data
and

Comment: Catastrophic leakage or"rupture" assigned enginering judgement. Catastrophic leakage assumes valve
is

by

the

tobeina
closed state, then the valve fails
 VMA8I valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak* Original failure mode: internal leakege (catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 100
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Catastrophic leakage or "rupture" assigned by engineering judgement. It
assumes the valve to be in a closed state, then the valve fails.

VMACG valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail open close

to

to

ort
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.7E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-74) Ultimate source: generic data and operating expereince
Comment: The same value is used in FTs for fail to open or close mode. For the standby operating mode,assuming montly test interval
failure per demand is 5.4E-3.

VHACJ valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Valuse used is from Station Blachout Study (NUREG/CR-3226). Two types of failures are included: valve hardware faults(5.0E-4) and
command circut faults (2.5E-4)

VMACW valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a, include driver. Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/d 95%: 3.0E-3/d 5%: 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial military experience data
I

and

and
Comment: Demand probabilities are based on presence of proper input signal Failure to operate include changing state from closed to open or
from open to closed position.

VMADB valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: failure remain open
to

in

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-7/hr max: 1.0E-6/hr min: 8.0E-8/hr

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
K) Comment :
Os
to
Os
to VMADH valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.3E-8/hr 95%: 1.6E-7/hr 5%: 9.1E-9/hr
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 9.3E-8/hr. Operating experience 1.6E+6 hours of operation, no failures.

VMADI valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: failure to remain open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 3728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment:

VMADO valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.2E-7/hr 95%: 3.0E-7/hr 5.8E-9/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior: WASH 1400,MOV fail remain open. 5%=20%; 95%=80%. demand rate converted hrly rate assuming demand days.
to

Per

to

in45
Operating experience: 1.89E+6 hours operation, failures.
of

no
VMADW valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: failure to remain open (plug)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: ultimate data source not known(sources presents plug per demand)
Comment: Failure to remain open refers to reduction of flow to unusable level due to foreign particles or gate failure. Not included
in value inadvertent or false signal driving valve closed.

VMADZ valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.3E-8/hr
OR

Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific experience
Comment: Also applicable to manual valves. Prior:WASH 1400, fail to remain open,plugged. 1 demand in 45 days used to convert to hourly rate.
Operating experience:!.11E+7 hours of operation, no failures.
 VMADZ valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer open /excessive leakage through valve
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-8/hr
Source: ZION NPP PSS (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1363 MOV+remote(PWR),external leakage (mean)and WASH 1400, MOV, external elakage/rupture (distribution).
Opearting experience:6.95E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
VMAEB valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment:

VMAEH valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.2E-4/d 95%: 1.6E-3/d 5%: 2.8E-4/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 4.3E-3/d. Operating experience 5315 demands, 3 failures.

VMAEI valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

VMAOB valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr min: 2.0E-7/hr

OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment :

to
to
VMAOH valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.9E-3/d 95%: 3.8E-3/d 1.7E-3/d

OR

5%:
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.3E-3/d. Operating experience 5315 demands, 15 failures.

VMAOI valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

VMATU valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: internal leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-6/hr
Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.7) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience and generic data
Comment: Assesement based data item WASH 1400.Generic failure based assigned W-1400,because clearly defin
onW

nad

modis

onFM

to

itsno
ed here. Assesed failure rate is said to be very pessimistic.

VMATU valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from US nuclear experience
Comment: Failure mode comparable with external leak.

VMAYJ valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fails from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Value based data summary (1.0E-7/hr) assuming monthly system test (720 hrs).
onNRCLE
 VMVDS valve motor operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normally closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: failed closed
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.5E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment:

VMWDS valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: normally open Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: failed open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-6/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating exprience

ofBWR
Comment:

VHXDS valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: normally open Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: failed closed
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-7/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluatiopn operating experience

ofBWR
Comment :

VMYDS valve motor operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: normally closed Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: failed open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-7/hr
OR

Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment :

VMQCE valve motor operated general (BWR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a(generaly exclude driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 8.0E-3/cy
Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1023 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi procedure) experience
50

&
Comment: Reference EGG-EA 5B16 1982.

to
o\
t/l
to
o\ VMQQE valve motor operated general (BWR application)
Component boundary: detail n/a(generally exclude operator) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY rec : 6.0E-8/hr
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1023 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi procedure) & experience
Comment: Reference EGHG-EA-5B16 1982.

VMQYE valve motor operated general (BWR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 8.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:
Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1023 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi procedure) & experience
Comment: reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.

VMPCE valve motor operated general (PUR application)

Component boundary: detail n/a(generally excludes operator) Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 4.0E-3/cy
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1022 Ultimate source: expert opinion aggregation (delphi procedure) & plant experiexce
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B16 1982.

VHPQE valve motor operated general (PWR application)

Component boundary: detail (generally excludes driver) Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: plug Original failure mode: plugged
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 6.0E-8/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE 500 (1984) pg.1022 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation (delphi procedure) and expreience
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B16

VMPYE valve motor operated generaKPWR application)

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 1.0E-7/hr
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1022 Ultimate source: expert judgement aggregation(delphi procedure) experience
50

and
Comment: Reference EGG-EA-5B169
 VML8F valve motor operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.3E-6/hr 95%: 3.1E-6/hr 1.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours

OR

5%:
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop. 220. Cum. opérât ing time 14E+6 hours. failures. Data based experience with isolating valves.

on
VMLCF valve motor operated globe diameter between inches

2and6
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.9E-6/hr 9.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.

5
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.220.Cum.operating time 14E+6 hours.18 failures.No.of demands operational time known. Data based experience with

in

isnot

on
isolating valves.FM incl.actuator failure.but not power supply.

VMLYF valve motor operated globe diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.3E-6/hr 95%: 7.5E-6/hr 5.3E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
OR

5%:

1.2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.220 Cum.operating time 14E+6 hours.89 failures. Data based on experience with isolating valves with either electric or
pneumatic operator.

VMLAF valve motor operated globe diameter between inches

2nad6

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-5/hr 95%: 1.5E-5/hr 5%: 1.1E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.1 REPAIR TIME: hours

9
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.220. Cum.operating time 14E+6 hours.187 failures."All modes" incl:1)fail to operate,2)external,3)internal leak,4)faulty indie.
5)spurius operation,6)unspecified.1),2),3) dominât,5)minor
and6)

VHOCY valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension

10<ON2nm

Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,control,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure change position
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-3/d
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.12 Ultimate source: plant operating exprience (Ringhals 2 PWR),ATV reports
Comment: Total pop. 12.Number demands operational time 600.Number failures 1.FAILMODE regarded open/close operation
of

per

of

to as demand
0\
one

-4
oo VMOCT valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension 100< ON < 200 mm
Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

alt
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.3E-3/d 95%: 3.7E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.12 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.180.Number of demads per operational time 6181.Number of failures:30. a=0.114; b=18 Critical failures occured at 6
plants.

VMNCY valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension > 200 mm
Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.13 Ultimate source: plant operating experience(Ringhals 2 PUR) ATV reports
Comment: Total pop. 23.Number of demands per operational time 1486.Number of failures 5.

VMNCT valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension 200mm

>
Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure change position
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.2E-3/d 95%: 4.2E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.13 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.95.Number demands operational time 3059.Number failures 0.11; b=15.2 Critical failures occured
of

per

of

2.a=

at
4 plants.

VMKCT valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension<=100 mm

Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

alt
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure change position
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.9E-3/d 95%: 3.6E-2/d REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

4
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.11 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.71.Number of demands per operational time 2512.Number of failures observed: 18. a=0.307; b=38.5. Critical failures
occured at 6 plants.

VMKCY valve motor operated isolation valve pipe dimension<=100mm

Component boundary: valve,motor,protection,controls,switch,fuse,indications Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.3E-3/d REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.11 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (Ringhals 2 PUR)
Comment: Total pop.22.Number of demands per operational time 983.Number of failures:5.
 VMRCG valve motor operated regualting
Component boundary: valve with operator Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to close (in terms of regulating)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 7
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-79) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination generic data sources

is

of
VMACU valve motor oprated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-6/hr
OR

:
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.6)
B Ultimate source: asesed from nuclear experience generic sources

and
Comment: Assesment based data item WASH 1400 data.If valves tested montly,given failure rate gives peak probability

onW

and

are

the

of
1.4E-3/d, what is in agreement with WASH 1400.

VSROT valve pilot valve operated safety valve pipe dimension 125,150,300

m
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.8E-4/d 95%: 1.4E-3/d REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

9
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.22 Ultimate source: plant operating experience( 7 BWR plants),ATV reports,LERs
Comment: Total pop.126.No.of demands 1281.No of failures 1.a=0.0167;b=21.4 Pilot valve see "vwkot". Safety valve+pilot valve=pressure relief
system.Critical failure plant only.
one

VSOCG valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer or main steam line) with one pilot valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to open or to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 7.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

4
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Operating experience: 20 test and 80 operational demands, no failures.
applicable water relief safety valves.
Not

to

VSTEG valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer or main steam line) with two or three pilot valves
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 7.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating expereince

Comment: Operating experience: 20 test and 80 operational demands, no failures. Failure rate is not influenced by number of pilot
N» valves. Not applicable to water relief safety valves.
K)
-0
O VSTOG valve pilot valve operated safety valve (pressurizer main steam line) with three pilot valves

or

twor
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 4.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

6
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Operating experience: test operational demands, failures reported. assumed that having more than pilot

20

and80

no

Itis

one
valve lower actual valve opening failure rate.N/a to water relief

VPTDH valve piston operated butterfly used HVAC

in
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-7/hr 95%: 4.3E-7/hr 1.4E-8/hr
OR

5%:
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereinee
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-7/hr. Operating experience 9.3E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

VPTEH valve piston operated butterfly used HVAC

in
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-3/d 95%: 1.4E-3/d 5%: 8.3E-4/d
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating experience 24713 demands, 30 failures.

VPTOH valve piston operated butterfly used in HVAC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-3/d 95%: 2.2E-3/d 5%: 1.4E-3/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 1.5E-3/d. Operating expereinee 24713 demands, failures.

49
VPACO valve piston operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.5E-3/d 95%: 4.9E-3/d 1.4E-3/d
OR

5%:

Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:NUREG 1363,PWR air-op valves,failure demand,w/o command. Operating experience:2564 demands, failures
on

10
 VPADO valve piston operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.9E-7/hr 95%: 5.5E-7/hr 6.8E-9/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:WASH 1400,air-op,failure to remain open.5%=20%; 95%=80% Per demand rate converted to hourly rate assuming 1 dem. in 45 days.
Operating experience:2.74E+5 hours operation,no failures.

of
VAGOT valve pneumatic operated isolation valve hydraulic scram system valve,pipe dimension <100 mm
Component boundary: valve, operator,control eqiupment,relays,logic and automation Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-4/d 95%: 3.3E-4/d REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.17 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced BWR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.278.No.of demands per operational time 27816. Ho.of failures 4. a=0.0203; b=141. Critical failures occured at one
plant

VAHCT valve pneumatic operated isolation valve pipe dimension <=100mm

Component boundary: valve,operator,control equipment,relays,logic automation Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

and

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure change position
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.9E-3/d 95%: 3.4E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.16 Ultimate source: plant operating experienceC 7 BWR plants),ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.86.No.of demands per operational time 2366, 14 failures a=0.129; b=21.7 Critical failures occured at 4 plants.

VAHCY valve pneumatic operated isolation valve pipe dimension <=100mm

Component boundary: valve,operator,control equipment,relays,logic automation Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

and

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure change position
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.5E-3/d REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.16 Ultimate source: plant operating experienceCRinghals 2 PWR)
Comment: total pop.33.No.of demand per operational time 1236, no.of failures 8.

VRPOU valve power operated relief PORV

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.6E-6/hr

OR

Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.5) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear expereince data
B

and
Comment: The same failure rate applicable for safety valves.Assesment bsd on W data,WASH 1400 adn SRS data item(7.0E-3/d).For yearly testin
stdby failrate(2.6E-6/hr)gives peak rate 2.3E-2/d(pessimistic).
Si
-J VRPEH valve power operated relief PORV
to
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-2/d 95%: 6.7E-2/d 5%: 1.0E-2/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPUR
Comment: Generic mean 2.5E-2/d. Operating experience demands, failure.

1
VRPEO valve power operated relief PORV
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.lE-2/d 95%: 3.0E-2/d 5%: 6.9E-4/d
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363. Failure to reclose after water or steam relief has the same distribution, based on EPRI valve test program.
Operating expenence:31 demands. failure.

1
VRPOH valve power operated relief PORV
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.2E-3/d 95%: 8.6E-3/d 5%: 1.0E-3/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operatng experience
Comment: Generic mean 4.3E-3/d . Operating expereince 8 demands, no failures.

VRPOO valve power operated relief PORV

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.9E-3/d 95%: 1.1E-2/d 5%: 2.1E-4/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363 (1980),BWR relief open on demand. BWR used because lack of PWR PORV data, and similarities between PORV and
AD function.Op.experience 31 demand, no failures.

VRPEJ valve power operated relief valve PORV

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment- normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fails reclose
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 10

Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: This value also applicable Safety Relief Valves. ASEP used generic value from IREP procedure guide, also
is

to

buti
falls into range indicated LERs.
the

by
 VRPEU valve power operated relief valve POVR
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-6/d
Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.5) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience and data
Comment: Assesment based on W data item and SRS data item applicable to PORV's(4.0E-2/d) If PORVs are tested yearly,stdby failrate(5E-6/h
r)gives peak probability of 4.4E-2/d, what is consistent with SRS

VWCCA valve remote operated PORV block valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fails to transfer on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.6E-2/d ERROR FACTOR: 2.4
Source: NUREG 4550/Vol.3,tbl.IV.8-1 Ultimate source: Surry operating expreince

NP
Comment:

VCA8B valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage minor
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr max: 2.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-8/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion IREP data

and
Comment:

VCA8B valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage catastrophic
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-7/hr max: 7.0E-7/hr min: I.E-10/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: Valve initialy closed, then failed

VCA8G valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.9E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: German Risk Study (pg.P3-78) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several data sources. Operating experience revealed values, 2.6E-5/hr 4.2E-6/hr
is

of

two

and
with recorded events,respective
2and5

ly

K)
-J
W
N»
-J
VCA8I valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

at
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage(catastrophic)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 100
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: This failure mode assume that valve initialy closed than failed

VCA8W valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal teak Original failure mode: internal leak (severe)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr 95%: 1.0E-6/hr 5%: 1.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial, military and other experiecne and data
Comment: Internal leak is failure mode comparable to fail to close.

VCA9I valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage(minor)
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opnion
Comment:

VCAAE valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY 2.1E-6/hr high: 3.3E-4/hr low: 8.0E-8/hr REPAIR TIME: 1.8 hours
OR

rec:

Source: IEEE (1984) pg.1065 Ultimate source: expert judgement experience

50

and
Comment: ref:Corps of Engineers R/M data base,NPRD-2,NERS 80-02,NUREG 2232 Given value is composite of diffrerent sources,constructions and
sizes check vlvs.Per cycle val.9.6E-5/cy.FM comment angle vlv.
of

VCADH valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 2.1E-8/hr 5%: 2.4E-9/hr
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experince
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 1.0E-8/hr. Operating experience 2.2E+6 hours operation, failures.
of

no
 VCAEB valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-6/hr max: 1.0E-5/hr min: 6.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion IREP datda

and
Comment:

VCAEG valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: German Risk Study (pg.P3-77) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate used combination several generic data sources. Regarding operating experience, there recorded failure

is

of

was1

in
2.6E+6 hours,what is comparable to generic,so it was used.

VCAEH valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.8E-4/d 95%: 4.5E-4/d 1.4E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experince
Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-4/d. Operating experience 14262 demands, 5 failures.

VCAEI valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Hourly rate 3.0E-6(EF 10) based on one actuation per month

VCAEJ valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fails to close (causing back leakage)
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Value used from IREP Procedure Guide.
in

(O
VCAES valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fails prevent flow

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: Shoreham PRA.GE data(tb.A.2.1) Ultimate source: evaluation ofBWR operating experience
Comment :

VCAEZ valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure seat/excessive leakage

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.4E-7/d
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
NPS

Comment: Pnors:NUREG 1363 check valve(PUR),internal leakage (mean) WASH 1400, check valves, reverse leakage (distrib).

and
Operating experienced.08E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

no
VCAOB valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean • 2.0E-7/hr max: 1.0E-6/hr mm: 8.0E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment:

VCAOH valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-4/d 95%: 2.8E-4/d 5%: 6.9E-5/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updater with plant operating expereince
OldPWR

Comment. Generic mean 2.7E-4/d. Operating experience 14262 demands, failures.

2
VCAOI valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR-
OR

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment: Hourly rate is 3.0E-7 (EF 10), based on one actuation per month
VCAOJ valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fails to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol. 1,tbl. VIII .1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Generic value developed Station Blackout Study used.

in

was
VCAOS valve self operated check
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fails to permit flow
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.5E-7/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment :

VCAOW valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear, industrial military expereince data
I

and

and
Comment :

VCAOZ valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open demand
to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.3E-5/d
Source: ZION (tbl .5.1 Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
NPS

.1
-5)

Comment: Prior:NUREG 1363 check valves(PWR),fai open (mean) WASH 1400 check valves, fail oepn (distrib.).
Ito

and

to
Operating experience:6968 demands, no failures.

VCATW valve self operated check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear and industrial experience and data
Comment: Rupture is failure mode comparable to external leak.
to
-o VCEOG valve self operated check ECCS & RHR systems
oo
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic -failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.lE-7/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

4
Source: German Risk Study (pg.P3-76) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Operating experience: 1.5E+6 operating hours, failures. other check valves combination generic data sources with

no

For

of
failure rate of 2.lE-6/hr (EF 10) was used in FTs.

VCFOV valve self operated check ESF system valves

Component boundary: valve, body and interiors Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.4E-5/d 95%: 1.7E-4/d 5%: 1.7E-5/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.438) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports
Comment: Overall standy hourly failure rate 3.0E-8/hr.

VCF8V valve self operated check ESF systems valves

Component boundary: valve body interiors Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: reverse leakage
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.4E-7/hr 95%: 7.0E-7/hr 5%: 4.1E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.442) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment: Overall rate. BWR 2 times higher than PWR.

VCFYV valve self operated check systems valves

ESF

Component boundary: valve body interiors Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
and

al
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: leak externally
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.9E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.9E-8/hr
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.446) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports
Comment: Overall rate. BWR higher than PWR.

VCAEU valve self operated check applicable to all check valves in safeguard systems and main feed
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-6/hr

Source: Sizewell B (PWR/RX312 pg.4) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience and data
Comment: Assesment based on U data item,literature data, and SRS data item (2.0E-4/d).For monthly tested valves stdby prob, of 2.0E-6/hr
gives peak failure prob.of1.4E-3/d what is pessimistic.
 VCAOU valve self operated check applicable check valves safeguards system main feed

toal

in

and
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-7/hr
Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.4) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear expereince data

and
Comment: Assesment based on 2 W data item,WASH 1400,and SRS data item(PWR) (5.0E-5/d).For monthly tested valves stdby failrate of 1.0E-7/hr
gives peak failure rate 7.2E-5/d.Consistent with other sources

of
VCS8F valve self operated check diameter betweeen 2 nad 6 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 5.3E-7/hr 95%: 7.3E-7/hr 3.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 9 hours

1.3
OR

5%:
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expreince
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.662. Cum.operating time 51E+6 hours. No.of failures 27.

VCL8F valve self operated check diameter between 12 and 24 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.2E-7/hr 95%: 9.5E-7/hr 5%: 4.lE-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.5 REPAIR TIME: hours

12
Source: data Ultimate source: operating expereince
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.343. Cum.operational time 24.4E+6 hours. No.of failures

15.
VCLAF valve self operated check diameter between inches
12and4

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-6/hr 95%: 2.8E-6/hr 5%: 1.8E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.2 REPAIR TIME: hours

12
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.343.Cum.operating time 24.4E+6 hours.No of failures 54."All modes"include: Dfail to open,2)fail to close,3)external,4)intern
leak,5)unspecified.1)completely negligable(no failures occuring)

VCLEF valve self operated check diameter between 12 and 24 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.2E-7/hr 95%: 3.2E-7/hr 5%: 5.7E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2.1 REPAIR TIME: hours

19
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experiece
HWR

HW

Comment: Pop.343.Cum.operating time 24.4E+6 hours.No.of failures 3.No.of demands in cumulative component operating time is not known.

N)
-J
VO
to
oo
o VCLYF valve self operated check diameter between inches

12and4
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.8E-7/hr 95%: 1.4E-6/hr 7.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

5%:

1.4

8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.343.Cum.operating time 24.4E+6 hours. No.of failures

24.
VCSAF valve self operated check diameter between inches

2and6
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-6/hr 95%: 1.6E-6/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.2

8
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.662. Cum.operating time 51E+6 hours. 67 failures. "All modes" include:1)faiI to open,2)fail to close,3)external leak,4)internal
leak,5)unspecified.Dis negligableCno failures recorded)

VCSEF valve self operated check diameter between inches

2and6
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.1E-7/hr 95%: 2.2E-7/hr 6.8E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
OR

5%:

1.8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.662.Cum.operating time 51E+6 hours.6 failures. No.of demands in cumulative opearting time is not known.

VCSOF valve self operated check diameter between 2 and 6 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.9E-8/hr 95%: 9.2E-8/hr 6.8E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

2.8

6
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.662.Cum.opérât ing time 51E+6 hours. 1 failure. No.of demands in cumulative operational time not known.

VCSYF valve self operated check diameter between inches

2and6

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.1E-7/hr 95%: 3.5E-7/hr 5%: 1.3E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 8 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.662.Cum.operating time 51E+6 hours.No.of failures
1.
 VCT8F valve self operated check diameter between inches

6and12
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.5E-7/hr 95%: 7.1E-7/hr 5%: 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.5 REPAIR TIME: 13 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop. 390. Cumulative component operating time 29E+6 hours. No. of failures 13.

VCTAF valve self operated check diameter between 6 and 12 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.8E-6/hr 95%: 2.3E-6/hr 1.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours
OR

5%:

1.2

12
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expreince
Comment: Pop.390.Cum.operating time 29E+6 hours. No.of failures modes" include:1)fai open,2)fail close,3)external leak,

53."Al

Ito

to
4)internal leak,5)unspecified.1Completely negligable(no failure)

VCTEF valve self operated check diameter between 6 and 12 inches

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.4E-7/hr 95%: 3.2E-7/hr 5%: 6.8E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 2 REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.390. Cumulative component operating time 29E+6 hours. No.of failures 4.Number of demands per operational time is not known.

VCTYF valve self operated check diameter between 6 nad 12 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.2E-7/hr 95%: 1.2E-6/hr 5%: 5.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: hours

1.4

12
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.390. Cumulative component operational time 29E+6 hours. No.of failures

24.
VCHAF valve self operated check diameter larger than inches
24

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: all modes Original failure mode: all modes
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-6/hr 95%: 6.2E-6/hr 5%: 2.1E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.6 REPAIR TIME: 10 hours
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop. 48. Cumulative component operating time 2.52E+6 hours. 9 failures, "all modes" include Dexternal leak, 2)unspecif ied.

oo
00
VCHYF valve self operated check diameter larger than 24 inches
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-6/hr 95%: 4.2E-6/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.9 REPAIR TIME: 13 hours

OR

5%:
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HUR operating experience
Comment: Pop.48. Cumulative component operating time 2.52E+6 hours. 5 failures.

VCB8F valve self operated check diameter less than 2 inches

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leak
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-7/hr 95%: 1.8E-7/hr 8.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
OR

5%:

1.4
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR
Comment: Pop.1907.Cum.opérât ing time 1.4E+8 hours.No.of failures

17.
VCBAF valve self operated check diameter less than 2 inches
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes
al

al
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.7E-7/hr 95%: 4.6E-7/hr 2.9E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 6 hours
OR

5%:

1.2
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.1907.Cum.operating time 1.4E+8 hours. 51 failures. Failure mode include:1)faiI to open,2)fail to close,3)external leak,4)
internal leak,5)unspecified.Contribution Dextremly low.
of
VCBEF valve self operated check diameter less than inches
2

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-8/hr 95%: 6.8E-8/hr 1.1E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
OR

5%:

2
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1907.Cum.operating time 1.4E+8 hours. No.of failures 4. No.of demands not known.

VCBOF valve self operated check diameter less than inches

2

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.8E-9/hr 95%: 3.4E-8/hr 5%: 2.3E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 3.0 REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: data Ultimate source: operating experience
HWR

HWR

Comment: Pop.1907.Cum.operating time 1.4E+8 hours.No.of failure 1. No.of demands not known.
 VCBYF valve self operated check diameter less than inches

2
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: external leak
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.6E-8/hr 95%: 8.0E-8/hr 5%: 2.3E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: REPAIR TIME: 4 hours

1.8
Source: HWR data Ultimate source: HWR operating experience
Comment: Pop.1907.Cum.operating time 1.4E+8 hours. No.of failures 6.

VCMEH valve self operated check main steam check valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.4E-4/d 95%: 4.7E-4/d 5%: 5.2E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.7E-4/d. Operating experience 378 demands, no failures.

VCJET valve self operated check pipe dimension > 100mm

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.4E-3/d 95%: 1.9E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 9 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.19 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced plants), reports, LERs

BUR

ATV
Comment: Total pop.168.No.of demands per operational time 3211.No.of failures 11. a=0.0568; b=16.5 Critical falures reportd at 5
plants.

VCSCT valve self operated check pipe dimension 500mm, 600 mm (main steam system)
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.2E-3/d 95%: 1.9E-2/d
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.15 Ultimate source: plant operating experienced plants), reports, LERs

BWR

ATV
Comment: Total pop.24.Number of demands per operational time 632. No. of failures 2. a=0.09; b=28.3
Critical failures reported plant only.
one

VCIET valve self operated check pipe dimension <=100 mm

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to

FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 5.5E-4/d REPAIR TIME: 12 hours

Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.18 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.417.No.of demands per operational time 3628.No of failures 2.a=0.0129; b=23.3 Critical failures at one plant only.
No failure to open observed out of 3628 demands.
N»
00
t»
to
oo VCJOT valve self operated check pipe dimension
-p..

>10m
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.3E-4/d REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

9
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.19 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (7 BUR plants), ATV reports, LERs
Comment: Total pop.168. No.of demands per operational time 3211. No of failures 1.a=0.071; b=11.2 Critical failure at one plant only.
Ringhals 2 PWR- no failure to open out of 1844 demands.

VCUDO valve self operated check stop check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.8E-7/hr 95%: 5.2E-7/hr 5%: 6.7E-9/hr
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience.
NPRA

Comment: Prior: WASH 1400 failure of MOV to remain open.5%=20%;95%=80%.Per demand rate converted to hrly rate assuming 1 demand in 45 days
Operating experienced.42E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

VCUEO valve self operated check stop check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.6E-4/d 95%: 3.4E-4/d 5%: 3.3E-5/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363,check valve failure close demand Operating experience: demand, failure.
to

on

321

1
95%/5% ratio is 10, indicating moderate degree of uncertanty.

VCUOI valve self operated check stop check

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :

VCUOO valve self operated check stop check

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 9.9E-5/d 95%: 2.2E-4/d 5%: 2.1E-5/d
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363 check valve failure to open on demand Operating experience: 251 demand, no failures.
95%5% ratio indicating moderate degree unceratnty
is10,

of
 VCWDO valve self operated check swing
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-7/hr 95%: 6.0E-7/hr 6.9E-9/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating expeirience
Comment: Prior:WASH 1400 failure remain open.5%=20%; 95%=80%.Per demand rate converted hrly rate assuming demand days

ofMOVt

to

in

45
Operating experience:!.48E+5 hours of operation, no failuires.

VCWEO valve self operated check swing

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.8E-5/d 95%: 2.1E-4/d 2.0E-5/d
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:NUREG 1363, check valve failure to close on demand. Operating experience: 426 demands, no failures
95%/5% ratio is 10 indicating moderate degree of uncertanty.

VCWOO valve self operated check swing

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 9.8E-5/d 95%: 2.1E-4/d 2.0E-5/d
OR

5%:
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior:NUREG 1363, check valve failure to open on demand. Operating experience: 427 demands, no failures.
95%/5% ratio is 10 indicating moderate degree of unceratnty.

VCNES valve self operated check testable check valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fails to prevent flow
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.2E-6/hr
OR

Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation operating experience

ofBWR
Comment :

VCZDO valve self operated check tilting disc check valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: transfer closed
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.9E-7/hr 95%: 5.7E-7/hr 5%: 6.8E-9/hr
Source: Oconee (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
NPRA

Comment: Prior: WASH 1400,failure remain open.5%=20%;95%=80%.Per demand rate converted hrly rate assuming demand days
ofMOVt

to

in45
oo Operating experience: 2.39E+5 hours of operation, no failures.
NJ
00
Os VCZEO valve self operated check tilting disc check valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.3E-4/d 95%: 2.7E-4/d 3.0E-5/d

OR

5%:
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363, check valve failure to close on demand. Operating experience: 2719 demands, 1 failure.
95%/5% ratio indicating moderate degree unceratnty.

is10

of
VCZOO valve self operated check tilting disc check valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.7E-5/d 95%: 1.7E-4/d 5%: 1.9E-5/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior: NUREG 1363,check valve failure to open on demand Operating experience: 2707 demands, no failures.
95%/5% ratio is 10 indicating moderate degree of uncertanty.

VCNOS valve self operated check valve testable check valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

alt
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fails permit flow
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.2E-7/hr
Source: Shoreham PRA,GE data(tb.A.2-1) Ultimate source: evaluation of BWR operating experience
Comment:

VSCEB valve self operated code safety valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close, given open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.0E-5/hr max: 2.0E-4/hr min: 8.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: Aplies only
toPWR

VSCEI valve self operated code safety valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close, given open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment: applies only
toPWR
 VSCOB valve self operated code safety valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 6.0E-7/hr max: 4.0E-5/hr min: 3.0E-6/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: applies only. Premature opening covered under initiating events

toPWR
VSCOI valve self operated code safety valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Applies to PWR only. Premature opening is treated as an initiating event.

VWKCG valve self operated pilot valve

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail open close
to

to

ort
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 4.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 6
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Operating experience: test operational demands failures
60

and80

no

.
VSDEO valve self operated pressurizer safety valve short inlet piping
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 4.8E-3/d 95%: 1.0E-2/d 5%: 1.1E-3/d
Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:Hedian,failure to reclose(steam relief) Babcock&WiIcox Co. Distribution based on EPRI test.
Operating experience: 10 deamnds, no failure. ONLY STEAM RELIEF

VSDOO valve self operated pressurizer safety valve short inlet piping
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.7E-4/d 95%: 8.0E-4/d 7.4E-6/d

OR

5%:

Source: Oconee NPP PRA (tbl.b-1.) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant specific operating experience
Comment: Prior:Median General Atomic data base (GCR) primary relief valves, range factor
of

for

10.
Operating experience: demands, falures.
10

no

to
oo
-j
oo VSBEB valve self operated primary safety valve
oo
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close,given open

to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-5/hr max: 2.0E-4/hr min: 8.0E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: applies only

toBWR
VSBEI valve self operated primary safety valve
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close,given open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-2/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: aplies only
toBWR

VSBOB valve self operated primary safety valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic fei lure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-5/hr max: 2.0E-4/hr min: 8.0E-6/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion IREP data

and
Comment: applies only
toBWR

VSBOI valve self operated primary safety valves

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: applies to BWR only

VRADG valve self operated relief

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: spourious opening
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.6E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 7
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-83) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate combination several generic data sources.
is

of
 VRSDZ valve self operated relief/safety
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: premature opening or leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.6E-6/hr

OR

:
Source: ZION (tbl.1.5.1-5) Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience

NPS
Comment: Priors:NUREG 1363 safety valves(PWR),premature opening (mean) WASH 1400 relief valves, premature opening (distrib.).

and
Operating experience: 6.19E+5 hours operation, failures.

of

2
VSMEH valve self operated safety main steam
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.6E-3/d 95%: 7.1E-3/d 5%: 8.8E-5/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.9E-3/d.Operating experience demands, failures.

10

no
VSHOH valve self operated safety main steam
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
n/a

Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.3E-4/d 95%: 1.1E-3/d 5%: 1.3E-5/d
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 3.3E-4/d. Operating experience 10 demands, no failures.

VSAEU valve self operated safety relief valve

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.0E-7/hr
OR

Source: Sizewell (PWR/RX312 pg.5) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear experience data
B

and
Comment: Assesment based on W data item and SRS data applicable to SRVs, (6.0E-3/d).If SRV are tested yearly stdby failrate of 7.0E-7/hr
gives the peak probability of 6.1E-3/d,what is pessimistic.

VVAEJ valve self operated safety relief valve BUR General Electric
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fails to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VI11.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Value used is taken from IREP Procedures Guide.
K)
00
to
^o
o VSPDV valve self operated safety valves PUR
Component boundary: valve body and internals, operating mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: premature open

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.4E-6/hr 95%: 5.4E-6/hr 2.0E-6/hr

OR

5%:
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.468) Ultimate source: US plants LER reports evaluation
Comment:

VSPOV valve self operated safety valves

PWR
Component boundary: valve body and internals, operating mechanism Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.9E-3/d 95%: 7.4E-3/d 5%: 1.8E-3/d
Source: NUREG 1363 (1982) (pg.465) Ultimate source: plants reports evaluation

US

LER
Comment: Overall data.Standby hourly rate is 1.7E-6/hr. Demand rate is taking into account 5 years test interval,and operational demands
in observed period (demand=1/2 forced scrams,PWR)

ofal
WAEB valve self operated vacuum breaker
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: failure close
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.0E-8/hr max: 4.0E-7/hr min: 2.0E-8/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: applies only
toBWR

WAEI valve self operated vacuum breaker

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: applies only
toBWR

VVAOB valve self operated vacuum breaker

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: failure open
to

to

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 6.0E-8/hr max: 4.0E-7/hr min: 2.0E-8/hr

OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment: aplies only
toBWR
VVAOI valve self operated vacuum breaker
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: failure to open
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: applies only

toBWR
WACW valve self operated vacuum valve
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate

to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-5/d 95%: 1.0E-4/d 5%: 1.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial military experience data

and

an
Comment: Failure operate include changing state fron closed open from open closed position.
to

to

or

to
VCUEG valve self operated (motor operated) check stop check
Component boundary: including operator Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail close Original failure mode: fail close
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 7.4E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR: 4
Source: German Risk Study (pg.F3-78) Ultimate source: generic data and operating experience
Comment: In FTs this component is included for isolation of accumulators. Operating experience for electrical operator part of valve
gives failure rate of 4.3E-6/hr.

VCUOG valve self operated (motor operated) check stop check

Component boundary: without operator (motor) Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.5E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data sources
Comment: In FTs this component is included for isolation of accumulators. Principal reference NPRDS annual report 1976.

VCU8G valve self operated (motor operated) stop check

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: standby Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: internal leak Original failure mode: internal leakage
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data

Comment: assumed that stop check valve somewhat better terms probability internal leak than regular check valve.
Itis

is

in

of

of

Failure rate combination several generic sources.

is

of
VSADG valve self operated (pilot operated) safety
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position Original failure mode: spourious opening
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 2.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:

OR

7
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: Failure rate is combination of several generic data sources.

VSRDT valve self operated (pilot operated) safety valve (pressure relief system) pipe dimensions 125,150,300

m
Component boundary: Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

al
Generic failure mode: fail to remain in position* Original failure mode: spourious opening
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.3E-6/d 95%: 7.5E-6/d REPAIR TIME: 9 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.22 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants)

(7BWR
Comment: Critical failures reported plants. Spurious opening include detected leakages power. Opérât

on2

al

at

in
expereicne data for this failure mode n/a.

VSRET valve self operated (pilot operated) safety valve (pressure relief system) pipe dimensions 125,150,300 mm
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: failure to reclose
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.4E-3/d 95%: 7.2E-3/d REPAIR TIME: 9 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.22 Ultimate source: plant operating experience (BWR plants), reports, LERs

ATV
Comment: Total pop.126.No.of demands 1281.No.of failures 2. Pilot valve see "vwket". a=0.0232; b=9.67
Critical failures reported on 2 plants.

VRRCG valve self operated (pilot or power operated) pressurizer relief

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: closed Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: fail open close
to

to

ort
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 4.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

6
Source: German Risk Study (tb.F3,7-1) Ultimate source: operating experience
Comment: Generic data seems applicable different types failure modes.
notbe

dueto

and

VWMCT valve self operated, motor operated (redundant closure) stop check pipe dimension 500mm, 600mm (main steam system valve)
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to change position
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.5E-2/d 95%: 7.7E-2/d REPAIR TIME: 4 hours
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.14 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants),ATV reports, LERs

(6BWR
Comment: Total pop.24. No.of demands operational time 632. No.of failures 16.FaiI.mostly related open/close oper.by motor.Press
per

to
clsing fction 10 times more reliable.a=0937;b=36.1.Crit f.at 5 pi
 VDODH valve solenoid operated all systems, except HVAC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed

to

in
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 8.7E-7/hr 95%: 2.0E-6/hr 1.0E-7/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
Comment: Generic mean 1.3E-6/hr. Operating experience 8.1E+5 hours of operation, no failures.

VDOEH valve solenoid operated all systems, except HVAC

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.7E-3/d 95%: 2.9E-3/d 5.5E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PUR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating expereince
Comment: Genreic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience 2263 demands, 4 failures.

VDOOH valve solenoid operated all systems, except HVAC

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to open Original failure mode: fail to open on demand
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d 95%: 1.7E-3/d 2.4E-4/d
OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating expereince 2263 demands, 2 failures.

VDHDH valve solenoid operated used HVAC

in

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al

Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: transfer closed
to

in

FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.9E-7/hr 95%: 2.2E-6/hr 4.5E-8/hr

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
Comment: Generic mean 1.3E-6/hr. Operating experience 2.4E+5 hours of operation , no failures.

VDHEH valve solenoid operated used HVAC

in

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to close Original failure mode: fail to close on demand
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 8.0E-4/d 95%: 1.7E-3/d 5%: 7.6E-5/d
Source: Ultimate source: generic data updated with plant operating experience
OldPWR

Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

538

no

to
•o
OJ
VDHOH valve solenoid operated used in HVAC
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail open Original failure mode: fail open demand

to

to

on
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.4E-3/d 95%: 1.2E-2/d 3.7E-3/d

OR

5%:
Source: Old PWR Ultimate source: generic data updated uith plant operating expereince
Comment: Generic mean 2.4E-3/d. Operating experience demands, failures.

538

5
VDAAF valve solenoid operated general
Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: modes Original failure mode: modes

al

al
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 2.7E-7/hr 95%: 3.5E-7/hr 5%: 2.1E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 1.3 REPAIR TIME: 5 hours
Source: HUR data Ultimate source: HWR operating expereince
Comment: Pop.2635.Cum.operating time 145.2E+6 hours.39 failures."All modes incl:1)passing,2)plugged,3)faulty operation,4)unspecified.Contrib
of 4)is dominant, other about equal (6 times lower)

VDACB valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 2.0E-6/hr max: 1.0E-5/hr min: 8.0E-7/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert opinion and IREP data
Comment:

VDACG valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fail to open or to close
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.7E-5/hr ERROR FACTOR: 20
Source: German Risk Study (pg.P3-75) Ultimate source: generic data
Comment: There specific operating experience data this component failure rate combination several generic data sources
isno

for

and

is

of
(6).

VDACI valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail change position Original failure mode: failure operate
to

to
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR: 3
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment :
VDACJ valve solenoid operated general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: fails to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-3/d ERROR FACTOR:

OR

3
Source: NUREG 4550, Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: Same value as for air operated valve. Two types of failures included in the failure rate: valve hardware fault (1.0E-3) and
command circut faults (1.0E-4).

VDACW valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to operate
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-3/d 95%: 3.0E-3/d 3.0E-4/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-1) Ultimate source: assesed from nuclear,industrial and military experience and data
Comment: Based presence proper input signal Failure valve operate include changing state from closed
on

of

ofa

to
to open or fron open to closed position.

VOADW valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: fail remain position Original failure mode: failure remain open(plug)
to

in

to
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-4/d 95%: 3.0E-4/d 3.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: ultimate data source known
I

not
Comment: Failure to remain open refers to reduction of flow to unusable level due to foreign material or gate failure.Not included in
data inadvertent false signal driving valve closed.
is

or

VDATW valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: rupture Original failure mode: rupture
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-1) Ultimate source: ultimate data source known
I

not
Comment :

VDAYJ valve solenoid operated general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: leakage/external leak Original failure mode: fails from plugging
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 4.0E-5/d ERROR FACTOR:
OR

Source: NUREG 4550,Vol.1,tbl.VIII.1-2 Ultimate source: assesed from several nuclear data sources
Comment: same value operated valve. Value based data summary (1.0E-7/hr) assuming month (720 hrs) test
The

asfori

is

onNRCLE

one

interval.
ro
VDNCT valve solenoid operated general (normally activated)
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: normally activated Operating environment: normal

n/a
Generic failure mode: fail to change position Original failure mode: failure to function
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 7.1E-7/hr 95%: 3.7E-6/hr REPAIR TIME: hours

OR

3
Source: Swedish Rel.data book, tbl.23 Ultimate source: plant operating experience plants), reports, LERs

(7BUR

ATV
Comment: Total pop.513.Operating time 2260E+4 hours. Mo.of failures Critical failures reported plants.

16.

on2
a=0.0487; b=68600

CWCGW wire control circut wire typical circut, several joints

Component boundary: wire section wth soldered and lug connection to comp.S term board Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: short to ground Original failure mode: short to ground
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-7/hr 95%: 3.0E-6/hr 5%: 3.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed form nuclear, industrial exeprience and expert opinion
Comment: Data do not permit a unique separation of failure modes in all cases; hence failure modes listed for wires and terminal boards
are not necesary independent, and should not be combined.

CWCHW wire control circut wire typical circut, several joints

Component boundary: wire section with soldered connection comp.& term.boar Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal

andlug

to
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short to power
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY median: 1.0E-8/hr 95%: 1.0E-7/hr 5%: 1.0E-9/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: WASH 1400 (table 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial experience expert opinion
I

and
Comment: Data do not permit a unique separation of failure modes in all cases; hence failure modes listed for wires and terminal boards
are necesary indpendent, should combined.
not

and

notbe

CWCIW wire control circut wire typical circut, several joints

Component boundary: wire section with soldered and lug connection to comp.&term.board Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY median: 3.0E-6/hr 95%: 1.0E-5/hr 1.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

5%:

3
Source: WASH 1400 (table III 4-2) Ultimate source: assesed from industrial,nuclear experience, expert opinion
Comment: Data do not permit a unique separation of failure modes in all cases; hence failure modes listed for wires and terminal boards
are not necessary independent, and should not be combined

CWAGB wire general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: short to ground Original failure mode: short to ground
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 1.0E-6/hr max: 5.0E-6/hr min: 2.0E-8/hr
OR

Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement IREP data
and

Comment :
 CWAGI wire general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short to ground Original failure mode: short to ground
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-7/hr ERROR FACTOR: 10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Given value circut Given value consistent with IEEE data 1000 circut

isper

is

50

for
ft
CWAHB wire general
Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal

n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short to power
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 3.0E-8/hr max: 2.0E-7/hr mm: 6.E-10/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.1.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

CWAHI wire general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al
Generic failure mode: short circut Original failure mode: short to power
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-8/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10
Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion
Comment: Given value is per circut Given value is consistent with IEEE 500 data for 1000 ft circut

CWAIB wire general

Component boundary: detail n/a Operating mode: all Operating environment: normal
Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE OR PROBABILITY mean : 1.0E-5/hr max: 5.0E-5/hr mm: 2.0E-7/hr
Source: NUREG 2815 (table C.I.) Ultimate source: expert judgement and IREP data
Comment :

CWAII wire general

Component boundary: detail Operating mode: Operating environment: normal
n/a

al

Generic failure mode: open circut Original failure mode: open circut
FAILURE RATE PROBABILITY mean 3.0E-6/hr ERROR FACTOR:
OR

10

Source: IREP NUREG 2728 (tb.5.1-1) Ultimate source: expert opinion

Comment: Given value is per circut Given value is consistent with IEEE 500 data for 1000 ft circut

VO
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