EN BANC [G.R. No. L-53373. June 30, 1987.

] CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO

L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL,
RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

Criminal Procedure; A court that grant a motion of the fiscal to

dismiss a case commits no error and the fiscal’s view thereon, in a
clash of views with the judge or complainant, should normally
prevail.—Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for
insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the
same commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show
either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be
established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should
normally prevail. On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or
final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the Courts to restrain a
criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where it is necessary for
the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner.

Same; Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior

permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the
case.—The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
1
consideration of the Court, The only qualification is that the action of the
Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of
the People to due process of law.

Same; Same.—Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and

whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the
Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case,

Same; Where the court refuses to grant the fiscal’s motion to

dismiss, including a case where the Secretary of Justice ordered the
fiscal to move to dismiss the case, the fiscal should continue to
appear in the case although he may turn over the presentation of
evidence to the private prosecutor.—However, one may ask, if the trial
court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the
directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the
prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be
designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is
a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary
of Justice. The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We
all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the
Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused
should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the
case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to
continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J p:
The issue raised in this case is whether the trial court acting on a
motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
2
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated
for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) 77. 1 When the
case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review
filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1,
1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion. 2A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the
order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18,
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary
writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17,
1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with
the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a
comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that
the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment
of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have
finally resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial
Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy
of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,
1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set
the arraignment stating:
"ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this case filed by the
prosecuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as
suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex
"A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is
3
 urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check
involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing
obligation the liability of the drawer can only be civil and not
criminal.
The motion's trust being to induce this Court to resolve the
innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not
only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes
the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered
as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for
December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED." 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition
and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from
the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the
accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused
whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside,
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case,
declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect,
ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the
obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court
without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to
comment to the petition, not to file a motion to dismiss, within ten (10)
days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious.
Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and
a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed.
In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court
resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of
February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to
the petition.
4
 Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while
the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by
law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are
shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their
office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after
an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the
fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or
even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a
proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that
the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither
has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an
information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with
the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a
fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence
has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move
for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the
defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 247 In a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the
offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final
nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the
Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the
5
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any
limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial
or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case may be and it may
be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently
the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is
the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted
himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is
true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. 35 The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the
right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was
due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the
Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination
of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice
will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to
handle the case cannot possible designated by the Secretary of Justice
6
who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the
fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying
the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all
know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the
Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk
from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines
even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor
for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that
the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although
he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal
or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of
the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this
is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.