Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 162336, 1 February 2010
Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 162336, 1 February 2010
FACTS:
Soriano was charged for Estafa through falsification of commercial documents for allegedly
securing a loan of 48 million during his incumbency as president of the bank, in the name of two
(2) persons when in fact these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the bank's
officers approved or had any information about the said loan. The state prosecutor conducted a
Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special Investigation of
BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information against Soriano for Estafa
through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law (Director, Officer,
Stockholder or Related Interest or General Banking Act as amended).
ISSUES:
1. Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under
Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA
7653 (The New Central Back Act).
2. Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of
RA 337, as amended) could also be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order denying a
Motion to Quash?
4. Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction.
RULING:
1. Yes. Since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds
that it can be initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed
by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview
of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint for a public crime. Following the
rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that
the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements
provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and
(d) of RA 7653.
2. Yes. The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is justified by the fact that it
even expressly covers loans to third parties where the third parties are aware of the transaction
(such as principals represented by the DOSRI), and where the DOSRI’s interest does not appear
to be beneficial but even burdensome (such as in cases when the DOSRI acts as a mere guarantor
or surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the banking system in such
situations, it will surely be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the DOSRI acted for
his own benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary interpretation will
effectively allow a DOSRI to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of the law.
3. No. This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in Soriano v. People, where we
held: In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in
such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present
the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law
4. No. There is no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought by petitioner given this
Court's findings in the earlier issues of the instant case. The requisites to justify an injunctive
relief are: (1) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in
or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." Absent any clear and unquestioned legal
right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse of discretion. Caution and
prudence must, at all times, attend the issuance of an injunctive writ because it effectively
disposes of the main case without trial and/or due process.