Rodriguez v.

Tan
G.R. No. L-6044 | November 24, 1952

Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.

Petition for certiorari (Rule 65)

FACTS:

Flaviano Rodriguez died leaving an estate valued at 10,000Php. The estate had no debts and all
the heirs, are of age (Widow Fortunata Vda de Rodriguez and her six children). The heirs had a
verbal agreement not to liquidate the estate with an understanding that each of the six children
would be entitled to a portion to the earnings of the estate from year to year for the needs of
their families so long as not to exceed the partition they are entitled to.

Eight years after the death of Flaviano, Abelardo Rodriguez, one of the heirs, filed a petition for
administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano. The other heirs objected to the petition
invoking that if the estate is free from obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration
proceedings shall be allowed.

The Judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, overruled the opposition and appointed Abelardo Rodriguez
as administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond. The heirs filed a petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify the order of Judge Tan.

In the answer, Abelardo Rodriguez admitted to the existence of the verbal agreement but
contended that such agreement was not carried out. In reality, it was Benjamin Rodriguez who
took over the administration of the estate, and in his discharge of his duties, failed and refused
to give Abelardo his share of the income.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration
proceedings and in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator.

HELD/RULING: YES. Section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and
the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

Section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention

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were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in
other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only once
but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.

The core of petitioners' objection is not that the heirs have erroneously instituted these
administration proceedings but that the court erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez
administrator of the estate. It is claimed that Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed administrator
without the petitioners having been given an opportunity to be heard. But this claim has no
basis it appearing that the parties had been duly heard before the court issued its order now
complained of. It appears that both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to
be appointed as administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and
qualifications of the persons recommended.

The petition is dismissed with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby dissolved.

Sps. Butiong v. Plazo

Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:

Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife,
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a
resort and a family home, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

Plazo and Alaras filed a complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Possession. They discovered that their co-heirs, namely, Benita Tenorio (Second wife) and
other children sold the properties to Spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong (deceased;
but substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel Villafria) without their knowledge and consent.

It was later found out that the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has
no record of any transaction involving the subject properties. TCTs of the titles to the property
were given to Plazo and Alaras. However, they were not able to enter the premises of the actual
lots as they were padlocked. 4 out of the 8 cottages were found out to be demolished.

Subsequently, Plazo and Alaras learned of a notice for extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father in the tabloids. They annotated their adverse claims on the properties before the
register of deeds in Nasugbu.

Villafria denied allegations on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in
acquiring the properties. Villafria alleged further that the family home was sold by Tenorio to
Spouses Bondoc and that the property acquired by Villafria consists only of the resort.

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The Trial Court nullified the transfer of the properties to the spouses Bondoc as well as Villafria
due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance.

Villafria fimed a motion for reconsideration raising the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction which
was denied. He subsequently appealed but was also denied due to non-compliance of the rules
on notarial practice. Villafria filed for an MR which was denied.

Villafria then filed a Petition for the Annulment of Judgement and Order before the CA
assailing the decision and order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, which the CA dismissed.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in entertaining
the special proceeding for the settlement of estate of Pedro Rinoza and the civil action for
annulment of title of the heirs and third persons in one proceeding

HELD/RULING: No. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature
and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However,
a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit,
the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition
with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

It was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will,
leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a
special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the
same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially. Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an
action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as law
expressly permits the same.

Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in
an action for partition, as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising
from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property.

The action herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also for
annulment of title and documents. The action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in
rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.