Aristotle and Virtue Theories
Aristotle and Virtue Theories
INTRODUCTION
“One may also observe in one’s travels to distant countries the feelings of recognition and
affiliation that link every human being to every other Human Being”.1
1
(Aristotle, 1890) 1155a21-22
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people, with the right motive, and in the right way’. This is Aristotle’s
‘doctrine of the mean’.
The relationship between Aristotle s ethics and his psychology are not as
obvious as the differences. Aristotle has been criticized for thinking up
theories that conflict his basic theories, but one who thinks constantly
cannot be held back by one s own thoughts. As we know by this point we
are all trying to gain happiness through being a good person. A person of
virtue. As for the connection, another difficulty arises, I believe that the
plants and animals without reason do certain activities to better
themselves and make themselves happier. If they are without reason
then their activities are not thought out and therefore instinctual or might
I say subconsciously done. So how can be if he specifically demands that
being aware of your actions is the true path to virtue? This is my only
connection an anti-connection.
The doctrine of the mean entails that we can (often, if not always) place a
virtue ‘between’ two vices. Just as there is a right time, object, person,
etc., at which to feel fear (or any emotion), some people can feel fear too
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often, about too many things, and towards too many people, or they get
too afraid of things that aren’t that dangerous. Other people can feel
afraid not often enough, regarding too few objects and people. Someone
who feels fear ‘too much’ is cowardly. Someone who feels fear ‘too little’
is rash. Someone who has the virtue relating to fear is courageous. The
virtue is the ‘intermediate’ state between the two vices of ‘too much’ and
‘too little’. Aristotle presents the following examples. For many states of
character, he notes, we don’t have a common name
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According to the old Greek thinkers, there are in all seven virtues of which
four are called Cardinal Virtues while rest three are
called Theological virtues. The “Cardinal” ones are those which all civilised
people recognise. The “Theological” are those which, as a rule, only
Christians know about.
Plato identifies four “cardinal virtues” that are necessary for a happy
individual and that are necessary for a good society. He also believed that
the ideal state should be with people with such virtues. The four cardinal
virtues are prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude {or Courage}.
Prudence
Prudence literally means “discretion in practical affairs”. Prudence is called
the charioteer of the other virtues because it guides and sets the rule and
reason for the other virtues. Prudence is the footprint of Wisdom.
Justice
Justice is the flawless order by which every human being do their own
business, the right man in the right place, i.e. the class and division of
citizens. Justice is a more abstract than the other virtues. He states that
justice in the State means justice in the individuals who form the State.
Justice states civic strengths that underlie healthy community life.
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Equality: Treating all people the same according to notions of fairness and
justice.
Temperance
Fortitude / Courage
A brave man acts in the face of his reasonable fear. It is the never-failing
salvation of the opinions which law and education have prescribed
concerning dangers. It is the emotional strengths that involve the
exercise of will to accomplish goals in the face of opposition, external or
internal.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Xianzhong, H. (2007, April 10). Justice as a virtue: An analysis of Aristotle’s virtue
of justice. frointers in philosophy of china , pp. 265-279.
People currently regard justice as the main principle of institutions and
society, while in ancient Greek people took it as the virtue of citizens.
Since virtue can be said to be a specific individual character, Aristotle
also defines the virtue of justice as the character of justice, with which
citizens act justly and desire to do what is just. The virtue of justice is
also an individual ethical virtue, differing from others for it is at the
same time a social ethic. We can call the virtue of justice a “non-
individual individual ethical virtue.” It has been explained as between
pure altruism and egoism, which is a wrong explanation. John Rawls an
American philosopher regards justice as the first virtue of social
institutions, challenging Aristotle’s virtue of justice, an assertion which
also needs further deliberation. Aristotle seems most interested in
establishing a conception of the formal structure of justice, which seems
to reflect a conception of desert. He distinguishes within particular justice
between justice in distribution and justice in rectification. The former, he
claims, adheres to a kind of proportionality, in which what each deserves
is proportional to the relationship between the contributions. If A
contributes twice as much as B (of whatever the metric of merit is
relevant in some particular case), then A’s return ought also to be twice
B’s. This conception of distributive justice obviously lends itself to “goods
of fortune” — and to some goods, like wealth, more obviously than others
— but it need not in principle be confined to such goods, although the
examples Aristotle provides suggest such applications. Aristotle seems
torn between a conception of justice as a virtue in his distinctive
understanding of what a virtue is — with a requirement that one have all
the virtues to have any (Nicomachean EthicsVI.13), and rooted in the
doctrine of the mean — and justice as having the form of a formal
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Virtue ethics is a broad term for theories that emphasize the role
of character and virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s
duty or acting in order to bring about good consequences. A virtue ethicist
is likely to give you this kind of moral advice: “Act as a virtuous person
would act in your situation.”
Most virtue ethics theories take their inspiration from Aristotle who
declared that a virtuous person is someone who has ideal character traits.
These traits derive from natural internal tendencies, but need to be
nurtured; however, once established, they will become stable. For
example, a virtuous person is someone who is kind across many
situations over a lifetime because that is her character and not because
she wants to maximize utility or gain favors or simply do her duty.
Unlike deontological and consequentialist theories, theories of virtue
ethics do not aim primarily to identify universal principles that can be
applied in any moral situation. And virtue ethics theories deal with wider
questions—“How should I live?” and “What is the good life?” and “What
are proper family and social values?
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DISCUSSION
Aristotle's Ethics and Politics remain two of his most relevant works. It
has been said that the Ethics is still the best springboard for the
consideration of ethical problems and dilemmas. While Aristotle's answers
are objectionable to many, the questions he presents are as pertinent to
modern times as they ever were.
The purpose of ethics for Aristotle is simply to find the ultimate purpose of
human life, once again demonstrating his emphasis on teleology. Ethics
falls under the category of practical sciences, since its concern is not
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knowledge for its own sake but rather for the purpose of application.
Aristotle first recognizes that happiness is the ultimate good, since all
other goods are intermediate while happiness is final. We pursue other
goods to achieve happiness, but happiness is valuable in itself.
In Ancient Greek history, the Greek term for ethics is êthos and means
something like character. When Aristotle analyses the good life in the
Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, he therefore focuses on the
central topic of good and bad character traits that is virtues and vices. In
this original sense, ethics means an analysis about the character or
character traits. In Ancient Roman thought, which was essentially
influenced by Cicero, the Greek term ethikos (the adjective to êthos) was
translated with the Latin term moralis (the adjective of mores) whereas
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the Latin term mores, in fact, means habits and customs. It is possible to
translate the Greek term êthos with habits and customs, but it is more
likely that the translation of ethikos with moralis was a mistranslation.
The term moralis rather refers to the Greek ethos whose primary meaning
is habits and customs. If the term morality refers to mores, then the term
morality means the totality of all habits and customs of a given
community. The term moralis became a terminus technicus in the Latin-
shaped philosophy, which covers the present meaning of the term. In
modern times, the habits and customs of a given community are termed
‘conventions’, which are authoritative for the social life in society.
Morality, however, is not simply a matter of mere convention but the
latter often conflicts with morality (for example, an immoral convention),
hence, it seems inappropriate to shorten the term in this way. At present,
there are, at least, four
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle, ., Ross, W. D., & Brown, L. (2009). The Nicomachean ethics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bostock, David (2000). Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Broadie, Sarah (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
LeBar, Mark and Slote, Michael, "Justice as a Virtue", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
Korsgaard, C. (1986). Aristotle on Function and Virtue. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3(3),
259-279
Trianosky, G.V. "What is Virtue Ethics All About?" in Statman D., Virtue Ethics (Cambridge:
Edinburgh University Press, 1997)
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