How Piracy Saved Somalia

In 2009, piracy off the coast of Somalia splashed onto the global stage at near
epidemic levels. The impact of Somali piracy affected the entire international
community as shipping expenses soared.
The wave of piracy attacks, however, was short-lived due to a quick and
comprehensive response by the international community to counter piracy and
its causes.

The global response to Somalia continues today and is a reversal of 20 years

of alienation prior, which made possible the country’s devolution into a failed
state that the world ignored and feared simultaneously. The success in
countering the three-year piracy epidemic, however, shadows the success of
piracy for Somalia by demanding attention and assistance for a withering
nation. In effect, piracy saved Somalia.

A UNIQUE HISTORY
To understand Somali piracy, the country’s history must be understood. Unlike
the majority of Africa, Somalia was never truly colonized in the traditional
manner. The entirety of what is historically known as Somalia has been sliced
and diced over the course of a century by the Italians, Ethiopians, British,
French, Kenyans and arguably its own people in the northern area known as
Somaliland.
Whereas most African nations can be viewed in the chronological construct of
untouched, colonized, transitioning or independent, Somalia was effectively
passed through colonist hands in more of an asymmetrical way. This left
Somalia fitting the profile of a foster child who has been passed from one
home to another with no consistency like the other colonized countries. This
particular case makes the nation highly difficult to fit into traditional colonial
paradigms like other African states.

In 1956, Somalia was granted “Internal Autonomy” by its Italian colonizers. In

1960, Somalia was given full independence. From 1960 to 1969, the country
saw a slew of border conflicts and domestic political struggles that left
Mohamed Siad Barre as its leader. In 1970, Barre declared Somalia a socialist
state with support from the Soviet Union. It seemed that Somalia was on
course for being a successful Soviet client-state in a critical juncture of the
world, with ample coastline and a strategic asset overall.
Barre’s zealous momentum led him to strive for a “Greater Somalia.” This
would include the ethnic Somali territories taken by Kenya and the Ogaden
region in Ethiopia. Annexing the Ogaden region would have been the final act
of the “Greater Somalia” concept. However, in an ironic turn of events, it was
this attempted annexation that became the downfall of Somalia as a solidified
nation.

The country’s leader made a drastic miscalculation when he invaded the

Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. Barre had hoped for a
“Greater Somalia” by bringing all Somalis into the fold of a unified Somalia.
Additionally, Somalia had just been hit with a draught and Barre may have
been attempting to acquire more fertile ground in Ethiopia.
Surprisingly, the Soviets opted to back Ethiopia, in turn soliciting the United
States to back Somalia over the Ogaden region. This fascinating conflict
consisted of not only massive Soviet backing, but also support (to include
large numbers of troops) from Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen and East
Germany. The eight-month-long war killed over half a million people and
ended with Somalia retreating to the pre-conflict borders with its military
ravished.

As Somalia lay disheveled, with its military in ruins, it entered a state of

disarray. In 1978, Somali forces were expelled from Ethiopia. By 1981,
internal elements showed their disdain with the Barre regime and began to
work against it. By 1988, a peace accord was signed with Ethiopia. The
Somali people opted to oust Barre in 1991 for his failed efforts against
Ethiopia and his lack of solidarity in Somalia. Internal conflict continued
afterward.
The Somali state collapsed in 1991, followed by the 1994 “Battle of
Mogadishu” (more commonly known as the “Black Hawk Down” incident). It
was this series of events that led to the withdrawal of nearly all international
actors. Somalia had been off the grid essentially for nearly two decades since
1995, with only small occasional engagements over the last decade. This near
complete disengagement left the nation open to whoever had the bigger gun,
with Somalia viewed as the most dangerous country in the world.

SOMALIA AS AN INTERNATIONAL INTEREST

However, it was 2006 that really began to bring the Somalia conversation to
the table. The international community acknowledged that Somalia was a
moment away from becoming the next Afghanistan—a geographical security
vacuum where the likes of al-Qaeda or any negative influencer or violent actor
could base itself and conduct operations with international reach.

The assessment was too accurate. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a
collection of Islamic law businessmen with militias, decided to take
governance into their own hands and push out the chaos-causing warlords,
intent on establishing an Islamic rule of law—and they were successful in
securing Mogadishu.

The great irony was that Mogadishu, for the first time in 15 years, was actually
stable. There was a rule of law—albeit mostly Islamic law—and certain basic
services began to trickle in, and Mogadishu’s air and seaports reopened after
remaining closed for over a decade. It seemed there was a fighting chance for
at least the capital city to stabilize.

This situation was far from ideal in the international community’s eyes,
specifically the US and Europe, having just spent half a decade battling
Islamist extremism and with two counterinsurgencies waging away in Iraq and
Afghanistan. To the credit of Ethiopia and its Western backers, the ICU was
far from a liberal organization—the rule of law was existent, but it was violently
strict.
Also, the ICU was believed to be harboring a known terrorist responsible for
his involvement in the US Embassy bombings in Sub-Saharan Africa. This
was enough to convince the US and its allies that the ICU was not an option.
This same year, Ethiopian troops began to engage the ICU to evict them from
the capital in December 2006.
For all of 2007 and 2008, Ethiopian troops combined with African Union
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), “a peace keeping mission operated by the
African Union in Somalia with approval by the United Nations,” secured the
bulk of Mogadishu and surrounding southern Somalia. There was resistance,
however, from the ICU and warlord remnants.
In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its forces as planned. Immediately after
their withdrawal, a new organization arrived to replace them: al-Shabab. Al-
Shabab was essentially a more violent, extremist splinter organization from
the ICU. It believed forfeiting its power and territory was sacrosanct, and it
was willing to engage in all means necessary to reclaim it. In late 2009, the
world watched painfully as al-Shabab captured town after town, re-instilling its
version of Islamic law to include executing a full attack on Mogadishu.
As 2010 arrived, a famine had struck Somalia that would last for two years,
killing over a quarter million people. Simultaneously, al-Shabab was wreaking
havoc on any international organization still present, and the United Nations’
World Food Program had to withdraw from al-Shabab- controlled territory,
leaving little to no assistance to those starving.

In February 2010, in a not-so-surprising move, al-Shabab declared its

allegiance to al-Qaeda. This moment was arguably the lowest point in recent
Somali history from the perspective of the international community. All the
gains made by the African Union (AU) and Ethiopian forces were not only
reversed back to essentially the ICU, but also territorially, an al-Qaeda
franchise took over the entire southern part of the country to include the
capital. The situation stayed unchanged for all of 2010 and most of 2011, as
onlookers watched to decide what to do next.

THE RISE OF PIRACY AND AL-SHABAB

One important thing did change, however, though not on land. From 2009
through 2011, a piracy epidemic took hold. For three years, off the coast of
Somalia, piracy incidents to include hijacking and hostage for ransom
skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital importance of the
Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations, this was a dire
scenario.

The international community immediately moved to act by deploying naval

ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region and further out into the
Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes. This was a watershed moment of
global relations, where the world saw actors as diverse as the US, Iran,
Russia, India and China come together to neutralize the threat.

What has been seen so far is a change in strategy and

tactics by al-Shabab. It shifted from a rebel group holding
territory to somewhere between insurgents and terrorists.

This maritime international intervention was a stellar success, and in 2012,

Somali piracy was virtually nonexistent. This was for good reason, considering
the World Bank calculated that Somali piracy was costing the global economy
$18 billion a year. To summarize the outcome of how Somali piracy brought
the world together to solve for it, there is no better way to say it than: “This is
the irony of International Security Dynamics … ‘Piracy may be unique in
international affairs for its ability to bring enemies together. Pakistan has
saved Indian sailors from Somali pirates. China and Taiwan, same thing. The
U.S. Navy saved Iranian sailors practically every weekend in January. Cats
and dogs living together, mass hysteria, etc.’”
The result of Somali piracy was and still is a global collaborative effort to
stabilize the country and its waters. The world’s navies came together to solve
maritime threats, and global military, political and aid organizations came
together to solve land issues. AMISOM countered al-Shabab threats on land,
in order to neutralize the factors that led to piracy and the connection between
piracy and al-Shabab.

Back on land, however, al-Shabab was excelling, partially due to funds from
piracy. Reports that al-Shabab was even executing small-scale attacks in
northern Kenya led to that country’s deployment of military forces into
southern Somalia in order to carve out a buffer zone.
The year 2012 saw dramatic progress for Somalia. Al-Shabab began to lose
ground by a combination of Kenyan forces from the south; African Union and
Somali government forces from Mogadishu; US unmanned aerial vehicles
from above; and contingents of Ethiopian forces from the west. In August
2012, Somalia swore in its first parliament in over 20 years. In September, the
first presidential election since 1967 occurred.
The following year continued on a trajectory of rapid progress for Somalia. It
began in January 2013 when the US recognized the government of
Somalia for the first time since the state’s collapse in 1991. Having a formal
government with a relatively al-Shabab-free zone, the international community
now had a formidable entity to support.
What has been seen so far is a change in strategy and tactics by al-Shabab. It
shifted from a rebel group holding territory to somewhere between insurgents
and terrorists. Its urban tactics resemble that of terrorism—dispersed high
profile attacks. However, the organization’s forfeiting of urban space to avoid
direct force-on-force conflict in order to flee for the countryside and launch
attacks from there is a shift to insurgency.

The likely approach will be the combination of the two, and will have a lasting
impact. Al-Shabab is never going to be a conventional existential threat to the
Somali state again. However, it will continue to pose a threat via terrorist
methods bordering on insurgency. In April 2014, it was announced that
Somalia would be deploying troops to assist with stability in South Sudan.
This was a rather large step in Somalia’s security paradigm as it was able to
export security.
In April 2013, the US successfully petitioned the United Nations Security
Council to lift the arms embargo on Somalia, making it now legal to provide
weapons to the new Somali military in order to retain their ground and defend
against al-Shabab forces. In March 2014, AMISOM began
an extensive clearing operation that forced al-Shabab to flee into the
countryside, while al-Shabab simultaneously started executing high profile
attacks in Mogadishu.
With chaos in Somalia as the backdrop, it is easy to understand how and why
piracy reared its ugly eye-patch.

Piracy existed notably off the coast of Somalia since the state collapsed in
1991. However, it was not until 2006 when the International Maritime Bureau
reported a significant rise in piracy incidents—ten in total—that the situation
escalated. This was the first increase in three years. By the end of 2007, the
bureau reported that piracy incidents had tripled in just one year.
The beginning of 2008 brought another significant increase in the first quarter
alone, leading the European Union to call for “international efforts to combat
piracy off the coast of Somalia.” A month later, the United Nations Security
Council voted unanimously to permit naval vessels from nations affected into
the waters of Somalia.

In August of the same year, the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) was
established by a coalition of navies belonging to Combined Task Force 150.
Subsequently, in October 2008, NATO deployed a naval force charged with
patrolling Somali waters.

On April 8, 2009, the renowned “Maersk Alabama” was hijacked by Somali

pirates. This was the first American vessel to be subject to piracy in over 200
years. The US responded swiftly by sending in a Navy SEAL team to solve the
problem. This event was later turned into the movie Captain Phillips, released
in 2013.
The year 2009 proved to be a savage boon for piracy, with the number of
piracy incidents more than doubling to 181. It was this year that Somali piracy
became regularly reported by US media. The following two years, 2010 and
2011, showed no end in sight for the piracy problem.
Incident numbers staying about the same for 2010 and 2011 illustrated a small
win: While successful hijacking almost cut in half, incidents overall only
dropped by about 15 incidents. This change in successful hijackings was likely
due to increased onboard anti-piracy security measures, though the attempted
hijacking still continued at an alarming rate.

Then something happened: In 2012, there were only 32 incidents and only
seven successful hijackings. As 2013 rolled into 2014, the final annual count
only listed two incidents and no hijackings. Four months into 2014, there were
no hijackings and no incidents.
The reasoning behind this dramatic change, and arguably the death of Somali
piracy as seen over the last half a decade, was a collaborative effort by the
international community. What happened was rather remarkable in the sense
that countries who were historical enemies began helping each other and
working together to counter Somali piracy—and it worked.
Despite the three-year epidemic of piracy, it is critical to understand the two
unintentional positive effects of piracy.

Effects: Somali Economy

First, the dramatic transfer of wealth into Somali communities was immense.
In the absence of significant foreign aid to Somalia, and with little to no
traditional means of income, Somalis turned to the
one opportunity available to them: piracy. Despite the risk of death or
imprisonment, “the 0.01 percent they might make — $30,000 on average — is
54 times the country’s average annual salary of about $550.”
This cost-benefit analysis was basic economics, according to Scott Carney
of Wired Magazine, who created an astonishing analysis of Somali pirate
economic analysis, titled “Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the
Somalia Pirate Business Model.” In an extensive graphic breakdown of
economic formulas and calculations made easy for the layman, Carney
clarified how piracy was the best decision a pirate could make. Looking at the
societal impact, it is also no wonder that piracy was supported during the peak
years.
As piracy increased, so did the wealth transfer that moved millions of
dollars from ransom payers to the pirates. As ransom money poured into
Somalia, “it [went] into the local economy, creating jobs and wealth and fueling
micro economies along the coast.” This significant transfer of wealth affected
real estate development, sent basic wages through the roof, employed
thousands and even created its own investment market.
As these micro-economies developed, so did the number of those employed
by piracy. Despite a United Nations (UN) study that claimed 50% of the
revenue went to financiers outside of Somalia, the amount of revenue that
poured into traditionally impoverished pirate villages was staggering in
comparison to their traditional income levels.

Out of the estimated $400 million that was paid to pirates, “about 30% of a
ransom payment goes to pirates, 10% to their shore-based helpers, 10% in
gifts and bribes to the local community and 50% to financiers and sponsors,
who are generally based abroad.” The same report “estimated that 10,000 to
15,000 people are employed by the pirates indirectly in related industries such
as boat repair, security, and food provision. (Other enterprising Somalis have
set up special restaurants to cater to the hostages.)”
With increased revenue entering Somali pirate towns, wages began
to skyrocket. In one particular village, “the daily wage increased from 40,000
Somali shillings in 2005 to 120,000 in 2011 … this is likely to reflect both direct
employment opportunities and investments into local businesses.”
Aside from wage increases, piracy revenue had such an impact on Somali
pirate town economies that a rather robust stock exchange of sorts was set up
for investment into the industry. As one wealthy former pirate stated: “[W]e
decided to set up this stock exchange. We started with 15 ‘maritime
companies’ and now we are hosting 72 … the shares are open to all and
everybody can take part, whether personally at sea or on land by providing
cash, weapons or useful materials … we’ve made piracy a community
activity.”
A town official even added that “piracy-related business has become the main
profitable economic activity in our area and as locals we depend on their
output … the district gets a percentage of every ransom from ships that have
been released, and that goes on public infrastructure, including our hospital
and our public schools.” The outcome is that “[p]iracy has changed [the town
of] Harardheere from a small fishing village to a town crowded with luxury
cars.”
The visual signs of growth were apparent too. Community real estate
development increased. In January 2012, the BBC ran an article
summarizing a Chatham House report published in the same month, titled
“Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental
Effects of Somali Piracy.” Chronological comparisons of pirate towns
illustrated the growth over the years. Daytime satellite imagery analysis
illustrated that the pirate town of Garowe, for example, almost doubled in size
from 2002 to 2009.
The benefit was not limited to pirates. In an odd turn of
events, piracy benefited the local fishing industry. Before, large oversized
foreign fishing vessels would troll through their fishing waters catching the fish
faster than they could be replenished. Now, with the fear of piracy in the
nearby shore waters, rarely does anyone come through anymore.
This left a significant increase in the supply of fish for the local fishermen and
their communities. Fishermen can now catch upward of £200 a day, whereas
before they averaged under £5. Even the sizes of the fish have been reported
to be the largest catches in 40 years. The significant alteration in the Somali
economy was the immediate positive effect. It was not, however, the only
positive effect; another more global and lasting consequence was just
beginning.

Effects: International Cooperation

As the international community began to focus on solutions to Somali piracy, it
first began with counterpiracy and maritime security methods. Security
contractors who historically worked in Iraq and Afghanistan began
offering solutions to Somali piracy. According to the British Parliament, “the
proportion of successful attacks has fallen dramatically, due to a combination
of self-defense measures and the effects of the naval patrols.” There is no
question that increased offshore security measures decreased the number of
successful pirate attacks as seen in this graphic.

Somali piracy, executed by some of the most marginalized

people on the planet, managed to affect the entire global
economy and alter international foreign policy for the
better.

However, the number of attempts did not decrease as fast, leaving the
international community to require a solution to causes of piracy as a whole—
onshore. Despite “military vessels from NATO, the European Union, Russia,
China and dozens of other countries patrol[ling] the Indian Ocean waters,” the
consensus for an onshore solution continued to build as analysis clarified that
all “the experts agree that the only long-term solution to the problem of piracy
is to restore law and order on land.”
For three years, offshore piracy incidents, including hijacking and hostage for
ransom, skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital
importance of the Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations,
this was a dire scenario. The international community immediately moved to
act by deploying naval ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region
and further out into the Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes.

It is no coincidence that the peak years of Somali piracy coincided with the
beginning of an integrated, international intervention by the global community.
The last great year of Somali piracy was 2011, which concluded three years of
hyper-inflated piracy attack numbers and an increased number for the few
years before that. The international aid response became highly apparent in
2011, which corresponded with foreign aid to Somalia to be roughly double of
the average aid amounts for the half a decade prior.
Beginning in March 2014, AMISOM initiated a sweeping campaign to oust al-
Shabab. Al-Shabab has been effectively expelled to the countryside. However,
it continues with high profile terrorist attacks in the capital of Mogadishu, albeit
this is far better than an active insurgency or full-scale territorial control. The
international community has planned what it calls Vision 2016. This plan is to
have fully democratic elections by 2016 with the security environment
relatively stable.
The Somali piracy boom is over, and the numbers are the lowest they have
been in several years even prior to the explosion of hijackings. As of February
2014, “1,435 suspected Somali pirates or their financiers are now in custody
or jail in 21 countries.” With Somali piracy in the rear-view mirror, it is now
possible to assess the ramifications from it, exposing the irony of it all.
Somali piracy, executed by some of the most marginalized people on the
planet, managed to affect the entire global economy and alter international
foreign policy for the better. It illustrates how even negative events in history
often can bring about positive change. Somalia is developing and stabilizing at
a rapid rate due to the extensive aid and assistance from the international
community. When popular hotel resorts return to Somalia, the global
community will be vindicated in all its sacrifices—but don’t forget to thank the
pirates.