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Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18979             June 30, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document and its duplicate,
marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing
as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as such.

This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of
the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso
Icasiano as executor thereof.

The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be published for
three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila chronicle", and also caused
personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.

On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958,
she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on
November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. 1äwphï1.ñët

On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own
Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.

On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he
filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will
executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate
(Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad
Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and
supplemental petition, but by order of July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor
Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence, and
after several hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the
oppositors appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same
is contrary to law and the evidence.

The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on
September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate
at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by
three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that
the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before
attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by
attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and
testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the
said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and
Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also
testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and
testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining
one unsigned copy in Bulacan.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition
and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate
copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and
her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its duplicate
were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and
attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as
witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the
original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts
required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the
language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and
spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the
original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the
same date June 2, 1956.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted
two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the
duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and
further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue
influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes
of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby
proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not
enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free
disposal.

We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both original and
duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the
documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the
testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were
actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the
witnesses. The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in
the duplicate original were not written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us
unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but
principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences
between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The
expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original
of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the
duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the
comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical differences that would justify the
charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and
the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the
expert.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not
appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with
different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor's
expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy
being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).

Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than
others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil.
216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well
die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they
should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not
suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which,
as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of
non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion. It
is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue
influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows
absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary
public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly
and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its
component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off.
Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own
testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The
text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for
the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a
fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of
the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is
not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is
easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in
law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original
is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous
and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third
page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate. The
amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and
A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or
claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the
amended petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

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