VOL.

208, MAY 8, 1992 531

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 48772. May 8, 1992.

PASTOR T. BRAVO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Privilege

Communication is lost by proof of actual malice.—Even, if said letter report
was in the nature of a qualified privileged communication, such privilege is
lost by proof of actual malice as in the case at bar. Moreover, said letter
report lost its character as a qualified privileged communication the moment
petitioner furnished copies thereof to several provincial and national
government agencies which had no interest, right or duty in the prosecution
of said charges and the

____________

* SECOND DIVISION.

532

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

general rule is that any written or printed statement falsely charging another
with the commission of a crime is libelous per se.
Same; Libel; In the offense of libel, the place of its commission is not
an indispensable element, the case may be filed where the libelous article
was printed and first published or in the place where any of the offended
party resides.—The fact that the information alleged that the offense of libel
was committed on or about March 23, 1972 in Quezon City is merely in
compliance with the aforementioned provision of the law which allows the
filing of a libel complaint at the place where any of the offended parties
reside to establish the proper venue. In fact, there is no variance between the
offense charged in the information and the offense proved during the trial
since it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the libel committed by the
petitioner in Naga City is the very same offense charged in the questioned
information which merely quoted verbatim petitioner’s robbery complaint
and letter-report. Furthermore, in the offense of libel, the place of its
commission is not an indispensable element pursuant to the aforementioned
law for a libel case may be filed where the libelous article was printed and
first published or in the place where any of the offended party resides, and
since complainant Viña resides in Quezon City at the time of the
commission of the supposed libelous article, then it follows that the lower
court had properly acquired jurisdiction to try said case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Gancayco, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

NOCON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the accused Pastor

1
Bravo of the decision dated January 7, 1977 of the Court of Appeals
modifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII in Criminal Case No. Q-2937 for
LIBEL, the dispositive portion of which reads:

______________

1 CA-G.R. No. 16892-CR entitled People of the Philippines vs. Pastor T. Bravo.
Ponente: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco; Justice Mama D. Busran and Justice Samuel F.
Reyes, concurring.

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VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992 533

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

“WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED, as

follows—
 Appellant Pastor Bravo is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, for the crime of libel with the
accessory penalties of the law, and with respect to his civil liability, said
appellant is hereby ordered to pay Bibiano Viña the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages; P6,600.00 as actual damages; and P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, at appellant’s costs.
2
SO ORDERED.”

The information upon which this prosecution was based is as

follows:

“That on or about the 23rd day of March, 1972, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused, without any lawful intention and justifiable cause,
and with deliberate intent to defame and injure the reputation of one
BIBIANO M. VIÑA and to expose him to public contempt, ridicule and
dishonor, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and publicly,
submit a report to the Department of Justice, Manila; Chief of the
Constabulary, Manila; Chief of Police, Naga City; Chief of Police,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, stating among other things, as follows:

‘The Provincial Commander

PC Headquarters
Naga City
Sir:
I wish to report, for purposes of records that the above-
named persons, which I accused for robbery, as evidenced by
the caption of my complaint have given me several threats of
my life and the life of the members of my family, threats to
burn my residential house at Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
threats to accuse me of several concocted crimes. x x x x x x x
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Very truly yours,
(SGD) PASTOR T. BRAVO’

_____________

2 CA’s decision, Rollo, p. 29.

534

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals
x x x     x x x     x x x
“thus imputing upon said Bibiano M. Viña the commission of crimes,
said accused knowing fully well that the same are absolutely false and
without basis in fact, and as a matter of fact, said complaint was dismissed
on March 27, 1972 by the Fiscal of Camarines Sur and the report mentioned
above ordered archived for lack of evidence, thereby casting and causing
dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the said Bibiano M. Viña, to his
damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded under the
3
provisions of the Civil Code.”

The prosecution’s evidence upon which the trial court based its
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is as follows:
Private respondent Bibiano Viña instituted a civil suit against
petitioner Pastor Bravo with the CFI of Camarines Sur which
rendered a decision in favor of the former. When said decision was
appealed to the Court of Appeals, a writ of execution pending appeal
4
was issued by said court. Petitioner, to forestall the execution, filed
a motion to stay said execution with the appellate court, which the
5
latter granted in a resolution dated August 17, 1971. A copy of said
resolution was furnished complainant’s counsel on August 23, 1971. 6
The latter did not do anything to stop further execution of said writ.
However, since it appears that Sheriff Renato Madera was never
7
notified of the order to stay the execution of the writ, Sheriff
Madera together with some members of the Philippine Constabulary
proceeded to execute the writ in the absence of respondent Viña, by
seizing the properties of petitioner and selling the same to private
8
respondent Viña at a public auction held on September 10, 1971.
As a result of the seizure of his properties by way of execution,
petitioner filed a complaint on October 25, 1971 with the fiscal’s
office of Camarines Sur against private respondent Viña, and

______________

3 Annex “A”, pp. 14 and 16.

4 Exhibit “N”.
5 Exhibit “3”; Exhibit “O”.
6 Exhibit “3-C”.
7 Exhibit “O-1”.
8 T.S.N., October 23, 1973, pp. 29-32.

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VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992 535

 Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

his other co-defendants for the crime of robbery with force upon
9
things.
While the complaint for robbery was still pending investigation
with the fiscal’s office, petitioner on or about March 8, 1972,
furnished copies of said complaint together with his affidavit the
following governmental agencies to wit: (1) Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regional Office, Naga City; (2) Clerk of Court, Court of
First Instance of Naga City; (3) Municipal Treasurer, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur; (4) the Provincial Commander, PC Headquarters,
Naga City; (5) the Chief of Police, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; (6) the
Philippine Coconut Administration, Manila; (7) Bureau of
Commerce, Manila; (8) Bureau of Labor Regional Office, Naga
City;10 and (9) the Social Security System Regional Office, Naga
City.
The complaint and affidavit narrated the alleged commission of
the crime of robbery on September 1, 1971 which gave rise to the
filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office of Camarines Sur.
The circulation of the complaint and affidavit has for its purpose
the ruining and damaging of private respondent’s reputation;
humiliating him and embarrassing him before his friends and
business associates and to his former co-police officers of Quezon
City, private respondent being a former Quezon City Police Chief.
Again, on March 23, 1971, petitioner sent a letter-report to the
Provincial Commander of Naga City alleging that private respondent
Viña, together with his co-accused in the robbery case have
threatened petitioner and members of his family several times; that
they even threatened to accuse petitioner of several concocted
crimes and, as a matter of fact, they had already filed a complaint of
11
illegal possession of firearm against petitioner. Copies of said letter
were furnished the Secretary of Justice, Manila; the Chief of
12
Constabulary, Manila; and the Chief of Police, Naga City.

_____________

9 Exhibits “A” and “H”.

10 Exhibit “I”.
11 Exhibit “C”.
12 Exhibits “C-4” and “C-6”.

536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

Upon receipt of the letter-report, the Secretary of Justice directed the

provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur to investigate the alleged threats
against petitioner.
On March 27, 1972, the complaint for robbery was dismissed by
the provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur “for want of evidence to
prove the existence
13
of a prima-facie case of robbery against the
respondents.” Private respondent Viña received a copy of the
notice of dismissal on April 13, 1972.
On July 17, 1972, for lack of evidence, the complaint of
petitioner against private respondent for threats was likewise 14
archived by the provincial fiscal after conducting an investigation.
On October 15, 1972, Sheriff Renato Madera delivered to private
respondent a copy of the letter complaint of petitioner alleging
threats made by the private respondent against the petitioner, causing
private respondent to file a complaint for LIBEL against the
petitioner on March 21, 1973.
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court
below, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the defendant Pastor T. Bravo

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two separate crimes of Libel and there
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences
said defendant to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, for each of the two separate crimes of libel committed; to suffer
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
With respect to his civil liability, the Court further orders the defendant
Pastor Bravo to pay Bibiano Viña the amount of P300,000.00 as moral
damages, to pay P6,600.00 as actual damages and to pay P10,000.00 as
15
attorney’s fees.”

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner sought appellate review by

the Court of Appeals, which modified the decision of the trial court
by dismissing the libel case arising from the

____________

13 Exhibits “B” and “B-3.

14 Exhibits “D” and “D-1”.
15 RTC’s decision, pp. 23-24; Records, pp. 114-115.
 537

VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992 537

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

robbery complaint on the ground of prescription and reducing the

awards of moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 9, 1977 and
his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated March 19, 1977
having been both denied on July 20, 1978, petitioner now comes to
Us with his petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s contention that his robbery-complaint necessarily
partakes of the nature of an absolute privileged communication for
which he could not be held criminally liable, has no leg to stand on
as the criminal complaint for robbery never reached the status of a
judicial proceeding, having been dismissed by the provincial fiscal
of Camarines Sur “for want of evidence to16 prove the existence of a
prima facie case against the respondents.” Consequently, there are
none of the alleged “utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleading,17petitions and motions”
to speak of, which the case of Sison v. David cited by the petitioner,
considers as belonging to the class of “communication that is
absolutely privileged.” Furthermore, said contention is already moot
and academic as the libel charge based on the criminal complaint for
robbery was already dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals
on the ground of prescription.
As to petitioner’s contention that his letter-report is a qualified
privileged communication and that no malice was established, We
find the decision of the Court of Appeals refuting the same
supported by the evidence on record showing that petitioner was
motivated by actual malice in filing the robbery complaint and the
letter-report of the alleged threats of private respondent Viña.
Firstly, petitioner gave unnecessary publicity to the fact that
private respondent Viña was a defendant in a robbery case which
appeared in a three-column headline in the “Bicol Star”.
Secondly, petitioner falsely accused private respondent of
threatening him, knowing fully well that it was the group of private
respondent and not private respondent personally who threatened
him, a fact he admitted in open court, thereby

___________
 16 Exhibits “B” and “B-3”; T.S.N. October 22, 1973, pp. 7-9.
17 1 SCRA 60.

538

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

imputing on private respondent the commission of a crime.

Likewise, petitioner’s allegation that private respondent had
threatened to accuse him of several concocted crimes and in fact had
already filed a complaint of illegal possession of firearms against
him, is simply not true, so much so that petitioner was forced to
deny in open court that private respondent had anything to do with
the filing of the complaint but that it was Sgts. Guerrero and
Buendia who did so.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in its decision:

“The evident falsity of appellant’s letter-complaint is further proved by his

unexplained failure to present not even one of the supposed five informants
or sources of his beliefs that herein complainant Viña and his co-accused in
the robbery case, is about to frame him up for the commission of several
concocted crimes, etc., mentioned in said letter-complaint (Exh. C).
Finally on this score, there is this undisputed evidence on record to show
the motivation which propelled appellant to harbor ill-feelings, hatred and
revenge against herein complainant, which eventually triggered his filing the
robbery complaint, and his letter-complaint, and in giving said imputations
undue and unncessary wide publicity. The Court refers to a civil case as We
have said earlier where complainant Viña was the principal plaintiff and
appellant the sole defendant where after trial an adverse decision was
rendered against appellant and in favor of Viña. When the case was
appealed by appellant to this court docketed as CA-G.R. No. 48042-R
(Exhs.) or 3, p. 28, rec.) this Court ordered the execution of the appealed
decision pending appeal (Exh. N, p. 25, rec.), resulting in the seizure of the
appellant’s goods, etc. and sold to herein complainant Viña in an auction
sale (Exh. 2, p. 44, rec.) conducted therein. This execution impoverished
appellant who was a prosperous businessman before the levy on his
properties hence it is but naturally expected that from this time on there was
instilled in appellants heart, a burning hatred, revenge and ill-feelings to
even up with the complainant who had caused great misfortune to him and
to his family and the net result are those questioned false written serious
imputations of robbery, grave threats, and frame-up charges, etc. hulled
against Viña.
The foregoing belies appellant’s claim of having acted in good faith in
18
authoring the questioned aspersions against Viña.”

____________

18 CA’s decision, pp. l-m; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

Thus, even if said letter report was in the nature of a qualified

privileged communication, such privilege is lost by proof of actual
malice as in the case at bar. Moreover, said letter report lost its
character as a qualified privileged communication the moment
petitioner furnished copies thereof to several provincial and national
government agencies which had no interest, right or duty in the
prosecution of said charges and the general rule is that any written or
printed statement falsely charging another with the commission of a
crime is libelous per se.
Petitioner also contends that he was convicted of a libel charge
which is at variance with the one specified in the information since
he was being charged with libel allegedly to have been committed in
Quezon City and not in Naga City where said libel was allegedly
committed.
Article 360, 3rd paragraph of the Revised Penal Code provides
that:

“Art. 360. Persons responsible.—

x x x     x x x     x x x
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. x x x”

The fact that the information alleged that the offense of libel was
committed on or about March 23, 1972 in Quezon City is merely in
compliance with the aforementioned provision of the law which
allows the filing of a libel complaint at the place where any of the
offended parties reside to establish the proper venue. In fact, there is
no variance between the offense charged in the information and the
offense proved during the trial since it was proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the libel committed by the petitioner in Naga
City is the very same offense charged in the questioned information
which merely quoted verbatim petitioner’s robbery complaint and
letter-report. Furthermore, in the offense of libel, the place of its
commission is not an indispensable element pursuant to the
aforementioned law for a libel case may be filed where the libelous
article was printed and first published or in the place where any of
the offended

540

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

party resides, and since complainant Viña resides in Quezon City at

the time of the commission of the supposed libelous article, then it
follows that the lower court had properly acquired jurisdiction to try
said case.
Finally, petitioner contends that there was no fiscal who was
physically present during the proceedings of the libel cases since the
entire evidence for the prosecution was presented by a private
prosecutor who had no express authority from the fiscal to represent
the State, thereby rendering the19 entire trial invalid as enunciated in
the case of People vs. Beriales.
Petitioner is in error. The case of People vs. Beriales is not
applicable to the case at bar because in said case, the city fiscal did
not appear in all of the trial court’s proceedings, from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the decision of conviction, due
to the persistent failure and refusal of the city fiscal to submit to the
trial court its resolution on the re-investigation of the criminal case,
and it was only the private prosecutor who handled the case without
the authority and active participation of the prosecuting fiscal.
However, in the case at bar, it cannot be said that the trial fiscal
never appeared during the trial of said case. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General in its comment:

“ ‘But in the case at bar, during the arraignment of appellant before the
lower court (CFI of Rizal stationed in Quezon City, Branch XVIII in Crim.
Case No. Q-2837), it is presumed that the prosecution was personally
represented by a prosecuting fiscal since there is no showing in the records
of the case of his absence thereto (pp. 21-22, Records). Then, on the first
day of the trial on the merits of said case, which was on October 22, 1973 at
9:00 o’clock in the morning, Fiscal Modesto C. Juanson personally
appeared and represented the prosecution. Although the transcript of the
said proceedings is silent on the matter, the presence of Fiscal Juanson in
court in effect gave authority to the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Grecia, to handle the prosecution under his (fiscal’s) direct control and
supervision. And this implied authority granted by the said prosecuting
fiscal to the private prosecutor continued for the succeeding proceedings as
indicated by the stenographers concerned in their transcripts of the

_____________

19 70 SCRA 361 (1976).

541

VOL. 208, MAY 8, 1992 541

Bravo vs. Court of Appeals

proceedings held on October 23, 1973 and February 4,1974 when it is

specifically stated therein: ‘For the prosecution: Atty. Benjamin Grecia,
under the supervision and control of the City Fiscal’ (See Annexes ‘3’ and
‘5’, Motion for Reconsideration). The same implied authority granted by the
said prosecuting fiscal to the private prosecutor was acknowledged by the
defense counsel when, despite the absence of the prosecuting fiscal on
October 24, 1973, which was but a continuation of the cross-examination of
the prosecution witness Bibiano Viña, said defense counsel proceeded to ask
questions of said witness, after which the private prosecutor offered the
prosecution’s exhibits and rested its case. The same is true during the
hearing of February 4, 1974 when, despite the absence of the prosecuting
fiscal, said defense counsel proceeded to present the appellant as a defense
witness and thereafter allowed the private prosecutor to cross-examine the
defense witness. By allowing the private prosecutor to present the evidence
for the prosecution, and to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses,
offering no objection nor questioning the absence of the prosecuting fiscal,
the said defense counsel in effect acknowledged the authority granted by the
prosecuting fiscal to the said private prosecutor to handle the prosecution of
the case based on the continuing authority granted by the prosecuting fiscal
even at the start of the trial of this criminal case before the trial court. And
finally, on the hearing of February 5, 1974, which was the last proceedings
held in this case. Fiscal Modesto C. Juanson was personally present and
actively handled the case for the prosecution, as shown by the fact that, after
the defense offered its exhibits and rested its case, Fiscal Juanson interposed
no objections to some of the defense exhibits and objected to the other
exhibits and to the ‘remarks and interpretations’ of the defense counsel in
offering his exhibits (pp. 27-28, tsn, Feb. 5, 1974). The presence of Fiscal
Juanson during the last hearing of this criminal case and his active
participation in the said hearing has the effect of confirming his previous
authority granted to the private prosecutor for the latter to handle the
prosecution of the case during some of his absences in court and further
ratifying all the acts of the private prosecutor pursuance to such authority.’
(page 6-7, Comment dated April 29, 1977 filed by Appellee in CA-G.R.
20
16892-CR)”

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed decision

of the respondent Court of Appeals, the same is hereby

____________

20 OSG’s Comment, Rollo, pp. 55-56.

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

National Power Corporation vs. Angas

AFFIRMED in toto, and the petition for certiorari dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

          Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and

Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed; decision affirmed in toto.

Note.—To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be

identifiable. (Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142
SCRA 17.)

——o0o——