QUIROG vs.

AUMENTADO
Facts:
Liza M. Quirog was permanently appointed as Department Head of the Office of the Bohol
Provincial Agriculture by then Bohol Governor Rene L. Relampagos. The appointment was confirmed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Quirog was likewise certified by the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) as
one of the two candidates qualified for the position.
However, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog’s appointment upon the finding that the
same was part of the bulk appointments issued by Gov Relampagos after May 14, 2001 elections in violation
of a CSC Resolution prohibiting the issuance of midnight appointments. In a motion for reconsideration, it
was contended by the Relampagos and Quirog that the appointment cannot be considered a midnight
appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampago’s term and that Quirog was
already the acting Provincial Agriculturists a year prior to said appointment. The CSCROVII however ruled
that Quirog and Relampagos had no legal personality to file the pleadings. That under Section 2, Rule VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 40, series of 1998 only the appointing officer may request
reconsideration of the disapproval of an appointment by the Civil Service Commission. Even if Relampagos
was the one who appointed Quirog, he could not file a motion for reconsideration because his term as
governor had already expired.
On appeal with the CSC, the latter ruled in favor of the petitioners. It ruled that the appointee Quirog be
allowed to question the decision and that the latter was not a midnight appointment. On appeal with the
CA, it was however contended by then incumbent Bohol Governor Erico B. Aumentado that Quirog and
Relampagos had no legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration of the disapproved appointment
or to appeal the same and insisted that Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment. The CA ruled
against the petitioners.
Issues:
(1) WON petitioners Relampagos and Quirog have the legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of, or appeal from the disapproval of the latter's appointment by theCSC
2) WON the subject appointment was a midnight appointment.
Held:
1.) Yes.In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, the Court declared that both the
appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal
standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. Clearly, pursuant to Abella,
Jr., Quirog had the right to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal the adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In
contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as governor, had lost the legal personality to
contest the disapproval of the appointment.
2.) No. It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment. The constitutional
prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.
The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond dispute that
Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the subject position for a year
prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed to the
position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately
shows that the filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said position to be
permanently filled up.

NAZARENO VS. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

Doctrine:
The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees already
assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once. There is no need
to wait for the approval of the appointments by the CSC. The appointments shall be effective until
disapproved by the CSC.
Facts:
1. The 52 petitioners in this case were all bona fide employees of the City of Dumaguete appointed to
various positions by City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. sometime in June 2001, shortly before the
end of his term.
2. On July 2001, the newly elected Mayor Perdices announced that he was not recognizing the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. Thereafter, the Treasurer was directed not to make any
disbursements pertaining to petitioners and petitioners’ names were deleted from the list of employees.
3. The petitioners filed a petition for Mandamus with injunction and damages before the RTC of
Dumaguete against the Mayor and 4 other City Officers (Civil Case). On the same day, Director II Fabio
Abucejo (Abucejo) of the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC-FO), pursuant to CSC
Memorandum No.001374, invalidated and revoked the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo in
June 2001 because the appointments were in violation of Items No. 3(d) and 4 of CSC Resolution No.
010988 dated 4 June 2001, which prohibit the outgoing chief executive from making mass appointments
after elections.
4. A copy of the CSC-FO’s findings were given to the petitioners and upon receipt, they filed a motion
for reconsideration before the CSC Regional Office VII. The CSC RO dismissed this reasoning that the
motion should be filed before the CSC FO. The petitioners filed another motion to treat their first motion
as an appeal. The CSC RO dismissed appeal and affirmed the CSC FO’s decision.
5. Petitioners elevated the case to the CSC Proper. The CSC Proper noted that generally, it is the
appointing officer who appeals invalidated appointments but relaxed the rule in this case as the appointing
authority was no longer in power. However, the appeal was still dismissed.
6. The petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed this and affirmed
the CSC decision. The petitioners filed a petition for the review of this decision before the SC.
7. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the injunction prayed for in the Civil Case. But upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents, the RTC lifted the injunction. The CA affrimed. This Court also
affirmed on the ground that the petitioners had already availed the remedies of law when they appealed the
decision of the CSC FO to the CSC RO and then to the CSC Proper. Hence, the injunction was lifted.
8. The petitioners filed a motion to declare the respondents in default in the Civil Case. This was
denied by the RTC but the CA declared the respondents in default.
9. The RTC dismissed the case. Hence this petition.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. They should receive their salaries for the meantime because their appointments are valid until
declared invalid (citing an unnumbered CSC Memorandum Circular, issued on 6 December 2001, with the
subject matter: “Reiteration of the Strict Implementation of Section 1, Rule IV and Section 3, Rules VI,
both of Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, otherwise known as the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.”)
Respondent’s argument:
1. The right of the petitioners to their positions and salaries is unclear thus, mandamus will not lie.
The RTC took note that the invalidation of petitioners’ appointments by the CSC Proper was then pending
appeal before the Court of Appeals and unless it was reversed, petitioners’ right to the salaries, salary
adjustments, and other emoluments claimed, were doubtful.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering respondents to pay
petitioners’ salaries, salary adjustments, and other emoluments, from 28 September 2001 until this Court
finally resolves the issue of the validity of petitioners’ appointments NO
2. Whether petitioners are entitled to an award for damages resulting from the invalidation of their
appointments NO
Held/Ratio:
Petition is denied.
A. On their right to compel the City Government to pay their salaries
1. The Court noted the following pertinent rules:
Rule IV of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, Section 1. An
appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall
be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. x x x
Section 3. When an appointment is disapproved, the services of the appointee shall be immediately
terminated, unless a motion for reconsideration or appeal is seasonably filed.
Services rendered by a person for the duration of his disapproved appointment shall not be credited as
government service for whatever purpose.
If the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil service
law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the Qualification Standards (QS) prescribed for the position,
the same is considered effective until disapproved by the Commission or any of its regional or field offices.
The appointee is meanwhile entitled to payment of salaries from the government.
If a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the disapproval is seasonably filed with the proper office,
the appointment is still considered to be effective. The disapproval becomes final only after the same is
affirmed by the Commission.
2. The general rule is that appointments shall take effect immediately; and should the appointees
already assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once. There is
no need to wait for the approval of the appointments by the CSC. The appointments shall be effective until
disapproved by the CSC.
3. The CSC has a three-tiered organizational structure, i.e., the CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the CSC
Proper acting as a collegial body. The disapproval of the appointments by the CSC FO and CSC RO is not
final and executory until affirmed by the CSC Proper.
4. Nevertheless, the aforementioned general rules cannot be simply applied to the case at bar given
its peculiar circumstances.
5. Section 3 above only applies if there was no violation of civil service laws but if there was, Section
4 states that: “The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of appointees whose
appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as the publication requirement
pursuant to RA 7041.”
a. This consistent with Sec 65, Chapter 10, Book V of the Administrative Code which states that: “No
person employed in the Civil Service in violation of Civil Service law and rules shall be entitled to receive
pay from the government, but the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be
personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the employment been lawful, and the disbursing
officials shall make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.”
6. The rules laid down by the CSC in CSC Resolution No. 010988, dated 4 June 2001, are deemed
included in what is the “civil service law,” it having the force and effect of law.
7. Since petitioners’ right to the payment of their salaries by the City Government of Dumaguete is
still unsettled at this point, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against respondents to make such
payment. Mandamus applies only where the petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is
doubtful. Until the SC finally resolves the pending petition for review of the CA’s affirmation of the CSC
Proper’s disapproval of the petitioners’ appointments, the issue of who will pay their salaries cannot be
settled.
B. On damages
1. Mayor Perdices’ refusal to re-appoint petitioners is merely in exercise of the former’s discretion
and does not constitute bad faith.

PROVINCE OF AURORA VS MARCO

Facts:
Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong 5 days before the
end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along with 25 other appointments, was accompanied
by a certification stating that funds were available for the position. When the new Gov took over, the
appointments made by Gov Ong were revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the
availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration from the CSC Regional Office but was
denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the appointment on the
ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its validity
because evidence was not presented.
Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC because it was not
allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was
granted. The Province filed an MR of the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed
within the 15-day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via
Rule 43 against the CSC’s second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution, invoking the constitutional
prohibition against midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision.
Political Law
Issue:
W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made by local executives
Held:
No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those
made by local executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.
Remedial Law
Issue:
W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case
Held:
No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal may be taken over an order
of execution.
Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an appeal where the order appealed
from is not appealable. This rule is based on the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that a
final and executory removes from the court which renders it the power and jurisdiction to further alter or
amend it, much less revoked it. Thus, even if a judgment is later on discovered to be erroneous, it remains
immutable.

STA MARIA VS LOPEZ

Facts:
Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Mariawas the Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines
(UP), and the the respondent Salvador P. Lopez the Univerity President.
Sta. Maria, a professor of English and Comparative Literature, was elected Dean of the College of
Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. His appointment
as such Dean was for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner
terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position
in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic
of the Philippines.
In February 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of Education
presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic
program and the physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez
created a committee which met with Sta. Maria regularly.
As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the president, the students were
not appeased. The students went on to boycott their classes which infected the other colleges and the newly
installed members of the UP Student Council voted to support the education students' strike. Until the day
that all academic activity in the university came to a complete stand still so that the UP President called a
meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence (40 in
favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, President Lopez issued the transfer
order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. Theorder, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria and
simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College of
Education, without additional compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of Sta. Maria constitutes removal.
Held:
Yes, A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or
salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an
increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in
salary."
A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims
to "lure the employee away from his permanent position", cannot be done without the employee's consent.
For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or employee is
transfer can take place unless the officer of the employee is first removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position.
The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university, being an
academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special
assistant who merely assists the President, as the title indicates. The special assistant does not make
authoritative decisions. Second. The position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative
decisions in his own name and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff
position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter, and cannot be abolished even
by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a
creation of the university president.
It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In actual
administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no dean at all. He of course,
basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it could have been intended to be. But actually he is a dean
without a college.
GLORIA VS CA
● Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely
those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts
where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
● Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure.
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon
City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created
by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative
of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners
and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit
his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as
fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum
to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of
petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle
of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented
transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court
of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA
138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure
him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office
of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil.
116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure,
the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)

GLORIA v CA
Facts:
On June 29, 1989, Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of
City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. Upon recommendation of DECS
Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science
and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative
of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the
President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of
petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary
Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit
his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as
fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum
to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of
petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle
of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented
transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel
is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a
preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta.
Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)." Having found the reassignment of
private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to
the MIST cannot be countenanced.

FERNANDEZ VS STO TOMAS

Facts:
Petitioners in the instant case, Salvador Sanchez here serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioners
assailed the validity of the resolution promulgated by the CSC and its authority to issue such, the Resolution
No. 934710 resolves to effect changes in the organizations specifically Central Offices (re arranged and
merged some offices. It also allocated some functions (internal organizations). The objective which is to
improve on the delivery of services
Issue 1:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the
extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office];
Held:
YES.
Examination on the statutory provisions specifically The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure
and organization of the Commission Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and
OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions,
each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. In short these offices constitute administrative
subdivisions of the CSC. Legislative Authority have validly delegated to CSC by Sec. 17 and also Sec 1 of
1997 Revised Administrative Code.
The reorganization of offices is moved by legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and
convenience.
Issue 2:
Whether the reorganization abolished offices?

Held:
It did not abolish any public office nor terminate relationship whatsoever employees by the Civil Service
Commission Office or any of its officers and employees.

RATIONALE why CSC can validly reorganized:

Because only CSC knows the ever-changing needs with the call of times or demand of times, as long as
this will not involve any reduction in rank or status or neither the salaries of such employees and it is not
amounting to removal nor constructive dismissal.

PADOLINA v FERNANDEZ
Facts:
Ofelia D. Fernandez was the PAGASA Finance and Management Division Chief of the DOST.
On April 2, 1996, Padolina issued SO 129 providing for the reassignment of Branch/Division/Section
Chiefs and other personnel in PAGASA. Pursuant to this order, Fernandez was reassigned to the Finance
and Management Service Director's Office in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Fernandez requested Padolina to lift SO 129 stating that such order was tantamount to her constructive
dismissal, thus, a violation of her security of tenure. However, Padolina denied the said request inasmuch
as he found no compelling reason to lift SO 129. Instead, he advised Fernandez to comply with the order
of reassignment. Fernandez appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) praying that SO 129 be
declared ineffective and that she be restored to her former position, but the CSC dismissed the appeal for
lack of merit.
Padolina issued DOST Special Order No. 557, S. 1996, which directed the return of certain PAGASA
officials/employees to their units as of March 30, 1996. Likewise, it ordered the retention of other PAGASA
personnel, including Fernandez, at their current assignments in accordance with SO 129.
A fact-finding committee was formed to look into the reason behind her refusal to accept her reassignment.
After an ex-parte evaluation of pertinent documents, the committee recommended that a formal charge of
insubordination be filed against the Fernandez. After a trial in absentia, a report was submitted by the
committee finding Fernandez guilty of insubordination. The committee recommended that a penalty of
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day without pay be imposed on Fernandez. On May 13, 1997,
Padolina issued a decision adopting the committee's findings and recommendation.
Fernandez moved for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution denying her appeal but was denied, hence she
elevated case to CA. CA declared S)129 void ab initio because such order adversely affected the position
of respondent who should be restored to all the rights and privileges of her office; and that respondent's
reassignment has effectively demoted her in rank, status and salary for a triple violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
WON SO129 is void ab initio and if reassignment is valid.
Held/Ratio:
• No. A reassignment is a movement from one unit to another in the same agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status, salary, and does not require an appointment.
Section 24 (g) of Presidential Decree No. 807 authorizes reassignment by providing that an employee may
be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency but such reassignment shall not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. A diminution in rank, status, or salary, is enough to invalidate
such a reassignment.
•SO 129 does not have any definite duration for reassignment, it being expressly subject to a separate DOST
Special Order.
• It is tantamount to an indefinite floating assignment resulting in a demotion. Itremoves her power of
supervision over 41 subordinate employees, thereby diminishing her status
SO 129 violated the security of tenure of respondent and hence, invalid. An examination of SO 129 also
shows that the questioned order contains no definite date or duration of the reassignment. In fact, in No. 4
of the Implementing Guidelines of SO 129, it is stated therein that "the return of the various
Branch/Division/Section Chiefs and other personnel concerned to their respective Units shall be the subject
of a separate DOST Special Order," which means that the respondent's duration of service in the office of
the DOST-FMS Director shall be for an indefinite date, dependent on the time when the DOST shall issue
a new special order which may or may not even include respondent. As a matter of fact, she was not one of
those returned to their original units per DOST Special Order No. 557. Accordingly, the SC held that such
a situation is indeed tantamount to a floating assignment, which results in a diminution of status or rank.
The SC also ruled that respondent was deprived of the emoluments attached to her former position like
RATA and similar allowances which signified a diminution in compensation that is proscribed by the rule
on re-assignment. Finally, the SC also held that the status of respondent has been adversely affected
inasmuch as her reassignment to the DOST-FMS Director's Office reduced her to a mere subordinate
without authority to supervise anyone; in effect, she was demoted in rank and status.

PLAZA II v. CASSION
Re: Devolution (Sec. 17 & 24, LGC 1991)
Facts:
Upon the implementation of the LGC, some functions of agencies, like that of the DSWD, were devolved
to LGUs. The City Council of Butuan passed a resolution authorizing its mayor to sign an MOA for the
devolution of the DSWD to the city. Pursuant to said MOA, the services, personnel. assets and liabilities
and technical support systems of DSWD were transferred to its city counterpart. By virtue of the same
MOA, the mayor issued an EO, reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO),
devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon who was
also designated as OIC of CSSDO. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by
Carolina M. Cassion. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize petitioner Tuazon as their
new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of the reconstituting EOby
Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal.
Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD building, they failed
to do so. Because of this, Mayor Plaza issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the
CSC Memorandum Circular.
Issues:
(1) WON the dropping of respondents from the roll is legal.
(2) WON respondents were denied due process for lack of notice and hearing.
(3) WON the contention of respondents that it was really the intention of the mayor to systematically
remove them was meritorious.
(4) WON the EO was valid.
(5) WON respondents' right to security of tenure has been violated as they were transferred without their
consent.
Held:
(1) Yes. The CSC Memorandum Circular provides that, "officers and employees who are absent for at least
thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and
may be dropped from the service without prior notice."
(2) No. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action wherein
the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing. In the above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may
be dropped from the rolls if he was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty
days. Prior notice is not necessary.
(3) No. No evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention.
(4) Yes. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and
liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government
units. Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers
power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities. Furthemore, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local
chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered
to issue the EO in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive,
Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take
charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of departments appointed by the
local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian
concerned. While initially, the Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government
Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment.
(5) No. There was no such transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty.
The change of respondents place of work from the original CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a
transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service.
There were no new movements or appointments from one position to another.