CASE DIGEST 1 – ROE VS WADE

FACTS:

1. Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and
an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal
abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal
abortion.

2. Roe sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes
were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

ISSUE: WON the statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the Roe to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras,
or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, struck down the Texas law banning abortion for being
unconstitutional, effectively legalizing the procedure nationwide. In a majority opinion written by Justice
Blackmun, the court declared that a woman’s right to an abortion was implicit in the right to privacy
protected by the 14th Amendment.

1. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving
from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. A common law
abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was
not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common
law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
2. Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The
first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The
second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with
abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
3. In striking down the Texas law, the State however made the following regulations:
a. 1st trimester - the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
b. 2nd trimester – the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal
health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
c. 3rd trimester – the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the
potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
 CASE DIGEST 2 – IMBONG VS OCHOA

Petitioner: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC

Respondents: HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Governmen

FACTS:

1. The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the
full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s
health and population control.

2. Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of
RH Law on the grounds that it violates right to life of the unborn since the act would authorize the
purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives.

ISSUE: Whether RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the Right to Life of the unborn & Right to Health

HELD: NO. The Court declares RA 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except for Section 3.01 (a) and 3.01
(g) of the RH-IRR which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires, and, therefore null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution

RIGHT TO LIFE:

The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of
implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object –
it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized
only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual
infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza)

1. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

2. In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

3. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent
the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect
it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
Section 4(a) RH LAW

Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.01 (a) RH-IRR

Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.01 (g) RH-IRR

Contraceptive refers to any, safe, legal effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health
product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb.
RIGHT TO HEALTH: NO.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution
is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions are self-
executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory.

Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion
of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that
the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of
RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only

after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies
to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among
others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Section 9. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System and Family Planning Supplies. – The National Drug Formulary shall
include hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. The Philippine National Drug Formulary System (PNDFS) shall be observed in selecting drugs
including family planning supplies that will be included or removed from the Essential Drugs List (EDL) in accordance with existing
practice and in consultation with reputable medical associations in the Philippines. For the purpose of this Act, any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available
on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient.

These products and supplies shall also be included in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals: Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
 CASE DIGEST 3 – MEYER VS NEBRASKA

FACTS:

1. Robert Meyer, an instructor in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska, taught the subject of reading in
the German language to 10-year old Raymond Parpart, a 4th grader. The Hamilton County
Attorney entered the classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He
charged Meyer with violating the Siman Act.

2. Meyer was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton County. The Nebraska SC affirmed
his conviction by a vote of 4-2. The majority thought the law a proper response to the “baneful
effects” of allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results
“inimical to our own safety”. The dissent called the Siman Act the work of “crowd psychology”.

3. Meyer appealed to the US SC. His lead attorney was Mullen, an Irish-Catholic and prominent
Democrat who had earlier failed in his attempt to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the
Siman Act from the Nebraska SC. Petitioner contends that the Siman Act violates the liberty
guaranteed under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

ISSUE: Whether the Siman Act violates the due process clause of the 14th amendment

HELD: YES. The US SC held that the teacher’s conviction was based on an UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE

1. The court reversed, holding that the statute was arbitrary and without reasonable relation to
any legitimate State goal.

2. The court further held that the liberty guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV protected the
teacher's right to teach and the right of parents to engage the teacher in educating their
children.

3. The court stated that education and acquisition of knowledge were matters of supreme
importance that should be diligently promoted. The State could not, under the guise of exercising
its police power, interfere with such guaranteed liberty interests.

4. The court found that, by the statute, the legislature was attempting to materially interfere with
the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of students to acquire knowledge,
and with the power of parents to control the education of their own children. Thus, the teacher's
conviction was based on an unconstitutional statute.
 CASE DIGEST 4 – WISCONSIN VS YODER

FACTS:

1. Three Amish students from three different families stopped attending the New Glarus High School
in the New Glarus, Wisconsin, school district at the end of the eighth grade because of their
parents' religious beliefs. They were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law (which requires a child's school attendance until age 16).

2. Under Amish church standards, higher education was deemed not only unnecessary for their
simple way of life, but also endangering to their salvation. These men appealed for exemption
from compulsory education on the basis of these religious convictions. The Amish provide
continuing informal vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the
rural Amish community. They sincerely held to the belief that the values their children would
learn at home would surpass the worldly knowledge taught in school.

3. The three families were represented by Jonas Yoder (one of the fathers involved in the case) when
the case went to trial. They were convicted in the Green County Court. Thereafter the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found in Yoder's favor because it violated their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thereupon, Wisconsin appealed that ruling in the US Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N the law compelling a child to attend school until 16 violates the free exercise clause

HELD: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Yoder in its decision. Justice Douglas filed a partial dissent
but voted with the court. Justices Powell, Jr. and Rehnquist took no part

1. The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children

2. Not all beliefs rise to the demands of the religious clause of the First Amendment. There needs to
be evidence of true and objective religious practices, instead of an individual making his or her
standards on such matters. The Amish way of life is one of deep religious convictions that stems
from the Bible. It is determined by their religion, which involves their rejection of worldly goods
and their living in the Biblical simplicity. The modern compulsory secondary education is in sharp
conflict with their way of life.

3. With respect to the State of Wisconsin's argument that additional modern education beyond 8th
grade is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and productively in America's
political system, the Court disagreed. It argued that the State provided no evidence showing any
great benefit to having two extra years in the public schools. Furthermore, the Court contended
that the Amish community was a very successful social unit in American society, a self-sufficient,
law-abiding member of society, which paid all of the required taxes and rejected any type of public
welfare. The Amish children, upon leaving the public-school system, continued their education in
the form of vocational training.
4. The Court found no evidence that by leaving the Amish community without two additional years
of schooling, young Amish children would become burdens on society. To the contrary, the Court
argued that they had good vocational background to rely upon. It was the State's mistaken
assumption that Amish children were ignorant. Compulsory education after elementary school
was a recent movement that developed in the early 20th century in order to prevent child labor
and keep children of certain ages in school. The State of Wisconsin's arguments about compelling
the school attendance were therefore less substantial.

5. Responding to Justice Douglas's dissent, the Court argued that the question before it was about
the interests of the parents to exercise free religion and did not relate to the child's First
Amendment's rights. As such, the argument pertaining to the child's right to exercise free religion
was irrelevant in this case.

6. Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal
education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of their religious beliefs.

7. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a
successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the
sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital
role that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities,
and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.

8. Beyond this, they have carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their
alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of the overall interest
that the State relies on in support of its program of compulsory high school education. In light of
this showing and weighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and
what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity
how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by
granting an exemption to the Amish.

9. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary
education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing
evidence that accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years
of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an
inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in
any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.
 CASE DIGEST 5 – GINSBERG VS NEW YORK

FACTS:

1. Under 484-h of the New York Penal Law it was illegal to willfully sell to a minor under 17 any
picture which depicts nudity, is harmful to minors and any magazine which taken as a whole is
harmful to minors.

2. Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette in Bellmore, Long Island.
In it they sold magazines including those deemed to be pornographic. He was prosecuted from
two informants who testified that he personally sold two 16-year-old boys the magazines
containing pornographic images of women, both called "Sir", and, "Mr" Annual. It was insisted
upon by their parents to buy them so they could lay the grounds for persecution. He was tried in
Nassau County District Court and found guilty. The court had found that the pictures were harmful
to minors under the law. The conviction was upheld by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court
of New York and was denied an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

3. Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify
two different sets of the population regarding obscene material and that it was an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. He cited Meyer v. Nebraska (struck down the Siman Act
forbidding children to learn German), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (upheld the right of parents to
send their children to private school) and Prince v. Massachusetts (students could not be required
to salute the American flag against their religious convictions), in all of which cases the court sided
with the minors.

ISSUE: Whether a law that prohibited the sale of material deemed harmful to minors, but not obscene
to adults, violated the First Amendment.

HELD: NO. The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate, and, in our view, the limitations in 484-h upon the availability of sex material to minors under
17 is justifiable, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such
material might be harmful.

1. First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society. The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support
of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.

2. The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth and safeguarding them
from abuses. This Court cannot say that the statute, in defining obscenity based on its appeal to
minors under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.

3. It is constitutionally permissible for New York, under this statute, to accord minors under 17 years
of age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves
what sex material they may read and see.
 CASE DIGEST 6 – LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA

FACTS:

1. This case was concerned with garbage being disposed by the City Government of Caloocan in the
Tala Estate. The complainants sought to end the operations of the dumpsite as they were
concerned with the environmental and health impacts.

2. An investigation found that the City Government of Caloocan was operating the dumpsite without
the required Environmental Compliance Certificate. The Lake Laguna Development Authority
(LLDA) issued an order to the City Government asking them to stop operating the dumpsite.
Activities at the site ceased for a few months, but resumed again after that. Another cease and
desist order was filed.

3. The City Government then filed a petition seeking a declaration that they have sole authority over
promoting the health and safety of the Caloocan residents in light of a balanced ecology of the
region in which case all orders issued asking them to stop operations of the dumpsite would be
void.

4. The lower court allowed this petition declaring the City Government of Caloocan to have sole
authority over these matters and ruling that the LLDA did not have the power to issue a cease and
desist order. CA sustained the position of the lower court. Hence the petition.

5. LLDA claims that CA suppressed and disregarded the provisions of EO 927 which granted
administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

ISSUE: Whether LLDA, under its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Brgy Camarin authorized by the City Government of
Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the
sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such
open garbage dumpsite.

HELD: YES.

1. The Supreme Court allowed the LLDA’s appeal and overruled this decision. It held that the LLDA
had the authority to issue a cease and desist order concerning the operations of the dumpsite
seeing as Republic Act. No 4850 explicitly authorized them to make such orders where it serves
the aim of stopping pollution.

2. Furthermore, the Court pointed out Article II, section 16 of the Constitution which grants the right
to a healthy environment, as well as state policy which declared to promote the right to health
which is also enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Declaration of
Alma-Ata as a fundamental right.

3. Assuming that the authority to issue a “cease and desist” order was not conferred by law, there
is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily
be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as
 are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has
also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise
of its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases, LLDA has
implied authority to issue a “cease and desist” order.

4. The immediate response to the demands of “the necessities of protecting vital public interests”
gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies (Art 2, Section 16) in the Constitution. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

5. As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state “to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them”. It is to
be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the UDHR and the Alma Conference Declaration
of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

6. The issuance of the cease and desist order by LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its amendatory laws. RA 4850, instead of
conferring upon LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, have provided under its Section
4 (d) the power to institute “necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence
to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de
Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA.”

7. Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the court will not dwell further on the
related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with
the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
 CASE DIGEST 7 – GARCIA VS BOI
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and
the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

FACTS:

1. Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) formed by Taiwanese investors applied with the BOI an
application for registration as a new export producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified
Limay, Bataan as the plant site and the use of “naphtha cracker” and “naphtha” as feedstock or
fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint-venture with Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC) who had control over the administration, management and
ownership of the Petrochemical Industrial Zone in Bataan.

2. BOI issued a Certificate of Registration to BPC and together with incentives, such as exemptions
from tax on raw materials (eliminating 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as
raw materials in the petrochemical plant), repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation of
investments and remittance of earnings on investments.

3. BPC filed a request for an approval of an amendment of its investment application in the BOI,
concerning the increase of the investment amount, increase in production capacity of its naphtha
cracker, polyethylene plant and polypropylene plant, change of the feedstock from naphtha only
to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas and the transfer of plant site from Bataan to Batangas.

4. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted
private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where
to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE: Whether the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest

HELD: YES. The petition is GRANTED.

1. BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national
output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the
feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is
need to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell
can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be
diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces of the
transferred petrochemical plant.

2. Naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from ad valorem tax by the approval of RA 6767
but excluding LPG from exemption. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical
industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a
foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting feedstock from
naphtha to LPG.
3. Under Section 10, Article 12 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the State to “regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.” The development of self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Sec 19, Article 2 of the Constitution. In Article 2
of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 “the sound development of the national economy in
consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism is the set goal of
government.

4. If the plant site is maintained in Bataan, PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit
and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the management of the
project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.

5. Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the
spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State’s full control over the
development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on
real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation
of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be
noticed and understood.

6. A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity where the BOI reasoning may
be accorder fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest.

7. The Court finds that BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer from
Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the
main reason that the final say is in the investor. No cogent advantage to the government has
been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government
expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best
for the national interest.
 CASE DIGEST 8 – PAMATONG VS COMELEC

FACTS:

1. Elly Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President in 2004. COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or not nominated by a political party or are not supported by registered political party with
a national constituency.

2. Pamatong filed a petition for certiorari claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal
access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article 2 of the Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates. He claims
that he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the President and
he is capable of waging a national campaign sine he has numerous national organizations under
his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign sine he has practiced
law in the other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE: Whether Pamatong’s interpretation of Sec 26, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution gives him a
constitutional right to run or hold public office.

HELD: No. The provision merely recognizes a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.

1. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to
the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

2. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment
to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision
does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause
of action before the courts.

3. An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is
not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State
shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word
"broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to
"service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

“I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would
be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government
would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as
are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order
 that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to
limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to
access to it, I change the word "broaden."

4. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide
amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

5. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source
of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.

6. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found
in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

7. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In
the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.
 CASE 9 – BELGICA VS OCHOA

FACTS:

1. In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork
Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional
Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon
Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph
Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno
Aquino III administrations.

2. One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members
of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention
of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution 225 which states that:

“Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

ISSUE: Can petitioners can invoke their right Sec 26, Art 2 insofar as PDAF propagates political dynasties?

HELD: NO. SEC 26 IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING. IT IS A MERE GUIDELINE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

1. At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not,
by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue.

2. In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.

3. The Court however, struck down PDAF for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL since it violates the
following:
a. Separation of powers – it allowed legislators to wield non-oversight, post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution

b. Non-delegability of legislative power – it conferred unto legislators the power of

appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to
fund specific projects which they themselves determine
c. Prescribed procedure of presentment – it has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill and in the process denied the
President the power to veto items

d. Public Accountability – it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by

giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize

e. Genuine local autonomy – it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions

f. Principle of non-delegability – it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate

funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem
fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure
development projects”
 CASE DIGEST 10 – GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS SPRINGER

FACTS:

1. The National Coal Company (NCC) was created by Act 2705 (approved March 10, 1917) and
subsequently amended by Act 2882 (March 5, 1919).

Act 2882 states that “The voting power of all such stocks owned by the Gov’t of the Philippines
shall be vested exclusively in a committee, consisting of the Gov. Gen, the Pres. of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

2. The petitioners were elected directors of the NCC by a vote of the gov’t-owned shares cast by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House. The Governor General challenged the validity of
the legislated amendments and did not participate in the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act 2882 is unconstitutional insofar as it vests power in the legislative to appoint

HELD: YES.

1. The court sustained the contention of the Government that “the election of the directors and
managing agents by a vote of the government-owned stock was an executive function entrusted
by the Organic Act to the Gov. Gen, and that the acts of the Legislature, divesting him of the that
power and vesting it, the majority of which in each instance consisted of officers and members
of the Legislature, were invalid as being in conflict with the Organic Act.”

Sec. 8 of the Organic Act

“That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine
Legislature, authorized by this Act”

Sec. 21 of the Organic Act

“That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer… ‘The Governor General of
the Phil. Islands’.”

“…general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of the government…”

2. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not
to enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with the duty of enforcing them. The latter are
executive functions. Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental
to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that
would to usurp the power of appointment by indirection.
Initiative and Referendum

Garcia vs COMELEC

Facts

1. In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan
agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone
in accord with Republic Act No. 7227.
2. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
3. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its
submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code
of 1991. They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said
resolution.
4. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the
Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counterproductive and futility."
5. In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative
on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance."
6. In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative
on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance."
7. These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution is not subject to local initiative according to the COMELEC?

Held: No, resolutions are covered by the power of local initiative.

1. We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the
Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
2. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a
local initiative.
3. The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative
was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a)
expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz: “Initiative on local
legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.”
4. Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local
Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its
coverage.
5. We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a
local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well-known distinction between a resolution and an
 ordinance — i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion
which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and
control matters applying to persons or things in general. 25 Thus, resolutions are not normally
subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration
of the business affairs of a city.
6. In the case at bench, however, it cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the
municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent
rule of conduct or government. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social,
political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in
the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.

Non-delegation of Legislative Power

ESL vs POEA

Facts

1. Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA.
2. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA
but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
3. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.
This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
4. The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of nondelegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.

Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA was a violation of nondelegation of
legislative power?

HELD: No. it was a valid delegation of legislative power.

1. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing, he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
 2. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
3. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is was put into effect by
their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the
force and effect of law.
4. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a
sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."

TABLARIN vs GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

1. The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
2. On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
3. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation
of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate,
the Board of Medical Education.
4. Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

Issue: Whether or not the RA 2382 was a violation of non-delegation of legislative power.

Held: Petition is DISMISSED, RA 2383 was a valid delegation of legislative power.

1. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces
the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like
the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical
 education and the practice of medicine in our present-day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this
point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission

"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that
is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted
this practice but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of ‘subordinate legislation,’ not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there
is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward
the approval of the practice by the courts."

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rulemaking authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then
Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta —

"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is ‘safe
transit upon the roads.’"

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body
of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the non-delegation principle.

Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor

Facts:

1. On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor
practices stating the following grounds "

(1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which is attached, to
the detriment of the interest of our members;

(2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and

(3) Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without Official
Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining
Agreement

2. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its
willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea
 that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended, a position that failed to
meet the approval of private respondent.
3. Subsequently, respondent Minister, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the
private respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National
Labor Relations Commission on September 28. 1981.
4. It is the submission of petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends
article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the
power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the
National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the assertion that such
conferment of authority "may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers'
right to self-organization and collective bargaining.

Issue: Whether or not BP 130 in so far that it amends 264 of the Labor Code is and undue delegation of
legislative powers.

Held: No. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over
labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and
thereafter decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face
unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.

1. The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny.
The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for petitioner
labor union within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national
interests, but only when a strike is in progress.
2. What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who "Shall
have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual
position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the
execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the
government
3. To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated the performance of the administrative functions of
the President, who can then devote more time and energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as
the national leader.
4. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the
reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
 Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. Inc vs. Drilon

Facts:

1. Petitioner entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with its employees, increasing the
salaries by P200 for the years 1986 and 1987 and P300 for 1989.
2. It was stipulated in the contract that if ever there were legislations passed that would increase
salaries greater than the one in the CBA, the company would pay the difference.
3. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage.
4. . The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Drilon promulgated
Implementing Rules and Regulations for RA 6640, Section 8 of which provides that increases by
companies will not be credited as compliance if these weren’t stated in the CBA in anticipation of
RA 6640.
5. The petitioners argue that the provision is null and void on the ground that it unduly expands the
provisions of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can
provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

HELD: No. Implementing rules cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law.

1. As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which
prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in CAB it is a
fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is
designed to implement.
2. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640.
3. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations.
4. Thus, petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA
including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the
wage increase mandated by RA 6640, is correct.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

Facts:

1. In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No.
7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power
and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to
import and market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries
and other downstream oil facilities.
2. Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil
 industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.
3. In a separate petition (G.R. 127867), petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,
Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition and Sanlakas
argued that R.A. No. 8180, specifically Section 15 is unconstitutional because it: (1) gives undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not providing a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry; (2) Executive Order No. 392, an
order declaring the implementation of the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, is
arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the Oil Price
Stabilization Plan- a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180; and (3) Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel among Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of
constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition.

Issue: Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD: No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power.

1. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test and
the sufficiency test. The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency
test demands an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority.
Section 15 provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test.
It also laid down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.

PEOPLE VS DACUYCUY

Facts:

1. On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M.
Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers).
2. The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:

a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional
nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for
the offense

b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment
is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
 3. On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in
substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional
4. The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of
law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.
4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 4670 Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative.

HELD: Yes, Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if
the courts were the legislative department of the government.

1. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within
specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute
such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative
power
2. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts
are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the
benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability
of legislative powers.

EMPLOYEES CONFEDERATION V. NATIONAL WAGES COMMISSION

Facts:

1. On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No.
NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region.
2. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the
Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP).5 ECOP opposed.
3. On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A amending Wage Order No. NCR-
01, as follows: Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, all workers and employees in the
private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum
wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an
increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.
4. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission. On November 6, 1990, the
Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990,
the Commission denied reconsideration.
 5. The Solicitor General, in his rejoinder, argues that Republic Act No. 6727 is intended to correct
"wage distortions" and the salary-ceiling method (of determining wages) is meant, precisely, to
rectify wage distortions

ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 6727 unduly delegated the power to the National wages board by granting
them the authority to determine “salary ceilings”.

HELD:

1. RA 6727 was intended to rationalize wages. This is done by: 1. providing full-time boards to police
wages round-the-clock 2. giving the boards enough power to achieve this objective SO, if RA 6727
only intended boards to set floor wages only, the Act would not need a board but only an
accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index or have Congress do it when the need
arises.
2. Congress may delegate he power to fix rates, provided that it leaves sufficient standards. RA 6727
gave statutory standards for fixing the minimum wage.

ART. 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing — The regional minimum wages to
be established by the Regional Board shall be as nearly adequate as is economically feasible
to maintain the minimum standards of living necessary for the health, efficiency and
general well-being of the employees within the framework of the national economic and
social development program. In the determination of such regional minimum wages, the
Regional Board shall, among other relevant factors, consider the following:
(a) The demand for living wages;
(b) Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the consumer price index;
(c) The cost of living and changes or increases therein;
(d) The needs of workers and their families;
(e) The need to induce industries to invest in the countryside;
(f) Improvements in standards of living;
(g) The prevailing wage levels;
(h) Fair return of the capital invested and capacity to pay of employers;
(i) Effects of employment generation and family income; and
(j) The equitable distribution of income and wealth along the imperatives of economic and
social development."

The wage order was not acted in excess of board’s authority. The law gave reasonable limitations to
the delegated power of the board.
Qualifications of Senators

SJS V DDB

Facts:

1. In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue
2. On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office
in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections
3. Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23,
2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
4. Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

5. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that
all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in
the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the additional requirement mandated by Sec 36(g) RA 9165 and COMELEC resolution
No. 6486 for Senator was valid.

HELD: No. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is hereby declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

1. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance
is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions,
the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
2. Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
 allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in
the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
3. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
4. It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision
does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor
or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if
the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception,
made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones
shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And
since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of
public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever
5. While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections
and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court
deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing
issuance.
6. It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

Cases on party-list

BANAT V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic
was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
2. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their
petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
3. The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as
winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion
of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning
party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
4. Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
5. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing
the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat is constitutional
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?

RULING:

1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
2. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
3. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
4. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats
5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
 ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the
May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
2. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.
HELD: No.The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides
for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
1. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
2. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
3. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
4. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
5. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
6. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
7. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
8. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a
 statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided
that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or
regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have
the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but
they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.

ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC

FACTS:

1. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003,
Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration
with the COMELEC.
2. COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds stating that the party’s definition of
the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs. Upon its seeking reconsideration, the COMELEC again denied its
application mentioning that:
1. The party has not proven that its interests are also the nation’s.
2. There is no substantial differentiation – they are granted the same rights as
others as men and women.
3. The party espouses values contrary to public morals.
4. The RPC prohibits immoral doctrines, etc…
3. Ang Ladlad filed this petition to annul the COMELEC’s resolutions.

ISSUE: Wherther the COMELEC’s resolutions denying registration to Ang Ladlad is justified – NO.
 HELD: NO. COMELEC’s resolutions denying registration to Ang Ladlad is not justified

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the
sectors in the enumeration.

The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members
in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be “a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived
lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual
conduct. Evidently, therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.

Equal Protection

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with
the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal
protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made
“an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.”

Freedom of Expression and Association

 We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs
and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals
of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold
and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which
are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles
of international law to ascertain their true status.

Apportionment

TOBIAS V. ABALOS

Facts:

1. Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality
of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong
2. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675
into law on February 9, 1994.
3. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
4. Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII,
Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the RA No. 7675 violates Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution.

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED, RA No. 7675 does not violate Article VI Section 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution.

1. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
 2. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase
in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
3. As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners
overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.

MARIANO JR. V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."
2. The petitioner assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:
a. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction
of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code;
b. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit
for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
c. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
i. it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law
to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
ii. the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
iii. the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 violates the provision of Article VI Section 5 (3).

Held: No, RA 7854 does not violate the provision of the Constitution

1. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
2. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
 3. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
4. Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

MONTEJO V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the
sub-province of Biliran became a regular province.
2. The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8)
municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to
reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the
1990 census.
3. To remedy the resulting inequality, On December 29, 1994, COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
4. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the
composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed.
5. Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent
COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the
First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while
the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters.
To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered
voters be transferred from the First to the Second District.
6. In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. He argues that respondent COMELEC
violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities to one legislative district to
another legislative district.

HELD: No, Only minor adjustments in the Legislative District can be done by COMELEC.

1. Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment
as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make
minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." Minor adjustment according to the
 debates by the commission does not include transfer of municipalities for there should be no
change in the allocations per district.
2. Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did
not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust
the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new
province was created. . . ."
3. Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No.
2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
4. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make
the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte.

BAGABUYO V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and
sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro."3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.
2. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On March
13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371
3. Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007.
4. In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds,
the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for
the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local government unit.

Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

Held: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar.

1. The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. This
argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of
apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units.
2. Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number
of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.17It is
the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.18
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
 about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
3. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives
and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a
local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de
Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Residence qualification: CASES.

GALLEGO V. VERRA
Facts:
1. Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in the Catarman Agricultural School in
the province of Samar, he was employed as a school teacher in the municipality of Catarman,
Samar, as well as in the municipalities of Burawen, Dulag, and Abuyog, province of Leyte, and
school teacher of Abuyog, Leyte, and presented his candidacy for municipal mayor of his home
town, but was defeated.
2. After his defeat in that election he went to Mindanao in search of a job.
3. He proceeded to the sitio of Kaato-an, municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, whereat he arrived
on June 20, 1938, and immediately found employment as nurseryman in the chichona plantation
of the Bureau of Forestry.He stayed in the chinchona plantation until he resigned in September
1940.
4. But during the period of his stay, there, his wife and children remained in Abuyog, and he visited
them in the month of August of the years 1938, and 1940. Although the Government offered him
a free house in the chinchona plantation, he never took his family there. Neither did he avail himself
of the offer of the Government of a parcel of the hectares of land within the reservation of the
chinchona plantation. He and his wife own real property in Abuyog, part of which he acquired
during his stay in Malaybalay.
5. Nevertheless, On October 1, 1938 he registered himself as an elector in precinct No. 14 of
Lantapan, municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in the election for assemblymen
held in December, 1938.
6. On January 20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his residence certificate from the municipal
treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was stated that he had resided in said municipality
for one year and a half.
7. Based upon the facts that he is, (1) registration as a voter, (2) his having actually voted in
Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen, and (3) his residence certificate for 1940, the
trial Court of Appeals declared that the herein petitioner Pedro Gallego had acquired a residence
or domicile of origin in the municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile of origin
in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time he was elected mayor of the latter municipality,
and, that, therefore, his election was void.
8. This case is before us on petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, which declared illegal and with the petitioner's
election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lost his domicile/residency in Abuyog Leyte.

Held: No; the petititoner did not lost his residence/domicile in Abuyog Leyte.

1. The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.
2. In the light of these principles, we are persuaded that the facts of this case weigh heavily against
the theory that the petitioner had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog. We believe he did not
reside in Malaybalay with the intention of remaining there indefinitely and of not returning to
Abuyog.
3. His departure therefrom after his defeat in that election was temporary and only for purpose of
looking for employment to make up for the financial drawback he had suffered as a result of his
defeat at the polls. After he had found employment in Malaybalay, he did take his wife and children
thereto.
4. He did not buy the offer of a free house by the government. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog
and did not avail himself of the offer of the Government of ten hectares of land within the chichona
reservation in Malaybalay. During the short period of about two he visited his home town and his
family no less than three times notwithstanding the great distance between the two places.
5. We might add that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a
stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the needs of a community, from an elective office to
serve that community; and when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak
or inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not
be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected.
6. Petitioner is a native of Abuyog, had run for the same office of municipal mayor of said town in the
election preceding the one in question, had only been absent therefrom for about two years
without losing contact with his townspeople and without intention of remaining and residing
indefinitely in the place of his employment; and he was elected with an overwhelming majority of
nearly 800 votes in a third-class municipality. These considerations we cannot disregard without
doing violence to the will of the people of said town.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.
2. On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.
3. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
 4. On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation
of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
5. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

HELD: Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte.

1. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.
2. An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness
as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile
of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
3. It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
4. Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed
to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AQUINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

1. Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of Makati City providing the following
information; Residence in Constituency: ___ years & 10 months.
2. Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which
should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections
3. Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate
that he had resided in the constituency for l year and 13 days.
4. Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day,
a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in evidence, his Affidavit,
lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.
 5. 2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which DISMISS the: petition for Disqualification
against respondent Agapito Aquino and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of
Representative in the 2nd District of Makati City.
6. Elections were held. Petitioner Aquino won the election.
7. Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd
Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.
8. COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
9. Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent
Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention
to raise, among others, the issue of whether or not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution.
10. COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May
6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as
a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City in the elections, for
lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year
against the petitioner is valid.

HELD: Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the
petitioner is valid.

1. Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that election. His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents
Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of
origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.
2. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's
intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two
(2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year
because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
3. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate
that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is not to acquire’ s new residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City.
4. Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one-year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
 district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic
area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.

DOMINO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

1. Domino filed his COC for representative in a district. He indicated that he resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1yr and 2mos.
2. Immediately preceding the election. Private respondent filed a petition to see the
cancellation of Domino’s COC on the ground that: is not a resident, much less a registered
voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections;

HELD: We hold in the negative.

1. Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in
1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon
City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District
of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
2. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and
has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
3. A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until
a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
4. The lease contract does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it
does not result in loss or change of domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house
and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence
of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
5. Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened
by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case
where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. While, Domino's intention to establish residence
in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November
4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997,
34 and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of
 change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.
6. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the
district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental
law. Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

Citizenship qualification: CASES.

CO V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts:

1. The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
2. The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
3. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
4. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district
of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,
Jose Ong, Jr.
5. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
6. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
a. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
b. Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
7. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
8. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

1. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which
he bought from the fruits of hard work.
2. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
3. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
4. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the
Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
5. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
6. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
7. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May
15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28,
1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
8. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate
of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years
old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
9. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
10. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
11. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila.
12. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis
of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as
a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural
born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
13. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born
14. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
15. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is
to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old.
16. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his
already having been a citizen since 1957.
 17. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
18. In Re: Florencio Mallare: The Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
19. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
20. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
21. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his
citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has
already been laid to rest.
BENGZON V. CRUZ

Facts:

1. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
2. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
3. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
4. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
5. On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in
its resolution dated April 27, 2000
6. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision

Issue: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held: Yes, Cruz is a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

1. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
 naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
2. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."
3. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
4. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity
5. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
6. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 263.
7. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father

VALLES V. COMELEC

Facts:

1. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia,
to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and
Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
2. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only
as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.
3. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental.
4. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition.
5. In the 1995 local elections Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, but the said petition
was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
6. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was
questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division
came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition.
 7. Petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
8. Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent
had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under
oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in declaring Rosalind as a Filipino Citizen

HELD: No, the COMELEC was correct to identify Rosalind as a Filipino Citizen
1. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
2. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which
the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
3. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents’ father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte....
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen
of the Philippines.
4. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
5. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The
fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.