G.R. No.

99031 October 15, 1991

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner,

Doctrine: The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised
by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.

If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Facts

Sometime in 1989, petiotioner Rodolfo D. Llamas the incumbent Vice Governor of Tarlac, together with
Tarlac Board Members Marcelino Aganon, Jr. and Arnaldo P. Dizon, filed on June 13, 1989 a verified complaint
dated June 7, 1989 against respondent governor Mariano Un Ocampo III before the then Department of Local
Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w),
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws,
among them, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices ACt. Prior to that, petitoner filed with the Office of the
Omdusman a verified complainant dated November 10, 1988 against respondent governor for the latter's
alleged viloation of Section 3-G of Republic Act. (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The complaint before the DLG, docketed as Administrative Case 10459, was subsequently tried, where
both petitioner and respondent govemor presented their respective evidence.

Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, respondent governor, in his official capacity as
Provincial Governor Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc.,
a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor himself as chairman and controlled by his
brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary and that the transactions constitute a fraudulent
scheme to defraud the Provincial Government; and that the said Agreement is wholly unconstitutional, illegal,
and immoral.

On the other hand, it is the contention of respondent governor that "the funds were intended to
generate livelihood project among the residents of Tarlac and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc.
was authorized by law and considered the best alternative as a matter of judgment." And that the Agreement
is not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial Government and respondent governor did not
and would not profit thereby because it provided sufficient safeguards for repayment.

After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government rendered a decision dated
September 21, 1990, Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III was found guilty of having violated Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which act amounts to
serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, for which the penalty of suspension from office for a period
of ninety (90) days, effective upon the finality of the Decision.

Respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the abovequoted decision but the same was
denied.

Subsequently, and pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of B.P. Blg. 337, to the effect that the decision of the
Office of the President in administrative suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without
prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts, petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting govern
 To the surprise of petitioner, however, respondent govemor on March 19, 1991, issued an
"administrative order" dated March 8, 1991, in which the latter signified his intention to "(continue, as I am
bound to exercise my fimctions as govemor and shall hold office at my residence," in the belief that "the
pendency of my Motion for Reconsideration precludes the coming into finality as executory the DLG decision."

Without ruling on respondent governor's Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent issued a
Resolution dated May 15, 1991, in O.P. Case No. 4480 granting the respondent executive clemency in the sense
that his ninety-day suspension is hereby reduced to the period already served. Such was granted pursuant to
a letter-petition of 10 May 199. In his letter petition respondent is pleading for a thirty (30)-day reduction of
his suspension, petitioner invited attention to the DLG Secretary's decision clearing him of having personally
benefitted from the questioned transaction. In the same letter, petitioner manifests serving more than sixty
(60) days of the ninety-day suspension. Previously, petitioner submitted documents and letters from his
constituents tending to show the relative success of his livelihood loan program pursue under the aegis of the
LTFI and/or the Foundation's credible loan repayment record

Issue: Whether or not the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases

Ruling: No

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily
involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, we do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of the executive clemency
in administrative cases.

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that
is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section
5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved
criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor.

On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies
are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be
unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or
executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the
interest of the public