and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.

[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs

EN BANC assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision
of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005] In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the
first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian,
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay
INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil
PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith,
TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents. above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former President Marcos.

DECISION Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the
PUNO, J.: PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel,
one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of
on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its law.
interests. On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation
Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of
was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General,
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs
million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment which he had intervened while in the said service.
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] It In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were
further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not
was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth
before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the
separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14] litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to
inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22,
1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary
disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used
motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17] oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The
difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater.
2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony.
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The PCGG Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]
employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the
Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the
Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways.
was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19] First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced
a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At
the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many
profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These
issue. reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes,
I other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial
regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some
states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation
Substantive Issue behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and
safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as
in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast,
were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of
a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to
guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should
detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office.
Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became
Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the
development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47
bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form
again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA
members.[22] Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part
because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States
of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in
was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23] unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their
employment with the government.
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model
entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24] Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum
rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the
101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated
canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and
the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the
others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees
ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in
government service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the
government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26] On the other conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format
hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only
and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad
to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments
interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to
minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the
representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38]
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
 In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation
to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas,
provides, viz.:
then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a
service. conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed
with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of
paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly advised that the following procedure should be taken:
applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.

The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. 1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as that studies and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et
al. 2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve
a liquidation plan.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by
of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the Monetary Board.
the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar
Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well
as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and 4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance
not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention
by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board
acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating
General, viz:[40] to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the
banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The Board decided as follows:

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 ...
denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The
 E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial banking functions.
and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
...
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination
Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period
a report on the current situation of Genbank;
that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its
Co., dated March 23, 1977; liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
together with its attachments; and
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or
General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-
Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover
Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. accounts and assets of such institution.
265, section 29, viz:
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of
The provision reads in part: the Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of
this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the
head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the second
agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the
same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall
and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form
true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which
finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are
for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in
 issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by
Section. Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a 1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur,
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of
pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris,
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that
may affect the interests of others.[42]
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981) the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second
interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to
GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws,
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or
or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
term matter and cannot disqualify.
principles of law.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be
Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept
that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc.
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again,
upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which
the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former government
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition
participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself
extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate
had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the
GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the
rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with
then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is
a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer
not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case
or employee.
No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by
respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the
owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the
dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist
a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator petitioners motive as highly suspect.
protecting the interest of government.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted
II that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] The client
Balancing Policy Considerations with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the
latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be
overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government
ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she
States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule. can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job
its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of
already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation is not independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is
inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust
defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
for higher income in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of corrosive effect on the rule of law.
entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law,
disqualified.[46]Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
less appealing to enter.[47] firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of
not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward
opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent, and results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former
observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information
frequent judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme Court found between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the
game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59] and some courts have
to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was abandoned perse disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the
danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As The question of fairness
afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the
procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent
Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the
reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive
Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
for no two sides are involved. addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is
of loyalties while still in government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this denied.
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently
charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary No cost.
words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from
post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the SO ORDERED.
dampening of aggressive administration of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however,
considers this concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a
private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last
client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the
best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least
vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case at
bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to
liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et
al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of
what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or
her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x. [67] More,
he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote
him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on
friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their
former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that
does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to
disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]

III
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT,
RESPONDENT. Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is
of the opinion and so decides that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
DECISION
Yulo, C. J.y Moron, Horrilleno, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having

published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

"Marriage

"license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter
free for the poor. Everything confidential.

"Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105
Tel. 2-41-60."
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to
repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical
rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement
was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason
thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he denies the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, * * * is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome oi
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., 37, the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of
law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the
public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because
there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, A.C. No. 6903 PhP15,000.00 Commissioner
Complainant,
Present:
VELASCO, JR., In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of
PERALTA, PhP78,500.00, to wit:
-versus- ABAD, January 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Acceptance fee
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. January 15, 2005 PhP11,000.00 Filing fee

February 3, 2005 PhP5,000.00 Filing fee

ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO,
Respondent.
May 4, 2005 PhP2,500.00 Filing fee
Promulgated:
April 16, 2012
June 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Filing fee

For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status
of her case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. Sometime in
July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the
DECISION Clerk of Court of Malabon and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on
January 27, 2005, no petition has yet been filed for her.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hence, Suzette called for a conference, which was set on July 28, 2005, where she
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant demanded the refund of the total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead
Suzette Del Mundo (Suzette) charging respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano (Atty. offered to return the amount of PhP63,000.00 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred
Capistrano) of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. expenses in the filing of Tuparans case, to which she agreed. On the same occasion, Atty.
Capistrano handed to her copies of her unfiled petition,3 Tuparans petition4 and his
Withdrawal of Appearance5 in Tuparans case with instructions to file them in court, as well as
a list6 containing the expenses he incurred and the schedule of payment of the amount of
The Facts PhP63,000.00, as follows:

On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal
PhP20,000.00 August 15, 2005
services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective
marriages allegedly for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer
Agreement2 was entered into by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required PhP20,000.00 August 29, 2005
an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another
PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition, Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare PhP23,000.00 September 15, 2005
amounts for the following expenses:
PhP11,000.00 Filing fee

PhP5,000.00 Summons
However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 on August 15,
2005 and thereafter, refused to communicate with her, prompting the institution of this
PhP15,000.00 Fiscal
administrative complaint on September 7, 2005.
PhP30,000.00 Psychiatrist
In his Comment/Answer7 dated November 14, 2005, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt The Issue
of the amount of PhP78,500.00 from Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum
of PhP63,000.00. He also admitted responsibility for his failure to file Suzettes petition and The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of
cited as justification his heavy workload and busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Professional Responsibility.
Manila and lack of available funds to immediately refund the money received.

In the Resolution8 dated January 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the case to the The Ruling of the Court
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD but takes exception to the amount of
PhP140,000.00 recommended to be returned to Suzette.
For failure of respondent Atty. Capistrano to appear at the mandatory conference
set by Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP- Indisputably, Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of
CBD), the conference was terminated without any admissions and stipulations of facts and the bar. In his Manifestation and Petition for Review,12 he himself admitted liability for his
the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers to which only Atty. failure to act on Suzettes case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to
Capistrano complied. him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach
his lawyers oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his
and his familys livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be
In the Report and Recommendation9 dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his
Commissioner Quisumbing, found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his clients interest by payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-
his failure to inform Suzette of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition for CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the appropriate penalty of one year
declaration of nullity of marriage. It also concluded that his inability to refund the amount he suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of the Canons of
had promised Suzette showed deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity and good Professional Responsibility, thus:
demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of violating Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for two CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
years from the practice of law. MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Quisumbing through Resolution No. XVIII- RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
2007-9810 with modification ordering the return of the sum of PhP140,000.00 attorneys fees property collected or received for or from the client.
to Suzette.
RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
However, upon Atty. Capistranos timely motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-26311 on May 14, 2011 reducing the penalty of by him.
suspension from two years to one year, to wit:
xxx
RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as it is hereby CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 dated 19 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
September 2007 and REDUCED the penalty against Atty.
Arnel C. Capistrano to SUSPENSION from the practice of xxx
law for one (1) year and Ordered to Return the amount
of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00) to RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
complainant with thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
 Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
time to the clients request for information.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society.13 His workload does not justify neglect in handling
ones case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can
efficiently handle.14
Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to
his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from
his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and
processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to
return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust
reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of
professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.15

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,
in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.16 Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts.17

With the foregoing disquisition and Atty. Capistranos admission of his fault and
negligence, the Court finds the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP-CBD, sufficient sanction for his violation. However, the Court finds
proper to modify the amount to be returned to Suzette from PhP140,000.00 to
PhP73,500.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of
PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof
of such payment.
EN BANC hospital;10 (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the
A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015 order declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do so;11 (3)
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, Respondent. not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that
DECISION they would not be presenting any witnesses without consulting his clients;12 and (4) failed to
CARPIO, J.: comply with the trial court’s order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.13
The Case
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate
Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Benjamin Justice) Jose P. Perez informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina
F. Baterina. since it only has administrative supervision over officials and employees of the judiciary.
The Facts However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already “being acted
On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 before the Office of the upon” by the OCA.14
Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on
Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina. the complaint within 10 days from notice.15 Failing to comply with the Court’s order, Atty.
Baterina was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to again ordered to comply with the Court’s 6 July 2009 Order.16
take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the
judge’s court. In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been
recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged
The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and damages the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to comply was “not at all intended to show
filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.”17
involved in the suit is a strip of land located at the northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in
Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano’s family, but the Province of Ilocos Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano
Sur constructed an access road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after
provincial government’s motor pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, he was suspended by the Court from the
proceedings.2 practice of law for two years.18 He alleged that this fact was made known to Tejano’s mother
and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another
The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented
would hear the case before Judge Arquelada became the branch’s presiding judge in by a lawyer until the termination of the case.19 Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed
2001.3 Prior to his appointment to the bench, however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial bias” and “undue and conflict of interest”20 of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s
prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented the Province of Ilocos predicament.
Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.4
The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives in order to
the former’s bid to “take possession” of their property and was “collecting rentals from avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case.” The Court also referred the case to the
squatters who had set up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663.” In support of Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
his accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-430045 covering IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation
Lot No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada;
receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo,6 sheriff at Judge Arquelada’s sala at the Vigan After the proceedings, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and
City RTC; receipts of rents paid to Aida Calibuso,7 who was expressly designated by Laderas Recommendation,21 part of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
as her attorney-in-fact8 in collecting said rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar First, it appears that respondent’s failure to appear in representation of his clients in the said
Arquelada, Judge Arquelada’s brother.9 civil case before the RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in
2001. While this is a justified reason for his non-appearance, respondent, however,
As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his] cause.” manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That way, the RTC would have, in
Specifically, Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer. Respondent’s
pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had waived their right to present evidence after contention that the fact of his suspension was nonetheless circularized to all courts of the
several postponements in the trial because his mother was ill and confined at the Philippines including the RTC is unavailing. Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in
properly informing the RTC of his suspension in order to protect the interests of his clients. RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,”
explained the consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek another counsel’s and must act “in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
assistance in the meantime. Clearly therefore, respondent’s inaction falls short of the in the Code of Professional Responsibility.”24
diligence required of him as a lawyer.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due
Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty
submit their formal offer of evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence,
disregard of the RTC’s Order dated 8 November 2004. Respondent’s bare excuse that he care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to
remembers making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the records of this case such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.”25 A
clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of respondent, his clients’ case was lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its
dismissed by the RTC. termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.”26

xxxx Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the
very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient ground for he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
disciplinary action against him. His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be
countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not
from the practice of law for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.”27 The client “should
Pesos (P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary action. x x x.22 never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully informed about
On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution: the developments in his case.”28
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237
Adm. Case No. 8235 Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its
Joselito F. Tejano vs. course without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility29 and renders him subject to disciplinary action.30 The
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.31
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is
and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the Fine of Fifty rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to
Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent is hereby deleted.23 follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court orders in his own
The Court’s Ruling disciplinary proceedings.

The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty. Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court
would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers duty to the Court.
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives
xxxx being themselves officers of the court.”32 As such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence promptly and completely.”33
in connection therewith shall render him liable. Proper Penalty

In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that “the appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.”34

The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being
found guilty of gross misconduct.35 In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against
Atty. Baterina for failing to file her Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title
and recovery of possession where she and her siblings were defendants. Because of such
failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to present her
evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.

Atty. Baterina was also found to have “convert[ed] the money of his client to his own
personal use without her consent” and “deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the
amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing an answer with counterclaim,” which
he never did.

The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina’s “repeated failure to comply with the
resolutions of the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Supreme Court.”36

These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to
his clients, as well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such
incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated among the members of the
Bar.

For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension
period of five (5) years.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this decision to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
SUPREME COURT motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot
Manila continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on
SECOND DIVISION Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to
take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974 denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13,
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in
vs. order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent. 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf. 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf. was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred
FERNANDO, J.:p to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have
motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.1 One of the grounds to come all the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was
for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the defense of the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the
two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as
of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was likewise counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case."6
noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de 2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those
discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence
counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high
reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine
oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress
work is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to
to shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled
fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit. in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal.
case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete
only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a
the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must
Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of be fulfilled."8
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where respondent was de
Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.3 from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail. especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to the prosecution of criminal cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11reiterated such
withdraw as counsel de oficiospeaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as
allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by
municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective
assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected
to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his
obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect
be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran
in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be
of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the
aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he
so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present Constitution is even more
emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the
task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an
election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is
not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may
likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert
himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal,
if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good
standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners
that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes
precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued showing that
[ A.C. No. 10662 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654], July 07, 2015 ] upon signing of the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from you Eighty Eight
Thousand Pesos (Php88,000.00) only. Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest
of 12% or the equivalent of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was
JUN B. LUNA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, RESPONDENT. signed. Consequently, it is useless for us to argue before the court that his principal
indebtedness amounted to One Hundred Thousand Pesos(Php100,000.00). Hence, if you
DECISION accept the compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00),
you stand to gain Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00).
LEONEN, J.:
....
Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to
deliver to his client, complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as to whether he
received after entering into a Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his deserves to be paid for his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose Calvario.
client's consent.
Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services regarding this
On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] against his lawyer, Atty. case.[17] (Emphasis in the original)
Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel's Reports, Requests for Funding, and
Statements of Accounts in relation to case developments, retainer's fees, and reimbursement
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal services in filing a foreclosure for expenses incurred.[18]
Complaint[2] on October 14, 2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon.[3] The
Complaint against one Jose Calvario (Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you
from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[4] over a parcel of land went into plea agreement for Compromise Agreement without my knowledge [a]nd beyond
in Quezon Province.[5] Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed the Complaint praying for to [sic] what we had discussed."[19] Atty. Galarrita replied through the Letter[20] dated
payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon Calvario's January 27, 2006, stating in part:
failure to fully pay within the period.[6]
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am certain that in this
The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna's presentation kind of case, a compromise is better than WINNING it.
and offer of evidence.[7]
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to acquire the land
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his formal offer of that's why you signaled your approval of a compromise.
evidence.[8] They submitted the Kasunduan[9] (Compromise Agreement) before the trial court
on February 14, 2006.[10] It provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I can't waste my
for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the encumbrance time going to Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is too precious for my cases here
annotation on the land title.[11] The trial court approved[12] the Compromise Agreement in its in Metro Manila.
February 20, 2006 Decision.[13]
The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings conducted
Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and did there despite sending several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.
not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received.[14]
If that's the case, why prolong the agony?
Luna's Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel's Report[15] dated August 12, 2003 where
Atty. Galarrita proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested to acquire the
compensation for his services in the case:[16] land and you are not bent in spending the right remuneration for your undersigned counsel?

Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay you IN CASH the full I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account because I just
amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we could not handle that amount of cash in my pocket.[21]
are aware that it's your desire to fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us In his Letter[22] dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:
nonetheless, to present the pros and cons of having this case be amicably settled.
Yes I'm not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why I'm the one who XX-2013-441,[48] adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's
propose to them [that] [w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer, they are the Report and Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from
one[s] who insist to go to Court. . . . This is what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the practice of law for six (6) months and [o]rdered to [r]etum the amount of One Hundred
the right amount to cover all those only been spent including Acceptance fee. You even Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant without prejudice to the filing of a collection
waive[d] your fee on this, for every hearing which I couldn't understand, [y]et we end up case for retainer's fee against complainant."[49] The Board of Governors denied
that we still going [sic] to pursue this case, it was discussed during my trip there. [This is] reconsideration in its May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-2014-270.[50]
[t]he reason I'm too surprised with your plea Agreement without my knowledge.[23]
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer's fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita's The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for
negligence in handling the case.[24] review was filed as of November 17, 2014."[51]In any case, it is this court that has the
authority to discipline members of the bar.[52]
In his Letter[25] of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this case was
archived [was] because I could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transport The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively
allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon. . . . that's moot and academic because this case was liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna's
not dismissed by the court, at all."[26] Atty, Galarrita then stated that "[f]or all my consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received.
shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I betrayed
you and your cases."[27] This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board
of Governors, with modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law
In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. to two (2) years.
Tayag, seeking delivery of the land title since they paid the P100,000.00 settlement
amount.[28] Another heir, Lutchiare Calvario, wrote Luna in September 2009 again
demanding delivery of title.[29] I

Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted the P100,000.00 Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in
to date.[30] He prays for Atty. Galarrita's disbarment.[31] all their dealings.[53]

In his Verified Answer,[32] Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
Complaint.[33] He argues that he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
Power of Attorney[34] that includes this purpose.[35] He regularly submitted reports to Luna on profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied
developments and possible settlement before he entered the Compromise Agreement.[36] He in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]."[54]
submits that Luna "'slept' on his rights."[37]
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their]
Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership Agreement,[38] Luna shall pay him knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their]
P4,000.00 monthly.[39] Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of November 17, 2006, and clients[,]"[55] and to "delay no man for money or malice[.]"[56]
after four years with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna's unpaid obligation
amounted to P208,000.00.[40] He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services.[41] Atty. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the
Galairrita, thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien.[42] highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.[57]Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and
property—to their lawyers, certain that this confidence would not be abused.
Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.[43] More Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving
than four years elapsed since their last communication in 2006 when the Compromise a mortgaged land in Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna's consent,
Agreement became final.[44] respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with the other party.

In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,[45] the Integrated Bar of the Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
Philippines Investigating Commissioner[46] found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of following cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the
the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended "his suspension from the practice right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon
of law for a period of one (1) year[.]"[47] a prescription already acquired[.]"

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No. The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when
entering into a compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation: Respondent, the former may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his
part thus curing the defect on the latter's authority to enter into the same.[59] (Emphasis
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their supplied, citation omitted)
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."[60] Members of the bar must always
special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge conduct themselves in a way that promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal
of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.[58] (Emphasis supplied) profession."[61]
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise
agreements, but as found by the Investigating Commissioner: Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty.
Galarrita's lack of authority to compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust and confidence
any authority for the Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise Agreement at reposed in him by complainant Luna.
that precise stage of the trial. Firstly, the Complainant was not made a party to the
Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was
executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of II
P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably
informed of the execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the
came to know of the same only much later. former's receipt of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the
amount to complainant Luna.
Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special Power of Attorney
wherein he authorized the former to "enter into possible amicable settlement or submit any This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property coming
matter to arbitration and alternative modes of dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, into the lawyer's possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]."[62] ( Rule 16.03
the necessity of amendment to the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof the limitation of the
number of witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner, CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of come into his possession.
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist, the advisability of
suspending the proceedings, offer matters that may properly be considered under Rule 18 of ....
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the authority given
to Respondent, the same SPA cannot justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect, the SPA was executed on September 16, demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
2002 or a month before the filing of the Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage. may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to Respondent to thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that could be executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts
fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute received for and on behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code
Respondent as Complainant's representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial. of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension
for one year, or two years, and even disbarment[,]"[63] depending on the circumstances of
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be each case.
liberally interpreted and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been
executed, still the Respondent may not have faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata,[64] respondent received four checks totalling P225,000.00
During the mandatory conference, it was established that at the time the compromise was from his client's employer after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their
executed the Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current information compromise agreement.[65] Despite full payment of settlement award, respondent only
technology it would have been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client remitted P45,000.00 to his client and refused to deliver the balance.[66] Respondent
about it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast explained that he delivered P90,000.00 to his client's wife, but his secretary misplaced the
doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for and in his behalf. signed receipts, and he deducted his 25% attorney's fees of P56,250.00 from the
award.[67] The balance left was only P750.00.[68] This court found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of
It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of demanding the amount from violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:
PI54,500.00 representing the balance after P45,000.00 and the 10% attorney's fees had
been deducted from the settlement award.[69] On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of
Complainant's supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment of P100,000.00. Despite
In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr.,[70] respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk R[es]pondent's allegations that he had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel's
of Court corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the estate of their deceased mother, report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any express approval of
but respondent only delivered P751,332.26 to his clients.[71] Respondent explained that he the same.
deducted P250,000.00 as his attorney's fees, while complainants countered that respondent
could only retain P14,000.00 as they already paid him P86,000.00 for his services.[72] This There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad
court found Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010,
Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to or a period of four (4) years, Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had
return to complainants the amount of P236,000.00.[73] collected from Mr. Calvario to Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform
Complainant about the same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right to retain the
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,[74] respondent received P255,000.00 from the Officer-in- same invoking the counsel's right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that Complainant
Charge Clerk of Court representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other party in the had incurred accrued attorney's fees which he is bound to pay under the general retainer
ejectment case respondent handled for his client.[75] Respondent did not inform his client of agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement with the
this transaction and failed to reply to the final demand letter for accounting.[76] Respondent odious motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In
did not file an Answer to the administrative Complaint despite notice, and failed to appear at so doing, he violated the trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the
the mandatory conference.[77] This court found Atty. Langit guilty of violating Canons 1, 11, Code of [Professional Responsibility.
16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law
for two (2) years, and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of P255,000.00 As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining lien and his retention of the money,
with 12% interest per annum.[78] the undersigned deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility
allows the lawyer to apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
In Bayonla v. Reyes,[79] respondent should have delivered to her clients the amount of and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." But this provision
P123,582.67—the net amount of Bayonla's share in the expropriation compensation after assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney's fees and as to
deducting respondent's 40% share as attorney's fees—but respondent only delivered the application of the client's fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he
P79,000.00 and refused to remit the P44,582.67 shortage.[80] This court found Atty. Reyes may deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his client, with full disclosure on every
guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, detail. Without the client's consent, the lawyer has no authority to apply the client's
suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay complainants money for his fees, but he should instead return the money to his client, without
the amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per annum, and render accounting and prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.
inventory.[81]
....
In Jinon v. Jiz,[82] respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of title
expenses.[83] His client later learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals from the On Respondent's argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice
property amounting to P12,000.00, yet respondent only turned over it to state that the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not
P7,000.00.[84]Complainant terminated respondent's legal services and demanded the return anymore carry the same.[88] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
of the amounts.[85] Respondent countered that his legal services covered negotiation and sale Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence.[89] This court accepts and
of the property for a fee of P75,000.00.[86] This court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules adopts the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with
16.01, 16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years
practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to pay complainant the amount of considering that respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised litigation without
P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of demand until finality of Decision, complainant Luna's consent, but also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.
then 12% until fully paid.[87]

In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving III
complainant Luna's property without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent
the lack of authority issue, respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of
refusing to turn over the P100,000.00 settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the P100,000.00 to complainant Luna.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,[90] the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which must give prompt notice to their clients of any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their
respondent received 1*937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse clients.[101]
and lot.[91] However, respondent did not turn over this .amount to developer Crown Asia, and
no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant.[92] This court suspended Atty. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer's duty to "account
Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer for for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."
the return of the P937,500.00.[93]
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension
Ronquillo held that "[disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an from the practice of law.
action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." [94] Thus,
disciplinary proceedings are limited to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney's lien are: "(1) lawyer-client
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar."[95] relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3)
unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees."[102]
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from
disciplinary proceedings "remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is
nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his not the main issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien
client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his defense was not established. Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty.
professional engagement."[96] This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation for his services in the
return of amounts representing legal fees. foreclosure case.[103] Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in
handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred expenses respondent Atty.
This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings Galarrita seeks to reimburse.[104]
when respondent's civil liability was already established:
Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.
the ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the
respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client's funds or for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount
administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent's of P100,000.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum from February 2006[105] until fully paid,
liability. That has been the reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.
involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortem v. Pagatpatan, supra,
Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra.[97] (Emphasis supplied) Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his respondent Atty. Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be furnished the
refusal to turn over the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien.[98] The Rules of Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
Court provides for attorney's retaining lien as follows: all courts concerned.

SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and SO ORDERED.
papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has
secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering
such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.[99]
First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients['] money for
[themselves] by the mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney's fees."[100] They
 Republic of the Philippines L-51928
SUPREME COURT Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First
Manila Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De
EN BANC Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in
G.R. No. L-53869 March 25, 1982 the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C Acero, allegedly on the
RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner, ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes).
vs. Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This
ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article VIII of
BRANCH 11, presided by HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge; BRIGIDA the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.
VERA CRUZ, joined in and assisted by her husband JOSE VERA CRUZ, and Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio Puyat,
PRIMITIVO CANIA JR., respondents. et als. Hon. Sixto T.J. de Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately. And since
G.R. No. L-51928 March 25, 1982 the issue involved is on all fours with L-53869, the Court opted to resolve Case No. L-51928
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. jointly with L-53869 instead of with L-51122 as originally directed.
PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like
LARDIZABAL, petitioners, Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Courts of First Instance.
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS ENRIQUE M. BELO, A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any
MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. Assemblyman from appearing as counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate
FERNANDEZ, respondents. jurisdiction", and the "similar" provision of Section 17, Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is
elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: ... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel
These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction.
respective, involved the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation now
used to read: comprehends all members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members
Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel of the Commissions on Appointments, a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution.
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, ... Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite
The antecedents facts follows: held on April 7, 1981, Section 11 now reads:
L-53869 SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed before any court without appellate jurisdiction, ...
by Raul A. Villegas against the Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private The term 'collegiate" remains deleted , and the terminology is now "Court without appellate
respondents) before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, then presided by Hon. jurisdiction."
Ceferino E. Dulay (Civil Case No. 431-L). An answer, dated October 11, 1979, was filed by Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be
private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino 1. Legaspi, a member of resolved under the amended provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general rule,
the Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas "challenged" the the provisions of a new Constitution take effect immediately and become operative on
appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred pending litigation." 1
under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance, which are essentially Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel"
trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of First "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction.
Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction. After the "Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's
Opposition and Reply to the Opposition were filed, Judge Dulay issued an Order inhibiting jurisdiction". 2 "Counsel" means "an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or
himself from the aforesaid case because Assemblyman Legaspi was likewise the lawyer of his management of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer
wife in two pending cases. The case was re-raffled and redocketed as Civil Case No. R- appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public
18857, and transferred to Branch II, presided by Judged Francisco P. Burgos (respondent officer, or public body". 3 Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is "counselor, an
Court). attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in an action". 4 Thus,
In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal
Assemblyman Legaspi, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of
recourse to certiorari and Prohibition. another. This is the common, popular connotation of this word which the Constitution must
A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980 have adopted. In one case, 5 in resolving the question of what constitutes 'appearance as an
enjoining respondent Court from acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.
advocate," the Court held that "advocate" the Court held that "advocate" means one who collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the
pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or judicial court, a counselor. Commission on Appointments could not appear before Courts of First Instance. Uppermost in
Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman the minds of the framers was "appellate jurisdiction" more than Court. Under Section 11,
Valentino L. Legaspi, in preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the scope of the prohibition was expanded to embrace
No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, appears as their counsel. all members of the National Assembly who were barred from "appear(ing) as counsel before
Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for Excelsior in Civil any Court without appellate jurisdiction." Consistently, the principal criterion is "appellate
Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI. They represent jurisdiction." So that, when a legislator appears in an original case filed with a Court with
and plead the cause of another before a Court of justice. "appellate jurisdiction."
The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in
and Fernandez, respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction? the legislature. 15Their office has always favored them with the influence and prestige that it
There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that carried. Today, as before, it is only "appellate practice" that is allowed with the significant
it revises and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that difference that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This so because with the
cause 6 Or, that it necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been instated in and acted removal of the legislative power to review appointments the source of power and influence
upon by some other court whose judgment or proceedings are to be reviewed. 7 In an early that members of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the exercise of the legal
Philippine case, 8 it was held to mean jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court. profession has been greatly minimized.
And, that it calls for and demands previous legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9 This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because the
By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However, under nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is
the same statute, their jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) intended. 16 In fact, the original emandement proposed by Antonio V. Raquiza, Delegate of
appellate. 11 They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and Municipal the First District, Ilocos Norte, in Resolution No. 345 entitled "Prohibiting Members of the
Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal judges National Assembly to Use Their Office As a Means of Promoting Sel-Interest" — was to bar a
of provincial capatals or City Judges pursuants to the authority granted under the last National Assembly member from appearing as counsel before any Court. In the "Whereas"
paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act. 12 clauses, that proposal was believed to be an "improvement" over Section 17, Article VI of the
It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the 1935 Constitution and the purpose of the proposed amendement was explained as follows:
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by the xxx xxx xxx
deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both the original and amended Section 11, 2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of administrative cases where a legislator cannot appear. In our proposal he
First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the previous is absolutely barred because it is feared that the practice of his profession
prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts with appellate jurisdiction from decisions and will interfere with the performance of his duties or that because the power
orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated otherwise, under the amended proviso, Courts of his office might influence the administration of justice.
of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction. ... (Emphasis supplied) 17
It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took The co-author of Resolution No. 345. Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone District of
cognizance of the suits in the exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate Isabela, and Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated further on the
jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from appearing purpose behind the prohibition when he wrote in his Position Paper that 'The prohibition
before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention. against appearing as counsel is necessary because of the under influence which members of
It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality". Depending Congress enjoy when they practice before the Courts and especially before administrative
on the case before it, said Courts can be either of appellate or original jurisdiction. The agencies. It is an accepted fat that our legislature is composed of a predominance of
question then to be resolved is whether or not Assemblymen can appear as counsel before practicing lawyers, and who are therefor expected to be naturally not averse to exerting all
Courts of First Instance in cases originally filed with them. influence that they can muster in the pursuit of their profession." Continuing, he said: "The
We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, inability to practice as counsel ... should be part of the sacrifices entailed in running for the
appearance by legislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein position of lawmaker. 18 The amendement proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O. Catan, Jr. of
said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that Negros Oriental even went further: "No member of the National Assembly shall, during his
whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same term of office, appear as counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative body
be a prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed implied and intended in the provision ..." 19 Delegate Emerito M. Salva from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own
itself. 14 amendment, thus:
It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of
members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court office, practice directly or indirectly any occupation or profession or be
inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of allowed to engage directly or indirectly in any trade, business, or
the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a industry. 20
and explained: WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the
10.2. Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and
assemblymen should render full-time service to the national. He pointed Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from
out that they should be barred from the practice of their respective appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil
professions since they would reasonably be compensated for devoting their Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No.
time to the work of the National Assembly. 21 r-18857, respectively. The Restraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made
While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did not permanent.
carry the several amendments proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment prevailing at No costs in either case.
the 1971 Constitutional Conventional, and reinforce the condition that appearance as counsel SO ORDERED.
by Assemblymen was meant to be confined to appellate practice and not unlimited practice
before Courts of First Instance. That sentiment has been carried over the amendment ratified
in the April, 1981 plebiscite. For, there is no substantial difference between "Court inferior to
a Court with appellate jurisdiction" (the original 1973 provision) and "Court without appellate
jurisdiction' (the amended provision).
The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue
influence upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for
personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus preserve the independence of the
Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a signed Judge of the Court of First
Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in
the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party
represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his office possesses is more felt and could be
more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or resolution
appealed from the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also
of correctness in its favor.
In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason,
justice and public interest.
The limited application to "appellate practice" is a view-point favored by constitutionalist of
eminence, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution of the
Philippine, 22 where he said:
It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal
case, but he cannot do so before any administrative body. Also, while it is
only appellate practice that is allowed a member of the National Assembly,
formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a Senator or Representative
who was in the Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the
present Constitution. Those differences should be noted (Emphasis
supplied) 23
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the Constitutional
prohibition, thus:
... The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a
sentiment shared by the last Constitutional Convention, because of the
widespread belief that legislators found it difficult to resist, as perhaps
most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the purpose was and is
to stress the fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the
maxim that a public office is a public trust. ... 24
Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and
Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate
jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the
two cases involved herein.
 Republic of the Philippines series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator,
SUPREME COURT to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in
Manila this decision.
EN BANC Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964 Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of
vs. Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant. Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee. of the position.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant. Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants. the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960,
MAKALINTAL, J.: the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case.
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of
office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their
was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by deed of donation.
the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o
extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado
of donation executed on 2 January 1926. mayor impuesto o contribucion."
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui
their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is
prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows: not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on
nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on
se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of
Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces the Hospicio de Barili.
en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of
que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y intervenor.
que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the
ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224)
senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar
en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu. dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of
The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof
the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to
instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of
gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7
such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant
be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, disbarment were wiped out.
because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken
subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the
institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932.
considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First
defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in
member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was
donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not
others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and
1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers.
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as
required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February,
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually,
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner,
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4
or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the
of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting
an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not
to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration."
the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and
the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends
On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and successively
President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus,
R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio
stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of
other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff donation.
then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed
granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with
a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal,
however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that
"the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo
warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying
the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was
issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no
action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of
the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his
favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first
case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further
proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr.
Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of
the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting
claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all these circumstances militate
against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be
filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that
the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the
latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this
action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960
does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to
the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be
counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said
office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer,
grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by
them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio
 THIRD DIVISION Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the
post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the
addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997] Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a he said:
District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
DECISION
Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
NARVASA, C.J.: fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi from me."
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996,
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
company. He wrote: salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez,
Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith payments."c
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests." filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a
copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that 1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I ignorance and evident bad faith;"
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to 2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest 3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
controversial contract." may properly use.
 She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on
and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** " Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2] It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion M. ALAUYA."
that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for report and recommendation.[14]
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious
Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4] and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done
in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended
to ** (his) rights and interests;"
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against **
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation
(his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9] from his salary.[15]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing
the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and
man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & judiciary."[18]
 Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed --
however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As
a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted
to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960 his professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and complaint, P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First
ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be
vs. appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court;
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the
PHILIPPINES, respondent. prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees,
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner. transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts of
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent. stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June 1956, the
PADILLA, J.: petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No.
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the
of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On
June 1957. 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of
Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial
control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The
served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor
within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in
those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an
was passed. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial
Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of
Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the services of a special
assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner received
and municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the
Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of
municipality in this present administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the Court Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this
provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal Court.
mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the The Revised Administrative Code provides:
Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is
inform the municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or
the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such
prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. —
rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its
declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when
Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or him by any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in
engage the services of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality
expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original
wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the
approving Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are
the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed,
and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the without pronouncement as to costs.
municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David,
represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special JJ., concur.
attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and
when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme
Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province;1 and when in the case involving the municipality,
he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The
fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383
was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case
of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal
council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or
hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and
the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment,4 a
fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well and
faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he
is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court,
pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the
municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan
(civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would
be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the
controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further
amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides
that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government
Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In
Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished
supervision from control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan
from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor
without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959 Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner, formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
vs. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good
Office, respondent. standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner. or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
respondent. applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
MONTEMAYOR, J.: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations. held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, supplied).
and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service
examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . . Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165. cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws,
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law.
Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application
of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other
for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may
actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical
a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required
mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is
such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed
the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons
use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent
invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to
these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They practice before the Patent Office.
call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been (a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
prepared. before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that: entered on the register of attorneys.
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a xxx xxx xxx
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to (c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and
any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
order or decision of the director. prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific
mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent
taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
technical men, which is not the case. presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name
acts of the Head of the Patent Office. placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to
records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the
person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied). case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to Patent Office.
the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
follows: National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions
or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government,
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions,
before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of
rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before
The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part
of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied) from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an
regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice
an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of before the Patent Office. No costs.
comparison: Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the and Endencia, JJ.,concur.
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of
the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist
their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our
attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the
harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full
effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of
Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that
 SECOND DIVISION admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either
moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
[A.C. No. 1053. August 31, 1981.] maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but also the
administration of justice." (Quingwa v. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, 19 SCRA 439)
SANTA PANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, Respondent.
3. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CHARGE NOT A BAR TO DISBARMENT
SYNOPSIS PROCEEDINGS. — The acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge at the Court of First
Complainant filed before this Court a verified complaint charging respondent lawyer with Instance of Manila is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are
gross immorality, for having misrepresented himself as still "single" when he started courting not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
her, proposed marriage to her and finally succeeded in marrying her with full consciousness law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity
that his first marriage was valid and subsisting. Simultaneously, a criminal case was also from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. (In re: del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399)
filed by complainant against respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was
however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Respondent in his answer to this 4. ID.; ID.; CONDUCT CONSTITUTING VIOLATION OF OATH OF OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. —
administrative complaint denied such misrepresentation, and claimed that he was threatened Where, notwithstanding the fact that this Court has already severely reprimanded
and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate the marriage which was only a cover-up of respondent from using a name other than his authorized name in the "Roll of Attorneys" and
complainant’s pregnancy, but admitted having a carnal affair with her after the celebration of was warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or
the marriage. The Solicitor General to whom the case was referred for investigation, report disbarment from office in the future, respondent repeated the same overt act of using
and recommendation found respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, his
for three (3) years while this Court’s Legal Officer-Investigator to whom the case was explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears
referred for reception of additional evidence recommended suspension for five (5) years with unsatisfactory. He should have employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings
prospect of total disbarment. Meanwhile, notwithstanding his Court’s severe reprimand and before courts considering the fact that he had already been warned and reprimanded by this
warning for using a name other than his authorized name in the "Roll of Attorneys", Court. Respondent’s conduct thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with
respondent repeated the same overt act, attributing the same to poor eyesight. this Court. He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and
honorable dealings with the court, of being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent’s acquittal in the criminal charge is not a bar to and lawful orders.
disbarment proceedings and finding him guilty of grossly immoral conduct, suspended him
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years and for another year for his willful
disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name. RESOLUTION

SYLLABUS
DE CASTRO, J.:
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS AT LAW; ACTS CONSTITUTING GROSSLY
IMMORAL CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. — While in his affidavit, respondent frankly admitted
having carnal relations with complainant for several times and claimed that he was On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this Court a verified complaint charging
threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate the marriage dated June 18, respondent Atty. Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter having misrepresented
1980, in the same breath, he admitted having a carnal affair with complainant after the himself as still "single" when he started courting complainant, proposed marriage to her and
celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status as finally succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness that his first marriage to his
"single," courted complainant, proposed marriage to her — knowing his legal impediments to first wife was still valid and subsisting. 1 (A Criminal Case for bigamy was also filed by the
marry complainant. Respondent’s motives were clearly and grossly immoral. He won her complainant against the respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI,
confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present wife still validly subsists. In docketed as Criminal Case No. 15528).
Villasanta v. Peralta, this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the material allegations thereof for being
their marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. without legal or factual basis. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect cause of action against Respondent. 2
and dignity." (April 30, 1957, 101 Phil. 313, see also Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 591)
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for report, investigation and
2. ID.; ID.; DUTIES UNDER THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS. — As stated in paragraph 29 recommendation. On June 1, 1976, the Solicitor General submitted his report finding
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the respondent Ramos guilty as charged, with a recommendation for his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 138 of the Rules of with a church celebration after which they will live together as husband and wife. From
Court. 3 Subsequently, the corresponding complaint for his suspension from the practice of January 1968 to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each other in various hotels in
law was filed. Manila, particularly the Golden Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June 1970,
complainant informed respondent that she was pregnant. Whereupon, both agreed to get a
On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer to the complaint and moved for the quick marriage. Accordingly, complainant and respondent filed their respective applications
appointment of a commissioner to hear and take additional evidence in his behalf, which, for a marriage license (Exhs. "H", "H-1" and "H-2") and based thereon, they obtained a
however, was denied by the Court per its Resolution of October 6, 1976. At the hearing of marriage license issued on June 16, 1970 (Exh. "D") and celebrated their marriage before
February 25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for his own behalf, moved for the Minister Isidro L. Dizon on June 18, 1970 (Exh. "B"). After the marriage, complainant and
presentation of additional evidence, which was, however, opposed by complainant’s counsel respondent agreed to have a church marriage before they live together as husband and wife,
on the ground that respondent is resorting to dilatory tactics. At the hearing of September 2, although they continued to have sexual trysts. Respondent was invited by complainant to
1977, complainant and respondent appeared and the Court set the hearing of the case for meet the latter’s mother to whom respondent expressed his desire to marry complainant,
the purpose of reception of additional evidence before its Legal Officer-Investigator. and to which proposal complainant’s mother agreed, provided respondent bring his parents
with him to ask for complainant’s hand. Several weeks had passed and respondent failed to
Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking through Justice Felix Antonio, bring his parents to complainant’s home. Complainant and her mother became suspicious.
severely REPRIMANDED respondent Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a repetition of the They made inquiries about the personal status of respondent and they ultimately discovered
same overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from the practice of law. 4 The that respondent was already married to one Editha Encarnado (Exhs. "C" and "E"). After
reprimand was administered because respondent used the name "Pedro D.D. Ramos" in discovering that respondent was a married man, complainant resigned from her job as
connection with Criminal Case No. 35906. He averred that he had a right to do so because in receptionist from the office of Councilor Lito Puyat. She stopped having intimate relationship
his Birth Certificate his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos," and his parents are Pedro Ramos with respondent and because of the humiliation and embarassment she suffered before her
and Carmen Dayaw, and that the "D.D." in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of friends and officemates, she filed the present disbarment case.cralawnad
"Dionisio Dayaw" his other given name and maternal surname. The Court opined that
"respondent in effect resorted to deception. He demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with Upon the other hand, respondent tried to prove, through his affidavit subscribed before Asst.
the courts."cralaw virtua1aw library City Fiscal Primitivo Peñaranda of Manila, that he never misrepresented himself to be "single"
and that complainant knew at the outset of his married status; that it was purely
At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia Reyes appeared submitting the decision of complainant’s wish to carry on a love affair with him as described in his affidavit; that he was
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case No. 15528, acquitting threatened and forced to sign blank marriage contract forms and applications for marriage
respondent of the charges of bigamy on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, for having license by the brothers of the complainant who are allegedly notorious police characters; that
contracted the second marriage with the complainant. his signature in the marriage contract (Exh. B) was forged and falsified; that the marriage
contract was only celebrated as a cover-up of the pregnancy of the complainant; and that
On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted his report concurring in the the disbarment proceedings were initiated by complainant because he refused to elope with
findings of the Solicitor General, although he recommended a penalty of a minimum five- complainant and abandon his wife Editha Encarnado, and he stopped giving her money and
year suspension from the practice of law, with prospect for the imposition of a total avoided seeing her again.
disbarment from the practice of law, as the Court finds fit and appropriate. 5
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of
On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its motion to expedite disposition of the grossly immoral conduct which warrants proper action from this Court. His own declarations
case, further alleging that respondent Ramos is still using the name of Pedro Dionisio Ramos in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of immorality. Thus, in his affidavit subscribed
and P.D.D. Ramos in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, before Asst. Fiscal Primitivo Peñaranda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967, respondent frankly
disregarding the Resolution of this Court dated September 7, 1979. 6 Commenting, admitted having carnal relations with complainant for several times. What is more,
respondent admitted the allegations of complainant’s counsel but alleged that he signed the respondent claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to
pleadings inadvertently because of poor eyesight.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary celebrate the marriage dated June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having
carnal affair with complainant after the celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent
The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who investigated the case, and the Legal Officer- misrepresented his civil status as "single", courted complainant, proposed marriage to her —
Investigator before whom the additional evidence was presented, are as follows: Respondent knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant, respondent’s motives were clearly and
was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1964. He was legally married to and living with Editha grossly immoral — won her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present
Encarnado, the marriage with her having been celebrated on September 4, 1963. Both wife still validly subsists.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
complainant and respondent were officemates in the Office of Councilor Lito Puyat, City Hall,
Manila since 1967. With the convenience thus offered, respondent, representing himself to In Villasanta v. Peralta, 7 where respondent was disbarred because he made love with
be "single," began courting complainant, proposed civil marriage to her to be later followed complainant, procured the preparation of a false marriage contract and arranged a false
wedding with complainant while his first wife was still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing, this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage (even his
act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still
valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity."cralaw
virtua1aw library

It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned profession of law must conform
with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but also the administration of justice." 8

Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him in this
disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent Ramos upon the criminal
charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Moreover,
this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal cases. 9

This court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other than the
authorized name in the "Roll of Attorneys" and was warned that a repetition of the same
overt act may warrant his suspension or disbarment from office in the future.
Notwithstanding such reprimand and warning, however, respondent repeated the same overt
act of using unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. His explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears
unsatisfactory. He should have employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings
before courts considering the fact that he had already been warned and reprimanded by this
Court. Respondent’s conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with
this Court. He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and
honorable dealings with the court, of being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules
and lawful orders.

In the light of the foregoing, the court finds that respondent committed a grossly immoral
act, as found both by the Solicitor General and this Court’s Legal Officer-Investigator, and as
recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years, for gross immorality, and an additional one (1) year for
his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name, in serious
disrespect of this Court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42992 August 8, 1935 Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which
FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant, the words "outrage" and "mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the
vs. same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee. the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132 and
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO. 513).
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf. The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for
DIAZ, J.: many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary,
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner, has relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in
not been acted upon to date, for the reason that the question whether or not the decision his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
which has already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the first assignment appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to
of error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for which purpose threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and
the case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the good practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and
translation of which reads as follows: hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters,
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt,
wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in
desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
"sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he
When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may
Francisco to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not á right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics,
him it is not contempt to tell the truth. 158 and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice (In reThatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep.,
The phrases: 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls . . . . which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has and relief.
a right to do, the judicial outrage . . . . It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that
administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceed in utter At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of
disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, Legal Ethics, which reads as follows:
or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
 It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the directed to words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the growth
maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by
are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and side with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Garchitorena vs.
clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be noted.
it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper One came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came from a judge and is accepted.
authorities. In such cases but not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the
and the person making them should be protected. respondent. Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts.
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which justify not alone punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe that
need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same the action taken in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse methods? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every
from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the wind.1avvphil.ñet
facts a valid defense: The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a hostile
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case is lost,
the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be which he thinks should have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do
observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of well charitably to overlook professional improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at
intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration losing a case.
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit
motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a me to offer a few corroborative authorities.
recurrence thereof and to prevent others by following the bad example, from taking the Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority
same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the in the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said: "No class of
justice it deserves. the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente J. as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. ... To say that
Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and, reiterating an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to
what this court said on another occasion that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may
the courts in order that there be due administration of justice (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944), and consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a
so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail in moment under our present system." (Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
their mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of ten days, Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently
and to be reprimanded, and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that the entire was elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former capacity, in
paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has been stated, constitute sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again, that a judge
contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So ordered. will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur. passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge
decides for one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both parties are beforehand
equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in
Separate Opinions human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling, which often reaches to the
MALCOLM, J., dissenting: judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and
From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was declared tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second
that "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court
conduct", until the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood for the fullest will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In rePryor [1877], 26 Am. Rep., 747.)
expression of freedom of speech. I stand for the application of that basic principle now. The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently the
The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such is leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a famous
found in a second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out of which case, he said: "When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for
arise more bitter feelings than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous language, in fact the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may
vigorous and convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the necessities of
hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess that I cannot find in all
the motion here judicially penalized. this or in the evidence in the case anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable
fortitude, and still less can I find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice
in any sense that I possibly can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United
States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)
In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the Supreme
Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-General Wood,
out of friendship for Cailles, had invited members of the court to Malacañang previous to
formulating the decision, and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a
banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated against the respondent by the Attorney-
General were halted by the court. In he opinion it was said: "We doubt very much if any one
would think for a moment that memory of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would
sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief
Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an
account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and
that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez
[1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with
scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human
sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too drastic
action. It may result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients'
causes. Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial
course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a
lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs
lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their
clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to
overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in
no way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect and
consideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and that the
language of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity
of the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion constitutes
contempt of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal
of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a member of the bar of long
and honorable standing with this blemish. With due deference to the opinion of the majority,
I must strongly dissent therefrom.
Vickers, J., concurs.
 Republic of the Philippines asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money
SUPREME COURT therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by
Manila respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs
EN BANC himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been in
A.C. No. 492 September 5, 1967 existence for quite some time5 — supports respondent's allegation that they remained in
OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants, possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or
vs. complainants), to withdraw the same upon payment of the corresponding costs. Hence,
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent. complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective
claims.1awphîl.nèt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion,
BENGZON, J.P., J.: the former denies this. Fiscal Raña made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs.
Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios
against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that acta alteri nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must
way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension necessarily redound to respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to
claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither
purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures she nor her counsel of record appeared.
on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally
in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A
years later, respondent refused to surrender them. lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raña to whom this case was referred the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the
by the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence,
received the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here
purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and
refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent
withdrawing said documents from the photostat service. Anyway, he had already advanced should have forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them
the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let
respective photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal. this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants require of him.
nothing for his services, Fiscal Raña recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at
least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims
for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands
upon him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her
documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru
counsel, appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his
memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the
dismissal of the administrative case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims
since there was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however,
overlooks the fact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally
entitled to recover fees.2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily,
he was bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary
action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence
substantiating the accusations against him.3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents
has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted 4 that respondent
 SECOND DIVISION Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000] children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm [5] she
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again
DECISION came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
DE LEON, JR., J.: It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived
Leslie Ui. with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
The relevant facts are: Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents
Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was
University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of
legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the
come to an end. "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company. when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street,
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of
had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of
formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 [3]. which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a
live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
would live together.[4] Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the
one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
the offense charged. complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8] Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from
Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui
her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San on this matter.
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a
to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the
However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-
the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the 5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she
reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the contention of considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in
complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making civil status, she parted ways with him.
false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by
member of the Philippine Bar. having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew
she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that
what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a
be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be document containing an intercalated date.
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
profession; and knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known
conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17] to respondent.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and Report and Recommendation, finding that:
that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by
stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does
was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary
courtship.[18] human experience.
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another
she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
 woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
single women prefer single men. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar
broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together. obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was disbarment.
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S.
every single girl. 959).[26]
x..........................x..........................x" In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui,
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that
attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty." exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal
We agree with the findings aforequoted. background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are: a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in
b. a resident thereof; 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in
d. a person of good moral character; courting her.
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent
turpitude, are filed or pending in court; in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied) considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]
been held - We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer,
we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the
photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of
her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar,
can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to
her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the
defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of
her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines protect their rights, countered by filing against a the complainant two petitions with the
SUPREME COURT Court of Agrarian relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian court), docketed
Manila therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They
EN BANC alleged in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr. since
A.M. No. 598 March 28, 1969 1960 on a parcel of riceland located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the
AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant, complainant as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and
vs. that they had started to plow their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start of
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent. the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent [complainant herein]
Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. in his own behalf. ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed land without the knowledge and
Office of the Solicitor General for the Government. consent" of the petitioners. Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory
CASTRO, J.: order enjoining the complainant and her representatives from interfering with their peaceful
This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a verified letter- cultivation of the lands in question pending determination of the merits of their petitions.
complaint of Aurora Soriano Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an interlocutory order of
former with having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a injunction pendente lite was considerably delayed not only by reason of several
motion filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which allegedly postponements granted at the behest of the complainant but also because of the assurance
caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering. made by her through counsel in open court at the hearing of June 16, 1962, that neither she
On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the complaint. On nor any of her men would disturb or interfere with the petitioner's possession of their
December 10, 1963 the respondent filed his answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.
the questioned motion, but claiming in his defense that in preparing it, he relied not only But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing, the
upon information received but also upon other matters of public record. He also averred that complainant's men again entered the land in question and planted rice thereon. This
the complainant had made a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to declare him in unauthorized entry prompted the Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein
contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was however dismissed together with respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on
the complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that the complainant June 20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no
failed to move for the reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that objection by the complainant against the said motion, and finding the same meritorious, the
during the few years that he has been a member of the bar, he has always comforted agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the
himself correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the practice of law is a respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to refrain from molesting
sacred trust in the interest of truth. or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings."
This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor General for On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in
investigation, report, and recommendation. Because both parties reside in Iloilo City, the Sara, Iloilo, served copies of the order on the complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and
Solicitor General in turn referred the case to the City Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers to the possession of their landholdings. On
reception of evidence. Both the petitioner and the respondent adduced evidence in the the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the complainant, about the
investigation which was conducted. Thereafter, the City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor said order.lawphi1.ñet
General the record of the investigation, including the recommendation of the assistant city For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the
fiscal who personally conducted the investigation that the petition for disbarment be palay planted on the land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.
dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed with this Court his report, concurring in the Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a
recommendation of the assistant city fiscal. telegram 2 which reads as follows:
Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of BALASAN OCT 2 62
the intestate estate of the late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique GILDA ACOLADO
Soriano, Sr. who are heirs of the estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in special ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY
proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT HARVEST
On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and above the opposition TODAY....
of the complainant, the intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of ten MAMANG
hectares of the estate by the complainant to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda
possession of Enrique as lessee of the said land. In effect, the order likewise sustained the Acolado, their daughter.
possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano)
tenanted by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr. was coming to Iloilo City; when informed that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her.
In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon of that same day, October 2, 1962. She
the landholdings by placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to went to see the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had sent the
telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Barrio Malapoc Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each of them,
Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in in these two cases, pending the bearing of these cases on the merits.
question and harvested the palay thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC
upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed companions harvested the palay, she was Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is
told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that instead of filing a hereby ordered to implement this order and to report to this Court his
complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she decided instead to see the proceedings in this particular within a week from the date of his
respondent without delay. implementation of this order.
Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the SO ORDERED.
agrarian court, on October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
Contempt of Court" (hereinafter referred to as motion for contempt), praying that the (SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL
complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for, contempt of court for Commissioner
violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the 2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC
very same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter
from the, records claiming that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it was the the landholdings in question and to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering
respondent who should be punished for contempt for deliberately misleading the agrarian with the work of petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of said
court. Moreover, not content with this reply and countermotion for contempt the complainant Commanding Officer is now on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;
also lodged on October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent with the 3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram
City Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous allegations made against her by the from the petitioners, through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached
respondent in the latter's motion for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after as Annex "A" and made part hereof, informing the undersigned that respondent,
preliminarily investigating the said complaint, the assistant city fiscal to whom it was thru a certain Albert, with the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay of the
assigned dismissed the same on the ground that the allegations of the motion for contempt petitioners yesterday despite the vehement opposition of the petitioners not to
were privileged communications. The complainant did not appeal from the, said dismissal to enter their landholdings;
the city fiscal; neither did she elevate the same for review to the Department of Justice. 4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the
Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for petitioners, knowing fully well the existence and implementation of the interlocutory
contempt filed by the respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's order of this Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross and open defiance and
countermotion, also for contempt, against the formal instead, by order dated October 24, disobedience of said order and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of
1963, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the complainant's this Court in the peaceful administration of justice;
counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the 5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the
Aglinao brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with it the authority of this Court constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of
dismissed of all incidents therein, including the motion for contempt and counter-motion for court;
contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, 6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court
nor did she appeal therefrom. She filed instead the present administrative complaint against and duly punished, the lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be
the respondent. a mockery and rendered useless by the stubborn resistance and defiance of the
The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, respondent.
Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
under oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases respondent and her armed goons be declared and punished for contempt of Court
1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains false and libelous imputations injurious to the until such time that she turns over the produce of the landholdings in question
honor of the complainant. which she harvested illegally and until such time that she fully complies with the
For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto. interlocutory order of this Court.
COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of the above- Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the
entitled cases, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states that: premises.
1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.
Honorable Court issued an interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. Aragona
part of which is as follows: Counsel for the Petitioners
WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an interlocutory order is Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street
hereby issued ordering the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for Iloilo City
and in her behalf, to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with By:
the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings, situated at (sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.
 The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in accompanied by several armed men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers and,
Balasan but in Iloilo City where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after against the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her
which she left for her home which is situated also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between inquiry, she was informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.
Balasan and Iloilo City is 135 kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo City one has to Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent to file the
travel four hours by car or six hours by bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert, questioned motion for contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed
mentioned in the motion, is Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants to have actually witnessed the incident in question, coupled with the complainants own
she had placed on the lands involved in the C.A.R. cases she never met or saw Boneta or admission that the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a helper of Carlos Fuentes,
Fuentes from the time she was informed of the interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 in one of the tenants whom she had illegally placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao
the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when the said Alberto Boneta and several armed brothers, it was not unseemly for the respondent to assume that Albert did act at the behest
men allegedly harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to of the complainant. After all, the complainant had, in the past, committed the same forcible
harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962. Her act of entering the said landholdings on June 18, 1963, only two days after she had assured
uncontradicted testimony lends credence to her claim that she did not order Alberto Boneta the agrarian court that she would not disturb or interfere with the Aglinao brothers'
to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the Aglinao brothers' landholdings. possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them against her. In truth it is
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the precisely such forcible entry into the said lands that precipitated the issuance of the very
questioned motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying in
respondent. his motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the aforenarrated circumstances provided the
In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that respondent a probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the allegations which he
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — couched in rather intemperate language in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted in
that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice — if righteous indignation over the wrong supposedly done to his aggrieved clients — believing as
the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the he did in the truth of his charges — without deliberate intention whatsoever to malign and
inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes them — such as villify the complainant.
a judge, lawyer, or witness — does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been
thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. distilled from wisdom and experience. "The privilege is not intended so much for the
(emphasis supplied) protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the
motion for contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding — i.e., in legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely
C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 — besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject- and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or
matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any liability on an action for the recovery of damages." 6Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great
the part of the respondent. latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of
To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. 7
questioned pleading lack sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is not affected by factual or legal himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact, "Even from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law
when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 8 Thus, the power to disbar
mistake of the individual .... The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the attorneys ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of
communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged communication should not be misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive the court and member of the bar. 9
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent
The ultimate test is that of bona fides." 5 to continue in the practice of law and remain an officer of the court.
Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
the interests of his clients. For, contrary to the complainant's claim, the respondent did not
rely merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for contempt.
According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram
on October 2, 1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was
coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True
enough Mrs. Soriano saw the respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed
him that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant,
MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. 2002. This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan was also attached to that
SIMPLICIANO, respondent. Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the
Court of Appeals;
7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[8] executed by one Celso
DECISION
N. Sarto, alleged Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: defendant SPAC and notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on
19 August 2002, attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc.,
filed before the Court of Appeals; and
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for 8. Affidavit of Service[9] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of
allegedly notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
public had expired. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged Notary Public
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 for Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by December 31,
of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages 2002.
against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latters
failure to honor SPACs Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required
not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications[1] issued by the Clerk of respondent Atty. Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced the Order.[10]
by the following documents, viz: On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion[11] for extension of
time to file answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion[12] to resolve the complaint after the
1. Verification[2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, extension requested by respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on from 30 May 2003, with no comment or pleading filed by respondent.
February 18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order,[13] giving respondent
defendants Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To a last chance to file his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
defer Plaintiffs Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002; Respondent failed to do so.
2. Affidavits of Merit[3] signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation[14] dated 12
mentioned in par. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. February 2004, pertinent portions of which read:
Simpliciano as alleged Notary Public in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;
3. The Affidavit of Service[4] signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant
in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed
Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged that respondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002
Notary Public in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the and his commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service
pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof; signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law
4. The Affidavit of Service[5] of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Office subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. commission expires December 31, 2002.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as Notary All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondents alleged
Public. This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants Motion (1) For notarial book which reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary
Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow public.
defendants to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002. However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated
5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[6] signed this time by that as per records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary
a certain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, notarized on 16 August 2002 by Atty. public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003
Forum Shopping was attached to defendants Motion For Extension of Time showed that as per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary
To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year
6. The Affidavit of Service[7] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal 2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.
Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned
before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as Notary Public on 16 August documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial
Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as
notary public without having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A
member of the legal profession. lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should
of respondents commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
present and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[22] Towards
receipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
implementation should this recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of the duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
Board of Governors.[15] 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.[23]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an
Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
the report and recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that
to a suspension of six (6) months.[16]
interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented
We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty.
from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must
Simpliciano did not have a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the
be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of
public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002.[17] Records also show, and as
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already
this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
notarized a total of 590 documents.[18] The evidence presented by complainant conclusively
performance of their duties.[24]
establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent.
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant,
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing
consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping,
documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it
and affidavits of service, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents. [25] For
City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondents petition for certiorari filed in
such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
the Court of Appeals.
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to
such, and even disbarment.[26]
present any evidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer,
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the
which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A.
notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus,
no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
respondent was unable to rebut complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for
action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers
the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear
charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to
that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These
for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
immoral or deceitful conduct.
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the
privilege.[19] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it
legal profession.
for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be
On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing
heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an
documents with an expired commission:
attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an 1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents
attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit such as the extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and repurchase, and four (4) deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered
thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to lands, after his commission as Notary Public expired;
punish an attorney.[20] Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar
 2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since
only one (1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was
involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he
notarized an absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at
the same time, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and
when he entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of the
loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a
Notary Public. What aggravated respondents unlawful notarization was the fact
that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only
eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he
notarized five (5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit,
supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his
commission as Notary Public expired.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as
a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended
by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from
being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of
Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby
BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of
this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago

 EN BANC an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP ordered the parties to submit their position
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,Complainant, papers. No position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
Respondent. (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct.

DECISION The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerios
mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the
PERALTA, J.: truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further,
pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court processes, more particularly her failure to
appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the Court despite the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against her morally unfit to be a member of the bar.[8]
respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego
S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt. ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the
granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the Court, in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to
payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated check, to wit: Check No. submit a duly notarized medical certificate issued by a duly licensed physician and/or
0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.[2] However, upon presentation certified copies of medical records to support the claim of schizophrenia on the part of Atty.
at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation,
Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation. However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice[9] to comply with
the said Resolution, no medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court by
Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, either respondent and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was scheduled for August
31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due notice.[3] Subsequently, a Warrant of We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Arrest[4] was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004, complainant In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[10] we held that:
sent a letter[5] to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest
against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
said letter was received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
cards.[6] Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide. sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
Valerio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but she did peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must
not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter[7] dated March 16, 2006, at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts
respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and
against her. Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
obligation. Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
 this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, more severely.
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
the filing of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation to pay on her part. country for their information and guidance.
Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughters obligation. This Decision shall be immediately executory.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter, Atty. SO ORDERED.
Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from
properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the medical certificate
on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or
present the physician who issued it.

Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of
serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she
failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings
before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear
during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs
counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers
oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Ngayan v. Tugade,[11] we ruled that [a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint against
him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of
Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,[12] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was
imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,[13] having found guilty of gross
misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was
only entrusted to him by the complainant.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the
IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years,[14] because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has
also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP,
which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is
hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of
 EN BANC kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa
na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong halaga.
akin

Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin.

Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng
karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00.
Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera
REYNARIA BARCENAS,Complainant, A.C. No. 8159 na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera
(formerly CBD 05-1452) na ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x
ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO, x[6]
Respondent.
Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking
ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto lang makita
ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili
DECISION pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran.

Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00

PERALTA, J.: na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga bago mag alas
otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa
iyo ngayong hapon.

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against xxxx
respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1452, Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak
now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159. ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting panahon
pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows: Pasensiya ka na.[7]

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty.
Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for
supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as being a disgrace to the legal profession.
tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the
money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt[2] dated May 7, 2004. In the said On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the
receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta complaint.[8]
refused to accept the same.[3]
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. In compliance, in his Answer[9] dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he
To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know that San
P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or as Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only when
soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San
ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Antonio who entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San
Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might jeopardize the main and
personal needs. principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
In his letters dated August 18, 2004[4] and August 25, 2004,[5] Atty. Atty. Alvero case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300,000.00 from San
admitted the receipt of the P300,000.00 and promised to return the money. The pertinent Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the
portions of said letters are quoted as follows: reconveyance action.[10]

Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas.
perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still
subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had
not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to cultivate the land
the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to the Honorable Adjudication
Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed. Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no such
deposit or consignment took place and no evidence was presented
On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory that respondent deposited the amount in court.
conference.[11]
The fact is respondent promised to return the amount
Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit[12] dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that (Annex B and C of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure
he indeed sought Atty. Alveros professional services concerning an agricultural land therefore of respondent to account for and return the amount
dispute.He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he needed to provide an amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client constitute gross
of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be deposited in court. San misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under the
Antonioquoted Atty. Alvero as saying: Hindi pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file Code.[16]
ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera. Believing that
it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas in the amount
of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of
to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt.[13] Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended from
San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to borrow P80,000.00 the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and return the
from the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero declined and stated, Akala
nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na. Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular
Alvero lied to them since the money was never deposited in court but was instead used for administrative complaint against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this
his personal needs. For several times, Atty. Alvero promised to return the money to them, Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case.
but consistently failed to do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alveros letters dated
August 18, 2004[14] and August 25, 2004[15] showing the latters promises to return the We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
amount of P300,000.00.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03
During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
deemed to have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference.
CANON 1.
In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that
Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and return the LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The pertinent portion PROCESS.
thereof reads:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
The record does not show and no evidence was presented immoral or deceitful conduct.
by respondent to prove that the amount of P300,000 which was
entrusted to him was already returned to complainant or Rodolfo CANON 16.
San Antonio, by way of justifying his non-return of the money,
respondent claims in his Answer that the P300,000 was the source of the A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
principal cause of action of the petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
above-cited DARAB Case No. R-0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy of the POSSESSION.
Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 1 and made Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property
an integral part hereof. collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will show that the Petitioner
 Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the for a party without authority to do so.
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his
unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his We come to the penalty imposable in this case.
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and In Small v. Banares,[21] the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the
Court. amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing to return the said amount
upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court
finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order.
In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted
of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court. only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty
However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he had indeed and fair dealing.[22] For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any evidence that he performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio. character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet
the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law.[23]
From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client
relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years
must immediately return the money to his client.[17] These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and
properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent the personal record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands.[18] Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client This Decision shall be immediately executory.
relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client
relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or SO ORDERED.
otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.[19]

Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the
presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross
violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.[20] They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he
may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
JOSE E. ORIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONIO K. TUPAZ, respondent. office received the partial records of the case and a copy of the Investigation Report dated
November 14, 1993, recommending the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued in
favor of the tenant-farmers. Finally, in 1994, he was able to secure the documents relevant
DECISION
to the case, including copies of the Emancipation Patents, by going to Boac, Marinduque on
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: two occasions.
Respondent further alleged that he caused the preparation of a possible petition for the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and recommended its filing to the Office of the
In a Letter-Complaint[1] dated September 1, 1999, respondent Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz BALA, DAR Central Office. Thereafter, he was informed that the matter was referred to the
was charged with negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel to complainant Jose Office of the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs because one of the party-defendants would
E. Oria. be the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
Complainant Oria avers that his wife, Viola Luna Oria authorized him to institute legal Respondent avers that he had no discretion over the matter since the filing of the case
action to recover her unirrigated ricelands located at Barangay Banuyo, Gasan, Marinduque, has to be approved not only by the Director of BALA but also by the Assistant Secretary for
with an area of 1.2121 hectares, which were transferred, by virtue of the Operation Land Legal Affairs of the DAR. His duty was only to evaluate the legal remedy to be availed of
Transfer of the Agrarian Reform Program, to the alleged tenants in connivance with Lourdes which the BALA then endorses for official action to the department. He further alleged that
Argosino and Linda Rey, field personnel of the Marinduque Agrarian Office (MARO). he informed complainant of these incidents and the action taken regarding the case pending
Sometime in 1988, complainant went to the MARO and informed the Chief of the before the DAR.
Complaints Section of the illegal transfer. Subsequently, the spouses Oria discovered that Finally, respondent denies that he received P5,000.00 from complainant during his
Emancipation Patents were issued to the so-called tenants. tenure as Chief of the Litigation Division. He avers that he engaged in private practice upon
Mr. Oria sought the assistance of then Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor his retirement and that sometime in December 1997, he was requested by complainant to
Santiago, who ordered Legal Officer Pablo F. Reyes to investigate the matter. The latter handle the agrarian case, and they agreed on the amount of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees
recommended that the Emancipation Patents be cancelled and the property returned to Mrs. and P5,000.00 as appearance fee including roundtrip tickets from Manila to Marinduque per
Oria. hearing. He admits receiving the said amount only in January 1998, which was sent to his
On May 6, 1991, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), Herminiano C. account as partial payment of the agreed attorneys fees.
Echiverri, Jr., sent Mrs. Oria a notice that her children were eligible for Retention. However, Respondent states that he should not be penalized for merely doing his job as a foot
she did not file an application for Retention because she was awaiting the Investigation soldier of the government and that he should not be blamed for something that was already
Report of Legal Officer Reyes. a fait accompli as a result of governments desire to implement social legislation. He
On April 21, 1993, the Chief of the Legal Division, Ibra D. Omar Al Haj sent a letter to promised to help complainant regardless of monetary consideration with the filing of the case
complainants wife stating that the case had been forwarded to respondent Atty. Antonio K. for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the latters tenants.[3]
Tupaz, Chief of the Litigation Division of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) Based on the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
in Quezon City. the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-
Thereafter, complainant consulted the respondent regarding the case and he gave the 2003-349 dated June 21, 2003 which reads:
amount of P5,000.00 to the latter, promising a bigger amount after the termination of the
case. He also assured the respondent that a fixed amount of P1,000.00 as traveling
expenses would be given every time the latter will go to Marinduque. Complainant kept on RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
reminding respondent to follow up the case but the latter was always unavailable. Finally, Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
complainants wife visited respondents office and she was told that additional money was part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
needed for expenses. Hence, Mrs. Oria made a bank-to-bank deposit of P5,000.00 to the by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the
account of respondent. She later learned that he had already retired and was engaged in Commission finds respondent negligent in his duties to his client-complainant, Atty. Antonio
private practice. K. Tupaz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Complainant further alleged that when he went to the Litigation Division of the DAR
on August 31, 1999, he was told by Atty. Ibra D. Omar Al Haj, that the files of the agrarian On August 12, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating the
case of his wife were missing from the office. Thus, he filed the instant complaint. arguments in his comment.
In his Comment,[2] respondent avers that he met complainant during his tenure as We agree with the recommendation of the IBP.
Chief of the Litigation Division of the DAR, in relation to a dispute over the ownership of an There is no dispute that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the parties. After
agricultural riceland in Marinduque that was covered by the Operation Land Transfer of the respondent retired from the government service, he agreed to represent complainant as
Agrarian Reform Program. He also alleged that due to the volume of work and pending cases private counsel. He charged the amount of P25,000.00 as acceptance fee and received
handled by the legal officers in the office, he did the evaluation and secured the necessary P5,000.00 as partial payment.
documents to support the first endorsement. It was only sometime in October 1993 when his
 Respondent cannot justify his failure to help complainant by stating that after receipt of
part of the acceptance fee he did not hear anymore from complainant or his wife. The
persistence displayed by the latter in prosecuting this complaint belies the lack of enthusiasm
alleged by respondent. Records show that complainant exhausted all available remedies to
recover his property. It was, in fact, the loss of the latters file in the Office of the Litigation
Division and the Legal Division of the DAR that prompted him to file this instant petition.
As ruled in the case of Rabanal v. Tugade:[4]

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he
also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.

The records show that respondent handled complainants case since 1993 and there has
been no progress in the case since then. Respondent not only deceived his client, but also
failed to perform the undertaking to help complainant in filing the case for cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents. He pledged to assist complainant in filing a petition for cancellation of
the Emancipation Patents even without monetary consideration; yet to this day, complainant
has not recovered his property nor was any petition filed by respondent.
Respondent is required by his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for
suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action.[5] Any departure from the path which a
lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by
this Court as the disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-349 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines finding respondent negligent in his duties to his client is
AFFIRMED. Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004
[ A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015 ] until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.[3]

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a
RESPONDENT. love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.[4]

DECISION Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to
2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
PER CURIAM: represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However,
The Case despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty.
Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment[1] filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.[3]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007
against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando
of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in
embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla
Lawyer's Oath. XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by
respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own
home and in the OGCC premises itself.[6]
The Facts
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In
or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights
admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of
City. the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary
sanction by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.[7]
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three
(3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F.
2007. These alleged illicit relations involved: Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in
Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by
the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.[8]
a. AAA,[2] who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to
1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations; It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.[9]
being already married to Jardiolin;
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L.
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College,
with DDD; where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades.[10]
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC; The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order[11] dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. and was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's
Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer. opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.[23]
In his undated Answer,[12] respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in
support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda
procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong),
allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus,
should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue
messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had
the Rules on Electronic Evidence.[13] He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail recommended the disbarment of respondent.
messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not
properly established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration. messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their
familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which contained references to
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),[14] stating that the allegations in his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.
the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or
even general denials of such in his Answer. Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),[15] respondent simply denied all of Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." [16] respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than
one occasion, brought with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even one
On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. student driving for him.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28,
2007,[17] which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion to For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's
Cancel Hearing,[18]praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office
previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon
complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order[19] dated August learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her telephone
28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's Manifestation[20] praying that subpoenas be conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside
issued to several persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February
Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or
complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas[21] were 2001.
issued.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in
Reconsideration,[22] praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the his petition.
hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said motion, respondent
informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory
eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective
are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from
stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes. receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was considered
submitted for report and recommendation.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's
motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with
of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for Comments),[24] pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-
hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is another ploy CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to verify
of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled mandatory
conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),[25] submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report
No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information V. Conclusion/Recommendations
dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.[26] Complainant establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an
thereafter filed two Manifestations,[27]asserting that respondent is already barred from officer of the court and member of the bar. this Commissioner respectfully recommends that
submitting his verified position paper and that any decision or judgment would have to be Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a
based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.[28] STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the
norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility."[33]

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid
rendered a Report,[29] finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution[34] adopting and
respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As
court and member of the bar. modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent, thus:

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code [30] and/or RA
3019[31] as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials, complainant CBD Case No. 07-1973
was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support his Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
allegations in the petition. Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not able to discharge and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this adulterous applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987
affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
in complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit: hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration[35] dated July 3,
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his comment.[36]
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which
as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated
Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the June 28, 2012)[37] dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. complainant's motion in an Order[38] dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant
filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration).[39]
xxxx
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the with Leave[40] dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in Opposition[41] dated September 20, 2013.
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life, On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".[32] motion for reconsideration.[42] Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the
records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014.[43]
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation:
 case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
The Issue testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is
would warrant his disbarment. necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the
The Court's Ruling evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof
according to the equipoise doctrine.
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors'
resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
the evidences offered. against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence
of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of
the respondent.[46]
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which
respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. affairs.

xxxx This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to
have not only failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives,
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR. In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.[47]
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his
privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the in Arnobit v. Arnobit.[48] We ruled:
legal qualifications for the profession.[44] Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in
this exclusive and honored fraternity.[45] As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not
against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.: flouting those moral standards.

xxxx
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there is preponderance of any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the
law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule
138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar.[49] CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,[50] the
Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:
xxx

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, defeat the ends of justice.
conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and
a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
woman who has borne him a child.[51] (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and 13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human
illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as
including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;
messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant
was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant 14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer
evidence. the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1,
and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption against him is still pending with the
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not Sandiganbayan.''[53]
sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition
contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that
deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any
position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments for "lack
uncontroverted. of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in
attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not present in the country
as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.[52] (emphasis in the Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
original.) the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer
respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof. justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar
but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that
Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the
IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was able to submit
supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the
Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's
oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; [will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court;
I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligations without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition
through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that
he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting
the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was
observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election
protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
VERA, Respondents.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did
DECISION not appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007
hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De
in his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera,
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of only appear for the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in
Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07- turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of
The Facts
Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former
to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1)
case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of
Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s
acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous
disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had
more than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged
and only took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then
against him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents
rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest.
for election protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained
Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica
that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise
(Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At
stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding
the time that the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they
criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the
AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin
affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve
or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of
complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident,
Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-
Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his
Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled “Release
DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all causes of
action that complainants may have against him, including the instant administrative case.
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature
affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the
recommendation.
affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De
 The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every
lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found Profession, thus:28
the administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or
participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
with respect to the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
observed that the backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and
affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
to the odious act of advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
set for the filing of the election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics of the profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement
with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors,
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera. election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that
February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during
decreasing the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month. disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-
hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized
The Issue Before the Court the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De
Vera’s comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively Governors’ Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De
liable. Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the
subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his
entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents,
The Court’s Ruling
much less of the participation in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court
views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated
positive testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement of her signature and the
by the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.
months.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer
– is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The
is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though
belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with
high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission
appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary
be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the sanctions.43
authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33Likewise, he violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law,
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same
or similar acts will be punished more severely.
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia
discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of
held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of further administrative penalties.
the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of SO ORDERED.
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a
court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte),
suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious
document in court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to
impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation

in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only
thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds
committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
 EN BANC Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005,
the Court denied her motion.[9]
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO andSHALIMAR P. A.C. No. 8481
LAZATIN, [Formerly B.M. No. 1524] Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the
Complainants, Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being
a prohibited pleading and noted without action Ebanens third motion for reconsideration.[10]
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR.,
Respondent. On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action
x--------------------------------------------------x Ebanens Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.[11]

DECISION On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already
become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12] has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida,
PERALTA, J.: filed a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of
action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against 07222-05.
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P.
Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed
and res judicata. to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both
Servier Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583- Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation
pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages. On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments.[14] Both respondents
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2] It held that Ebanen admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment
voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed. rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for
the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount
2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3] to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they
claimed that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15]
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a
Resolution[4] dated May 5, 2003. On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[16]
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision[5] dated January 16, 2004, the Court grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that resigned from employment and was not constructively dismissed.
there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was
denied in a Resolution[6] dated April 30, 2004. On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants
failed to appear. Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However,
in a Resolution[7] dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied
with finality in a Resolution[8] dated October 11, 2004. Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter
of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners
Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.
 In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal violation of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the
against Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared second complaint against Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was
and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all
Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he
second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio. [17] He participated in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen
also admitted that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined occasionally.[21] He knew that the decision in the subject case had already attained finality.
pleadings and signed as counsel for Ebanen.[18] Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it involved the same
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of nullity of the
no choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her previous dismissal.
right to due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention
tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in
was no res judicata.[19] He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving the the prior complaint deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is decided
interest of his client. with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is
entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the courts
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a verdict and to comply with it.[22]
violation of the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended
that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that has parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more
prayed that Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a
courts. favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to
the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Thus,
imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer. the following requisites should concur:[23]
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of
violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
previously rejected by the courts. for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. judicata in the action under consideration.
Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the
rules on res judicata and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida. the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD. administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the
lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence
formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all
justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and
Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the are consistent with truth and honor.[24]
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same." [20] which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02
and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."[25]
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for
this practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty.[26] This we will not tolerate.

In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find
that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP,
which found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res
Judicataand Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six
(6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
SUPREME COURT confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
Manila overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the
attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
SECOND DIVISION
conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or permits his client
to do so." 2
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he
SANTA PANGAN, complainant was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to
vs. deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent, this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.

RESOLUTION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely

REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.

ANTONIO, J.: It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this
Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible.
The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13,
1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's
motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that SO ORDERED
on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the
attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona
Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D.
Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had
a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal
surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is
"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names
and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use
a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an
officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness,
candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of
the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him
in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead
of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
 Republic of the Philippines Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing
SUPREME COURT Atty. Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition
Manila of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.
EN BANC On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014 required Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the
SORSOGON CITY,Complainant, February 14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right
vs. to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent. in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued against the
DECISION accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
BERSAMIN, J.: dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate
law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative investigation,report and recommendation.7Several months thereafter, the Court also
cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled
the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both
complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the
Antecedents administrative complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006- stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the
51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca
Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever
withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and his clients.9
the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the
another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent following findings and recommendation:10
Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent xxxx
Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."2 The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S.
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants
14, 2007,3 viz: (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA
xxxx IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
sentiments of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant. complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Election and incidents in cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the
Courts in this province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case said cases.
is based on his whimsical dictates. It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against Madrid & Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no
this Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the
ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4)
smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed
duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case to secure a favorable action from the court.
from the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order. Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. of Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for:
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita
dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D.
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision
Arsenault is likewise DENIED. against defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a
SO ORDERED. result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation
entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating
tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52). Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for
2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14
Support pending before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Issues
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against (1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against
the clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case Professional Responsibility?
against the judges and personnel of the court. (2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA Ruling of the Court
ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board I
ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits
provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he
Third Division of the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and
(Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, court personnel.15
2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or
dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint
2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not
Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid
show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin
verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for
pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag
covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his
that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to
the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of
resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting
member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit
determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17
harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court. thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary
xxxx action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and
a penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19
the decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminalcomplaints; and proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims
purely personal whims. and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally
guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no
duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the constitutional mandate
them, among other things.21 was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions raised
nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30
did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them II
therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration. Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the his motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the
temerity to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit: judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on
erring judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases.32
and the law of the case.23 The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the
promulgated in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing legal causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain
of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt obligations upon them.33
dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged pertinently state:
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
upheld,25 and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s xxxx
agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26 Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions haveno materiality to the case.1âwphi1
that the Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
Appeals:27 the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution
decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the would be resting on a very shaky foundation.34
issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does
execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)
course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly
xxxx insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases
The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such
to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in
on its evaluation of a case. bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to
(Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions support it.
violated Section 14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice Regalado, Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a
declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for the judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The
latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according
to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as
a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative
complaint to be ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense
would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on
erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code,
we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice
of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
Atty. Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines ten (10) certificates of stock. Under the second cause of action, plaintiff after reproducing
SUPREME COURT the pertinent averments in the first cause of action, among which is the averment that he is
Manila a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, further alleged that on October 13, 1968,
EN BANC both defendants entered into a contract of personal and professional services with him under
the terms of which he was to head defendant corporation's legal department with the
G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975 condition that he should render such services only after his office hours, "even into the dead
OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. wee hours of the night and wherever such services would not run in conflict with his duties
WEBBER, petitioners, as Judge"; that in consideration of such services, the defendants undertook to pay him a
vs. yearly salary of P35,000.00 from the date of the contract, but where a case shall have been
JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance settled in and out of court, and defendants shall have won or saved money because of such
of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff settlement, he shall be paid by way of commission ten percent (10%) of the amount involved
of Manila, respondents. in the litigation and/or settlement; that, pursuant to said contract, he has rendered legal
Pio R. Marcos, Guillermo B. Bangonill & Jose P. Perez for petitioners. services as head of the legal department of defendant Omico and has attended to the
Jose S. Lu for respondent Alfredo Catolico. personal consultation of defendant Frederick G. Webber until the filing of the complaint,
when, by reason thereof, their official relations were severed; that the defendants should
ANTONIO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 render the corresponding accounting of his unpaid commission and salaries, taking into
Original petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to set aside consideration the partial payments and advances given to him as salary; that a more
the orders and judgment rendered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 (Alfredo detailed specification of the services rendered by him in favor of the defendants were made
Catolico v. Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, et al.) as having been made without or in a letter to the defendants, mailed on May 28, 1973 from his official residence in Cavite
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. City; that the defendants refused and failed to render such accounting and to pay his
I emoluments, in spite of his repeated demands to that effect. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that,
FACTS on the first cause of action, defendants be ordered to return to him the ten (10) certificates
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the Court of of stock, or, in case the return thereof cannot be done, to issue in his favor the same number
First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. N-1963 and amount of certificates of stock as replacement or to pay him the par value thereof; and,
and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos, against Omico on the second cause of action, defendants be ordered to render the corresponding
Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal accounting of the amounts due him in accordance with the averments in the complaint, and
capacity and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, to pay him the balance as reflected in the accounting as approved by the court; to pay him
alleging two (2) causes of action. The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of moral, exemplary, punitive and afflictive damages, in such amounts as assessed by the
the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of court; to pay him attorney's fees and costs; and to grant him such other reliefs available in
his services as legal counsel for the corporation. Under the first cause of action, plaintiff the premises. 1
Catolico alleged among others that he is a resident of Cavite City where he is a judge of the Served with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint, the petitioners, as
Court of First Instance and stockholder of the defendant Omico Mining and Industrial defendants therein, on June 10, 1973 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two
Corporation holding thirty (30) certificates of stock duly paid up bearing Nos. 13437 to grounds: namely (1) improper venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is
13466, the same having been issued to him way back in August, 1969; that defendant not a resident, the truth being that he is a resident of Quezon City where he has his
corporation, through its co-defendant Frederick G. Webber, pleaded with him that ten (10) permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of action, the contract of personal and
certificates of stock, Nos. 13437 to 13446, be allowed to remain with them under their professional services between plaintiff and defendants was entered into in the City of Manila,
responsibility, jointly and severally, for the specific purpose of using said certificates as part and, therefore, the case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule
collateral for a loan in the amount of P10,000,000.00, the defendants were then negotiating 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to the
with the Development Bank of the Philippines, and that both defendants, jointly and stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the
severally, promised to return said certificates of stock upon the approval or disapproval of contract of personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall
the loan application; that when disapproval of said loan application appeared imminent, the head the legal department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is
defendants again pleaded with him for the retention of the same ten (10) certificates of stock illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is
because they were negotiating for the purchase of the Bunning and Company of Tuguegarao prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private
for P2,000,000,00, and that they needed said certificates as part collateral for the practice as a member of the Bar. The motion to dismiss contains the following notice of
transaction; that when those two transactions failed, he demanded several times of the hearing: têñ.£îhqwâ£
defendants for the return to him of the ten (10) certificates aforementioned so that he could The Clerk of Court
use them, but said demands were of no avail; that in view of the failure of the defendants to Court of First Instance of Cavite City Branch II
comply with his demands, he is forced to file the complaint seeking the return to him of said Greetings:
 Please include the foregoing motion in the calendar of the Honorable Court 3. To pay to the plaintiff by way of attorney's fees the amount of Ten
on Saturday, June 16, 1973, and have the same submitted for resolution Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
without further arguments on the part of the defendants. 4. To pay the costs."7
(Sgd.) JOSE F. PEREZ On March 5, 1974, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, advancing the arguments
COPY FURNISHED: (1) that the judgment is contrary to law and the liberal interpretation of the Revised Rules of
(By registered Mail) Court, in that they have complied with the provisions of Section 10 of Rule 13, Revised Rules
Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, Counsel for the Plaintiff, of Court, by stating in the motion to dismiss that a copy thereof was furnished by registered
5-C Banawe, Quezon City mail to Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, counsel for the plaintiff, and attaching thereto the registry
Attached to the motion is Registry Receipt No. 45297 issued by Manila Central Post Office on receipt therefor issued by the Manila Central Post Office; that the purpose of the notice has
June 9, 1973.2 been served because as per certification of the post office of Quezon City, said Atty. Jaime B.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the parties Lumasag received the copy of the Motion to Dismiss before June 16, 1973, the date set for
nor their respective counsels appeared in court. But the court, noting that there was no clear the hearing of the motion; and that, with respect to the return card, they have not received
showing in the record that notice of hearing of said motion had been served upon counsel for the same, hence, they could not comply with the submission thereof; (2) that the
the plaintiff, issued on June 18, 1973 an Order postponing consideration of the motion "until circumstances obtaining in the case do not warrant the default order which finally paved the
counsel for the defendants shall have shown to the satisfaction of the Court that a copy of way for the rendering of judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because counsel for the plaintiff
his motion to dismiss has been furnished counsel for the plaintiff." The Order adds that "in had received a copy of the motion to dismiss one day before the hearing thereof; that said
said event, the Clerk of Court shall calendar anew the hearing of the motion to dismiss motion should have been acted upon, considering that it contains contentious issues which
furnishing a copy of the date of the bearing to counsels for the plaintiff and for the when resolved would show the complaint to be "nothing but empty claims"; and that the
defendants."3 Copies of said Order were sent to the respective counsels of the parties on ruling in Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. cannot apply, because the facts therein are
June 10, 1973 by registered mail.4 at variance with those of the present case; and (3) that the defendants have a valid defense
While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not and strong evidence to rebut and/or controvert the claims of the plaintiff as shown by the
yet presented to the court the required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed affidavits of Jose F. Perez and Hilarion P. Dugenio, legal counsel and corporate secretary,
a petition to declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his evidence ex respectively, of Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation. The motion contains a notice to
parte. In said petition, plaintiff alleged, in substance, that defendants had been served with counsel for plaintiff that the hearing thereof has been set for March 15, 1974.8
summons and copies of the complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of January 11, 1974, or after On March 15,1974, plaintiff Catolico, on his own behalf, filed a motion to postpone hearing of
a lapse of seven (7) months from the service of summons, defendants had not filed their the motion for reconsideration to April 29, 1974, to enable him to prepare an intelligible
answer to the complaint; that the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on opposition thereto. The motion does not contain a notice of hearing. It merely states at the
June 10, 1973, the hearing of which had been set to June 16, 1973 but the notice of said foot thereof that a copy of said motion was furnished Pio R. Marcos and Guillermo Bandonil,
hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag, counsel for counsel for defendants, without stating how delivery was effected. 9 But notwithstanding
plaintiff; that the Revised Rules of Court provides that petitions and motions should be sent absence of notice of hearing, the court, considering the absence, of objection thereto on the
to opposing parties who should be notified of the date of the hearing thereof; that the notice part of the defendants, granted the motion for postponement, with the condition that the
of hearing in defendants' motion to dismiss is fatally defective, it being addressed to the defendants be furnished with a copy of the opposition; that defendants may file their reply to
Clerk of Court; and that because of that defect, defendants' motion to dismiss is a "useless the opposition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof; and that thereafter the
piece of paper", citing Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Hon. Pedro A. Revilla, G.R. matter be deemed submitted for resolution. 10
No. L-31869, promulgated on August 8, 1973.5 By Order of January 15, 1974, the court On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before the
granted the petition6 and, consequently, it received ex parte the evidence of the plaintiff and court because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they had not
rendered judgment thereon on January 29, 1974, the dispositive portion of which received a copy thereof, 11 plaintiff Catolico filed a motion for immediate execution of
reads: têñ.£îhqw⣠judgment, alleging, among other things, that said judgment had already become final and
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and executory because the defendants failed to have the order of default lifted; that the motion
against the defendants directing the latter: for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was a "manifest attempt on the part of
1. To return to the plaintiff ten (10) certificates of stock corresponding to the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them an opportunity to have all their
100,000 shares of the Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation in the assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the prejudice" not only of
name of Vicente Resonda bearing Nos. 13437 up to and including 13446 or respondent Catolico but also of "some forty to fifty creditors who filed complaints against the
in lieu thereof, to deliver to said plaintiff new certificates of the above- defendants for estafa and civil suits for collection amounting to hundreds of thousands of
named corporation of equivalent value; pesos"; that some 80% of defendants' assets and properties had already been sold at
2. To pay to the plaintiff the total amount of One Million One Hundred fantastically low prices to defraud creditors who had been deceitfully assured by the
Eighty-six Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-five Pesos and Eleven centavos management that they are well protected; that the judgment might become ineffective "due
(P1,186,435.11) at the legal rate of interest until said amount is fully paid; to the notoriously deceptive movements" (sic) to which the defendants "daily and
continuously expose themselves"; and that immediate execution of the judgment is the only all parties concerned, at least three days before the
protection that can be rendered to plaintiff under the premises. 12 hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and
On June 18, 1974, the Court issued simultaneously two (2) Orders, one denying defendants' of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it, and
motion for reconsideration, 13 and the other directing the issuance of a writ of execution of its Section 5 of the same rule requires the motion to be
decision of January 29, 1974. In the latter Order, the court appointed the City Sheriff of directed to the parties concerned and to state the time
Manila, herein respondent Leonardo Alcid, to execute said writ of execution. 14 and place for the hearing of the motion. A motion which
On June 19, 1974, defendants filed their notice of appeal to this Court, an appeal bond and a fails to comply with these requirements is nothing but a
record on appeal. The record on appeal was approved on August 27, 1974 only because of useless piece of paper ...' (Emphasis supplied).
the absence of the respondent Judge from his station, he being then a participant in the Counsels who filed the instant petition know more than anybody else that
seminar of Judges of Court of First Instance in the Development Academy of the Philippines their motion to dismiss did not comply with the standards required in the
at Tagaytay City. 15 decision above quoted for it was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to
On the same date, June 19, 1974, in the afternoon, respondent Sheriff of Manila, through his the party concerned. As such, said motion to dismiss was but 'a useless
Senior Legal Assistant and Acting Executive Sheriff Dominador Q. Cacpal served a notice of piece of paper' without any legal standing, and, therefore, could neither be
garnishment to the defendants, together with a writ of execution issued by the respondent granted nor denied, by this respondent ....
Judge. On July 22, Pio R. Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Subsequently, or on September 6, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss said
defendant Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent Sheriff petition on the ground that the remedy of certiorari and prohibition is no longer available to
asking that the defendants be given a little chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to the herein petitioners, inasmuch as they had already perfected their appeal. 17 Petitioners
hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment. Among the reasons presented by Marcos opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that their appeal is inadequate to protect their
are that defendants were not given a chance to have their day in court in the motion for rights for, without the restraining order issued by this Court, the respondents could have
immediate execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from the lower executed the decision and orders in question. 18
court's decision and order of immediate execution. 16 II.
Because of the impending execution of the judgment by default which they believe to be ISSUES
illegal, defendants, on July 25, 1974, filed with this Court the instant petition praying, among The first issue to be resolved here is whether the respondent Judge acted without or in
other things, that respondent Judge be restrained from commanding the City Sheriff of excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default,
Manila, or his duly authorized representative, to execute the decision of January 29, 1974. in receiving plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment thereon.
The petition assails mainly the Order of respondent Judge, declaring the defendants in The second is whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper remedy
default, the consequent reception of the evidence of the plaintiff ex parte and the judgment available to petitioners.
by default rendered thereon, as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or III
with grave abuse of discretion because said respondent Judge failed to resolve first the 1. With regard to the first issue, respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the
defendants' motion to dismiss. In a resolution dated July 24, 1974, We required, without complaint is a "useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated therein is
giving due course to the petition, respondents to comment on said petition within ten (10) addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned, that is, the plaintiff or his
days from notice thereof, and, as prayed for, issued a temporary restraining order. counsel, as required by the rules. We do not agree. As copied verbatim above, the notice of
Respondent Judge and private respondent Catolico filed separate comments. Per resolution hearing states the time and place of hearing, and a copy thereof was sent through registered
dated August 20, 1974, We resolved to consider their comments as their Answer to the mail seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing of the motion but actually received
petition. by plaintiff's counsel one (1) day before said date, as per certification of the Quezon City
In his answer, respondent Judge justifies his failure to act on the aforesaid motion to dismiss Post Office.
the complaint in this wise: têñ.£îhqw⣠To Our mind, what is decisive here is that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the time and place
In insisting in their petition that it was obligatory for this respondent to of the hearing of the motion to dismiss. We have said in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
grant or deny said motion to dismiss, counsels who filed this petition seem v. Bath Construction and Company, 19"unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
to be feigning ignorance as to reasons why this respondent chose to ignore the court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
their motion to dismiss and considered it a mere scrap of paper. It is motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix
humbly submitted that said reasons have been amply set forth and any period within which he may file his reply or opposition." In the Matusa case, We said that
discussed in the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. N-1963 (Annex F to granting that the notice is defective for failure to specify the exact date when the motion to
the petition) in accordance with the decision of this Honorable Tribunal in dismiss should be heard, the Court, in taking cognizance of the motion on the date set for
the case of Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc., versus Hon. Pedro the hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such a pleading may have had, especially
Revilla, et al., G.R. No. L-31869), to this effect: têñ.£îhqw⣠if it is taken into account that upon receipt of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff was properly
'Finally, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides notified of the existence of said pleading. 20 Indeed, We declared that there may be cases
that notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to
truncate the adverse literal application of the pertinent rules violated." 21 The case at bar is assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
such an instance, because private respondent had sufficient notice of the place, time and are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.
date when the motion to dismiss was to be heard. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the
that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an
petitioners in default. The motion to dismiss was pending before the court when such attorney was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial
declaration was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of default while a motion position. 25
to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. 22 The irregularity of the order of default is It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose cause,
evident from the fact that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for filing object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is
an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel had not considered inexistent and void from the beginning. 26
yet received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss. Under 3. On the question of the remedy availed of by petitioners, respondents maintain that where
Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the appeal is available, as it has been shown to be available to the petitioners when they
determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period perfected their appeal in Civil Case No. N-1963, the remedy of certiorari and/or prohibition
prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or cannot be resorted to. In resolving this question, We advert to Our ruling in Matute v. Court
deferment, unless the court provides a different period. In other words, the period for filing of Appeals, supra, where We stated: têñ.£îhqwâ£
responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time the defendant receives In opposing the instant petition, the plaintiff-respondent contends that the
notice of the denial or deferment of his motion to dismiss. Inasmuch as petitioners were remedy of the defendant petitioner is not a petition for certiorari but an
declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were, ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3 which
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
merits, in their absence, without due notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of 'A party who has been declared in default may likewise
due process. 23 Consequently, the order of default, the judgment and the order of execution appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
are patent nullities. contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
In connection with the foregoing, We notice the ambivalence with which the respondent for relief to set aside the order of default has been
Judge applied the rules. Thus, while he was unduly strict regarding the requirements of presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.' .
notice of hearing to the defendants, he was, at the same time, unduly liberal with respect to We do not agree. The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is
the plaintiff. For instance, plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration did not contain any notice of properly, though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has
hearing, or proof of service thereof, or even the address of the plaintiff who signed been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who has
personally said motion. Notwithstanding the absence of these data, respondent Judge readily been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and
granted the motion. Then there is plaintiff's motion for immediate execution of judgment efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by
pending appeal. Although it was apparent that a copy of said motion could not have been default set aside as a nullity.
received by the counsel for the defendants at their office in Baguio City prior to the date of It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in
the hearing on June 3, 1974, considering that it was only on May 29, 1974 when a copy of default is differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in
said motion was allegedly posted by registered mail at the Manila Post Office, respondent default. The former irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial,
Judge did not require, as he did with respect to defendants' motion to dismiss, proof of while the latter retains such a right and may exercise the same after
service of the notice thereof. Such conduct falls short of the requirement that the official having the order of default and the subsequent judgment by default
conduct of a judge should not only be free from impropriety, but also from the appearance of annulled and the case remanded to the court of origin. Moreover the
impropriety.. former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule
2. There is, moreover, the consideration that the challenged judgment seeks to enforce a 41 by virtue of which he can contest only the judgment by default on the
contract which is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The contract of designated ground that it is contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter,
professional services entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the however, has the option to avail of the same remedy or to forthwith
former was still a judge of the Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law and interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of
in contravention of the express provision of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of default even before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the
Court. The aforecited Rule was promulgated by this Court, pursuant to its constitutional event that the latter has been rendered, to have both court decrees — the
power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there order of default and the judgment by default — declared void. The
is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at- defendant-petitioner's choice of the latter course of action is correct for he
law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions controverts the judgment by default not on the ground that it is not
and privileges of a judge of the Court of First Instance. 24 This inhibitory rule makes it supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the ground that it is
obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid
judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and order of default..
 Granting, however, that an appeal is open to the defendant-petitioner, the
same is no longer an adequate and speedy remedy considering that the
court a quo had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and the
carrying out of such writ loomed as a great probability. This is in
consonance with the doctrine enunciated in Vda. de Saludes v. Pajarillo and
Bautista (78 Phil. 754) wherein this Court held that an 'appeal under the
circumstances was not an adequate remedy there being an order or
execution issued by the municipal court.' Hence, the rule that certiorari
does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as in the instant
case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution.
The above ruling applies with cogent force in the present case..
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of execution
rendered by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 are hereby set aside, and the
respondent Judge is ordered to hear and decide the motion to dismiss the complaint, taking
into account Our foregoing opinion. The temporary restraining order is made permanent,
with costs against private respondent.
 Republic of the Philippines Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent
SUPREME COURT imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate
Manila tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
EN BANC pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991 On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment
vs. were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent. moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly
fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents
PER CURIAM:p which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for Rollo.)
registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National
subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses: Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled
justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion,
Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4,
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent
therein. Register of Deeds.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official. Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent
3. Dishonesty. to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.
4. Extortion. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer,
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with or be heard in a formal investigation.
pending official transaction before him. In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. awaiting his action.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.) Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal
register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent. The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1)
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He
submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions. opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents
the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party,
arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS transactions before him.
representatives. Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act
send money for a round trip plane ticket for him. with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
respondent through his niece.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair,
misconduct. speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession
misconduct. its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor,
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction. responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration described as moral character.
of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the
registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct
denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary
registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to
Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements emphasis supplied.)
not adverted to in his previous denial. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
xxx xxx xxx discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers
he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of
denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a]
opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so. dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
to mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.) manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be Responsibility.)
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately. practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs.
No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
1419, Rollo). The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law
Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso,
respondent. 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the
lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as SO ORDERED.
a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath
is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose
 Republic of the Philippines In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
SUPREME COURT including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
Manila international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or
EN BANC civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949 commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
vs. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner. Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said —
Hussey for respondents. War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
MORAN, C.J.: hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by subject to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded impede our military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S.,
and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of
Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war
seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement.
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to (Cowles Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners. June, 1944.)
In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and
this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
practice law in the Philippines. continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
not being a party in interest in the case. Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by
Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that — enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation. case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
 . . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during appear as prosecutors before the commission.
then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people
. of the Philippines as accusers.
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and
were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic. Port. It appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey to practice law there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as
and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not prosecutors in petitioner case as with such appearance they would be practicing law against
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the the law.
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty. Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a involved in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already challenged on several constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is
been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military necessary to read the whole context of said order which is reproduced as follows:
commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in RULES AND REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR
military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither CRIMINAL.
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation the Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication Crimes Office charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all
of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be Japanese accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the rules
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment and regulation such trial.
of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials. supervision and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the from all available sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record
United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about
with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a the prompt trial of the accused.
privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section
its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over exchange with the said Office information and evidence of war crimes.
the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war
said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such criminals:
Military commission. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio. (a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur. to be convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
Separate Opinions (a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: jurisdiction over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori convening authority at the time of the trial.
Kuroda for Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare. (b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme jurisdiction over all offenses including but not limited to the following:
Court to practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of (1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in
the case. violation of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
President of the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional (2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be
limited to murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of (2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate
war or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of punishment therefor.
hostage; plunder of public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or (3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.
village; or devastation not justified by military necessity. (4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts directed by the convening authority.
committed against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on (b) Rights of the Accused. — The accused shall be entitled:
political racial or religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime (1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly
defined herein whether or not in violation of the local laws. worded so as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.
III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS (2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the
(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed convening authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
by the President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates (3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at
may be appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the the trial in support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who
commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an personally appears before the commission.
alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or (4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and
alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening any documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand
authority but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall them.
be made known to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced (c) Witnesses. — The Commission shall have power:
by the president of the commission in open court. (1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to
(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question
members. witnesses.
(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission (2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.
persons whom he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and (3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers
not disqualified by personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be and duties set forth in (1) and (2) above.
appointed to hear a case in which he personally investigated or wherein his (4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the
presence as a witness is required. One specially qualified member whose ruling is commission.
final in so far as concerns the commission on an objection to the admissibility of (d) Evidence.
evidence offered during the trial. (1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance
(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply
by the affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the the rules of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to
affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present. achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the
(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
one of the member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member (a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission
of the Commission present shall preside. to have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the
IV. PROSECUTORS armed forces of any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of
(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to the document.
conduct the prosecution before each commission. (b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by
(b) Duties. — The duties of the prosecutor are: the International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a any investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission
commission. considers as possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission (c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.
of all cases referred for trial. (d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to
V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION the commission to contain information relating to the charge.
(a) Conduct of the Trial. — A Commission shall: (e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by original is not immediately available.
the charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any (2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
unnecessary delay or interference. government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of
military or other agencies of any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a (g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to
preliminary offer of proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the death by hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or
admissibility of such evidence. such other punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor (h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried
be considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of into effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death
the accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but or life imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that of the Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a
justice so requires. Board of Review to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in be on duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of
evidence without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that Staff shall have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute,
such confession or statement was procured by mean which the commission believe suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to
to have been of such a character that may have caused the accused to make a false the accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new military commission; but
statement the commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as he shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence. Except as
was so procured. herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall final
(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
as follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances: VI. RULE-MAKING POWER
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open Supplementary Rule and Forms. — Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to
court. govern its procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or and forms as may be prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of
"Not guilty." the Philippines.
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside
may at this or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he out of the appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War
proposes to submit to the commission and the commission thereupon may rule Crimes Office in the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and
upon the admissibility of such evidence. shall be expended in accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or General as approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures, installations,
presented. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on messing, and billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then Legal
motion of the defense for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the
evidence before the commission may defer action on any such motion and permit or Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines
require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property
evidence. Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War Crimes
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The Office.
presiding member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
evidence it proposes to submit to the commission where upon the commission may Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
rule upon the admissibility of such evidence. hundred and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
MANUEL ROXAS
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as
President of the Philippines
the commission may rule as being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission. By the President:
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless EMILIO ABELLO
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment Chief of the Executive Office
and sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
based. Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
( f ) Record of Proceedings. — Each commission shall make a separate record of its congressional enactment.
proceeding in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important
by the prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the question, is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative
defense counsel. The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, power expressly vested in Congress by the Constitution. .
certified by the presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be The Constitution provides:
delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.
 The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING THE
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO SAFEGUARD
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUILITY
legislative power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the OF ITS INHABITANTS.
Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national
the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to
Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and
Constitution in the Supreme Court. all subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were supply, and by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population
believers in the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further the establishment of an air protective service and the organization of volunteer
elaborated by Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the guard units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the
United State of America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has interest of the public. To carry out this policy the President is authorized to
allocated the three power of government — legislative, executive, judicial — to distinct and promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect off law until
separate department of government. the date of adjournment of the next regulation which shall have the force and effect
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First
are in the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of
government may exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution Philippines. Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to
or by law by virtue express authority of the Constitution. suppress espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish citizens (a) when not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or
government office is essentially legislative. other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as may bee necessary in
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military the public interest; (3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of
commissions. Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in crops and hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order
nature. It confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war to insure adequate production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit
crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of
any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. . work in productive enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to regulate
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or
subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the business undertakings of all kinds; (7) to insure an even distribution of labor among
Supreme Court. the productive enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of transportation in order to maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued
the Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the transportation facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or
Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission. enterprise for use or operation by the Government;(10) to regulate rents and the
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity, both imported and locally
established by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity,
legislative power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress. monopolization, hoarding injurious speculations, and private control affecting the
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the supply, distribution and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical,
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the building, material, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture
Supreme Court. and industry, with power to requisition these commodities subject to the payment of
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)
Executive Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the
however, to suggest that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 President may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any
under the emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government.
Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any
below: provision of this Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by
the President under the authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600. imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten
thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or corporation,
the manager, managing director, or person charge with the management of the The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29,
business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor. 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days or, at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
from the date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken
taken by him under the authority herein granted. direct part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend legislative body as chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the
such amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five "Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by
Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight. the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the We approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances
remainder of this Act. then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue
SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval. of the following provisions of the Constitution:
Approved, August 19, 1940. In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671 promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI,
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR section 26.)
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express
Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines; provision of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.;
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of but if there could still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the surrender of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before
President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to the surrender of Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function
promulgate such rules and regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four
national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the
empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and
branches, department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the independence legislative organs, — Congress and the President of the Philippines — would
Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature
precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive
subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with
government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines
laws and appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to democracy.
modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative
and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to so, because it permit the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can
maintain and enforce its authority. afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
promulgated by him under the power herein granted. The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations. governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Chief of the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among
Philippines shall otherwise provide. other, General Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting
Approved December 16, 1941. opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129,
and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in
disposing the Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence
in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them
no justice can expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we
vote to declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
 Republic of the Philippines criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial
SUPREME COURT Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict
Manila in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
EN BANC and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965 pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly
vs. instituted together with the criminal action.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
PAREDES, J.: WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor
with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said is dismissed, without costs.
municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced,
securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his
was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
appearance of City Attorney Fule. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for
Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
the pertinent portions of which read: of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case
with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in at bar, who is a relative.
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
liability of the accused. hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes
committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of
 Republic of the Philippines Balibado et al., defendants" for "annulment of sale of real property and redemption with
SUPREME COURT damages." This complaint was prepared on February 26, 1972 by "Eligio R. Berango & B.B.
Manila Bercacio & Ass." as counsel for the plaintiffs, with Eligio R. Berango signing the complaint.
EN BANC (Exhibit B)
During the pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to
A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975 withdraw P1,500.00 from the P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need
CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO, complainant, of money, but no action was taken by respondent. The verbal request was followed by a
vs. registered letter dated January 24, 1973 advising Judge Bercacio that complainant herein
MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAY, respondent. was withdrawing the amount of P3,500.00 deposited with him and requesting him to remit
the said amount within ten days from receipt of the letter. (Exhibit D) There was still no
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.: response from respondent Judge, hence, another letter was sent dated February 21, 1973,
Respondent, incumbent Municipal Judge of Tabaco, Albay, faces this administrative complaint which We quote:
for conduct unbecoming a judge on two counts: (1) engaging in the practice of law, and (2) Hon. Bonifacio Bercacio
failure to return promptly to complainant, Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, the money deposited Municipal Judge of Tabaco
with him. Tabaco Albay
The following are the undisputed facts: Sir:
Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, to whom We shall refer henceforth as complainant, claims to This is a tracer of my letter to you dated January 28, 1973, demanding from you
be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in the return of the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00),
Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale which I entrusted to you for the redemption of my land which is involved in Civil
executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Case No. 4591 entitled "Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, et al., vs. Maximo Balibado, et
Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, al.," which is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch III.
as ex-officio notary public, on January 25, 1972. Having been apprised of the execution of Inasmuch as you failed to deposit that amount to the Clerk of Court, Court of First
this deed of sale, complainant went to the office of Judge Bercacio to verify the matter. Upon Instance of Albay, I am demanding from your good self the return of said amount
being shown a copy of the deed of sale, complainant informed respondent judge that the to me because I need it very badly.
vendors owned only one-third undivided portion of the property and that she and other I have spent a lot of money in going back and forth from Sto. Domingo to your
cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem residence to demand from you the amount but of no avail for almost one year.
or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the Failure on your part to comply with the same, I will be constrained to take the
judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property and necessary action on the matter against you.
for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay Alfredo Thank you.
Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00 for which he issued the Very truly yours,
corresponding receipt which reads: (Sgd.) Mrs. CONCEPCION DIA-
This is to certify that MRS. CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO of Sto. Domingo, AÑONUEVO
Albay, has deposited with the undersigned, the sum of THREE THOUSAND (Exhibit E)
FIVE HUNDRED (P3,500.00) PESOS Philippine Currency, for the purpose of As the foregoing letter elicited no reaction from the Judge, complainant Mrs. Añonuevo
exercising her right to the legal redemption of the property sold to MR. sought the assistance of a lawyer in the person of Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid who accordingly
ALFREDO ONG by Messrs. Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Mrs. wrote to respondent on March 16, 1973, giving the lattera final period of grace within which
Petrona B. de Barrios as per Doc. No. 7, Page 3, Book No. 1, Series of to return the sum of P3,500.00, otherwise proper measures would be taken to protect the
1972, of the Notarial Register of the undersigned, dated Jan. 25, 1972. interests of his client. (Exhibit F)
Tabaco, Albay, February 23, 1972. Respondent finally broke his silence and answered with a letter given hereunder:
(Sgd.) BONIFACIO B.
BERCACIO (Exhibit C) Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid
El Casino Bldg.
Legazpi City
Dear Dolfo:
I am in receipt today of yours dated the 16th. inst.
Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer.
Frankly, I am indeed surprised at the tenor of your letter, particularly the
Forthwith a complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay
threat it contains despite the explanation I verbally gave you when you
(Civil Case No. 4591) entitled: "Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, et al., plaintiffs, versus Maximo
dropped at my office. .
 If you would re-examine the receipt I issued to Mrs. Concepcion D. Respondent's claim is belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs.
Añonuevo, dated February 23, 1972, you will note that the amount was Añonuevo manifested as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy
entrusted to me to make it available anytime "for the purpose of exercising available to her and her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He
her right to the legal redemption of the property sold to Mr. Alfredo Ong." accepted from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property
The case instituted by the plaintiffs, among whom is Mrs. Añonuevo for the from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses (t.s.n. January 28, 1974, p. 9). (c) He
determination of their right is still pending in Court due to the illness of wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-owners offering to
Judge Zurbano and the prolonged vacation of the Presiding Judge. redeem the land in question (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, p. 89). (d) When his attempts at an
When the money was entrusted to me, I was made to understand that the out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591
amount was not exclusively hers alone. I regret that legal ethics forbid me (t.s.n. February 1, 1974, p. 24), for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal
from revealing to you what was imparted to me in confidence which I have research fees (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, p. 119). (e) He was present together with Atty.
the moral obligation to keep inviolate. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it was Atty. Berango
Your insinuation of inaction on my part is false because I summoned Mrs. who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of
Añonuevo to my office after I received her letters; she apologized and did respondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango
not insist that the money be returned pending the termination of the civil and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial." (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, p. 67)
case. From reliable sources I have learned that she is being made a Moreover, it has not escaped Our attention that as claimed by complainant herein it was
conveyance tool for sinister motives and there is ample ground to suspect respondent Judge who dealt with her all along in connection with the conduct of her case.
that this matter is being used as a vehicle for revenge. This is borne out by the letter of Atty. Berango asking respondent to collect from Mrs.
The case now pending in the CFI is being handled by another lawyer who Añonuevo the amount of P500.00 as his attorney's fees (Annex 3 of respondent's comment,
should have some say on this matter. p. 11, rollo), and the fact that respondent invited Mrs. Añonuevo to a conference in his office
Very truly yours, to discuss the matter with Atty. Berango. (see Annex A, Ibid., p. 12, rollo) If Atty. Berango
(Sgd.) BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO indeed was the lawyer of Mrs. Añonuevo, why did he have to seek the intervention of
(Exhibit G) respondent to collect his attorney's fees and why did respondent have to call Mrs. Añonuevo
Due to the non-remittance of the aforementioned amount, Atty. Madrid filed with the Court to his office for that purpose?
of First Instance an urgent motion dated August 20, 1973, praying that Judge Bercacio be The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
directed to consign in court the amount deposited with him by the plaintiff, Mrs. Añonuevo. proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
(Exhibit H) litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. (Martin,
Upon receipt of the foregoing motion, respondent manifested to the trial judge that he would Comments on Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1974 Ed., p. 251; Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol.
be ready to deliver the money as soon as the plaintiffs won the case. On September 13, 6, p. 206) Hence, even if we were to accept respondent's explanation that it was Atty.
1973, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and on the same date, Berango who represented Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-plaintiffs in court, respondent's
issued an order directing Judge Bercacio to deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount of actuations as noted above still fall within the prohibition.
P3,500.00 within five (5) days from receipt of the order (t.s.n. February 1, 1974, p. 19). On The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid
September 17, Judge Bercacio received a copy of the order and on September 26, 1973, he the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a
turned over the amount to Atty. Rodolfo Madrid (t.s.n. Ibid. pp. 22-24) litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this
1. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude
in part: any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.
All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of 2. Respondent's failure to return the amount of P3,500.00 to herein complainant upon her
sessions applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to demand is highly reproachable, to say the least.
municipal judges, but the latter may, after office hours and with the Mrs. Añonuevo gave to respondent the aforesaid amount with the understanding that it
permission of the district judge concerned, engage in teaching or other would be offered to Alfredo Ong for purposes of redeeming the property sold by Mrs.
vocation not involving the practice of law ... (Emphasis supplied) Añonuevo's co-owners. When Alfredo Ong refused the extra-judicial offer of redemption,
and which was implemented by Circular No. 37 of the Secretary of Justice dated June 22, respondent should have either returned the money to Mrs. Añonuevo or consigned it in
1971 to the effect that court.
... no Municipal Judge shall ... engage in private practice as a member of Respondent contends that he kept the money because he wanted it ready for payment to the
the bar or give professional advice to clients ... (emphasis supplied) vendee should the complaint for redemption prosper. In fact, according to respondent, he
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, Mrs. brought the amount with him during the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, just in case an amicable
Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case; that when he saw his name in settlement would be effected between the parties, but when this failed, he gave the
the complaint as one of the lawyers, he called Atty. Berangos attention to the mistake and P3,500.00 to Atty. Berango for custody. However, on April 9, 1973, Atty. Berango returned
this was immediately corrected in the subsequent pleadings by deleting his name. to him the money because Mrs. Añonuevo had secured the services of another counsel. Due
to this development, he wrote to complainant herein to come to his office for a conference
with Atty. Berango on the latter's attorney's fee and also in order that she may get back the
money she had deposited. (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, pp. 95-100)
The explanation of respondent fails to convince Us of his good faith. Even if we were to
concede that his intention in keeping the money was to have it ready at any time for
payment to Alfredo Ong should the civil case prosper, nevertheless, when complainant herein
made demands on him, verbal as well as written, to return the money, he should have
immediately turned it over to complainant to forestall or erase any possible suspicion that he
had spent it; or he could have deposited it in court, anyway, his purpose, as he said, was to
keep the money available at all times.
Respondent's obstinate refusal or failure to accede to complainant's request for almost a
year led the latter to secure the services of another counsel who was compelled — what to
him must have been an unpleasant task — to ask from no less than a member of the
Judiciary the return of the P3,500.00 deposited with the latter otherwise he would have to
take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. That demand of Atty. Madrid
was made in March of 1973, but instead of delivering the amount, respondent still held it
putting up the excuse in a letter to Atty. Madrid (see pp. 4-5 of this Decision) that the money
did not belong entirely to Mrs. Añonuevo and that the latter had agreed to his keeping the
money during the pendency of the case. That of course was untrue, because, first, there was
nothing in the record to show that the P3,500.00 belonged to persons other than Mrs.
Añonuevo from whom respondent received it, and secondly, it was Mrs. Añonuevo who had
personally been asking all along for the return of said amount. It is to the discredit of
respondent that it took a court order issued on September 13, 1973, for him to return
complainant's money to Atty. Madrid.
While the Court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money
deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations, respondent placed his
honesty and integrity under serious doubt.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice. To a certain degree, respondent herein failed to meet
these exacting standards of judicial conduct.
WHEREFORE, We find respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as charged, and hereby
suspend him from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately upon finality of
this decision, with the warning that commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will
warrant a more severe penalty from the Court.
So Ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines office, much to its regrets, will be forced to withdraw its approval of the existing toll rates."
SUPREME COURT By reason of this communication, the provincial board, on March 7, 1934, with the
Manila conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a resolution reducing the tolls for 2-ton trucks or
EN BANC more, the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the respondents, from P1.20 to P0.50 on
G.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939 one bridge, and from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other. And on April 10, 1935 "upon authority of
ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the Department of the Interior" the provincial board
vs. refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company,
VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC., NEGROS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and Inc., and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future
NICOLAS CONCEPCION,respondents. payments for tolls by said companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents
Licerio Floirendo and Eulogio de Guzman for petitioner. have been benefited with an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months. (Exhibit V.)
E.P. Virata for respondents. The various incidental questions raised by the petitioner revolves around the reasonable
LAUREL, J.: compensation to which he is entitled, and we pass on to the consideration of this point.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals of September Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and
20, 1938, in the above-entitled case on various alleged errors of law. did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these
The Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., during the time the services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It
legal services are claimed to have been rendered by the petitioner, were operating is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and the only
automobile lines in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, Nicolas Concepcion, question is the reasonable amount to which he is entitled. He claimed in the lower court the
was at the time the president, general manager, and controlling stockholder of these two sum of P20,000. The trial court awarded him P10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion engaged the professional services reduced this amount to P3,500.
of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of Manila. The employment was Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have
for the purpose of obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll rates on and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services
various bridges along the line operated by the respondent transportation companies. rendered, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the
According to the petitioner, these toll bridges are in places known as Bago, Calatrava, extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer . . .." The
Danao, Hinigiran, Malogo, Talavan-Dacu, Talabangay, Bagacay, Binmalayan and Sicaba. At following are the circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an
the time of the employment of the petitioner, it appears that the respondent transportation attorney: the amount and character of the services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble
companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges up to December 31, 1932, an involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
amount said to represent one-seventh of their gross income up to that date, and in view of rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property
their high rates, the payment of the toll charges were detrimental to the transportation affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and experience called
business of the respondent if not remedied in time. The herein petitioner accordingly took for in the performance of the services; the professional character and social standing of the
steps to obtain first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a
also the refund of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much a larger fee when it is to be
Negros. For this purpose, he appears to have signed Exhibit A which Concepcion brought to contingent that when it is not. The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered
Manila, asking that the Bago and Malogo bridges be declared free, and said petition was filed not to enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation, but to determine whether or
with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in January, 1933. not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the services rendered, or as as incident
Believing that the suppression of tolls on the Bago and Malogo bridges could not be effected, in ascertaining the importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation.
the petitioner filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and Communication, petition (Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil., 419; Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil., 499.)
Exhibit B asking for the reduction of toll charges over the eleven (11) bridges in Occidental The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing with
Negros. This fact was brought to the knowledge of Nicolas Concepcion who in turn wrote to the authorities concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers submitted in
the petitioner, Exhibit K-1, the pertinent part of which reads thus: evidence, for he appears to have had various conferences with the Secretary of Public Works
Now compadre if this toll business will not all be effected I would like to request you and Communications, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Labor and the Insular
therefore to work for at least 50 per cent reduction on all toll bridges, so that our Auditor, and had otherwise taken steps to secure the objectives of his clients. The
little business will prosper a bit. We will always hope of course for the best to come. importance, merits and value of professional services of a lawyer are measured not alone by
(In English.) his work taken separately, but by his work taken as a whole. There are services which, when
The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the transportation companies' petition and taken separately, may not in themselves have any noticeable special merit, but when
urged the provincial board of Occidental Negros to act favorably. The provincial board, considered in connection with the other works and services of the lawyer to which they are
however, declined to follow the suggestion. The Secretary of Commerce and Public Works related, acquire an unquestionable value. That is why even the time employed is not itself an
warned the provincial officials by sending them the communication, dated April 23, 1934, appropriate basis for fixing the compensation. (Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil., 350;
with the admonition that "if the toll rates have not been revised by . . . June 15, 1934, this Bachrach vs. Teal and Teal Motor Co., 53 Phil., 631, 634.)
The respondents in their brief insinuate that the services of the petitioner were unsolicited
and unauthorized. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals, upon the proof submitted,
concluded that the employment of the petitioner was duly made and solicited by the
president and manager of the respondent corporations, and such finding cannot be
disturbed. "It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his
client . . . That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to
serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for
his services. . . ." (Wolfson vs. Anderson, 48 Phil., 672, 675.)
The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but the
intention and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And in any
case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation
which lawyers should receive for their professional services. (Panis vs.Yangco, 52 Phil., 499,
502.)
No hard and fast rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what is
or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case. (2
Thornton on Attorney at Law, p. 783.)
We have noted in the beginning that the services here were rendered in a case of an
administrative nature. But that does not alter the application of the proper rule:
Professional services, to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation, are as
legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or
jury that the claim presented or the defense set up against a claim presented by the
other party ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates;
and the legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to
receive compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such
contracts illegal, if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or
unfairness. (Stanton vs. Embry, 23 Law. ed [U.S.], 983, 985.)
As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of the
toll of the bridges in the said province, the respondents were benefited with an economy of
P78,448. The refund to the said corporations of the amount of P50,000 is a great relief and
enhancement of their business. Facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion
that the reasonable compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however,
the sum of P1,280 which the petitioner had already received.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly modified, without pronouncement
regarding costs. So ordered.
 collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd
Republic of the Philippines ed.)
SUPREME COURT The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Manila Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in
SECOND DIVISION the practice of law when he:
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
vs. representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
Management, respondents. representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner. representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
PARAS, J.: Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect stated:
on the political aspect of our national existence. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
least ten years. (Emphasis supplied) proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
Constitution which similarly provides: instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their supplied)
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied) embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
Black defines "practice of law" as: have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
 Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile practice of law.
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new MR. OPLE. Thank you.
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as ... ( Emphasis supplied)
advocacy, counselling and public service. Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law (emphasis supplied)
within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312) Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23) understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
be allowed to make a very brief statement? most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates."
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). (Ibid.).
The Commissioner will please proceed. The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years". to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit. spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine legal profession. (Ibid.).
Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up. In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
Commission on Audit? as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes. lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should
be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). research has become a vital necessity.
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.). "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
service. (Ibid.). corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law. affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to require an ability to deal with the law.
intelligent decision-making. At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition supplied.)
of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts. orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to
and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the be more closely involved in the running of the business.
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
flowing therefrom. "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and May 25,1990, p. 4).
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and
as well into the intertwining modern management issues. rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
to the organization and management of the legal function itself. complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning. supplied)
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint
The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global venture may be used to illustrate the point.
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. [Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
often with those who are competitors in other arenas. Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal
as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied) supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require trying to make a global economy work.
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied) relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group- enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
performance than internal group processes. only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a- modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is 4).
 The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
law for at least ten years. In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo) agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963- model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius
and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied) Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
member. intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
ten years. True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
said: defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied) lawyers.
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
SCRA 744) where it stated: Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President?
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission is the incumbent President?
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is We now proceed:
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Emphasis supplied) Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, Additionally, consider the following:
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200) (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides: (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
temporary or acting capacity. Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as condition that —
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern No blade shall touch his skin;
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 No blood shall flow from his veins.
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
the constitutional intent. anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
SO ORDERED. performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law,
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.) or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
Sarmiento, J., is on leave. profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
Separate Opinions than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
NARVASA, J., concurring: As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the supplied).
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition. It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
PADILLA, J., dissenting: constitutes "practice of law." It states:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did 968).
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been Kan, 864).
met. 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
boundaries." practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg.
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
with.
 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
(Martin supra) simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
ed., p. 30).3 have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
The following relevant questions may be asked: however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? become involved in litigation."
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman? another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
COMELEC Chairman. businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4 and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not obviously be too global to be workable."
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position. engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
CRUZ, J., dissenting: lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
hisviewpoint. pretensions.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
subject to our review. experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed. Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
Chairman of the Commission on Elections. there?
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I The professional life of the respondent follows:
must regretfully vote to grant the petition. 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: 1961 consist of the following:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a 1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. 2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations,
Unfortunately, this was not the result. Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in International Finance Corporation
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse Corporation
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. affiliated companies
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms — Member
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and companies:
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
specific requirement written into the Constitution. b. Dataprep, Philippines
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say d. Semirara Coal Corporation
that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. e. CBL Timber Corporation
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the Member of the Board of the Following:
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, e. Graphic Atelier
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active f. Manila Electric Company
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations? h. Philippine Electric Corporation
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten- Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
year period. participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. xxx xxx xxx
where such knowledge would be helpful. Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, xxx xxx xxx
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years." these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an
facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the
Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed
Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
cited. His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts,
an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a
the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, xxx xxx xxx
87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
frequently or customarily, to wit: prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
xxx xxx xxx to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In by it, to wit:
answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he 968).
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27,
books as far as real estate is concerned." p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
 xxx xxx xxx After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities met.
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]). boundaries."
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law with.
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
this Court to obey its mandate. knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law,
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
I vote to GRANT the petition. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
Bidin, J., dissent nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
Separate Opinions same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
NARVASA, J., concurring: than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition. for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur. supplied).
PADILLA, J., dissenting: It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole constitutes "practice of law." It states:
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from 1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
 exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
Kan, 864). qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his CRUZ, J., dissenting:
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of hisviewpoint.
legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action subject to our review.
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359) appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both possessed
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
(Martin supra) of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
ed., p. 30).3 Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
The following relevant questions may be asked: engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law? however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually? come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR become involved in litigation."
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman? The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
COMELEC Chairman. hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he
the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4 engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
pretensions. deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his year period.
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
Chairman of the Commission on Elections. there?
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I The professional life of the respondent follows:
must regretfully vote to grant the petition. 1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: 1961 consist of the following:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a 1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. 2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations,
Unfortunately, this was not the result. Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East,
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in International Finance Corporation
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse Corporation
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the 4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision. affiliated companies
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a 5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms — Member
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and companies:
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
specific requirement written into the Constitution. b. Dataprep, Philippines
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say d. Semirara Coal Corporation
that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. e. CBL Timber Corporation
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the Member of the Board of the Following:
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law. b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
 e. Graphic Atelier xxx xxx xxx
f. Manila Electric Company Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
h. Philippine Electric Corporation transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea."
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose.
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22) Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer. answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor books as far as real estate is concerned."
such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. xxx xxx xxx
where such knowledge would be helpful. Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like.
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, xxx xxx xxx
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert ... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law? another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly,
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years." these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows: properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an
facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the
Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed
Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
cited. His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or
constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts,
an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a
the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, xxx xxx xxx
87 N.E. 2d 773, 776) ... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
frequently or customarily, to wit:
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued
by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27,
p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may
not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than
this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT
CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.
 EN BANC on December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time
[ Adm. Case No. 559-SBC, January 31, 1984 ] that she had a relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to
see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child. However,
respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see him again,
CARMEN E. BACARRO, COMPLAINANT, VS. RUBEN M.PINATACAN, RESPONDENT. and once more respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until he
finished his law course and married a singer by the name of Annie Sarabillo.[6]
DECISION Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the birth certificate of
her child, numerous letters written by respondent covering the period from March 6, 1967 to
GUERRERO, J.: March 25, 1971 professing his everlasting love for complainant with assurances of his
sincerity and loyalty, a letter dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom
This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging complainant identified as the sister of respondent, and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with
Ruben M. Pinatacan, a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, said Margie Pinatacan.[7]
and lack of proper character required of a member of the Bar. In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977,[8] respondent argued that based on the
evidence adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had
In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty.
became engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; Victor Sevilla, agreed with respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that "the
that when she became pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her intimacy between the parties in this case is neither so corrupt or so immoral as to warrant
and never fulfilled his promise to marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a the respondent's permanent exclusion from the Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended
baby girl; that because of respondent's betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.[9]
suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among others that he
render him unfit to become a member of the Bar.[1] is willing to recognize and give support or financial assistance to complainant's child Maria
Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that complainant Rochie although he cannot make assurance that he could give such support or financial
had been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of assistance immediately since he is without a source of income.[10]
complainant's child. He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant submitted a
January of 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct sworn statement expressing her adamant stand that respondent "is unreliable,
commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He went to Manila and stayed there for the untrustworthy, and without a word of honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on
greater part of March, 1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro several occasions in the past he had made the same promise to support our child x x x, he
City, but in June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never did not even give something to the child to buy a candy during our several meetings x x x
again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand, as far as he knew, complainant when I tried to see him every now and then for the fulfillment of his promise." Moreover,
was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied that he according to complainant, respondent's insistence that the child be aborted proves his "utter
ever promised marriage to complainant and that he ever cohabited with her.[2] disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or unsuitable for the
On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was not motivated by revenge, for she was
report and recommendation.[3] Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request aware that whatever fortunes respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an
prompted by financial difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to present heir, but that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was of the
her evidence before the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.[4] Respondent failed to attend opinion that "respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the legal
the hearings conducted by the City Fiscal on August 30 and September 27, 1976 during profession."[11]
which complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary.[5] By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity
In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts: After and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and
about a year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while registered in the local civil registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and
they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first send the original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court within ten
sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and (10) days after notice hereof.[12] On October 19, 1979, respondent submitted proof of his
they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for about a week. They returned to Cagayan de compliance with the above Resolution.[13]
Oro and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears no
the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back in May, question that the complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several years, that
1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get married because of his parents' during the said period they have been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child
objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he told her to have an Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan is the result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent,
abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel. Thereafter, she did not see or hear however, maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the
from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan
circumstances of their relationship with each other do not justify his disqualification from the
practice of law.
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant
must be of good moral character.[14] This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high
moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this
end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to
be honest and to possess good moral character.[15] "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen." [16] He sets an
example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean
living.[17] Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing
the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass
upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar,
that he has measured up to that rigid and ideal standard of moral fitness required by his
chosen vocation.
In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs. Tan and Peredo vs. Tan[18] against successful
1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of
the requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan
had sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by
complainant Bitangcor.
As in the Tan cases, We hold herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high
moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into
physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and
brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion.
When complainant refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him
to help support their child born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to
see him, respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On
top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a
sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complainant.
These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are
indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of
being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment
and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and
acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has
undertaken to give financial support to the said child,[19] We hold that he has realized the
wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. Likewise, We
reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro[20] that "in offenses of this character, the
blame hardly belongs to the man alone."
In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission
to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance
with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath. SO
ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing
SUPREME COURT the administrative case in view of the latter's conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at
Manila the same time. The oral motion was denied.
SECOND DIVISION On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against petitioner.
At the said hearing Municipal Judge Saludares testified by more or less reiterating the
G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974 testimony he previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief from the order in Misc.
ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner, Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of title. The continuation of the
vs. hearing was set for April 26, 1968.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondent. On April 15, 1968, petitioner filed the present petition, and on April 17, 1968, this Court
Jose P. Arro for petitioner. gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. in his own behalf. petitioner's posting of a bond.
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own motion to hear and
ANTONIO, J.:p determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction
In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan challenges the authority of thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts of first instance have
of said court involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member of the such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court should
Philippine Bar. govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan, he was required We find petitioner's contentions without merit.
by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended 1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the
from the practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of
containing factual averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit: persons to engage in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as
2968 of this Court show that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a such he is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in which he exercises the
verified petition for issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the
Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon his
as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by acts of misconduct, that he
herein petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his right to continue in the
search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be found and is therefore enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him
now presumed to be lost," and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco, may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the Court of First
when you know very well that the owner's duplicate copy has always been Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.
in the custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable:
of Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
as a result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon. Vicente P. Bullecer, Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend
Presiding Judge of Branch IV, issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding
the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a new owner's duplicate section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312. profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two (72) hours from the SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance,
receipt hereof to explain why you shall not be removed or suspended from further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of
the practice of law. Appeals or the Court of First Instance forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967 Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the
denying the material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified
circumstances under which he prepared the aforementioned petition. copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the
Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge had his letter filed and facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension,
docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against petitioner, and, together with Adm. Case No. 58 or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
against Atty. Justo Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for hearing on January SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.— No attorney
24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968, petitioner questioned, among others, shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he
the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was one for disbarment, has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the subject against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by
 himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a reasonable notice, Sec. 9 of
answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides that as far as applicable, the procedure outlined by
parte. the preceding actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of complaints
These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25, respectively, of the Code of Civil against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance." Section 2 of Rule
Procedure, which read: 139, provides that the respondent lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is granted 10 days from
SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers.— Courts of First Instance may suspend a service of a copy of the complaint within which to file his answer. It is desirable, therefore,
lawyer from the further practice of his profession for any of the causes that a similar period should be granted by the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such lawyer before it, for the purpose of uniformity in procedure. We find, however, that in the case at
will not be privileged to practice his profession in any of the courts of the bar, petitioner not only failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him by the
Islands until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. court within which to answer the complaint, but actually was not substantially prejudiced
SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. — Upon such suspension the judge thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint within the period of 72 hours from receipt
of the Court of First Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith thereof.
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which provides that as far as may
and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the be applicable, the procedure for the investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints
receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall against lawyers referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and
make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First
or extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer permanently from the Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent Judge, should be the one to conduct the
roll as it shall find the facts to warrant. present investigation. Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of
SEC. 25. Hearing of charges.— No lawyer shall be removed from the roll or complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The
be suspended from the performance of his profession until he has had full investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to
opportunity to answer the charges against him, and to produce witnesses said office by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court
in his own behalf and to be heard by himself and counsel, if he so desires, of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said
upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable notice the accused fails to courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the
matter ex parte. lawyer. On the basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the statement of the
2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of Rule 138, the Supreme Court
in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. "shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private extending the suspension or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are warrant." In other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor General
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of would, therefore, be unnecessary.
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his WHEREFORE, the present person is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of issued by this Court is ordered dissolved, with costs against petitioner.
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the
proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own
officers.1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own
motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or the disbarment of an attorney, when from
information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so
conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the
proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good
character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general
public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice.
3. Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed or suspended from the
practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer
the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court).2
 Republic of the Philippines complainants' house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally caught by
SUPREME COURT surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case
Manila 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the
EN BANC case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was received by respondent
attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974 issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners, On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty.
vs. Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent. which they lost their right to appeal from said decision. The trial court that heard case 2723
found for a fact that respondent did not inform his clients of the decision rendered in case
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p 2478; however, it denied damages for lack of proof that the spouses Alcala suffered any
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, filed this damage as a result of respondent's failure to notify them of the aforesaid decision. The
present petition for disbarment against respondent Honesto de Vera, a practicing attorney of judgment in case 2723 was appealed to the Court of Appeals1 by respondent herein but the
Locsin, Albay, who was retained by them as their counsel in civil case 2478 of the Court of same was affirmed by said appellate court.
First Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala". Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this complaint for
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice: 1) for disbarment against their former counsel.
having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in civil case 2478 1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest" of respondent in the handling of complainants'
resulting in the deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse judgment rendered defense in civil case 2478.
against them; and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of interest in The basis of this particular charge is the alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present at the trial
petitioners' cause resulting to their damage and prejudice. of case 2478 certain documents which according to the complainants could have proven that
Respondent attorney, in his answer to these charges, asserted that he notified his clients of lot 1880 actually existed, to wit: a sketch of lot 1880 prepared by the vendee, Semenchuk,
the decision in question and that he defended complainants' case to the best of his ability as himself (Exh. L-Adm. Case); technical description of lot 1880 taken from complainants'
demanded by the circumstances and that he never showed indifference, lack of interest or certificate of title (Exh. M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of lot 1880 in relation to the adjoining
disloyalty to their cause. lots prepared by surveyor Miguel N. Romero (Exh. N-Adm Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report and by surveyor Romero for the preparation of the sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case) — all of
recommendation, substantially found the following: which documents were turned over by Jose Alcala to respondent before the trial of case
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of two parcels of land (lots Nos. 1880 2478.
and 1883 covered by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed by the vendee, Ray We agree with the Solicitor General that there is no merit to this particular charge.
Semenchuk, against the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the ground that lot 1880 "could not be The records of case 2478 show that upon agreement of the parties and their attorneys, the
located or did not exist", and for the recovery of damages and attorney's fees. trial court appointed a commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and after conducting such
Respondent attorney, whose legal services were engaged by complainants, filed an answer relocation, the commissioner reported to the Court that the lot existed, but that the same
denying the material allegations of the above-mentioned complaint and setting up a was in the possession of other persons. Inasmuch as the existence of lot 1880 had already
counterclaim for the balance of the purchase price of the lots sold, the expenses of notarials, been verified by the commissioner, it was therefore unnecessary for respondent attorney to
internal revenue, registration, etc. plus damages and attorney's fees. introduce in evidence Exhibits "L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of which was merely to
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered judgment rescinding the contract of sale, on the prove the existence of said lot. If the complaint for rescission prospered it was because of
ground that the vendee Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of lot 1880 it complainant Alcala's failure to comply with his obligation of transferring the material or
being in the possession of a certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers who have been physical possession of lot 1880 to the vendee and for no other reason; hence, complainants
occupying the land for a number of years. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads: had nobody to blame but themselves. The fact that the plaintiff, Semenchuk, was not
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that respondent attorney exerted
(a) Declaring the deed of sale (Exhibit A) rescinded; his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
(b) Directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants the possession of lot 2. Gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his clients
No. 1883. of the decision in case 2478: —
(c) Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 The matter in dispute with respect to this specific charge is whether or not respondent
after deducting the amount of P250.00 which is the consideration in the notified his clients, the complainants herein, about the decision in case 2478. Respondent
deed of sale of Lot No. 185; and claims that he did inform his clients of the decision; complainants insist the contrary.
(d) Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 11, rollo) We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on hand to prove that
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed to respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the decision in case 2478.
inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to
As stated in the Solicitor General's report, the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala when the applicable to the case. Consequently, the plaintiffs are
writ of execution in said civil case was served upon him and his wife by a sheriff was such not entitled to damages because of the failure of Atty.
that it betrayed a total unawareness of the adverse decision. The evidence shows that when Honesto de Vera to inform them of the decision.
he was told about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala immediately inquired from the trial Court the "An attorney is not bound to exercise
reason for the writ of execution and it was only then that he was informed that a decision extraordinary diligence, but only a
had been rendered, that his lawyer received a copy thereof since April 19, 1963, and reasonable degree of care and skill,
because no appeal was taken the judgment became final and executory. Alcala then sought having reference to the character of the
the help of his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila and the latter wrote to respondent business he undertakes to do. Fallible
inquiring as to what steps were taken, if any, to prosecute an appeal from the decision in like any other human being, he is
question but respondent chose not to answer the letter. Thereafter, Alcala instituted an answerable to every error or mistake,
action for damages and filed the instant complaint for disbarment. and will be protected as long as he acts
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General: honestly and in good faith to the best
Again, we do not think petitioner Alcala would have felt so aggrieved and of his skill and knowledge. Moreover, a
embittered by the loss of his right to appeal the decision in Civil Case No. party seeking damages resulting from a
2478 so as to take all these legal steps against respondent, with all the judgment adverse to him which became
attendant trouble and expense in doing so, if it is not true, as he alleged, final by reason of the alleged fault or
that the latter indeed did not notify him of said decision. We believe and so negligence of his lawyer must prove his
submit, therefore, that respondent really failed to inform petitioners of the loss due to the injustice of the decision.
decision in Civil Case No. 2478, and this was also the finding made by the He cannot base his action on the
Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No. 2723 for unsubstantiated and arbitrary
damages filed by petitioners against respondent, and by the Court of supposition of the injustice of the
Appeals in the appeal taken by respondent from said decision. (pp. 38- decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G.
39, rollo) 6480)."
Is respondent's failure to notify his clients of the decision sufficient cause for his disbarment? (Exh. "D", id.; pp. 33-34)
Complainants answer the question in the affirmative, while on the other hand, respondent Significantly, petitioners did not appeal from the above decision, which is
prays that he be exonerated because, according to him, granting arguendo that he failed to an implied acceptance by them of the correctness of the findings therein.
inform the complainants about the decision, the truth is that said decision was fair and just Instead, it was respondent Atty. De Vera who appealed said decision to the
and no damage was caused to complainants by reason thereof. Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R), and the latter Court, although
On this point, We agree with the following appraisal of the evidence by the Solicitor General: agreeing with the finding of the trial court that respondent really did not
In this connection, it is indeed true that although both the Court of First inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 (Exh. "T"),
Instance of Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed by petitioners affirmed, however, the lower court's finding that petitioners were not
against respondent Atty. De Vera (pp. 30-34, Exh. "D", id.), and the Court entitled to the damages claimed by them by reason of respondent's failure
of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R (the appeal taken by respondent to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. ... While the rule
from the decision of the trial court in C.C. No. 2723), found that of res judicata in civil or criminal cases is not, strictly speaking, applicable
respondent actually did not inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case in disbarment proceedings, which is neither a civil or a criminal proceeding
No. 2478, still both courts also held that petitioners did not sustain any intended to punish a lawyer or afford redress to private grievances but is a
damages as a result of said decision, for which reason the trial court proceeding sui generis intended to safeguard the administration of justice
dismissed petitioners' action for damages against respondent, which by removing from the legal profession a person who has proved himself
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We quote the finding of the unfit to exercise such trust (p. 207, Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics; Re
Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No. 2723 in this Keenan, 86 ALR 679; De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439,
regard: April 12, 1961; In re Montague & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), still we
The second issue that has to be passed upon by the consider the findings of the trial court as well as of the Court of Appeals in
Court is neither the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On the damage, suit filed by petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera
this issue, the Court finds that the plaintiffs cannot based on the same grounds now invoked in this disbarment case relevant
recover damages from defendant Atty. Honesto de Vera. and highly persuasive in this case, especially as petitioners themselves
No evidence has been presented that they sustained have, as already observed, accepted and admitted the correctness of said
damages of the decision. Neither it has been shown that findings. And we may add that we ourselves agree with respondent that
the decision is not supported by the facts and the law petitioners had not been prejudiced or damaged in any way by the decision
 in Civil Case No. 2478, but that said decision appears in fact to be more The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from
favorable to them than could have been the case if the trial court had him. On the other, it is extremely that the respectability of the bar should
applied the law strictly against them in said case, ... (pp. 17-19, Report. be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved.
pp. 39-41, rollo; emphasis supplied). For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to reside
The Solicitor General's Report continues and says: in the Court. This discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or and judgment; but it must be exercised. (Ex parte Burr. 9 Wheat 529;
pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify Martin, Legal & Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed. p. 213.)
them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. It is no less true, however, Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or suspension under the
that in failing to inform his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke from Us as we hereby
civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence as rebuke and censure him, considering that his failure to notify his clients of the decision in
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest expected of him
matters of professional employment" (7 C.J.S. 979). The relationship of under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for severe censure from the Court.
the client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being General, and the fact that this appears to be the first misconduct of respondent in the
defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired exercise of his legal profession, We hereby hold said respondent GUILTY only of simple
(Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case No. 595, July 30, 1971). As it happened negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants, and We hereby
in this case, because of respondent's failure to notify petitioners of the SEVERELY CENSURE him. Let this decision be noted in respondent's record — as a member
decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were entirely caught by surprise, of the Bar — in this Court.
resulting in shock and mental and emotional disturbance to them, when SO ORDERED.
the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home with a writ of execution of a
judgment that they never knew had been rendered in the case, since their
lawyer, the respondent, had totally failed to inform them about the same.
... (pp. 23-24, Report, pp. 45-46, rollo; emphasis supplied).
We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the correctness of the decision
in case 2478 is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge but at most will serve
only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to
cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of negligence, inattention, and
carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give timely notice of the decision in
question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not result in any material or
pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not disposed to
impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme penalty of
disbarment. As stated in the very early case of In Re Macdougall:
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is
rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable,
and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. This
purpose should be borne in mind in the exercise of disbarment, and the
power should be exercised with that caution which the serious
consequences of the action involves.
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It
is a lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal, and ability, the attorney
may have acquired a fixed means of support for himself and family of great
pecuniary value, and the deprivation of which would result in irreparable
injury. (3 Phil. 70, 77-78)
In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court:
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an
individual and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise.
 Republic of the Philippines SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the
SUPREME COURT peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
Manila or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
EN BANC In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983 of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, authorized member of the bar.
vs. Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a
Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents. friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners. Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.
The Solicitor General for respondents. On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of
the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either
Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, direction and control of the fiscal.
denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that xxx xxx xxx
appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the
scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to
bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the
the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney,
and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, in the prosecution of the offense.
would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo) And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that
then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila. in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant- Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to
Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On
that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can
aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-
Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the
judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
(People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner
on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his
respondent judge. right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqw⣠said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the
success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer. conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal
respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only
Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs.
order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët case.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be
controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides
that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal,
Separate Opinions while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
AQUINO, J., dissenting: I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned
business appearing in court. criminal cases. Orders set aside.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that Separate Opinions
purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining AQUINO, J., dissenting:
witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no
Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal business appearing in court.
case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may
Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
case. purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal
controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only
that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs.
while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. case.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979, Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned respect of criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be
criminal cases. Orders set aside. controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal,
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
Separate Opinions disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned
criminal cases.
AQUINO, J., dissenting: De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice Herrera.
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no
business appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
 Republic of the Philippines This Court is not without a guide in deciding whether or not an employer-employee relation
SUPREME COURT exists between the contending parties or whether or not the private respondent was hired on
Manila a retainer basis.
THIRD DIVISION As stated in the case of Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., (G.R. No. 80680, January 26,
G.R. No. L-62909 April 18, 1989 1989):
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not
vs. there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1)
LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the
COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent, mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of
G.E. Aragones & Associates for petitioner. dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the
The Solicitor General for public respondents. putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been
Cirilo A. Bravo for private respondent. held to be the decisive factor.
Aban was employed by the petitioner to be its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: appointment paper (Exhibit "A"). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus living allowance.
This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution of the National Labor Relations Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his alleged failure to perform his duties well. (Exhibit
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the labor arbiter's decision ordering herein petitioner, "B").
Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation to reinstate Rogelio A. Abanto his former position Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with legal matters involving the said
without loss of seniority rights, to pay him 12 months backwages in the amount of corporation and its employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing
P18,000.00 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,800.00. appointment papers of employees. This latter duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of
On October 24, 1978, petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal his profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the corporation.
Assistant." He received a basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of The above-mentioned facts show that the petitioner paid Aban's wages, exercised its power
P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban
On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he by defining the duties and functions of his work.
would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to Moreover, estoppel lies against the petitioner. It may no longer question the jurisdiction of
perform his duties well. the labor arbiter and NLRC .
On October 6, 1980, Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The petitioner presented documents (Exhibits "2" to "19") before the Labor Arbiter to prove
The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally dismissed. that Aban was a managerial employee. Now, it is disclaiming that Aban was ever its
This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. employee. The proper procedure was for the petitioner to prove its allegations that Aban
Hence, this present petition. drank heavily, violated company policies, spent company funds and properties for personal
The only issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not there was an employer-employee ends, and otherwise led the employer to lose trust and confidence in him. The real issue was
relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban. The petitioner questions the due process, not the specious argument raised in this petition.
jurisdiction of the public respondents considering the alleged absence of an employer- The new theory presented before this Court is a last-ditch effort by the petitioner to cover up
employee relationship. The petitioner contends that its relationship with Aban is that of a for the unwarranted dismissal of its employee. This Court frowns upon such delaying tactics.
client with his lawyer. It is its position that "(a) lawyer as long as he is acting as such, as The findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter being supported by substantial evidence are binding
long as he is performing acts constituting practice of law, can never be considered an on this Court. (See Industrial limber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
employee. His relationship with those to whom he renders services, as such lawyer, can 83616, January 20, 1989).
never be governed by the labor laws. For a lawyer to so argue is not only demeaning to Considering that the private respondent was illegally dismissed from his employment in
himself (sic), but also his profession and to his brothers in the profession." Thus, the 1980, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former or similar position without loss of seniority
petitioner argues that the labor arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over the instant case. rights, if it is still feasible, to backwages without qualification or deduction for three years,
The contention is without merit. (D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Pucan 159 SCRA 107 (1988); Flores v. Nuestro, G.R. No. 66890, April
A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation 15, 1988), and to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00. Should
or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as reinstatement prove no longer feasible, the petitioner will pay him separation pay in lieu of
its in-house counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and reinstatement. (City Trust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87; Santos v. NLRC, 154 SCRA
otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may also 166; Metro Drug v. NLRC, et al., 143 SCRA 132; Luzon Brokerage v. Luzon Labor Union, 7
contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of SCRA 116). The amount of such separation pay as may be provided by law or the collective
lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other bargaining agreement is to be computed based on the period from 24 October 1978 (date of
is not. A similar arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations first employment) to 4 October 1983 (three years after date of illegal dismissal). [Manila
practitioners, and other professionals. Midtown Commercial Corporation v. Nuwhrain 159 SCRA 212 (1988)].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioner is ordered to
reinstate the private respondent to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority
rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and
P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay
the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years
backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines revoke such permission, under such terms and conditions as will safeguard the best interests
SUPREME COURT of the service, in general, and the court, in particular.
Manila ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is adjudged guilty of a technical violation of
FIRST DIVISION Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is hereby reprimanded. He may however
A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975 apply, if he so desires, for permission to resume his business connection with the
RENE P. RAMOS, complainant, corporation, in the manner above indicated.
vs. Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
MOISES R. RADA, respondent. Teehankee, J., is on leave.

CASTRO, J.:
Moises R. Rada a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is
charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government:....
From the respondent Rada's letters of explanation and their annexes, dated December 16,
1973 and June 27, 1974, respectively, and the letter and its annexes, dated August 12,
1974, filed by the complainant Rene P. Ramos, by way of rejoinder to Rada's explanation,
undisputed fundamental facts emerge that justify us in dispensing with a full-blown
investigation of this administrative case.
The respondent Rada receives a monthly salary of P267.75. On December 15, 1972 he was
extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy
Tang, as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte
which were foreclosed by the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and discharged
his duties as administrator. The administrative complaint against Rada was filed with the
Department of Justice on October 3, 1973. He requested permission to accept the
appointment on October 27, 1973. It is not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of
the duties of the position of administrator has at all impaired his efficiency as messenger;
nor has it been shown that he did not observe regular office hours.
Indubitably, therefore, Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting government
employees from engaging directly in a private business, vocation or profession or being
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private
business connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government service. Thus, his
violation of the rule — the lack of prior permission is a technical one, and he should be
meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty, which is reprimand.
The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require that his entire
day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the Government. Such being his situation, it would be
to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to augment his income, and
to award a premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from engaging in or being
connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and without foreseeable
detriment to the Government service. His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation
need not be terminated, but he must secure a written permission from the Executive Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, who is hereby authorized to grant or
 Republic of the Philippines Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other
SUPREME COURT assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter,
Manila as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... .
EN BANC Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983 Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, 7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon
JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant, City Chapter also included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter
vs. for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent. 8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that
on January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein
ABAD SANTOS, J.: respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a
Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of
Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the Bar;
the following lame explanation: 9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the 1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for which the
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official
taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Receipt No. 3363, ... .
Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... 10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as
paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .
Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated
1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Bar of the Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good
Receipt No. 83740,... . Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Philippines, ....
Honorable Supreme Court, included the respondent as among those taking Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not
the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He
dated July 23, 1979, ... should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
for my turn to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec.
while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the 3(e), Rules of Court.)
Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this
Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the imprisonment.
taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. * SO ORDERED.
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a Plana, Escolin Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
member of the Bar; Aquino, J., is on leave.
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme
Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member
of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an
Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the
year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979
and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable
Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a
 Republic of the Philippines completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private
SUPREME COURT Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Manila Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due
EN BANC to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963 admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
vs. such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
BENGZON, C.J.: The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination
in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-
legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of
the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year
high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now,
asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says
he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby
showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take
the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
 Republic of the Philippines the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to
SUPREME COURT which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
Manila charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any,
EN BANC and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014 be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in
vs. public, under the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants; 3)
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4)
AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents. directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June
DECISION 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for
MENDOZA, J.: the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an independent body, During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice
which is considered as a constitutional innovation the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light on a
the first time that the Court is called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to
exercise of its constitutional mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues such Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice
as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the position of Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a
vis-à-vis the appointing power of the President, the period within which the same may be confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the
exercised, and the ban on midnight appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez government.
v. JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBC’s Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice
composition and membership. Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice Carpio
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice
being challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The heart of the debate lies not only on the Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned
very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
discretionary power. More significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself
of its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to the against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself
Highest Tribunal of the land. provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded
Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party respondent. the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive
The Facts should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s explanation
Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on March 6, on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights.
2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or Jardeleza then put into record a written statement6 expressing his views on the situation and
recommendation for the said vacated position. requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for
General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for
was included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist
May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC. of four (4) nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B.
received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC Daway with four (4) votes.7
member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online portal of
meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te,
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one
Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" (1) nominee could not be included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC
before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his rules.
integrity. In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letterpetition in view of the
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Court, in the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President, "without prejudice to
exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue."8 The said
resolution was accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet
Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the position taken by the investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
majority. His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the
The Petition verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against him) and as
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary
remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when
65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play
(TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court and the Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not
Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it dispense with the need to
Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in honor petitioner’s right to due process."10
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of
position. nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity requirement" provided under Section
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter- 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection
petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only on July 1, to an applicant’s integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of
2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking hostage the
scheduled for deliberation by the Court en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s
already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated action on interpretation of the rule would allow a situation where all thata member has to do to veto
his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate,
impressed withurgency, was discretionary. without need for factual basis.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to
hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides that a
his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a
violation, of its own rules. Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation majority of all members of the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that
of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against his Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a
integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his application, majority of the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate
resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of nominees. Justice.
Jardeleza’s Position D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the President’s
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the Court constitutional power to appoint.Jardeleza’s exclusion from the shortlist has unlawfully
hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardeleza’s arguments, as follows: narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process in the events from among four (4) nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position.
leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. When accusations This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a
against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair
him of the nature and cause thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the petitioner has the right to
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad.
process when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 Comment of the JBC
meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made known to him on the On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked
same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant favorable action by the Court. For the
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not on the accusations against him JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or
per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did quasijudicial functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to
the JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a pending case,12 Jardeleza
divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit: himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant issue against the JBC in the implementation of its policies.
on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive the In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a
testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among other things, show
applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is
evidence. no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used
be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender
to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the
One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be filled. As things now stand,
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be
process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, called restrained by a TRO or an injunctive suit.
Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of Comment of the Executive Secretary
JBC-009 due to a question on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)raised the
case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and his possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, particularly the imposition ofa
general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his
about the content of the impending objection against his application. On these occasions, position that the subject JBC rule impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially
Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives
refused to shed light on the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, rise to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant
which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so who may well have already obtained a majority vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a
that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the member who invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and
witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and in public. full participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone objector may then
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the JBC and the
member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the voting process. His request very purpose for which it was created— to shield the appointment process from political
for a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it
right. The JBC is not a fact-finding body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his
members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of the integrity. While other provisions of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant
accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are merely directory as to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule does not afford the same
shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the opportunity. In this case, Jardeleza’s allegations as to the events which transpired on June
veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of 30, 2014 obviously show that he was neither informed ofthe accusations against him nor
ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a given the chance to muster a defense thereto.
hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is
relies on his or her own appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants. held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be operative when the objector is
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be
applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of at least a rendered inconsequential. In the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should
majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains their
invoked because an applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the
when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist
of all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s submitted to the President.
vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he needed the votes of the five(5) Other pleadings
remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the JBC in
in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter,
included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental
rule" was considered applicable. Comment-Reply of the JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General. to the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the Integrity
Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all pleadings filed with the Court Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s Reply consisted only of his arguments against the JBC’s
were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply.
private interest while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-
he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the
personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the
Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all position of the JBC.14
public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President of the
and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled
defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary relationship with a complaint for disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of
sharedby a lawyer and his client. Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the essence and their only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC and were perceived to be act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.16
dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-docketed as a separate Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of
administrative case. compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s principal allegations in his petition merit
The Issues the exercise of this supervisory authority.
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the conclusion as to the others, the Court The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamuslies to
opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
of Section 2, Rule 10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants. performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the
raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to
effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question
possible unconstitutionality of the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not becompelled to do
approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which the something.
gaping wound presented to the Court suffers. C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
The issues for resolution are: Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does not exercise
I. judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorariis directed
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are
SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER). the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial
II function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009. hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion
II. of a judicial nature."18 It asserts that in the performance of its function of recommending
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions.
PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS Hence, the resort tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.
RAISED. In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC,
III. it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity in violation of his right
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For
NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT. said reason, the Court is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of
The Court’s Ruling review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case Article VIII.
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The may be established by law.
Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
Section 8. involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of
private sector. [Emphasis supplied] discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their functions.19
duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not
are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be overcome.
they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or II – Substantial Issues
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the
declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified Jardeleza’s case.
and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shieldedfrom The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that
the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his actuations in the handling of
importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified. a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas to show his lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of
clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence, integrity, probity and insider trading.26
independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section
years." Additionally, "it is not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza’s "inability to discharge the duties of his
the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy office" as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardeleza’s manner of representing the
Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and government in a legal dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially
uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria had to be invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she
established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required tobe a member
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the Chief Justice shared withthe other JBC members the
Likewise for the sake oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in details of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s position in a case and how
writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set inthe this could have been detrimental to the national interest.
determination of competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21"soundness of physical and In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim against Jardeleza’s
mental condition,22 and "integrity."23 integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof were only supplied to the
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s
JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s demand to make the accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise
good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound the fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its significant bearing
moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in on the country’s foreign relations and national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself
certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-governmental from delving into the details thereof in this disposition. The confidential nature of the
organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the document cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a
police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and discussion that may possibly affect the country’s position in a pending dispute.
receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original
the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardeleza’s integrity?
to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character."24 Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in and logical challenge against his moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases
imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant? where the main point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: of immoral or corrupt behavior?
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case The Court answers these questions in the negative.
where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was
or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act of disloyalty" committed by
the favorable consideration of his nomination. Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting rule was the "disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the
put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the
nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and
the preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a
essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution.
hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction
the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion on whatlegal
Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve
fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the
interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality,
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has held:
purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistentwith
to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices. rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified as a "question of integrity" members of the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
factthat there was no clear indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic
might have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different manner ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion
of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public
on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that Jardeleza’s acts were urged by in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31Besides, the President, who has the final say on public eye and community approbation.39
the conduct of the country’s advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in one’s
constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the country’s trust and interest. While this point does values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is a bold disregard
notentail that only the President may challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in
commonsensical to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. the Judiciary. This is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute
The records are bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
of the Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardeleza’s inclusion in the disputed shortlist. On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her securities market.40Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading,
participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts inthe throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades
determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not inthe market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information,
produced a patent demonstration of a connection betweenthe act complained of and his all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough
integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, of stock marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses
Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would eventuallyfeel more secure with
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, their money invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading
linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What of securities based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the
this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person toengage in
the original ground of its invocation. fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra- These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2,
marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time onlyduring the June 30, 2014 Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on integrity." Hence, the
meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded.
inclusion of these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might The Availability of Due Process in the
raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the Proceedings of the JBC
"immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the
transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the accusations, that
stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the is, "a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of
qualification of the applicants," it might as well be clarified.33 heeding his request for an opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the unspecified
JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues. allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary"
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion supra. Unlike the first ground nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010,
which centered onJardeleza’s stance on the tactical approach in pursuing the case for the Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of
government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid candidates within which any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with
relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in
deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to
ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010
affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidate’s right
which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is
hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not required by availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s
law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory
is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, the fulfillment of the duty of JBC torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its
for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented
Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making
discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against an unsound and capriciousassessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
totread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates
and judge. of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. soundness.
After a tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments, the Court concludes that the A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the
right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right. Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:
they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or innocence of the SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the
accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable
the President cannot be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant
commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established shall submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government
rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
discretion accorded to the JBC. Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet background check on the
applicant’s access tothe rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the
part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an
that due process is not demandable. applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council mayreceive the
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the
he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience and laudable citations. His goal applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing
is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible evidence.
step to verify an applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not
qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause sufficient to engender
of the roster from which the President appoints. belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion, however, does not discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is well-established in interview. [Emphases Supplied]
jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the
neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010,46 squarely applies to his case. Entitled asa
conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.44 Hence, in the exercise of its "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-010 recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates
members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder consideration. For this purpose, it
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of
disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in alphabetical order.
is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may
profession evoke. be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible 010, per se, provide that: any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with
copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the qualifications of the the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing,
candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the
Judicial and Bar Council, as well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it. candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him; the candidate shall have five
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition,
against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file if he so desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition
his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires. against him.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of
session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates and the complaint or statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers "any" complaint or opposition;
opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very
investigation of the background of the candidates. essence of due process. While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right
the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for its further consideration. to answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the process.
interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It Application to Jardeleza’s Case
shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether
Council. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events leading up to, and during,
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the dateand place the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
of the interview. The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact that Jardeleza was asked to
members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among other things, the attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him.
candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like
session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates which shall be sent to the to propound questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in
Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. handling an international arbitration case not compatible with public interest;48 2] reports on
[Emphases supplied] his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause"
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule order from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use of the word As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not
"may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he manifested that his statement be put
discretionary on the part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court
of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth en banc. When Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear
or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was precisely
hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be heard per
it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must be given the opportunity to respond to the
mandatory, however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and
in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross- translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said
examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After
recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be
an application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process
due process is a part of JBC’s discretion when an opposition to an application is made of required for the voting to proceed.
record. While it may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances, testimonials, After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the
and discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications, the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right
Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the application of a to due process.
fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain himself. all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the grave import of the right of the himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC- JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these
circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the 1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of
Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the government.
treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or 2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within
opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten (10) days from the the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have warranted the
publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its
conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only application.
applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the 3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts,
fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nomineesto the President. The
procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to
desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda disregard the due process under JBC-010.
then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite 4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC
Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was
person would shed light on the matter. provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included
notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the JBC not take into in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad.
account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
Council empowered to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of
It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity rule" as it
the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the
Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the
consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested
the allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be informed and to explain himself would the minimum requirements of due process.
have been satisfied. In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current
the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this,
to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to guarantee that the
would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds the
that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the
during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into
discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against Jardeleza’s
affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the
in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in
person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able
Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise. to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of
to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same with Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the
vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide President. Need to Revisit JBC’s
his aspiration to become a magistrate of this Court. Internal Rules
Consequences In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed and
Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza may be revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and,
included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is therefore, can be misused or abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to
about to end. due process.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points: Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over
the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a member
aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the
collective votes of the other members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an
oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority
vote ofthe Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it
refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other things.
Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the
members as to its precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague,
nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should
it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive Secretary or also
by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial
type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an applicant
should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him
or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its
function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair, reasonable,
unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his
appointment as a member of the Court.1âwphi1 In deference to the Constitution and his
wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of
a candidate's worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor
General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the
President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate
Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules
relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-
010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 signature.
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al.
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin
Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of averred that this Court held that “when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
the Code of Professional Responsibility(CPR). charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.”11 During the
The facts are culled from the pleadings. mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed
by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. disbarment. She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any
Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance. unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating 1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for
purposes”. The GIS4identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
President. stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither
was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not
Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated
President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the
nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never company. The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts
taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI. and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014
comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made
and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule
the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a
Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to disciplinary action against the lawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the
strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has
performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath.”21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP
that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is
therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the
GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also
contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein.
That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential:
he never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would
support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS
that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform
to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document
we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the
practice of law.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary