Solicitor General; v MMA, 204 SCRA 837 (1991)

FACTS:

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court
held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605
and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the
decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces
continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Director
General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the
removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand,
argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the
confiscation of driver's licenses

Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution
requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in
light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32
(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-
making powers.). It also argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance
because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the
decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law
or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted

The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining
the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
the LGC

RULING:No.
SC discussed the ff: SC held that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites
are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient
standard.

But the problem is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. But rather validity of
the exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts the SC apply the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the
Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions In fact, such provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties
as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates
directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.
Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the
case at bar, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against
the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

Moreover, the measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse,
impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the
ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
SC then emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and
shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses
that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for —
and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against — the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to
the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.