Probation - Decided Cases

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014

ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P.
MATIAS, and ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by Enrique Almero y
Alcantara from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008 and Resolution
dated 29 May 2009 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103030.1

THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a
separate action for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.

Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of
his conviction only upon being served the warrant for his arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed
his application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had
even neglected to inform the court of his change of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied
his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a
Supplemental Petition,3 which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007
judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P.
Matias and Antonio P. Matias.

THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012

In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that the
judgment itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of
Exhibits.4 The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment
without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his
case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court. Without addressing the issue of probation, the dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his behalf to
release immediately petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA from detention by virtue of the
property bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause or causes.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.5

THE CA RULING

The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no
appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available against
the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court
erred in taking cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because
an application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and
effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at
the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his
change of address.6

On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent the State in a
criminal case, the CA held that petitioner himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the
RTC. The CA also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7 September 2007,
or more than one month after he received notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the
grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered
grave abuse, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s appealed January 28, 2008 Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of
appellee’s petition for certiorari.7

Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that private complainants have
personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC.

II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction.

III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation.8

OUR RULING

The Petition lacks merit.

Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and that
private complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application
for probation purportedly did not involve the civil aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late Francisco
Abueg v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA allegedly cannot apply, since it does not even discuss the
right of private complainants to interpose an appeal.

In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterated that what petitioner filed
with the RTC was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an
appeal in a criminal case over which only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action
from which private persons can appeal in the event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in
their Comment,10 argued that the CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present
case. In Abueg, the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property for crashing against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the
accused applied for probation. After the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court
entertained and acted upon the petition for certiorari filed by the victims’ heirs.11

We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated from a
criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself
impleaded private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of
private respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not
initiate. In any case, this Court has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with
sufficient personality if the facts show that the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
if the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.

In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled:

While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case,
private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father.14 (Citations omitted.)

Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal cases have sufficient
personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules, to
wit:

Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by
petitioner judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and
2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court
in order to promote their object, as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we held,
overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended party to
file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband.15

Petitioner’s second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of the nature of
probation and shall be discussed jointly.

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State,
and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.16

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and
save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch"
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.17

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was
amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if
the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the
probation only if the accused fails in his bid.19

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment,
or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.20 While he did not
file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a
petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D.
No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken
by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during
the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath,
he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any
procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the
filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed
by petitioner to the RTC, we concur with the findings of the CA:

(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying appellee’s
application for probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the January 8, 2007
decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had no
one but himself to blame for the procedural quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In denying
appellee’s motion for reconsideration of the September 18, 2007 denial of the application for
probation, public respondent distinctly ruled as follows:

x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He1âwphi1

blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address
but Atty. Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal
offer of evidence since all notices sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this
court since 2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned
with notations ‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?21
This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the negligence
and evasiveness of the parties themselves.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May
2009 are hereby AFFIRMED, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified
and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D.
Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question
of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and
the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.)
concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed
judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal
liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from
slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of
homicide.3

Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto
Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial
was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run,"
which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by
two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected
the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
1avv phi 1

overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,

De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
 3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that
the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right
within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the
original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the
prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial
trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the
delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson
et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure
(animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed
the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have
been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the
act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation
rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates
and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may
also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al.
should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed
to his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v.
Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as
their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering
their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to
slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a
result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them
closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on
various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise
known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and,
upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications
for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-
G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived
their right to appeal and applied for probation.

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies

III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
them DISCUSSION

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our
Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of
Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right
against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and
found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case
and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments
raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for
Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born
of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs
done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code
expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent
to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised
Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus,
it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary
that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to
action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

xxxx

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.

xxxx

In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of
the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.

xxxx

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or
avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with
the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be
applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the
accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has
carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the
one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it
has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by
a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the
discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon
and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

filed by Tecson et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al.
vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.

In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty
of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of
the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no
longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the
CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an
appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation, viz:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused,

be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases
supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy
if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is
worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying
reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the
exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or
where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is
on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to
act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan
may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for
the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil
action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is
whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is
nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-
evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.

In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before
the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment
therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case
before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a
particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce
a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al.
before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case.
The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.
Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide
was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in
his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from
hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to
the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to
choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the
Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation
proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted
the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal
action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed
insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment
the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the
appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case
before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot
be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue
of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense
charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a
withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA,
a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which
shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of
origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the
court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the
case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA
settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or
almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the
probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with
the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a
Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents
to file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the
CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,
place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law
oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately
admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate
and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self
respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by
all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government
of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this
end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
within them. (Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It points
out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made
themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the
Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within
the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of
eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only
became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1
year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.

In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that
Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its
various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere
reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and
Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted
by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to
slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence
fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so
gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC
Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from
their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
(Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as
a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against
them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of
the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

2. By service of the sentence.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

4. By absolute pardon.

5. By prescription of the crime.

6. By prescription of the penalty.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is
as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits
that technically do not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the
execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out
in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of
the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the
nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for
his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.

In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is
concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand
settled the following once and for all:69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the
trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is
a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.

xxxx

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

xxxx

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

xxxx

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC
doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got
was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
1âw phi1

probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al.,
we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted
of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.

While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms
and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom.
Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their
antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.

Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of
the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any
of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the
interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum.

As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than
that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day,"
which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In
this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal
penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory

penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25
and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the
ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a
court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct
sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as
setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole
and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its
medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to
the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within
the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and
Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional
automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional—
Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension
from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen
months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL;
that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with
law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of
the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the
exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that
office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if
expressly remitted in a pardon.85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation,
shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation
suspends the execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant
of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted
from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does
not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and
154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the
finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby
ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments
issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for
probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to
their remaining civil liability, if any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February
2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first
paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008

MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 14,
2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael
Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 20043 and July 28, 20044 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs.7 The
Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed
as follows:

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years
old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-
buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was
found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.8

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.9

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel manifested that his
client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits
granted to first-time offenders under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed
no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the former plea of
Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence,
in a Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec.
5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore,
sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine
pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.14

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a
minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70
of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws.

The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to
conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from
receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said
petition within five days from receipt of the order.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any
person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The
court ruled thus:

Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y
Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the
Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y
Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of
sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in
this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y
Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A.
9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with
Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is
of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of
violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:

"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended." (underlining supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l
should be, as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.20

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the
Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.21

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this petition where he raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF

THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A
MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
[THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER

RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND OTHER PURPOSES.22

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its
Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that

I.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section 24, Article II of
R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
 II.

Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law" has no application to the instant case.24

Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition for
certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right
under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does
Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law" have application in this case?

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for
certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.27

"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of
jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave
abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.28

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that the RTC neither
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and
adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua’s petition for probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by
the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree
No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.31
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24
of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of
drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to
drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law
considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers
as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified
from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given
the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the
intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and
pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.35

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of
drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a
penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under
Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs
shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application
in this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain
to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a
child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years
of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could
no longer be considered a child39 for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of
Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice