SUMULONG vs. COMELEC 73 P.R.

288, 1942

Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political
parties and persons named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right to propose the appointment of such inspectors.
He contends that the resolution of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each of the
precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one,
and only one inspector for each precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner
maintains that the discretion given by Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that
the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits
of the discretion granted to it by law.

Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly, and
honest elections. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The
Comelec because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution requires that the power of the
Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN

G.R. No. 133676

April 14, 1999

FACTS:

Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the
Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the
automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine.
After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They
found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to
read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among
those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed
how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while
the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).

Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had
the wrong sequence code.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in
the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next
day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998,
the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the
counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC
resolutions.

2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual
count. (The main issue in the case at bar)

2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?

2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?

2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?

3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

HELD:

the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in
issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire
nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations
to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.

(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1),
Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly
the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines.
They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate

In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We
hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a
literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an
election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.

It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC
had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes

(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the
manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots
and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.

3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and
will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now
discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their
assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.

The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.

Akbayan v. Comelec

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters
registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged
that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that
no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in
the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be
conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere
statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-
election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the
other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and
distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost
more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached
any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also,
AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to
the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
 Kabataan Party list v. COMELEC (2015)

TOPIC: Biometrics validation

FACTS: RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent,
and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May
2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.”

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration
records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated. Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the
Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his
vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to
facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before
the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it
only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they
could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that: System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods
stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to
conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative
necessities and other exigencies.