DOCTRINE IN OWNERSHIP OF LANDS-

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Director of Lands vs. IAC

219 SCRA 339

Under the Regalian doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
state.

Oh cho vs. Director of Lands

75 Phil. 890 [1946]

The standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by
purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since the time of immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before
the Spanish conquest.

Cruz vs. Secretary

G.R. No. 135385
Dec. 6, 2005

Nature of Possession by Natives

Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of lands in public domain. The right of the native does not include natural resources,
what is given is priority rights, not exclusive rights. State not preclude from into agreements with private entities.

De Ocampo vs. Arlos

G.R. No. 135527
October 19, 2000

Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain may be judicially confirmed.
Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights.
Lee Hong Hok vs. David
150-C Phil. 542 [1972]

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from the state.

Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos

Jan 23, 2006

Alienable land of public domain is limited to agricultural land. Homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes.

Jacinto vs. Director of Lands

49 Phil. 853

Friar lands under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120). They are intended to be sold to actual settlers and occupants.

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Inc. vs. Judge Bercilles

66 SCRA 481

The City Council of Cebu, through resulting in its transformation into a patrimonial property. The charter of City of Cebu (R.A. 3857)
had authorized the City Council to close any road and street, etc. and allowing the City to use the withdrawn property from public use,
for any other lawful purpose.

See: Article 422, 423, 424, 426 of the Civil Code

KRIVENKO DOCTRINE

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

44 Off. Gaz. 471

Aliens have no right to acquire any public or private land or private agricultural, commercial, or residential lands (except by hereditary
succession).
EXCEPTION TO KREVINKO DOCTRINE

Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals

239 SCRA 341

Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private land or to lands of the public domain, except by way of legal succession as general
rule.

But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen?

If the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

De Castro vs. Tan

A residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot
was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled
to recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally
qualified to own land.

RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO WHO HAVE LOST THEIR

CITIZENSHIP TO ACQUIRE LANDS

Under R.A. 8179, former natural-born Filipino citizens may acquire land under this following:

1.) 5,000 sq. m. - Urban Lands

2.) 3,000 sq. m. - Agricultural Lands

For business or other purposes

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195097 August 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARLON MEDIDA, Respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,J.,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to assail the Decision1 dated
December 16, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870, entitled Marlon Medida, Petitioner-appellee, v. Republic
of the Philippines, Oppositor-appellant.
On October 22, 2004, herein respondent Marlon Medida (Medida) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Argao, Cebu a petition for
registration of title over two parcels of land situated in Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu, identified as Lot Nos. 817 and 597 of Boljoon Cad.
1049-D and measuring 5,972 and 533 square meters, respectively. The petition was docketed as LRA Case No. AL-31 and raffled to
Branch 26 of the RTC, Argao, Cebu.
The initial hearing on the petition was conducted on September 22, 2005, with the attendance of the public prosecutor. The RTC
delegated the reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court. Before the court, Medida testified that he purchased the subject properties in
February 1997 from one Eufemia Romero (Romero), who had previously obtained the lots from Nabor Derama (Derama). At the time
of the lots’ purchase by Medida, the properties were covered by Tax Declaration No. 08774 under the name of Romero. Medida started
occupying the properties in 1997, and had since then declared the properties for tax purposes under his name. 2
Also among the witnesses presented during the proceedings a quo were Asuncion Derama Binagatan (Binagatan) and Engineer
Rafaela A. Belleza (Engr. Belleza).
Binagatan, daughter of Derama, testified that her father had inherited the subject properties from his uncle, one Florencio Villareal,
who possessed the lots even prior to the Second World War. She presented the old Tax Declaration No. 08590 under the name of her
father and covering the subject properties.3
Engr. Belleza, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Land Management Services – Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region VII, testified that the lots’ survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Jose V. Dumaguing (Engr. Dumaguing)
was approved by their office. Per the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 8174 and 5975 identified by Engr. Belleza, the subject
properties had already been declared alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.
On June 21, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of Medida via a Decision6 with dispositive portion that reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petitioner to have sufficient title proper for registration, the petition is hereby GRANTED and judgment is
hereby rendered confirming the title of petitioner Marlon D. Medida, married to Patricia F. Medida, over the following parcels of land:
1. A parcel of land, Lot 817, Cad. 1049-D, under AP-07-003683, situated in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Boljoon, Province of
Cebu, containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO (5,972) SQUARE METERS; and
2. A parcel of land, Lot 597, Cad. 1049-D, under AP 07-003653, situated in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Boljoon, Province of
Cebu, containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE (533) SQUARE METERS.
IT IS SO DECIDED.7
Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal before
the CA based on a lone assignment of error, to wit:
The trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for registration because the subject lands were not occupied and possessed for the
period required by law.8
In support of its appeal, the OSG argued that it was only from the subject lands’ date of alienability and disposability that the reckoning
of the thirty (30)-year statutory requirement of possession should begin. Based on the Advance Survey Plans submitted by the
respondent, Lot Nos. 817 and 597 were declared alienable and disposable in 1987 and 1980, respectively.9 The OSG then argued that
Medida’s possession of the properties prior to 1987 and 1980, as the case may be, should not be credited as part of the period of
possession required from him as an applicant for land registration.
On December 16, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision10 dismissing the appeal. It ruled that the doctrine invoked by the OSG
had been abandoned by recent jurisprudence. The appellate court emphasized that the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, now merely requires the
property for registration to be already declared alienable and disposable at the time that the application for registration of title is filed in
court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated June 21, 2006, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Laoang Northern Argao, Cebu, in LRA Case No. AL-31 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The Republic invokes in its petition a lone ground, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS WITHOUT BASIS.12
Citing jurisprudence on the matter, the Republic argues that the alienable and disposable character of the subject parcels of land has
not been sufficiently proved by the mere presentation of the surveyor’s notations on the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and
597. Petitioner Republic claims that such requirement must be established by the existence of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute.
In his Comment,13 Medida maintains that he has sufficiently proved that the subject properties have been declared alienable and
disposable. To further support this assertion, he submitted with his Comment the following certifications issued by the DENR-
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Argao, Cebu: (1) the Certification 14 dated June 22, 2011 which
states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 817, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 5,972
square meters is within the alienable and disposable area, Proj. No. 59-A, L.C. Map No. 3280, certified on August 6, 1987, as verified
by actual ground verification; and (2) the Certification15 dated July 5, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No.
597, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1 located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 533 square meters is within the alienable and disposable
area, Proj. No. 59 L.C. Map No. 2876, certified on January 11, 1980, as verified by actual ground verification.
Medida also seeks the petition’s denial on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which is not allowed in petitions for review under
Rule 45. Medida further argues that the OSG is bound conclusively by its declaration before the CA that the subject parcels of land
have been declared alienable and disposable.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the main issue for this Court’s resolution is:

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the parcels of land subject of the application for registration are part of the alienable
and disposable portions of the public domain.

The petition is meritorious.

First, we address Medida’s argument that the present petition raises a question of fact which is beyond the coverage of a petition for
review on certiorari. The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a "question of law" when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.16
Judging by the arguments that are raised by the OSG in its petition, the issue delves on the alleged insufficiency of the documents
presented by the respondent to support the CA’s conclusion that the subject parcels of land have been validly declared alienable and
disposable. In Republic v. Ve g a,17 we explained that when a petitioner seeks the review of a lower court’s ruling based on the evidence
presented, without delving into their probative value but only on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question
of law is raised. We explained:
The Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made
by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented.
When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their
probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
xxxx
Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence presented, x x x. It, however,
questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's conclusion that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and
the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject land?
Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of
facts.18 (Emphasis ours)
The issue in the present petition has been limited by the Republic, as it merely concerns the merit of notations in survey plans to prove
that the properties sought to be registered have been declared alienable and disposable. Similar to the Vega case, the contest rests
on the matter of sufficiency of evidence, an issue on a conclusion that was made by the appellate court without necessarily raising an
attack on the authenticity of the documents that were presented in the proceedings before the RTC. The issue being invoked by the
Republic to support its petition is then a question of law, a matter that is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

We now resolve the petition’s substantial issue. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.19
On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable, the respondent argues that the Advance
Survey Plans20 that were prepared by Engr. Dumaguing and approved by the DENR-Land Management Bureau, providing notations
that the lots indicated therein are within the alienable and disposable properties of the State, should suffice. We disagree.
As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable by
establishing the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.21 In a line of cases, we have ruled that mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties’ alienable and disposable character. Our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation22 is particularly
instructive:

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required
by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government
that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified
by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the
said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a
certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and
disposable.23 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us, Medida attempts to remedy the deficiency in
his application by submitting the Certifications24 of the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his Comment to further substantiate his
claim that the subject properties were already declared alienable and disposable. Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO
Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,25 this Court explained that a Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
CENRO certification, by itself, fails to prove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land. We ruled:
It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.26 (Emphasis ours)
We further explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy
x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the
land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person,
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated
in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook.
The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a
government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents. x x x.27 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO
Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
 custodian of the official records.28 Medida failed in this respect. The records only include CENRO Certifications on the subject
properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true copy by its legal custodian.
Furthermore, even the CENRO Certifications filed before this Court deserve scant consideration since these were not presented during
the trial. The genuineness and due execution of these documents had not been duly proven in the manner required by law.29
In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject parcels of land had been classified as part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, his application for registration of title should be denied.
There is even no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the Republic is bound by an alleged judicial admission on the subject properties’
alienability and disposability, when the latter included the following statement in its Brief 30 filed before the CA:
The Advance Survey Plan clearly shows that the Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 597, albeit alienable and disposable land, were declared
only as such in 1987 and 1980, respectively.31 (Citation omitted)
Said statement cannot be construed as an admission on the alienable and disposable character of the subject properties, as the
Republic merely cited the contents of the Advance Survey Plans to lay its basis in saying that Medida had not satisfied the required
number of years of possession. Furthermore, the afore-quoted statement should not be interpreted in isolation or taken out of context,
as the statements prior to the alleged judicial admission in fact provide:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conversion of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, anyone who applies for registration of ownership over
a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Such burden was not discharged in the present case. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
This Court also holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that can be established by mere
admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our
Constitution,33 no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the
State is duly protected by the proper observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 01870 is hereby SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by Marlon Medida is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

2. Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there
was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources – somehow against
the regalian doctrine.

3. Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, 3 September 2013

♦ Resolution, Bersamin, [J]

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we
upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig,
Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic
v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not
be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved
is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the
reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack
of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private
property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more
than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it
into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they
argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly
transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession
of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration
laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms
part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless
they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify
public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing
the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or
reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be
disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires
possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land
Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in
relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified
as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public
domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12,
1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June
12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be
respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other
legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of
the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire
lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration
is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete
title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation
of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned
by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason
of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective
still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run
against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public
Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only
to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant
becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of
the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been
already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
I submitted my vote joining the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice In the Result: See Separate Opinion
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERLATA
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
See separate concurring and dissenting opinion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may
be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.

Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. 21 Id.

22 See Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., pp. 1188-1189.

23 Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to
private persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)
24 Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 608-609.

25 Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69, 75.

26 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689, 692.

27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 190, 201.

28 Section 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

29 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 518. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee
in Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813.

30 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 521.

31 Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925); Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v.
Navarro, No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109, 115.

32 x x x WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to unregistered lands including alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and incomplete titles thereto by reason of their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation and cultivation thereof under bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for a number of years prescribed by
law; x x x (Presidential Decree 1073)

33 An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands (Approved on March 9, 2010).

34 Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for titling from 30 years to 10 years of untitled public alienable and disposable lands which have been
zoned as residential; and enables the applicant to apply with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources having jurisdiction over the parcel subject of the application, provided the land subject of the application should not exceed 200 square meters if
it is in a highly urbanized city, 500 meters in other cities, 750 meters in first-class and second-class municipalities, and 1,000 meters in third-class municipalities.
35 Section 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:

xxxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

36 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75042, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 165, 174.

37 Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, supra,

ELMER AT RANDOM
Anything from mundane to ethereal; from puerile to polemical.

Sunday, May 24, 2009

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property
that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3
December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled
to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription,
a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

4. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 207942 January 12, 2015

YINLU BICOL MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
TRANS-ASIA OIL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing prior to November 15, 1935 are vested rights that cannot be impaired.

Antecedents

This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and
mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMI's portion (known as the PIMI Larap Mines) was sold in a
foreclosure sale to the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BD0).1

In 1976, the Gold Mining Development Project Team, Mining Technology Division, The Mining Group of the Bureau of Mines prepared a so-called Technical Feasibility
Study on the Possible Re-Opening of the CPMI Project of PIM (Mining Aspect) and the Exploration Program (Uranium Project) at Larap, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, which discussed in detail, among others, an evaluation of the ore reserve and a plan of operation to restore the mine to normal commercial mining production
and budgetary estimate should the Bureau of Mines take over and run the PIMI Larap Mines. The Government then opened the area for exploration. In November
1978, the Benguet Corporation-Getty Oil Consortium began exploration for uranium under an Exploration Permit of the area, but withdrew in 1982 after four years
of sustained and earnest exploration.2

Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with
Philex Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)3 over the
area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in 1999, was
granted on July28, 2007 under MPSA No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the mineral deposits in the
portion of the mineral lands.4

On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a
deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were within the areas of Trans-Asia’s MPSA. Based on the documents submitted by Yinlu,
four of the six transfer certificates of title (TCTs) it held covered four mining claims under Patent Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser, Superior,
Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The areas covered occupied more than half of the MPSA area of Trans-Asia.5

On September 14, 2007, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu by letter that it would commence exploration works in Yinlu’s areas pursuant to the MPSA, and requested Yinlu
to allow its personnel to access the areas for the works to be undertaken. On September 23, 2007, Yinlu replied that Trans-Asia could proceed with its exploration
works on its own private property in the Calambayungan area, not in the areas covered by its (Yinlu) mining patents.6 This response of Yinlu compelled Trans-Asia
to seek the assistance of the MGB Regional Office V in resolving the issues between the parties. It was at that point that Trans-Asia learned that the registration of
its MPSA had been put on hold because of Yinlu’s request to register the deed of absolute sale in its favor.7
The matter was ultimately referred to the DENR Secretary, who directed the MGB Regional Office V toverify the validity of the mining patents of Yinlu. On November
29, 2007, the MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the DENR Secretary that there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of
Yinlu. Accordingly, the parties were required to submit their respective position papers.8

The issues presented for consideration and resolution by the DENR Secretary were: (1) whether the mining patents held by Yinlu were issued prior to the grant of
the MPSA; and (2) whether the mining patents were still valid and subsisting.9

On May 21, 2009, DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr. issued his order resolving the issues in Yinlu’s favor,10 finding that the mining patents had been issued to
PIMI in 1930 asevidenced by and indicated in PIMI’s certificates of title submitted by Yinlu; and that the patents were validly transferred to and were now owned by
Yinlu.11 He rejected Trans-Asia’s argument that Yinlu’s patents had no effect and were deemed abandoned because Yinlu had failed to register them pursuant to
Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended. He declared that the DENR did not issue any specific order cancelling suchpatents. He refuted Trans-
Asia’s contention that there was a continuing requirement under the Philippine Bill of 1902 for the mining patent holder to undertake improvements in order to have
the patents subsist, and that Yinlu failed to perform its obligation to register and to undertake the improvement, observing that the requirement was not an absolute
imposition. He noted that the suspension of PIMI’s operation in 1974 due tofinancial losses and the foreclosure of its mortgaged properties by the creditor banks
(MBC/PCIB) constituted force majeure that justified PIMI’s failure in 1974 to comply with the registration requirement under P.D. No. 463; that the Philippine Bill of
1902, which was the basis for issuing the patents, allowed the private ownership of minerals, rendering the minerals covered by the patents to be segregated from
the public domain and be considered private property; and that the Regalian doctrine, under which the State owned all natural resources, was adopted only by the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.12

Consequently, DENR Secretary Atienza, Jr. ordered the amendment of Trans-Asia’s MPSA by excluding there from the mineral lands covered by Yinlu’s mining
patents, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No. 252-2007-V is hereby ordered amended, to excise there from the areas covered
by the mining patents of Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation as described and defined in the Transfer Certificates of Title concerned: Provided, That the consequent
conduct of mining operations in the said mining patents shall be undertaken in accordance with all the pertinent requirements of Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, and its implementing rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.13

Trans-Asia moved for reconsideration,14 but the DENR Secretary denied the motion on November 27, 2009,holding in its resolution that the arguments raised by
the motion only rehashed matters already decided.15

Trans-Asia appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

On May 4, 2010, the OP rendered its decision in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638 affirming in totothe assailed order and resolution of the DENR Secretary,16 to wit:
The first contention of appellee is untenable. It is conceded that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree,
prescribed requirements for the registration of all mining patents with the Director of Mines within a certain period, among others. The existence of the mining claims
were in fact registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Camarines Norte prior to the issuance of PD 463, as found in the 4 TCT’s issued to PIMI that
were foreclosed by MBC, and eventually purchased by appellee through an Absolute Deed of Sale. The existence of the mining patents, therefore, subsists. Under
the Philippine Constitution, there is an absolute prohibition against alienation of natural resources. Mining locations may only be subject to concession or lease. The
only exception is where a location of a mining claim was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the government under the 1935 Constitution was inaugurated,
and according to the laws existing at that time a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain, and the locator is entitled to a grant of
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore (Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259). The right of the locator to the
mining patent is a vested right, and the Constitution recognizes such right as an exception to the prohibition against alienation of natural resources. The right of the
appellee as the beneficial owner of the subject mining patents in this case, therefore, is superior to the claims of appellant. The existence of the TCT’s in the name
of appellee further bolsters the existence of the mining patents. Under PD 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, once a title is cleared of all claims
or where none exists, the ownership over the real property covered by the Torrens title becomes conclusive and indefeasible even as against the government.
Noteworthy is the fact that the title trace backs of the said TCTs show that the titles were executed infavour of the appellee’s predecessors-in-interest pursuant to
Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act of 1902, in relation to the Philippine Bill of 1902, which govern the registration of mineral patents.

xxxx

After a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Office agrees with the DENR, as the assailed decisions are in accord with facts,
law and jurisprudence relevant to the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Order and Resolution of the DENR dated May 21, 2009 and November 27, 2009, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.17

Trans-Asia filed a first and a second motion for reconsideration.

Trans-Asia stated in its first motion for reconsideration that the OP erred: (1) in resurrecting Yinlu’s mining patents despite failure to comply with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 463; (2) in holding that Yinlu’s predecessors-in-interest had continued to assert their rights to the mining patents; and (3) in not holding that
the mining patent had been abandoned due to laches. The OP denied the first motion through the resolution dated June 29, 2010,18 emphasizing that there was no
cogent reason to disturb the decision because the grounds were mere reiterations of arguments already passed upon and resolved.

Nothing daunted, Trans-Asia presented its second motion for reconsideration, but this motion was similarly denied in the resolution of March 31, 2011,19 the OP
disposing thusly:

xxxx
After a second thorough evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Office finds no cogent reason to disturb its earlier Decision. The second paragraph of
Section 7, Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987 provides that "[o]nly one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases." This second motion is clearly unmeritorious.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of this Office dated May 4, 2010 and June 29, 2010,
respectively, affirming the DENR decisions, are hereby declared final. Let the records of the case be transmitted to the DENR for its appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.20

Trans-Asia then appealed tothe Court of Appeals (CA).

On October 30, 2012, the CA promulgated the assailed decision reversing and setting aside the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP.21 It agreed with the
DENR Secretary and the OP that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register the patents under PD No.
463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor. It found that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest did not register the patents pursuant to PD No. 463;
hence, the patents lapsed and had no more effect,22 viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 4, 2010, as well as the Resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March
31, 2011, respectively, rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 09-L-638, and the Order dated May 21, 2009 as well as the Resolution dated
November 27, 2009 issued by the DENR Secretary in DENR Case No. 8766 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23

Yinlu sought reconsideration of the decision. On June 27, 2013, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.24

Issues

In its appeal, Yinlu raises the following issues, namely:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S MINING PATENTS ARE VALID, EXISTING AND IMPERVIOUS TO THE MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING
AGREEMENT SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED TO THE RESPONDENT TRANS-ASIA.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S TITLES BASED ON "PATENTS" WERE MINING PATENTS OR SOME OTHER PATENT.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER YINLU’S PURCHASE OF ITS TITLES INCLUDED PURCHASEOF THE MINERALS FOUND THEREIN.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER YINLU THAT IT’S PRIVATE PROPERTY SHALL
NOT BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.

VI.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES APPLY TO TITLED PROPERTY.

VII.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SHARE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCES WAS AFFECTED BY THE MINING PATENTS OF
PETITIONER YINLU.25

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I Procedural Issue:

Tardiness of Trans-Asia’s Appeal

Yinlu contends that the CA should have outrightly dismissed TransAsia’s appeal for being taken beyond the required period for appealing; and that Trans-Asia’s
filing of the second motion for reconsideration was improper inasmuch as the motion did not cite any exceptional circumstances or reasons as required by Section
7 of the OP’s Administrative Order No. 18 Series of 1987.26

The contention of Yinlu is correct.

Section 1,27 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment rendered by the OP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is appealable to the CA. Section
428 of the Rule states that the appeal must be taken within 15 days "from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its lastpublication,
if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x."

Trans-Asia received a copy of the OP resolution dated June 29, 2010 denying the first motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2010.29 Hence, it had until July 29,
2010 to appeal to the CA by petition for review. However, it filed the petition for review only on May 11, 2011,30 or nearly 10 months from its receipt of the denial.
Under the circumstances, its petition for review was filed way beyond the prescribed 15-day period.

The CA opined that Trans-Asia’s petition for review was timely filed, citing the fact that Trans-Asia filed its second motion for reconsideration dated July 20, 2010
which the OP denied through the resolution dated March 31, 2011. It pointed out that Trans-Asia received a copy of the resolution dated March 31, 2011 on April
26, 2011; hence, the 15-day appeal period should be reckoned from April 26, 2011, rendering its filing of the petition for review in the CA on May 11, 2011 timely
and within the required period. It observed that Trans-Asia’s filing of the second motion for reconsideration was allowed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
18 of the OP Rules on Appeal because the second motion was exceptionally meritorious, not pro forma, for, even if the motion reiterated issues already passed
upon by the OP, that alone did not render the motion pro formaif it otherwise complied with the rules.31

It is true that Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 of the OP Rules on Appeal authorizes the filing of a second motion for reconsideration. But that authority is
conditioned upon the second motion being upon a highly meritorious ground.32 The rule remains to be only one motion for reconsideration is allowed. In that regard,
the Court stresses that the determination of whether or not the ground raised in the second motion for reconsideration was exceptionally meritorious lies solely
belonged to the OP.33 The CA could not usurp the OP’s determination in order to make its own.

As earlier indicated, the OP found and declared the second motion for reconsideration of Trans-Asia "clearly unmeritorious" when it denied the motion on March 31,
2011. Consequently, the filing of the second motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2010 did not stop the running of the appeal period that had commenced on July
14, 2010, the date of receipt by TransAsia of the OP resolution denying the first motion for reconsideration. The decision of the OP inevitably became final and
immutable as a matter of law by July 29, 2010, the last day of the reglementary period under Section 4 of Rule 43.

In taking cognizance of Trans-Asia’s appeal despite its tardiness, therefore, the CA gravely erred. Under Section 4 of Rule 43, the reckoning of the 15-day period to
perfect the appeal starts from the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 specifically allows only one motion for reconsideration
to an appealing party; as such, the reckoning is from the date of notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.34 With Trans-Asia having received the
denial on July 14, 2010, its 15-day appeal period was until July 29, 2010. The filing of the petition for review only on May 11, 2011 was too late.

Verily, an appeal should be taken in accordance with the manner and within the period set by the law establishing the right to appeal. To allow Trans-Asia to
transgress the law would be to set at naught procedural rules that were generally mandatory and inviolable. This is because appeal, being neither a constitutional
right nor part of due process, is a mere statutory privilege to be enjoyed by litigants who comply with the law allowing the appeal. Failure to comply will causethe loss
of the privilege. Moreover, procedural rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and
to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Among such rules is that regulating the perfection of an appeal, which is mandatory as well as jurisdictional.
The consequence of the failure to perfect an appeal within the limited time allowed is to preclude the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case in order
to review and revise the judgment that meanwhile became final and immutable by operation of law.35
Although procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, there are no reasons to relax them in Trans-Asia’s favor. As noted, the OP found the
ground for the second motion for reconsideration "clearly unmeritorious." To ignore such finding without justification is to unduly deprive the OP of its authority and
autonomy to enforce its own rules of procedure. On the other hand, Trans-Asiacould have easily avoided its dire situation by appealing within the period instead of
rehashing its already discarded arguments in the OP.

II Substantive Issues:

Yinlu’s mining patents constituted

vested rights that could not be disregarded

The finality and immutability of the decision of the OP are not the only reasons for turning down Trans-Asia’s appeal. Trans-Asia’s cause also failed the tests of
substance and validity.

Yinlu claims that its mining patents, being evidenced by its TCTs that were registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1 , 1902), the governing law on the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and indefeasible; that it was
the absolute owner of the lands the TCTs covered; that the TCTs were issued pursuant to mineral patents based on Placer Claims36 named Busser, Superior,
Bussamer and Rescue; that the TCTs were presented to and confirmed by the DENR and the OP; that Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed citizens of
the United States and of the Philippine Islands to explore, occupy and purchase mineral lands; that after the exploration and claim of the mineral land, the owner of
the claim and of the mineral patents was entitled to all the minerals found in the area subject of the claim as stated in Section 27 of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that
the person holding even a mere mineral claim was already entitled to all the minerals found in such area; that, as such, the mineral claims that had been patented
and perfected by registration still enjoyed the same privilege of exclusivity in exploiting the minerals within the patent; that aside from being entitled to the minerals
found within the mineral claim and patent, it was also entitled to the exclusive possession of the land covered by the claim; that its mining patents are property rights
that the Government should not appropriate for itself or for others; that its registered mineral patents, being valid and existing, could not be defeated by adverse,
open and notorious possession and prescription; that its substantive rights overmineral claims perfected under the Philippine Bill of 1902 subsisted despite the
changes of the Philippine Constitution and of the mining laws; that the Constitution could not impair vested rights; that Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463
would impair its vested rights under its mineral patents if said provisions were applied to it; and that Section 99 of PD No. 463 expressly prohibited the application of
Section 100 and Section 101 to vested rights.37

Yinlu asserts that contrary to the claim of Trans-Asia, the titles issued to it were mining patents, not homestead patents.38 It stresses that the TCTs from which it
derived its own TCTs were issued pursuant to Patents 15, 16, 17 and 18; that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there was no mineral patent separate from the original
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; that the mineral patent applied for under the procedure outlined in the Philippine Bill of 1902 resulted to an original certificate
of title issued under Act No. 496; that the beginning statements mentioned in Yinlu’s title stated "pursuant to Patent No._____,________Placer Claim;" that as such,
its mineral patents were part of its actual titles; that Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 allowed the titling of the land and the exploration of both the surface and
the minerals beneath the surface; and that its TCTs were already inclusive of the minerals located in the properties by virtue of the Philippine Bill of 1902, and thus
could not be separately soldor mortgaged from each other.39
The decision of the OP was actually unassailable in point of law and history.

During the period of Spanish colonization, the disposition and exploration of mineral lands in the Philippines were governed by the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867,40
otherwise known as The Spanish Mining Law.41 The Regalian doctrine was observed, to the effect that minerals belonged to the State wherever they could be
found, whether in public or private lands. During the American occupation, the fundamental law on mining was incorporated in the Philippine Bill of 1902, whose
Section 2142 declared: That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free
and open to exploration, occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands. Its Section 27 provided that a holder of the mineral claim so located was entitled to all the minerals that liewithin his claim, but he could not mine outside the
boundary lines of his claim. Pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was made or a mining patent was issued over a parcel of land in
accordance with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was considered private property and no longer part of the public domain. The claimant
or patent holder was the owner of both the surface of the land and of the minerals found underneath.

The term mining claim connotes a parcel of land containing a precious metal in its soil or rock. It is usuallyused in mining jargon as synonymous with the term
location, which means the act of appropriating a mining claim on the public domain according to the established law or rules.43 A mining patentpertains to a title
granted by the government for the said mining claim.

Under the 1935 Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, was expressly
prohibited. The natural resources being referred therein included mineral lands of public domain, but not mineral lands that at the time the 1935 Constitution took
effect no longer formed part of the public domain. Consequently, such prohibition against the alienation of natural resources did not apply to a mining claim or patent
existing prior to November 15, 1935. Jurisprudence has enlightened us on this point.

In McDaniel v. Apacible,44 the petitioner sought to prohibit the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from leasing a parcel of petroleum land in San Narciso
in Province of Tayabas. He claimed that on June 7, 1916 he entered an unoccupied land in San Narciso and located therein three petroleum mineral claims in
accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902; that on July 15, 1916, here corded the three mineral claims with the mining office of the Municipality of Lucena through
notices of location under the names Maglihi No. 1, Maglihi No. 2, and Maglihi No. 3; that he had been in open and continuous possession of the claims since June
7, 1916; that in 1918, he drilled five wells on said claims and made discoveries of petroleum on them; thaton June 18, 1921, respondent Juan Cuisia applied with
respondent Galicano Apacible, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, for the lease of a land whose boundaries included his three claims; that he
protested in writing to Secretary Apacible the inclusion in the Cuisia lease application of his three mineral claims; that Secretary Apacible denied his protest,and was
about to grant the lease application by virtue of Act No. 2932; thatsaid law, in so far as it purported to declare open to lease lands containing petroleum oil on which
mineral claims had been validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil had been made, was void and unconstitutional for it deprived him of
his property without due process of law and without compensation; and that Secretary Apacible was without jurisdiction to lease to Cuisia his mining claims. The
Court granted the petition, ruling as follows:

Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed extensively the question now before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I, sections 322, 539.)

The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawalof the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long
as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the
highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little to his security. (18 Ruling Case
Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.)

The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government
itself. Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator.

It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The Government itself cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral
land. The Government may not destroy the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a state of reservation." (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S.,
279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431.)

A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by
the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life
of the location. There is no provision for, nor suggestion of, a prior termination thereof. (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115 U. S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining &
Land Co., 194 U. S., 220.)

There isno pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims
in question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been
issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co, vs. Smith
(249 U. S., 337), and St. Louis Mining & Milling Co, vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U. S., 650), held that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after
discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There
is no conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they affirm thatwhen the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the
purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can acquire from the Government any interest as
against him. (Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 504, and cases cited.)

Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the
fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S.,
337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U. 4S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279; Del Monte Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S., 55;Elver vs. Wood, 208 U.
S., 226, 232.)

Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only
by abandonment as by nonperformance of the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U. S., 142; Bradford vs.
Morrison, 212 U. S., 389.)

The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third persons, but also against
the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent,
and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431; Consolidated
Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.)

The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and
they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil
Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc, 546.)

From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that, inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral
lands inquestion, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of
such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is
hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents answer the petition herein within a period of five days from notice hereof, that
a final judgment beentered, granting the remedy prayed for in the petition. So ordered.45

In Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez,46 the petitioner prayed that Eulogio Rodriguez as the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla,
as the Director of the Bureau of Mines, be compelled to approve its application for patent on a certain mining claim. It alleged that it owned the Nob Fraction mineral
claim situated in Itogon, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by C. L. O’Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902; that said
claim was located on January 1,1929, and was registered in the office of the mining recorder of Mountain Province on January 7, 1929; that by itself and its
predecessor-in-interest it had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the claim from the date of location thereof; and that prior to November 15, 1935, it
filed an application for patent but both respondents failed and refused to grant the application despite its having complied with all the requirements of the law for the
issuance of such patent. On the other hand, the respondents contended that the petitioner was not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to said mineral claim
because the 1935 Constitution provided that "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated."The Court ordered the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources provided in Section 1,
Article XII of the 1935 Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137, explaining:

This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the
Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining the status, under the Constitution and the
Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
as amended.

In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest to meet squarelythe fundamental question presented, disregarding for that
purpose certain discrepancies found in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where
he says that "the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the allegations in
the petitions and allege new ones in our answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should necessitate introduction of evidence
before the cases are submitted for decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference
between the allegations inthe pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty.

Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:

"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to
which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It is clear that the foregoing constitutional provision
prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used therein,
includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason
for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provision itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other
natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centumof the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only "agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands of the public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional
provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the prohibition.

This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the
provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that
a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
"Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate,
and upon which theyexpress their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs.Truax, 13 N. D., 181; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth
was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: "The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit
on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Governmentto deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any
other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made
upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection,
the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal.,
131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of
the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the
area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43
Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession,
with the right to the exclusive enjoyment ofall the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights
of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue
of his location, made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues" (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S.,
348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said:

"There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply-with all the requirements of the 1aw in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining
claim, or that the claim was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily
traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under
the law for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent
of the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any time upon proof what they had done in locating the claim, and of subsequent
expenditures to a specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself
was not afterwards open to sale."

In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said:

"The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and lower Federal courts, thatwhen the location of a mining claim is perfected under the
law, it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may
be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is 'real
property,' subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 735, 737; 1
Mor. Min. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14, Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs.Wood, 208 U. S., 226,
[317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs.Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to
purchase the claim or secure patent from the United States; but so long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right,for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent." (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.)

The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel case is determinative, of the fundamental question involved in the instant case.
But he maintains "that this decision is based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be
abandoned." We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well-founded or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution became effective; and even if we weredisposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution
became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.

It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In Wilbur vs.United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that"mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal
to do so is based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its decision the court said: "While the decisions of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a
writ of mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs.Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181;
61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In Roberts vs.United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred
to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said:

"’Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore,
in a certainsense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its language what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in
all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed
to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree a
construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved
upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and when his refusal isbrought before the court he might successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved
the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it was not ministerial, and the court would on that account be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the
powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of their duties,
whenever they should plead that the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly theyviolated
their duty in refusing to perform the act required.'" In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner.
Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional
and statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of
mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.47

The foregoing rulings wereapplied and cited in Salacot Mining Company v. Rodriguez,48 Republic v. Court of Appeals49 and Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals.50 Here, the records show that TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98 involved six parcels of land with an area of 248.342 hectares situated in Barrio
Larap and Santa Elena, Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.51 The TCTs were transferred tothe MBC and PCIB after PIMI’s properties were sold in
the foreclosure sale conducted on December 20, 1975.52 Consequently, new TCTs, namely: TCT Nos. 14565, 14566, 14567, 14568, 14569 and 14570, were issued
to MBC and PCIB cancelling TCT Nos. 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98.53 MBC and BDO, as registered owners of said lands, subsequently sold the same to Yinlu by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.54 Hence, TCT Nos. 72336, 72337, 72338, 72339, 72340 and 72341 were issued to Yinlu as the new registered owner.55

It also appears that TCT Nos. 94, 95, 96 and 97 covered mining lands with an aggregate area of 192 hectares. The lands wereoriginally registered in 1925, and the
TCTs were issued toPIMI in 1930. These TCTs of PIMI corresponded to more than half of the areas involved in Trans-Asia’s MPSA. However, the TCTs of PIMI
constituted mining patents and mining claims of the lands they covered. TCT No. 94 was issued pursuant to Patent No. 15 under the Busser Placer Claim; TCT No.
95,Patent No. 16 under the Superior Placer Claim; TCT No. 96, Patent No. 17 under the Bussemer Placer Claim; and TCT No. 97, Patent No. 18 under the Rescue
Placer Claim.56 Considering that these TCTs werevalidly transferred to Yinlu by virtue of the deed of absolute sale, and with the consequent issuance of TCT Nos.
72336, 72337, 72338 and 72339 in itsname, Yinlu was the owner and holder of the mining patents entitled not only to whatever was on the surface but also to the
minerals found underneath the surface.

The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The Government, whether through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or
dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize
the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. We uphold the rulings of the DENR Secretary and the OP to exclude the disputed
areas that had been established to belong exclusively to Yinlu as registered owner to be taken out of the coverage of Trans-Asia’s MPSA.

Still, Trans-Asia insists that Yinlu’s mining patents should no longer be recognized because they were not registered pursuant to Section 100 and Section 101 of PD
No. 463, which read: Section 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. Holders of valid and subsisting mining locations and other rights under
other laws, irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and
approval thereof by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the dateof approval of this Decree.

Section 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. All mining grants patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval
of this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100 hereof: Provided, That Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located and
registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", as shall be surveyed within one (1)
year from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements
of the respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases orpermits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation
shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other
obligations.

Trans-Asia submits that because MBC/BDO did not comply with the requirement for the registration of the patents, Yinlu’s mining rights should now be deemed
abandoned because no title or right was passed to it. In that sense, Trans-Asia maintains that Yinlu had no vested right. We disagree with Trans-Asia.

Although Section 100 and Section 101 of PD No. 463 require registration and annual work obligations, Section 99 of PD No. 463 nevertheless expressly provides
that the provisions of PD No. 463 shall not apply if their application will impair vested rights under other mining laws, viz: Section 99. Non-impairment of Vested or
Acquired Substantive Rights. Changes made and new provisionsand rules laid down by this Decree which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with order mining laws previously in force shall have no retroactive effect. Provided, That the provisions of this Decree which are procedural in nature
shall prevail.

The concept of a vested right was discussed and applied in Ayog v. Cusi Jr.57 Therein, the Director of Land sawarded on January 21, 1953 to Biñan Development
Co, Inc. (BDCI) a parcel of land on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application. BDCI filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the land who had refused to vacate.
In its judgment, the trial court ordered the occupants to vacate the land. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. BDCI thenmoved for
the execution of the trial court’s judgment, but the occupants opposed on the ground that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17,
1973, was a supervening event that rendered it legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in the area." The Court rejected the
invocation, and ruled that BDCI had a vested right in the land, to wit:

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.1âwphi1 Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporation to purchase public lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners’ prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights
in constitutional law.

A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest.’ (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege
to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. ‘A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power’ (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just an imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).58

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,59 we stated that mining rights acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were
vested rights that could not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the mining patents ofYinlu were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were
subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral
lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of registration and annual work obligations.

Relevantly, we advert to the DENR’s finding that PIMI’s failure to register the patents in 1974 pursuant to PD No. 463 was excusable because of its suffering financial
losses at that time, which eventually led to the foreclosure of the mortgages on its assets by the MBC and PCIB as its creditors.60 The failure of Yinlu’s predecessors-
in-interest to register and perform annual work obligations did not automatically mean that they had already abandoned their mining rights, and that such rights had
already lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declaredthat it had not issued any specific order cancelling the mining patents.61 Also, the tenets of due process required
that Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest be given written notice of their non-compliance with PD No. 463 and the ample opportunity to comply. If they still failed to
comply despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice must further be given informing them of the cancellation of their mining patents. In the absence of
any showing that the DENR had provided the written notice and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-ininterest to that effect, it would really be inequitable to
consider them to have abandoned their patents, or to consider the patents as having lapsed. Verily, as held in McDaniel and Gold Creek, supra, a mining patent
obtained under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was a protected private property. The protection should be basic and guaranteed, for no less than Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution decrees that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Nonetheless, we deem it significant to remind that Yinlu has been directed by the DENR to henceforth conduct its mining operations in accordance with Republic
Act No. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) and its implementing rules and regulations.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on October 30, 2012 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATE the decision issued on May 4,
2010 and resolutions dated June 29, 2010 and March 31, 2011 by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 09-L-638; and DIRECT the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-21213 and L-21214 March 28, 1968

HEIRS OF GABRIEL ZARI and HEIRS OF HERMENEGILDO CONCEPCION, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
JOSE R. SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
Miguel I. Mendiola for plaintiffs-appellee.
Nicanor U. Gatchalian for defendant-appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

These two cases, on direct appeal to this Court on questions of law, 1 turn on the principal issue of whether, or not a compromise agreement, executed
between party litigants before the new Civil Code, and which triggered the dismissal of litigation, may be rescinded by the party plaintiffs thereof, to pave the way for
the enforcement of their original demand, upon the provisions of Article 2041 of the new Civil Code, which creates for the first time the right of rescission with respect
to compromises. The law reads:

ART. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses, to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded, and
insist upon his original demand.

The factual backdrop starts way back in 1934.

Sometime before August 5, 1934, a certain Juan Fuentes purchased on installments under Contract 436 from Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia, S. en C. for P2,250 a
parcel of land of 15,000 square meters, Lot 9552, later known as Lot 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H of the subdivision plan, 2 of Hacienda de Mandaluyong, situated in Barrio
Bagong Ilog, Marikina, Rizal, and registered, in the company's name under Torres Title 30794.

On August 5, 1934, Juan Fuentes entered into two contracts: one with Hemenegildo Concepcion covering the 1/3 northern portion of said land with an area
of 5,000 square meters; the other with Gabriel Zari embracing another 1/3, the southeastern portion, thereof, with an identical area of 5,000 square meters. The two
contracts, couched in the same language were denominated sub-contracts of lease. However, as found by the court below, they were really contracts of conditional
sale by Fuentes to Concepcion and Zari whereunder each of the latter was to pay P1,600 spread out within a 78-month period in equal monthly instant of P20.50,
except the first which was P21.70. In fact, Paragraph 4 of those contracts stipulates that: "AI pago del inquilino del alquiler correspondiente a los setenta y siete
meses restantes dentro de los plazos, convenidos, obligara al arrendatario a transferir el dominio pleno de la parcels cedida en arrendamiento."

Then, sometime before mid-June, 1941, Juan Fuentes assigned all his rights and interests over the whole land to defendant-appellant Jose R. Santos, for
P1,070. This was put in writing in a deed styled "Assignment of Real Rights" dated June 15, 1941. In that deed, Jose R. Santos expressly bound himself "to respect
and recognize the contract of sale by installment which the party of the first part [Juan Fuentes] had with Gabriel Zari and Hermenegildo Concepcion of the portion
of land covered by Contract No. 436", which Fuentes executed with Ortigas. The Fuentes Santos transaction was with the knowledge and consent of Gabriel Zari
and Sofronio Concepcion, in representation of his father, Hermenegildo, who had, in the meantime, died.

On June 7, 1941, even prior to the date of the formal assignment, Jose R. Santos paid the balance of the purchase price of the aforesaid land to Ortigas,
Madrigal y Cia, S. en C. On June 14 following, the company executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale directly in favor of Jose R. Santos. New Torrens Title
43295 was then issued in Santos' name.
 Thereafter, Jose R. Santos refused to honor the rights of Hermenegildo Concepcion and Gabriel Zari under their respective agreements with Juan Fuentes.
Because of this, two complaints were lodged simultaneously on October 30, 1941 by the Concepcion heirs and Zari against Jose R. Santos in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Cases 8273 and 8275. 3 Plaintiffs sought to enforce their contractual rights to their respective 1/3 portions. On January 24, 1943,
during the pendency of the cases, two separate compromise a were executed in written confirmation of the verbal agreements amongst parties on May 21, 1942.
That compromise was induced by the parties' desire "to settle the case amicably in order to avoid litigation and expenses incident thereto."

In substance, the compromise was to this effect: the heirs of Hermenegildo Concepcion and Gabriel Zari would no longer pay the balance of the unpaid
installments. The sum of P969.12 thus far paid by Concepcion and his heirs would represent the "purchase price of 1,762 square meters" of the northwestern portion
of the land. In the same manner, the sum of P1,025.42 thus far paid by Zari would constitute the "purchase price of 1,854 square meters" of the southeastern portion.
The property would be resurveyed by the Concepcion heirs and Gabriel Zari to segregate the portions which would go to them. Upon completion thereof, Jose R.
Santos would convey the properties in absolute sale, and secure the Torres titles for the Concepcions and Zari. The heirs of Hermenegildo Concepcion and Gabriel
Zari would procure the dismissal of the suits they started against Jose R. Santos. Plaintiffs, by the compromise, "remised, released and forever discharged" Jose R.
Santos of and from any and all claims and demands whatsoever which "the former ever had or "hereinafter can, shall or may have against" Jose R. Santos "growing
out of or arising from the facts, circumstances and things set out in the" complaints against Santos. The dismissal of Civil Cases 8273 and 8275 followed.

Plaintiffs then sought to implement the compromise agreement. But this was blocked by defendant's refusal to comply with said compromise. Defendant went
to the extent of telling plaintiffs' counsel that the entire land of 15,000 square meters was his property and that he could not abide by the compromise agreement he
executed on January 24, 1943 — when he was already a full-fledged lawyer — 4 upon the lame excuse that "I am not fully aware of its contents." 5 He also claimed
that he sold no land to plaintiffs. In the language of the trial judge, 6 these are the facts —

For the purpose of implementing the compromise agreement, the plaintiffs notified the defendant in writing (Exhs. "F-2-Concepcion" and "F-Zari") of their
intention to cause a subdivision survey of the premises in order to segregate the respective portions allocated to them under its provisions. The plaintiffs obtained
the necessary permit in writing (Exh. "F-1a-Concepcion") from the U.S. Army which has leased and was occupying the premises at an annual rental of P900.00
during the period from April 10, 1945 to June 30, 1948 (Exh. "K-Concepcion", also Exh. "J-Zari"). After the completion of the subdivision survey and the plans and
the corresponding technical descriptions (Exhibit "F-7-Concepcion" and "F-4-Zari") had been duly approved by the Director of Lands, the plaintiffs, through Atty.
Anacleto de Guzman, addressed two letters dated July 26, 1948 (Exh. "G-Concepcion", also Exh. "G-Zari") and August 14, 1948 (Exh. "G-2-Concepcion," also Exh.
"G-2-Zari") to the defendant. In the said letters, the plaintiffs notified the defendant that they had already effected the segregation survey of the portion allocated to
them under the compromise agreement and requested him to execute the necessary deeds of sale in their favor. In reply thereto, the defendant addressed a letter
dated August 25, 1948 (Exh. "G-3-Zari") to Atty. de Guzman wherein the defendant [tacitly] denied having sold any land to the plaintiffs and manifested his refusal
to comply with the compromise agreement. 7

Offshoot of defendant's refusal to abide by the terms of the compromise agreements was the commencement by plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal of a second set of cases against defendant. The thrust of the fresh suits, docketed as Civil Cases 802 filed on March 23, 1949 8 and 878 on July 6, 1949; 9
was to enforce plaintiffs' right to their respective 5,000 square-meter portion under the old contracts with Juan Fuentes.
 Defendant presented separate motions to dismiss upon the ground that previous litigations between the same parties upon the same subject matter have
been compromised and dismissed. Civil Case 878, with respect to the Concepcion heirs, was dismissed by Judge Ambrosio Santos. Defendant's motion to dismiss
Civil Case 802, filed by Zari, was denied by Judge Juan R. Liwag.

The Concepcion appealed the dismissal of Civil Case 878 to this Court. On July 9, 1951, this Court through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, held that the
Concepcions still had "a recourse to law and to law and it is to enforce the compromise by a new appropriate action", and affirmed the order "not on the ground of
res adjudicata, but because the subject of the complaint has been released and can not be litigated anew." 10

Civil Case 802, on the other hand, was dismissed because of the failure of plaintiffs' counsel to appear at the hearing thereof. On appeal by Gabriel Zari, the
Court of Appeals, on April 24, 1952, remanded the case for trial on the merits.

One June 23, 1952, the heirs of Hermenegildo Concepcion registered a new complaint against Jose R, Santos specifically asking for rescission of the
compromise agreement, and reviving their original claim. The case was docketed as Civil Case 1769.

On March 2, 1953, Gabriel Zari moved to amend his complaint in, Civil Case 802. This time, he prayed for rescission of the compromise and insisted on his
original claim. Jose R. Santos opposed. On March 14, 1953, the amended complaint was admitted.

Defendant then filed his separate answers to both complaints: Civil Case 802, as amended, and Civil Case 1769.

The two cases were jointly heard. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts and went to trial as to those questions of fact not covered thereby.

On May 3, 1962 the trial court, decision. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant: rescinding the agreement of compromise
dated January 24, 1943 and declaring the same to be without force and effect recognizing the plaintiffs' rights under the control of installments which Hermenegildo
Concepcion and Gabriel Zari had simultaneously executed with Juan Fuentes on August 5, 1934; declaring the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1769 the rightful owners
of the Northern portion of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43295 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, with an area of 5,000, square meters,
upon payment to the defendant of the sum of P631.08 representing the balance of their installments remaining unpaid; declaring the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 802
the rightful owners of the Southeastern portion of the above-described land, with an area of 5,000 square meters, upon payment to the defendant of the sum of
P574.78 representing the balance of their monthly installments remaining unpaid; ordering the defendant to execute the necessary deeds of sale in favor of the
plaintiffs in both cases (sic) the sum of P966.67 representing the latter's shares in the rentals paid by the U.S. Army to the former with costs of these suits against
the defendant. 11

Defendant Jose R. Santos appealed direct to this Court because, as he specified in his notice of appeal, "he will present a question of law."

By well-entrenched jurisprudence, the door leading to factual question is shut, and solely questions of law may be inquired into. 12
 The focal point of inquiry is whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiffs have the legal remedy of rescission.

1. To be recalled is that before the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a
compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof.

When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041, quoted at the start of this opinion, created for the first time the right of rescission. That provision
gives to an aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand." Article 2041 should obviously
be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata."

In a nutshell, the factual situation before us may be described as follows: Two plaintiffs, in separate suits against defendant, each claimed 5,000 square meters
of land. Those suits were dismissed by virtue of written amicable settlements whereby, upon plaintiffs' resurvey of the land, defendant would execute absolute deeds
of sale in favor of plaintiffs for a little less than 2,000 square meters each. When defendant refused to execute the necessary documents of sale to plaintiffs after the
latter had caused the resurvey and segregation of the land, plaintiffs again separately sued defendant to enforce their original claims of 5,000 square meters each,
not the compromise. One of the suits reached this Court which held that plaintiff's original claims cannot be litigated anymore but that the recourse open was to
compel compliance with the obligation under the compromise. All these happened before the effectivity of the present Civil Code. After the latter Code took effect,
when defendant continued to refuse to honor the compromise agreements, plaintiffs aimed at rescission thereof and insisted on their original demand for 5,000
square meters each. Can this be done?

Surging to the surface are the pertinent transitory provisions of the present Civil Code.

Article 2252 thereof provides as a general proposition that "[c]hanges made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation hall have no retroactive effect." But the next article, Article 2253, states in part that "if a right
should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may
have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin."

Does plaintiffs' right of rescission of the compromise agreements, a right declared for the first time in this Code, prejudice or impair any vested or acquired
right of the defendant's? This is the key question.

2. A vested or acquired right, it has long been accepted, is elusive of definition. So Manresa says. 13 So our own Code Commission comments, viz:

... laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The question of how far the new Civil Code should be made applicable to past acts
and events is attended with the utmost difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the abstract principle that laws have no retroactive effect because vested or acquired
rights should be respected. But what are vested or acquired rights?

The Commission did not venture to formulate a definition of a vested or acquired right seeing that the problem is extremely complicated.....

xxx xxx x x x1äwphï1.ñët

 What constitutes a vested or acquired right will be determined by the courts as each particular issue is submitted to them, by applying the transitional provisions
set forth and in case of doubt, by observing article 10 governing the silence or obscurity of the law. In this manner, the Commission is confident that the judiciary
with its enlightenment and high sense of justice will be able to decide in what cases the old Civil Code should apply and in what cases the new one should be binding.
This course has been preferred by the Commission, who did not presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide for each and every question that may arise.
14

We are thus especially asked to consider the circumstances of the very case, before us to determine whether any right has been vested on or acquired by
defendant which can constitute a stumbling block to plaintiffs' right of rescission.

In Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 15 this Court explained that a vested right is "some right or interest in the property who has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy"; it is an "immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment"; it is to be contradistinguished from a
right that is "expectant or contingent." 16 The Benguet case continued on to quote from 16 C.J.S. 214-215, as follows:

Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest.
The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property
founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. So, inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested.

3. To ascertain any right of defendant under the compromise agreement, we need to analyze once more the terms thereof. So analyzing, we observe that the
right acquired by defendant therein was to have plaintiffs' original suits dismissed. And, any claim of plaintiff against defendant in relation thereto would be "remised,
released and forever discharged." On the other hand, plaintiffs' right was that of ownership over parcels of land — in considerably reduced areas — amounting to a
little less than 2,000 square meters each as specified in the compromise agreement. It must be emphasized that defendant does not really have a vested or acquired
right on the remaining difference of more than 3,000 square meters each against plaintiffs. Defendant's claim to those last named portions of land is umbilically
dependent on his right to have plaintiffs' claim thereto released.

Is this right vested or acquired? By the very nature of things, such right of release is not absolute. It carries a condition. Defendant perforce must execute the
necessary deeds of sale to plaintiffs in obedience to the compromise. Had defendant done this before the advent of the present Civil Code, his right of release would
have vested unconditionally. But he has not done so. And, plaintiffs' claims remain — as before.

4. The compromise here effected, it must be stressed, is not a judicial compromise as contemplated by law. It is not incorporated in a judgment that may be
executed. The result of the compromise, in fact, was the dismissal of the two litigations filed. There is nothing to execute. This position finds affirmance in Article
2037 of the Civil Code, which, in part, decrees that "there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise."

Controlling herein, to our mind, is Article 2257 of the present Civil Code. It reads in part:
 ART. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the
former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this
Code.

xxx xxx xxx

If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated
after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided
any sanction or penalty therefor. 17

Correlating the foregoing provision to the problem before us, we find that defendant's refusal to adhere to the compromise now, results in a "deprivation of"
his "rights" over the properties covered by the Fuentes agreements with plaintiffs. For, plaintiffs have the right of rescission under the present Code. Ordinarily, the
rule in Article 2257 just quoted is that such deprivation cannot attach to those omissions incurred when the old Civil Code was in force. But, by the same article, "a
continuous or repeated act or omission" that subsists after the Civil Code "has become operative" makes the latter Code applicable. This, of course, is but logical.

Here, defendant has continued to refuse to live up to his part of the bargain even after the effectivity of the present Code. Worse still, defendant did have the
temerity to negate plaintiffs' rights under the deeds executed by Juan Fuentes (defendant's predecessor) covering plaintiffs' respective portions. These rights
defendant himself — in a public document — solemnly undertook to respect. 18 The following from the decision of the trial court is illuminating:

Upon the other hand, the defendant tried to show by his evidence that the plaintiffs have not acquired any real rights over the land under litigation because
according to him, the deed of assignment of real rights is null and void. The defendant contends that Juan Fuentes could not lawfully assign any right over the said
parcel of land in favor of another inasmuch as he (defendant) had previously purchased the same direct from the Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia. In effect, the defendant
claims that Juan Fuentes had nothing to assign. To support his claim, the defendant relied on the date of execution of the deed of assignment of real rights and the
date of his actual acquisition of the land from the Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia. That while the said assignment of real rights appears to have been executed on June 15,
1941, the defendant actually paid the balance of the purchase price of the land to the Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia, on June 7 of the same year (Exh. "A"), or approximately
one week earlier. The company executed the necessary deed of absolute sale in his favor on June 14, 1941, or exactly one day before the execution of said
assignment of real rights, and on the same date (June 14, 1941) the defendant obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43295 in his name from the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal.

The foregoing circumstances do not, however, justify the defendant's stand on the matter. For one thing, there is no doubt that the parcel of land which the
defendant purchased from Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia is the same parcel of land which was assigned to him by Juan Fuentes (paragraph 4, Stipulation of Facts, dated
September 25, 1957). Besides, the evidence adduced by the defendant, both oral and documentary, clearly and unmistakably proved this fact. Among the documents
presented in evidence by the defendant is a
offered to pay in full the balance of the purchase price of the land in question and signed it: "JUAN FUENTES, by Jose R. Santos." .... 19
Thus it is, that, as found by the lower court, "defendant tacitly denied having sold any land to the plaintiffs and manifested his refusal to abide by the compromise
agreement." 20 Defendant's pattern of conduct is reflected in the lower court's statement that "it is obvious from the very beginning that the defendant herein had
been desperately trying to avoid his obligation to the plaintiff(s)." 21

Plaintiffs, by law and logic, should be permitted to rescind the compromise and revert back to their original demands.

5. This Court's decision in Concepcion vs. Santos, supra, cannot serve as a bar to plaintiffs' present claims. For at least three reasons: First. That case was
decided under the old Code. It is merely reflective of the law in force at that time. Second. That decision in fact precisely recognized the right of plaintiffs to enforce
the terms of the compromise agreement by a new judicial action. That right they had under the old Code. But upon the effect activity of the present Civil Code, they
not only had that right but also obtained, in addition, an alternative right to rescind the compromise agreement and insist upon their original demands, upon
defendant's continued failure to abide by the terms of the compromise. Third. That decision cannot be said to establish the law of the case with respect to the present
inquiry. Because, after the effectivity of the present Code, defendant has continued to violate the compromise. This continuing violation could not have been
envisioned in, and consequently could not have formed part of, this Court's earlier decision.

6. Another provision of law which gives our view a lift is Article 2254 of the Civil Code. It declares that "[n]o vested or acquired right can arise from acts or
omissions which are against the law or which infringe the lights of others." 22 On this article the Code Commission says: "It is evident that no one can validly claim
any fixed or acquired right if the same is founded upon his having violated the law or invaded the rights of others. This principle is universally accepted." 23 Indeed,
in Benguet, supra, pronouncement was made that "no person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit." 24

It is clear then that defendant could not have any fixed or acquired right in the premises. Here involved is defendant's persistent non-compliance with the terms
of the compromise — which no doubt can be categorized as acts "which infringe upon the rights of others", plaintiffs herein. Defendant, a lawyer, should know that
he may not profit from his own wrongdoing.

We, accordingly, rule that the trial court did not err in setting aside the compromise agreements and enforcing plaintiffs' original demands.

For the reasons given, the decision of the trial court in the cases below is hereby affirmed.1äwphï1.ñët

Costs against defendant-appellant Jose R. Santos. So ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., reserve their votes.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the foregoing opinion.

Under the law and doctrines extant prior to the new Civil Code, a contract of compromise had the effect of novating and extinguishing the erstwhile disputed
obligations; so much so that, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the previous litigation (Concepcion vs. Santos, 89 Phil. 429, 432), "non-compliance with the
compromise restored neither the covenant that it had superseded nor the plaintiff's cause of action under the original sale contract." It is a corollary to this rule that
once the compromise was had, Santos acquired the right to be free and immune in the future from any claim, suit or action under the obligations (sale) superseded
by the compromise; and this right (although negative in form) became vested in said party as of the date the compromise was entered into under the old Code. To
maintain now that because of the new Civil Code, the plaintiffs-appellees can still sue Santos on the original contract of sale, is to divest Santos of the immunity
conferred upon and acquired by him because of the extinction of the old obligation under the Code of 1889 as a result of the compromise, and the main opinion itself
recognizes that the new Code expressly limits the retroactive operation of its innovative articles when the same would prejudice or impair vested right (Art. 2252).

The subsequent conduct of Santos is indeed reprehensible and repugnant to any fair-minded person. But the remedy of appellees is to sue for specific
performance of the compromise and to collect damages, actual, moral and exemplary, in view of the wanton disregard by Santos of his solemn engagements.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I can only say amen to the very comprehensive and analytical study and discussion of the facts and the accurate application thereto of Articles 2252, 2251
and 2041 of the Civil Code made by Mr. Justice Sanchez in the joint decision of these cases, in so far as the Heirs of Gabriel Zari are concerned. I must say that the
views of our learned colleague in that respect cannot be improved upon. My doubts are related to the case of the heirs of Hermenegildo Concepcion.

For the sake of brevity, I shall adopt the statement of the facts of these cases in the majority opinion:

In a nutshell, the factual situation before us may be described as follows: Two plaintiffs, in separate suits against defendant, each claimed 5,000 square meters
of land. Those suits were dismissed by virtue of written amicable settlement whereby, upon plaintiff's resurvey of the land, defendant would execute absolute deeds
of sale in favor of plaintiffs for a little less than 2,000 square meters each. When defendant refused to execute the necessary documents of sale to plaintiffs after the
latter had caused the resurvey and segregation of the land, plaintiffs again separately sued defendant to enforce their original claims of 5,000 square meters each,
not the compromise. One of the suits reached this Court which held that plaintiff's original claims cannot be litigated anymore but that the recourse open was to
compel compliance with the obligation under the compromise. All * these happened before the effectivity of the present Civil Code. After the latter Code took effect,
when defendant continued to refuse to honor the compromise agreements, plaintiffs aimed at rescission thereof and insisted on their original demand for 5,000
square meters each. Can this be done? (Page 7, Decision)

In effect, the majority holds that this can legally be done in both the cases of the Zaris and the Concepcion for the reasons that (1) article 2041 of the Civil
Code created for the first time the right of rescission and gives to an aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand"; (2) such right, declared for the first time under the Code, "is effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may
have been done or may have occurred under, the prior legislation", as provided in Article 2252; and (3) this can be done since defendant-appellant had no vested
right which might be impaired. I find it difficult to conform with the view that the third reason given can apply also to the Concepcions.

It is to be remembered that the first case filed by the Concepcions against Santos was discussed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal following the compromise
between the parties. The second action filed by them also against Santos for the same cause was again dismissed by the said court on the ground that the
compromise was res judicata to the second action; and on appeal from said dismissal, this Court declared that the lower court was in error — there was no res
judicata, although, nonetheless, this Court sustained the said dismissal on the ground that plaintiffs' claim had been released by virtue of the compromise. To borrow
the language of this Court in that appeal:1

The dismissal of Case No. 8273 did not constitute res adjudicata in the legal sense of the term. The doctrine of res adjudicata is predicated on a prior valid
judgment, and the order of dismissal made no reference to the compromise agreement, much less any adjudication on the basis of it.

But the agreement did release "the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading," and that release was good ground for the defendant's motion to
dismiss the second suit. (Sec. 1[g], Rule 8). By express terms, it had been seen the plaintiffs "remised, released and forever discharged" the defendant "of and from
any and all claims and demands whatsoever ... growing out of or arising from the facts, circumstances, and things set out in the complaint." Language could not
have been more comprehensive or more expressive of the parties' intention to enter into a new contract to take the place of the old one, than the words placed under
quotation.

The old agreement was merged in the new, with the result that action on the former or any feature of it which had been put in issue by the pleadings was
barred. Non-compliance with the compromise restored neither the covenant which it had superseded nor the plaintiffs' cause of action under the original sale contract.
But it was only to this extent that the compromise was res adjudicata and article 1817 of the Spanish Civil Code could be properly applied. Were the operation of the
dismissal not thus limited, the alternative would be either execution of the order, which would not be feasible, since the court did not and was not asked to render
judgment in accordance with the conditions of the stipulation, or complete extinguishment of plaintiffs' remedy, which the defendant would not pretend to assert. The
plaintiffs still have a recourse to law and it is to enforce the compromise by a new appropriate action. [emphasis supplied]

It will be seen then that this Court had expressly declared that the compromise was not res judicata in the strict legal sense, it was a bar to the second action
of the Concepcions to the extent that it superseded plaintiffs' cause of action under the original sale contract; that action based on the former agreement (sale) which
was merged in the new (compromise) was by such merger barred; and that the recourse to law left to them "is to enforce the compromise by a new appropriate
action." That decision of this Court has long become final and, to my mind, the law questions therein discussed and applied to the relation of the parties has become
the law of the case as between them and should not now be disturbed. Right or wrong, such questions had definitely been settled and are no longer open to question
by any court in any subsequent proceeding under the same cause. If as the majority intimates, that decision of this Court was erroneous, considering that at the time
it was rendered the present civil code was already in force, as in fact, it was already in force, with more reason must We hold that the present action for rescission
is barred, because the majority implies that the issue under discussion could have been raised and decided then. This Court has said so time and time again, and I
really do not see my way clear why We should depart therefrom in this particular case when just recently We have invoked the same principle in another case:2

As noted at the outset, We sustain respondent Court. Our August 31, 1964 decision in the main NAWASA suit is decisive of the case at hand. It furnishes the
law of the case. As was recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in People vs. Olarte L-22465, February 28, 1967, a ruling constituting
the law of the case, "even if erroneous, ... may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final .... A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be
applied to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined....." To the same effect is the following from the pen of Justice Makalintal: "It
need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in
any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and
authority to alter or modify" (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, L-15548, October 30, 1962). So it has always been from 1919, when We announced that a
decision that has become the law of the case 'is not subject to review or reversal in any court' (Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise vs. Deutsch-Australische Dampschiffs
Gesellschaft, 39 Phil. 474, 476).

It is then my considered opinion that, on the basis of the foregoing authorities cited as applied to the circumstances of this case, We cannot now grant to the
Concepcions the very same remedy which was precisely denied to them already by this Court in the previous case, there being no showing that the circumstances
have substantially changed.

I believe that the subsequent creation of the right of rescission in favor of an aggrieved pity under Article 2041 of the Civil Code cannot alter the law of the
case. I am not convinced that rescission can be allowed because it will not impair any vested or acquired right. By force of the decision (earlier quoted) in the appeal
taken from the order of dismissal of the second case between the same parties the right of the Concepcions to make good their demand for the 5,000 square meters
of land on the basis of the original sale contract had been foreclosed, except with respect to a small portion of it which, according to the same decision, they may by
action compel Santos to convey to them under the terms of the compromise. Correlatively, Santos thereby acquired the right to be free from any further vexatious
action by the heirs of Hermenegildo Concepcion relative to the 5,000 square meters of land embraced in the original sale contract. As previously stated, that decision
has long become final. The rights of the parties thereunder had been finally and definitely fixed by this Court in the decision referred to. Undoubtedly then, such
acquired right of Santos would be impaired should We allow the rescission under consideration and thereby permit the Concepcions to revive their original claim for
the bigger portion of the land — the very right this Court had foreclosed in its decision on the appeal taken from the dismissal of the previous case. By the very
definition of the majority, the right of Santos under the decision of this Court was not dependent on any contingency. Indeed, in a sense, it arose when the present
Civil Code was already in force.

The majority holds that the "release" of Santos' obligation — to convey the 5,000 square meters unto the Concepcions under the original sale contract — was
conditional, i.e., the claim of the heirs thereto would remain unless Santos performs his part of the bargain or compromise agreement. But did not this Court declare
in the decision above-quoted that non-compliance with the compromise restored neither the covenant which it had superseded nor the plaintiffs' cause of action
under the original sale contract, that to this extent the compromise was res adjudicata, and that the plaintiffs' recourse to law is to enforce the compromise agreement
by a new appropriate action? How then may it be rightly said that the release was conditional when, as earlier pointed out, that decision had become final and, right
or wrong, shall be the "law of the case" between them? Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the rescission of the compromise agreement sought by the Concepcions in
this third action they filed against appellant Jose R. Santos would impair and prejudice the vested or acquired rights of said appellant. The land involved is registered
land. It is covered by a torrens title in the name of Santos. A cloud was cast upon the said title by the claims of said heirs, but the same was removed, in respect of
the portion not covered by the compromise agreement, upon the final pronouncement of this Court that said heirs had no night thereto, which pronouncement was
naturally retroactive as of the date the compromise became final. The correlative rights of the parties were already fixed and established when the Civil Code of the
Philippines (granting the new right of rescission to an aggrieved party) took effect, and, surely, such rights should not be affected by said subsequent legislation. Art.
2253 of the Civil Code expressly ordains, as the majority adverts, that "new rights" (under the New Code) cannot "prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right"
originating from the prior legislation. Even without Art. 2253, in Balboa vs. Farrales, 3 this Court declared that Sec. 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of
homestead land during the period of five years subsequent to the issuance of patent, cannot be applied because it would impair and diminish the vested rights
acquired under Act No. 926, holding, as follows:

Vested right is "some right or interest in the property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downa vs.
Blount, 170 Fed. Rep., 15, 20).... Thus, in this jurisdiction, vested rights are protected from impairment by express constitutional provision. Therefore, the right vested
in Buenaventura Balboa by Act No. 926 cannot be divested, impaired or restricted by section 116 of Act 2874. Said right should be governed entirely and exclusively
by the provisions of Act No. 926, under which it was acquired..... The right, title and interest of the appellant having become vested under the provisions of Act No.
926, his rights cannot be affected by any law passed subsequent thereto. The provisions of Act No. 2874 cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the vested
right acquired by the appellant before its adoption.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, my vote is that the decision appealed from be modified in the sense that although it is affirmed in so far as the
Zaris are concerned, it is reversed in so far as the Concepcion are concerned, and the complaint of the Concepcions in Civil Case No. 1269 of the court a quo is
dismissed, with costs against defendant-appellant Santos in the case of the Zaris and against the Concepcions in the other case.

February 17, 2016

G.R. No. 175760

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

For a judicial confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the land subject of the application needs only to be alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to annul and set aside the Decision2 dated August 25, 2005 and Resolution3 dated November 7, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 72389.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed5 the Decision dated May 10, 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-
Carmen-Sogod, Cebu, which granted respondent Sogod Development Corporation’s (Sogod) application for original registration of title over Lot No. 2533, Cadastre
827-D, situated in Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu.6

On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and confirmation of land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896 square meters
and situated in Brgy. Tabunok, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu.7 The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 016-SO.8
Sogod claimed that it purchased the land "from Catalina Rivera per deed of absolute sale dated Oct[ober] 28, 1996[.]"9 It also averred that "by itself and through its
predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in open, continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]"10

On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Petition11 on the ground that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original
registration of title to alienable lands pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.12

The trial court issued an Order dated June 15, 2000 pronouncing a "general default against all persons except against the Solicitor General[.]"13

On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City filed an
Opposition on the ground that the land was previously forest land and "was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986."14 Thus,
it could not be registered without violating Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6940.15

Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Sogod also presented witnesses Celedonio Campos, Jr., Bonifacia Sugarol, and Ranito Quadra to prove its ownership
and possession of the land.16 According to their testimonies, the land "was originally in the possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of Catalina."17 "Catalina
inherited this land from her mother[.]"18 On October 28, 1996, Catalina sold the land to Sogod.19 "A tax clearance dated July 30, 1999 was issued by the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer, certifying that all taxes over the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 043-6156 had been paid."20 "Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 11096
A was issued in the name of [Sogod]."21

The Office of the Solicitor General did not present any controverting evidence.22

On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision23 granting the application.24 The Decision stated, in part:

The facts presented show that the applicant corporation and its predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and undisturbed
possession of the land, subject of this application for registration of title for not less than fifty (50) years or since time immemorial. The state did not present evidence
to controvert these facts.

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts which are supported by oral and documentary evidence, the court finds and so holds that the applicant, Sogod
Development Corporation represented by Celedonio Campos, Jr. has a registrable title to the land sought to be registered, hereby confirming the same and ordering
its registration under Act 494, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 over Lot 2533, Cad 827-D, situated in Tabunok, Sogod, Cebu, Island of Cebu, Philippines,
as described in Plan As-07-001393, and strictly in line with its Technical Description, upon the finality of this decision.25

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals.26 According to the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in allowing the titling of
Lot No. 2533 because:

(1) Sogod failed to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier;27
(2) The tax declarations presented by Sogod "are of recent vintage"28 and are "not accompanied by proof of actual possession . . . since June 12, 1945[;]"29

(3) The land was only declared alienable and disposable on January 17, 1986, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1611,30 "making it impossible for
[Sogod] and its predecessor-sin-interest to have possessed the land in concept of an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier[;]"31 and

(4) "Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution disqualifies private corporations from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands."32

On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu.33
It ruled that Sogod was able to prove that "it and its predecessors-in-interest ha[d] been in possession of [Lot No. 2533] since June 12, 1945 or earlier and the land
sought to be registered is an agricultural land[.]"34 Upholding the corporation’s right to file the application before the court a quo, the Court of Appeals held that lands
possessed in the manner and for the period required by Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 become ipso jure private lands.35 Judicial confirmation in this
case would only be a formality to confirm "the earlier conversion of the land into private land[.]"36

The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration37 of the Court of Appeals Decision. In the Resolution dated November 7, 2006, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.38 Hence, the present Petition for Review was filed. Respondent Sogod Development Corporation assigns
the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE TITLING OF LOT NO. 2533 DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO SHOW THAT IT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-ININTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER A BONAFIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION, GRANTING RESPONDENT’S
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2533 IN VIEW OF THE OPPOSITION DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 2000 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) STATING THAT SAID PROPERTY WAS ONLY DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ON
JANUARY 17, 1986.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE SINCE ARTICLE XII,
SECTION 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DISQUALIFIES PRIVATE CORPORATIONS FROM APPLYING FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF ALIENABLE
LANDS.
IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DATED AUGUST 2, 2001, GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT ON THE BASES OF TAX DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE OF RECENT VINTAGE.39

Respondent filed its Comment,40 to which petitioner filed its Reply.41 On May 30, 2011, the court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.42

Petitioner and respondent filed their memoranda on January 4, 201243 and October 15, 2014,44 respectively.

Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:

First, "whether the occupation of forest land prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land may be considered for purposes of complying with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of title[;]"45 and

Second, "whether [respondent] and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property in the manner and length of time required by law."46

Petitioner contends that since the "application for registration was filed on December 9, 1999, respondent could only be considered in bona fide possession for a
period of 13 years from the time [the land] was classified as alienable and disposable [in 1986]."47 It adds that any possession or occupation of the land prior to its
declaration as "alienable and disposable cannot be counted for purposes of acquisitive prescription because forest lands are not susceptible of [private
appropriation]."48 It further argues that Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, "applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural
land[,] [and] [f]orest lands are excluded."49

Moreover, petitioner contends that possession in good faith "is important in the consideration of whether the applicant has acquired a grant of registrable title from
the government."50 "The alienable nature of the land is essential to the bona fide claim of ownership and possession since June 12, 1945."51

Even if the court’s ruling in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic52 is applied, respondent’s possession would allegedly be short of the length of time required by
law.53 The earliest tax declaration presented by respondent is 1947, which was "short of the June 12, 1945 requirement of [the] law."54 According to petitioner, "[a]
statement that a tax declaration for the year 1945 existed does not equate to clear and convincing proof of possession required by law considering further that the
person who declared the property [could not] be precisely determined."55 Petitioner also "point[s] out that the total area . . . declared by respondent’s predecessor’s-
in-interest [sic] [was] at most 21,000 square meters as opposed to the area of 23,45656 [square] meters [that was] sought to be registered."57 Finally, according to
petitioner, "it does not appear that respondent submitted a document proving that Catalina Rivera inherited the property from her mother."58

On the other hand, respondent’s application, even when considered under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, "must still be dismissed for failure to prove
the existence of an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial."59

Respondent counters that factual issues

Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive

7.
MINDA S. GAERLAN
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 192717 March 12, 201
Petitioner filed an Application for original registration of title over a parcel of land. He allegedthat she acquired the property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land. OSGfiled an Opposition to petitioner s application for registration on the ground that the sub!ect landis a portion of the public do"ain# hence#
not registrable. Petitioner also "aintains that the sub!ectland is alienable and disposable. $o support her clai"# petitioner sub"its %&'(O certificationand asserts that
the land sub!ect of her application has been declared alienable and disposable in)*+, and that her possession through her predecessors-in-interest started in
)*+*. hether petitioner s application for registration of title /ill prosper. 'o. Applicants for registration of title "ust establish and prove0 1)2 sub!ect land for"s part of
thedisposable and alienable lands3 1+2 that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have beenin open# continuous# e4clusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the sa"e3 and 152 thathis possession has been under a bona fide clai" of o/nership since 6une )+# )*7,# or
earlier.&ach ele"ent "ust necessarily be proven by no less than clear# positive and convincingevidence3 other/ise the application for registration should be
denied.As to first requisite# %&'(O certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposablecharacter of the land. $he applicant "ust also sho/ sufficient proof
that the D&'( SecretaryOn the second and third requisites# petitioner failed to establish that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open# continuous#
e4clusive and notorious possession and occupation of thesub!ect land on or before 6une )+# )*7,. 8ased on the records# the earliest evidence of possessionthat
petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest had over the sub!ect property /as only in )*9,.

G.R. No. 192717 March 12, 2014

MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1
dated March 11 , 2010 and the Resolution2 dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN. The CA had reversed and set aside
the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMisamis Oriental, Branch 20, in LRC No. 92-05 and dismissed the application for registration of title filed by
petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan.

The records bear out the following factual antecedents:

On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application4 for original registration of title over a parcel of land known as Lot 18793, Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an
area of 1,061 square meters, more or less, and particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the North, by Lot 835, Cag. Cad; on the East, by Lot No. 4342-A of Subd. Plan; on the South,
by Lot 4342-K of Subd. Plan; and on the West, by lot 4342-C of Subd. Plan with an area of ONE THOUSAND SIXTY ONE (1,061) SQUARE METERS more or less
(Lot 4342-B - Sketch Plan).5

In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the above-mentioned property from Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land.6 She had the property declared for taxation purposes under her name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 998937 and 05 83 51.8 Attached
to the application are the following documents:

(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the three (3) Blue print copies;9

(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land;10

(c) Surveyor's Report of Survey or Surveyor' s Certificate;11

(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land;12 and

(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893.13

After finding petitioner's application sufficient in form and substance, the trial court set the case for initial hearing.

On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an Opposition14 to petitioner's application for registration
on the ground that (1) neither petitioner nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations attached to the petition do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of a bona fide acquisition of the subject land; (3) the claim of ownership based on Spanish title is no longer available for purposes of registration; and (4) the subject
land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable.

During the hearing, petitioner testified that (1) she is the applicant for registration of a parcel of land located at Buenavista Village, Carmen, Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City, known as Lot 18793, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of 1,061 square meters; (2) that she acquired said land through sale on November 28,
1989 from Mamerta Tan; (3) that after the sale, she declared the property for taxation purposes under her name; (4) that she was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 99893
and 058351 ; (5) that she has been religiously paying taxes thereon since 1989 up to 1991; and ( 6) that she took possession of the land and caused its survey.15
Petitioner also presented Mamerta Tan who testified that she is the vendor of the land subject of the present application and that she sold the land to petitioner in
1989. Mamerta averred that she became the owner of the said property in 1975 after she bought the land from Teresita Tan. She declared the property under her
name for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 36942.16

Another witness, Mr. Honesto Velez, the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, testified that he issued certifications or certified copies of records on file in his office
and he identified the certified photocopy of the Land History Card17 pertaining to Cadastral Lot 4342, Case No. 4 situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City under the
name of cadastral claimant Potenciano Abragan. The history card started with Tax Declaration No. 1645 in the name of Potenciano Abragan. Later, another tax
declaration, Tax Declaration No. 37129 in the name of Presentacion Eviofa, was issued. This tax declaration was subsequently replaced by Tax Declaration No.
37130. He stated that based on the records in their office, it appeared that petitioner is the owner of Lot 4342. Another claimant is Presentacion Eviota and the
remaining portion was in the name of Potenciano Abragan. Presentacion Eviota was also issued a tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 124750 covering an area of
897 square meters, but not involving the same parcel of land. Eviota's land was only a portion of Lot 4342. The original area of the land claimed by Abragan is 12,293
square meters.18

City Assessor Velez further testified that their records showed that petitioner possessed a 1,061-square meter portion of Lot 4342 covered by Tax Declaration No.
058351. All the transfers made over portions of this parcel of land were all recorded in the land history card on file with their office, thus paving the way for the
issuance of corresponding tax declaration to its new owners.19

Petitioner also presented and offered the following exhibits20 to support her application for registration of title, to wit:

1) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land,

2) Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ,

3) Tax Receipts,

4) Certified True Copy of Land History Card,

5) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan,

6) Tax Declaration in the name of Presentacion T. Eviota,

7) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano Abragan.

On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered Judgment21 granting petitioner's application for registration of title. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
There being no evidence presented by the oppositor, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding applicant Minda S. Gaerlan as owner in fee simple of the land subject
of this application and hereby decreeing that Lot 18793, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of One Thousand Sixty One (1 ,061) square meters, more
or less, be registered in her name [in] accordance with the technical description attached to the application.

SO ORDERED.22

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that the trial court erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is available
for private appropriation. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN.

On March 11, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision23 reversing and setting aside the ruling of the trial court and dismissing the application for registration of title filed
by petitioner.

The CA found that petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable. The CA stressed that the applicant for land
registration must prove that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable and that the land subject of the application falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA held that
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. Moreover, the CA observed that there is no evidence on record to establish that petitioner, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land and that she possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that petitioner is not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.24

Hence, petitioner is now before us claiming that the CA erred in denying her application for registration of title.

Petitioner asserts that her predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Abragan, possessed the subject property as early as 1929. She claims Potenciano was the one who
asked for the original survey of Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 with an original land area of 12,293 square meters, situated in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City. She averred that the
property subject of the present application consisting of an area of 1,061 square meters and known as Lot 18793, Cad-237, is a portion of Lot 4342, Cad-237. In
support of her claim, petitioner seeks to submit as additional evidence Bureau of Lands (BL) Form No. 700-2A25 of the Land Management Services which conducted
a survey on Lot 4342, Cad-237 on November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as the Cadastral Survey Claimant.

Petitioner also maintains that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and this land classification has long been approved by the DENR
Secretary. She points out that during the entire period of possession of Potenciano Abragan, the subject land had already been classified as alienable and disposable
land. To support her claim, petitioner submits as additional evidence the Certification26 issued by the CENRO stating that a parcel of land designated as Lot 4342,
Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City containing a total area of 12,293 square meters more or less falls within an area classified as Alienable and
Disposable under Project 8, Block I and Land Classification (LC) Map No. 5 85 certified and approved on December 31, 1925. She prays that she be allowed with
leave of, court to submit the aforementioned document in support of her application for registration.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she and her witnesses had testified on the issue of actual, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land, including the act of declaring the subject lot for tax purposes in their names and religiously paying the taxes of the land to the government. Thus,
petitioner argues that the CA erred in not declaring that she is entitled to registration of the subject land.

Respondent, through the OSG, filed a Comment27 asserting that only questions of law may be raised in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Respondent posits that in the present case, petitioner, for the first time and only in the present appeal, seeks the admission to evidence of
the following: (1) the Certification dated July 16, 2010 issued by the CENRO in Cagayan de Oro City to prove that Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 located in Patag, Cagayan de
Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I and LC Map No. 585 which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925
and (2) BL Form No. 700-2A which shows that Potenciano Abragan was the original claimant of the entire land denominated as Lot 4342 since 1929, to prove her
supposed acquisitive prescription of the contested lot.

Respondent argues that petitioner's attempt to introduce additional evidence is impermissible as its introduction would involve a review and assessment of the
evidence on record. Respondent adds that the determination of the probative value of evidence is a question of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari. Petitioner should have offered the aforementioned documents before the land registration court and while the case was pending appeal before
the CA as it is an appellate court with authority to receive evidence.

Moreover, respondent points out that BL Form No. 700-2A submitted by petitioner named Potenciano Abragan as the original claimant of the entire area known as
Lot 4342 but the same document does not show that petitioner is likewise a claimant of a part of Lot 4342 or that she derived title to the lot in question from Potenciano
Abragan. Petitioner's possession only started in 1989 when she acquired the lot from Mamerta Tan who in turn acquired the lot from Teresita Tan. But there is no
clear evidence showing how, when and from whom Teresita Tan acquired the subject lot.

Respondent cites the rule that the applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of
dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is respondent's contention that even if said BL Form No. 700-2A were
considered in this appeal, it would not help petitioner's cause because the document is bereft of any information showing that petitioner has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Hence, respondent maintains that the CA properly reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling granting petitioner's application for land registration since petitioner
failed to offer in evidence the necessary certification that the parcel of land applied for registration is alienable and disposable in character during the proceedings
below. Petitioner also did not present any certification from the DENR or a certified copy of any land classification map in order to establish irrefutably the fact that
the subject parcel of land is, in fact, alienable and disposable. Respondent claims that in the absence of such classification the land remains an unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.

Also, respondent avers that petitioner failed to present specific acts that would show the nature of her possession and that of her predecessors-in-interest. The trial
court's decision merely relied on the testimony of petitioner and her witnesses regarding the transfer of possession of the subject property from one possessor to
another without, however, adverting to the particulars of their respective possession thereof. To prove adverse possession, it is not enough to simply declare one's
possession and that of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest to have been adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in the concept of owner for the required
number of years. The applicant should present specific acts that would show such nature of possession. Thus, according to respondent, petitioner has failed to
positively establish a registrable title to the subject parcel of land.

Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title.

Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well
established that this Court is not a trier of facts . Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions
of law may be raised.28

The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand,
there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the facts,
the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.29 In Republic v. Vega,30 the Court held that when petitioner asks for
a review of the decision made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support
the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review of the CA's conclusion that the documents
and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed.

Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of her application has been declared alienable and disposable in 1925 and that her possession through
her predecessors-in-interest started in 1929. However, after a careful examination of the evidence adduced by petitioner, we find no error on the part of the CA in
dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove satisfactorily the requirements for registration provided under the law.

P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,31 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 107332
specifies those who are qualified to apply for registration of land. Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended provide
thus:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. -The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same; and (3) that his possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.33 Each element must necessarily be proven
by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence; otherwise the application for registration should be denied.34

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable.35

To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.36

To comply with the first requisite, petitioner submitted a CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad-237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the
alienable and disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner also submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925. We,
however, find that the attached certification is inadequate to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. We held in Republic v. TA .N Properties, Inc.37
that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient
proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable. We ruled in Republic v. TA .N
Properties, Inc. that:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.38
Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land
is indeed alienable and disposable.39

In Republic v. Medida,40 the Court explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of
a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of
the DENR Secretary s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.-Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," x x x. The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents. x x x41

Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to her petition deserves scant consideration since it was not presented during the proceedings before the
trial court or while the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner only presented the said certification for the first time before this Court. The genuineness
and due execution of the said document had not been duly proven in the manner required by law.42 Also, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly
discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.43 In the
present case, petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO certification was not presented and submitted during the proceedings before the trial court to
justify its belated submission to this Court.

As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner failed to establish that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12, 1945. Based on the records, the earliest evidence
of possession that petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest Mamerta Tan had over the subject property was only in 1975 when Mamerta Tan purchased the subject
lot from Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that she purchased the property from Teresita, the records are bereft of any evidence to show Teresita's mode
of acquisition of ownership over the subject lot or from whom she acquired the property and when her possession of the subject lot had commenced.1âwphi1

In addition, Honesto Velez, City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, merely testified on the tax declarations issued to certain persons including petitioner and Mamerta
Tan as enumerated in the Land History Card of Cadastral Lot 4342 but his testimony did not prove their possession and occupation over the subject property. What
is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.44 Here, it is not shown by clear and satisfactory evidence that petitioner by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest had possessed
and occupied the land in an open, exclusive, continuous and notorious manner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Notably, petitioner attempted to convince this Court that Potenciano Abragan is her predecessor-in-interest and was in possession of the subject property even
before 1929. However, there was absolutely no evidence proffered by petitioner that she derived her title to the property from Potenciano Abragan. Moreover, BL
Form No. 700-2A attached by petitioner to her present petition and sought to be submitted as additional evidence, does not in any way prove that Potenciano
Abragan was in possession and occupation of the property before 1929. At best, it merely shows that it was Potenciano who requested for an original survey of the
lot. More importantly, just like the CENRO certification, BL Form No. 700-2A could not be given any evidentiary weight and value since it was not presented before
the trial court and its genuineness and due execution has not been duly proven. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.45

In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) she and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, her application for registration of title of the subject property under P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-
MIN are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Josephine Wee vs. Felicidad Mardo
G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Felicidad Mardo was granted a registered Free Patent covering a lot situated in Silang, Cavite. She allegedly conveyed a portion of the said lot to
petitioner, Josephine Wee, through a deed of absolute sale. However, respondent
refused to vacate and turn over the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified. Relying on the aforementioned deed of absolute sale, petitioner filed
an Application for Original Registration of the said parcel of land. The respondent opposed such application alleging 1] that
she is the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land; and 2] that petitioner’s deed of absolute
sale is surreptitious. During the pendency of the case, respondent managed to register the land in her name. The RTC rendered a Decision granting the application
of petitioner. The trial court held that Josephine Wee is qualified to register the subject land in her name, and directed the Administrator of LRA to issue the
corresponding decree in her name based on the plan and technical description of said land as submitted by the applicant and the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite to issue title in her name. The Court of Appeals, upon appeal by respondent, reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby denying the application for
registration by petitioner. The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1)
of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was
not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement of possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14
(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the adverse, open and notorious possession and occupation of a person and his predecessor-in-interest over a parcel of land can defeat a certificate
of title.
RULING:
The petition deserves no merit

G.R. No. 202414 June 4, 2014

JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the June 26, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed and set aside the September
4, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City, Cavite (RTC), granting petitioner's "Application for Registration of Title."

Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

Respondent Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo, was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979, covering Lot No. 8348,
situated in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.

On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner, Josephine Wee, through a Deed of Absolute Sale,1 a portion of Lot No. 8348 known as Lot No.
8348-B, for a consideration of ₱250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent, however, refused to vacate and turn over the subject property claiming that the alleged
sale was falsified.

On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land located at Barangay Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite, known as Lot
No. 8349. Said application was amended on September 19, 1996, this time covering a parcel of land known as Lot 8348-B situated in Barangay Puting Kahoy,
Silang, Cavite. Petitioner claimed that she is the owner of the said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.

On September 19, 1997, respondent filed her Opposition to the Amended Application alleging 1] that she is the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land which is
the subject of the amended application; and 2] that petitioner’s deed of absolute sale is surreptitious.

On October 28, 2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Application alleging that the land described in the application was different from the land being claimed
for titling. The motion was, however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but
both were denied by the RTC.

Thereafter, petitioner completed her presentation of evidence and filed a formal offer which was admitted by the RTC.

On June 10, 2003, during the pendency of the case, respondent managed to register the land in her name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-1840.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on May 10, 2005 which was annotated on the title. A "Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Pleading and to Admit Attached Supplemental Complaint for Reconveyance" was filed by petitioner which was denied by the RTC on the ground that
a motion for reconveyance was different from an application for registration of title.

Consequently, respondent presented her own evidence, through the testimony of her counsel, who testified that the parcel of land subject of the application for
registration was the property she bought ten (10) years ago. Respondent, however, did not state from whom she bought it. As proof of her alleged ownership, she
presented copies of tax declarations in the absence of any deed of sale in her favor.

On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision2 granting the application of petitioner. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the applicant, Josephine Wee, as qualified to register the subject land in her name, and the Administrator of
LRA is hereby directed to issue the corresponding decree in her name based on the plan and technical description of said land as submitted by the applicant and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to issue title in her name.

SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent which was denied by the RTC. Hence, respondent appealed the decision before the CA, which case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 96934.

On June 26, 2012, the CA handed down a Judgment3 reversing and setting aside the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision, dated September 4, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch XVIII) of Tagaytay City, Cavite, in LRC No.
TG-647 is SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, applicant-appellee’s Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land located at Barangay Putting Kahoy, Silang Cavite, known as Lot No. 8349,
Cad. Lot 042118-011719-D of Silang Cadastre, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her
admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising any
acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement of possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

A copy of the decision was received by petitioner on July 2, 2012. On August 15, 2012, petitioner filed this subject petition for review challenging the CA decision.

Hence, this petition.

In advocacy of her petition, petitioner assigns the following

ERRORS:

I.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred and ruled contrary to law in not finding that petitioner is entitled to register the subject land under her name. Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, wherein petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest unexpectedly and unjustifiably continued to be in physical possession of the subject property
after the sale thereof to petitioner, the latter must be deemed to be in possession and occupation thereof through her predecessor-in-interest. Under the Public Land
Act and Presidential Decree No. 1529, the period of possession of an applicant’s predecessor-in-interest benefits and is credited in favor of the applicant.
II.

Moreover, petitioner was denied actual possession of the subject land by circumstances amounting to a fortuitous event. By express provision of Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, such fortuitous event does not affect her vested right to register the property under her name.

III.

The Court of Appeals likewise seriously erred and ruled contrary to the law and to the evidence in not finding that petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, respondent
Felicidad Mardo, had possession and occupation of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

IV.

In view of the fact that the validity of the sale of the subject parcel of land to petitioner in 1993 was duly established before the trial court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and considering further that the registration of the said land under respondents name was fraudulently secured, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and
to put an end to the long pending dispute between the parties, the Court of Appeals should have ordered the reconveyance of the subject parcel of land to the
petitioner as its rightful owner.

Petitioner presents the theory that she must be deemed to have been in possession and occupation of the subject property through respondent, her predecessor-
in-interest, who after the sale in 1993 and despite demands from her, unexpectedly and unjustifiably continued to occupy the property and refused to turn over
physical possession to her. Petitioner argues that it is not necessary that the person in possession should himself be the occupant as the occupancy can be held by
another in his name.

Moreover, petitioner also seeks reconveyance of the subject property arguing that by virtue of its fraudulent registration, respondent became a trustee of an implied
trust for her benefit, as its real owner, having validly acquired the same from respondent through an absolute deed of sale.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition deserves no merit.

P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Decree, governs the original registration proceedings of unregistered land. The subject application for original
registration was filed pursuant to Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, which provides the condition necessary for registration. Thus:

SEC 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(Emphasis supplied)

Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.4

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she
could not have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she had admitted that it was not
physically turned over to her. As she was not in actual and physical possession, she could not have exercised any acts of dominion over the subject property which
was essential to the requirement of possession and occupation contemplated under Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite, under the name of respondent Felicidad Gonzales.

In the case of Republic vs. Umali,5 this Court ruled that once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of
public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof.
Said title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in
Section 103 of PD 1529, which provides that:

Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. – Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. x x x After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered
land to all intents and purposes under this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, respondent’s registered patent in the corresponding Registry of Deeds is a veritable Torrens title and becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title upon
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of its issuance.6

For said reason, the order of the RTC directing the Administrator of LRA to issue a corresponding decree in petitioner’s name is null and void. A land registration
court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same
land would be null and void, since the principle behind the original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.7

Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.8 The certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse, open and
notorious possession. Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
A Certificate of Title Not
Subject to Collateral Attack

Petitioner argued that the rule on indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. In this case, she alleged that the respondent
fraudulently registered the subject property under her name after she (respondent) had already sold a portion thereof to her (petitioner). By virtue of the deed of sale,
petitioner insists that she is considered to be the real owner of the subject parcel of land.

The Court finds no merit in petitioner’s argument. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted
for such purpose

Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive

9. G.R. No. 212388 December 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and JUANA MENESES, represented by RODOLFO S. AGUINALDO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated November 8, 2013 and
Resolution dated April 29, 2014 of the Court or Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94 720, entitled Heirs of the Spouses Donato Sanchez and Juana Meneses, represented
by Rodolfo S. Aguinaldo v. Republic of the Philippines.

Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 45361 that covered Lot No. 854 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 26.2 In said petition, respondents made the following allegations:

1. That OCT No. 45361 was issued in the name of their predecessor-ininterest, the spouses Sanchez, pursuant to Decree No. 41812 issued in relation to a Decision
dated March 12, 1930 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan;

2. Said lot was declared for taxation purposes in the name of the spouses Sanchez and that when the latter died intestate, they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. Said Deed, however, could not be registered because the owner’s copy of OCT No. 45361 was missing; and

3. The Offices of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Lingayen and Dagupan, Pangasinan issued a certification that the copies of Decree No. 41812 and OCT No. 45361
could not be found among its records.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the CFI issued an Order dated June 24, 2001 giving due course thereto and ordered the requisite publication
thereof, among others. Meanwhile, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) requested the trial court, which the latter granted through its October
11, 2002 Order, torequire respondents to submit the following documents:

1. Certification from the RD that OCT No. 45361 was either lost or destroyed;

2. Copies of the technical description of the lot covered by OCT No. 45361, certified by the authorized officer of the Land Management Bureau/LRA; and

3. Sepia film plan of the subject lot prepared by the duly licensed geodetic engineer.

Due to difficulties encountered in securing said documents, respondents moved for the archiving of the case, which motion was granted by the trial court. It was later
revived when respondents finally secured the said documents.

The petition was published anew and trial later ensued, with the following documents submitted by respondents in evidence, to wit:

1. Decision dated March 12, 1930 (written in Spanish) in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920 adjudicating Lot No. 854 in favor of the spouses
Donato Sanchez and Juana Meneses which was certified by the LRA as a true copy of the original; and

2. Certified true copy of the Registrar’s Index Card containing the notation that OCT No. 45361 covering Lot No. 854 was listed under the name of Donato Sanchez.

On January 11, 2008, the LRA submitted its Report pertaining to the legality of the reconstitution sought in favor of respondents, the relevant portions of which, as
quoted by the CA in the assailed Decision, are as follows:

(2) From Book No. 35 of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots on file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears that Decree No. 418121 was issued to
Lot No. 854, Dagupan Cadastre on January 12, 1931, in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920. Copy of the said decree, however, is no longer
available in this Authority.

(3) The plan and technical description of lot 854, cad 217, Case 3, Dagupan Cadastre, were verified correctby this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the
same have been approved under (LRA) PR-07-01555-R pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.

On June 30, 2008, however, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Decision3 dismissing the petition for lack of sufficient evidence, ruling that RA No. 26 only
applies in cases where the issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted has been established, only that it was lost or destroyed. While acknowledging the
existence of Decree No. 418121 which was issued for the lot subject of the case, the RTC nevertheless held that there is no established proof that OCT No. 45361
was issued by virtue of said Decree.
Aggrieved, respondents moved for reconsideration of the above Decision, insisting that there was sufficient evidence to prove the issuance of OCT No. 45361.
Instead of filing a comment thereto, the RD of Dagupan City manifested that OCT No. 45361 had been superseded by TCT No. 10202 issued to a certain Rufino
Mariñas with notation that the land it covered was "originally registered on the 29th day of January, [1931] x x x as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121
issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920." Furthermore, TCT No. 10202 was cancelled by TCT No. 44365 and later by TCT No. 80792 in the name of Dagupan
Doctors Villaflor Memorial Hospital, both bearing a note which reads, "The name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is not available as per certification of the
[RD of Lingayen], dated August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and 107416, respectively."

Disagreeing with the trial court’s findings and holding that Lot 854 was judicially awarded to respondents’ predecessor-in-interest in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO
Cad. Record No. 920,the CA reversed the RTC ruling on appeal and directed the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 in favor of herein respondents.

The CA held that even though respondents were unable to present the documents necessary for reconstitution of title as enumerated under Section 2 of RA No. 26,
particularly (a) to (e) thereof, the documentary pieces of evidence presented by respondents fall under paragraph (f) of said provision and are sufficient to warrant
the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361. In this regard, the CA emphasized that the certificates of title which the RD manifested to have superseded OCT No. 45361 all
bear the notation to the effect that Lot No. 854 was originally registered on January 29, 1931 as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121 issued in G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 920, the name of the registered owner of which is not available. This, to the CA, substantially complies with the requirement enunciated in
Republic v. Tuastumban4 that the documents must come from official sources which recognize the ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in the assailed Resolution, petitioner lodged the instant petition questioning the sufficiency
of the documents presented by respondents to warrant the reconstitution of the alleged lost OCT No. 45361.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and convincing proof has been adduced that OCT No. 45361 was issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The
Decision dated March 21, 1930 and the Registrar’s Index Card containing the notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor mention that Decree No. 418121 was
issued to support the issuance of OCT No. 45361. At this point, it is well to emphasize that a petition for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for obvious reasons.

Assuming arguendo that respondents were able to sufficiently prove the existence of OCT No. 45361 considering the totality of the evidence presented, the Court
finds that reconstitution thereof is still not warranted, applying Section 15 of RA No. 26. Said provision reads:

Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate
oftitle was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained
in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. x x x
As explicitly stated in the above-quoted provision, before a certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed may be reconstituted, it must first be proved by the
claimants that said certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or destroyed, among others. Here, the mere existence of TCT No. 10202, later cancelled
by TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 80792, which bear the notations:

originally registered on the 29th day of January, [1931] x x x as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121 issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920.

The name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is not available as per certification of the [RD of Lingayen], dated August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and
107416, respectively.

clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek to be reconstituted is no longer in force, rendering the procedure, if granted, a mere superfluity.

Additionally, if indeed OCT No. 45361 was lost or destroyed, it is necessary that the RD issue a certification that such was in force at the time of its alleged loss or
destruction. Definitely, the RD cannot issue such certification because of the dearth of records in support of the alleged OCT No. 45361 in its file. The presentation
of alleged derivative titles––TCT No. 10202, TCT No. 44365 and TCT No. 80792––will not suffice to replace this certification because the titles do not authenticate
the issuance of OCT No. 45361 having been issued by the RD without any basis from its official records. As a matter of fact, it isa wonder how the derivative titles
were issued when the existence of OCT No. 45361 could not be established based on the RD’s records. The RD failed to explain how it was able to make an
annotation of the original registration of the lot under OCT No. 45361 when respondents are now asking for its reconstitution. It is also highly suspicious why
respondents are asking the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 when, supposedly, it has already been cancelled and new titles have already been issued based on
transfers purportedly made by respondents. Lastly, of what use is the reconstituted OCT No. 45361 when the lot has already been transferred to other persons. It
will practically be of no value or worth to respondents.

If the respondents still insist on the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361, the proper procedure is to file a petition for the cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No.
418121 following the opinion of then LRA Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep. In said Opinion, Administrator Ulep explained the reason for the necessity of the petition
for cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, thus:

1. Under the premises, the correctproceeding is a petition for cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and for issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-
issued decree.

In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing a
petition for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such decree and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued decree.

"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to his Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept
the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decreeunder the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the lower court
findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the
issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in their opposition.

Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the amended petition subject to the private respondent’s being given the opportunity to
answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing evidence shall be given the
parties."

Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the same is valid and
intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy of such decree is intact.
What is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?

Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD 1529 which states that: "The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree
of registration." This provision is significant because it contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old decree will not be canceled and no
new decree issued, the corresponding OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while the decree upon which it was based shall bear
the signature of the past Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of the law which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of
registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.

2. Republic Act No. 26 for reconstitution of lost OCT will not lie.

It is so basic under Republic Act No. 26 that the same shall only apply in cases where the issuance of OCT has been established, only that it was lost or destroyed
under circumstances provided for under said law. Again, within the context of this discussion, RA No. 26 will not apply because in this case, there is no established
proof that an OCT had been issued. In other words, the applicability of RA No. 26 hinges on the existence of priorly issued OCT.

Will reconstitution of Decree lie then? Again, the answer is no. There is no showing that the decree is lost. In fact, it can be established that a decree, pursuant either
to a cadastral proceeding or an ordinary land registration case, has been issued. Under existing land registration laws and jurisprudence, there is no such thing as
reconstitution of a decree. RA No. 26 cannot likewise be the basis because the latter refers to an OCT and not a decree of registration.

3. For as long as a decree has not yet been transcribed (entered in registration book of the RD), the court which adjudicated and ordered for the issuance of such
decree continues to be clothed with jurisdiction.

This matter has been settled in several cases, to name a few:

"There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.1âwphi1 The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the
second assignment error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for
the reason that no motion therefore has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered."
"We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment may be
enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party. And his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party." (Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315) Furthermore, in Gomez v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 503, the Supreme Court declared that:

". . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,)
until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it."
(Also cited in Labarada v. CA and Ramos v. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418, 423-424)

4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still be under the name of the original
adjudicate.

It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent. The heirs shall have
the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be prohibited from filing the necessary petition.

As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be the same as that of the original
decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor modified; hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicatee.

In sum, from the foregoing, it may be safely concluded that for as long as the decree issued in an ordinary or cadastral registration case has not yet been entered,
meaning, it has not yet been transcribed in the Registration Book of the concerned Registrar of Deeds, such decree has not yet attained finality and therefore may
still be subject to cancellation in the same land registration case. Upon cancellation of such decree, the decree owner (adjudicatee or his heirs) may then pray for
the issuance of a new decree number and, consequently, pray for the issuance of an original certificate of title based on the newly issued decree of registration.

As such, We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the R TC that reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 is not warranted under the circumstances, albeit on a different
ground.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 8, 2103 and its
Resolution dated April 29, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94720 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 in Dagupan
City in Cad. Case No. 2001-0043-D is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

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G.R. No. 163994

[Back to Main]
THIRD DIVISION
EASTWORLD MOTOR G.R. No. 163994
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
Represented by Its President, Present:
PETER TY,
Petitioner, Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
– versus – Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
SKUNAC CORPORATION,
Represented by Its Alleged President Promulgated:
LARRY LIM; and MIGUEL LIM,
Respondents. December 16, 2005
x — — — — — — —— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —— — — — — — x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
T his Court has consistently held that a re constituted certificate of title is void if the owner’s duplicate certificate is not lost or destroyed, but
is in the possession of another person. Nonetheless, a valid transfer can issue from the void reconstituted title if an innocent purchaser for
value intervenes. A finding of “good faith” and “for value” requires a judicious evaluation of the facts of each case.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 5, 2003 Decision[2] and the June 3, 2004
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -GR SP No. 72615. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. Resultantly, the assailed order of x x x RTC, Branch 4,
Manila in LRC Case 309 is declared NULL and VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. The Register of Deeds of Manila is ordered
to cancel the new owner’s duplicate copies pursuant to the assailed order. The writ of injunction issued is hereby made permanent. x x x
Miguel Lim is ordered to pay [respondent corporation] attorney’s fees in the amount of P150,000.00 and to pay the costs.
“The Intervention of Eastworld is hereby ordered DISMISSED.”[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
The CA narrates the facts as follows:
“Sometime in February 2, 2001, x x x Miguel Lim, then presenting himself as [p]resident of [respondent] corporation filed wit h x x x [the]
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila[,] a petition for the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in lieu of the l ost TCT No. 207104
pursuant to RA 26 as amended by P.D. 1425.
“As one of the jurisdictional requirements, [Miguel Lim] execu ted an affidavit of loss and also attached a [photocopy] of the alleged title to the
petition.
“On the basis of said proofs and compliance of other jurisdictional requirements[, the trial] court issued an order on March 7, 2001, setting the
petition for ex-parte reception of evidence before LRA Clerk of Court Atty. Josefina L. Montañer. The reception of evidence was set on March
28, 2001, transcript of said proceedings [was] attached to [the] records.
“On May 22, 2001, [the trial] court issued an order dir ecting the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No.
207104 in lieu of the lost one and to deliver the same to [Miguel Lim or his] authorized representative. A copy of said order was served upon
a hand written request of [Mig uel Lim] and on June 25, 2001 a certificate of finality was issued by the chief, clerks of court division of the Land
Registration Authority.
“As a consequence, [a petition to annul order and injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order was fil ed with the CA] with the lone
issue raised, to wit:
‘ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 4 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.’
“In support of its submission, [respondent corporation] advance[d] the following arguments:
‘DISCUSSION/ARGUMENTS
‘In the above-mentioned Affidavit of Loss, x x x Miguel Lim falsely asserted that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 207104 was lost.
‘x x x Miguel Lim’s above averment is a total lie, calculated to mislead the Regional Trial Court of Manila into issuing a new owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 207104.
‘The truth of the matter is that x x x Miguel Lim was fully cognizant that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 207104 is in the custody and
possession of Larry Lim, President of [respondent] -corporation.
‘Miguel Lim was never in custody or possession of the said title.
‘Clearly, the subject Order was issued on the basis of the false and fraudulent representation of x x x Miguel Lim, and is, therefore, null
and void, and must be annulled and set aside.’
“[Despite] due notice, [Miguel Lim] never filed any comment, much less a memorandum as required, [despite] the time extension granted him.
“On the other hand, [Petitioner] Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation, represented by its [c]hairman, Peter Ty filed a Moti on to Intervene
which [the Court of Appeals] granted in an Order dated January 14, 2003. Intervenor assert[ed] its ownership being a purchaser in good faith
of such property. It submits that [respondent corporation] must bear the loss being responsible for the loss of title.”[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Because the owner’s certificate of title was not lost but was in fact in the possession of the true owner, the reconstituted one was deemed void
and its cancellation ordered by the CA.[6]
The appellate court further ruled that petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith and f or value.[7] The latter should have been on guard,
because the Affidavit of Loss was annotated at the back of the reconstituted title. Moreover, petitioner verified the identity of the seller of the
property only after the sale had taken place.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues in this wise:
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring as null and void the reconstituted title more than one (1) year after the same was
issued.
“Whether or not the mere fact that the TCT 207104 shown to petitioner is a reconstituted one overturn the fact that petitioner is a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s intervention. The nullification of the new (reconst ituted) owner’s duplicate
certificate issued by the RTC Branch 4, Manila in LRC Case No. 309 cannot prejudice petitioner’s rights.
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to note that it is Larry Lim’s negligent act of failing to update the corporation’s SEC
documents which made the sale of the subject lot possible.”[10]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Reconstituted Title
Being intertwined, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner will initially be addressed by the Court. Also, a discussion of these
issues will lead to a resolution of the first one.
At the outset, the Court observes that the applicable law in applying for a replacement of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title is PD
1529. New Durawood Company v. Court of Appeals [11] clarified that RA No. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of
lost original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds.[12] Respondent Miguel Lim procured the reconstituted title on the basis of RA No.
26.
At any rate, the procedure employed for the issuance of the reconstituted certificate of title has not been raised as an issu e in the present
case. The controversy relates primarily to petitioner’s right as purchaser of the property co vered by the replaced certificate.
Ownership Merely Evidenced
by the Certificate of Title
This Court has consistently held that when the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in th e possession of another
person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.[13] Reconstitution can v alidly
be made only in case of loss of the original certificate.[14] The rationale for this principle is summarized in Strait Times v. Court of
Appeals,[15] from which we quote:
“The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate is not
necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence
of title over a particular property.[16]
Applying the above ruling to the instant case, the certificate of title procured by Miguel Lim was clearly void. Respondent corporation’s
presentation of the original owner’s duplicate certificate of title showed to the court the physical e xistence, and the corporation’s possession,
of the certificate. The existence of the document is in fact unrebutted by petitioner.
Buyers in Good Faith
Settled is the rule that no valid transfer certificate of title (TCT) can issue from a void TCT, unless an innocent purchaser for value had
intervened.[17] An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other perso n has a right to
or interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the b uyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property.[18] The protection given to innocent purchasers for value is
necessary to uphold a certificate of title’s efficacy and conclus iveness, which the Torrens system ensures.[19]
In the last analysis, good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of intention. But in ascertaining the intention that impels one on a given occasion,
the courts are necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and other outward acts by which the motive may safely be
determined.[20] Naturally, a finding of good faith depends on the factual circumstances of each case. The absence of any knowledge or
circumstance that ought to put a person on inqui ry implies good faith.
CA’s Finding Not
Supported by Evidence
The evidence considered by the CA supposedly supported the finding that petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. This
Court finds that evidence wanting. We quote the pertinent portion of the appellate court’s Decision:
“x x x. A careful reading of TCT No. [207104] will readily show that the affidavit of loss which was the alleged basis for th e issuance of a new
title was annotated [at] the back of said title. x x x [Petitioner] could not close its eyes to such fact and that it should have been sufficient
basis for it to be on guard and cause the necessary investigation as to the truth of the allegation contained in said affidav it of loss. Having
failed to do so, it cannot claim that it is a purchaser in good faith.
“Besides, records undeniably show that the alleged SEC certification [petitioner] secured and which it now presents to [alleg e] good faith is
dated only September 10, 2002. Clearly the same was secured long after the sale took place and only after [respondent] instituted the action
to annul. Under such circumstances, the allegation of good faith is negated.”[21]
The annotation of an affidavit of loss on a reconstituted certificate is a direct result of the reconst itution. The annotation does not necessarily
categorize every purchaser of property covered by the reconstituted certificate as a purchaser in bad faith. As a rule, the annotation serves
as a fair notice that the reconstituted certificate might be defect ive and inferior to an already existing original certificate of title. Hence,
purchasers should make the necessary investigation regarding the procurement of property covered by a reconstituted certifica te.[22]
The present case, however, presents circumst ances that make such an investigation futile. Thus, the annotation of the Affidavit of Loss on the
reconstituted certificate cannot, by itself, be the basis of a finding of either good or bad faith.
First, the property is titled under the name of responde nt corporation, which was also the party that petitioned for the reconstituted
certificate. Second, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on July 5, 2002, between petitioner and Skunac Corporation, as represented by
Miguel Lim.[23] Third, the Verification and Certification attached to the Petition for the Issuance of Lost Owner’s Copy of TCT was signed by
Lim as president of the corporation.[24] Fourth, the Secretary’s Certificate that authorized Lim for the judicial reconstitution of the lost duplicate
original was prepared by Lani G. W enceslao, the corporate secretary of Skunac Corporation.[25][26] appear as the president and the corporate
secretary, respectively.[27]Significantly, in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), both Lim and Wenceslao, both of
whom are stockholders of respondent corporation,
This Court also disagrees with the CA’s finding that the allegation of good faith was negated by the SEC Certification, which stated that Lim
was president of Skunac Corporation. Although dated September 10, 2002, the Certification was not a substantial proof that petitioner had
failed to verify the records prior to the sale on July 5, 2002.[28] The Certification had obviously been procured to address respondent’s Petition
to Annul the Order of judicial reconstitution, filed on September 4, 2002.[29] Moreover, the Certification simply confirmed that on June 1 0,
2002, prior to the sale, Lim was elected president.
Further Proceedings Necessary
The Court is not prepared to rule categorical ly that petitioner was a purchaser in good faith and for value, and therefore entitled to the property
covered by the subject certificate of title. The right of respondent corporation to due process would be violated if it is not given the opportunity
to prove that petitioner was not an innocent
purchaser. Indeed, the CA should have ordered further proceedings to determine whether petitioner’s right should prevail over respondent ’s.
The procedure to be followed when trial is necessary for cases involving the annulment of judgment is stated in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court:
“Sec. 6. Procedure. – The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of the evidence
may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.”
This Court observes that the assailed Decision failed to addre ss many questions that may shed light on the present controversy, as follows: (1)
How did Larry Lim obtain possession of the original duplicate certificate of title, when the SEC records were silent as to hi s involvement in the
corporation? (2) Was the original duplicate certificate of title really lost? (3) Who was the true president of the corporation? (4) Was the
corporation negligent in failing to update its SEC records? (5) Was the sale valid?
Petitioner’s contention that the case had already bee n litigated when respondent allegedly filed an injunction case before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on August 29, 2002, should also be addressed.[30]
The instant case cannot be fully settled by voiding a reconstituted certificate on the basis of the e xistence of the duplicate original. The rights
of a purchaser of the property covered by the reconstituted certificate should also be determined.
Another Issue:
Indefeasibility of Title
Petitioner claims that the indefeasibility of a title one year after its entry bars respondent corporation from annulling the trial court’s
judgment. This argument must necessarily fail. As discussed earlier, the reconstituted certificate is void. Consequently, it may be attacked
anytime.[31] Demetriou v. Court of Appeals[32] affirms that the remedy to nullify an order granting reconstitution is a petition for annulment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the appellate court for reception of evidenc e in conformity with
this Decision. The assailed CA Decision is PARTLY AFFIRMED, only insofar as it declared the reconstituted certificate of title null and void .
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
W E C O N C U R :
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Chairman’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 11-29.

[2] Id., pp. 34-38. Sixth Division. Penned by Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Delilah Vidallon -Magtolis (Division
chairperson) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid (member).
[3] Id., p. 40.
[4] Id., pp. 37-38.
[5] Assailed Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 35-36. Citations omitted.
[6] Id., pp. 4 & 37.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] The case was deemed submitted for decision on April 29, 2005, upon this Court’s receipt of respondent’s Memorandum, signe d by Atty.
Crisostomo A. Quizon. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Arniel N. Bondoc, was received by this Court on April 27, 2005.
[10] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 183.
[11] 324 Phil. 109, February 20, 1996.
[12] Id., p. 118.
[13] Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 31, 44, March 15, 2002; New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil.
109, 120, February 20, 1996; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 158, 162, November 14, 1994; Serra v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA
482, 494, March 22, 1991.
[14] Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424, 432, March 12, 1987.
[15] 356 Phil. 217, August 28, 1998.
[16] Id., p. 230, per Panganiban, J.
[17] Cayana v. Court of Appeals, 426 SCRA 10, 22, March 18, 2004; Pineda v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 438, 447, August 25, 2003; Tenio-
Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 550, 560, March 1, 1994; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 495, September 10,
1985; Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367, 377, February 28, 1963.
[18] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 491, 495-496, November 6, 1997; Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 555;Duran v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, p. 494; Fule v. De Legare, supra, p. 374.
[19] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra; Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 462, 476, February 9, 1996.
[20] Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, (1994 rev. ed.), p. 147.
[21] Assailed Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 37.
[22] See Jose v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 735, 742, December 26, 1990; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 865, 872, December 27,
1979.
[23] Rollo, p. 84.
“A party dealing with the president of a corporation is entitled to assume that he has the authority to enter, on behalf of t he corporation, into
contracts that are within the scope of the powers of said corporation and that do not violate any statute or rule on public policy.” People’s
Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 357 Phil. 850, 867, October 7, 1998;Yao Ka Sin Trading v. Court of Appeals, 209
SCRA 763, 782, June 15, 1992 (citing Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of the Private Corporations, Vol. 2 [perm. ed.], 1969 rev. vol., p. 614.)
[24] Id., p. 61.
[25] Id., p. 62.
[26] General Information Sheet dated January 6, 2001, Annual Meeting; id., p. 96.
[27] Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information dated September 10, 2002; id., p. 95.
[28] Deed of Absolute Sale; id., pp. 84-85.
[29] Petition to Annul Order and for Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order; id., pp. 47 -54.
[30] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 181.
[31] Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra; New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,
supra; Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra.

G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of
respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title in her possession.

On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against
the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of
Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The
parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the
execution of the contract.

IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to
pay damages to INK.

IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded
and revoked.

On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was actually no genuine issue as to any material fact.

On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7 October 1991 an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except
the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.

On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as
mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK
alleged that the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground that the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK
over the property was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the
Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.

On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion involved the registrability of the
document of sale, and she was not made a party to the main case.

On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616)
in open court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new
transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.2

On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its order by directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. 3

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as
they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration
of its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the certificates of title.

Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for
intervention informing said court that the sale of the properties was not executed by it but was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void.
The trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith,
IDP brought the matter before the SEC which later declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable decision in similarly seeking
the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.

Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together
with such instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails
to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529
clearly states:

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which
divests the title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court,
after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or
memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding
owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if there was unanimity among the
parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial it should
be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly belonged.4

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.5

The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court was for specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such
action was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court.6 When IDP, the defendant in the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity
of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general
jurisdiction.

Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to
the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of
the property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have the same
registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender
of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction.
7 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register
of Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title
to be surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the principal action.8 This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits.

The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial
court directing the surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice
her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to
the new transfer certificates of title. This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable
from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short,
the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent
of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the property.9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register
of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the
same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided. Courts
should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
litigations because of the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.