PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, Petitioners, v. HON.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE,

Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Willy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo.
Pablo Santero in turn, who died was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero .com : virtual law library

Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance with the respondent court to include
Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted directing the
administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate
of Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider
said Order.

Amended Order was issued by respondent Court directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to the additional three (3) children
of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others that in her previous
motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three (3)
children who were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares
in the inheritance of Pablo Santero

another Order was issued by the respondent court directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three additional recipients or
children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on the oppositors’ Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to
the Movants." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed
and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the
guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83 because
these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They further allege that the administrator of the estate of
Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held
in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are
derived.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Whether the private respondents are entitled to allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late Pablo Santero and not the intestate
estates of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti, parents of their late legitimate son Pablo Santero.

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." In view of the barrier present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private respondents are
excluded from the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

"Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the
family.
brary

"Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them." cralaw virtua1aw library

The fact that the private respondents are age, gainfully employed or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowances under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased,
the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the
provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with
respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

Page 1 of 14
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO
SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, Oppositors-Appellants.

Gelacio Sebial died intestate in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in
1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly
begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.

After hearing, the lower court in its order of January 16, 1961 appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found that the descedent left an estate
consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent’s estate
was invalid and ineffective.

The oppositors filed a motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the grounds that the decedent’s estate was valued at less than six thousand
pesos and that it had already been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding.

On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent’s estate allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land,
with a total value of nine thousand pesos, all located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors registered their opposition to the inventory
on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent’s estate.

The administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her
the parcels of land

The probate court issued an order suspending action on the pending incidents in view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. It ordered the parties
to prepare a complete list of the properties belonging to the decedent, with a segregation of the properties belonging to each marriage

Oppositors Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of Balbina Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and
Leoncia Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land. They alleged that the conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel
of land, containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly purchased with money coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis.
They further alleged that the said seven-hectare land was sold by the children of the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado.

The lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another inventory. In compliance with that order she submitted an inventory dated
November 17, 1961, wherein she reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and added two other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at
P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. The oppositor interposed an
opposition to the said inventory.

The oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition" which was based on their own inventory

The lower court approved the second inventory dated November 17, 1961 because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven
parcels of land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent’s estate. In another order also dated December 11, 1961 the lower court granted
the motion of the administratrix dated May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who
are in possession of the parcels of land should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in her possession and
administration of the same. The lower court denied the oppositors’ motion for "revision of partition."

Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed
beyond the three-month period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court;

Oppositors’ contention in their motion for reconsideration that the probate court had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated November 17,
1961 because the administratrix filed it after three months from the date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month period prescribed in
section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent’s estate and retains that
jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of
jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal

The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the decedent’s estate is less than five thousand pesos and he had no debts, the
estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit of six
thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the decedent’s estate was "not more than five thousand pesos",
in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower court’s omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of
evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not such a
determination.
EMILIO ADVINCULA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, and

Page 2 of 14
ENRIQUE A. LACSON,Respondents.

Emilio Advincula, on November 22, 1954, appointed, special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, In due course, he
was, on February 12, 1955, appointed regular administrator of said estate. After Advincula had qualified as such, the brothers of the deceased, who left
no issue, submitted to the court, for allowance, a document purporting to be her last will and testament. Petitioner opposed the probate thereof upon the
ground that it did not bear the signature of the deceased; that the signature thereon, if hers, was secured through fraud and duress; and that, the
instrument had not been executed with the requisite formalities

Enrique Lacson, one of the brothers of the deceased, filed a motion praying that he be appointed administrator of said estate, in lieu of petitioner herein,
for the reason that said respondent is the executor named in the aforementioned alleged will.

It was alleged that the present administrator is incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he being foreign to the estate, and
without changing or removing him as such would be disastrous to the estate and to the heirs named in the will of the decedent."

"The Court: The appointment of Emilio Advincula as administrator is hereby revoked and in his stead, the oppositor, Enrique A. Lacson, is hereby
appointed administrator of this intestate estate.

"The former administrator, Emilio Advincula, is hereby ordered to submit within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, his final account covering the entire
period of his administration and should it appear that any deficiency has been incurred by him during his incumbency, his bond shall answer for said
deficiency."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond, letters of administration was issued to him, and he tried to take possession of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner instituted the present action for certiorari, against Lacson and Judge Teodoro, to annul his aforesaid orders upon the ground that the same
were issued with grave abuse of discretion

Lacson’s appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator of the estate of Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon the fact that the former is
named executor in the alleged will of said deceased.

Section 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides: "When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the
cha

person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules."

Besides, the discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the appointment of an administrator of the estate
of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even
authorize the revocation thereof, until the alleged will has been "proved and allowed by the court." Rule 83, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is plain and
explicit on this point.

"If after letters of administration have been granted on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the
letters of administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the letters to the court, end
render his account within such time as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will shall be
as hereinbefore provided."

A stranger to deceased may be competent, capable and fit to administer her estate, in much the same as a member of her immediate family could be
incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either to her or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and, as
such, one of her forced heirswhether she died testate or intestate. Lastly, Advincula has not been found guilty of any specific act or omission constituting
one of the legal grounds, enumerated in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the removal of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is clear that
respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as administrator of the estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson
Advincula.

HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA, Namely: FE, ELIAS, JR. and SERVANDO, ALL SURNAMED LORILLA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, HON. FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA and SHERIFF HONORIO P. SANTOS, Respondents.

Commercial Credit Corporation (now known as Pentacapital Finance Corporation and hereinafter referred to as PENCAPITAL) filed a complaint with

Page 3 of 14
the Makati Court for a sum of money against Sanyu Machineries Agencies, Inc., Sanyu Chemical Corporation, and several other defendants, among
whom was Elias Lorilla, (now deceased) who had acted as sureties for the two corporate debtors.

PENCAPITAL sought for, and obtained from the Makati Court, a writ of attachment on the real property of defendant Elias L. Lorilla covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 298986, and which levy was duly annotated on the certificate of title concerned.

Elias L. Lorilla executed a dacion en pago over the property attached in favor of the Joint Resources Management Development Corporation by reason
of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 298986 in the name of Elias L Lorilla was cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No 114067 in
the name of JRMDC. But the levy caused to be made by PENCAPITAL over the property was carried over to the new certificate of title

JRMDC filed suit against PENCAPITAL for the cancellation of the latter’s levy on the property in question with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila
Makati Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment in favor of PENCAPITAL and against the defendants therein, including Elias L. Lorilla.

Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision by Alfredo Concepcion, then counsel of record of defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever
was interposed from said judgment by said lawyer in behalf of defendant Lorilla.

Motion of PENCAPITAL, the Makati Court issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5262 and PENCAPITAL thereafter proceeded against the
property covered by TCT No. 298986 in the name of defendant Lorilla.

Pasig Court rendered decision dismissing JRMDC’s complaint for the cancellation of the levy on attachment on the Lorilla property, ruling that the
dacion en pago executed by defendant Lorilla in favor of JRMDC cannot prevail over the prior writ of attachment duly annotated on the property in
favor of PENCAPITAL.

Heirs of Elias L. Lorilla, filed a motion to quash the writ of execution issued by the Makati Court, arguing that since defendant Elias L Lorilla passed
away one year and three months before the Makati Court. rendered decision the case should have been dismissed insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is concerned,
in keeping with Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

Makati Court, the motion to quash said writ of execution, ruling that the judgment in Civil Case No 5256 having become final, it is now beyond its
authority to amend it by dismissing the same insofar as defendant Elias L. Lorilla is concerned.

Whether Section 21 of Rule 3 and Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court are applicable in the present case.

Whether petitioners, heirs of Elias Lorilla, were deprived of their right to due process of law.

"SECTION 21. Where claim does not survive. — Where the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendant’s death, the action "shall be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially provided in these
rules." Petitioners argue that this manner is provided for in Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. 6 As contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, the action has to be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased defendant. 7 The claim becomes a mere incident in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased where the whole matter may
be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and distribution of the estate.

However, the records do not show if any notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262
before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not
be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice. Neither could the petitioners have been made aware of the trial
court’s judgment adverse to their father, for all notices and orders of the court were sent to Lorilla’s counsel of record, who did not bother to inform the
parties concerned of Elias Lorilla’s death. Apparently, Lorilla’s counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his client, as the
Rules require.

As far as the Makati Court was concerned, until the Writ of Execution was issued and the levy thereof on August 5, 1993, Lorilla continued to be
represented by counsel of record, Atty. Concepcion; and that upon service of a copy of the decision on said counsel at the latter’s address, Lorilla was
deemed to have been validly served notice of the judgment. 10 The failure of Atty. Concepcion to serve notice on the court and the adverse parties
regarding his client’s death binds herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a
client is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.

Petitioners claim that their right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals did not annul the decision of the Makati Court dated April 5,
1989. They claim that as heirs of Elias Lorilla, they would be deprived of their lawful inheritance without due process, as they were not parties to the
case where the adverse decision against their father was rendered. Said judgment, they posit, cannot be enforced against them because the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over them, nor over the estate of Elias Lorilla.

But while petitioners were not properly substituted for Elias Lorilla as defendants, absent any notice of his death, it could not be said that petitioners
were deprived of due process of law, for as far as the trial court was concerned, they were not parties to the case.

Moreover in this case, we find that the property which petitioners claim as their lawful inheritance, was no longer part of the estate of Elias Lorilla at the
time of his death. For Elias Lorilla had earlier executed a dacion en pago over this property in favor of the Joint Resources Management Development
Corporation (JRMDC). By reason thereof, Lorilla’s transfer certificate of title was cancelled, and a new one was issued in favor of JRMDC. 13 The levy of
PENTACAPITAL annotated on Lorilla’s certificate of title was carried over onto the title of JRMDC. Elias Lorilla’s payment of his obligation to JRMDC
being one of dation in payment, it is governed by the law on sales. 14 The subject property was validly transferred to JRMDC already. Hence petitioners
could not claim that they were deprived of their lawful inheritance without due process of law.

Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court sets out the procedure that should be followed after the death of the defendant in a case. If he died
"before final judgment in the Court of First Instance," the action should be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting his claim in the

Page 4 of 14
settlement of the estate of the deceased in accordance with and as required by Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. 15 Here, however, the
property in question had already been taken out of the estate of Elias Lorilla, even before judgment in Civil Case No. 5262 was rendered, and it was
transferred to JRMDC by virtue of the dacion en pago executed by Elias Lorilla. For this reason, Section 5, Rule 86 loses its pertinence to the case at bar.

Likewise, Section 7 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court 16 will not apply to the present case. For it speaks of a situation where a party dies after the
entry of the judgment or order of the court. It does not cover a situation where the court was reportedly informed of the death of a party only after final
judgment.

LEON CLIMACO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARLOS SIY UY, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Climaco filed with the lower court an action for damages against (1) Carlos Siy Uy and (2) Manuel Co, his complaint alleging: that defendants
maliciously charged him with the crime of estafa before the City Fiscal of Manila; that, conspiring with each other, they gave the latter a false Manila
address for plaintiff in order to mislead said officer into filing, as he did file, Criminal Case No. 399622 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
him, without giving him an opportunity to present his side of the case; that, besides, defendants had arranged to have plaintiff arrested and taken to
Manila, without giving him a chance to file a bond, albeit this part of the plan failed; that to defend himself, plaintiff and his counsel had to make several
trips to Manila by plane and boat, thus, incurring extraordinary expenses; that, after trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case; that

Page 5 of 14
the said prosecution hurt the business credit and reputation of plaintiff, wounded his feelings, and caused him suffering, anguish, humiliation, and
damages

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over
the person of defendant Carlos Siy Uy who died before summons could be served upon him. Pending resolution of this motion, plaintiff filed a motion
for leave to amend his complaint to substitute the heirs of Carlos Siy Uy — and eventually, the Executor of his Estate — as defendants in the action.

The lower court issued an order granting the motion, but subsequently, defendants moved for a reconsideration of said order and, on January 12, 1959,
the court issued the appealed order not only setting aside its previous order of October 11, 1958 but also dismissing the complaint.

Thereupon the plaintiff took the present appeal.

Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not
survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Neither could the action as against the deceased Siy Uy be maintained under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court because this legal provision
only authorizes actions against the Executor or Administrator when they are for the recovery of real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, or when the action is to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. In this
case the damages which Climaco sought to recover from the deceased Siy Uy did not spring from any injury caused to his person. Therefore, in so
far as the appealed order denied Climaco’s motion for leave to amend his complaint in the sense stated therein, the same is correct.

However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant. Manuel Co was also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order
appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co.

ROSITA SANTIAGO DE BAUTISTA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Bautista, husband and father of the plaintiffs-appellees, respectively, was a passenger of jeepney, owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman,
deceased husband and father of defendants-appellants, respectively, as one of the jeepneys used in his transportation business. Eugenio Medrano y
Torres was employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as the driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove and managed said jeepney at that time along Taft
Avenue, Pasay City, in a negligent and reckless manner and, as a result, the jeepney turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano Bautista
sustained physical injuries which caused his death. Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence
by the trial court and sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano Bautista, plaintiffs-appellees herein, in the sum
of P3,000.00. A writ of execution was issued against said driver, Eugenio Medrano for the said sum of P3,000.00 but the same was returned to the Court
unsatisfied. On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died.

Page 6 of 14
Because of their failure to collect the said sum of P3,000.00 from the driver, Eugenio Medrano, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint against defendants-
appellants that they demanded from Rosendo de Guzman and from the defendants-appellants the payment of the sums of P3,000.00 fees for the suit by
reason of the death of Numeriano Bautista as related above, but Rosendo de Guzman and later the herein defendants-appellants refused to pay the
same. Plaintiffs-appellees therefore prayed that the defendants-appellants be ordered to pay the said sums

Defendants-appellants they maintained that the suit was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be
filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate such
proceedings, that the heirs could not be held liable therefor since there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.

The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The procedure thus opened for a money claimant against a deceased person, as in the instant case, is for said claimant to file proceedings for the
opening of the judicial administration of the estate of said deceased person and to present his claim in said proceedings. The claimant may only proceed
to sue the heirs of the deceased directly where such heirs have entered into an extra-judicial partition of such estate and have distributed the latter
among themselves, in which case, the heirs become liable to the claimant in proportion to the share which they have received as inheritance. Plaintiffs’
complaint does not state that the defendants have received any such inheritance from their said deceased father, Rosendo de Guzman, and hence, there
is no cause of action against aforesaid defendants." This order became final.
cralaw

Then, plaintiffs-appellees filed with the same trial court Civil Case against the same defendants in the former case, the complaint containing analogous
allegations as those embodied in the first complaint but in this second complaint they further allege that Rosendo de Guzman died intestate and that
intestate proceedings were filed in the same court and a project of partition was presented in and approved by said Court with the five heirs receiving
their shares and said intestate proceedings were closed. They also alleged that Numeriano Bautista during his lifetime was the only one supporting
them and his death caused them shock, sufferings and anxiety and therefore defendants-appellants should pay to them, aside from the P3,000.00, an
additional amount of P15,000.00 as moral, exemplary and compensatory damages, plus the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees for the prosecution of this
case, besides the costs of suit.

Defendants-appellants again filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the same grounds as those interposed in the first complaint but adding the further
ground of res judicata in view of the dismissal of the first case which became final as no appeal or any other action was taken thereon by the appellees.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient merit.

whether or not the trial court erred in giving due course to the complaint on the grounds stated above.

We sympathize with the plight of the plaintiffs-appellees but they have lost their right to recover because of negligence and a failure to observe
mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that they were no longer suing Rosendo de Guzman who died shortly after the
accident but his heirs.

Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same
chanrob1es

be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedents, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever; except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants . . . Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
virtual lawlibrary
chanrobles

The above-quoted rule is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator
is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
Therefore, upon the dismissal of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs-appellees, they should have presented their claims before the intestate
proceedings filed in the same court. Instead of doing so, however, the plaintiffs-appellees slept on their right. They allowed said proceedings to
terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such is not sanctioned
by the above rule for it strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. With the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein plaintiffs-
appellees to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a
subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import.

Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs-appellees had a cause of action against the defendants-appellants who
are the heirs of the deceased against whom the liability is sought to be enforced, much less take cognizance of the complaint. As in the first complaint,
said court could not have assumed jurisdiction over the second case for the simple reason that it was no longer acting as a probate court which was the
proper forum to file such complaint. The termination of the intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that
plaintiffs-appellees’ claim was a money claim which should have been presented before the probate court. The liability of the late Rosendo de Guzman
arose from the breach of his obligations under the contract of carriage between him and the unfortunate passenger. The obligations are spelled out by
law but the liability arose from a breach of contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim.

If we are to allow the complaint to prosper and the trial court to take cognizance of the same, then the rules providing for the claims against the estate in
a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period would be rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money claim against the distributees
may be filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely is what the rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid further delays in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to the heirs, legatees or devisees.

Furthermore, even assuming that the plaintiffs-appellees had no knowledge of the intestate proceedings which is not established, the law presumes that
they had such knowledge because the settlement of estate is a proceeding in rem and therefore the failure to file their claims before such proceedings
barred them from subsequently filing the same claims outside said proceedings.

Page 7 of 14
 MANUEL A. TORRES, JR., (Deceased), GRACIANO J. TOBIAS, RODOLFO L. JOCSON, JR., MELVIN S. JURISPRUDENCIA, AUGUSTUS
CESAR AZURA and EDGARDO D. PABALAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, TORMIL
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ANTONIO P. TORRES, JR., MA. CRISTINA T. CARLOS, MA. LUISA T. MORALES and DANTE
D. MORALES, Respondents.

The late Manuel A. Torres, Jr. (Judge Torres for brevity) was the majority stockholder of Tormil Realty & Development Corporation while private
respondents who are the children of Judge Torres’ deceased brother Antonio A. Torres, constituted the minority stockholders.

Judge Torres, in order to make substantial savings in taxes, adopted an "estate planning" scheme under which he assigned to Tormil Realty &
Development Corporation various real properties he owned and his shares of stock in other corporations. Hence, ten (10) deeds of assignment were
executed by the late Judge Torres:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Consequently, the aforelisted properties were duly recorded in the inventory of assets of Tormil Realty and the revenues generated by the said
properties were correspondingly entered in the corporation’s books of account and financial records.
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Likewise, all the assigned parcels of land were duly registered with the respective Register of Deeds in the name of Tormil Realty, except for the ones
located in Makati and Pasay City.

At the time of the assignments and exchange, however, only 225,000 Tormil Realty shares remained unsubscribed, all of which were duly issued to and
received by Judge Torres
Due to the insufficient number of shares of stock issued to Judge Torres and the alleged refusal of private respondents to approve the needed increase in
the corporation’s authorized capital stock (to cover the shortage of 972 shares due to Judge Torres under the "estate planning" scheme), Judge Torres
revoked the two (2) deeds of assignment covering the properties in Makati and Pasay City. 4

Noting the disappearance of the Makati and Pasay City properties from the corporation’s inventory of assets and financial records private respondents,
were constrained to file a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to compel Judge Torres to deliver to Tormil corporation the
two (2) deeds of assignment covering the aforementioned Makati and Pasay City properties which he had unilaterally revoked and to cause the
registration of the corresponding titles in the name of Tormil. Private respondents alleged that following the disappearance of the properties from the
corporation’s inventory of assets, they found that, Judge Torres, together with Edgardo Pabalan and Graciano Tobias, then General Manager and legal
counsel, respectively, of Tormil, formed and organized a corporation named "Torres-Pabalan Realty and Development Corporation" and that as part of
Judge Torres’ contribution to the new corporation, he executed in its favor a Deed of Assignment conveying the same Makati and Pasay City properties
he had earlier transferred to Tormil.

The second controversy — involving the same parties — concerned the election of the 1987 corporate board of directors.

Judge Torres assigned from his own shares, one (1) share each to petitioners Tobias, Jocson, Jurisprudencia, Azura and Pabalan. These assigned shares were in the
nature of "qualifying shares," for the sole purpose of meeting the legal requirement to be able to elect them (Tobias and company) to the Board of Directors as Torres’
nominees.

The reason behind the aforestated action was to remedy the "inequitable lopsided set-up obtaining in the corporation, where, notwithstanding his controlling interest in
the corporation, the late Judge held only a single seat in the nine-member Board of Directors and was, therefore, at the mercy of the minority, a combination of any two
(2) of whom would suffice to overrule the majority stockholder in the Board’s decision making functions."

Consequently, private respondents instituted a complaint with the SEC praying in the main, that the election of petitioners to the Board of Directors be annulled.

Private respondents alleged that the petitioners-nominees were not legitimate stockholders of Tormil because the assignment of shares to them violated the minority
stockholders’ right of pre-emption as provided in the corporation’s articles and by-laws.

Panel of Hearing Officers of the SEC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.
Ordering and directing the respondents, particularly respondent Manuel A. Torres, Jr., to turn over and deliver to TORMIL through its Corporate
Secretary, Ma. Cristina T. Carlos: (a) the originals of the Deeds of Assignment 1aw library

3. Declaring as null and void the election and appointment of respondents to the Board of Directors and executive positions of TORMIL

4. Ordering the respondents jointly and severally, to pay the complainants the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as and by
way of attorney’s fees.

Petitioners promptly appealed to the SEC en banc, during the pendency of said appeal, petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr. died. However, notice thereof
was brought to the attention of the SEC not by petitioners’ counsel but by private respondents in a Manifestation

Petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on grounds that no administrator or legal representative of the late Judge Torres’ estate has yet been
appointed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati where Sp. Proc. was pending.

SEC en banc issued an Order denying petitioners’ aforecited motions on the following ground: "Before the filing of these motions, the Commission en
jgc:

banc had already completed all proceedings and had likewise ruled on the merits of the appealed cases. Viewed in this light, we thus feel that there is
nothing left to be done except to deny these motions to suspend proceedings."

Petitioners insist that the failure to transmit the original records to the Court of Appeals deprived them of procedural due process. Without the evidence and the
original records of the proceedings before the SEC, the Court of Appeals, petitioners adamantly state, could not have possibly made a proper appreciation and correct
determination of the issues, particularly the factual issues, they had raised on appeal. Petitioners also assert that since the Court of Appeals allegedly gave due course to
their petition

There is nothing on record to show that the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition. The fact alone that the Court of Appeals issued a restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda does not indicate that the petition was given due course. The office of an
injunction is merely to preserve the status quo pending the disposition of the case. The court can require the submission of memoranda in support of the respective
claims and positions of the parties without necessarily giving due course to the petition. The matter of whether or not to give due course to a petition lies in the
discretion of the court.

Petitioners contend that the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals are null and void for being rendered without the necessary substitution of
parties (for the deceased petitioner Manuel A. Torres, Jr.) as mandated by Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioners insist that the SEC en banc should have granted the motions to suspend they filed based as they were on the ground that the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, where the probate of the late Judge Torres’ will was pending, had yet to appoint an administrator or legal representative of his estate.

It has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the Court for the appearance of the legal representative
or of the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by
the court without such legal representative or heirs, and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment are not binding. 16

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Judge Torres instituted Special Proceedings No. M-1768 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the ante-mortem probate of his holographic will
which he had executed. Testifying in the said proceedings, Judge Torres confirmed his appointment of petitioner Edgardo D. Pabalan as the sole
executor of his will and administrator of his estate. The proceedings, however, were opposed by the same parties, herein private respondents Antonio P.
Torres, Jr., Ma. Luisa T. Morales and Ma. Cristina T. Carlos, 17 who are nephew and nieces of Judge Torres, being the children of his late brother
Antonio A. Torres.

It can readily be observed therefore that the parties involved in the present controversy are virtually the same parties fighting over the
representation of the late Judge Torres’ estate. It should be recalled that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of
the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. In the present case, this purpose has been substantially fulfilled (despite the lack of formal
substitution) in view of the peculiar fact that both proceedings involve practically the same parties. Both parties have been fiercely fighting in the
probate proceedings of Judge Torres’ holographic will for appointment as legal representative of his estate. Since both parties claim interests over
the estate, the rights of the estate were expected to be fully protected in the proceedings before the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals. In either
case, whoever shall be appointed legal representative of Judge Torres’ estate (petitioner Pabalan or private respondents) would no longer be a
stranger to the present case, the said parties having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the SEC and the Court of Appeals and having
thoroughly participated in the proceedings.

Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated in the case and presented evidence in
defense of deceased defendant.

It is appropriate to mention here that when Judge Torres died on April 3, 1991, the SEC en banc had already fully heard the parties and what remained
was the evaluation of the evidence and rendition of the judgment.

Further, petitioners filed their motions to suspend proceedings only after more than two (2) years from the death of Judge Torres.

For the SEC en banc to have suspended the proceedings to await the appointment of the legal representative by the estate was impractical and would
have caused undue delay in the proceedings and a denial of justice. There is no telling when the probate court will decide the issue, which may still be
appealed to the higher courts.

In any case, there has been no final disposition of the properties of the late Judge Torres before the SEC. On the contrary, the decision of the SEC en banc
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals served to protect and preserve his estate. Consequently, the rule that when a party dies, he should be substituted by
his legal representative to protect the interests of his estate in observance of due process was not violated in this case in view of its peculiar situation
where the estate was fully protected by the presence of the parties who claim interests therein either as directors, stockholders or heirs.

Intestate Estate of the late Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan, deceased. BIENVENIDO P. BUAN and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS, Co-
Administrators and appellees vs. SYLVINA C. LAYA, ET AL., petitioners and appellants.

Petitioners herein filed a contingent claim for more than P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina
Paras Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the deceased spouses Buan, collided with a
car in which Juan C. Laya, Rodolfo Escosa, Jose S. Palma, and Juan de Leon, were riding; that the collision was caused by the fact that the driver of the
bus managed and drove the vehicle in a negligent manner; that as a consequence of the collision Juan C. Laya was killed and his companions suffered
physical injuries. The driver of the bus was Ernesto Triguero, and he was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners herein, reserved the civil action for damages, and they filed an
independent civil action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the administrator of the deceased spouses Buan. The petition for the admission
of a contingent claim was accompanied with a copy of the complaint filed in the civil case and a sentence in the criminal case filed against Ernesto
Triguero, driver of the Philippine Rabbit Bus.

When the administrators learned of the filing of the contingent claim in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, they filed an opposition thereto on the
ground that the same was not filed before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan, and that it was also not filed within the
period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac admitted the but denied the prayer that a portion of
the estate be set aside to respond for the amount of the contingent. Counsel for the administrators then moved to set aside the order. Judge Agustin P.
Montesa, sitting as Judge for the Court of First Instance of Manila, held that the civil action filed in Manila by the heirs of Laya, petitioners herein, was

Page 10 of 14
premature because the sentence of conviction of the driver of the bus had not become final. The court also ordered the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint within 10 days. Thereupon, the plaintiffs in said civil case (C.F.I. Manila, No. 20867) filed an amended complaint.

In the meantime, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, on a motion for reconsideration filed by the administrators, set aside its previous order of
December 16, 1953, admitting the contingent claim of petitioners. The reason for the admission of the claim, according to the court, had ceased to exist
and even the plaintiffs had filed the amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same has not yet been acted upon by the said court.
A motion to reconsider this order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac having been denied, petitioners have prosecuted this appeal to Us.

A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which liability depends on some future event which may or may not occur, so that duty to pay may never
become absolute.

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the
deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim presented in the
administration proceedings depends. While the said action has not yet been finally decided or determined to the effect that the petitioners herein,
heirs of the deceased Juan C. Laya, have no right of action against the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, the
contingent claim that petitioners have filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in the proceedings for the administration of the deceased spouses
Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, may not be dismissed. The order of the court dismissing the claim and declaring that the same may again be
entertained if another valid complaint by the petitioners herein is filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, is inconsistent with the nature and
character of a contingent claim. A contingent claim does not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon which it is based; it awaits
the final outcome thereof and only said final result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the
administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim
into a valid claim, the court should then be informed that the claim had already matured. The order of the court subject of the appeal should,
therefore, be set aside.

The first order of the court admitted the claim but denied the petition for the setting aside of a certain amount from the estate to respond therefor.
The validity of the contingent claim is apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to the deceased spouses, Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan,
was found guilty of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the said deceased spouses—the employers of the driver—can be made
responsible, as masters of a servant, for damages for the death of the petitioner's father. A portion of the estate should therefore, be set aside to
respond for such damages as petitioners herein may subsequently recover in the action they have brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
This amount should be fixed in the court below.

POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents.

In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and ConsolacionSarrosa — in which Eumelia Cabado
and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the
Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could
be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc
Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the decedents'
heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had
never been included in any inventory of the estate.

The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpanta Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's
return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
5 It accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presentee evidence in substantiation of their positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court
issued an Order the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. 7

The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of the two administrators that:

1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime;

Page 11 of 14
2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been
resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the
fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children; and

3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin,
collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title issued in their favor.

Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses'
Estate

The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to
the estate having been filed well within ten (10) years from the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title over it.

There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to
determine whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the administrators who have more than
once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. So it was
made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be
included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate.

The movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate court that the
fishpond must be delivered to the estate.

Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the contention
of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership should be in a court of general jurisdiction.

Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs
to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ,
and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the
administrators.

Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based
on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint on the following grounds, to wit:

(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the estate.

The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by
the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been
accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. In their petition, the administrators contended that
Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court (Branch I I, Judge Adil, presiding) in the
legitimate exercise of its j jurisdiction over the proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.

In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the
owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the
fishpond,22 which motion had been denied filed a notice of appeal from said Order.

These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the petitions and ruled in substance that:

3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question, the estate administrators would have to recover possession
of the fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.

From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court by certiorari. They ascribe to the Appellate Court the following
errors, viz: Page 542

2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond then in the hands
of a third person; and

As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason for the exception being that
the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a
mode of practice which may be waived.

If cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and
writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or
should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one
clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of
its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. The examination provided in the cited section is intended

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merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the
estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if
the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate
action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.

Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in
intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining
the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any
character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced
at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another)
adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already
had occasion to rule.

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. 35

Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the
premises only be appropriately determined in a separate action, the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and should
not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the
superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to
complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that
jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the
exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed superior to
otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may be, regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction
over the same question.

MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, plaintiffs-appellants,

Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar to recover
damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with
notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from
their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously
failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.

Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased.
The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, and by order of the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should
have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and
the claim filed therein.

Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was appealed to us on points of law.

Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not
filed in the estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the executor or
administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter.

Whether or not the plaintiffs may include the heirs in the action for recovery of money.

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Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the
plaintiffs-appellants; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and
these words (also used by the Rules in connection with attachments and derived from the common law) were construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38
Phil., 182, 189-194.

to include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to
recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific
property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To
maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369,
Aug. 31, 1953).

Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the Court of First Instance of Samar that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement
of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First
Instance.

The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered dismissed, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

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