G.R. No.

L-30801 March 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P.
Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.

Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No.
3280).

The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention
prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after
posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to
his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug
municipal building where there would be more security.

Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix
Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his
prostrate body.

Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's
recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help.
Nobody came to succor him.

Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his departure, Ural
cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night. From the
municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore
and went home.

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice,
sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back
(Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death would
unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause death", she
said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would
be complications.

Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of
death (Exh. B).

The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and
the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as witnesses
Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a
joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder.1

It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who should have been
presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae.2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of
the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He
heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of
Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to
Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.

Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar", testified that she
heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be
burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.

Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July
31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.

The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's
alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the
consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.

Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he
was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.

Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted that the accused
was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police
investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why it was not
immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.

The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are compatible with the
prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given credence,
Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on
the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not find
any justification for disbelieving Alberio.

This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The
presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of
Court).

The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la
relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la
predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos,
la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed.,
1968, p. 335-336).

The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the cause of death, no
more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which
broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which
ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there was a sufficient
causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S.,
20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).

There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in the death of the
latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance
does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was
wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty days after
the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The
person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code;
People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal
Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he
had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking
advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by
medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the
police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual
from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken
condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences
of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official
position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty
for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

_____

G.R. No. L-29800 August 31, 1971

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CARLOS PASTORES, EDMUND MAGAT, and EUGENIO VILLAR, defendants-appellants.

J. L. Ballutay for appellant Edmund Magat.

Norberto Quisumbing for appellant Carlos Pastores.

R. Oben for appellant Eugenio Villar.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, finding the accused in Criminal Case No.
1477 guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party
and to pay the costs.

The records show that based on a complaint duly executed by Minda V. Reyes before the Municipal Judge of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya
accusing Carlos Pastores, Edmund Magat and Eugenio Villar, alias Boy, of the crime of rape, allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August 1966, in municipality of Bayombong, province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused
 Carlos Pastores, Edmund Magat, and Eugenio Villar, alias Boy, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another thru force, threat and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs, attack and have carnal
knowledge with one Minda Reyes, against her will and without the consent of the latter.

That in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstances of superior strength and in an
uninhabited place and nighttime are present.

On arraignment, the three accused entered pleas of not guilty.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:

DR. BENIGNO RIVERA, Jr., resident physician in the Bayombong Hospital, who conducted the physical examination
on the person of the complainant a few hours after the alleged rape was committed, affirmed on the witness stand the
findings contained in the medical certificate (Exh. B). He declared that the contusions found in the vulva and fresh
laceration at the posterior fourchette of the complainant's genital organ could have been caused by some force
inflicted on the said parts of the body by a hard object.1

Complainant MINDA V. REYES testified that in the evening of August 5, 1966, she attended the coronation ceremony
held at the St. Mary's College in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where she was then a 4th year BSE student. The affair
ended at about 11:30 in the evening, and she left the school with her boy friend, Augusto Brillantes, at past 12
midnight. As there were no more jeepneys that would take her to her hometown, Solano, she and Augusto agreed to
just stroll along the streets of Bayombong in the moonlit night.

They walked from the school up to the capitol ground. There, they sat on one of the benches and conversed for about
2 hours.2 Then, they decided to walk around, because they did not want people to see them still together at that late
hour. They walked through the streets until they came to the Perez grandstand in the Clisoc Field. 3 They were seated
in the grandstand and had been conversing for about 30 minutes when the three accused appeared and approached
them. Edmund Magat and Boy Villar took her by the hands, while the third one, Carlos Pastores, held Augusto at bay
with a bolo. Then, Magat and Villar started embracing and kissing her, and touch her breast and private parts. She
struggled and cried for help. Augusto tried to come to her aid twice, and twice Pastores boxed him, and Augusto was
weakened. Then, accused Magat dragged her up the grandstand, and forced her to lie down. But she struggled and
was able to get up. Magat dragged her down from the grandstand. 4 Carlos Pastores then held her by the hand and
ordered Magat and Villar and Augusto to follow them to the dike. They walked, Pastores still holding her hand and
threatening her with a knife, followed by Magat and Villar who had Augusto between them.

When they reached the dike, which was about 200 meters away from the grandstand, Pastores ordered Magat and
Villar to take Augusto away, which the two did.5 The witness and Pastores had walked a little farther when the latter
started kissing and embracing her. She resisted him, but Pastores covered her mouth, and laid her on the ground; he
slapped her face and boxed her sternum. And when she kept on shouting, Pastores strangled her; he removed her
blouse, forcibly took away her bra, her skirt and her panties. She was nervous and frightened, and Pastores was able
to have sexual intercourse with her.6 She kept on struggling and moving and Pastores' organ was removed. He tried
to insert it again, but desisted. Then, she felt a sticky substance between her legs. Although feeling weak, she
grabbed her clothes and put them on. Pastores threatened to kill her if she would report to the authorities. He also
threatened to call his two companions and she pleaded him not to. As Pastores would not let her go home, she
decided to go along with him and pretended that she liked him. Pastores brought her to the house of one Mrs.
Bongcad to whom she was introduced as Pastores' sweetheart. She kept her peace because she was afraid. Later,
when she reiterated to Pastores her desire to go home to change her clothes, he consented. 7 She took a tricycle and
dropped first at the residence of Augusto and informed his mother about the incident. Then, she proceeded to the
municipal building and reported what happened to the police. Later in the day, she was brought to the provincial
hospital where she submitted to a physical examination. Complainant further declared that on account of the incident,
she had to drop her studies. At the time of the hearing, she was no longer the girl friend of Augusto Brillantes.

AUGUSTO BRILLANTES took the witness stand and corroborated the testimony of the complainant. He declared that
in the evening of August 5, 1966, he attended the festivities at St. Mary's College with his girl friend, Minda Reyes;
that the coronation ceremony ended at about 11:30 p.m.; that he and Minda left the school about an hour later; that
as there were no more jeepney that would take Minda home to Solano, they decided to take a walk. They walked to
the capitol building ground and sat on a bench for about one and a half hours; then, they strolled away and went to
the Perez grandstand at the Clisoc Field beside the Nueva Viscaya high school. 8 They were seated in the grandstand
conversing for about an hour when they saw three men approaching. He and Minda went down to avoid them, but the
men overtook them, and accused Magat and Villar held Minda and took her away. He was left with accused Pastores
who pointed a bolo at his stomach. He tried to help Minda who was crying for help, but Pastores hit him in the solar
plexus. And when he ran up towards the grandstand to where Minda was, he was met by Magat and Villar who
pointed a bolo at him and poked a gun at his side. When he tried to free himself from their hold, Villar boxed him, and
he became unconscious. When he regained consciousness, Pastores ordered them to walk towards the dike.
Pastores and Minda were ahead of them, the former holding a knife against Minda's side; he was made to walk
between Magat and Villar who had their weapons pointed at his sides. 9

On reaching the edge of the dike, Pastores ordered Magat and Villar to take him away, so the two forced him to go to
the other side of the dike some 50 meters away. 10 There, he was held at bay until it was about 5:30 or 6:00 in the
morning. When he inquired from his two guards where Minda and Pastores could be, Villar left to look for them. Villar
returned informing them that the two could not be located. The witness then was taken by Magat and Villar to the
junction where he took a tricycle ride. He returned, however, to the dike to look for Minda and when he failed to find
her, he thought of going to the municipal building to report the incident to the police. On the way to the town hall, he
passed by their house and heard his mother in hysterics. He learned that Minda had already passed that way and
had informed his mother that he was missing. He stayed by his mother's side until about 9 o'clock when she finally
calmed down. 11

This witness admitted that when he was taken away by Magat and Villar, he was not able to see Pastores and Minda
anymore; 12 and during all the time that they were at the other side of the dike, these accused never left his side. He
also declared that he severed his relationship with Minda Reyes because of the incident.

The defense presented accused EDMUND MAGAT, who declared in court that after attending the coronation
ceremony at St. Mary's College in the evening of August 5, 1966, he conducted his girl friend to her residence. He
was walking home with a friend and neighbor, Eugenio Villar when they were called by Carlos Pastores in front of the
billiard hall, and they were invited to watch the games. They joined Pastores and stayed in the billiard hall for about
one or two hours. Then, they decided to go home. When they were almost at the corner of the road leading to the
house of Pastores, the latter asked his two companions to accompany him to the grandstand where he intended to
pass the night, reasoning that his father would get angry at his late arrival. Magat and Villar obliged and went with
him. Near the grandstand, they heard a woman crying. She turned out to be Minda Reyes who was then being
embraced by Augusto Brillantes. Pastores approached them, and he was met by Augusto who took him aside about
9 meters away, and told him something. When Pastores returned to his companions, he told them they were going
home. Minda thereupon ran after them, and wanted to go with them because Augusto allegedly was drunk and was
making a fool of her. Minda walked with Pastores ahead of the witness and Villar. At the crossing near the Girl Scouts
building, Pastores turned to them and ordered him and Villar to go home, which they did. In their house, it was his
father who opened the door for him. And, as his father was scolding him for his late arrival, the witness had to narrate
what he and his companions saw at the grandstand. He had already gone sleep when he was awakened by their
neighbor, Patrolman Bulaya, who was called by his father, and he had to repeat to the policeman the incident that
they witnessed at the grandstand.

Magat denied that he was armed when he and his companions went to the grandstand; that they had threatened
Augusto with harm, and that he tried to abuse Minda.

In his testimony, accused EUGENIO VILLAR corroborated Magat's declarations. He, too, denied the charges that
they were armed when they went to the grandstand that they tried to abuse Minda, and that he boxed Augusto.

Patrolman FERNANDO BULAYA of the Bayombong Police Force testified that between 2 and 3 o'clock in the
morning of August 7, 1966, Juan Magat woke him up in his house and related to him the information given by his
(Magat's) son about the finding by the latter and his companions of a crying woman in the grandstand. He then went
to the Magat residence to get from Edmund the whole story, and the latter repeated to him the information previously
given to the father, and that Brillantes and Pastores raped the woman. With Juan Magat, whom he requested to
accompany him, we went to the grandstand to verify Edmund's story. Finding no one in the place, they dropped at the
house of Villar and they were told that Villar was sleeping. They passed by the dyke and still meeting no one, they
dropped by the house of Pastores, which they found to be silent. The witness then went to the municipal building
intending to make a report on the matter, but he already found Minda Reyes giving her statement to the officer on
duty. He did not make a report anymore.
JUAN MAGAT testified along the same line as the policeman's. He declared having learned from his son about their
finding of a woman crying in the grandstand; that he went out and got Patrolman Bulaya to interrogate Edmund,
because he was interested to find the involvement of his said son in the incident.

For his part, accused CARLOS PASTORES declared that at about midnight of August 5, 1966, he was at the
Hawaiian Recreational Hall when he chanced upon Edmund Magat and Eugenio Villar, passing by. He invited the two
to watch the games and they came in. Later, as Magat wanted to go home, they walked out of the hall together. But
he was afraid that his father would get angry with him for coming in late, so he asked his companions to accompany
him to the grandstand where he intended to sleep. At a distance of about 30 meters from the grandstand, they heard
the voice of a crying woman. They found out she was Minda Reyes, who was with Augusto Brillantes. When he went
near the couple, Augusto got up, pulled him aside, and told him that he had sexual intercourse with the girl who did
not like it and he had to force her. Augusto then requested him to leave him and Minda alone. He returned to his
companions and informed them they were leaving. But Minda ran after them, held on to his hands and expressed
desire to go with them because Augusto was drunk and he might fool with her again.

They left the grandstand; Magat, Villar and Augusto walking behind him and Minda. As Magat was determined to go
home, he allowed Magat and Villar to leave. Then he and Minda continued walking until they reached the dike. There,
they met Mrs. Pacita Bicera, to whom he introduced Minda as his sweetheart. They also met Mr. Bicera and Mrs.
Bicera's brother who were both working as a "bangkero" (boatmen) in the river, and when they were teased about
their forthcoming marriage, Minda smiled and pinched him at his side. 13 Minda asked him for transportation money,
and since he had none, they proceeded to the house of Mrs. Bongcad. There, they took coffee; he was sleepy, so he
went inside the room and slept. Minda later came into the room, took off his shoes which were muddy and washed
them. Minda came in again to remind him of the money she was asking for, so he asked Mrs. Bongcad to give Minda
some. Mrs. Bongcad had only fifty centavos which she gave to Minda. Upon receipt of the money, Minda went inside
the room and bade him goodbye with the promise to return at noon. She even kissed him and said, "goodbye,
dear". 14 He went back to sleep until about 11 o'clock, and returned to their own house when he could no longer wait
for Minda.

He denied that he threatened Minda or boxed Augusto, and declared that he knew Minda, who was a classmate of
his in one subject at the St. Mary's College, and Augusto, because they were from the same barrio. This testimony of
accused Pastores was corroborated by Pacita Bicera, Inocencio Ascado and Concepcion Bongcad who all declared
that Minda was introduced to them by Pastores as his girl friend, to which introduction Minda merely smiled.

Considering the evidence thus presented, the court in its decision of May 31, 1968 found the charges against the
accused to have been duly proved, and declared Carlos Pastores liable for the rape of Minda Reyes as principal by
direct participation, and accused Edmund Magat and Eugenio Villar as principals by indispensable cooperation, for
their role in separating Augusto Brillantes from the victim and standing guard over him, which acts enabled accused
Carlos Pastores to commit the rape without interference or intervention. Consequently, the three accused were
sentenced to life imprisonment, and ordered to indemnify the victim, jointly and severally, in the amount of P5,000.00,
and to pay the costs. From this decision, the accused interposed the present appeal.

In this instance, appellants raise the question of jurisdiction of the trial court. It is pointed out that whereas the sworn
complaint signed by Minda V. Reyes on August 15, 1966 charged the accused of having sexual knowledge of the
complainant by "taking advantage of the fact that said Minda Reyes was then in a state of coma or
unconsciousness", the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal, which does not contain the signature of the offended
party, alleged that the offense was committed through force, threat and intimidation. Appellants, therefore, contend
that as the allegation of the information charges a rape committed in a manner different from that charged in the
complaint signed by the offended party, then such complaint can not properly be made the basis of the information as
required by Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 15 In other words, the issue being presented here is whether or not a complaint signed by the offended party
charging rape committed in a particular way can be the basis of an information charging rape committed in another
way, for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the court.

This issue is not really new; it has already been answered in the affirmative. In the case of People vs.
Bangalao, 16involving exactly the same set of facts, this Court ruled that an information charging rape committed on a
minor and demented girl, based upon the complaint signed by the girl's mother alleging rape committed by means of
force and intimidation, lawfully confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The reason for the ruling was given
thus:
 ... . In the case at bar, however, the complaint was for rape, and this gave the court jurisdiction to
try the case. The power or jurisdiction of the court is not over the crime of rape when committed on
a minor and demented girl, but over rape, irrespective of the manner in which the same may have
been committed.

It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in municipalities, in most cases without the
advice or help of competent counsel. When the case reaches the court of first instance, the Fiscal
usually conducts another investigation, and thereafter files the information which the results thereof
justify. The right and power of the court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the
filing of the complaint, and a change in the allegations thereof as (to) the manner of committing the
crime should not operate to divest the court of the jurisdiction it has already acquired. The right or
power to try the case should be distinguished from the right of the accused to demand an acquittal
unless it is shown that he has committed the offense charged in the information even if he be found
guilty of another offense; in the latter case, however, even if the court has no right to find the
accused guilty because the crime alleged is different from that proved, it cannot be stated that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case. (on p. 336)

Appellant Pastores likewise questions the decision finding him guilty of rape, making capital of the fact that the
physician who conducted the physical examination of the complainant after the incident found her hymen to be intact,
and that Minda's behavior when she was seen by witnesses Bicera, Bongcad, and Ascado did not indicate that she
had just been ravished.

The ruling of the court below as regard Pastores must be affirmed. It must be remembered that the fact that a
woman's hymen has no sign of laceration does not preclude a finding of rape. For, the rupture of the hymen or
laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape; 17 it is enough that there is
proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. 18 In the present case, in addition to the positive
declaration of the complainant about the consummation of rape on her person, we have the testimony of the
examining physician that when he examined complainant at about 11 o'clock in the morning of August 6, 1966, he
found contusions in the vulva, congested condition and discoloration of hymen, and fresh laceration at the posterior
fourchette — injuries which indicated that the object that inflicted them had penetrated past the labia majora of the
pudendum. Furthermore, the condition of complainant's unruptured hymen was explained by the same physician
during the trial. He declared that there is a type of hymen, the elastic kind, that returns back to its original virginal
appearance even after sexual intercourse, and complainant's belongs to this type. 19

It may be true that as testified to by witnesses Bicera, Bongcad and Ascado, when complainant Minda Reyes was
introduced to them by accused Pastores as his girl friend, she acknowledged the introduction with smiles. But that is
understandable, considering that according to complainant, she pretended that she liked the accused in the hope that
by so doing, he would allow her to go home. Indeed, it must really be this display of docility that reassured Pastores
that Minda was under his control, so that when she again asked for permission to go home, he finally consented.
Besides, if Minda went voluntarily with appellant, as the defense would want the court to believe, because she
wanted to avoid the company of Augusto, then why would she continue walking with appellant and accompany him in
paying visits to his friends even after Augusto had dropped out of sight? Certainly, it is rather strange that a girl who,
a few hours before, did not even want to be seen conversing with her boy friend in a public place such as the capitol
grounds for fear of what people would say, would willingly go with a man whom she hardly knew 20 and walk with him
in a more or less isolated place at early morning hours, and allow herself to be introduced to his acquaintances as his
girl friend. It also runs counter to the normal course of human behavior that a girl who likes a boy would kiss and bid
him goodbye (as defense witnesses testified Minda did), and the moment she was out of his sight, would proceed
directly to the municipal building to file a complaint for rape against him. Complainant's behavior after the assault
actually supports her assertion that she was threatened by Pastores that he would allow his two companions to do to
her what he (Pastores) had already done, thus making her decide to go along with the latter's idea in order that she
may have the chance to get away from him. Truly, a young woman and a college student at that, like this
complainant, would not have charged a man of having raped her and come out and give all the sordid details of her
debasement in open court, if she were not really subjected to such outrageous act. We sustain, therefore, the trial
court's ruling giving more credence to the testimony of the complainant. In fact, it may be said that her not offering
resistance to appellant's imposition, that she should go with him after her violation, was a ruse resorted to in order to
escape from further harm and enabled her later to go directly to the police authorities to report and charge the proper
author of the criminal act. Complainant's conduct indicates an admirable presence of mind that bespeaks well of her
character and intelligence.
With regard to the accused appellants Edmund Magat and Eugenio Villar, their attacks on the credibility of the
offended party and other witnesses of the prosecution are not substantially different from those of appellant Pastores,
which were properly disregarded by the trial court as earlier discussed (pages 9-10). The same thing can be said of
their contention that no rape could have taken place, in view of the complainant's unruptured hymen. That this stand
is untenable has been previously shown in this opinion (pages 8-9).

The trial court considered that all the accused appellants acted in conspiracy and are equally responsible as co-
principals. We agree with defense counsel that the details of commission of the offense do not satisfactorily support
the finding of conspiracy, particularly in view of the uncontradicted fact that the herein appellants met the complainant
Minda Reyes and her companion and friend, Brillantes, purely by chance. Whatever the responsibility of Magat and
Villar, it must be predicated on their action in separating Brillantes from the complainant when all five had reached the
river dike, and thereafter, preventing Brillantes from rendering aid to Minda. While this act was undoubtedly one of
help and cooperation, We do not view it as indispensable, so that the rape could not have been committed without
the sequestration of Brillantes. It must be recalled that at the grandstand, the latter proved no match for Pastores,
who boxed and effectively weakened Brillantes; and further, Pastores was then armed with a knife while Brillantes
had no weapon.

That Villar and Magat were aware of Pastores' criminal design to rape Minda Reyes is apparent under the
circumstances. Upon returning home Magat advised his father of what transpired at the river dyke, and thereafter the
father informed patrolman Bulaya that Minda had been raped. 21 Considering that appellant Edmund Magat had not
seen either Pastores or Minda Reyes at the river dyke after he and Villar had taken Brillantes away, Magat's
informing his father that Minda had been raped demonstrates these two appellants' awareness of what Pastores
intended to do with Minda when he asked his two companions to guard Brillantes while he (Pastores) compelled
Minda to go with him.

Villar and Magat's cooperation not being indispensable for the commission of the crime, they are only liable as
accomplices, as admitted by Villar's counsel in his brief (page 10).

In People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, this Court made the SCRA 892-898), the accused who stayed outside the house
while the others robbed and killed the victims yet had knowledge of the criminal intention of the other accused and
only went along with them was only convicted as an accomplice. And in the case of People vs. Crisostomo (46 Phil.
775), three of the accused who held the victims' companions to prevent the latter from rendering any help to the
victim who was being kidnapped were only convicted as accomplices, even if circumstances indicated conspiracy
among them, for their acts were not indispensable to the realization of the crime. Well known is the rule that in case
of doubt as to the participation of an accused the lesser liability should prevail.

In People vs. Balili (G.R. L-14044, August 5, 1966, 17 observation that —

...........................................................................................

as against an accomplice, a court will sometimes draw the inference of guilty participation in the
criminal design from acts of concert in the consummation of the criminal act and from the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered, where it would not draw the same inference for the
purpose of holding the same accused in the character of principal. This is because, in case of
doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.

The preceding doctrine was followed in many subsequent cases, collated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Fernando in People vs. Tolentino, G. R. No. L-29419, August 30, 1971.

The penalty for an accomplice is one degree lower than that prescribed for a principal (Rev. Penal Code, Article 52);
so that Pastores having been meted out reclusion perpetua, the penalty for his accomplices should be reclusion
temporal, ranging from 12 years and one (1) day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts 4103
and 4225), Magat and Villar should be sentenced to a minimum penalty within the range of prision mayor and to a
maximum within the range of reclusion temporal (People vs. Mallari, 60 Phil. 400).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed in so far as it finds appellant Carlos Pastores guilty as principal
in the rape of complainant Minda Reyes; but the decision is modified as to Edmund Magat and Eugenio Villar, who
are found guilty as accomplices merely, instead, of co-principals, and each one of the two is sentenced to undergo a
minimum of eight (8) years of prision mayor and a maximum of sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal. All three are
jointly and severally condemned to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P5,000.00 and to pay the costs.

______

G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Silvino Lopez de Jesus for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding the defendant guilty of
homicide and sentencing her to suffer not more than fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporaland not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco
Rivera in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

I. El Juzgado a quo, erro al dar absoluto credito a las pruebas de la acusacion, las que son insuficientes
para apoyar una declaracion de conviccion.

II. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que los celos fueron el motivo que impulso a la acusada al agredir al
occiso Francisco Rivera.

III. El Juzgado a quo al declarar increible el testimonio de la acusada en esta causa.

IV. Y el Juzgado a quo erro al no absolver a la acusada.

It appears from the evidence that on the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida
Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of the
defendant and asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of Maria Inguit.
About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about five minutes later,
according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the house where
the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendant's party. When
they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of the defendant's
party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and the defendant was the hindmost. She was
about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of defendant's
companions that was called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio". He went back and found that
Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he
died the next afternoon.

Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where Francisco Rivera was. He
found and that Enrique Bautista was with the wounded man, and the defendant had started back towards the house
of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of Maria Inguit, Remedios
de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her.

The case for the prosecution rests upon the testimony of Enrique Bautista. According to him the defendant waited on
the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he
arrived in front of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned around and returned to
the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya). He further testified that the defendant
stabbed the deceased before either of them had said anything; that the distance between him and the deceased was
about one foot; that he did not see any of the companions of the defendant after they reached the path and had to
walk one behind the other.

The defendant on the other hand testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part a
man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in
her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt weak
and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed
him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked
him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre mia; Dios
mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; that when she was face to
face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness and could not be
sure that it was Francisco Rivera.

Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:

P. ¿Y que paso siendo usted la ultima de entre sus compañeros? — R. Despues de pasar nosotros en una
bifurcacion de los caminos cuando llegabamos en una parte estrecha el occiso subitamente me abrazo por
detras cogiendome los pechos y basandome.

P. ¿Y entonces que hizo usted cuando usted sintio ese abrazo y beso? — R. todavia me agarro en mi parte
genital y en eso yo trataba de desasirme de el; el me siguio abrazando cogiendome de los pechos y
basandome, y yo a mi vez seguia tratando de desasirme de el insistentemente.

P. ¿Y que sucedio? — R. Cuando yo trataba de desasirma de el, el me siguio abrazando y yo a mi vez

seguia tratandome de desassirme de el y el llego a agarrarme en la parte genital y trato de lanzarme.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted cuando le trataba de lanzarle a usted el occiso? — R. Yo procuraba desasirme de el y
cuando me quede debilitada y ya no podia hacer nada contra la fuerza de el yo saque de mo bolsillo un
cortaplumas.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted del cortaplumas? — R. Lo abri porque cuando ya no podia hacer nada y estaba y a
debil yo hice lo que debia hacer en defensa de mi pudor, le apuñale.

She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question was in a pocket of the
overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without having an opportunity of changing her
clothes.

We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the
darkness ("Apenas se podia ver a alguien en esa obscuridad."); that he did not see any of the companions of the
defendant.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been making love to the defendant, and also to another girl
named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant were engaged,
that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained by the
evidence of record.

The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly could
have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released her.

The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about eleven o'clock that night in
the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances under which he had been
stabbed.

The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. We do not believe
her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in question took
place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not improbable that she was
reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the details of what had occurred.
We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the night in
question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the
deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say who he
was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by
means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling
what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending herself.

In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a person is not criminally
responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that
the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard by any of her
companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do so because of the suddenness
with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright which it naturally caused, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from criminal liability. In the case of the United States vs.
Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting
wounds or her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might have
been heard by people near by.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de
oficio.

_____

G.R. Nos. L-30012-30015 March 9, 1929

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEPH L. WILSON and ALFREDO DOLORES, defendants-appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellant Dolores.

Gregorio Perfecto for appellant Wilson.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant Alfredo Dolores was accused with Joseph L. Wilson in criminal cases Nos. 35408 (G. R. No. 30012),
35426 (G. R. No. 30013), and 35447 (G. R. No. 30014) of the crimes of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch, estafa
through falsification of mercantile document, and falsification of a mercantile document, respectively. In the
information filed in the criminal case No. 35408, it is alleged that "on or about the 26th day of September, 1927, in the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused being then employees of the San Carlos Milling Company, a
business from doing business in this city, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, falsify a cable or telegraphic dispatch,
to wit: a cablegram in the following manner: the said accused, taking advantage of their positions as employees of the
aforesaid San Carlos Milling Company of which Alfred D. Cooper was then the manager, prepared and caused to be
prepared on the front page of a cablegram form used by the Commercial Pacific Cable Co., of said city, the following
code cablegram:

SCARLOSCO HONOLULU

WYSUXMOOJL.

which, deciphered, reads as follows:

SCARLOSCO — San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.

 HONOLULU — Honolulu

WYSUX — Deposit Irving Bank — Columbia Trust Co., New York for account China Banking
Corporation, Manila, account San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., $———; instruct Irving Bank-Columbia
Trust Co., advise Manila of deposit by cable.

MOOJL — 100,000

and wrote on the back thereof in typewriter at the space provided for the name and address of the sender
the following:

ALFRED D. COOPER

By (Sgd.) ALFREDO DOLORES

227 David, Manila

thereby causing it to appear that the above-mentioned cablegraphic message was prepared and sent by and
under the authority and with the knowledge and consent of Alfred D. Cooper, then manager of the San
Carlos Milling Company wherein the said accused were then employed, when in truth and in fact, as the said
accused very well knew, the said Alfred D. Cooper never authorized, nor had any knowledge of, nor gave
his permission to the preparation and sending of the said cablegraphic message; that the said accused,
once having forged and falsified the above- mentioned cablegraphic message in the manner above
described, presented the same to the office of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company for the due
transmission.

The information filed in criminal case No. 35426 charges that "on or about September 29, 1927, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the above named defendants, who were then employees or clerks of a mercantile concern known
as "San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.," duly organized in this locality, with grave abuse of confidence and with the intention
to defraud and prejudice said institution and the local banking institution known as "Bank of the Philippine Islands,"
acting upon a common agreement, and cooperating with each other and conspiring together, falsified a mercantile
document, to wit, a check against the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the sum of two hundred thousand pesos by
forging and simulating at the bottom and in the indorsement of said check the signatures of Newland Baldwin,
Manager of the San Carlos Milling Co., Inc., and falsely causing it to appear that said Newland Baldwin intervened in
said check, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such intervention, so that the aforesaid check, once
falsified, reads as follows:

No. A-352046

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

OFFICIAL DEPOSITORY OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

MANILA, P. I., September 29, 1927

Pay to San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., or order Pesos Two Hundred Thousand & 00/100 only (P200,000),
Philippine currency.

SAN CARLOS MILLING CO., LTD.

By NEWLAND BALDWIN

For Agent

that once said check was falsified, prepared, and drawn as above stated, the said accused, containing the
collusion and conspiracy plotted by them, presented it for payment to the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
falsely and fraudulently stating and representing to said bank and its officers that the check was authentic
and duly signed by Newland Baldwin, manager of said company, San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., in the ordinary
course of its business, the accused herein having succeeded, through said falsification and deceitful
representations, in collecting the amount of the check aforesaid in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, to wit,
 two hundred pesos (P200,000), which said defendants misappropriated and converted to their personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said institutions, to wit, the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., and the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, in the aforesaid sum of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), Philippine
currency, equivalent to 1,000,000 pesetas.

The information filed in the criminal case No. 35477 reads as follows:

That on or about September 28, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above named
defendants, who were then employees or clerks of a mercantile concern known as San Carlos Milling Co.,
Ltd., of this locality, with grave abuse of confidence and with the intention to prejudice said institution, acting
upon a common agreement and cooperating with each other and conspiring together, did willfully, unlawfully
and criminally falsify, in a mercantile document, to wit, the "Manager's Check" No. 17444 of the China
Banking Corporation, of September 28, 1927, is issued in favor of the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., for the
sum of two hundred thousand and one pesos (P200,001), the signature of one Newland Baldwin, Manager
of said San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., by forging, simulating, and imitating it in the indorsement on the back of
said document, and falsely causing it to appear in said indorsement that Newland Baldwin intervened
therein, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such intervention, so that, once falsified, said
indorsement reads as follows:

For deposit only with Bank of the Philippine Islands, to credit of account of San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.,

By NEWLAND BALDWIN
For Agent

Upon being arraigned on the above-quoted informations, the defendant Alfredo Dolores pleaded not guilty and, upon
motion by the prosecution, and with the conformity of the attorneys for the defense, a joint trial of the above-
mentioned cases with respect to the defendant Alfredo Dolores was had.

The trial court found the defendant Alfredo A, Dolores guilty as principal, by direct participation and in conspiracy with
Joseph L. Wilson, of the crimes alleged in the informations filed in criminal cases Nos. 35408, 35426 and 35447, and
sentenced him in a criminal case No. 35408, for the crime of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch with the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision
correccional, to the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings; in
criminal case No. 35426, for the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document, to eight years
of presidio mayor, to the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings; and
in criminal case No. 35447, for the crime of falsification of a mercantile document, with the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine months, and eleven days of prision correccional,
to pay a fine of 12,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings. From these judgment the defendant Dolores appealed.

The evidence fully sustains the findings of the court below and leaves no doubt whatever as to the appellant's guilt,
but his counsel insists that the court erred (1) in holding that "in preparing and in sending the false cablegram, Exhibit
A (case No. 35408), as well as in preparing and in negotiating the check no less false, Exhibit C (case No. 35426)
and in later collecting its value, and in likewise preparing the false commercial documents, Exhibits A and B, of the
criminal case No. 35447, it was the idea of the said accused to benefit himself and damage another," and (2) in
holding that the defendant Alfredo Dolores wanted to defraud and damage or, more correctly, defrauded and
damaged the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

Under the first assignment of error, counsel argues that the defendant Dolores did nothing but carry out the orders of
his superior, Joseph L. Wilson, and that he, consequently, is exempt from criminal responsibility. This argument is
entirely groundless. In order to work exemption from criminal responsibility for obeying the orders of a superior, it
must be shown that the person who gives the order and the person who executes it acting within the limitations
prescribed by law. That is not the case here. In his brief, the Attorney-General well and truly says:

The evidence of record clearly shows that the defendant Alfredo Dolores took direct part in, and cooperated
with his codefendant Joseph L. Wilson by means of acts prior to, and simultaneous with, the perpetration of
the crimes in question. He cooperated in the drafting of the checks and other documents for the falsification
of which he is now prosecuted, and he was the one who cashed said check and withdrew the money from
the bank. He furthermore received from Joseph L. Wilson the sum of P10,000 as his share in the embezzled
 amount. It cannot be maintained, therefore, that Alfredo Dolores merely obeyed his superiors, and that he
was not informed of the fact that his codefendant, Joseph L. Wilson intended to embezzle said money.

Moreover, the behavior of the defendant Alfredo Dolores subsequent to the commission of the crimes in
question clearly shows his guilt. It is proven that after the withdrawal of the amount of P200,000 from the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, he was seen in secret conversation with Joseph L. Wilson in Calle Herran,
Paco; that from that day he had been hiding from the authorities; that he had registered at the Plaza Hotel
under the name of Jose Gil; that he went to Sorsogon and Albay, where he represented himself as Patricio
Lopez; that in Albay he attempted to Board a foreign vessel, but did not succeed in his attempt. The flight of
a person after the commission of an offense, while it does not constitute a presumption of guilt, is
nevertheless a circumstance indicative of his guilt (U. S. vs Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486; U. S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil.,
618).

The second assignment of error evidently relates to case G. R. No. 30013 (estafa through falsification of a mercantile
document) and requires no refutation. The conspirators carried away P200,001, and, of course, someone suffered
the loss. Whether the loss fell on the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., or on the Bank of the Philippine Islands is
immaterial; it is sufficient that it was sustained by a person or persons, other than the perpetrators of the crime. It is to
be observed that the trial court, at the request of the interested parties, made no pronouncement as to the indemnity
and that, therefore, the civil responsibility is not involved in the cases before us.

The judgment appealed from are affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.