IMMOVABLE PROPERTY (9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are

Art. 415. The following are immovable property: intended by their nature and object to remain at a
(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
adhered to the soil;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are other real rights over immovable property. (334a)
attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable;
MOVABLE PROPERTY
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated property:
therefrom without breaking the material or (1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which
deterioration of the object; are not included in the preceding article;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or (2) Real property which by any special provision of law is
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the considered as personalty;
owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to (3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by
the tenements; science; and

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements (4) In general, all things which can be transported from
intended by the owner of the tenement for an place to place without impairment of the real
industry or works which may be carried on in a property to which they are fixed. (335a)
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works; Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal
property:
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or (1) Obligations and actions which have for their object
breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner movables or demandable sums; and
has placed them or preserves them with the intention
to have them permanently attached to the land, and (2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and
forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these industrial entities, although they may have real
places are included; estate. (336a)

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter

thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either
running or stagnant;
TITLE II – OWNERSHIP

Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. Kinds of Ownership
(a) Full ownership (dominium or jus in re propia) — this
‘Ownership’ Defined includes all the rights of an owner. (possession and
Ownership is the independent and general right of a person to rights)
control a thing particularly in his possession, enjoyment,
disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those (b) Naked ownership (nuda proprietas) — this is ownership
imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to where the right to the use and the fruits has been
the provisions of the law. denied. (mere possession)

Ownership is that independent right of a person to the exclusive [NOTE: 1) Naked ownership plus usufruct equals full
enjoyment and control of a thing including its disposition and ownership. 2) Usufruct equals full ownership minus naked
recovery subject only to the restrictions or limitations ownership. 3) Naked ownership equals full ownership minus
established by law and the rights of others. usufruct.]
.
Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. The [NOTE: A usufructuary’s right may be called jus in re aliena
Auditor-General, Pedro M. Gimenez because he possesses a right over a thing owned by another.].
FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sold to the Government a parcel
of land to be used by the latter in connection with the relocation (c) Sole ownership — where the ownership is vested in only
of squatters. The Government occupied the land at once, one person.
although it had given only the down payment of its price, the
balance to be paid in the future after the seller shall have first (d) Co-ownership (or Tenancy in Common) — when the
caused the registration of the property in its name. In the ownership is vested in two or more owners.
meantime, is the seller (who has not been completely paid, but
who has already delivered the land) required to pay the real Manresa says: “The concept of co-ownership is unity of
estate taxes thereon? the property, and plurality of the subjects. Each co-
owner, together with the other co-owners, is the owner
HELD: No, the seller is not required to pay the real estate taxes of the whole, and at the same time, the owner of an
on the lot sold, because after all, it has already delivered the undivided aliquot part thereof.” (3 Manresa 368-387;
land to the Government. Ownership has therefore been Sison v. Fetalino, 47 O.G. No. 1, 300).
transferred to the government by virtue of said delivery. Be
it noted that generally, payment of the purchase price is not Where Questions of Ownership Should be Decided
essential to effectuate the transfer of ownership. Not being Questions relating to ownership or even to the validity or
the owner anymore, the Corporation had no duty to pay said discharge of a mortgage should generally be ventilated in an
taxes. Since payment has already been made “under protest,” a ordinary civil action or proceeding, and NOT under the
refund must be made in favor of the Corporation. Incidentally, proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act, inasmuch as
the fact that the condition regarding registration, has not yet the latter proceedings are summary in nature, and more or less
been complied with is of no significance, insofar as the payment inadequate. (RFC v. Alto Surety and Ins. Co., L-14303, Mar. 24,
of said taxes is concerned. 1960). There are, of course, exceptions, as when both parties
concerned, are given full opportunity to present their sides, and
the court is able to obtain sufficient evidence to guide the Land [NOTE: The right to possess is the right to hold a thing or enjoy
Registration Court in formulating its decision. This, however, a right. (Art. 523.) It may be exercised in one’s own name or in
naturally falls within the sound discretion of the Court. (Aglipay that of another. (Art. 524.)]
v. De los Reyes, L-12776, Mar. 23, 1960).
Right to use not necessarily included.
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a — One’s possession may be in the concept of an owner or a mere
thing, without other limitations than those established by holder with the ownership pertaining to another. (Art. 525.)
law.
Thus, ownership is different from possession. The right to
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possess does not always include the right to use. For example,
possessor of the thing in order to recover it. while the bailee in the contract of deposit holds the property in
trust, he is not granted by law the right to make use of the
Rights of an Owner Under the Civil Code property in deposit. (Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 541
Under Art. 428, the owner has: [1991]; see Arts. 1962, 1977.)
(a) the right to enjoy
(b) the right to dispose Judgment of ownership may not include possession.
(c) the right to recover or vindicate. — A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled
to possession which may be in the hands of another such as a
The right to enjoy includes: tenant or a lessee. A person may have improvements thereon of
(a) the right to possess P which he may not be deprived of without due hearing. He may
(b) the right to use U have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession.
(c) the right to the fruits. F
Therefore, a judgment of ownership does not necessarily include
The right to dispose includes: possession as a necessary incident. (Jabon v. Alo, 91 Phil. 750
(a) the right to consume or destroy or abuse CDA [1952]; Talens v. Garcia, 87 Phil. 173 [1950].)
(b) the right to encumber or alienate. EA
However, this doctrine may be invoked only in instances where
Rights of an Owner Under Roman Law the actual possessor has some rights which must be respected.
(a) jus possidendi — the right to possess It does not apply where a party has not given any reason for
(b) jus utendi — the right to use retaining the possession of a property after his claim of
(c) jus fruendi — the right to the fruits ownership was rejected by the court.
(d) jus abutendi — the right to consume (and to transform or
abuse) CASE:
(e) jus disponendi — the right to dispose
(f) jus vindicandi — the right to recover. - If I buy a house from X, and X is renting it to Y, I can ask
Y to leave the premises so that I may possess the same
Jus Possidendi unless the lease is still unexpired and duly recorded in
The right to possess means the right to hold a thing or to the Registry of Property, or unless at the time of sale, I
enjoy a right. In either case, it means that the thing or right is already knew of the existence and duration of the lease.
subject to the control of my will. (Arts. 1495, 1496, 1497).
 The reason for the general rule is that the right to use The use of property has a social function to contribute to
the house is one of the rights transferred as a the common good. (Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 6.)
consequence of the change of ownership. (Art. 1676;
see also Saul v. Hawkins, 1 Phil. 275). The right I can Jus Fruendi
exercise even if there is an acute housing shortage and Y The right to the fruits includes the right to three kinds of fruits
does not have any place to go to, except of course if some — natural, industrial and civil fruits (such as rents from
law expressly and directly prohibits me from doing so. buildings).
(See Villanueva v. Canlas, L-5229, Sep. 18, 1946).
The right to natural fruits extends to the young of animals. (Art.
- If I lease my house to L, L has the right to physically 441).
possess my house for the duration of the lease as long as
he complies with the conditions of the contract, It has been held that only owners, and not mortgagees, can
otherwise, if I should eject him forcibly from the house, claim damages for injury to the fruits of a piece of land and
he may bring an action of forcible entry against me, even for injury caused by the deprivation of possession. The
if I am the owner. (Masallo v. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134). recovery of these damages is indeed an attribute of ownership.
(Calo v. Prov. Sheriff of Laguna, [CA] L-214-R, Mar. 5, 1954).
Jus Utendi
The right to use includes the right to exclude any person, as The word “accessions’’ is also used to refer to the fruits of a
a rule, from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this thing.
purpose, the owner-possessor may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or The general rule is that all accessions and accessories are
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of the included in the obligation to deliver a determinate thing
property. (Art. 429). although they may not have been mentioned. (see Art. 1166.)

He may enclose or fence his property, subject to the servitudes Jus Abutendi
that may be constituted thereon. (Art. 430.) In Roman law, jus abutendi did not really mean the right to
abuse, but the right to consume. However, modern
Upon the other hand, the owner of a thing cannot make use terminology allows both meanings.
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. (Art. 431). A person can indeed burn his own house if in an isolated place,
but not where the burning would endanger the properties of
Otherwise, he may be held liable for damages, and if his property others. A person can dispose of his wealth, but he must leave
is a nuisance, it may even be destroyed. Also as a consequence enough for his own support and for those whom he is obliged to
of ownership, it has been held that when a person using his support. (Art. 750).
brother’s land, with the latter’s permission, is sued by a stranger
who claims to be the owner thereof, the owner is entitled to “The donations may comprehend all the present property of the
intervene in the action so that he can adequately protect his donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or
rights. If he be not allowed to intervene, a judgment against the in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of
brother-possessor would generally not be binding on the all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation,
brother-owner. (Mansa v. Judge, et al., L-7830, Apr. 30, 1955). are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced in petition of any The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the
person affected.” complaint and sets forth a state of facts quite inconsistent with
those alleged in the complaint.

If a person wastes his money for the purpose of depriving his Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of
compulsory heirs of their rightful legitime, he may be declared a the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the
spendthrift or prodigal. (Martinez v. Martinez, 1 Phil. 182). plaintiff has administered the community estate for several
years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don
Prodigal Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be
registered in his own name without the consent of the father
- a person who habitually spends his money recklessly and and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the
extravagantly. property of the estate, which caused the defendant to
revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the
- acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to
disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the
extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an
deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. account of his administration.
Gen: the court may prohibit the prodigal to perform juristic acts Jus Disponendi
without the curators The right to dispose includes the right to donate, to sell, to
pledge or mortgage.
Exception: may conclude contracts by which he acquires rights
but not duties without the curator’s assistance. SALE: a seller need not be the owner at the time of perfection of
the contract of sale. It is sufficient that he be the owner at the
PEDRO MARTINEZ vs FRANCISCO MARTINEZ. time of delivery. (Art. 1459).
Facts: This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the MORTGAGE OR PLEDGE: It is essential that the mortgagor or
son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez the pledgor be the owner of the thing mortgaged or pledged,
Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father. otherwise the contract is null and void. (Art. 2085; see also
Contreras v. China Banking Corp., [CA] GR 74, May 25, 1946).
He alleged that Don Francisco Martinez, owing to his advanced
age, is dissipating and squandering his estate by making A mortgage, whether registered or not, is binding between the
donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre, and to her parties, registration being necessary only to make the same valid
parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has as against third persons. (Samanillo v. Cajucom, et al., L-13683,
given over the administration of this estate to the management Mar. 28, 1960).
of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and
has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order A husband cannot ordinarily donate property of considerable
to take possession of the property held in common with the value to his wife as long as the marriage lasts. Such a donation
plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives. is considered null and void. (Art. 133; Uy Coque v. Navas, 45 Phil.
430).
The same rule is applicable to a donation between a common-
law husband and a common-law wife, according to a decision 3) Accion reivindicatoria (or a reivindicatory action). (Roman
promulgated by the Court of Appeals. Catholic Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286; see also Emilia
v. Bado, L-23685, Apr. 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 183).
Jus Vindicandi
The right to recover is given expressly in Art. 428 which [ADDITIONALLY, we can also make use in certain cases of the:
provides that “the owner has also a right of action against the 1) writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; and 2) writ of
holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.” possession.]
Moreover “every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be Nota Bene
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.” (Art. 539, par. Oliveras, et al. v. Lopez, et al. L-29727, Dec. 14, 1988
1).
A “move in the premises” resolution is not a license to occupy or
Thus, jus vindicandi is transmissible to the heirs or enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases
assignees of the person entitled to it. (See Waite v. Peterson, involving real property. A “move in the premises” resolution
et al., 8 Phil. 449). simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to
inform the Court of developments pertinent to the case which
If somebody actually possesses a piece of property, and claims may be of help to the Court in its immediate disposition. In other
to be the owner thereof, the law raises a disputable presumption words, this phrase must not be interpreted in its literal sense.
of ownership. The true owner must then resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property. (Art. 433). Tabora v. Velio L-60367, Sep. 30, 1982
In case of disputes involving real property, the proper barangay
In other words, the true owner must not take the law into his court is where the property is situated, even if the parties reside
own hands. somewhere else in the same municipality or city. If this is not
followed, the Lupong Barangay (under PD 1508) would have no
Actions available to recover possession and/or ownership. jurisdiction.
RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
Replevin
The proper action to recover personal property is replevin, (a) Replevin is defined as an action or provisional remedy where
governed by Rule 60, Rules of Court. the complainant prays for the recovery of the possession of
personal property. (Sec. 1, Rule 60, Rules of Court).
Recovery of Real Property
There are three usual actions to recover the possession of real [NOTE: Machinery and equipment used for an industry and
property: indispensable for the carrying on of such industry, cannot be the
subject of replevin, because under the premises, they are real,
1) Forcible entry or unlawful detainer (either action was and not personal property. (Machinery and Engineering Supplies,
formerly referred to as accion interdictal) Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 70).].

2) Accion publiciana (or the plenary action to recover the better (b) At the commencement of the action, or at any time before the
right of possession). other party answers, the applicant may apply for an order of the
delivery of such property to him. (See Sec. 1, Rule 60, Rules of
Court). Northern Motors, Inc. v. Herrera
FACTS: If a purchaser on the installment plan of personal
(c) When he applies for the order, he must show by his own property, secured by a chattel mortgage, fails to pay as
affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows of stipulated in the contract, may the mortgagee immediately sue
the facts — for replevin to obtain possession of the mortgaged property, or
is it essential for him to first foreclose on the mortgage?
1) that the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession HELD: The chattel mortgagee has the right to obtain
thereof; immediate possession of the mortgaged chattel upon breach
of contract by the chattel mortgagors. If possession is not
2) that the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse transferred or delivered, replevin may be availed of.
party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to
his best knowledge, information and belief; Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA
Leisure’s Club, Inc.’s act of filing a replevin suit without the
3) that it has not been distrained or taken for a tax intention of prosecuting the same, constitutes a wanton,
assessment or fi ne pursuant to law or seized under a writ fraudulent, reckless, oppressive and malevolent breach of
of execution or preliminary attachment or otherwise contract which justifies the award of exemplary damages under
placed under custodia legis or if so seized, that it is Art. 2232 of the Civil Code.
exempt from such seizure or custody; and
La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. CA
4) the actual market value of the property. (Sec. 2, Rule If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property
60, Rules of Court). taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should, within 5 days
from such taking:
(d) The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse (1) post a counter bond in double the value of said property; and
party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof — both requirements, as
aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse well as compliance therewith within the 5-day period mentioned,
party if such return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to being mandatory.
the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the
applicant in the action. (Sec. 2, Rule 60, Rules of Court). The remedy of a stranger to the action for replevin is a third-
party claim under Sec. 7, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. To avail
(e) The court then orders the sheriff to take such property into of the remedy of intervention, prior determination of whether one
his custody. (See Sec. 3, Rule 60, Rules of Court). Under the old is a proper party defendant or a stranger to the action is
law, it was the clerk of court who made the order. (Sec. 263, Act necessary.
190).
Arabesque Industrial Phils. v. CA
(f) If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building A writ of replevin cannot be directed against the lawful
or enclosure, and not delivered upon demand, the sheriff must possessor.
cause the building or enclosure to be broken
open. He then takes the property. (See Sec. 4, Rule 60, Rules of Chua v. CA
Court). Replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis.
Navarro v. CA The law insists that an action for forcible entry must be filed
As to the properties sought to be removed, the court sustains within one year because public interest is involved, and therefore
the possession by plaintiff of all equipment and chattels the case must be tried and decided as soon as possible.
recovered by virtue of a writ of replevin.
Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala
Sebastian v. Valina Purpose of forcible entry
Under the Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of — “The purpose is that, regardless of the actual condition of the
replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. title to property, the party, in peaceable and quiet possession
shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or terror … In
RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY. affording this remedy, breaches of the peace and criminal
FORCIBLE ENTRY (DETENTACION) disorder would be minimized. A party out of possession must
Definition respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is
Forcible entry is a summary action to recover material or his.’’
physical possession of real property when a person originally in
possession was deprived thereof by force, intimidation, strategy, Gumiran v. Gumiran
threat, or stealth. (Keyword is FISTS). (See Rule 70, Sec. 1, Rules Facts to be stated in the complaint for forcible entry
of Court). — The complaint must allege that one in physical possession of
a land or building has been deprived of said possession by
Prescriptive Period another thru:
The action must be brought within one year from the a) force, or
dispossession. However, in case of strategy or stealth, it would b) intimidation, or
seem that the better rule would be to count the period of one c) threat, or
year from the time of DISCOVERY of such strategy or stealth. d) strategy, or
e) stealth.
Issue Involved
The issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de Sps. Benitez v. CA
facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor In forcible entry, the plaintiff is derived of physical
ownership. (See Maddammu v. Court, 74 Phil. 230; Mercado v. Go possession of his land or building by means of force,
Bio, 78 Phil. 279; Masallo v. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134). intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege
and prove prior possession.
Cases
Masallo v. Cesar [NOTE: If the forcible entry was not accomplished thru any of the
If an owner deprives a person lawfully entitled to possession above-mentioned means, “forcible entry is not the proper
(such as, for example, a tenant who has complied with all his action.’’ (Gumiran v. Gumiran, supra).].
obligations) thru FISTS, said tenant may bring an action of
forcible entry even as against the owner. This is because the [NOTE: It is not essential to set forth in the complaint for forcible
owner in the example presented had surrendered material entry the exact language of the law. It is sufficient if stated
possession to the tenant by virtue of the lease contract. The fact substantially, or if facts are alleged showing that the
that he is the owner is immaterial. dispossession took place thru any of the means set up by the
law. (Gumiran v. Gumiran, supra).].
Monteblanco v. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation and Coruna
[NOTE: A, in a complaint for forcible entry stated in the action for recovery the action for possession and the action of
complaint that he had been “deprived” of the land he owned. Is recovering title, he should have waited for the period of one year
this sufficient? to elapse from the date when the cause of action arose before
HELD: No, this is not sufficient for he did not state in what way filing his complaint in this court, because the Court of First
he had been deprived. (Gumiran v. Gumiran, supra).]. Instance has no jurisdiction over an action for recovery until
after the expiration of the time prescribed by section 80 of the
[NOTE: A, in a complaint for forcible entry stated in the
Code of Civil Procedure.
complaint that the defendant had “unlawfully turned the
plaintiff out of the possession” of land or building. Is this From the decision the plaintiffs appealed.
sufficient?
HELD: Yes, this is sufficient. It is true that prior physical HELD: In view of the provisions of section 80 of the Code of
possession must be alleged. But this can be implied from the Procedure in Civil Actions, as amended by Act No. 1778. Said
fact that the complaint states that the plaintiff had unlawfully section 80 provides for a special remedy for the purpose of
been deprived of his possession. (Co Tiamco v. Diaz, et al., 42 recovering the possession of land under the special facts and
O.G. 1169; Maddammu v. Court, 74 Phil. 230).]. gives justice of the peace original jurisdiction in such cases.

[NOTE: Is it essential in the complaint for forcible entry or The facts upon which said action (forcible entry and detainer)
detainer to state that the action is being brought within the one- can be brought, are specially mentioned in said section. They
year period or is it sufficient to just prove this in court without are: "That the person has been deprived of the possession of his
the necessity of alleging the same in the complaint? lands by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," etc. Of
HELD: This fact need not be alleged in the complaint, but must course we do not mean to decide that the complaint must allege,
be proved during the trial. (Co Tiamco v. Diaz, et al., 42 O.G. in the language of the statute, that the person has been deprived
1169).]. of his possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. The plaintiff in an action of desahucio must set up in his
Allegation of Ownership by Defendant in Forcible Entry complaint facts which show that the dispossession took place by
Cases reason of force, intimidation, etc.
Gumiran v. Gumiran
Facts: On the 18th of February, 1909, the plaintiffs commenced In the present case the allegation in the complaint is simply that
an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela, the plaintiff has been "deprived" of the land of which he is and
relating to the possession of a certain parcel of land The has been the legal owner for a long period. This allegation is not
plaintiffs alleged that they were the absolute owners and entitled sufficient to show that the action is based upon the provisions
to the possession of said land; that upon the 6th day of May, of said section 80. Moreover, upon an examination of the prayer
1908, they were in possession of said land and had been from of the complaint, it is seen that the plaintiff is not only seeking
time immemorial, and that, without any right or title, the to be repossessed of the land but desires also a declaration that
defendant deprived them of the possession of the same, that the he is the owner of the same. It is quite clear, from an
defendant was still in possession of said land and that the examination of the complaint, that, had the same been
plaintiffs, by reason of such wrongly dispossession, had suffered presented in the court of the justice of the peace, it would have
damages in the sum of P500. been demurrable, for the reason that the facts alleged fail to
show that the plaintiff had been dispossessed by any of the
The Court of First Instance judge dismissed the case since the methods mentioned in said section 80.
plaintiff preferred to exercise together in a single complaint of
Ganadin v. Ramos or affect ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall
If what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to
does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. The the land or building.’’ (Sec. 18, Rule 70, Rules of Court).].
municipal court will still have jurisdiction.
Patricio S. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals and Basaran
Aquino v. Deala FACTS: In a forcible entry case, a judgment by compromise was
Under the law, justice of the peace courts and municipal judges given stating that according to the terms of the compromise,
have jurisdiction over cases involving forcible entry and each party admitted the ownership and possession by the other,
unlawful detainer but have no jurisdiction to pronounce of half of the land.
judgments regarding ownership. Now then, A brings an action
of forcible entry against B in the justice of the peace court. B, Issue: What is the effect of the pronouncement of this
however, alleges his ownership over the property in question. “ownership”?
Does B’s allegation deprive the court of its jurisdiction?
HELD: The judicial pronouncement did not amount to an
HELD: No, otherwise the jurisdiction of a court can be changed adjudication of the title of the land involved. The ownership
by the mere allegation by the defendant, and the ends of justice thereof was mentioned in said agreement merely as a BASIS for
would be easily frustrated. Of course, if the question of the right of possession therein acknowledged by both parties.
ownership really becomes essential in determining the question Such right of possession was the only question sought to be
of possession, the justice of the peace court would no longer settled and actually decided therefore by the inferior court.
have jurisdiction, for the issue has changed. Thus, the Supreme
Court has said, “if in the course of the hearing and in the [NOTE: Incidentally in the above case, defendant was a Muslim.
presentation of evidence it is found that the question of The compromise agreement was attacked as void under Secs.
possession cannot be resolved without first determining the title 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
to the property, its jurisdiction is lost, and the case should be on the ground that the same did not have the approval of the
dismissed.’’ (Torres v. Peña, 4 O.G. 8, p. 2699; Peñalosa v. Garcia, Provincial Governor or his duly authorized representative. The
44 O.G. 8, 2709, decided Apr. 1, 1947). court held that such approval is needed only in ordinary
contracts, not in agreements for the settlement of judicial
[NOTE: The amendment to the Judiciary Act, already referred to proceedings, approved by the court before which the same are
with respect to city courts (not municipal courts) and CFI’s pending.
having concurrent jurisdiction in cases where possession cannot
be determined unless the issue of ownership is also resolved.]. The approval by the governor or his representative cannot be
given greater weight than that given by a court of justice — a
[NOTE: If a court without jurisdiction decides a case, the court which can properly hear both sides.].
judgment is completely null and void, and may be attacked at
any time, directly or collaterally. This is true even if no appeal UNLAWFUL DETAINER (DESAHUCIO)
has been made. Indeed, there would be no res judicata on the Unlawful detainer is the action that must be brought when
issue of ownership. (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).]. possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person of
any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the
[NOTE: The Rules of Court provides: “The judgment rendered in expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with virtue of any contract, express or implied.
respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title
In such a case, prior physical possession IS NOT required. failed to surrender the land. What is B’s remedy? An action for
(Sps. Benitez v. CA, 77 SCAD 793 [1997]). unlawful detainer because of the withholding of possession.

It is, however, not the proper remedy if the purpose is not to Villamin v. Echiverri
recover possession but to exact specific performance of a If there is no legal ground for ejectment of a tenant of an
contract. (Municipality of Batangas v. Santos, et al., L-4012, apartment, the suit cannot prosper. Under PD 20, increase of
June 30, 1952). rent is not allowed if the monthly rental is P300 or less.

Municipality of Batangas v. Santos Ganadin v. Ramos

This case involves conflicting claims between the parties If in an unlawful detainer case the lessor wins, he is entitled to
involving their transaction over a parcel of land and its the fair market value of the property.
improvements, with the respondents claiming, on the one hand,
that they had purchased the property on installment pursuant Cañiza v. CA
to an oral contract to sell, and the petitioners insisting, on the In an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the
other, that the amounts paid by the respondents to them were defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the
in payment of the latter's indebtedness for a previous loan. The plaintiff and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
trial court sided with the petitioners but the appellate court alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the respondents. vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.
[NOTE: To make out a case of unlawful detainer, the complaint
must show that the withholding of possession, or the refusal to Chua v. CA
vacate, is UNLAWFUL. Thus, where the complaint shows prior Public policy dictates that unlawful detainer cases be resolved
possession by the defendant, but does NOT allege that the right with the least possible delay and judgments in favor of plaintiff
of possession had terminated, and that occupancy was being are executed immediately. Sole issue in an action for unlawful
unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff, there is NO case of detainer is physical OR material possession. The pendency of an
unlawful detainer. However, the precise terminology of the law action for quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the city
does not necessarily have to be employed. (Valderrama Lumber or municipal trial court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the
Manufacturers’ Co. v. L.S. Sarmiento Co., L-18535, May 30, ejectment case over the same property. The subsequent
1962).]. acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening
event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful
[NOTE: A person or squatter who occupies the land of another at detainer case.
the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that To What Lands Applicable
he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action The action can apply to all kinds of land, whether agricultural,
for ejectment or unlawful detainer is the proper remedy against residential, or mineral, since the law does not distinguish.
him. (Yu v. De Lara, et al., L-16084, Nov. 30, 1962).]. (Teodoro v. Sabala, et al., L-11522, Jan. 31, 1958).

Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga Distinguished from Forcible Entry

S sold a lot to B a retro. S failed to redeem within the stipulated In forcible entry, the possession was unlawful from the very
period of repurchase, and B was able to consolidate his beginning; in unlawful detainer, the possession was lawful in
ownership over the property. However, despite demand on S, he the beginning, but became unlawful afterwards (as in the case
where a lease contract has already expired). In both, however, Fisher, 2 Phil. 676). In the Dy case, the value of the bangus fry
ownership is not involved, but only the right to the material which disappeared was recovered.
possession of the premises.
Effect of No Demand to Vacate, in Case Demand is Essential
Evidence showing ownership may indeed be given, not for the If demand to vacate is essential (as in non-payment of rents) but
purpose of proving ownership, but merely to show proof that demand is not made, the case should be brought before the
material possession had been lost. (Baguiro v. Barrios, GR L-277, Court of First Instance (now Regional
43 O.G. 2031). Trial Court) and not the justice of the peace or the municipal
court. Error on this point is jurisdictional. (Doradov. Virina, 34
Also, both are proceedings in personam (binding only on the Phil. 264).
parties, and privies) and not proceedings or actions in rem
(binding upon the whole world). (See Vda. de Sengbengco, et al. [NOTE: The demand to vacate is essential only if the tenant
v. Arellano, et al., L-16269, Mar. 8, 1961). However, since they detains possession (except if the cause is expiration of the
involve real property, they are also termed “actions quasi in rem’’ period), but is not essential if detention is made by a buyer,
which are really actions in personam, involving real property. seller, or some other person. (See Sec. 2, Rule 70, Rules of
Court).].
De Guzman v. CA
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are QUIETING THE ‘ACCION PUBLICIANA’
PROCESSES and the 1-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance The accion publiciana is intended for the recovery of the
of the summary nature of the action. The 1-year period is better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an
counted from the time the entry by stealth was made by the ordinary civil proceeding before a Court of First Instance
defendant. After the lapse of the 1-year period, the remedy of the (now Regional Trial Court) (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu v.
party disposed of a land is to file an accion publiciana. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286), and must be brought within a period
of ten years, otherwise, the real right of possession is lost.
Right to Damages in Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (See Art. 555, No. 4).
Cases
The plaintiff in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is The issue is not possession de facto but possession de jure.
entitled to damages, not for those caused to the property (like (Rodriguez v. Taino, 16 Phil. 301). The 1948 Judiciary Act did not
destruction) but for those caused by his being deprived of the introduce any modification to the well-established principle that
use or possession of the premises, such as the use and collection when deprivation of possession has lasted more than one year,
of fruits. Damages caused the property itself can only be the action to recover falls within the jurisdiction of the CFI (now
recovered in an ordinary action, because the plaintiff in such a RTC). (Firmeza v. David, 92 Phil. 733).
case should be the owner. (Santos v. Santiago, 38 Phil. 575; Dy,
et al. v. Kuizon, L-16654, Nov. 30, 1961). Commonwealth Act 538 which provides for the automatic
suspension of an action for ejectment against tenants occupying
In the Santos case (supra), the plaintiff was able to recover the lands which the government desires to acquire thru purchase or
value of the fruits of the trees produced, but not the value of the expropriation proceedings, applies only to forcible entry and
trees that were destroyed or cut down. In the case, it was held unlawful detainer cases, and NOT to ‘accion publiciana.’
that a fair rental value for the time when plaintiff was deprived (Miranda v. Legaspi, et al., 92 Phil. 290).
of possession could be recovered as damages. (Sparrevohn v.
Kinds of Plenary Actions to Recover Possession (Accion
Publiciana) The ‘Accion Reivindicatoria’
There are two (2) kinds of accion publiciana: The accion reivindicatoria or reivindicatory action is defined
1) That where the entry was not obtained thru FISTS (fraud, as an action to recover ownership over real property. The action
intimidation, stealth, threat, or strategy). (This can be must be brought in the Court of First Instance (now Regional
brought as soon as the dispossession takes place, without Trial Court) where the real estate is situated. (Roman Catholic
waiting for the lapse of one year). (Gutierrez v. Rosario, 15 Phil. Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286). The fact that the value
116). Failure to state that “deprivation” was caused by FISTS of the improvements on the land is less than the jurisdictional
would make the action not one of forcible entry but accion amount does not deprive the Court of First Instance (now RTC)
publiciana. (Gumiran v. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 17). Thus, where the of its authority to take cognizance of an accion reivindicatoria.
complaint not only shows prior possession by the defendant but (Carpena v. Manalo, et al., L-13143, Apr. 26, 1961). Of course, if
also fails to allege that the plaintiff was deprived by FISTS, no there are pending title proceedings over the public land involved
case of forcible entry is made out, and the justice of the peace (pending in the Bureau of Lands), and the attention of the Court
court has NO jurisdiction over the case. (Valderrama Lumber of First Instance (RTC) is called on this point, the said court
Manufacturers Co. v. L.S. Sarmiento, et al., L-18535, May 30, must dismiss the suit, NOT for lack of jurisdiction, but for lack
1962). of cause of action. If the attention of the CFI (RTC) is not called
on this matter, it can still proceed to hear the case. (Pineda v.
2) That where the one (1)-year period for bringing forcible Court of First Instance of Davao, et al., L-12602, Apr. 25, 1961).
entry or unlawful detainer has already expired. [Here the It must be brought within 10 years or 30 years as the case may
action may still be brought after the one-year period as accion be (depending on whether the other party seeks to obtain
publiciana, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial ownership by ordinary or extraordinary prescription).
Court); hence, if brought before the CFI (now RTC) before the
expiration of the one-year period, the action would still be either [NOTE: Insofar as real property is concerned, ordinary
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, and, therefore, the CFI (now prescription which requires, aside from other requirements for
RTC) would not have jurisdiction.] If forcible entry or unlawful prescription, good faith and just title runs for 10 years;
detainer has already been brought or decided upon by the justice extraordinary prescription, which does not require good faith or
of the peace or municipal trial court, may the subject be again just title, runs for 30 years.].
threshed out in an accion publiciana brought after the expiration
of the one-year period? [NOTE: When brothers, thru fraudulent representations have
been able to succeed in obtaining title in their names of a parcel
The Supreme Court, on this point, has answered in the negative, of land, thereby depriving their sister of her rightful share in the
on the ground that this would present a real case of res judicata. inheritance, a constructive trust is created in favor of said sister.
(Del Rosario v. Celosia, 26 Phil. 404). She has therefore the right to vindicate the property
REGARDLESS OF LAPSE OF TIME. (Eustaquio Jan, et al. v.
[NOTE: An accion publiciana, which naturally is res judicata only Vicente Zuñiga, et al., It should be observed, however, that this
insofar as one of the parties is held to have the better right of doctrine of imprescriptibility of an implied trust would seem to
possession, does NOT bar a subsequent action between the same be directly at VARIANCE with the rule stated in J.M. Tuason and
parties where one seeks to compel the other to execute a formal Co. v. Magdangal, L-15539, Jan. 30, 1962, and Cornelio Alzona,
deed of sale over the same property to enable him to obtain a et al. v. Gregorio Capunitan, et al., L-10228, Feb. 28, 1962 that
transfer certificate of title in his name, and to quiet title over the an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
same. (Cabanero v. Tesoro, L-12802, Feb. 11, 1960).]. trust prescribes in ten (10) years.].
[NOTE: One of the actions which does not lapse by death is that (a) The welfare of the people is the supreme law of the land.
for the recovery of title or possession of real estate. (Sison and (b) Use your property so as not to impair the rights of others.
Azarraga v. Balgos, 34 Phil. 885).]. “Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.’’ “The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
Effect of Denial of Petition for Registration under the Torrens of a third person.’’ (Art. 431).
System
(20) The Limitations on Ownership
The denial of a petition for the registration of land, under the (a) Those given by the State or the Law.
Torrens system, is not res judicata to another action brought, (b) Those given by the owner (or grantee) himself.
either for registration of the same land, or to any action of (c) Those given by the person (grantor) who gave the thing to its
ejectment. While an alleged owner of land may have a right suffi present owner.
cient to justify an action of ejectment, he may not have titles
suffi cient to justify a registration of his land under the Torrens Examples
system. While his title may indeed be defective, still the title of (a) Limitations imposed by the State — police power, power of
the adversary might still be more defective. (See Ramento v. taxation, power of eminent domain.
Sablaya, 38 Phil. 528). (b) Limitations imposed by the Law — the legal easement of
waters, the legal easement of right of way.
Writ of Injunction (c) Limitations imposed by the owner — when the owner leases
A person deprived of his possession of real or personal property his property to another, said owner in the meantime cannot
is ordinarily not allowed to avail himself of the remedy of physically occupy the premises; when the owner pledges his
preliminary preventive or prohibitory injunction, the reason being personal property, he has in the meantime to
that the defendant in actual possession is presumed disputably surrender its possession.
to have the better right. (Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273; Palafox (d) Limitations imposed by the grantor — the donor may prohibit
v. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444; Evangelista v. Pedrenos, 27 Phil. 648). the donees from partitioning the property for a period not
Under the Civil Code, however, under certain conditions, and in exceeding twenty (20) years.
view of the frequent delays in cases of this nature, the remedy
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may be availed of The Limitation of ‘Police Power’
in the original case of forcible entry; and during the appeal, in Police power is the right of the State to regulate and restrict
the case of unlawful detainer. personal and property rights for the common weal.

(a) Original Case of Forcible Entry Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
“A possessor deprived of his possession thru forcible entry may right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
within 10 days from the fi ling of the complaint present a motion disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
to secure from the competent court, in may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary man- or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property. (n)
Right of Ownership Not Absolute
The right of ownership is not absolute. There are limitations
which are imposed for the benefit of humanity, and which are Principle of self-help.
based on certain legal maxims, such as the following: right to counter, in certain cases, force with force.
[NOTE: The right to repel or prevent an actual or threatened his rights, including the right of property. One of the elements
physical invasion or usurpation of property is essential to the of self-defense is that the means employed must be reasonable]
maintenance of property rights.]
Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or
The following are the requisites for this article to apply: tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
(1) Owner or lawful possessor. — The person defending his or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
property must be the owner or lawful possessor; hence, if his constituted thereon.
possession is wrongful, the right to use force cannot be availed
of; Right of an owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements
by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges
(2) Reasonable force. — He must use only such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an invasion or The limitation to this right is the right of others to existing
usurpation of his property; otherwise, he shall be liable for servitudes imposed on the land or tenement.
damages;
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
(3) No delay. — The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at such manner as to injure the rights of a third person. (n)
the time of an actual or threatened dispossession, or
immediately after the dispossession to regain possession Obligation to respect the rights of others.
Article 431 is self-explanatory. It is based on the police power
Once delay has taken place, even if excusable, the owner or of the State expressed in the Latin maxim: sic utere tuo ut
lawful possessor must resort to judicial process for the recovery alienum non laidas. It is particularly useful when dealing with
of the property (Arts. 433, 536.) for he is no longer justified in nuisances. (see Arts. 677-681, 683, 694-707.)
taking the law into his own hands.
This restriction is of a fundamental character (Report of the Code
Actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation. Commission, p. 95.) and is deemed to exist even without an
— The person against whom force is employed has acted or is expressed provision to this effect. It does not apply, however,
acting wrongfully or unlawfully; hence, the right of self-help is where the owner of a thing makes use of it in a lawful manner
not available against a sheriff attaching property in the lawful for then it cannot be said that the manner of the use is such “as
exercise of his functions. to injure the rights of a third person.’’ But an owner of land will
not be permitted to use it in a particular way with no other
Article 432 is an exception to Article 429. purpose than to damage his neighbor, such as by the erection
The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the of a high fence out of spite to obstruct the light and view of his
interference of another with the same, if the interference is neighbor.
necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the
the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand interference of another with the same, if the interference is
from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him. necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
(n) damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from
the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand
[Note: The principle of self-defense in the Revised Penal Code from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.
covers not only defense of a man’s person but also extends to (n)
 (2) Damage to another much greater than damage to
Obligation to permit interference under certain conditions. property. — The imminent danger or threatening damage,
As a rule, a person cannot interfere with the right of ownership compared to the damage arising to the owner from the
of another. By way of exception, Article 432 allows interference interference, must be much greater. This requisite is also
with another’s property under certain conditions. (Report of the touched upon above.
Code Commission, p. 95.) It is based on what is known as the
state of necessity, a justifying circumstance recognized in the (a) Since the danger (e.g., to person’s life) sought to be
Revised Penal Code8 but which does not also exempt the prevented by the interference is much greater than the
offender from civil liability. It likewise embodies the principle of damage (e.g., to property) that the owner may suffer if it
the “the least evil’’ rule, i.e., that as between two evils, one is is not prevented, it is but just that the owner be obliged
justified in choosing the lesser evil. to allow the temporary interference with his right of
property.
There are two requisites for the application of Article 432.
(1) Interference necessary. — The interference must be (b) After all, he may demand from the person benefited (not
necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened necessarily the actor) indemnity for the damage to him9
damage to the actor or a third person. unless, of course, the owner would have been liable under
the law for the damage (e.g., destruction of an illegally
(a) The interference includes all acts to another’s property constructed dike to prevent flood) if the danger had not
including its destruction if necessary to avoid the been prevented, in which case he would not be entitled to
danger or damage. In case of a fire, for example, the recover indemnity for the damage suffered by him.
owner has no right to prohibit or prevent firemen from
breaking into his yard or into his house, or even from Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises
demolishing his house if such a step or measure is a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner
absolutely necessary to prevent the fire from spreading. must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property. (n)
(b) If such interference is disproportionate to the necessity of
averting the threatened danger or damage, or to the Resort to judicial process.
gravity of the danger or damage, it becomes unlawful or Article 433 applies to both immovable and movable property. It
wrongful, such as demolishing a house which is not in is similar to Articles 536 and 541. (see Art. 1131.)
the path of a fire, or shooting to death a neighbor’s pig
found among the plants of a person’s land. (People v. There are two requisites to raise the disputable presumption of
Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162 [1958].) ownership, to wit:
(1) There must be actual (physical or material) possession of the
(c) The law, however, does not require a person acting in a property; and
state of necessity to be free from negligence or mistake. (2) The possession must be under claim of ownership.
The measure of rational necessity is to be found in the
situation as it appears to the actor and he must be given Judicial process contemplated.
the benefit of reasonable doubt as to whether he Under Article 433, one who claims to be the owner of a property
employed rational means to avert the threatened injury. possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action
for its physical recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean
no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly
heard and adjudicated.

An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under

Section 7 of Act No. 313510 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial
process” as contemplated above. Even if the same may be
considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s
right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not
an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.” (Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3[a, 1].) Such
a petition is a non-litigious proceedings authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135,
as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought within
the ambit of the Act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not
with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third person
in possession of an extra-judicially foreclosed realty, who claims
a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, will have no
opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this
nature. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person
may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex-parte
possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his
summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due
process. The actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal
presumption of just title in his favor, which must be overcome
by the party claiming otherwise. (Philippine National Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 161 SCAD 643, 374 SCRA 22 [2002]; see
Supena v. De la Rosa, 78 SCAD 409, 267 SCRA 1 [1997].)