RA 9165

1. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jun1993/gr_101216_18_1993.html
2. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/may2011/gr_177191_2011.html
3. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_129019_2000.html
4. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_103295_1993.html

G.R. Nos. 101216-18 June 4, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, SONIA DICHOSO y VINERABLE and JAIME PAGTAKHAN y
BICOMONG, accused.

REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo M. Alcantara for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag appeals from the 11 June 1991 Decision of Branch 30 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case
No. 6712-SP (91)1 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III and
Section 4, Article II, respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended,
and sentencing him in each of the said cases to suffer the penalty of "reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit."

The informations in the above criminal cases were filed against Redentor Dichoso and his wife
Dichoso y Vinerable on 8 March 1991.

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) reads as follows:

That on about February 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-
named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, give way (sic) to another and
distribute 1.3 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) and 6 decks of
aluminun foil of shabu, a regulated drug without being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
while that in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91) states:

That on or about February 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-
named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, give way (sic) to another and
distribute dried marijuana fruiting tops, leaves and seeds, a dangerous drug, without
being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Accused Jaime Pagtakhan was charged with illegally possessing a regulated drug (shabu) and,
thus, violating Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, in an information
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6710-SP (91) in the court a quo.

Accused Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because, in the words of the trial court,
she "cannot be located."4 The records do not show that the trial court took further steps to have her
arrested.

The three (3) cases were consolidated for joint trial in Branch 30 of the RTC of San Pablo City and
trial proceeded as against accused Jaime Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso after the two had
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. NARCOM agents S/Sgt. Iluminado Evangelista, Sgt.
Fabian Gapiangao, CIC Rolando Bisenio and P/Maj. Rosalinda Royales, the forensic chemist,
testified for the prosecution. Accused Redentor Dichoso and Jaime Pagtakhan, as well as barangay
captain Francisco Calabia, testified for the defense. The latter identified a Sinumpaang Salaysay5 in
which he denounced the veracity of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D" and his signatures therein.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:

On February 22, 1991, the Narcotics Command of the 4th Regional Unit stationed at
Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo City applied for a search warrant to be issued on
the house of spouses Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso located at Farconville
Subd., Phase II, San Pablo City. After searching questions on the applicant and his
deponent the Court was satisfied that there existed probable cause to believe that
indeed said spouses were keeping, selling and using an undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) and marijuana in said residence.
Consequently, Search Warrant No. 028 was issued by the Court (Exhibit "A").

On February 23, 1991, (Saturday) at about 2:00 P.M. at the local NARCOM stationed
at Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo City, T/Sgt. Iluminado Evangelista, the local
District Commander organized a team to serve Search Warrant No. 028 upon the
spouses Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso residing at Farconville Subd., Phase
II, San Pablo City. Evangelista, the team leader, was with S/Sgt. Fabian Gapiangao,
Sgt. Antonio Tila, CIC Rolando Besinio, Police Officer Michael Exconde and a driver.
Upon approaching said residence the team met an old man and Evangelista
introduced himself and his companions as Narcom agents duly armed with a search
warrant. Evangelista asked for Redentor and Sonia and the old man opened the gate
into the Dichoso compound for the Narcom Agents. The old man led them to the
Nipa house where inside Redentor, Jaime Pagtakhan and two other persons were
sitting near a small table with suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top thereof.
Taken aback the foursome did not move. Evangelista told them that they were
Narcom agents, and that they should not make any move and they had with them a
search warrant to serve. He then asked Sgt. Tila, a team member, to fetch for the
barangay chairman (sic). In the meantime Evangelista served a copy of the search
warrant to Redentor. After about 15 to 20 minutes Chairman Francisco Calabia
arrived and was met by Evangelista who forthwith showed him a copy of the said
warrant. Calabia read the search warrant and explained the contents thereof to
Redentor.

Thereafter, the search ensued inside the nipa house. Evangelista discovered 200
grams more or less of suspected marijuana wrapped in plastic inside a cabinet which
was standing on the right side upon entering the door of the nipa house. Likewise
discovered by him inside the cabinet are six (6) decks of suspected shabu wrapped
in an aluminun foil and the "Golden Gate" notebook (Exhibit F) containing the list of
suspected customers of dangerous and regulated drugs together with the
corresponding quantity and prices. From Pagtakhan's right hand, Evangelista
recovered a small quantity of suspected shabu.

Then, the search was shifted to the main house of the Dichosos. However, the
search produced negative results.

Evangelista instructed Besinio to collect the confiscated items recovered at the nipa
house of the Dichosos. Besinio separately wrapped the items whereupon he and
Gapiangao made markings on the same. Besinio also put the names of Redentor
and Sonia inside some of the pages of Exhibit "F". The team then got from the main
house a plastic bag where all the confiscated items were put. Besinio sat in a corner
of the nipa house and prepared in his own handwriting the PAGPAPATUNAY
(Exhibit "B") attesting to the result of the search conducted by the NARCOM team
listing thereon the different confiscated items, another PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit
"C") attesting to the lawful manner the search was conducted, and the Receipt
(Exhibit "D"), all dated February 23, 1991. Said exhibits were alternately given to
Calabia who read the contents thereof before voluntarily affixing his signatures
thereon. Then, he explained to Redentor and Pagtakhan the contents of said
exhibits. Afterwhich, Redentor likewise voluntarily affixed his signatures thereon.
(Exhibits B-1, C-1 and D-3). Pagtakhan also affixed his signatures on Exhibit "B" and
"D" opposite the items confiscated in his possession by Evangelista. A certain
Angelito Ancot affixed his signature on Exhibits B and C also as witness. Redentor
was then given a copy each of Exhibits B, C and D (Exhibits B-4, C-4 and D-4).
Subsequently, Calabia and the Narcom team left the Dichoso residence. Said team
brought with them for further investigation at their headquarters Redentor, Pagtakhan
and the two other persons found inside the nipa house. Said two other persons who
were later known to be a certain "Jun" and a certain Bayani Salamat were set free by
the Narcom after having convinced the investigators that they were innocent visitors
or house guests of Redentor. Evangelista prepared a letter addressed to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, requesting examination of
the confiscated drugs. At about 9:50 P.M. of that same day accused Redentor and
Pagtakhan executed their separate waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code with the assistance of counsel (Exhibits "J" and "K").

On February 25, 1991 (Monday) the Narcom made a return of the search warrant
and inventory to the Court (Exhibit E).

On February 26, 1991 (Tuesday) Besinio handcarried the confiscated items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory (Exhibits "L" and "L-2") for examination. That same day
 P/Major Rosalinda L. Royales, Forensic Chemist concluded, after qualitative
examination, that the one (1) transparent plastic bag containing 1.3 grams of
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) placed in a plastic bag with
markings and the six (6) foils containing 0.3 grams of suspected metamphetamine
hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) wrapped in a foil and placed in a plastic bag with
markings gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu).
Additionally, the one (1) aluminum foil containing 0.02 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) placed in a plastic bag with markings as confiscated from
Pagtakhan gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride [sic] (shabu)
and the one (1) light green plastic bag containing 103.7 grams of suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops, crushed leaves and seeds wrapped in a newspaper gave
positive results for marijuana (Exhibits M, series).6

On 17 June 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision,7 dated 11 June 1991, finding Jaime
Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

On the basis of the evidence on record, the Court finds that Redentor Dichoso
violated Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Also, it is the finding of the Court that Jaime Pagtakhan violated Section 16 of said
Act. Both of them should be made to suffer the consequences of their unlawful acts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in Criminal

Case No. 6710-SP finding JAIME PAGTAKHAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged in the Information, hereby sentences him to suffer the straight
penalty of Six (6) years and one (1) of prision mayor and to pay the costs. In case he
files an appeal, the bailbond for his provisional liberty is hereby fixed at double the
amount of his present bailbond.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 6711-SP and 6712-SP, the Court hereby renders judgment
finding accused REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offenses charged in the Informations, hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and the costs of suit.8

Acting upon the ex-parte motion of the Assistant City Prosecutor, the trial court, in its Order of 25
June 1991, 9clarified the sentence imposed on accused Dichoso by declaring that the sentence
of reclusion perpetua refers to each of the two (2) cases against him, and amended the decision by
inserting the words "in each case" after the words "to suffer" and before the words "the penalty" in
the decretal portion thereof.

Accused Redentor Dichoso filed a Notice of Appeal. 10

The records does not disclose that accused Jaime Pagtakhan appealed from the decision. The
transmittal letter of the clerk of court of the RTC, dated 7 August 1991, does not make any reference
to Criminal Case No. 6710-SP(91) and its original record was not forwarded to this Court. 11

Nevertheless, the docket section of this Court entered in the docket the three (3) criminal cases in
the court below and numbered them as G.R. Nos. 101216-18, erroneously including in the cover of
the rollo the name of Jaime Pagtakhan as an accused-appellant.

In the Appellant's Brief filed on 5 February 1992, 12 accused Redentor Dichoso, henceforth referred
to as the Appellant, urges this Court to reverse the decision because the trial court erred in:
 I. . . . NOT QUASHING SEARCH WARRANT NO. 028 AND DISMISSING THE
CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

II. . . . CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED

AND/OR PLANTED EVIDENCE.

III. . . . ADMITTING PROSECUTION'S EXHIBITS B, C AND D WITHOUT THE

ACCUSED BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL.

IV. . . . CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE

INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

V. . . . COMPLETELY DISREGARDING ACCUSED'S EVIDENCE THAT THE LAND

AND NIPA HUT FROM WHERE THE PROHIBITED, REGULATED (sic) AND SETS
OF PARAPHERNALIAS (sic) WERE ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED BELONG TO
ANOTHER PERSON. 13

In support of the first and second assigned errors which are jointly discussed, appellant contends
that Search Warrant No. 028, obtained and executed by the NARCOM agents, is a general warrant
because it was issued for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended" and did not specify the particular offense which he violated under the said law, contrary to
the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that it was issued in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense." It was, he asserts, issued for three (3) possible
offenses, viz.: (a) illegal possession of marijuana dried leaves, (b) illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and (c) illegal possession of opium pipe and other paraphernalia
for prohibited drug. He then argues, following this Court's ruling in Stonehill vs. Diokno 14 which
condemned general warrants and barred the admission of any evidence obtained by virtue thereof,
that the articles seized from the nipa house could not be used as evidence against him and be made
the basis of his conviction.

Appellant further claims that he was framed by the police officers. He states that a certain Jun
planted the deck of shabu found on the table where he and his companions were gathered around.
Jun allegedly placed the shabu there after asking permission to use it, then he went out to meet Sgt.
Evangelista and the members of the NARCOM team outside the house. Jun purportedly did not
return to the hut anymore, leaving his friend Bayani Salamat behind. Appellant and Jaime Pagtakhan
were also allegedly handcuffed immediately, while Salamat was not and was, in fact, released
without being interrogated. To bolster his claim, appellant cites the testimony of Barangay Captain
Calabia that the search which yielded the shabu, marijuana and drug paraphernalia was conducted
even before his arrival, that when he arrived, the seized articles were already on the table, and that
the appellant was already handcuffed. Calabia also assailed the veracity of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D".

In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that (1) Exhibit "B" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting
to the result of the search conducted by the NARCOM team and listing the items confiscated), (2)
Exhibit "C" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the lawful manner of the search), and (3) Exhibit "D" (the
Receipt for Property Seized) are inadmissible in evidence since he signed them while under police
custody without having been accorded his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
These exhibits, he argues, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions.

In his fourth assignment of error, appellant alleges that he cannot be convicted for violation of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, for unlawfully selling, delivering and giving away to another, and distributing
1.3 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and dried marijuana leaves, fruit tops and
seeds since he was not caught "in flagrante." He posits the view that in the light of the definition of
"delivering" and "selling" in Section 2 of the Act, only the overt acts of unlawfully selling, delivering,
dispensing, transporting and distributing prohibited and regulated drugs are punishable under
Sections 4 and 15 of the said Act, respectively. He points out that according to Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, mere intention is not a crime. He further argues that Exhibit "F" cannot be a
basis for his conviction because (1) the alleged transactions mentioned therein are undetermined
and could refer to a loan, chattel mortgage or sale, but not to the dispensing and delivering of shabu
and marijuana as the lower court presumed; (2) the names of Redentor Dichoso of "Redy Dichoso"
and Sonia Dichoso appearing in the said notebook were entered or written by CIC Orlando Besinio
himself, and without such entry, there is nothing therein which would associate it with the appellant;
and (3) it is inadmissible in evidence because it is not among the items particularized in the search
warrant. He concludes this assigned error with a claim that the trial court erred in holding that a
considerable quantity of shabu and marijuana was found in his residence because 1.3 grams of
shabu and six (6) decks of aluminum foil of shabu can by no means be characterized as
"considerable," especially taking into account his admission that he sometimes uses shabu.

In his last assigned error, appellant asserts that the nipa house and the lot where it is located do not
belong to him but to his brother, Abner Dichoso, hence, the search conducted therein was
unconstitutional and illegal and the items obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence against him.

Appellee, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, refutes the arguments raised by the appellant and
prays that We affirm the assailed decision.

We shall now pass upon the assigned errors and the arguments adduced in support thereof.

On the validity of the search warrant: In its entirety, the search warrant in question reads as follows:

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4th Judicial Region, Branch 30
San Pablo City

People of the Philippines,

Plaintiff,

-versus- SEARCH WARRANT No. 028

REDENTOR DICHOSO -for-

and SONIA DICHOSO
of Farconville Sub., VIOLATION OF RA 6425
Phase II, San Pablo known as the "Dangerous
City, Drugs Act of 1972" as amended

Respondents.

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

G r e e t i n g s:
 It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath, T/Sgt.
Iluminada S. Evangelista and his witness Marlon Alcayde that there is probable
cause to believe that the above-named defendants are illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic) stored inside the nipa hut
within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at reasonable hour of the
day or night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above-stated marijuana leaves, shabu and sets of paraphernalias
(sic) and bring the same to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

Witness my hand this 22nd day of February, 1991, at San Pablo City.

(SGD.) J. AUSBERTO B.
JARAMILLO, JR.
(TYP) J. AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO,
JR.
Judge 15

It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search warrant because while it is
for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body
thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
specifies the offense involved, viz., illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in
connection therewith. These are evident from the clause, "are illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence
at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."

Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for
illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is
a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In Olaes vs. People, 16 which was cited by the Solicitor General, We sustained a search warrant
similarly captioned and rejected the argument of the petitioner therein that it was a general warrant,
thus:

The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respondent judge is
unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed
to have committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid finding of
probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity
with the Bill of Rights. In support of this argument, they cite Stonehill v. Diokno,
 where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants issued therein for
being based on the general allegation that the petitioners had committed violations of
"Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised
Penal Code." . . .

xxx xxx xxx

We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case and find it does not
come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a
bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the particular
sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of
prohibitions contained in such codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the
instant case.

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection
with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it
is clearly recited in the text thereof that 'There is probable cause to believe that
Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta.
Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana
dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although the
specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at
all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding
for probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."

The rationale We laid down in Prudente vs. Dayrit 17 holds true in the instant case. There, We upheld
the validity of a search warrant assailed as having been allegedly issued for more than one (1)
offense since it did not contain any reference to any particular provision of P.D. No. 1866 that was
violated, when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses. We said:

In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." While the said
decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by
the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge,
the term, "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular
provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score.

Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No.

1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it
cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items
destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species,
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under
P.D. No. 1866. . . .

We, therefore, agree with the Solicitor General that the search warrant in question contains fatal
infirmity that may justify its invalidation.
Since Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its execution may be admitted
in evidence. Consequently, the trial committed no error in denying the appellant's motion to quash
the said warrant and refusing to dismiss the informations filed against him.

Frame-Up: This Court rejects the appellant's claim that he was framed. This defense requires strong
and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agents acted in the
regular performance of their official duties. 18 Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. He did not
even attempt to prove that the NARCOM agents who obtained the search warrant, conducted the
search and recovered the prohibited drugs had motives other than to enforce the law and stem the
menace of drug addiction and trafficking which has already reached an alarming level and has
spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations. 19 It may be stressed here that
the defense of frame-up can be easily fabricated and the accused in drugs cases almost always take
refuge in such a defense. 20

Furthermore, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, appellant's claim of a frame-up only
concerns the deck of shabu allegedly taken out of the pocket of one Jun who asked for and was
readily permitted by the appellant to use shabu on that occasion. It does not concern, much less
explain, the origin of the other prohibited drugs and paraphernalia seized during the search.

Admissibility of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D": There is merit to the appellant's claim that Exhibits "B," "C"
and "D" partake of the nature of uncounselled extrajudicial confessions made while under the
custody of the NARCOM agents and, therefore, violative of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. 21 These exhibits are not "simply inventories or receipts of articles seized from
appellant" as the appellee wants this Court to believe. 22 A clearer examination thereof shows that
CIC Rolando Bisenio, who prepared them, deliberately wrote, in bold letters below the name
REDENTOR D. DICHOSO (over which the appellant was made to sign) the words "MAY-ARI" in
Exhibit "B" and "MAY-ARI BAHAY" in Exhibit "C," while the word "OWNER" is printed below the sub-
heading "COPY OF THE RECEIPT RECEIVED" in Exhibit "D." By such descriptive words, appellant
was in fact made to admit that he is the owner of the articles seized (Exhibit "B"), the house
searched (Exhibit "C") and the articles inventoried in the receipt (Exhibit "D"). Thus, while it may be
true that the appellant was not asked specific questions regarding the vital issue of ownership,
Bisenio obtained an admission from the former through the said exhibits. This was a clever way of
circumventing the aforesaid Constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. Admittedly, at the
time Bisenio prepared the exhibits, the appellant was already in the effective custody of the
NARCOM agents deprived in a significant way of his freedom of action. The preparation of the
exhibits substituted, for all legal intents and purposes, the custodial interrogation.

There was no need of requiring the appellant to sign documents similar to Exhibits "B" and "C." As to
Exhibit "D," which is the receipt for property seized, it is a document required by Section 10, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court to be given by the seizing officer to the lawful occupant of the premises in
whose presence the search and seizure were made. It is true that in People vs. Olivares, 23 We made
the following statements:

Exhibits "A" and "L" which identically show the specimen signatures, are also
admissible. These documents are part and parcel of a mandatory and normal
procedure followed by the apprehending and seizing police officers. In these three
Exhibits, the accused-appellant did not give any statement against his own interest.
The mere signing of documents did not amount to Olivares' subjection to a custodial
investigation wherein an accused is required to give statements about his
involvement in the offense and wherein the right to be informed of his rights to
silence and to counsel would otherwise be invoked. (People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635
[1987]). Guilt is proved by other evidence.
Yet, as explicitly indicated therein, Olivares "did not give any statement against his own interest,"
unlike in the case of the appellant whose name Bisenio described as the owner.

Nevertheless, the above discussions do not alter the result of this appeal. As correctly stated by the
appellee, these exhibits were not appreciated by the trial court as extrajudicial confessions but
merely as proof that the articles therein enumerated were obtained during the search which, by the
way, was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the NARCOM agents independently of the
said exhibits.

Seizure of Exhibit "F": It is contended by the appellant that Exhibit "F," the brown notebook
containing the entries of names and figures, should not have been admitted in evidence because it
was not one of those specifically mentioned in the warrant, hence, its seizure was unjustified. This
so-called warrant rule — that only those listed in the search warrant may be seized — which the
appellant claims to have been enunciated in 1920 in Uy Khetin vs. Villareal. 24 and which he now
summons to his rescue, is not without exceptions. Among such exceptions is the plain view doctrine
enunciated in Harris vs. United States 25 and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire 26 which has been adopted
in our jurisdiction. 27

In Harris, the Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America ruled:

It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence. Ker v. California, 374 US 23, 42-43, 10 L ed 2nd 726, 743,
83 S Ct 1623 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 US 559, 71 L ed 2nd 1202, 47 S Ct
746 (1927); Hestor v. United States, 265 US 57, 68 L ed 2d 898, 44 S Ct 445 (1924).

We are not, however, inclined to rule that the foregoing exception applies to this case, for the reason
that the search warrant was not for unlawful sale of shabu or marijuana but for unlawful possession
thereof as shall be hereinafter discussed and that the notebook per se is not an article possession of
which is illegal or criminal. Exhibit "F" proves neither sale nor possession.

Ownership of the House Searched: The view of the appellant that the search was illegal and the
articles seized thereby cannot be used against him in evidence since he does not own the nipa
house searched or the lot wherein it was built, is unmeritorious. It is not necessary that the property
to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession. 28 It was established, even
by the defense's own evidence, that the appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa
house. He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent to the big or main house in
the Dichoso residential compound, and that he and his family have been using the nipa house as a
resting place even before the search. 29

Any doubt as to the appellant's control over the nipa house where the seized articles were recovered
is wiped out by the testimony of the defense's own witness, Francisco Calabia, who affirmed that the
appellant and his wife Sonia Dichoso actually reside therein while Redentor's parents and brother
reside in the big house. 30

And now to the culpability of the appellant. He contends that he could not be held guilty under
Section 15, Article III (for unlawful sale of shabu) and under Section 4, Article II (unlawful sale of
marijuana) of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case No.
6712-SP(91), respectively, because he was not caught in the act of selling or delivering shabu and
marijuana, and that the finding of guilt against him was based solely on Exhibit "F" which, according
to the trial court, "contains conclusive proof of Redentor's unlawful business of selling shabu and
marijuana to customers, which included Pagtakhan and Bayani Salamat."

After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the evidence of
the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction for unlawful sale of shabu in Criminal Case No.
6711-SP (91) and for unlawful sale of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91). There is,
however, overwhelming evidence which establishes with moral certainty the guilt of the appellant
for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana under Section 16, Article III and Section 8, Article II,
respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

In convicting the appellant as charged, the trial court relied mainly on Exhibit "F", which it considered
as "conclusive proof" of the appellant's drug pushing, and the ruling in People vs. Toledo. 31 It said:

Redentor may claim that no evidence exists to show that he was drug pushing i.e.,
selling, delivering, giving way (sic) to another and distributing shabu and marijuana.
The Court is not convinced. Exhibits "F" among other things was found inside his
nipa house where, according to Calabia, the said spouses reside. Redentor
exercised control and custody of Exhibit F. He is commonly referred to by his
nickname "Redy" which incidentally appears in some pages of Exhibits F.
Pagtakhan, on the other hand, answers to the nickname "Jimmy" which also appears
in Exhibit F. Bayani Salamat, one of the companion (sic) of Redentor inside the nipa
house at the time the Narcom agents arrived, also appears to be a customer of
Redentor (see pages 2 and 3 reverse side of page 5, Exhibits "F"). Redentor,
according to Pagtakhan, is called for (sic) his nickname "Redy". That name appears
on Exhibit F (see pages 2, 3, 4, and 5, thereof). The Court finds and so holds that
Exhibit F contains conclusive proof of Redentor's unlawful business of selling shabu
and marijuana to customers which includes Pagtakhan and Bayani Salamat. . . ..
Furthermore, there is a considerable quantity of shabu and marijuana taken by the
Narcom agents from the residence of Redentor which strongly indicates an intention
of the part of Redentor to sell, distribute and deliver said dangerous and regulated
drugs without being authorized by law (People vs. Toledo, 140 SCRA 259). 32

We find, however, that the conclusions drawn from Exhibit "F" are merely conjectural. For one, the
prosecution did not attempt, and thus failed, to prove that the handwritten entries therein were made
by the appellant. It could have easily done so by presenting, in accordance with the Rules, either a
handwriting expert or an ordinary witness familiar with the handwriting of the appellant. 33 There is, as
well, no competent proof that the said entries refer to transactions regarding shabu or marijuana and
that the figures appearing therein pertain to prices of dangerous drugs.

The facts in the instant case do not warrant the application of People vs. Toledo, 34 which the trial
court and the appellee cited as authority. While in that case, this Court stated that the possession of
a considerable amount of a prohibited drug (three (3) plastic bags of marijuana) coupled with the fact
that the accused was not a user of the prohibited drug, indicate nothing except the intention to sell
and distribute it, the conviction of Toledo for violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, was not based on that ground alone, but on the accused's extrajudicial
confession, held to be valid and admissible, wherein he disclose the details of his transactions of
buying and selling marijuana by narrating how and from whom he bought the three (3) plastic bags
of marijuana found in his possession, to whom he would sell it, and for how long he had been
engaged in pushing prohibited drugs. In the instant case, appellant disclaims ownership of Exhibit
"F" and avers that the names Redentor and Sonia Dichoso written on several pages thereof were
actually written by prosecution witness CIC Orlando Bisenio. 35 Other than exhibit "F," there is no
evidence of sale, delivery, distribution or transportation of prohibited drugs by the appellant.
The other case cited by the appellee, People vs. Claudio, 36 is of no help to the prosecution. In that
case, the accused was convicted of the violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 for her act
of transporting marijuana and not of selling or delivering the same, thus:

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the
prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No.
6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it
is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution
and transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of
marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4. 37

In a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, what is material is the proof that the selling transaction
transpired coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence, 38 and that to
sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. 39

In the case at bar, not a single witness of the prosecution, not even Sgt. Evangelista, claims to have
seen the appellant sell or deliver shabu or marijuana to anybody. Although Sgt. Evangelista testified
that he was sold by his civilian informer or agent that the latter was able to buy shabu from and was
offered marijuana by the appellant, the said civilian informer, who was presented by the NARCOM
when it applied for a search warrant, was not presented in court during the trial of the cases below.

The unlawful sale of shabu or marijuana must be established by unequivocal and positive
evidence. 40

There is no doubt, however, that the appellant is guilty of unlawful possession of shabu under
Section 16, Article III and unlawful possession of marijuana under Section 8, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case
No. 6712-SP (91), respectively. The crime of unlawful possession of shabu, a regulated drug, under
Section 16 is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful sale thereof under Section 15. Similarly,
the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana under Section 8 is necessarily included in the crime of
unlawful sale of marijuana under Section 4 of the Act. 41

The appellant cannot evade liability for illegal possession of dangerous drugs by his admission that
he sometimes uses shabu. Section 30 of R.A. No. 6425, which provides that a drug dependent who
voluntarily submits himself for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation in a center, shall not be
criminally liable for any violation of Section 8 and Section 16 of the law, does not apply to the
appellant because occasional "use" of a dangerous drug is not the same as "drug dependence"
which is defined as "a state of psychic or physical dependence, or both, on a dangerous drug,
arising in a person following administration or use of that drug on a periodic or continuous
basis." 42Throughout the trial of the case below, the appellant, whose petition for bail due to health
reasons was denied, he has not been shown to be a drug dependent and even if he was, indeed, a
drug dependent, he did not voluntarily submit himself for rehabilitation as required by the law.

On the contrary, appellant's admission during the trial that he used shabu "once in a while" 43 only
helps ensure his conviction for violation of Section 16 of the Dangerous Drugs Act because the
unauthorized use of a regulated drug like shabu is one of the acts punishable under the said section.

The penalty for illegal possession of regulated drugs like shabu is "imprisonment ranging from six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos." 44 The same penalty is provided for illegal possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. 45 The
Indeterminate Sentence Law 46 should, however, be applied. It provides that in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the minimum term of which shall not be less
than the minimum fixed by law and the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum term
prescribed by the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, dated 11 June 1991, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6711-SP (91) and 6712-SP (91) is hereby
modified. As modified, accused-appellant REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Section 8 of Article II of the
said Act in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years as
minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00).

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 177191 May 30, 2011

MICHAEL SAN JUAN y CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated December 21, 2006,
which affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, dated July 8, 2004,
finding petitioner Michael San Juan y Cruz (petitioner), together with Rolando Pineda y Robledo
(Pineda), Cynthia Coderes y Habla (Coderes), guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 5,4 Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.5

The Facts

Petitioner, together with Pineda and Coderes (accused), was charged with the crime of Transporting
Illegal Drugs in an Information6 dated December 16, 2003, which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of December 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport a total of 978.7 grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) a dangerous drug[s].

Contrary to law.

When arraigned on February 17, 2004, the three accused entered separate pleas of not guilty to the
offense charged.7 During the pre-trial, the three accused did not enter into any stipulation or
admission of facts with the prosecution.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On December 15, 2003, at about 10:00 a.m., elements of the Intelligence Unit of the Pasay City
Police, namely: Police Inspector Grant Golod (P/Insp. Golod), Police Officer (PO)3 Zoilo Manalo
(PO3 Manalo), and PO2 Roberto Jovenir (PO2 Jovenir), together with Senior Police Officer (SPO)2
Soriño Aure (SPO2 Aure), PO2 Froilan Dayawon (PO2 Dayawon), PO2 Carlito Bintulan, and PO1
Angel dela Cruz, who were all in civilian attire, conducted surveillance, monitoring, and intelligence
gathering to arrest violators of the law along Senator Gil Puyat (formerly Buendia) Avenue in Pasay
City due to numerous reports of rampant snatching, robbery, and holdup in the area. P/Insp. Golod
and PO3 Manalo boarded a vehicle driven by PO2 Jovenir, while SPO2 Aure and the rest of the
officers occupied another.9

While cruising along Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, the police officers noticed a blue Toyota Corolla 4-
door sedan car (car), which had no license plate at its rear, parked in front of a liquor store. Thus,
P/Insp. Golod called the other group using his cellphone, and informed them that they should check
the said car.10

SPO2 Aure and PO2 Dayawon approached the driver side of the car, whereas PO3 Manalo and
PO2 Jovenir approached the passenger side thereof. SPO2 Aure knocked on the car’s window.
When the driver, later identified as petitioner, opened the car’s windows, SPO2 Aure asked for the
Official Receipt (OR) and the Certificate of Registration (CR) of the car but none was produced.
SPO2 Aure was about to accost petitioner, when a commotion ensued at the passenger side11 of the
car because PO2 Jovenir noticed that the passenger, later identified as Pineda, was trying to hide a
plastic bag under his seat, the contents of which accidentally came out (lumawit). PO2 Jovenir
opened the door, held Pineda's right hand and asked him, "Ano yan?" The contents were discovered
to be plastic containers containing white crystalline substance which the police officers suspected to
be shabu12 so much so that PO2 Jovenir uttered, "Pare, may dala to, shabu, positive."13 At this
juncture, Pineda said, "Sir, baka pwede nating ayusin ito."14

SPO2 Aure instructed petitioner to alight. When he was frisked, SPO2 Aure recovered two small
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. SPO2 Aure turned over these sachets to PO2
Jovenir. At the back seat of the car was another passenger who was later identified as Coderes.
Upon questioning, Coderes replied that the owner of the shabu was a certain Mike who was waiting
for the accused at her condominium unit at Unit 1225, 12th Floor of the Cityland Condominium on
Dela Rosa Street, Makati City (Cityland Condominium).15

Immediately thereafter, the police officers, with the accused, went to Cityland Condominium for a
follow-up operation. Upon arrival, P/Insp. Golod coordinated with the Security Officer of the said
condominium, while SPO2 Aure, PO3 Manalo, and PO2 Jovenir were led by Coderes to Unit 1225.
SPO2 Aure, PO3 Manalo, PO2 Jovenir allowed Coderes to walk ahead of them. Upon reaching Unit
1225, Coderes pretended to knock on the door but the police officers did not notice that she had a
key with her. Coderes immediately opened the door, went inside the unit and locked herself in. The
police officers forcibly opened the door by kicking it and rearrested Coderes. They then searched the
unit for "Mike," but they discovered that Coderes was the only one inside. From Cityland
Condominium, the police officers brought all the accused to the Pasay City Police Headquarters for
investigation.16

Subsequently, upon examination, the two plastic containers and the two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance were positively identified as shabu.17 The supposed testimony of
Engineer Richard Allan B. Mangalip, Forensic Chemical Officer, before the RTC, was the subject of
stipulation by the parties.18

Version of the Defense

Pineda and Coderes denied that they were arrested while on board the car and that they possessed
the illegal drugs. They claimed that, on December 15, 2003, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m., they
were inside Unit 1225 and were preparing to go out shopping; that somebody knocked on the door;
and Pineda asked who that person was, but there was no reply; that the door was forcibly opened
and armed men gained entry and ordered them to lie down on the bed face down; that the men
searched the unit and took their personal belongings and money; that they later recognized the said
armed men as Pasay City police officers; that they presented no warrant of arrest and/or search
warrant; that they were brought to separate rooms in Sinta Court Motel (Sinta Motel) at the corner of
F.B. Harrison and EDSA Extension in Pasay City; that the police officers demanded money from
them in the amount of ₱500,000.00 in exchange for their release; and that they were brought to the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the Pasay City Police Headquarters at around 7:00 or 8:00
p.m.19 On that day, Coderes only saw petitioner at the CID.20

On June 2, 2004, petitioner testified that he knew Pineda because he is the godfather of one of
Pineda’s children; that he also knew Coderes because she is the live-in partner of Pineda; that
around 10:00 a.m. on December 15, 2003, he was at the lobby of the Cityland Condominium and
was waiting for an elevator in order to see Pineda and Coderes; that upon riding the elevator, three
(3) male persons joined him who were all in civilian attire and whom he later came to know to be
Pasay City police officers, namely: PO2 Jovenir and P/Insp. Golod and another one whom he failed
to identify; that one of them pressed the number four (4) button of the elevator; and that at the time,
petitioner was calling Pineda through his cellular phone, but, there was no signal.21

Petitioner also related that P/Insp. Golod suddenly held petitioner's hand which was holding the
cellular phone, and PO2 Jovenir punched him in the stomach and was told to peacefully go with
them so that he would not be hurt; that they did not introduce themselves to him; that the elevator
opened on the fourth floor, and the person who pressed the number four (4) button went out and the
elevator went down; that when the elevator reached the ground floor, P/Insp. Golod pulled him
towards the lobby, while PO2 Jovenir remained by the door of the elevator; that there was another
man who held him and he was pulled out of the Cityland Condominium; that he was brought to a
parked white car, handcuffed at his back, and made to board the backseat of the said white car with
his face down, and thereafter the car left; that he did not know what kind of car it was because he
was ordered to bow down and not to look out, and they were always holding his head; that he was
with P/Insp. Golod and the other policemen inside the white car; that he was brought to Sinta Motel;
that he was brought inside a room, and frisked, and the police officers took from him his watch, his
wallet and the money inside his wallet, the car key, and the parking ticket; that he was asked if he
knew Pineda and Coderes to which he assented; that when he was asked who was the owner of the
car key, he said that the car did not belong to him as it was just being offered for sale; that in going
to the Cityland Condominium, he used the car; that when he was brought out of the Cityland
Condominium, the car was left at the parking area of the Cityland Condominium; that, as a car sales
agent, he made sure that the OR, CR, and plate number of the car were complete; that the car had a
rear plate number; that P/Insp. Golod demanded that petitioner pay ₱200,000.00 in exchange for his
release; that he stayed at the Sinta Motel for five (5) hours before he was brought to the CID; that he
stayed at the CID for two (2) hours and he was made to sit on a chair; that after two (2) hours he
was brought inside a room of the same building where he stayed until the following day; that on the
following day, the accused were brought to Fort Bonifacio for drug testing; and that they were
brought back to the CID and, in the afternoon, petitioner was brought to the Pasay City Jail. While
inside the CID, petitioner saw the car parked at the back of the Pasay City Hall.22

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC gave greater weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution, and found the
testimonies of the arresting officers more credible and worthy of belief. Thus, in its decision dated
July 8, 2004, the RTC convicted petitioner, Pineda, and Coderes of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding the three accused Rolando Pineda y Robledo, Cynthia Coderes y Habla and
Michael San Juan y Cruz all GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Php 500,000.00 each, plus costs.

The 978.7 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) involved in this case is hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned-over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law.

SO ORDERED.23

Aggrieved, the accused, through their respective counsels, appealed their case.24

The CA's Ruling

On December 21, 2006, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA opined that the
inconsistencies pointed out by the defense were unimportant matters which do not delve into the
material elements of the crime. The CA also relied on the presumption that the aforementioned
police officers regularly performed their official functions. Thus, the CA disposed of the case in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 8, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116 of Pasay City convicting accused-appellants Rolando R. Pineda, Cynthia H. Coderes
and Michael C. San Juan of violation of Section 5, Rule II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 03-2804CFM is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.25

Undaunted, petitioner alone filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution27dated March 21, 2007.
Of the three accused, only petitioner sought recourse with this Court through this Petition based on
the following grounds:

1. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE DESPITE THE
GLARING VIOLATIONS OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND R.A. 9165
MAKING SUCH EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE
ADMITTED CONFLICTING AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF ALL THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY PUTS THE CONVICTION IN DOUBT.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE LATTER'S CLEAR
VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED PROCEDURAL RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
ON DUE PROCESS BY NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO PRESENT A MATERIAL
WITNESS.28

Petitioner avers that the police officers initially apprehended the accused for a mere traffic violation;
hence, there was no justifiable reason for them to search the car in the absence of any search
warrant and/or the fact that the accused were not caught in flagrante delicto. The police officers also
failed to appraise the accused of their rights. Petitioner points out that the follow-up operation
conducted in Unit 1225 was unlawful as the police officers were not armed with any search warrant,
and they simply relied on the alleged information given by Coderes. In view of the numerous,
conflicting, and material inconsistencies in the respective testimonies of PO2 Jovenir, SPO2 Aure
and P/Insp. Golod, petitioner submits that such would lend credence to the unanimous claim of all
the accused that they were arrested in Cityland Condominium in Makati City and not on board the
car parked in Pasay City. Moreover, petitioner, invoking R.A. No. 9165, asseverates that the police
officers did not follow the procedure prescribed by law. He questions the identity of the illegal drugs
alleged to have been seized from the accused and those presented before the RTC because instead
of proceeding immediately to the Pasay City Police Headquarters, the police officers went to the
Cityland Condominium, making planting of evidence highly probable.29 The police officers also failed
to make any inventory of the alleged prohibited drugs in clear violation of the law.30

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court. The issue of whether
petitioner was apprehended in the act of violating R.A. No. 9165 is factual in nature. The OSG
claims that petitioner was lawfully caught in flagrante delicto, thus, any evidence seized from him
may be used against him. Citing the CA's ruling, the OSG avers that the police officers were clear,
positive, and categorical in their testimonies against the accused. Lastly, the OSG invokes the rule
that findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only respect, but
also finality by this Court.31

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is impressed with merit.

It is the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case that the appeal throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed
judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned.32 We find the Petition meritorious on the basis of
such review.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Said
provision of law reads, as follows:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. ― The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.33

Petitioner was charged specifically with the transport of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
However, upon review of the facts of the case, no such transport was proven to have taken place.

The RTC found that petitioner and accused were seen in a parked Toyota Corolla car, which had no
rear license plate, by a team from the Pasay City Police Force. When the police approached the
driver and asked for the vehicle’s papers, none were presented, prompting the police to ask the
vehicle’s occupants to disembark for verification purposes. The driver, petitioner, did so, while the
man on the passenger side, Pineda, was seen attempting to hide a paper bag under his seat. The
paper bag dropped on the floor, partially revealing its contents, namely, one of two plastic containers
with a white crystalline substance inside. This prompted the police to search petitioner as well, and
they recovered two small plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance from him. An
examination of the substance by the Southern Police District Crime Laboratory revealed the contents
to be positive for shabu.

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that a conviction for transportation of dangerous drugs cannot
stand.

"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: "to carry or convey from
one place to another."34 The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug
from one place to another. In the present case, although petitioner and his co-accused were arrested
inside a car, the car was not in transit when they were accosted. From the facts found by the RTC,
that car was parked and stationary. The prosecution failed to show that any distance was travelled
by petitioner with the drugs in his possession. The conclusion that petitioner transported the drugs
merely because he was in a motor vehicle when he was accosted with the drugs has no basis and is
mere speculation. The rule is clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty.
All doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to
prove the element of transport of dangerous drugs, namely, that transportation had taken place, or
that the accused had moved the drugs some distance.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great respect. But when there is
a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
the factual findings of the trial court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of an
accused, considering that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The Court must be
satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court leading to an accused’s conviction
has satisfied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.35

Having charged that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Pineda and Coderes, it was incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that all the accused had come to an agreement concerning the transport of
shabu and had decided to execute the agreement.36

In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v. People37 is instructive:

There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting
the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the
evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist,
it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product
of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for
purposes of conviction.381awphi 1

In this case, the prosecution, other than its bare assertions that petitioner and accused conspired in
transporting the shabu, failed to establish that there was indeed a conscious criminal design existing
between and among petitioner and accused to commit the said offense. True, petitioner was in the
driver’s seat of the parked car on that fateful day of December 15, 2003, but it could not be deduced
that he was even aware that Pineda had with him two plastic containers containing shabu, nor did he
accord any form of assistance to Pineda. According to PO2 Jovenir, these plastic containers were
placed inside a bag and Pineda tried to conceal these under his seat.39 These facts, standing alone,
cannot give rise to a presumption of conspiracy. Certainly, conspiracy must be proven through clear
and convincing evidence. Indeed, it is possible that petitioner was telling the truth when he said that
he merely met with accused in order to offer the car for sale, as that was his part-time business.40

It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime
— proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy.41 In fine, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove and establish
conspiracy. Necessarily, petitioner should be held accountable only for his alleged respective
participation in the commission of the offense.42

However, we find that the prosecution also failed to adequately prove petitioner’s participation in the
offense charged with moral certainty.

Crucial are the following facts. SPO2 Aure allegedly found the two sachets in the possession of
petitioner.43However, it should be noted that SPO2 Aure did not mark the sachets himself. Instead,
he turned over these sachets to PO2 Jovenir.44

Thus, on Direct Examination, PO2 Jovenir testified:

PROSECUTOR PUTI:

Q - Contained in this bag are also two (2) small transparent plastic sachets with granules and
with markings RJ-4 and RJ-5 and the date. These two (2), why is it that the same are
included in that bag?

A - SPO2 Aure confiscated those two (2) small transparent plastic sachets from the
possession of [petitioner], sir.
 Q - The driver?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - How do you know that these are the two (2) plastic sachets that were confiscated by
SPO2 Aure from [petitioner]?

A - Sir, I also put markings RJ-4 and RJ-5 on those plastic sachets.

Q - Why do you say that these were the two (2) plastic sachets that were confiscated by
SPO2 Aure from the driver [petitioner]?

A - Because SPO2 Aure handed to me those plastic sachets and according to him, he
confiscated those two (2) plastic sachets in front of [petitioner], sir.

PROSECUTOR PUTI:

Q - When was the handing made?

A - Right at the scene, sir.45

The answers elicited from PO2 Jovenir raise numerous questions and ultimately cast doubts on the
identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the two sachets containing illegal drugs allegedly seized
from petitioner. The prosecution, in its quest to establish its claim that these two sachets were
actually recovered from petitioner, even had to propound similar questions to PO2 Jovenir twice —
only to reveal that the latter merely relied on SPO2 Aure’s claim. PO2 Jovenir did not actually
witness that SPO2 Aure seized these two sachets from petitioner. Neither was it established that the
two sachets were actually marked in the presence of petitioner by SPO2 Aure himself.

Apropos is our ruling in People v. Coreche:46

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the
authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the
corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v.
Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the
accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These
rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the
authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned by the prosecution's failure to prove that the evidence
submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant
acquittal on reasonable doubt.47
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Decision dated December 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00180, and ACQUITS petitioner Michael San Juan y Cruz on reasonable doubt.
He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 129019 August 16, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICKY UY y CRUZ, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision,1 dated April 24, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 96-8899, finding the accused-
appellant Ricky Uy y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 15,
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos.

Accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A.
7659, in an Information reading as follows:

That in the evening of 13 June 1996 in Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, distribute, and/or deliver 250.36 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug without the corresponding license and/or legal
authority to sell, distribute and/or deliver the aforesaid regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, when duly arraigned on July 19, 1996
entered a plea of NOT GUILTY to the crime charged in the Information.3 Thereafter, trial ensued.

After trial, on April 24, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of the offense
of Violation of Section 15 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused RICKY UY y CRUZ Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 15 of RA 6425 as amended
by RA 7659, and hereby imposes on him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
condemns said accused to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) PESOS
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.

The 250.36 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2",
"B-3", "B-4" and "B-5") are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch
Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to cause the delivery and transportation thereof
to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his detention at the City Jail during the
pendency of his case provided that he agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with
the rules and regulations of the City Jail.

SO ORDERED.4

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Ofelio Sotelo, Forensic
Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, (2) PO3 Emmanuel Lopez, (3) PO3 Edgar Bitadora, (4)
SPO1 Juanito Lazaro, and (5) PO3 Wilfredo Lumba, the last four came from the Narcotics
Command.

The facts as synthesized by the Solicitor General based on the evidence on record are as follows:

On June 13, 1996, at around 5:00 p.m., one Lino Buenaflor was arrested as a result of a
buy-bust operation in Taguig, Metro Manila. When investigated, Lino Buenaflor divulged that
his source of shabu is Ricky Uy, appellant herein (TSN, 8-28-96, pp. 2-5).

Thereafter, Lino Buenaflor cooperated with the arresting officers to entrap appellant. The
team was composed of PO3 Bitadora, PO3 Manuel Lopez, PO3 Lumba, PO3 Anabiso, PO3
Lazaro and PO3 Labrador as the poseur buyer.

On their way, Lino Buenaflor placed a call through a cellular phone to appellant, informing
the latter that he has a good buyer, hence he ordered 250 grams of shabu. Appellant
instructed them to proceed to his house at 767-C F. Cruz St., Malibay, Pasay City. The team
proceeded to the house of appellant on board a white Toyota Corolla owned by Lino
Buenaflor and a Lite Ace as a backup vehicle. (TSN, 8-28-96; pp. 5-10)

Five minutes after arrival of the team near his house, appellant came out making a waving
sign to Lino Buenaflor, then went back to his house. (TSN, 11-11-96, pp. 29-32)

Lino Buenaflor and PO3 Labrador alighted from the car and later, appellant came out from
the house with a plastic bag. The three were then already facing each other. Afterwards,
PO3 Labrador first extended to appellant the money and the latter extended to the former the
shabu. PO3 Labrador then started scratching his head as the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was already consummated, hence, appellant was arrested. (TSN, 11-11-96, pp.
35-40)5

For his defense, appellant Ricky Uy testified that he was the victim of a frame-up. Appellant's
testimony is summed by the trial court as follows:
 On the evening of July 13, 1996, he was at home suffering from diarrhea. It was around 6:00
p.m. when Lino Buenaflor called inviting him for a disco. He, however, refused the invitation
due to the said stomach ache. At around 11:00 p.m. Lino Buenaflor called again, this time
being answered by the wife since he was inside the comfort room. After twenty minutes, he
called again and insisted on his invitation because he is going to tell him something, and that
he is already near the place.

Accused told Eddie Baybago, cousin of his wife, to open the gate as Lino Buenaflor would be
arriving. Later accused heard the blowing of horns of the car of Lino Buenaflor. After 2-3
minutes, Eddie Baybago did not come back and a person entered then followed by another
two persons. They asked if he is Ricky Uy. Four men came along, one of whom hit accused
with a 45 cal. pistol on his back.

Accused asked them what were they doing inside the house and actually one of them
entered a part of the house carrying a tissue box paper. Then they proceeding to the kitchen,
and the one carrying the tissue box, opened the cabinet below the sink and brought out
something and they said "this is the thing." Accused, however said, he does not own it, but
was hit instead.

Several men entered the house and some of them went upstairs and there was already a
commotion inside the house. Later, pictures were taken from the accused with the alleged
"shabu" and later accused was brought out of the house and proceeded to Camp Crame for
investigation.6

Accused-appellant appeals his conviction to this Court, raising the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR
TESTIMONY WERE NOT ONLY DOUBTFUL, UNRELIABLE AND UNWORTHY OF
CREDENCE, BUT WERE FULL OF INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS AND
IMPROBABILITIES, WHILE DISREGARDING THE STRONG DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED THAT THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS ACTUALLY A FRAME-
UP.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE
CHARGE OF ILLEGAL SALE OF SHABU WERE DULY SUBSTANTIATED.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY A PROSECUTION WITNESS AS THE SELLER OF THE SHABU TO A
POSEUR-BUYER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POSEUR-BUYER DID NOT TESTIFY
IN COURT.

IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE BARANGAY OFFICIAL WAS
PRESENT ONLY AFTER THE COMMOTION INSIDE THE HOUSE HAD BEEN FINISHED
AND CONSEQUENTLY AFTER THE FRAME-UP HAD ALREADY BEEN COMMITTED.

THE TRIAL COURT, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE BARANGAY
OFFICIAL TO TESTIFY IN COURT WAS DUE TO HIS REFUSAL TO TESTIFY FOR FEAR
OF THREATS FROM THE POLICE.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE REFUSAL OF THE WIFE TO
ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND TO GO TO CAMP CRAME AFTER HIS ARREST, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE WIFE, TOGETHER WITH HER COUSIN, EDDIE BAYBAGO, AND
OTHER PERSONS, FOLLOWED THE GROUP TO CAMP CRAME BUT THEY WERE
DELAYED IN REACHING THE CAMP BECAUSE THEIR JEEP DEVELOPED ENGINE
TROUBLE.

VII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE CLAIM OF THE ACCUSED THAT
THE POLICE OFFICERS BARGED INTO THEIR HOUSE, PLANTED EVIDENCE AND
TOOK AWAY THEIR JEWELRY BY TAKING JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE OF ALLEGED
PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THOSE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO OF ASCRIBING
TO POLICE OFFICES WHO ARREST THEM CRIMINAL AND/OR IRREGULAR ACTS TO
EVADE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY.

VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NOT EARNEST EFFORT
ON THE PART OF THE WIFE TO PURSUE HER COMPLAINT WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
NARCOTICS COMMAND OR PURSUED HER COMPLAINT FOR THE RECOVERY OF
THE ARTICLES ILLEGALLY TAKEN FROM THEM, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE
SAID PERSONAL ARTICLES WERE TAKEN FROM THEM THROUGH ILLEGAL AND
UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND MOREOVER, THEIR FAILURE
TO MAKE CONTINUOUS FOLLOW-UP OF THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT THROUGH THE
FAULT OF THE ACCUSED'S WIFE BUT DUE TO THREATS ON HER LIFE.

IX

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPUTING ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES IN THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND HIS WIFE REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF
THE BARANGAY OFFICIAL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH ALLEGED
INCONSISTENCIES DO NOT IMPAIR THEIR CREDIBILITY AS THEY WERE SPEAKING
OUT THE TRUTH IN THEIR TESTIMONY.

X
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS EDDIE BAYBAGO AND IN HOLDING THAT HIS
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE OCCURRENCE INSIDE THE HOUSE WAS HEARSAY.

XI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED'S DEFENSE OF FRAME
UP, LIKE ALIBI, IS A WEAK DEFENSE, DESPITE AMPLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO
SUPPORT THE SAID DEFENSE.

XII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7

At the core of the assigned errors is the issue of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused-appellant.

We rule in the affirmative.

Accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He posits that the prosecution could not have proved an essential element of the crime which is the
identity of buyer and seller due to their failure to present the poseur buyer in open court. He
maintains that he was the victim of a frame-up and that what really happened on the night of the
alleged buy-bust operations was that the police officers barged into their house, planted evidence
and stole valuable property. Thus, the trial court erred in not believing his version of the facts, which
is supported by the testimony of his wife and Eddie Baybago, as against the inconsistent testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.

It is axiomatic that the accused is accorded in his favor the disputable presumption of innocence.8 It
is the burden of the prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting quantum
of evidence therein required.9Corollarily, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not
rely on the weakness of the defense.10 In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of
evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the
presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once
the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of the
possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilty Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.11

Existing jurisprudence has set the requisites for the prosecution of a dangerous drugs case. The
elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.12

The actual sale of the shabu, which is the as corpus delicti in the crime of illegal distribution and sale
of prohibited or regulated drugs, has been sufficiently established by the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses.
PO3 Edgar Bitadora, who was part of the team which conducted the buy-bust operation, testified
that he saw the exchange of the marked money and the bag between accused-appellant Ricky Uy
and poseur-buyer Labrador.13The records are clear on this point, to wit:

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q. Now after you saw Lino Buenaflor, Ricky Uy and Labrador talking or conversing
with each other what else did you observe?

PO3 EDGAR BITADORA

A. Ricky Uy left and entered his house sir.

Q. And after Ricky Uy left, what transpired next?

A. He came out with something sir.

Q. Alright, when Ricky Uy returned with something where was Labrador then?

A. He was already outside the car, sir.14

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Alright, when Labrador alighted from the car what else did you observed (sic).

A. I saw there was an exchange of something sir. Well I guess something inside a
"supot" sir, and marked money.15

ATTY. GATPATAN:

The witness said "pera" siguro na marked money.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q. And after the exchanges what happened next?

A. Labrador made a signal by scratching his head.

Q. Will you tell us the significance of the sign by scratching his head?

A. Because before we left the office it was agreed if he makes a signal by scratching
his head the transaction has been consummated.

Q. And when the transaction is consummated what will happen Mr. Witness?

A. We can already arrest the person, sir.16

Thus, we agree with the trial court when it declared that "the (trial) court is satisfied from a careful
scrutiny and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution that the elements necessary for the
charge of illegal sale of "shabu" (violation of Sec. 15, R.A. 6425 as amended by RA. 7659) are duly
substantiated . . .."17

The identities of the seller and the buyer have also been established. Accused Ricky Uy was
positively identified in open court by PO3 Edgar Bitadora as the seller of the 250.36 grams of shabu
to PO3 Nelson Labrador who acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation on June 14, 1996.
The records show:

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q. Now, Mr. Witness, this person Ricky Uy, if you will see him, will you be able to
identify him?

PO3 EDGAR BITADORA

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you look around the courtroom and see for yourself if Ricky Uy is in the
courtroom.

A. Witness approaching the gallery and tap the shoulder of a man in the courtroom
who responded to the name when asked as Ricky Uy.

Q. Now, Mr. Witness, did you come to know whether these was really shabu
confiscated from the accused Ricky Uy?

A. Well, I saw it sir.

Q. If you will see that shabu, will you be able to identify?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, there is shabu here which was already previously marked as Exhibit "B"
containing five (5) plastic packs marked as Exhibit "B-1" to "B-5", tell us the relation of these
exhibits to the one you saw.

A. That came from Ricky Uy, sir.18

Accused-appellant, however, argues that the failure of PO3 Nelson Labrador to testify on his
allegedly having purchased "shabu" from the accused during the incident in question was fatal to the
prosecution's case.

We disagree.

We have previously declared that what can be fatal is the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer if
there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction.19 In the case at bar, the other members of the
team that conducted the buy-bust operation testified in court. They declared that they witnessed the
consummation of the illegal sale perpetrated by the accused-appellant Hence, their positive
identification of the accused-appellant rendered the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer non-fatal
to the case of the prosecution. We, likewise, note that the absence of the poseur-buyer was
sufficiently explained, as PO3 Labrador was at the time of the trial paralyzed and confined in a
hospital due to gunshot wounds received.20

The accused-appellant also points to inherent contradictions and improbabilities in the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies. However, the only inconsistency he cites is the number of cars used in the
operation. Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that, on the one hand, PO3 Edgar Bitadora
testified in direct examination that only two vehicles were used in the alleged buy-bust operation.
But, on cross-examination, he changed his testimony and stated that there were actually three
vehicles instead of only two vehicles.21 On the other hand, PO3 Wilfredo Lumba testified that five
vehicles that were used when they conducted the alleged buy-bust operation.22

This contention is without merit.

The crux of this case is the alleged illegal sale of "shabu" by the accused-appellant. Whether two or
three cars were used in the buy-bust operation is immaterial and does not impair the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.

Besides, we have previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime,
do not impair their credibility.23 These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions are only with respect
to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the
witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal sale of shabu by appellant.24

Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence.25 In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses were in chorus in
pointing to the accused as the seller of the shabu to the poseur-buyer.

Accused-appellant insists that no buy-bust operation was conducted and, instead, he was a victim of
a frame-up. He claims that he was falsely accused by Lino Buenaflor.26 As a result of this accusation,
the law officers carried on an illegal and unlawful search of his house and premises without a
warrant of arrest, planted shabu inside the house, branded him as a seller of drugs, pretended that
they caught him in flagrante delicto and even took pictures of the accused together with a barangay
official and the shabu.27

A buy-bust operation has been considered as an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction.28 The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of
the marked money successfully consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused.29

We are not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence
to extract information or even to harass civilian.30 However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has
been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can be easily concocted hence commonly
used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.31 We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to
mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemen's alleged rotten
reputation, accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is
precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
exists.32 Bare denials cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of
appellant as the person who was in possession of, and who delivered the methamphetamine
hydrocholoride ("shabu") to the poseur-buyer.33 In the case at bar, the records clearly show that
accused-appellant was entrapped through a buy-bust operation. The testimony of PO3 Bitadora
identifying him as the seller of the illegal drugs is clear and straightforward:

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q You stated a while ago you brought Lino to your headquarters and cooperated with
your office, in what way did he cooperated with your office?

A He revealed to us his services of shabu.

Q And did your office came (sic) to know the source of shabu?

A Yes, sir.

Q Tell us?

A A certain Ricky Uy sir.34

Q After that what happened next?

A We formed a team we conducted a buy bust.

Q Was there any occasion this Lino Buenaflor had any conversation with Ricky Uy
while at your office?

A Before we proceeded to the area Lino first called up Ricky Uy through the cellular
phone.35

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q. Do you know the reason why Lino Buenaflor would call a certain person by the
name of Ricky Uy?

A As far as I know Ricky Uy is Lino's Kumpare and he was ordering shabu.36

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Do you know how much shabu Lino Buenaflor will order from Ricky Uy?

A I overheard 250 grams sir.

Q While Lino Buenaflor was talking to Ricky Uy did you hear what they were
conversing about?

A Yes, sir.
Q Tell us the exact words.

A Pare, oorder ako ng 250 shabu may kasama akong good buyer."

Q What was the answer Mr. Witness?

A. I don't know what was the answer of the person in the other line but we performed
another buy-bust operations.37

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Tell us, what will be the participation of PO3 Nelson Labrador In this drug buy-bust
operations?

A. He will act as poseur-buyer.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q. While you were on board the white Toyota Corolla car what happened?

A. Approximately 20 meters before reaching the house of Ricky Uy, I alighted from
the car, while the car proceeded to the house of Ricky Uy sir.38

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q You said that the car parked near the house of Ricky Uy after it parked what
happened?

A Well, I saw Ricky and Lino talking to each other sir.

COURT

Q At what distance did you see?

WITNESS

A Approximately 20 meters Your Honor.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q When Ricky Uy was talking to Labrador, Lino to Labrador, where was Lino then?

A Lino was still inside the car, sir.

Q What about Labrador?

A Labrador was also inside the car, sir.

Q And what about Ricky Uy?

A He was outside sir.39

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after Ricky left, what transpired next?

A He came out with something sir.

Q Alright, when Ricky Uy returned with something where was Labrador then?

WITNESS

A He was already outside the car, sir.

Q When Ricky returned you said Labrador was already outside of the car, now what .
. . . (interrupted by the Court)

COURT

Q How about the driver, how about Labrador?

WITNESS

A He was just seated at the driver's seat sir.

COURT

Q How about the accused?

WITNESS

A He was inside (sic), Your Honor.

COURT

Q So it was Labrador who stepped out of the car?

WITNESS

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL VIBANDOR
Q Alright, when Labrador alighted from the car what else did you observed (sic)?

WITNESS

A I saw there was an exchange of something sir.

WITNESS

A Well, I guess something inside a bag "Supot" sir, and marked money.

ATTY. GATPATAN

The witness said "pera siguro na marked money."

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q And after this exchanges (sic) what happened next?

WITNESS

A Labrador made a signal by scratching his head.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Will you tell us the significance of the sign by scratching his head?

WITNESS

Q Because before we left the office it was agreed if he makes a signal by scratching
his head the transaction has been consummated (sic)

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q And when the transaction is consummated (sic) what will happen Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

A We can already arrest the person, sir.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Alright, when Labrador made that pre-arranged signal by scratching his head what
did you do?

WITNESS

A I run towards the area sir.

FISCAL VIBANDOR
 Q And what about Lumba what did he do if any thing?

WITNESS

A Lumba alighted from the car while I guarded Lino.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q And how did you guard Lino?

WITNESS

A I went inside the car and it was then that I handcuffed Lino sir.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q While you were rushing to the place where Ricky Uy and Labrador was (sic) what
did you observe insofar as Ricky Uy is concerned?

WITNESS

A Well, he might have learned of the operations so he attempted to run towards his
house.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Was he able to get inside his house?

WITNESS

A No, sir.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q Why?

WITNESS

A Labrador was able to grab him sir.

FISCAL VIBANDOR

Q And after Labrador grabbed him Mr. Witness, what happened next Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

A We boarded him inside the car and brought him to the headquarters.40

There is no evidence of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, PO3 Bitadora
included, which would affect the credibility of their testimony. Hence, the law enforcers involved in
the buy bust operation on accused-appellant are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty.41 The testimony of PO3 Bitadora shows that Ricky Uy was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu. This testimony was corroborated in its material points by the testimonies of PO3 Emmanuel
Lopez, SPO1 Juanito Lazaro and PO3 Wilfredo Lumba. This too is supported by the presentation of
the 250.36 grams of shabu which the accused-appellant sold to the poseur-buyer.

In contrast, we find that accused-appellant failed to establish his defense of frame-up. The trial court
in its decision has clearly pointed out the inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
defense.42

The witnesses accused-appellant presented are both his relatives, namely, his wife and the latter's
cousin. As regards his wife's testimony, the same is incredible. The trial court took notice of her
testimony that she refused to go with her husband to the police headquarters after his arrest. Were it
true that her husband was wrongly imputed a crime, in the natural and ordinary course of life, the
wife would have even insist to go under the circumstances, even if the arresting officer did not want
to. The wife testified that the arresting law officers unlawfully took several valuable items in their
house such as cash and jewelry. However, the trial court pointed out that there was no earnest
efforts on the part of the wife to recover these items. The long delay and lack of earnest efforts to
recover them cast doubt on the truthfulness of the assertion. The testimony of Eddie Baybago is
neither of any help since he testified that he was outside the house at the time the alleged buy-bust
or frame-up took place. His testimony, therefore, with respect to what transpired in the house is
hearsay. Accused-appellant failed to present any independent corroborative evidence and such
failure is fatal to the defense of frame-up and justifies the finding that there is no necessity of
overturning the evidence for the prosecution.43 We quote with approval the trial court's ratiocination
on why the accused-appellant's defense of frame-up must fail:

[N]o arresting officer would plant such huge quantity of shabu mentioned in the information if
only incriminate an individual who was not shown to be of good financial standing and
business importance.

If only to show and serve that purpose, a small quantity of shabu would be more than
sufficient enough and the victim goes to jail just the same. In this case the approximate street
value of the shabu confiscated is more or less Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00)
Pesos. The possibility of the arresting officer to raise-up that much amount if only to frame-
up is quite a remote probability, lest the difficulty and enormous risk of obtaining such kind
and quantity of a regulated drug. Furthermore, there was no showing that the arresting
officers attempted to extort money or anything of value.44

As borne in the records, there is no showing of ill-motive on the part of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation. The accused-appellant is not shown to be of good financial
standing and business importance.

In short, the trial court found the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible and
those of the defense witnesses unworthy of belief. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the
findings of the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses during their testimony is
accorded with great respect.45 After a careful review of the testimonies of both the prosecution and
defense, we see no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.

In sum, we reiterate that once the presumption of innocence is overcome, it is the burden of the
accused-appellant to show his non-complicity of the charge against him especially if his defense is
that of frame-up or alibi since under existing jurisdiction, he must substantiate such defense with
clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, the guilt of the accused has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt that Ricky Uy knowingly carried with him 250.36 grams of shabu
without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. The amount of
shabu sold being more than 200 grams, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00.46

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 April 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110 of Pasay
City in Criminal Case No. 96-8899 finding herein appellant Ricky Uy y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of unlawfully selling/delivering/transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" in
violation of Section 15, Art. III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 103295 August 20, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,

vs.
ROLANDO SALAMAT y DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Lagunzad & Campos for accused-appellent.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rolando Salamat, alias "Tolits," alias "Mr. T," was charged in three separate
informations with the following offenses: (1) illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug commonly known as shabu, in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10528-MN; (2) engaging in the unlawful sale of shabu in
violation of Section 15, Article III of the same law, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10529-MN;
and (3) illegal possession of firearms ammunition under Criminal Case No. 10530-MN.

On August 22, 1991, appellant moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 10528-MN on
the ground that the offense charge therein, that of illegal possession of a regulated drug, is absorbed
in and is necessarily included as an element of the offense of unlawful sale of such regulated drug
for which accused likewise stands charged. The resolution of the motion was deferred by the trial
court until such time when all the evidence for the three cases shall have been adduced.

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him, after which the
three cases were tried jointly by the court.
In a joint decision dated November 29, 1991, the court a quo rendered judgment 1 with this decretal
portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

Rolando Salamat y De Guzman alias Tolits alias Mr. T:

1. Not guilty in Crim. Case No. 10528-MN for a Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, R.A.
6425 for (sic) which he is hereby accordingly acquitted. This disposes of the motion
to quash filed by the accused in this particular case ruling on which was reserved by
the Court until such time as all the evidence in these cases shall have been adduced;

2. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 10529-MN for (sic) a Violation
of Sec. 15, Art. III, R-A. 6425. Said accused is hereby accordingly sentenced to life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties thereof
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00;

3. Not guilty of the accusation against him in Crim. Case No. 10530-MN for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions.

Costs against the accused in Crim. Case No. 10529-MN only.

SO ORDERED.

The evidence for the prosecution show that on July 18, l991, Cpl. Eddie Regalado of Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Malabon Police Station received information from their confidential informant that there
was shabu in the house of a certain Rolando Salamat. On the basis thereof, Cpl. Regalado, together
with Pat. Aberto Nepomuceno, applied for and was subsequently issued a search warrant by Judge
Amanda Valera-Cabigao on the same day. 2

On July 22, 1991, at around 7:00 A.M., a police team composed of

Cpl. Regalado, Pats. Nepomuceno, Guevarra, Galang, Sales and Olog, accompanied by the
confidential informant, proceeded to the house of the suspect, herein appellant Rolando Salamat., at
No. 127 Interior Sanciangco Street, Catmon Malabon in order to effect service of the search
warrant.3

A buy-bust operation was first conducted with Pat. Nepomuceno acting as poseur-buyer in the
company of the confidential informant. While the two were walking towards the house, they were met
by appellant who was then coming out of the house. Pat Nepomuceno testified that appellant
already knew him because he had on two occasions previously bought shabu from the latter as part
of the surveillance being then conducted on appellant's illegal activities. When the accused
approached them, Pat. Nepomuceno told him "tatlong piso lang pare," means that he was buying
P300.00 worth of shabu. Appellant went inside the house and came back few minutes thereafter and
handed over the shabu to Pat Napomuceno who paid appellant with the P300.00 marked bills. After
examining the suspected shabu, Pat. Nepomuceno lighted his cigarette as a pre-arranged signal to
his companions, then around ten meters away, to move in.4

However, appellant resisted arrest and was able to run inside the house and lock himself inside. The
raiding team introduced themselves as policemen but were instead met with gunshots coming from
the house. At about the same time, the policemen saw several men coming from the back of the
house and running towards a place called Palmario. Thereafter, when the policemen gave an order
for him to surrender, appellant came out of the house and threw a gun on the ground Sgt. Guevarra
immediately took the gun while Pat. Nepomuceno handcuffed appellant. The policemen showed the
search warrant to appellant who merely kept silent.5

There were two houses searched by the policemen, the first of which is located at 127 Sanciangco
Street where appellant, was apprehended and another located at 139 Interior Sanciangco Street
which is around twenty meters away from the first house. As a result of the search made, the police
were able to confiscate ten packets of shabucontained in an eyeglass container and several
paraphernalia from the first house, and three packets of shabu and additional paraphernalia from the
second house, 6 as well as a copy of a search warrant issued against one Susana Ignacio and a
receipt for the items seized from her.

The receipts for the items seized from the two houses 7 were signed by Barangay Captain Florentino
Cruz who was present during the search. The common-law wife of appellant, Marilou Salamat, also
signed the receipt for the items taken from the second house at 139 Interior Sanciangco
Street. 8 Appellant was duly furnished copies of the receipts by the policemen.

Appellant was then brought to the police station where he was investigated and subsequently
detained. The items confiscated as a result of the search and the buy-bust operation were turned
over to the NBI Forensic Chemist who subsequently issued a report with the finding that the
specimens submitted for examination were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.9

On the other hand, appellant testified that in the morning of July 22, 1991, he was in the house of
Rolando Cabangis at 127 Interior Sanciangco Street, Catmon, Malabon, where he was examining a
ring which Cabangis was selling to him, when he heard gunshots outside. When he went out of the
house, he was suddenly grabbed by Pat. Nepomuceno and later brought to the police station together
with Cabangis. He was informed of the charges against him only after he was detained at the police station. 10 The following day, only
Cabangis was released from jail. It was his wife, Marilou, who told him that the policemen searched their house.

Appellant denies that he sold shabu to Pat. Nepomuceno and claims that maybe the reason why he
was so charged was because the father of Pat. Napomuceno previously filed a case against him for
robbery in band but the same was subsequently dismissed. 11 He also denies that the shabu and
paraphernalia confiscated by the police from his house belongs to him. He contends that the
signature of Marilou Solis Salamat appearing on one of the receipts, marked in evidence as Exhibit
C, is not her true signature. While he admits that there are several pushers in their place, appellant
denies that he is a pusher. He, however, admits that he knows the house of Cabangis at 127 Interior
Sanciangco Street is often used for "jamming" or "pot sessions" whenever the latter is not around. 12

Marilou Salamat testified that no search warrant was presented to her when the police searched the
house at 139 Interior Sanciangco Street, and denies that she signed a receipt for the items
confiscated therefrom. She also denies that the signature over the typewritten name of Marilou Solis
Salamat appearing in Exhibit C belongs to her. On rebuttal, however, Cpl. Regalado declared that he
was present when the search warrant was presented to Marilou Salamat by Sgt. Guevarra and when
she signed Exhibit C in the presence of the barangay captain and the father of appellant. 13

On appeal before us is only that portion of the judgment of the trial court finding herein appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 for
unlawful sale of a regulated drug. Since appellant has been acquitted of the offense of illegal
possession of a regulated drug and of firearms and ammunitions, we deem it unnecessary to dwell
on the issue raised by appellant anent the validity of the search warrant used in this case
considering that it was for the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and paraphernalia, of
which appellant was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 10528-MN, that the evidence obtained pursuant
thereto was offered. We shall nonetheless discuss hereafter the propriety of appellant's acquittal in
said case.
The main contention of appellant in the case at bar actually hinges on the credibility of the testimony
of Pat. Nepomuceno. If it were true that Pat. Nepomuceno did buy shabu from him on two occasions
prior to the incident subject of this case, appellant then contends that (1) it was improbable for Pat.
Nepomuceno not to have remembered the exact dates when he previously bought shabu from
appellant; (2) the testimony of said witness that he did not know appellant prior to July 22, 1991 is
not true; (3) it is highly questionable why the shabu allegedly bought from appellant on those two
occasions were not presented before the court; and (4) it is surprising why the witness had a hard
time describing and identifying the house subject of the search warrant.

Furthermore, appellant would make capital of the fact that since he has known Pat. Nepomuceno as
a policeman for almost five years, it was unlikely and highly improbable for him to sell shabu to the
latter. Besides, he adds, the fact that Pat. Napomuceno is the son of Col. Nepomuceno who filed a
case against appellant, but which case was later dismissed, is sufficient basis to cast doubt on the
motives of Pat. Nepomuceno in implicating him in the aforestated charges.

Clearly, the issues raised are factual and involve the credibility of the witnesses, a matter addressed
to the trial court because it is in a better position to decide such questions, having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Hence, to once
again reiterate, an entrenched doctrine, its finding on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would have affected the result of the case.14 That absence is only all too
evident in the instant case.

In the first place, the testimony of appellant consists merely of denials without any other evidence to
sustain his claim and defense. We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between the positive declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative
statements of an accused, the former deserves more credence.15

Next, the alleged failure of prosecution witness Pat. Nepomuceno to remember the exact dates
when he previously bought shabu from appellant is too trivial an omission as could cast doubt on his
credibility. Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor
details, and not upon the basic aspects of the crime, do not impair their credibility. 16 Contradictions
on minor or trivial details are not unnatural and are normally considered as enhancing, rather than
debilitating, the testimony of a
witness. 17 Moreover, credence is generally accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who are enforcers of the law as they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, more so where, as in this case, appellant has opted to invoke the inherently weak and
standard defense of denial. It is axiomatic, under the rules of evidence, that said defenses cannot
prevail when arrayed against the positive testimonies of prosecution
witnesses. 18

The fact that appellant has known the poseur-buyer as a policeman for almost five years cannot be
considered as a strong deterrent which would prevent the former from entering into illegal
transactions with the latter. As this Court has noted many times, drug pushers have become
increasingly daring in the operation of their illicit trade and have not hesitated to act openly, almost
casually and even in scornful violation of the law, in selling prohibited drugs to any and all
buyers.19 In real life, pushers, especially small-quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to
customers, be they strangers or not, who have the price of the drug, and this fact the Court has
recognized. 20Besides, it will be noted that Pat. Napomuceno had on two occasions
bought shabu from appellant as part of a test-buy operation which was primarily intended to gain
appellant's confidence.

Lastly, appellant would Like to impute ill motives to Pat. Nepomuceno in testifying against him. Such
allegation is nothing more than a desperate effort on the part of appellant to exculpate himself from
liability. We have said that motive is important when the identity of an accused is in doubt, but when
the perpetrator has been positively identified, as in this case, even discounting such motive there is
enough evidence to convict appellant.21Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
police officers were induced by any motive other than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug
pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their duties
regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 22

We now digress, as earlier indicated, to make our observations on the acquittal of appellant in
Criminal Case No. 10528-MN where he was charged with the illegal "possession, custody and
control" of thirteen packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride, separately from the sale of said
regulated drug worth P300.00 charged in Criminal Case No. 10529-MN. In acquitting appellant in the
first case, the court below made the following ratiocination:

The court, however, is not inclined to sustain the charge of illegal possession of
additional shabu and paraphernalia to facilitate its sale and consumption. A trader,
whether he be legal or illegal, is expected to have stocks of his me(r)chandise ready
at all times to be sold to prospective buyers. The seller or trader cannot be held liable
anymore for the possession of these stock.23

We are taken back by this reasoning, not only because we find it absurd and illogical, but because of
its total disregard of the holding in U. S. vs. Look Chaw, 24 handed down as early as 1911 and which
has stood the test of time with its recent reiterations by this Court;25 and we are intrigued how these
cases have escaped the attention of the lower court and have been glossed over sub silentio by the
Solicitor General. We, therefore, deem it necessary to reproduce the pertinent pronouncements in
said case.

True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by section 31 of
the Act, and another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 of the same Act before
cited.

And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when
one of them is a necessary means for the commission of the other, only the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree, . .
..

But the illegal, possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of 30 cans of
opium, which are the two acts confessed by the accused, are not one act which
constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a necessary means for the commission
of another. They are two isolated acts, punishable each of them, in themselves. Only
in the event where all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its totality
the same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being delivered as
the matter or subject of a sale previously agreed upon, could it be said, in the opinion
of this court, that the possession of the opium was a necessary means to effect the
delivery by reason of the sale, and that the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for
the possession of the opium
seized. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, with the acquittal of appellant for his illegal possession of shabu, albeit distinct from that
which he sold in the buy-bust, operation, he may no longer be proceeded against for the first
offense. Propitiously, he was correctly convicted of the crime of selling a small part of the shabu in
his possession. It would have been interesting to see how the theory adopted by the trial court would
have fared if appellant had also been acquitted of the charge of selling such drug. Hence, we direct
our trial courts to take particular note of this clarificatory emphasis on the matter, to avoid another
miscarriage of justice with its consequent setback to the operose campaign against dangerous drugs
in this country.

One final observation. We are here again confronted with a case where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is "life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties
thereof." In Administrative Circular No. 6-92 issued by this Court on October 12, 1992, as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 dated June 21, 1993, all judges of the regional trial
courts, inter alia, were specifically enjoined to be more circumspect in the proper imposition of the
penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua.

In view of the gaffes which continue to reach us on appeal, as in the case at bar, we are constrained
to quote this excerpt from said circular for guidance and strict compliance:

As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Evidently, it
considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case.
Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio,
(April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 459), this Court held:

The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life
imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty
being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the
Revised Penal Code but by special law. Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory
penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the
same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not carry with
it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration.

As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in PP vs. Pilones and in the
concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court
already made it clear that reclusion perpetuais not the same as imprisonment for life
or life imprisonment. Every Judge should take note of the distinction and this Court
expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.

Considering that a violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, of which appellant has
been found guilty, carries a penalty of life imprisonment, the decretal portion of the trial court's
decision subject of the present appeal should necessarily be, as it is hereby, modified.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment, of the court a quo in Criminal No. 10529-MN is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, subject to the MODIFICATION that the phrase "or reclusion perpetua, together
with all accessory penalties thereof" in paragraph 2 of the decretal portion therein is hereby
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.