G.R. No.

L-61311 September 2l, 1987

FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO,
FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office
of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents.

Facts: There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a
strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together
forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners
claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the
demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners' behest, we have
issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our
decision.

This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was
protested on November 10, 1961, where the Court of First Instance of issued a writ of preliminary
injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public
plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years
later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land
occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore
could not be the subject of private occupancy.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact,
according to then they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space
allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to the municipal government. Then, on January 12,
1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the
immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and
customary use as a public plaza

Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, respondent Vicente A.
Macalino, as officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a
resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the
subject place beginning July 1, 1982

Issue/s: Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making
them lawful lessees of the land

Ruling: The petition must be DISMISSED

There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be
evicted is a public plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. 2040. This finding was made after
consideration of the antecedent facts as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando
Mayor Rodolfo Hizon, who later became governor of Pampanga, that the National Planning Commission
had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951. This intention was reiterated in 1964 through
the adoption of Resolution No. 29.

The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of
contracts they had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original
occupants were concerned, and later with them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space
allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they saw they are paying daily fees. However, the
parties belabor this argument needlessly.

Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, where the Supreme Court declared:
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market
stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of
or even leased by the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy
the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease
contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case
No. 2040 was decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29,
series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated
the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through
the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital
infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Villarico vs CA
G.R. No. 105912 June 28, 1999
FACTS:
Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of
land in Ubihan,Meycauyan,Bulacan. Spouses Villarico alleged that they are the absolute owners of
subject property, having bought the same from the spouses, Segundo Villarico (Teofilo's father) and
Mercedes Cardenas, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, that they are not aware of any mortgage
or encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or interest therein, and that the land
involved is not within the forest zone or government reservation.
Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the
public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan and is not available for private
appropriation.
The CFI dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate
of title is void. CFI stated that in accordance to past jurisprudence if the land in question still forms part
of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).
The CA affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether the disputed land still forms part of the public domain?
HELD:
Yes
As determined by the Lower Courts, no evidence of Declassification was made by the Director of
Forestry declaring that land is alienable and disposable. This scenario makes land incapable for private
appropriation. This is even if the alleged owner is in possession of land for more than 30 years.
Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long, does
not ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
Chavez v Public Estate Authority
Facts:
The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for the reclamation of certain foreshore and
offshore of Manila Bat as well as for the construction of the two phases of the manila-cavite coastal
road. The latter obliged to carry out all works of construction in consideration of 50% of the total
reclaimed land. In 1977, then president Marcos issued PD 1084 creating PEA which was tasked with the
reclamation of lands including foreshore and submerged areas, to develop, improve, acquire, lease and
sell any kinds of lands. Then President Marcos also issued PD 1085 which transferred the lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay to PEA under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project. (MCCRRP)
In 1981, Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP stating that all
future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA. CDCP AND PEA executed a memorandum of
agreement i which CDCP agreed to give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and
transfer all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all areas reclaimed by it in the
MCCRRP to PEA (99,473 square meters in the financial center area) and (3,383,888 square meters at
varying elevations above mean low water level)
In 1988, then President Aquino issued special patent no. 3517 which grants and transfers to PEA, the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP (1,915,894 square meters) The Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Titles in the name of PEA. (1,578,441 or 157.
841 hectares -total land area of the freedom islands)
In 1995, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, for the
development of such freedom islands. Such jva required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares
of submerged areas surrounding such islands to complete the southern plan of the MCCRRP. Then
President Ramos approved such JVA.
In 1996, then Senate President Maceda delivered a speech denouncing such JVA as the grandmother of
all scams. This caused the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations to conduct a joint investigations.
Such investigation concluded that 1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA
are lands of the Public Domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands, and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; 2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void;
and 3) the JVA itself is illegal. In 1997, then president Ramos created a legal task force to conduct a
study on the legality of the JVA through AO NO 365. A year later, there were published reports in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today, stating that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and
AMARI under and order issued by then president Ramos. The same year, Antonio Zulueta filed before
the court a petition for prohibition with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and Preliminary Injunction, but was dismissed for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy without
prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court. In 1998 as well, herein petitioner Frank I.
Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He contends that the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale of such lands by PEA to AMARI. He prays that PEA Publicly discloses the
terms of negotiation in the jva invoking the right of the people to information on matter of public
concern. He assailed that the sale of lands of public domain to AMARI are in blatant violation of sec. 3
art XII of the 1987 constitution.

Issue: WON the stipulations in the amended JVA for transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution
Held:
Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim... judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the... terms of the grant of authority."
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in
some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other
works for the defense of the territory, and... mines, until granted to private individuals."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant
to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the
government could lease or alienate the property to private... parties
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of
reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the
Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and without
prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act.[46] The
salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a)Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time... declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited or classified
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be
classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes
other than agricultural purposes,... and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of
under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or
rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under
the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into disposable lands of the public domain
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified
as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease
only and not otherwise."
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public
lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands,
which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by...
constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such
prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and... corporations from acquiring
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands
under existing public land laws.
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No.
2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general law... governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or
disposable
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must
first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition
or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands... for public or quasi-public uses.
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No.
2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain.
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the
government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of
the foreshore and lands under water remained in the... national government.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed
and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such
sale.
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority
required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed
for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain."
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who
were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were
no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public... domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution.
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain
only through lease
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain.
Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide
Submerged areas are those... permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.
Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as... title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain,
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands.
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be... subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution... he 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a... recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a
limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from... acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-
hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay
are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently
"owned by the State."
As such, foreshore and submerged areas
"shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified."[72] The President has the... authority to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or
concession to qualified... parties.
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the
disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first
be classified as alienable or disposable before the government... can alienate them.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under
water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the
National Government.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are
still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying
these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of... the public domain open to disposition.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the
PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain.
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive
jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public... domain."
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is
vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or
through private contractors.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA
remain inalienable lands of the public domain.
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell
its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,... There is no express authority under
either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
"ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared
that lands reclaimed by PEA
"shall belong to or be owned by PEA."
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government."
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable
lands of the public domain.
PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial... properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations.
The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does
not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with
the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the
constitutional ban does not apply to individuals.
PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands."
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly
government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public
ownership of the land.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously
conferred by any of the recognized modes of... acquiring ownership.
Villarico vs CA
G.R. No. 105912 June 28, 1999
FACTS:
Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of
land in Ubihan,Meycauyan,Bulacan. Spouses Villarico alleged that they are the absolute owners of
subject property, having bought the same from the spouses, Segundo Villarico (Teofilo's father) and
Mercedes Cardenas, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and
continuous possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, that they are not aware of any mortgage
or encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or interest therein, and that the land
involved is not within the forest zone or government reservation.
Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the
public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan and is not available for private
appropriation.
The CFI dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate
of title is void. CFI stated that in accordance to past jurisprudence if the land in question still forms part
of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).
The CA affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether the disputed land still forms part of the public domain?
HELD:
Yes
As determined by the Lower Courts, no evidence of Declassification was made by the Director of
Forestry declaring that land is alienable and disposable. This scenario makes land incapable for private
appropriation. This is even if the alleged owner is in possession of land for more than 30 years.
Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long, does
not ripen into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
LEVY D. MACASIANO v. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO
Respondents:
The respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila
and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal
council authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open
spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms
and conditions.
The municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Ferrer to enter
into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and/or vending areas.
Respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets
with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque.
Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the
destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were
later returned to respondent Palanyag. He wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten
(10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Petitioner:
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service
and are therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation or
private contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipality of Parañaque. Petitioner submits
that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for another public purpose and that
absent a clear showing that the Municipality of Parañaque has been granted by the legislature specific
authority to convert a property already in public use to another public use, respondent municipality is,
therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for the establishment of a flea market.
Petitioner also submits that assuming that the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, it
failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of
the ordinance providing for the establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitioner
contends that by allowing the municipal streets to be used by market vendors the municipal council of
respondent municipality violated its duty under the Local Government Code to promote the general
welfare of the residents of the municipality.
RTC: Upheld the legality of the disputed ordinance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the Municipal Council of Parañaque authorizing the
lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid?
RULING: NO.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of
Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality.
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are
under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power
to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code.
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads
and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the
province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to
the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be
complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government
unit concerned It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed"
in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government
Code. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract. However, those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily
used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the
local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons. This limitation on the authority of the local government over public properties has been
discussed and settled by this Court en banc in Dacanay v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., et al
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought
to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of
man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or others contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street,
the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or
licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not
be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the
greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the
respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
The Mayor’s Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for
the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and
traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the
establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the other
observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances and fire engines,
instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver and look for other
streets which are not occupied by stalls and vendors thereby losing valuable time which could,
otherwise, have been spent in saving properties and lives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances and the people
rushing their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the
vendors. One can only imagine the tragedy of losing a life just because of a few seconds delay brought
about by the inaccessibility of the streets leading to the hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors, normal
transportation flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from their
schools and walk, rain or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at the end of the day.
Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of the residents
therein.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down
by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should
be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the
community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance
the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the general
prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government should
refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public has a legal right to demand the demolition
of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality
have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their
specific public purpose.
Carlos Palanca v Commonwealth of the Philippines
January 29, 1940, G.R. No. 46373

FACTS:
On July 17, 1919, Carlos Palanca obtained a judgment from the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
registration of four plots of land, adjoining each other and separated only by certain waterways called
estuaries. Before the decision was rendered and after the evidence was presented, the Government,
through the Attorney General, filed a request to reopen the proceedings to prove the existence of
waterways and rivers within the land. The Court denied this request as it considers it unnecessary to
reopen the case for that purpose, since even on that ground, the registration of this would not affect the
property rights of the Government and the public use of such means of transportation, which would
always remain under Article 39 of the Land Registration Act.
Later, the government instituted this present action against Carlos Palanca, claiming it is illegally
occupying potions of the Viray River and the Sapang Sedaria Estero, which are navigable, and asks that
he be forced to open them. The Trial Court dismissed this petition but when it was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, such decision was reversed and declared that Viray River and Estero Sapang Sedaria
are of public domain and use and that the right acquired by Carlos Palanca by virtue of its location
cannot affect the rights of the State since such rivers are intended for public use.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Viray River and Estero Sapang Sedaria are of public domain.

RULING:
Yes. “The River Viray and the Estero Sapang Sedaria, being navigable, useful for commerce, for
navigation, and fishing, have the character of public domain (or ownership)”.The Supreme Court did not
agree with the petitioner’s contention that the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan on July 17, 1919 and the Torrens title issued, consequently, in favor of Carlos Palanca
establishes the non existence of the river and whether or not it is navigable. In that decision, while it
was said that the terrain was crossed by a waterway called estuaries, there is no statement that these
estuaries were not navigable.
G.R. No. 185023, August 24, 2011, CITY OF PASIG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (MPLDC) owned two parcels of land in Pasig City. Portions of
the properties are leased to different business establishments. In 1986, the registered owner of MPLDC,
Jose Y. Campos (Campos), voluntarily surrendered MPLDC to the Republic of the Philippines.
On 30 September 2002, the Pasig City Assessor’s Office sent MPLDC two notices of tax delinquency for
its failure to pay real property tax on the properties for the period 1979 to 2001. In a letter, Independent
Realty Corporation (IRC) President Ernesto R. Jalandoni (Jalandoni) and Treasurer Rosario Razon
informed the Pasig City Treasurer that the tax for the period 1979 to 1986 had been paid, and that the
properties were exempt from tax beginning 1987.
On 20 October 2005, the Pasig City Assessor’s Office sent MPLDC a notice of final demand for payment
of tax for the period 1987 to 2005. On the same day, MPLDC paid payment under protest.
On 9 November 2005, MPLDC received two warrants of levy on the properties. On 1 December 2005,
respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed with the RTC a petition to enjoin petitioner Pasig City from auctioning the properties and
from collecting real property tax.
On 2 December 2005, the Pasig City Treasurer offered the properties for sale at public auction. Since
there was no other bidder, Pasig City bought the properties and was issued the corresponding
certificates of sale.
On 19 December 2005, PCGG filed with the RTC an amended petition and prayed that the public auction
be declared void and Pasig City be prohibited from assessing and collecting from MPLDC real property
tax and penalty.
The RTC held that the acts of respondent in assessing real property taxes on properties owned and
controlled by the Republic of the Philippines, in collecting taxes from Mid-Pasig in lieu of the actual
occupants or beneficial users of certain portions thereof, and in auctioning said properties in favor of
respondent, followed by the corresponding certificate of sale, are all unequivocally tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC’s decision. It ruled that the fact that Mid-Pasig and its properties
have not been validly declared by the Sandiganbayan as "ill-gotten" wealth, the same are not yet public
properties. Thus, Pasig City through its City Assessor and City Treasurer did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued real property tax assessment on the subject parcels of land.

Issue:
Who owns the properties? Was the assessment of taxes upon the said properties by City of Pasig
invalid? Was the sale on public auction of these properties valid?
Ruling:
The Republic of the Philippines owns the properties which are surrendered ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos. As such, the same assumes a public character and thus belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that Jose Y. Campos, "a
confessed crony of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos," voluntarily surrendered or turned over to
the PCGG the properties, assets and corporations he held in trust for the deposed President. Among the
corporations he surrendered were the Independent Realty Corporation and the Mid-Pasig Land
Development Corporation.
Article 420 of the Civil Code classifies as properties of public dominion those that are "intended for
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads" and those that "are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth." Properties of public dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are
exempt from sale at public auction. Property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be subject of the commerce of man. The Supreme Court has also
repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.
In the present case, the parcels of land are not properties of public dominion because they are not
"intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads." Neither are they "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth." MPLDC leases portions of the properties to different business
establishments. Thus, the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are not only subject to
real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.
Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines
are exempt from real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person." Thus, the portions of the properties not leased to
taxable entities are exempt from real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable
entities are subject to real estate tax. The law imposes the liability to pay real estate tax on the Republic
of the Philippines for the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. It is, of course, assumed
that the Republic of the Philippines passes on the real estate tax as part of the rent to the lessees.
In sum, only those portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax for
the period of such leases. Pasig City must, therefore, issue to respondent new real property tax
assessments covering the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. If the Republic of the
Philippines fails to pay the real property tax on the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities,
then such portions may be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.
TOPIC: lands devoted for public use; government instrumentality vs. not a government-owned or
controlled corporation

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE:

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 419. Property is either of
public dominion or of private ownership. ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public
dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied) ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. ARTICLE 422.
Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation; The charging of fees to the public does not
determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not.
Property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction
sale; Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy.

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority (“MIAA Charter”). Executive Order No. 903
was issued on 21 July 1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos.
909 and 298 amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment
within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,
including the runways and buildings (“Airport Lands and Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air
Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall
be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the
Philippines.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061.
The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax
already due.
On 28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
for the taxable years 1992 to 2001.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport
Lands and Buildings.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among
the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that
MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in the name
of MIAA. However, MIAA points out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real
owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. The MIAA Charter mandates
MIAA to devote the Airport Lands and Buildings for the benefit of the general public. Since the Airport
Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service, the ownership of these properties
remains with the State. The Airport Lands and Buildings are thus inalienable and are not subject to real
estate tax by local governments.
MIAA also points out that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the payment
of real estate tax. MIAA insists that it is also exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local
Government Code because the Airport Lands and Buildings
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of “govern-ment-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among
the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that
MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing
laws. If so exempt, then the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all
proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. In such event, the other issues raised in this
petition become moot.

HELD:

MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate
tax. However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or controlled
corporation as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined.—x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or,
where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of
its capital stock: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be “organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation.” MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the
department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a “separate and
autonomous body” will make its operation more “financially viable.”
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, which
states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.—Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities
and local government units. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987
Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local governments may
only exercise such power “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power
is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must
be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable
is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering
essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature
clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for
sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in the law empowering
local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists
is resolved against local governments.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
1. (1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
2. (2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and
other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character
of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road, either the public
indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among the public who actually use
the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system is even a more efficient
and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of
public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one
“intended for public use.” Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public
use” if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The
charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and
other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees
does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s
tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public facility.

REASONING

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce
of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of
man. As early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas that properties devoted
to public use are outside the commerce of man, thus:
“According to article 344 of the Civil Code: “Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties
of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the
City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for
non-payment of real estate tax.

CONCLUSION

Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs
the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within the entire government
machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, MIAA as a government
instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to “[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind”
by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a “taxable person” as
provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the specific real property leased
becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to
taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
Manila Lodge 761 vs Court of Appeals
GR No. L-41001, September 30, 1976
Castro, C.J.;

Procedural Overview:

RTC: TDC filed an ordinary civil action for damages and cancellation of annotation. The court dismissed
and ruled that the property is public dominion

Court of Appeals: TDC and BPOE appealed. The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the court
below.

Doctrines: Act 1360, as amended intended the reclaimed land as an extension of the Luneta Park. As
such, it cannot be denied that it is a property of public dominion, contrary to the claim of TDC and
Manila Lodge that it is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Facts: Tarlac Development Corporation filed an ordinary civil action against the City of Manila and
Manila Lodge 761,BPOE for damages and cancellation of annotation of the right to repurchase by the
City of Manila. The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared that the subject land, south wing
portion of the Luneta extension, is public land. As such, the sales between BPOE and TDC is null and
void. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the court below.
Issue: whether or not the property sold to TDC is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila?

Ruling: The Court ruled that south portion of the Luneta extension is not a patrimonial property of the
City of Manila, but a plaza extension of the Luneta Park; hence, it is a property of the public dominion.
The Court disposed the petition by resorting to interpretation of Act 1360, as amended. Such that,
insofar as Act 1360, as amended is concerned, the intent of the then Insular Government was to
authorize the City of Manila to develop the reclaimed land as an extension of the Luneta Park by
constructing bulkhead and seawall on the reclaimed land, and to sell or lease the north portion-not the
south, for hotel site. This disquisition, as held by the Court, showed that the property subject of this
petition is not patrimonial property, but a property of the public dominion. The Court said that had the
property been a patrimonial property of the City of Manila, the Insular Government would not have
been enacted a law authorizing it to dispose the same because that is superfluous. All the words, clauses
and phrases should be given its effect, said by the Court. Finally, the Court concluded that the sale is null
and void because the property is part of the public domain, and advanced that Government is not
estopped to validate an act by its agent, which is prohibited by law. As such, the TDC cannot claim that it
bought the property in good faith and for value because there is no right of estoppel against the
government.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to
the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petition was denied.

Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

What are the classifications of public lands?

Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.

RULING:

1.

Classifications of land according to ownership.

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either:

(a) is intended for public use; or

(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer
intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from
the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land,
and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also,
public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration
of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

2.

Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and
period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

(Possession, Property Registration Decree, Regalia Doctrine)

People vs Narvaez
121 SCRA 389
Doctrine: Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause
damage to appellant’s house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with
them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of
appellant’s property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Facts:
Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place
was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. At the place of the
fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez. At that time, appellant was taking his
rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his house
and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying—‘Pare, if possible you stop destroying
my house and if possible we will talk it over—what is good,’ addressing the deceased Rubia, who is
appellant’s compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: ‘No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.’
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer
fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia,
likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting.
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co., Inc. and residents of Maitum, South Cotabato in which Appelant Narvaez was part of.
Both parties claims that they were the lawful owners of the land Appellant was among those persons
from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of
Kiamba, and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built
his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon
to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about
2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in
Negros Oriental, filed sales application over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by
Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Considering the abovestated facts, the conflict between Fleisher Company and the settlers became the
very root of the issue which led to the death of Fleisher and Rubio.
Narvaez raised that he used self-defense in protecting his person.

Issue:
Whether or not the there was a lawful aggression which would justify the crime committed?
Held:
This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights. The question is,
was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property,
to destroy appellant’s house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or
tenements.
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land. He
should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of
chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant’s entrance and exit to the highway. The following
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
“Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver
the thing.”
“Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and
the Rules of Court” (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
appellant’s house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop
and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful
aggression as contemplated by law.
G.R. No. 168732 June 29, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G.MARUHOM, BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G.
MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G.
MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M.
IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM, respondents.
Facts:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-
heir, instituted an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of
possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.
In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land
described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3) lots.
Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground
tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and
then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the
latter’s Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in
siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects
located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in
Iligan City.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a
permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his
request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and
property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-
terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents
further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and
properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Further, these illegally
constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling them to
recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable
for exemplary damages.
Disputing respondents’ claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely that (1) there is a
failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion when they
were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have no cause of action because they failed to
show proof that they were the owners of the property, and (3) the tunnels are a government project for
the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may be necessary for the same
Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area
occupied by petitioner.
Held:
Yes. In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the application of the
exceptions to the above rule. Consequently, the CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial court that
respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since
1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the
lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This
conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
U.S. v. Causby
328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Facts:
Thomas Lee Causby bought 2.8 acres of land outside of Greensboro, North Carolina, intending to raise a
chicken farm. The fact that the land was just one third of a mile from an airport didn’t concern them, as
it was a small, municipal airport that was little used. But several years later, the Government leased the
use of the airport and the U.S. military began using it. Army bombers and transports would fly sixty feet
over their house, skimming just eighteen feet above the tallest trees. The roar and glare of the planes
disturbed Causby’s sleep. Even worse, the noise was so startling that it frightened the animals on his
farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced
to abandon his business.

The farmer decided to sue the US government for trespass. At that time, US jurisdictions followed the
old common law rule that landowner owns all of the land beneath their property and all of the sky
above their property “into the periphery of the universe”—in Latin: Cujusest solum ejus est usque ad
coelum.

Causby believed that their Fifth Amendment rights had been violated. The Fifth Amendment says in
part, “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Though
government had not physically taken the Causby’s property from them, they believed they were entitled
to compensation because the government’s actions had made it impossible for them to use their
property as a chicken farm.

The government argued that the Causbys’ property had not been taken, as the government had not
physically intruded on their land. Furthermore, people could not be said to own all the air above their
land, because this would make it impossible for the United States to control its own airspace.

The United States Court of Claims agreed with Causby's argument, finding that the government’s actions
amounted to what is called a “partial taking, and therefore ordered the government to pay
compensation.

The case eventually went to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and therefore entitling the latter to just
compensation.
Ruling:
Yes, to an extent.

The Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the space
above the land "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept
the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass
suits. Common sense revolts at the idea."

However, while The Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the
common law doctrine and found it inapplicable in the case, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to
have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even
fences could not be run. . . . The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he
can occupy or use in connection with the land.” (enveloping atmosphere rule)

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court
does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking,
unless, like in this case, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment of the land.
Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined
that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
Florencio Ignao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Juan Ignao, substituted by his Legal Heirs,
and Isidro Ignao
G.R. No. 72876; January 18, 1991
FERNAN, J.
Doctrine: Article 448 cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in
common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of
which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person unde the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership.
Facts:Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were
coowners of a parcel of land in Kawit, Cavite. Ignao successfully obtained an order of partition of the
said land, allotting 133.5 square meters or 2/8 thereof to private respondents, and giving the remaining
portion with a total area of 266.5 square meters to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition
was ever effected. Ignao later instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against
private respondents alleging that the area occupied by the 2 houses built by private respondents
exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously allotted to them. The lower court found that the houses of
Juan and Isidro occupied a portion of Florencio's property but they should be considered builders in
good faith under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Issue:Is Article 448 applicable to a builder in good faith on a property held in common?
Held:Yes. Article 448 is applicable to a builder in good faith on a property held in common.
It has been previously held by the Supreme Court that Article 448 cannot apply where a co-owner
builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land
that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
unde the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when the
co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has
encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good faith,
then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.
G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

Facts:
The case is a petition for review of the decision and two subsequent resolutions of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-84, the application over which was filed by private
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual,now deceased of Balanga, Bataan. The applicant
owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered property is
bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the
Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped
into the fray opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of the property sought to be
registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was not
amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy
to occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal,
his original land registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of
Pascual took over the case.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered
under the Torrens system.

Decision:

The petition is hereby granted and the decision of the IAC dated Nov 1978 is reversed and set aside.
And the decision of the Court of First Instance is hereby ordered reinstated. The decision assails that it
cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the
Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan. Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s any land to
be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this.
Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the
property adjacent to Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not
Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along
sea shore cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public
use and declared as private property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part
of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof.
Republic of the Philippines (Director of Lands) v. Court of Appeals
Court of First Instance- found that Lots 1 and 2 are accretion of the land covered by TCT No. 89709 and
ordered their registration in the names of the private respondents
Court of Appeals- affirmed the decision
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------
Doctrine- Art. 457 of the NCC
• To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current waters.
This requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision
is said to n place.
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water
3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
• The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly
intended or designed to bring about accretion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario Tancinco
are registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Bario Ubihan, Meycauayan, bulacan nordering on
the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property- Lot 1, 2 and 3 PSU 131892. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando Vicente, in
representation of the Bureau of Lands filled a written opposition to the application of registration.
Private respondents filled a partial withdrawal of the application and Lot 3 was withdrawn from the
application. The lower court rendered decision granting the application on the findings that the lands in
question are accretions to the private respondent’s fishponds covered by TCT No. 89709. The Republic
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. The
petitioner sublits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art. 457 of the NCC because what actually
happened is that the private respondent simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is an accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the
result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. On the other hand, private
respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Viriginia Acuna regarding the Lots 1 & 2.
Issue: Whether or not Lots 1 & 2 are accretion which belong to the private respondents and thus can be
registrated under their name.
Ruling:
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. There is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The court agree
with the observation of SolGen that it is preposterous to believe that almost 4 hectares of land came
into being because of the effects of the rivers. The lone witness of the respondents who happens to be
their overseer noticed only the accretion sometime in 1939, thus, their witness was incompetent to
testify to a gradual increase to their land in the years before 1939. There is evidence that the alleged
alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the rivers.
The alluvial deposit came into being not because of the sole effect of the river’s current but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is
not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it.
The lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property on 1940, it was also
declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it has supposedly permanently formed. The
only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939, they existed
only after the respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river. What
respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation. Wherefore, instant petition is granted.
GR No. 98045Nazareno vs CAJune 26, 1996
Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as
a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio
Nazareno, petitioners‘ predecessor-in-interest. Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. A decision was
rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The decision of the
lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject
lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the
approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private
respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with
the order of the District Land Officer, recommended the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application. Based on
the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to
the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and
OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.
The petitioners Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC for
the annulment of the decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of
the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accretion belongs to the riparian owners

HELD: No. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that ―”to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” In the case of
Meneses v. CA, it was held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second
requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian
owner. By their own admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other
filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot
be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was
gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek
and the Cagayan River.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, it was held that the word “current” indicate the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application. The
mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land,
having been the subject of survey plan which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno‘s
Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by
Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually
covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River.
The Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but even finality. Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the
current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused
by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in
Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the
water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate
intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In
the present case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno‘s labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.
G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017
Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos and her daughters, namely, Virginia, Aurea, and Bingbing vs. Alberto
Abejon and the estate of Teresita Dinglasan Abejon

FACTS:
The case arose from a complaint for cancellation of title with collection of sum of money.
1. Erlinda and her late husband Pedro delos Santos borrowed the amount of P100,000 from her sister,
Teresita. As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their land property covered by TCT No.
131753 which mortgage was annotated on the title.
2. After Pedro died, Erlinda was unable to pay the loan and agreed to sell the land to Teresita for
P150,000 (amount of the loan plus P50,000). They executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage,
and eventually TCT No, 131753 was cancelled and TCTNo. 180286 was issued in the name of Teresita
Abejon, married to Alberto Abejon.
3. Respondents, Alberto and Teresita constructed a 3-storey bldg worth P2,000,000 on the subject land.
The petitioners (Erlinda and daughters) refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that Pedro had
died in 1989, and therefore the signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 is forged.
4. The respondents, Alberto and Teresita demand the amount of P150,000, the consideration for the
sale of the land and P2,000,000 for the construction cost of the 3-storey building but to no avail.
5. RTC Ruling
- declared the Deed of Sale NULL AND VOID (due to the forged Deed of Sale)
- Ordered the cancellation of TCT 180286 (issued in the name of Teresita and Alberto) and
reinstatement of TCT 1317573
- Petitioners to pay: P100,000 plus 12% interest per annum, P2,000,000 construction of the house,
P100,000 for attorney's fees
6. CA Ruling
- affirmed RTC’s ruling with modifications
- Cancel of the Release of Mortgage
- Adjusted legal interest
- Imposing 6% per annum on the construction cost of the building

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for the loan
obligation, the construction of the building and the attorney's fees

Ruling:
The petition is partially meritorious. The law on accessions apply.
1. The loan was contracted by Erlinda and her late husband, and so it is only chargeable to Erlinda and
Pedro's conjugal partnership (they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code and in the
absence of any prenuptial agreement) and if insufficient, the Erlinda and Pedro's estate shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
• Respondents may also foreclose the mortgage to secure the loan, alternative to demanding the
payment of the loan.
2. The contract is null and void ab initio, so the parties are restored to the state they were found before
the sale.
• Erlinda and the petitioners must return the subject land. The Register of Deeds should cancel TCT No.
180286 issued in the name of Teresita and reinstate TCT 131753 in the name of Pedro and Erlinda with
the mortgage annotated (must be restored to its state before cancellation).
• Respondents (Teresita) are entitled to the refund of the additional P50,000 as consideration of the
Deed of sale, subject to legal interest of 6% per annum
3. Art. 448, CC: Builder, planter, planter, or sower in good faith - one who, not being the owner of the
land, builds, plants or sows on the land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in
his title or mode of acquisition
• The essence of good faith lies in the honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior
claim, or absence of intention to overreach another
• Bad faith may only be attributed to the land owner when the act of building, planting, sowing was
done with knowledge and without opposition on his part
• The Deed of Sale was executed in 1992, 3 years after the death of Pedro. Teresita knew that the Deed
of Sale was void because of the forged signature of Pedro and would not operate to transfer rights over
the subject land to her name. Despite awareness of the defect, Teresita still proceeded to construct the
3-storey building.
• Respondents are builders in bad faith
• On the other hand, the petitioners knew defect in the Deed of Sale from the start but nonetheless still
acquiesced to the construction of the 3-storey building thereon.
• Petitioners are landowners in bad faith
• Art. 453, CC: where both landowner and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be
treated as if both of them were in good faith.
• When both the landowner and the seller are in good faith, the landowner has two options under Art.
448, CC:
a. he may appropriate the improvements for himself and reimburse the buyer (builder in good faith) the
necessary and useful expenses under Art. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code
b. he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than the improvements, in
which case , the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
• Under the first option, the petitioner may appropriate the 3-storey building for themselves, but the
respondent has a right of retention over the building until the petitioners complete reimbursement
• Under the second option, the petitioners may sell the land to the respondents at a price equivalent to
the current market value, but if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the building,
the respondents cannot be compelled to purchase the land, but may only be obliged to pay rent
• The court remanded the case to the lower court for the determination of the proper application of the
provisions
4. The reward for attorney’s fees must be deleted. No premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
5. Wherefore, the petition is partially granted
a) The Deed of Sale and Release Mortgage is nullified
b) The Register of Deeds is to cancel TCT 180826 and reinstate TCT 131753
c) 1.) P100,000 – the loan obligation is the liability of Erlinda and Pedro’s estate
2.) Erlinda is ordered to return the P50,000 consideration for the sale of the land with legal interest
3.) The case is remanded to the RTC for the proper application of the provisions
[G.R. NO. 156357 : February 18, 2005]
ENGR. GABRIEL V. LEYSON, DR. JOSEFINA L. POBLETE, FE LEYSON QUA, CARIDAD V. LEYSON and
ESPERANZA V. LEYSON, Petitioners, v. NACIANSINO BONTUYAN and MAURECIA B. BONTUYAN,
Respondents.
Doctrine:
(Quieting of Title, Cloud,) an action is an attack on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus
challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is considered direct when
the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may
be an original action or a counterclaim in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
(Reconveyance; Prescription): Case law has it that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years,
the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to one
who has a better right. An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date
of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or
the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right
to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
(Registration; Fraud,) Registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud. There is settled
jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
the court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation
can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners
whose ... possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted
with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name
of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its
reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in
possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period
of prescription commences to run against such possessor. – David v. Malay
The paramount reason for this exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could not
be used as a shield for fraud. Moreover, to hold otherwise would be to put premium on land-grabbing
and transgressing the broader principle in human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64471 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Ponente: Callejo, SR., J.:
Facts:
Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Barangay Adlawon, Mabolo, Cebu City, which
was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 03276-R in 1945 with the following
boundaries
North: Calixto Gabud
East: Marcelo Cosido
South: Pedro Bontuyan
West: Asuncion Adulfo
Because of the construction of a provincial road, the property was divided into two parcels of land
covered by T.D. No. 03276-R and T.D. No. 01979-R.
February 14, 1948, Gabud executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on both properties, in favor of Protacio
Tabal, married to Leodegaria Bontuyan.
T.D. No. 03276-R was cancelled by T.D. No. 13615-R in the name of Protacio Tabal effective 1949.
January 5, 1959, Tabal executed a Deed of Sale over the property covered by T.D. No. 13615-R in favor
of Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia Bontuyan, daughter of Gregorio Bontuyan, for P800.00. T.D. No.
13615-R was cancelled by T.D. No. 100356 in the names of the spouses Noval.
Gregorio Bontuyan received a copy of the said tax declaration in behalf of the spouses Noval. The latter
tax declaration was then cancelled by T.D. No. 008876 under the same names effective 1967.
Subsequently, the property was surveyed by Cadastral Land Surveyor Mauro U. Gabriel on January 22,
1964. The plan survey was approved on September 30, 1966. The property covered by T.D. No. 008876
was identified as Lot No. 17150 of Cebu Cadastre No. 12, while the property covered by T.D. No. 01979-
R was identified as Lot No. 13272.
May 22, 1968, the spouses Noval executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the two lots covered by T.D. No.
008876 in favor of Lourdes V. Leyson for P4,000.00. Lourdes Leyson took possession of the property and
had it fenced. Despite the said sale, T.D. No. 008876 was cancelled by T.D. No. 21267 effective 1974
Thereafter, T.D. No. 21267 was cancelled by T.D. No. 23821 which, in turn, was cancelled by T.D. No. 01-
17455 effective 1980.
In 1989, the latter was cancelled by a new tax declaration, T.D. No. 01-001-00646. All these tax
declarations were in the names of the spouses Noval.
Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson paid for the realty taxes over the property. However, the tax declaration
issued thereon continued to be under the names of the spouses Noval.
Despite his knowledge that the property had been purchased by his son-in-law and daughter, the
spouses Noval, Gregorio Bontuyan, who was then 91 years old, filed an application with the Bureau of
Lands for a free patent over Lot No. 17150 on December 4, 1968. He alleged therein that the property
was public land and was neither claimed nor occupied by any person, and that he first entered upon and
began cultivating the same in 1918. Thus, on November 19, 1971, Free Patent No. 510463 was issued
over Lot No. 17150 in his favor, based on which Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1619 was issued
to and under his name on March 21, 1974
Another parcel of land, Lot No. 13272, was also registered under the name of Gregorio Bontuyan under
OCT No. 0-1618. He then declared Lot No. 17150 for taxation purposes under T.D. No. 13596 effective
1974.
On February 20, 1976, Gregorio Bontuyan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 17150 in favor
of his son, Naciansino Bontuyan.
On April 28, 1980, Gregorio Bontuyan, then 103 years old, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale over
Lot Nos. 13272 and 17150, covered by OCT No. 0-1618 and OCT No. 0-1619, respectively, in favor of
Naciansino Bontuyan for P3,000.00. Because of the said deed, OCT No. 0-1619 was cancelled by TCT No.
1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan on December 2, 1980.Gregorio Bontuyan died intestate on
April 12, 1981.
On March 30, 1981, the spouses Bontuyan executed a Real Estate Mortgage over Lot No. 17150 covered
by OCT No. 0-1619 in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for a loan of
P11,200.00. Naciansino Bontuyan had earlier executed an affidavit that the property was not tenanted.
Shortly thereafter, the spouses Bontuyan left the Philippines and resided in the United States.
Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson died intestate.
The spouses Bontuyan returned to the Philippines in 1988 to redeem the property from DBP only to
discover that there were tenants living on the property installed by Engineer Gabriel Leyson, one of the
late Lourdes Leyson's children. Despite being informed that the said spouses owned the property, the
tenants refused to vacate the same. The tenants also refused to deliver to the spouses the produce from
the property.
The spouses Bontuyan redeemed the property from DBP on September 22, 1989.
February 12, 1993, Jose Bontuyan, Nieves Atilano, Pacifico Bontuyan, Vivencia Noval and Naciansino
Bontuyan, the surviving heirs of Gregorio Bontuyan, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the latter's
estate and adjudicated Lot No. 13272 in favor of Naciansino. Based on the said deed, T.D. No. 01-001-
00877 was issued to and under the name of Naciansino over the said property starting 1994.
June 24, 1993, Naciansino Bontuyan, through counsel, wrote Engr. Gabriel Leyson, demanding that he
be furnished with all the documents evidencing his ownership over the two lots, Lots Nos. 17150 and
13272. Engr. Leyson ignored the letter.
The spouses Bontuyan, thereafter, filed a complaint against Engr. Leyson in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City for quieting of title and damages. They alleged that they were the lawful owners of
the two lots and when they discovered, upon their return from the United States, that the property was
occupied and cultivated by the tenants of Engr. Leyson, they demanded the production of documents
evidencing the latter's ownership of the property, which was ignored.
Engr. Leyson averred, by way of affirmative defenses, that the two lots were but portions of a parcel of
land owned by Calixto Gabud, covered by T.D. No. 03276-R, and was subdivided into two parcels of land
because of the construction of a provincial road on the property; Gabud later sold the two lots to
Protacio Tabal, who sold the same to Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia Bontuyan, one of the children
of Gregorio Bontuyan; Simeon Noval later sold the property to Lourdes Leyson on May 22, 1968 who,
forthwith, took possession thereof as owner; and Gregorio Bontuyan was issued a free patent over the
property through fraud. Engr. Leyson concluded that the said patent, as well as OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT
No. 1392, were null and void and that the plaintiffs acquired no title over the property.
RTC DECISION:
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Leyson heirs and against the
spouses Bontuyan. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint for
dearth of evidence declaring the defendant and the intervenors as the true and legal owners and
possessors of the subject parcels of land; declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan
and TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void; ordering the Register of Deeds to
cancel OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and issue new ones in favor of defendant Gabriel Leyson and
intervenors Josefina Poblete, Fe Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson; ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant and intervenors the following: a) P50,000.00 attorney's fees; b) 1,000.00 per appearance; c)
100,000.00 moral damages for defendant and intervenors; d) 10,000.00 exemplary damages; and e)
10,000.00 litigation expenses. The trial court held that Simeon Noval had sold the lots to Lourdes Leyson
on May 22, 1968, who thus acquired title over the property.
Court of Appeals:
The spouses Bontuyan appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed, with modification, the decision
of the RTC. The appellate court held that the Leyson heirs were the owners of Lot No. 13273, while the
spouses Bontuyan were the owners of Lot No. 17150.
The CA ruled that the answer of the Leyson heirs to the complaint constituted a collateral attack of OCT
No. 0-1619 which was proscribed by law.
The Leyson heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision insofar as Lot No. 17150 was
concerned, contending that their counterclaim for the nullification of OCT No. 0-1619 contained in their
answer constituted a direct attack on the said title. The CA denied the motion.
SC Ruling:
The Court hereby AFFIRMS the ownership of Leyson on Lot No. 17150.
OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 covering the said lot are hereby nullified. The Register of Deeds is
ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 1392 and to issue another title over the property in favor of the petitioners
as co-owners thereof.
Second Division Unanimously Concurr Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
G.R. No. 187987 November 26, 2014
VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG
VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG VELEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.

Facts:
• Vicente Torres, et al. (petitioners) including Jesus Velez (respondent) are co-owners of several parcels
of lands (Lot No. 4389) in Carcar, Cebu. Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against
the petitioners and other co-owners before the RTC Cebu City. A judgment was rendered based on a
compromise agreement signed by the parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente
were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them
to all the co-owners. The agreement was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. The
petitioners discovered that Lapinid was already occupying a portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot
No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. A forcible entry case was filed
against Lapinid.

• The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale of a
definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force and
effect and they Lapinid pay a rental fee of ₱1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or from the time of
deprivation of property.

• Jesus asserted that, because of the previous arraignments that the land is adjudication to the co-
owners the group of Velez and Jesus and that several co-owners already sold their land to Jesus, he is a
majority co-owner and that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot was already
adjudicated in his favor. Lapinid admitted that he entered into a deed of sale with Jesus covering the
3000 sq. meters land. Lapinid avers that he believed that Jesus was the majority owner of the land when
the latter showed several titles in support of his claim. He further denied that he acquired a specific and
definite portion of the questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does not mention
any boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus permitted him to occupy a portion not
exceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners.
The RTC Ruling
• The RTC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry. But also annulled the site assignment by Jesus
Velez in the Deed of Sale to Lorenzo Lapinid because of the lack of exact location of which still has to be
determined either by agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper proceedings.

• Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, they
filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The CA Ruling
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It validated the sale and ruled that the
compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It
likewise dismissed the claim for rental payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not a co-owner (Jesus Velez) can validly sell a portion of land he co-owns in favor of another
favor.
Whether or not Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other co-owners.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jesus Velez and Lorenzo Lapinid and denied the petition on the
grounds that:
On the First Issue
• A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the co-owned
property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third
person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rightswill be affected. This is evident from the
provision of the Art. 493 of the Civil Code:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
• A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is
at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to
enjoin a co-owner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person
in its enjoyment.

• In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from
the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of
sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate
share in the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract, Lapinid eventually became
a co-owner of the property.

• Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of
Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails. The Supreme
Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before
partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share
after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make
the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share,
subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to
be unaffected by the alienation. The validity of sale being settled, it follows that the subsequent
compromise agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid as a co-owner.

• It was ruled that Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said
properties, receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties. Be that as it may, the
compromise agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over the share
sold by Jesus. As early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property and
thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by the other co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise
agreement, which is to have the covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not
affect the proportionate share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise
agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent, said agreement could not have affected his ideal
and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent his consent. Nemo dat quod non
habet – "no one can give what he does not have."
• The Supreme Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common.
On the Second Issue:
• As previously discussed, Lapinid, from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to
enjoy the property held in common.

• The Court cited, in support of its ruling, Art. 486 and 493 of the Civil Code which provide that:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership
or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership
may be changed by agreement, express or implied.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

• Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners,
the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and
every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

• From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be ordered to pay
rental payments to his other co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the property owned in
common must be respected despite opposition and may notbe limited as long he uses the property to
the purpose for which it isintended and he does not injure the interest of the co-ownership.
Magsano, et al. vs. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016 –
Stephen Binag Ramos and Justice Pajarillo

Facts:
On July 1, 1991, spouses Roque and Susana (collectively, mortgagors), the parents of petitioners,
purportedly executed in favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a 418 square-meter
parcel of land located in Dagupan City, covered by TCT No. 48754, as well as the improvements thereon
(subject property), as security for the payment of their P35,000.00 loan.
The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when it fell due, causing
respondent bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property, with notice to the mortgagors,
and, in the process, respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction sale held on
March 21, 1994 for a total bid price of P65,826.69. The mortgagors then failed to redeem the property
within the redemption period. Respondent bank subsequently sold the same to Sps. Manuel.
Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises; hence, respondent bank
applied for and was granted a writ of possession over the subject property and, thereafter, a writ of
demolition, resulting in the demolition of petitioners' houses.
Consequently, on September 6, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate
Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed of Sale, and TCT No. 4875425 against respondent
bank, Sps. Manuel, and Sheriff Daroy (defendants) before the RTC, which they amended on September
3, 2007. They averred that Roque had already passed away prior to the execution of the Real Estate
Mortgage; hence, the said mortgage was null and void. They further claimed that the said property is
their family home, but the consent of the majority of the beneficiaries had not been secured. They
likewise asserted that Sps. Manuel were aware that: (a) the foreclosure proceedings were invalid; and
(b) petitioners were in possession of the subject property, hence, purchasers in bad faith.
For their part, defendants denied knowledge of the death of Roque, and averred that petitioners have
no cause of action to seek the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage since they were not parties
thereto. They contended that assuming that the latter have a cause of action, the same had prescribed.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It declared that petitioners have no cause of action
against the defendants, holding them bound by the misrepresentation of their mother who signed the
Real Estate Mortgage, the authenticity of whose signature they never contested. And even assuming
that petitioners have a cause of action, the RTC ruled that the same is barred by prescription,
considering that the action to annul the Real Estate Mortgage and the foreclosure sale was filed beyond
the prescriptive period from the time their causes of action accrued.
CA affirmed RTC's findings.

Issue:
W/N (a) the Real Estate Mortgage was void; and (b) Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith.

Ruling:
(a) Conjugal partnership between spouse was dissolved pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana and the other heirs of Roque with respect to
his share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the conjugal
partnership, she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself as
co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her undivided interest in the subject property, she
could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in its entirety without the consent of the other co-
owners.
(b) The Court finds that Sps. Manuel are not innocent purchasers for value who can acquire title to the
subject entire property.
While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than
the vendor, as in this case, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries
concerning the actual possessor.
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when Sps. Manuel bought the same.
However, the records do not show that Sps. Manuel inspected the property and inquired into the nature
of petitioners' possession and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a measure of precaution which
may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a similar situation, and thereby discover the irregularity
in the acquisition of title by the respondent bank. Sps. Manuel, therefore, failed to exercise the diligence
required in protecting their rights; as such, the Court cannot ascribe good faith to them.
Tabasondra et. Al vs. Sps. Castillo et. Al [ G.R. No. 196403, December 07, 2016 ]

Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."

*Plaintiffs-Appellees- respondents
Defendants-Appellants- petitioners

The Case

Under appeal is the adverse decision promulgated on November 30, 2010[1] whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) modified the judgment rendered on September 22, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, in Tarlac City ordering the partition of all the three parcels of land owned in common among
the parties.[2] The modification by the CA, which expressly recognized the alienation by the two co-
owners of their shares, consisted in limiting the partition of the property owned in common to only the
unsold portion with an area of 33,450.66 square meters.

Facts:
The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages. Where the
respondents were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina namely: Tarcila Tabasondra-
Constantino and the late Sebastian Tabasondra. While the petitioners were the children of Cornelio by
his second wife, Sotera; namely: Arsenio Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Fausta Tabasondra-
Tapacio, Fernando Tabasondra, Guillermo Tabasondra, Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Myrasol
Tabasondra-Romero, and Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil.

Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the
registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as Lot No.
2536, containing an area of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and forty-seven (77,147) sq. m.; Lot
No. 3155, with an area of thirteen thousand six hundred fifty-nine (13,659) sq. m.; and, Lot No. 3159,
with an area of nine thousand five hundred forty-six (9,546) sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 106012.

Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and
August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by
TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of
Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

On August 2002, the controversy arose when the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against
the Defendants-Appellant claiming that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the
Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they
asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that
the same should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own
the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the
said sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the partition of the three (3) parcels of
land covered by TCT No. 16012 among the compulsory and legal heirs of Cornelio, Valentina and
Valeriana all surnamed Tabasondra.

On November 30, 2010, the CA promulgated the decision affirming the RTC with modification in that the
partition and the accounting is ordered to be made only with respect to a thirty-three thousand four
hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

Issue:
Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only 33,450.66 square
meters of the property registered under TCT No. 10612.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina
and Valeriana was 100,352 square meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of
such total area. It was established that Valentina and Valeriana executed the Deed of Absolute Sale,
whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612 in
favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso shares to
Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the
alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the common property. According
to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as
the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of
their shares in favor of the respondents.

The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in granting the complaint and
ordering a partition without qualifying that such should not include the shares previously pertaining to
Valeria and Valentina. Simply put, since the aggregate area of the subject property is one hundred
thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352) sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana
each has a share equivalent to thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq. m.
portion thereof. Accordingly, when Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants-Appellants
became co-owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelia's death, the only area that his heirs, that is,
the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and which may be made subject
of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of
the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso
shares in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property
with Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In effect,
Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third
pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of
Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and the petitioners.

Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not segregate the 100,352-
square meter property into determinate portions among the several co-owners.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and
to effect the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-,, third; the
heirs of Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of
Sebastian (collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA
uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express
terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the R TC will be to appoint not
more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to
command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the
property as directed in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 30, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 92920 in that the accounting is to be made only
with respect to the fruits of the one-third portion of the property still under the co-ownership of all the
parties; REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, in Tarlac City for further proceedings
in accordance with •this decision, and to determine the technical metes and bounds and description of
the proper share of each co-owner of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10612,
including the improvements thereon, in accordance with the Civil Code and Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Roxas v. Tuason
G.R. No. L-3788. December 21, 1907.
First Division, Torres (J): 4 concur
Doctrine:
Facts:
On 19 February 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, applied for the
registration of the estate owned by Roxas (Hacienda de San Pedro Macati) in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act. Said hacienda was acquired by Roxas by inheritance under the
will of his late father, Jose Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of 4 parcels of land, irregular
shape, designated on the accompanying plan under the letters “A” to “D”, containing a total area of
1,761 hectares 51 ares and 5 centares, equivalent to 17,615,105 sq.m., and assessed at P415,221.34, of
which P59,904 corresponded to the portion of said hacienda included within the limits of the city of
Manila and P256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in the Province of Rizal. The building
constructed of strong materials, called the “CasaQuinta” or “Casa de Ingenieros,” belonging also to
Roxas, is erected within parcel “C,” occupying, together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430 sq.m.,
and was assessed at P98,557.34. The hacienda was not mortgaged nor that any person has any right to
or any interest therein; and it is almost wholly occupied, under lease, by about 429 tenants whose
names, residences, and postal addresses, as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of
his attorney in fact, are stated in the application.
On 24 April, Roxas requested the summoning of the persons therein named, and stated in addition that
the total area of the hacienda is 17,613,595.91 sq.ms., as specified in the corrections made to the
technical description. On 24 July 1906, Roxas amended his application and gave the postal address and
names of several occupants of the property; and by other amendments to his original petition dated 30
August and 25 September 1906, rectifications are made in the boundaries of the hacienda, the last of
which represents a decrease of 1,446.70 sq.ms., or 14 ares and 46.70 centares which must be deducted
from the original description.
The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means of subpoenas and
notices published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason, appeared and by a document dated 10
September 1906, set forth her opposition to the registration and authentication of the title of Roxas, as
regards the parcel marked “C,” for the reason that two old monuments which had separated their
respective properties had been pulled down and new ones erected without her consent, and in her
opinion the latter included a considerable portion of the land owned by her. The municipality of San
Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration, alleging that the land occupied by the
municipal building and the public school had been in the possession of the town from time immemorial,
and that all the land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the
public domain and should be excluded from registration in favor of Roxas. On 18 September 1906, the
attorney for Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for
registration alleging that the 2 parcels of land owned by them had been improperly included within the
bounds of said hacienda in the parcel marked “C,” the second said parcels, which is the only subject of
the respective bill of exceptions and appeal interposed by them, consists of a building lot situated in
Calle San Pedro, opposite the first parcel of land, which was the subject of another bill of exceptions and
appeal by the Roxas; said second parcels measures 10 meters and 87 centimeters on its front and rear,
and 9 meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being stated.
On 17 October 1906, the court rendered decision, overruling the opposition made by Julia Tuason, by
the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel,
and ordered the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas excluding the
parcel of land with a frontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the
municipal building, which the government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor, so
long as the same is occupied by the said building or by another in substitution thereof and used for the
public good and for official purposes. Julia Tuason, the municipality of San Pedro Macati, and Alejandro
and Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to said judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the
same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence; said motion was overruled, Tuason, Aguirre
and the municipality of San Pedro Macati again excepting. The respective bills of exceptions having been
presented, the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from as regards Julia Tuason and the municipality
of San Pedro Macati, declared the appeal of Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre to be abandoned, and
ordered Tuason, the Aguirres and the municipality of San Pedro to pay their respective share of the
costs.
ISSUE:

HELD:
1. No evidence showing Julia Tuason owns the strip of land on the bank of the creek; Relief is application
of survey

The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed by monuments
belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy from the land of the said
hacienda is included within the Tuason’s land, since in the bill of sale executed by the procurador
general of the Augustinian friars on 28 March 1893, to Julia Tuason, no mention is made of monuments
erected thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of land purchased by her, except that the
land is situated in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro
Macati. Nor does the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda, forming part of
the barrio or sitio of Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from the Augustinian Fathers,
and that said creek traversed said barrio from one end to the other, or the Tuason’s land, in order to
affirm on good grounds that her land extended to the opposite bank of the aforesaid creek. Thus, from
the fact that the land of Julia Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati it
does not follow that the strip of a few meters in width on the bank of the creek belonged to her, there
being no evidence in support thereof, and if her statement were true, she would have applied for a
survey and demarcation of her property in accordance with the area of the same stated in her title
deed; and if she did not do so it must be because she renounces its verification in this manner or for
some other reason. Strip of land occupied by tenants of the hacienda The strip of land, irregular in
shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its bank, has always been occupied by
tenants of the hacienda as being an integral portion thereof, even at the time when the land owned by
Julia Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers, the original owners thereof. The hacienda’s tenants
were never molested or interfered with by the Augustinian Fathers or their tenants, nor later by Julia
Tuason or her tenants when cultivating the strip of land. Said tenants when cultivating the land did not
cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line between both properties.

2. No legal reason for Tuason to own strip of land No legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase
which has taken place on the hacienda’s side should be considered as belonging to Tuason, inasmuch as
the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that the slow decrease in
the width thereof benefited both properties equally since Tuason has not been able to show or prove
that her land has been thereby reduced. 5. Accretions belong to riparian owners Article 366 of the Civil
Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property provides that “rhe accretions which banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents belong to the owners of the estates
bordering thereon.” The provision is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account of the
accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has increased
all along the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though the law does not
require an express act of possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the
owner of the hacienda has possessed it for more than 30 years through his tenants, who have been
cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the corresponding portion of the said strip
down to the bank of said creek.
.
NOTES/RATIO:
7. Municipality of San Pedro Macati merely enjoys usufruct of the plots occupied by the municipal
building and town cemetery Roxas is the owner of the building lots and portions of land to which the
opposition of the municipality of San Pedro Macati refers; the latter has only the usufruct of the plot
occupied by the municipal building as long as the same or any other building of a public and official
nature is erected thereon; the municipality can not dispose of it as a property of its own because,
according to the documents offered in evidence by Roxas, the Spanish Government had recognized the
dominion of Roxas’ predecessor over the land occupied by said municipal building and by the town
cemetery, and the grant made by the owner was ever understood to be only of the usufruct thereof so
long as used for public purposes, the same being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such
purpose. 8. Prescription unavailing to plot occupied by public school In connection with the land
occupied by the public school of said town, no opposition based on ordinary or on extraordinary
prescription may be made by the municipality because the plot was granted only for the purpose of
erecting thereon a public school, and the possession thereof, on the part of the municipality, was simply
usufructuary, the government of the Province of Manila having recognized the title thereto which
pertained to Roxas, owner of the hacienda, whereof the said plot forms a part. The possession thereof
by the municipality has been but for a few years only. When the school building having been destroyed,
the land was abandoned. Prescription thus can not be invoked because the possession thereof was
interrupted and ceased many years since. 9. Aguirres’ appeal abandoned The attorney for Alejandro and
Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of 17 October 1906, whereby their claim to the second
parcel of land was dismissed. Their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register under 3788, was
duly forwarded. Notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has been exceeded, the Aguirres
have not filed their brief nor notified Roxas regarding the same. Roxas requested in a petition on 26
June 1907 that the Aguirres’ appeal be considered as having been abandoned. Said request is held to be
well based and in accordance with the law
G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992
JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS
OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS, respondents.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accretion noun – the process of growth or increase, typically by the gradual accumulation of additional
layers or matter.
"the accretion of sediments in coastal mangroves"

Facts:
The petitioner was a tenant of the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner of the fishpond situated in
Meycauayan Bulacan. During his tenancy he built a hut near the fishpond where he and his family lived,
and planted nipa palms and harvested them as his own without interference or prohibition from Don
Carlos.
When Don Carlos dies, his heirs and the petitioner entered into an agreement to surrender all the rights
of the fishpond he was tenanting and received P200,000 in consideration. Pursuant to the agreement
petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts he built therein while he continued to live in the hut
near the fishpond and take care of the nipa hut constructed therein. The respondent, meanwhile, leased
the fishpond to a certain Carlos dela Cruz.
The respondent, on February 17 1988, formally demanded that the petitioner vacate the place as he was
already indemnified according to them with respect to their prior agreement while the petitioner
refused to relinquish possession of the said lot.
The respondent later filed a Case before the Municipal Trial Court for forcible entry with preliminary
mandatory injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took
over the physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the huts bordering
the Liputan River and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.

Issue:
W/N the owners of the land automatically owns the accretion without registering them.

MTC Ruling:
Dismissed the case filed by the heirs as the Jose Reynante was found to have previous possession of the
said lot.

RTC Ruling:
Reversed the decision of the MTC in favor of the heirs and ordered Jose Reynante to restore possession
of the land together with nipa palms planted thereon.

CA Ruling:
Affirmed the decision of RTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration submitted by Jose
Reynante after.

SC Ruling:
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining the accretion it is still
subject to prescription. The petitioner, as proven by affidavits executed by disinterested parties, was in
possession of the land for more than 50 years. Since the owner of the land did not register the accretion,
the land will be subject to acquisition by prescription.
Wherefore, he decision of the CA is reversed and set aside and the decision of MTC is hereby reinstated.