Director of Lands vs.

Court of Appeals Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Actions in Rem; An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through Publication; The elementary norms of due
G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.* process require that Before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and
Registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given Notice and
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. opportunity to oppose.—It should be noted further that Land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such Proceeding requires constructive seizure of the
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, land as against all Persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
substituted by Property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through Publication. This being
so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and interested or whose rights May be adversely affected would be barred from contesting
MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents. an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a Party as an
owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land Registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive Evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Appeals; Petition For Review; Where a of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery
party appeals a final disposition of the Court Of Appeals, his remedy is a petition of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon
based on Rule 45, not Rule 65 Of the Rules of Court.—The Director of Lands the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned—nay, “the whole
represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court world”—who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and
notes that the petitioner’s counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed
the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant,
45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

Same; Same; Land Registration; Publications; Absent any Publication in a newspaper Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; The Official
of general circulation, the land Registration court cannot validly confirm and register Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed
the title of The applicant.—Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear And in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette Suffices to confer jurisdiction parties on time, if at all; The all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration
upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
any Publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land Registration court can objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
validly confirm and register the title of Private respondents. We answer this query in mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.—It
the negative. This Answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette
as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The word “shall” denotes an case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory Character of a statute; If mailing of as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its
notices is essential, then by Parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
Circulation is likewise imperative where the law includes such Requirement in its parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighbouring
detailed provision.—The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default
Setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an Imperative and thus orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
indicates the mandatory character of a Statute. While concededly such literal mandate in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
is not an absolute Rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the Present case the term
must be understood in its normal Mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared
Court through Mr Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Held that Section 23 of PD No. 1529 that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) Publication, (2) mailing and (3) interpretation, vacillation or equivocation—there is room only for application.—
posting, all of which must be Complied with. “If the intention of the law were Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
otherwise, said Section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of Mailing the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would
of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court
include owners of adjoining properties, And occupants of the land.” Indeed, if mailing has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
of notices is Essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
its detailed provision. interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is

1
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.” However, it found that the
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
requisites shall have been duly complied with. exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7
“x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
The Solicitor General for petitioner. Hearing (Exh. ‘E’) in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit ‘E’
Apollo T. Tria for private respondents. was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits ‘F’ and ‘G’). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over
PANGANIBAN, J.: the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.”
case mandatory or directory?
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in
its pertinent portion provides:8
“It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529]
Statement of the Case has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional;
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph,
But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the
The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4 court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper
hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, legally infirm.”
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration
Occidental Mindoro. of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
hereby dismissed for want of evidence. Upon the finality of this decision and payment Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree
be issued.” The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse
to us. This Court notes that the petitioner’s counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65.
The Facts This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC)
No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental The Issue
Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed “grave abuse of
heirs—Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado— discretion”10 in holding—
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem,
were substituted as applicants. “x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
______________ not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case
3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente; and No. 86 for want of such publication.”
Justices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna,
concurring.
4 Ibid., p. 35.
5 Known as the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Marin. shall be “published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, circulation.” According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is “necessary
2
to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and x x x in x x x a newspaper of general shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.”11
days from the date of the order.
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere “procedural The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the
defect.” They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
jurisdiction.12
(2) mailing; and (3) posting.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent 1. By publication.—
Court of Appeals ruled:13 Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
“x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.”
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity
“to explain matters fully and present their side.” Thus, it justified its disposition in this Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
wise:14 the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
“x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other the adjoining owners so far as known, and ‘to all whom it may
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party concern.’ Said notice shall also require all persons concerned
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.”
to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause
The Court’s Ruling why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
x x x x x x x x x”
We find for petitioner.
______________
9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and
days within which to file a “petition for review on certiorari.” It is thus
strange why the OSG described its petition as one “for certiorari under categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.” In any event, the Court, in its Resolution
dated March 9, 1992 admitted the OSG’s “petition for review on suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration
certiorari,” clearly ruling that the petition was one for review, and not one
for certiorari. court. However, the question boils down to whether,
10 Ibid., p. 21. This should really read “reversible error” since as already
explained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45. absent any publication in a newspaper of general
11 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
12 Ibid., pp. 56-57. circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm
13 Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.
14 Ibid. and register the title of private respondents.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory We answer this query in the negative. This answer is
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree impelled by the demands of statutory construction and
No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial the due process rationale behind the publication
hearing reads as follows: requirement.
“Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.—The court
shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to
order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon

3
the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration
initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and court must prove by
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.15 ______________
15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing
while concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute Dizon vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.
rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately 16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.
depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold 17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.

that in the present case the term must be understood in 286

its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. 286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his
notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, ownership
(2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same
with. “If the intention of the law were otherwise, said situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of
section would not have stressed in detail the realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world.
requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include achieved when all persons concerned—nay, “the whole
owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the world”—who have rights to or interests in the subject
land.” Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by property are notified and effectively invited to come to
parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general court and show cause why the application should not be
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included granted. The elementary norms of due process require
such requirement in its detailed provision. that
It should be noted further that land registration is a before the claimed property is taken from concerned
proceeding in rem.17 being in rem, such proceeding parties
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
persons, including the state, who have rights to or must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of
validated essentially general circulation should be deemed mandatory when
through publication. This being so, the process must the
strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may law already requires notice by publication in the Official
be Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected have
would already been complied with in the case at hand. The
be barred from contesting an application which they had reason
no is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is
knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
4
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
published therein may not reach the interested parties on ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
owners SO ORDERED.
of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On leave.
nature of land registration cases, the consequences of Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and
default orders issued against the whole world and the set aside. Application for land registration dismissed
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner without prejudice.
as possible demand a mandatory construction of the Notes.—Publication should precede the date of initial
requirements for publication, mailing and posting. hearing, and where the issue of the Official Gazette
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit where
publication requirement of the law. Private respondents the notice was published was released only after the
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not initial
have mattered because the statute itself allows no hearing, the court did not properly acquire jurisdiction
excuses. over
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with the case. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 442
such [1994]) The Supreme Court has consistently accepted
______________ the
18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.
probative value of certifications of the Director of the
287
VOL. 276, JULY 28, 1997 287 National Printing Office in reconstitution cases—and
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals there
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its is no reason for it to
______________
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared 19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical SCRA 708, 712, August 22, 1968 citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico,
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation 24 Phil. 504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific
Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968;
or
Dequito vs. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968.
equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There 288
is 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration Bondoc vs. National Labor Relations Commission
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without deviate from its earlier rulings and to require now the
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal submission of Official Gazette issues to satisfy the
requisites shall have been duly complied with. jurisdictional requirement. (Republic vs. Court of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Appeals,
5
247 SCRA 551 [1995]) intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood
——o0o—— brother
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. of their father.
VOL. 207, MARCH 25, 1992 561 Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When the words and
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal.—Verily, the
G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992.* interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more
humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL,
construction
petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759
OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable
ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, intent of
VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUALFERNANDO, the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA 233
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
_______________ (Nepomuceno,
* SECOND DIVISION. et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions
562 may
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their
Succession; Applicability of Article 992 of the Civil Code to language
acknowledged natural children.—Pertinent thereto, Article 992 fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
of the
the Civil Code, provides: “An illegitimate child has no right to general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail
of the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A.
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers
in to
the same manner from the illegitimate child.” x x x Eligio both natural and spurious.
Pascual PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the
is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Court of Appeals. Ramirez, J.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolito for
their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
6
petitioners. Manuel C. Pascual
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for private respondents. Jose C. Pascual
PARAS, J.: Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to Erlinda C. Pascual
563 Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
VOL. 207, MARCH 25, 1992 563 Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista of the deceased, to wit:
reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Avelino Pascual
Appeals1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 Isoceles Pascual
entitled “Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Loida Pascual-Martinez
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Virginia Pascual-Ner
Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Nona Pascual-Fernando
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al.” which dismissed the Octavio Pascual
petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
court Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Olivia S. Pascual
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: _______________
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual 1 Penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez and concurred in by
Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes.
are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
564
Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the 564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17). Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista
(a) Hermes S. Pascual
(b) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the
(c) half blood of the deceased and represented by the
(d) following:
(e) Dominga M. Pascual
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 Mamerta P. Fugoso
without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
adopted or spurious children and was survived by the Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
following: Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse; Dominga P. San Diego
Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the Nelia P. Marquez
full blood of the deceased, to wit: Silvestre M. Pascual
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista Eleuterio M. Pascual
7
(Rollo, pp. 46-47) despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their
late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial hereditary
Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their
Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47). On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to
On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the
a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for Letters of Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate
Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Hereditary
Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101). On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court,
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an
executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood “WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it
brother is
of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary
statement made by the oppositors, that they are not rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual” (Rollo, p. 136).
among On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for
the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and such motion
(Rollo, p. 102). was
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs denied. Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals
Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of rendered its decision the dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
petitioners.
“This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 38)
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals
Hermes issued
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.” its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, p. 108) (Rollo,
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into p. 42).
565 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
VOL. 207, MARCH 25, 1992 565 After all the requirements had been filed, the case was
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista
8
given due course. “Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is in
whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
the
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
the purview of Article 992 and of the doctrine laid down natural
in tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes
Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being of
acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such family
children were under conception there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
566 incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista by
(Rollo, p. 418). the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
Otherwise stated they say the term “illegitimate” condition
children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived;
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p.
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
419). the
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life;
herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 the
of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
is applicable to them. further
The petition is devoid of merit. grounds of resentment.”
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the Civil Code, Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his
provides: illegitimate children.
“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar,
the respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
shall succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
illegitimate child.”
father.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article
in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code
9
allows them legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
567 may
VOL. 207, MARCH 25, 1992 567 not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista 992 the exception.
(Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the “The rules laid down in Article 982 that ‘grandchildren and
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual. other descendants shall inherit by right of representation’ and
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. in
Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children x x x are
IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation
questions raised by the petitioner on this point. prescribed
The Court held: by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right
“Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights to
of inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their of
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these his father or mother.” (Amicus Curiae’s Opinion by former
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of Justice
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to Appellate
be Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the
legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. words and phrases of the statute are clear and
It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate unequivocal,
descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by their meaning must be
virtue 568
of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that ‘the 568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista
representation.’ Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow determined from the language employed and the statute
intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v.
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
to apart
the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]).
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
When
the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It
10
must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even grandmother, because of the barrier created by Article
if 992
the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. of the New Civil Code, between legitimate and illegitimate
FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may families. (De la Puerta vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA
be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be 861.)
strictly ——o0o——
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as 569
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be 1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
resolved People vs. Mapa
in favor of the general provisions rather than the No. L-22301. August 30, 1967.
exception. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Illegal possession of firearms; Being a secret agent of the
court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
governor is not a defense.—The fact that a person, found in
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a
Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural and provincial governor does not exempt him from criminal
spurious. liability.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.
illegitimate children are generally placed under one Courts; Statutes; Fundamental duty of courts.—The first and
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law.
whether "Construction
or not acknowledged natural children should be treated and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated
differently, in the negative. It may be said that the law that
may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX). application is impossible or inadequate without them." It is not
within the power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED
mandate of a statutory provision.
for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
respondent
Manila.
Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon,
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
JJ., concur.
General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for
Petition dismissed; decision affirmed.
plaintiff-appellee.
Note.—As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is
FERNANDO, J.:
barred from inheriting from Dominga, her paternal
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of

11
conviction by the lower court is whether or not the or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret without
agent a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal would
possession not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the
of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not. understanding being that only a question of law would be
The accused in this case was indicted for the above submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such
offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading question
as to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to
follows: "The undersigned accuses MARIO MAPA Y get a
MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection license for his firearm."
with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further examine the document so that he could pass on their
amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question:
That "Does
on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there six
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was
his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City
Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) of
1165 Manila without first having secured the necessary license
VOL. 20, AUGUST 30, 1967 1165 or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The
People vs. Mapa accused, now the appellant, answered categorically;
rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the "Yes,
necessary license or permit theref or f rom the Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, Atty.
1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to
found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused
he on
has neither a permit or license to possess the same and his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his
that we can submit the same on a question of law appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano
whether
12
Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, The only question being one of law, the appeal was
1962;1 taken to' this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also The law is explicit that' except as thereafter specifically
addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to * * *
Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 possess
the oath of any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
________________ therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
1 Exhibit 1.
intended
2 Exhibit 2.
1166 to be used in the"manufacture of firearms, parts of
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that
People vs, Mapa "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate to
dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
a Forces
secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
then the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he police,
was "willing to submit the case on the question of provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
whether treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered
of the provincial governor is exempt from the "when such firearms are in possession of such officials
requirement and
of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were public servants for use in the performance of their official
admitted duties."6
________________
and the parties were given time to file their respective
3 Exhibit 3.
memoranda. 4 Exhibit 4.
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court 5 Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative

rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime Code.

6 See. 879, Revised Administrative Code.
of
1167
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an VOL. 20, AUGUST 30, 1967 1167
indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to Manila Club Employees Union vs. Manila Club, Inc.
two The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition a
confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the
Government."
13
secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
equally PATRICIO AMIGO alias “BEBOT,” accused-appellant.
clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Penalty; Murder; The
the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal
it in
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.—In People vs.
Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that “in
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused
view
must stand. It cannot be set aside.
of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 III
where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and reclusion
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put perpetua,” thereby eliminating death as the original maximum
him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court,
even through
to a member of the municipal police expressly covered Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs.
by Masangkay
and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio,
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within
divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits
the
of
power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs.
mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal
that this decision conf licts with what was held in People maximum
v. as the
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority. ______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. 44
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, People vs. Amigo
JJ., minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as
concur. the
Judgment affirmed. medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
___________ Same; Statutory Construction; It is a settled rule of legal
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain,
VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 43 it
is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids,
People vs. Amigo
like
G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996.*
14
the records of the constitutional convention, for its at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution
interpretation. or
—A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable
there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the implication.
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state
the it
death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.
reasons One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal
it observation that this might be still another instance where the
and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion framers meant one thing and said another or—strangely,
perpetua. considering their loquacity elsewhere—did not say enough.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And Same; Same; Same; A person originally subject to the death
it penalty and another who committed the murder without the
is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both
under punishable with the same medium period although the former
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible is
to concededly more guilty than the latter.—Accordingly, with the
resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional hope that “as judges,
convention, for its interpretation. 45
Same; Criminal Law; Penalty; Whatever the intention was, VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 45
what we should determine is whether or not they also meant People vs. Amigo
to (we) will be equal to (our) tasks,” whatever that means, we
require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a hereby
result of the prohibition against the death penalty.—The reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods
question for
as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution.
death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever Instead,
the we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article
intention was, what we should determine is whether or not III,
they Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
also meant to require a corresponding modification in the prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except
other only
periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
It reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is minimum penalties remains unchanged. The Court realizes
not that

15
this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would —Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of
not reclusion
have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for
its sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy.
modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death The
penalty and another who committed the murder without the duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The
punishable with the same medium period although the former remedy is elsewhere—clemency from the executive or an
is amendment of the law by the
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that 46
is 46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a People vs. Amigo
question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court cannot but
perhaps apply
is the parable in the Bible of the workman who was paid the the law.
stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
longer Davao City, Br. 16.
than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
householder, the latter replied: “Friend, I do you no wrong. Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
Did MELO, J.:
you not agree with me for a penny?” Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated
Same; Same; Same; Penalties are prescribed by statute and murder in an Information reading as follows:
are essentially and exclusively legislative.—The problem in The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the
any crime of
event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress.
FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of
Penalties the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao,
legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
and the abovementioned accused, armed with a knife, with
have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
treachery
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not and evident premeditation and with intent to kill willfully,
encroach
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with
on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. said
Same; Same; Same; Courts; The duty of courts is to apply the weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the
law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an latter, the following injuries, to wit:
accused. “MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS—LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN
AND LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL
16
CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under
MIDTRANVERSE COLON.” Art.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
produced the crime of murder as a consequence but circumstance
nevertheless, present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty
that of
is, because of the timely and able medical assistance reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the
immediately cost;
rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy. to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as
(p. 1, Rollo.) actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
to which he pleaded not guilty. and
47 P50,000.00 as moral damages.
VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 47 (p. 32, Rollo.)
People vs. Amigo Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an arguing that error was committed by the trial court in
amended imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua
Information was filed charging now the crime of murder, against him despite the fact that Sec. 19(1), Article III of
to the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the
wit: offense was committed.
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as
the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with
borne out by the evidence, are as follows:
treachery
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having
and evident premeditation and with intent to kill willfully,
spent
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed
half-day at their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Mag-
with 48
said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
latter People vs. Amigo
multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent saysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their
loss gray
and damage to the heirs of the victim. Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada,
(p. 3, Rollo.) Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters,
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year
decision, disposing: old
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while a
five

17
year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)
(TSN, A bit irritated with the actuation exhibited by Patricio, Benito
April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992) rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway nothing to do with the accident. (Ibid. p. 7)
of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically
one asked; “You are Chinese, is it you?” With a ready answer
Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Benito
Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the said; “Yes, I am a Chinese and why?” Patricio in turn replied;
Ford “So
Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was you are a Chinese, wait for a while,” then left. (Ibid. pp. 7 and
heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the 19)
corner 49
of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 49
31, People vs. Amigo
1992, pp. 3 and 13) Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at policeman, but after a lapse of about one minute, Patricio
Lingling’s vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter
Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside once again, “You are a Chinese, is it not?” To this Benito calmly
Virgilio. Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an responded in the affirmative. (Ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)
accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled “Ah, so you are
the a
Tamaraw, causing a slight damage to the right bumper of the Chinese,” and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist
latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4) and
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest.
driver’s seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went (Ibid. p. 20)
down After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was
from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5) Benito, who was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away
a big and
man with a loud voice told Virgilio, “You were not looking,” to run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife
which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you.” (TSN, April 29, and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still
1991, p. chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him
16) and
While the two drivers were having this verbal confrontation, thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which
Patricio who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted hit Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)
from It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the
the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get
Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a out
small
18
of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly
open confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3)
its door. (Ibid. p. 10) weeks of
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH—SEPSIS (an
by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has
there were already several people around witnessing that fatal already circulated in the blood all over the body. (Ibid. pp. 6-
incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger 7)
to (pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
help them. (Ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987
lay Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act
seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and
left hence,
side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said
the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime
vehicle. (Ibid. p. 12)
of
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing
their father bathing with his own blood, embraced him, murder committed by accused-appellant without the
causing attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be
Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22) months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the Reasons out accused-appellant:
assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to overtake . . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not
him, imposable when the stabbing and killing happened, the
thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion
and perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the
carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down
consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was to
attended to at the Emergency Room. (Ibid. p. 13) reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very no
critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the
operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was correct
subsequently brought penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1,
50 Revised
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years
People vs. Amigo of
to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, reclusion temporal.
1991, (p. 10, Appellant’s Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
pp. 3 and 4) The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989])
19
thusly: those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court,
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should
Court be
that “in view of the abolition of the death penalty under restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional
Section provision in question.
19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the
be Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited
imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum the
period penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
to reclusion perpetua,” thereby eliminating death as the minimum
original and the medium. These should now be divided into three new
51 periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 51 the
People vs. Amigo legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section
maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the 19(1)
Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has
People not,
vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly
People reduced
vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
periods, A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that
the limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
in abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion the
temporal death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion reasons
temporal involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for
maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the it
maximum. and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after perpetua.
extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And
announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers it
as is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This under
conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible
to to
be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
of convention, for its interpretation.
20
xxx virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after
xxx reflecting
xxx on the question against in the light of new perspectives. And
52 well
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not
People vs. Amigo immutable.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules grown rigid
to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its once
imposition. pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all
Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is life
whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should
modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition not
against the death penalty. prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, side
is or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Accordingly, with the hope that “as judges, (we) will be equal
Constitution to
or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable (our) tasks,” whatever that means, we hereby reverse the
implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such current
intention, doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for
to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to
meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express our
or original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1)
even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
observation that this might be still another instance where the Article
framers meant one thing and said another or—strangely, 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it
considering their loquacity elsewhere—did not say enough. prohibits
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties
of remains unchanged.
the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain
that inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the
time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a 53
second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed VOL. 252, JANUARY 18, 1996 53
before, it People vs. Amigo
is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person
is originally subject to the death penalty and another who

21
committed the murder without the attendance of any affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby increased to
modifying P30,000.00
circumstance will now be both punishable with the same in line with the present policy.
medium (at pp. 120-125.)
period although the former is concededly more guilty than the The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog
latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216
the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not SCRA 476 [1992]).
construction. Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of
Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the Bible of the
reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and
workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny
pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead
although he had worked longer than others hired later in the
day for
also paid the same amount. When he complained because he sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
felt disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an
unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: Friend, accused. DURA LEX SED
I 54
do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?” 54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to People vs. Abrenica
the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are LEX. The remedy is elsewhere—clemency from the
essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative,
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify but surely, at this point, this Court cannot but apply the
them or law.
revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking
AFFIRMED.
body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no
SO ORDERED.
generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco
commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
medium Judgment affirmed.
period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Notes.—Republic Act No. 7659, reimposing the death
Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here penalty, could not be applied retroactively to a crime
adopted committed prior to its effectivity. (People vs. Timple, 237
and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty SCRA 52 [1994])
we While death can now be imposed as a penalty with the
imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three passage of Republic Act No. 7659 in 1993, it cannot be
murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others.
imposed in regard to a crime that was committed in
The
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is
1985.

22
(People vs. Pandiano, 232 SCRA 619 [1994]) the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent
——o0o—— Court
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED another
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator”
G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.* under this provision of R.A. 4200.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE Same; Same; Where the law makes no distinctions, one does
not distinguish.—The unambiguity of the express words of the
COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA,
provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations
respondents.
from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); Statutory Construction;
view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language
penalize even those privy to the private communications.
of a
Where
statute.—First, legislative intent is determined principally from
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
Same; Criminal Procedure; The mere allegation that an
clear
individual made a secret reco rding of a private communication
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
by
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or
under Section 1 of
would lead to an injustice. _______________
Same; Same; Even a person privy to a communication who * FIRST DIVISION.

records his private conversation with another without the 591

knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 591
1 of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
R.A. 4200.—Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally R.A. 4200.—Second, the nature of the conversation is
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties immaterial
to to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
any private communication to secretly record such not
communication be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
to recording private communications by means of the devices
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
to made
be a party other than or different from those involved in the a secret recording of a private communication by means of a
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all tape
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
by 1 of

23
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
COMMENT “conversation”
before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.
nature Same; Instant case and Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third Court, 235 SCRA 111 [1994], Distinguished.—In Gaanan vs.
person Intermediate Appellate Court , a case which dealt with the
should be professed.” issue of
Same; Words and Phrases; The contention that the phrase telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
“private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
include conversation
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
word telephone extension devise was neither among those devises
“communication” to a point of absurdity.—Finally, petitioner’s enumerated in Section 1 of the law nor was it similar to those
contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section “device(s) or arrangement(s)” enumerated therein, following
1 the
of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows principle that “penal statutes must be construed strictly in
the favor
ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of of the accused.” The instant case turns on a different note,
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word because the
communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary 592
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or 592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
which applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through R.A.
a 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)” mentions the unauthorized “recording” of private
These communications
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
written or expressive communications of “meanings or PETITION to review a decision of the Court of Appeals.
thoughts” The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
which are likely to include the emotionally—charged Voltaire Garcia for petitioner.
exchange, on Cesar V. Chavez for private respondent.
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private KAPUNAN, J.:
respondent, in A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the D.
legislative Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are,
24
alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in ESG—Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic)
a mag
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
insulted hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo,
and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in nag-aapply ka sa States, nag-aapply ka sa review mo,
a kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”1 CHUCHI—Hindi M’am, kasi ang ano ko talaga noon
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim icocontinue
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, ko up to 10:00 p.m.
attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the ESG—Bastos ka , nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
and gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The nakapasok dito “Do you think that on your own
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbvoyan na
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows: CHUCHI—Itutuloy ko na M’am sana ang duty ko.
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)—Good afternoon ESG—Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng
M’am. mga
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)—Ano ba ang nangyari no (sic) ko.
sa ESG—Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa
'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin gaano ka “ka bobo” mo. Marami ang nag-aapply alam
ko sa 'yo. kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI—Kasi, naka duty ako noon. CHUCHI—Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG—Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) ESG—Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI—Hindi m’am, pero ilan beses na nila akong CHUCHI—Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
binalikan, ESG—Kukunin ka kasi ako.
_______________ CHUCHI—Eh, di sana—
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati,
ESG—Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala
Branch 64.
2 Rollo, p. 48. kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi
593 ako.
VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 593 CHUCHI—Mag-eexplain ako.
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals ESG—Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
sabing ganoon— makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. “Putang ina ”
25
sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo Ester S. Garcia to record the latter’s conversation with said accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
ang mga magulang ko. recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
ESG—Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan person.
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
CHUCHI—Kasi M’am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. MARIANO M. CUNETA
ESG—Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan Asst. City Fiscal
na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a
mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na. Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
CHUCHI—Ina-ano ko m’am na utang na loob. facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
ESG—Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung violation of R.A. 4200. In an order dated May 3, 1989,
baga sa no, nilapastanganan mo ako. the
CHUCHI—Paano kita nilapastanganan? trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
594 petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals punished
ESG—Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong _______________
ka.3 3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and 595

alleging that the said act of secretly taping the VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 595
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City a person other than a participant to the communication.4
for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
violations of private communication, and other which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals
purposes.” in
An information charging petitioner of violation of the said a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith: On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals
INFORMATION promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accuses Socorro D. court’s
Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
follows: “[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by an
26
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of 596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
discretion Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
correctible by certiorari.”5 First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. its
Hence, the instant petition. express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her “main and principal only
issue”7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 where a literal interpretation would be either impossible11
does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by or absurd or would lead to an injustice.12
one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, “An Act to Prohibit and
the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
a Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
private conversation by a party other than those involved Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
that the substance or content of the conversation must spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
be device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged record
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, such communication or spoken word by using a device
petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
a
walkietalkie
“private communication,” not a “private conversation”
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
and
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
makes
conversation with private respondent was not illegal
it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties
under
to
the said act.10
any private communication to secretly record such
We disagree.
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 9. makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to
5 Rollo, p. 37. be
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex “H.” penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
or
9 Rollo, p. 14. different from those involved in the private
10 Rollo, pp. 14-15. communication.
596
27
The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized show the intent of the parties because the actuation of
to the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the
make such recording is underscored by the use of the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.
qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the
communication who records his private conversation with purview of this bill or outside?
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify Senator Tanada : That is covered by the purview of this
as a violator”13 under this provision of R.A. 4200. bill, Your Honor.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, Senator Padilla : Even if the record should be used not in
moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in
that Civil Cases or special proceedings?
in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed Senator Tanada : That is right. This is a complete ban on
contemplated tape recorded conversations taken without the
to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private authorization of all the parties .
conversations or communica- Senator Padilla : Now, would that be reasonable, Your
_______________ Honor?
11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685
Senator Tanada : I believe it is reasonable because it is
(1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970). not
13 Rollo, p. 33. sporting to record the observation of one without his
597 knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 597 is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals record the intention of the parties, I believe that all the
tions taken either by the parties themselves or by third parties should know that the observations are being
persons. Thus: recorded.
xxx Senator Padilla : This might reduce the utility of
Senator Tanada : That qualified only ‘overhear.’ recorders.
Senator Padilla : So that when it is intercepted or Senator Tanada : Well no. For example, I was to say that
recorded, in
the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. meetings of the board of directors where a tape
Now, suppose. Your Honor, the recording is not made by recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
all the parties but by some parties and involved not parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 remarks and observations are being made should know
but would cover, for example civil cases or special that these are being recorded.
proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily Senator Padilla : Now, I can understand.
by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
28
Senator Tanada : That is why when we take statements view held by the respondent court that the provision
of seeks
persons, we say: “Please be informed that whatever you to penalize even those privy to the private
say here may be used against you.” That is fairness and communications.
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
he makes distinguish.
598 Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals not
damaging statements against his own interest, well, he be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
a intercepting
recording of the observations and remarks of a person or recording private communications by means of the
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be individual made a secret recording of a private
used against him, I think it is unfair . communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice
xxx to
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As
1964) the
Senator Diokno : Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it
secretly records a public speech , he would be penalized required
under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
recording is done secretly. of
Senator TANADA : Well, that particular aspect is not the conversation, as well as its communication to a third
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication person should be professed.”14
between one person and another person—not between a _______________
speaker and a public. 14 Rollo, p. 67.

xxx 599
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995 599
1964) Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
xxx Finally, petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from include
the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of

29
the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The among others, has expressly been assured by our
word Constitution.
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing
and
or
the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and
imparting, as in a conversation,15 or signifies the “process of his
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
individuals through a common system of symbols (as satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
language signs or gestures)”16 These definitions are broad exchange of communication between individuals—free from
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or every
expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.”17
which are likely to include the emotionally—charged _______________
15 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and (1976).
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. 16 Id.
Any 17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10,

doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the 1964).

600
phrase
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
the fact that the terms “conversation” and
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,18 a case
“communication”
which
were interchangeably used by Senator Tanada in his
dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
Explanatory Note to the bill, quoted below:
that
“It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear
from
the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
their conversations being overheard. But this statement overhearing a private conversation without authorization
ignores did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension
the usual nature of conversations as well as the undeniable devise was neither among those devises enumerated in
fact Section 1 of the law nor was it similar to those “device(s)
that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their or
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often arrangement(s)” enumerated therein,19 following the
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, aggreable principle that “penal statutes must be construed strictly
falsehoods, in
and the expression of antisocial desires of views not intended favor of the accused.”20 The instant case turns on a
to
different
be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of com munication,
30
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances Labor Laws; Preventive suspension.—On the matter of
pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR. The
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin
unauthorized “recording” of private communications with Saldivar’s acts in conflict with his position as technical
operations
the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case
employee closely associated with Saldivar. The suspension of
at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no Salazar was further impelled by the discovery of the missing
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
petitioner. preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
SO ORDERED. available
Padilla (Chairman), Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ. , to the company pending Salazar’s investigation. By itself,
concur. preventive suspension does not signify that the company has
Hermosisima, Jr., J., On leave. adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed. answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to
for
Note.—Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the protection of the company’s property pending
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
investigation of
same, any alleged
the inadmissibility of the tape recordings is mandatory _______________
under Rep. Act No. 4200. (Salcedo-Ortañez vs. Court of * EN BANC.
702
Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 [1994]) 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
——o0o—— Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
_______________ malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortañez v. CA 235 SCRA
111
Same; Dismissals; Employees illegally dismissed entitled to
(1994). reinstatement and full backwages.—To go back to the instant
19 Id., at 120. case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much
20 Id., at 121. less a
601 legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. every
VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 701 right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC full
G.R. No. 82511. March 3, 1992.* backwages. The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS the
COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents. former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before
she
31
lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word “reinstate” above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception,
is such as
“to restore to a state, condition, position, etc. from which one when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
had strained relations between the employer and the employee. In
been removed” and in the latter, to give her back the income such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned
lost occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence
during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to of his
the employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere
past, would perforce make her “whole.” of
Same; Same; Statutory construction; “Plain-meaning” rule.— antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee
In concerned.
the first place, the wording of the Labor Code is clear and 703
unambiguous: “An employee who is unjustly dismissed from VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 703
work Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages Same; Same; Principle of “strained relations”.—Obviously, the
.. principle of “strained relations” cannot be applied
.” Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal possible
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim between
index the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature legal
in a act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an employee who shall
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
court merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his
from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to relationship with his employer had already become strained.
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, Here, it has not been proved that the position of private
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
are characterized
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it
the may well lead to strained relations between employer and
words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the
the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the has
Court, been unlawfully dismissed.
there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the PETITION for review from the resolution of the National
32
Labor Relations Commission. only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. against Saldivar.1
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara’s
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent. investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
ROMERO, J.: regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem with the company’s interests. Evidence showed that she
that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between
mean Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders
employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
(GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984,
petitioner as manager for technical operations’ support petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar
was under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective
Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within
allegedly very close. which to explain her side. But instead of submitting an
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by explanation, three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984,
reports that company equipment and spare parts worth private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to
missing, caused the investigation of the latter’s activities. include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits,
The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified
company’s internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, her
indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with considered dismissed “in view of (her) inability to refute
Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon and disprove these findings.”2
Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated
704 July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED private respondent to her former or equivalent position
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC and
often recommended by Saldivar. The report also to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would
disclosed have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
that Saldivar had taken petitioner’s missing Fedders Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without moral damages of P50,000.00.3
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations
petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was Commission in the questioned resolution dated
recovered December
33
29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to was the proper remedial recourse available to the
the company
reinstate- pending Salazar’s investigation. By itself, preventive
_______________ suspension does not signify that the company has
1 Records, pp. 34-43.
adjudged
2 Records, p. 22.
3 Ibid, p. 121. the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to
705 answer
VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 705 and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC the protection of the company’s property pending
ment of private respondent but limited the backwages to investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
a committed by the employee.5
period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR
4
had violated Salazar’s right to due process when she was
damages.4
promptly suspended. If at all, the fault lay with private
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for
respondent when she ignored petitioner’s memorandum
having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
of
that
October 8, 1984 “giving her ample opportunity to present
the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
(her) side to the Management.” Instead, she went
respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement
directly
with two (2) years’ backwages.
to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for
illegal
petitioner GMCR.
suspension without giving her employer a chance to
The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which
evaluate her side of the controversy.
pointed to Delfin Saldivar’s acts in conflict with his
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar’s
position
preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
as technical operations manager, necessitated
separation from employ-
immediate _______________
and decisive action on any employee closely associated 4 Rollo, p. 149.
with 5 Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.

Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled 706

by the discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning 706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive ment was not for cause.
suspension What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful
dismissal so as to “make whole” the victim who has not

34
merely lost her job which, under settled jurisprudence, is Before proceeding any further, it needs must be recalled
a that the present Constitution has gone further than the
property right of which a person is not to be deprived 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic
without due process, but also the compensation that rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
should Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate
have accrued to her during the period when she was Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of
unemployed? 1986,
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged
“Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the on
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee Social Justice and Human Rights
except _______________
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee 6 Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715.

who 7 LABOR CODE (1991), Book VI, Rule 1, Secs. 2 and 3.

is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to 707

reinstatement VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 707
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
full designed, among other things, to “protect and enhance
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits the
or right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
actual power
reinstatement.”6 (Italics supplied)
for the common good.”8
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the
Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice,
“Sec. 2. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment,
viz.,
the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee Labor ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural
except Resources Reform, Urban Land Reform and Housing,
for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when Health, Women, Role and Rights of People’s
authorized Organizations
by existing laws. and Human Rights.9
Sec. 3. Reinstatement.—An employee who is unjustly The opening paragraphs on Labor state:
dismissed “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of overseas,
seniority rights and to backwages.” organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
7 (Italics supplied) equality of employment opportunities for all.
35
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, protection,” at least greater protection than heretofore
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. the workers and whether they are organized or not.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice
of
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
the
and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits present formulation of the protection to labor provision
as and
may be provided by law.”10 (Italics mine) proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on
Compare this with the sole provision on Labor in the 1973 Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of
Constitution under the Article on Declaration of Principles Principles and State Policies “in the light of the special
and State Policies that provides: importance that we are giving now to social justice and
“Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full the
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate justice
the in national development.”12
relations between workers and employers. The State shall If we have taken pains to delve into the background of
ensure the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not
bargaining,
to
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
The be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.”11 cause provided by law has assumed greater importance
To be sure, both Charters recognize “security of tenure” under the 1987 Constitution with the singular
as prominence
_______________ labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this
8 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. (1). transcendent policy has been translated into law in the
9 CONST., Art. XIII.
Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or
10 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, pars. (1) and (2).
11 CONST. (1973), Art. II, Sec. 9.
unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved
708 employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED duty it
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated to dismissal
protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article
of the framers of the present Constitution was to give 279 should find application. Consonant with this
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector “full
36
liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
went would
further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took perforce make her “whole.”
effect Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been
on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming
any and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have outside looking in.
generated Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by
which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of
labor “full protection.”13 the
_______________ case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement
12 CONCOM Record, Vol. 2, p. 681.
can
13 The following provision on security of tenure is embodied in Article
279, Labor Code, reproduced herein but with the amendments inserted no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time
by (22
Republic Act No. 6715 approved on March 2, 1989 in bold type: years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
709
situation;16 or that it would be “inimical to the employer’s
VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 709
interest;”17 or that rein-
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC _______________
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence “In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
to of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the employee
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights AND OTHER PRIVILEGES and to his FULL backwages,
only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
backwages.14 computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin his ACTUAL reinstatement.”
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, 14 The application of Article 279 is illustrated in the following cases:
in Santos Salao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90786, September 21, 1991; Morales
the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her v.
NLRC, G.R. 91501, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 295; Carandang v. Dulay,
status G.R. 90492, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 792; and Santos v. NLRC, No.
before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166.
word “reinstate” is “to restore to a state, condition, 15 Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary.
16 Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora, Nos. L-46766-7, April 1, 1980, 97
position,
SCRA 5.
etc. from which one had been removed”15 and in the 17 San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and
latter, Employment, No. 58927, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 204.
to give her back the income lost during the period of 710

37
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED SCRA 665; Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No. 75740, January 15,
1988, 157 SCRA 87; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No.
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC 56398,
statement may no longer be feasible;18 or, that it will not July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219; and Divine Word High School v. NLRC,
serve the best interests of the parties involved;19 or that No.
the 72207, August 6, 1986, 143 SCRA 346.
23 Chua Qua v. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 117;
company would be prejudiced by the workers’ continued Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86000,
employment;20 or that it will not serve any prudent September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 811; ALU v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 83886-
purpose 87,
as when supervening facts have transpired which make September 20, 1990, 189 SCRA 743; and Pizza Inn v. NLRC, No. 74531,
June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773.
execution on that score unjust or inequitable21 or, to an 24 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189
increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of 711
“antipathy and antagonism” or “strained relations” or VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 711
“irretrievable estrangement” between the employer and Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
the In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private
employee.22 respondent. In the first place, the wording of the Labor
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered Code is clear and unambiguous: “An employee who is
the payment of backwages and separation pay23 or solely unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
separation pay.24 reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . .”25 Under
_______________ the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
18 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation v. Pagalibuan, G.R. 62909,
April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 404.
clear,
19 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
SCRA 528. meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
20 Gubac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81946, July 13, 1990, 187 SCRA 412.
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
21 Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, 1990, 190
SCRA 347. maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
22 Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191; De Vera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express
November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Orcino v. Civil Service Commission,
its intent or will and preclude the court from construing
G.R. No. 92869, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 815; Maglutac v.
NLRC/Conmart v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78637, September 21, 1990, 189 it
SCRA differently.26 The legislature is presumed to know the
767; Carandang v. Dulay, G.R. No. 90942, August 20, 1990, 188 SCRA meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and
792; Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA
to
537; Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84302, August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA
269; Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 79718-22, April have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
12, found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum,
1989, 172 SCRA 88; Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, or
158
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
38
Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If Charge of the extension office of the bank where he
in works;29
the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to
grounds sabotage the union’s efforts to organize the workers in
for non-application of the above-cited provision, this commercial and industrial establishments;30 or is a
should warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement primary
may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts by
between the employer and the employee. foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines;31
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales.32
concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust Obviously, the principle of “strained relations” cannot be
and applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if never be possible simply because some hostility is
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency litigation. That is human nature.33
and Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
productivity of the employee concerned. and legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the Court’s employee who shall assert his right could be easily
applica- separated from the service, by merely paying his
SCRA 767; Conmart v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78637, 189 SCRA 767; De Vera separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632;
his
Commercial
Motors Corp. v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, employer had already become strained.34
192 Here, it has not been proved that the position of private
SCRA 191; Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
1990, 190 SCRA 347.
25 LABOR CODE, Art. 279.
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such
26 R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 94 (1990). that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
27 Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984, 231 between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
SCRA 241. constitute an exception to the
712 _______________
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 28 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. 56393, July 23, 1987,
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC 152 SCRA 219.
29 Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No. 75740, January 15, 1988, 157
tion of the above principle: where the employee is a Vice-
SCRA 87.
President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust 30 Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665.
and confidence of top management;28 or is the Officer-In- 31 Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA
537.
32 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA

39
767. supplies and company assets.
33 Anscor Transport and Terminals v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85894,
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its
September 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 147.
34 Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, G.R. No. 75093, February 23, dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have
1990, 182 SCRA 538. held
713 countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of
VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 713 trust
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some
general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee basis which must be convincingly established.35 An
who employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions
has been unlawfully dismissed. and
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence suppositions. Petitioner’s allegation that since Salazar
reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may have and
created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits “presumed reasonably that complainant’s sympathy
its employees from involving themselves with any would
company be with Saldivar” and its averment that Saldivar’s
that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, investigation although unverified, was probably true, do
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to not pass this Court’s test.36 While we should not condone
the the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from
in speculative inferences.
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar’s
placed herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner dismissal would be most inequitous because the bulk of
was concerned. the
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public find-
respondent that such a circumstance did not create a _______________
conflict of interests situation. As a system analyst, 35 Reyes v. Zamora, No. L-46732, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 92; De Vera
v.
Salazar
NLRC and BPI, G.R. No. 93070, August 9, 1991.
was very far removed from operations involving the 36 Rollo, pp. 29 and 35.
procurement of supplies. Salazar’s duties revolved 714
around 714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the development of systems and analysis of designs on a Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC
continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy ings centered principally on her friend’s alleged thievery
a and anomalous transactions as technical operations’
position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in
40
view of Salazar’s special relationship with Saldivar, Gutierrez, Jr., J., No part as son handled case while
Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s still with counsel’s law firm.
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating Cruz, J., In the result.
private Feliciano, J., No part, in view of stock interest in
respondent is wanting from the records. petitioner.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report Padilla, J., No part, in view of equity interest in
came out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR petitioner
on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the 715
opportunity to refute management’s findings, the report VOL. 206, MARCH 3, 1992 715
remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence Español vs. Civil Service Commission
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged corporation.
culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance Resolution affirmed.
to Note.—An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
examination should have been carried out to ascertain seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
to reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295.)
hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her ——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to
have been unlawfully dismissed. VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 7, 1994 5
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated G.R. No. 109445. November 7, 1994.*
December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
her respondent.
Statutory Construction; When the language of the statute is
salary for a period of two (2) years only.
clear it should be given its natural meaning.—Petitioner’s
This decision is immediately executory. contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
SO ORDERED. accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, on
Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur. the theory that he was “unjustly convicted” by the trial court.
Narvasa (C.J.), I agree with Justice Herrera that Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner’s professed
there is just cause for dismissal. canon of construction that when the language of the statute is
Herrera, J., I believe there is just cause for clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of
dismissal per investigative findings (See Dec., p. 2). the
41
provision in question the qualifying word “unjustly” so that the 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
provision would simply read: “The following may file claims for Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Innocence; The
accused, presumption of innocence has never been intended as
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of evidence of
a innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof
judgment of acquittal.” that
Statutes; Republic Act No. 7309; Department of Justice; he is guilty to the prosecution.—The truth is that the
Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be űunjustly accused, presumption
convicted and imprisoned.”—But sec. 3(a) requires that the of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
claimant be “unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned.” innocence of
The the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is guilty
acquitted is to the prosecution. If “accusation is not synonymous with
not itself proof that the previous conviction was “unjust.” An guilt,”
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be one
set thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in
aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is order
innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
doubt, in reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another
which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he
because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the has
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless been “unjustly convicted.” As this Court held in a case: Though
be we
sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. In one case the are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide,
homicide we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or
because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of
consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was innocence
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
deported. In such a case to pay the accused compensation for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
having been “unjustly convicted” by the trial court would be conduct
utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to do not exist.
follow petitioner’s theory such an accused would be entitled to Same; Same; Same; To say that an accused has been
compensation under sec. 3(a). űunjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his
_______________ conviction
* EN BANC.
6
42
rather than with his innocence.—To say then that an accused solely to an unjust conviction
has 7
been “unjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 7, 1994 7
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in
that addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation “unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly
for convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this
having been the victim of an “unjust conviction.” If his because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused
conviction has
was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability,
conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious
on any
the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under conviction even though based on less than the required
the quantum
law liability for compensation depends entirely on the of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not
innocence necessarily
of the accused. unjust.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Article 204; Revised Penal Same; Same; Same; Appeal; An accusation which is based on
Code; The phrase űunjustly convicted” has the same meaning "probable guilt” is not an unjust accusation and a conviction
as based
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment” in Art. 204 of the on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment
Revised Penal Code.—The phrase “unjustly convicted” has the but
same meaning as “knowingly rendering an unjust judgment” only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.—
in The
Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the
re prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused
Rafael C. Climaco applies: In order that a judge may be held is
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether “there is
shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
contrary and
to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was the accused is probably guilty thereof.” Hence, an accusation
made which is based on “probable guilt” is not an unjust accusation
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . . and
Same; Same; Same; Same; The accused must have been a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily
űunjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly an
convicted and then imprisoned.—Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for
refer such

43
error is appeal. prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. his
Certiorari. son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner. the
MENDOZA, J.: latter barged into their hut and without warning started
a)
b)
shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because
This case presents for determination the scope of the petitioner did nothing more, petitioner’s presence at the
State’s liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
other things provides compensation for persons who are Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the
appeal payment of compensation to “any person who was
are acquitted and ordered released. unjustly
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of released
two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”1 The claim was filed
Boyon and the wounding of the latter’s wife Florida and with the Board of Claims of the
_______________
his 1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the SEC. 3. Who may File Claims.—The following may file claims for compensation
night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was before the Board:
any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;
c)
to d)
imprisonment and ordered immediately any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in
8 the Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; and
any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act,
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to offenses
Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical and/or
detained after their bonds had been cancelled. psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity,
abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or barbarity.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner’s SEC. 4. Award Ceiling.—For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the
appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal compensation shall be based on the number of months of imprisonment or
detention and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month: Provided,
of however, That in no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos
the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his 9
brief. VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 7, 1994 9
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the
44
ground that while petitioner’s presence at the scene of claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the
the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond Through counsel he contends that the language of sec.
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad 3(a)
blood is clear and does not call for interpretation. The “mere
between him and the deceased as a result of a land fact
dispute that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime
and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in- _______________
(P1,000.00) per month.
law, In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a
there was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty.” claim shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount
necessary
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the to reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical
Board’s ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the
resolution dated March 11, 1993: injury, whichever is lower. This is without prejudice to the right of the claimant
to
It is believed therefore that the phrase “any person . . . seek other remedies under existing laws.
unjustly 10
accused, convicted and imprisoned” in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust
“a
in
victim of unjust imprisonment.” In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a
itself,” he contends. To deny his claim because he was
reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his not
exculpation declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment
is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of for two years while his appeal was pending was justified.
reasonable doubt. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such
provides proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent
for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary stands
of and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he
Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the be
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the declared innocent of the crime before he can recover
petition compensation for his imprisonment.
as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner’s contention has no merit. It would require
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent’s ruling that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he
that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the must
45
be given compensation on the theory that he was civil action for damages.2 In one case the accused, an
“unjustly alien,
convicted” by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) was
is _______________
2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: “When the accused in a criminal
contrary to petitioner’s professed canon of construction
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
that beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
when the language of the statute is clear it should be omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
given of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in 11
question the qualifying word “unjustly” so that the VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 7, 1994 11
provision would simply read: “The following may file Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
claims acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of
for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who doubt
was as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently have
released sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to
by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.” pay
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be űunjustly moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In
accused, convicted [and] imprisoned.” The fact that his such a case to pay the accused compensation for having
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not been “unjustly convicted” by the trial court would be
itself proof that the previous conviction was “unjust.” An utterly
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to
his follow petitioner’s theory such an accused would be
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these entitled
reasons, to compensation under sec. 3(a).
be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not The truth is that the presumption of innocence has
because never been intended as evidence of innocence of the
he is innocent of the crime charged but because of accused
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to
liable to the complainant, because while the evidence the
against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof prosecution. If “accusation is not synonymous with
required guilt,”4
for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof.
a It is

46
one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden “unjust conviction.” If his conviction was due to an error
of in
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
guilty. erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other
It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the
he law
is convicted that he has been “unjustly convicted.” As this liability for compensation depends entirely on the
Court held in a case: innocence of the accused.
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape The phrase “unjustly convicted” has the same meaning
with as “knowingly rendering an unjust judgment” in Art. 204
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is of
innocent the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re
or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of
Rafael C. Climaco6 applies:
innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
rendering
unlawful
an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the
conduct do not exist.5
judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported
To say then that an accused has been “unjustly by
convicted” the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than deliberate intent to do an injustice ....
with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust
acquitted judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it
because he did not commit the crime, but that does not must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has
necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for acted
having been the victim of an without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his
_______________ duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case entitled
the complaint should be found to be malicious. to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
which
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.”
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation.
3 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991). Inexcusable
4 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971). mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
5 Supra, note 3 at 722. manifest
12 injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED explained
47
by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is
contrary appeal.
it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal
show that petitioner’s conviction by the trial court was
precept.
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust
ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court
conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The
were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of
accused must have been “unjustly accused, in
Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
consequence
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that.
of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It
Petitioner and his co-accused arrived together in the hut
is
of
important to note this because if from its inception the
the victims and forced their way into it.
prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only
conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
because there was no proof that he did or say anything
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any
on
conviction even though based on less than the required
the occasion. Said the appellate court.
quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito
not necessarily unjust. Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to show
_______________
6 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974).
Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to
13 show
VOL. 238, NOVEMBER 7, 1994 13 Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance
Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice of
a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question
defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to
for conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo
the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be
whether asked: where was the coming together of the two defendants
“there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has to an
been committed and the accused is probably guilty agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated
thereof.” murder
Hence, an accusation which is based on “probable guilt” on two counts? Where was Basbacio’s contribution to the
is commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was-as the record
not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such showsnothing

48
but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . . ——o0o——
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other VOL. 228, NOVEMBER 22, 1993 129
circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC
Why did they apparently flee together? And what about G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993.*
the JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondents.
be Labor Law; Appeal Bond; POEA; Appeal bond is required to
passed upon in view of perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA.—The POEA
14 Rules
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to
Tramat Mercantile, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals the
the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond
in
evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused,
an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to
convicted and imprisoned before he was released perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the
because of appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the
his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its Same; Same; Same; E.O. 247; Bonds are supposed to
discretion in disallowing petitioner’s claim for guarantee payments of valid and legal claims against
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309. employer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. POEA can also go against these bonds for violations by the
SO ORDERED. recruiter of the conditions of its license.—It is true that the
Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, cash
and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
supposed to
Kapunan, JJ., concur. guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
Feliciano, J., On leave. employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards
Petition dismissed. to
Note.—It is a cardinal rule in our criminal justice employees whose contracts of employment have been
system that to deprive a person of his precious life or violated.
liberty, the evidence against him must stand the crucible The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the
test of reasonable doubt to overthrow the constitutionally recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the
guaranteed presumption of innocence he has in his favor. Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing
(People vs. Lagnas, 222 SCRA 745 [1993]) the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of

49
other liabilities the recruiter may incur. this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be
Same; Same; Same; Overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with given
foreign employer. The bonds and escrow money are intended effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
to measure
insure more care on the part of local agent in its choice of and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
foreign magis
principal to whom overseas workers are to be sent.—It is true valeat quam pereat. Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the
that appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned
these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, POEA
as Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect
this nullify
distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
requirements because of the special risks to which our workers redundancy;
abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section
whom 4 and
there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign employer. The provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
bonds inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on possible as
the parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to Same; Same; In addition to monetary obligations of the
_______________ overseas recruiter appeal bond is required to perfect an appeal
* FIRST DIVISION.
130
from a decision of the POEA.—Accordingly, we hold that in
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and
whom our overseas workers are to be sent. the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; In interpreting a is
statute, necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
care should be taken that every part be given effect. Rule
Construction V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an
that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided appeal from a decision of the POEA.
and Same; Same; Every intendment of the law must be
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever interpreted
possible as in favor of the working class.—Every intendment of the law
parts of harmonious whole.—It is a principle of legal must
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to
as in the
50
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than Section 6. Bond.—In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
annulling involves
the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be
employee, perfected
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interests only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
of reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
labor. Commission or
PETITION for certiorari to set aside the order of the the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
National Labor Relations Commission. award.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner. abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent. rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is
131 not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
VOL. 228, NOVEMBER 22, 1993 131 overseas
JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC employment because they are already required under
CRUZ, J.: Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the pay a license fee of P30,000.00 but also to post a cash
order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission bond
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner’s of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P50,000.00, thus:
appeal Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a
from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment license
Administration on the ground of failure to post the fee of P30,000.00. It shall also post a cash bond of
required appeal bond.1 P100,000.00
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article and surety bond of P50,000.00 from a bonding company
acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the
223 of the Labor Code, as amended, providing that:
Insurance Commission.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal _______________
by 1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division,

the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash dated October 30, 1992.
or 132
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC
The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
from
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
the and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds
NLRC, as amended, reading as follows: shall
likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code
51
and its implementing rules and regulations relating to and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and a
and statement of the date when the appellant received the
relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which appealed
the decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party
Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the of
condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety such appeal.
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
matters falling under POEA’s jurisdiction shall be binding and requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period
conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co- for
terminus perfecting an appeal.
with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied) Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
the sum of P200,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank be
in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
same issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Rule, “to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
Commission
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis
money claims.” supplied)
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the 133
appeal bond requirement but suggests that the rules VOL. 228, NOVEMBER 22, 1993 133
cited JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC
by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor The question is, having posted the total bond of
Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of P150,000.00 and placed in escrow the amount of
the POEA, he says, are governed by the following P200,000.00 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules: petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect
Section 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall its
be appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 It was.
of
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily
this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and
as the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount
provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a equivalent
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
upon from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond
is
52
intended to further insure the payment of the monetary Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of
award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000.00,
on appeal to the NLRC. which
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of
placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment the
of recruiter.
all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed
claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees on
whose contracts of employment have been violated: The 134
POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by 134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC
recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is
the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 a
(reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. recruiters
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably are subject to more stringent requirements because of
intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be the
used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected
enforcement against it of every claim of recruited by
workers their foreign employers, against whom there is usually
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount no
may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is
if it solidarily liable with the foreign employer. The bonds and
could initially, may eventually be exhausted after the escrow money are intended to insure more care on
satisfying other subsequent claims. the
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal
a monetary award of about P170,000.00 to the dismissed to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
depleted care
if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, on
making the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure
them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
obligations the recruiter may incur. magis valeat quam pereat.2 Under the petitioner’s
53
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of Revenue
the further protection to the claimant employee, this Court
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded affirms once again its commitment to the interests of
because labor.
of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
we Bellosillo, J., On leave.
find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section Petition dismissed.
17. Note.—Purpose of an appeal bond is to insure during
The rule is that a construction that would render a the period of appeal against any occurrence that would
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled subsequently affirmed (Erectors, Incorporated vs. NLRC,
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and 202 SCRA 597).
harmonious whole. ——o0o——
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow De Guia vs. Commission on Elections
agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is G.R. No. 104712. May 6, 1992.*
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the
6, Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, petitioner, vs.
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Statutory Construction; Statute; A construction should be
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in rejected that gives to the language used in a Statute a
meaning
favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate
that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute
of
was
the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the enacted and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to
appeal bond as a be
_______________
attained by the enactment.—As it has oft been held, the key
2 “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.” Simonds v.
Walker, 100 Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass, to
373, 11 Am. Rep. 367. Charitable bequests are also governed by this open the door to what the legislature intended which is
maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A. N.C, B6 F.2d 849, 858. vaguely
135 expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the
VOL. 228, NOVEMBER 23, 1993 135 reason
San Carlos Milling Co., Inc. vs. Comm’r. of Internal which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs
54
construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars
in (Annex “A”, Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving
that process is the purpose of the act. Statutes should be the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex “B”, Petition), and
or
RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
(c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A.
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief,
and 7166,
secure the benefits intended. A construction should be apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex “C”, Petition).
rejected Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
does Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the
not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly,
and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it
attained affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other
by the enactment. municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which
resolution of the Commission on Elections. requires the apportionment into district of said
___________
* EN BANC.
municipalities does not specify when the members of
421 their
VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 421 Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would
De Guia vs. Commission on Elections consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. immediately
BELLOSILLO, J.: succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c)
the should continue to be elected at large in the May 11,
validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission 1992
on elections.
Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, Paragraph (d) states that “[F]or purposes of the regular
adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of However,
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall
preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by be
the elected by district.” Petitioner therefore insists that the
55
elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991.
Parañaque It
fall under this category so is “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
422 Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” At
De Guia vs. Commission on Elections issue
that they should continue to be elected at large until the in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof
1995 regular elections. which provides:
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court “Section 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang
observes that petitioner does not allege that he is Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
running Bayan.—The elective members of the Sangguniang
‘(a) Panlalawigan,
‘(b) Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be
for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the elected as follows:
election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he does not For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the
appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, a elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
personal be elected by legislative districts x x x x
For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the
or substantial interest.1 He does not also allege any legal
Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for
right that has been violated by respondent. If for this purposes
alone, ______________
petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action. 1 Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73
SCRA 333; Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28,
However, considering the importance of the issue 1969,
involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of 27 SCRA 533.
2 G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and
423
petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 423
Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside De Guia vs. Commission on Elections
the of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the xxxx
petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held ‘(c)
similarly ‘(d)
through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. The number and election of elective members of the
Commission on Elections.2 Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the
Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any
Now on the meat of the dispute.
other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166,
continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 x x x x Provided, further,
56
That, the Commission shall divide each of the November 18, 1991, or before COMELEC promulgated its Resolution No.
municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts 2313.
424
by barangay for purposes of representation in the
Sangguniang Bayan x x x x and, 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, De Guia vs. Commission on Elections
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance voted
with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this
elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district x x x x” Project of Apportionment, Parañaque together with the
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective
R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166,3 issued Resolution councilors for each district.
No. On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner’s
2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question. Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived to mean that the election of elective members of the
ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13)
relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the
COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom.
2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of
Bayan of Parañaque and the other municipalities of Metro Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third
municipalities, would be elected by district in the May 11, Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant
1992 or in the 1995 regular elections. petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted and
by the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11,
the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election 1992
Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance
and with existing laws. He would include in this class of
stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the
the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang municipality of Parañaque.
Panlungsod Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to
and Sangguniang Bayan COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313,
_____________ Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which
3 R.A. 7166 was approved only on November 26, 1991, when the
President signed it into law, although it was passed by Congress on clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district

57
apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or
Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections. the
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the
Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized statute
elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, needs construction, as it does in the present case, the
and We realize the web of confusion generated by the most
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some dominant in that process is the purpose of the act.4
framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical Statutes
implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 should be construed in the light of the object to be
thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions achieved
were and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,5 and they
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the should
sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the be given such construction as will advance the object,
Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.6
petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we A
pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because construction should be rejected that gives to the
then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to language
single out the singledistrict provinces referred to in par. used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
(b), purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that
and the municipalities tends
425 to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 425 enactment.7
De Guia vs. Commission on Elections The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown
in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which
of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts states in part:
each if the members of their respective sanggunian after “This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for
all May
would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 11, 1992, and provide for the necessary implementing details.
elections. It
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be also
________________
meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far 4 De Jesus v. City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 [1914]; Commissioner of Internal
as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason Revenue v. Filipinas De Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 [1960]; Garcia v. Ambler, 4 Phil.
81 [1904]; McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 [1914].
for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the 5 LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725 [1961]; People v.
door Purisima, G.R. No. 52050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542; Commissioner of
to what the legislature intended which is vaguely Internal Revenue v. Filipina Compania De Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 [1960].

58
6Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 [1916]). after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with
7Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 [1909]; Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 [1909];
Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Republic
the
Flour different sectors in the community, the Project of District
Mills. Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39 Apportionment of single legislativedistrict provinces and
SCRA municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
269; People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 [1958]).
426 “WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a.
De Guia vs. Commission on Elections compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b.
endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, population; c.
it no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in
seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for the
by case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or
providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang apportioned into different districts.”
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang This avowed policy of having sanggunian members
Bayan elected
be elected not at large, but by district x x x x” by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec.
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative 3 of
intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the “WHEREAS” clauses R.A. 7166.8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of
constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus— Sec.
“WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of
the the sanggunian
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 ____________
synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the 8 Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41001,
Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162.
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats; 427
“WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic VOL. 208, MAY 6, 1992 427
Act 7166, and approved by the President of the Philippines on De Guia vs. Commission on Elections
November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for
recommendation in
of the Commission on Elections aforestated; the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the
“WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the
Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission singledistrict
promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial
provinces and the municipalities in the Metro
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to
Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under
submit,
pars.
(b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2)
59
districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod
by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
although the Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain
under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the single-districts not having been ordered apportioned
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all under
likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be
large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and elected
Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. at large in the May 11, 1992 elections, although starting
But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full
have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That
have had enough time to apportion the single-district is
cities the true import of par. (d). Con-
and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area. 428
As they now stand in relation to the 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
districting/apportionment of local government units for Republic vs. Court of Appeals
purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear sequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner
that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative must
districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to fall.
be WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less
elected by district; (2) for provinces with single grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit,
legislative the
districts, as they have already been apportioned into two instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
(2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be SO ORDERED.
elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
district concur.
under the first part of par. (c); and, (4) for the thirteen Petition dismissed.
(13) Note.—An interpretation which lead to patent
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with
already been apportioned into two (2) districts each the legislative intent. (Motoomul vs. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA
under 743.)
the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be ——o0o——
elected © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

60
VOL. 169, JANUARY 31, 1989 829 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of “legal heirs,” makes no
Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
G.R. No. 78687. January 31, 1989.* debemos.
______________
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO * SECOND DIVISION.
SALENILLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF 830
APPEALS AND HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, 830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; To make a distinction as to the legal heirs
COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE AND WILLIAM
is to contravene the purpose of Sec. 119 of the Public Land
GUERRA, respondents. Act.—
Land Registration; Public Lands; Classes of persons who are Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private
bestowed the right to repurchase the property; The petitioners respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene
being the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees of the the
contested very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to
property, are considered legal heirs; Section 119 of the Public
give the homesteader of patentee every chance to preserve
Land for
Act does not distinguish the term “legal heirs."—From the himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously
foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating
of it.
persons are bestowed the right to repurchase—the
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Allowing the
applicantpatentee, petitioners to repurchase the property is more in keeping with
his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the the
contention of the private respondent sustained by the spirit of the law; Between two statutory interpretations, that
respondent which
appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.—
those Considering
classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia
not H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that
through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the
petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the property
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have
least, time
petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a and again said that between two statutory interpretations,
“legal that
heir” of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
may Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The 5-year
therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section period for the petitioners to repurchase the property has not
119 yet
61
prescribed.—Guided by the same purpose of the law, and Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals
proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the second, formally, on August 31, 1984—were both made within
fiveyear the
period for the petitioners to repurchase their property has prescribed five-year period.
not yet prescribed. Same; Same; Same; Redemption price to be reimbursed by
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the 5-year petitioners to private respondent applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39
period to repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or of the
foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins.—The cases pointed to Rules of Court, includes the purchase price, and the amounts
by of
the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, assessments or taxes paid plus interest.—Now, as regards the
present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised
bar. Rules
Both cases involved properties the titles over which were of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private
obtained respondent
either through homestead or free patent. These properties the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus
were interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to
mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure November
of 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and
the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were taxes on
foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five- the property that the private respondent might have paid after
year purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same
period to repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or rate
foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the as that on the purchase price.
expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
absolute of Appeals. Ejercito, J.
sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at
SARMIENTO, J.:
a
public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981,
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the
with the “Sheriff s Final Deed” issued on July 12, 1983, the reversal and setting aside of the decision1 of the Court of
two Appeals2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against
offers of the petitioners to repurchase—the first on November Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
17, Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William
1983, and the Guerra, involves a pure question of law, i.e., the
831 coverage
VOL. 169, JANUARY 31, 1989 831
and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No.
62
141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land mortgage was subsequently released on November 22,
Act. 1973
The facts are undisputed. after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later,
The property subject matter of the case was formerly or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued mortgaged
by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National
of Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a
the spouses, loan
________________ of P2,500.00.
1 Promulgated on September 17, 1986; Ejercito, B.C., J., ponente;
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan,
Coquia, J.R. and Martinez, A.M., JJ., concurring.
2 CA-G .R. SP. No. 04603, Elena Salenillas, et al. vs. Hon. Raymundo extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No.
Seva, etc., et al. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank
832 against the mortgage and the property was sold at a
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED public
Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals auction held on February 27, 1981. The private
Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said respondent,
original certificate of title was inscribed in the William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said
Registration public auction and as a result thereof a “Certificate of
Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December Sale”
10, was issued to him by the ExOfficio Provincial Sheriff of
1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a
spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property “Sheriff’s
in Final Deed” was executed in favor of the private
favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and respondent.
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. On August 17, 1983, the Philippine National Bank filed
Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet,
As a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent,
a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the
of motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the
Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private
Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by property in the possession of the private respondent, the
T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the
possession
63
of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, possession
833 until further orders from the court.3 However, in a
VOL. 169, JANUARY 31, 1989 833 decision
Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ Court
of possession was filed by the private respondent with of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According
the to the appellate court:
trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H.
the private respondents’ motion and instead made a Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9,
formal 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970
offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the of the
petitioners’ opposition and formal offer, the trial court property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and
judge on October 12,1984 issued the alias writ of Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the
possession property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 as amended could have already started. From this fact
prayed for the private respondent, The petitioners moved
alone,
for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting
denied. that
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not
elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by be
way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the the “conveyance” contemplated by the law. We will rule on the
respondent issue raised by the petitioners.4 xxx xxx xxx
trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ________________
3 Rollo, 20.
issuing the order dated October 12,1984 granting the 4 Id., 16.
writ 834
of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, 834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
denying their motion for reconsideration. Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,5 the
appellate court gave due course to the petition; required appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period
the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in of
support the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the
to their respective positions; and restrained the trial Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of
court reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with
and the private respondent from executing, Monge, is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the
implementing
64
property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the the right to repurchase their property and their right to
petitioners do
made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, so subsists.
1984, ______________
5 101 Phil. 563 (1957).
the period had clearly expired.
6 91 Phil. 389 (1952)
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners 7 101 Phil. 968 (1957).
moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went 8 Rollo, Id., 44.

for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent 835

appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this VOL. 169, JANUARY 31, 1989 835
petition. Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides
rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase in full:
within Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent
five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has
or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
not
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a
yet prescribed. To support their contention, the period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
petitioners From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only
cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals6 and Manuel three classes of persons are bestowed the right to
vs. repurchase—the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other
Philippine National Bank, et al.7 legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private
On the other side, the- private respondent, in support of respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court
the appellate court’s decision, states that the sale of the that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes
contested property by the patentees to the petitioners of
disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the repurchasers because they acquired the property not
said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The
enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act.8 the
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very
whether or not the petitioners have the right to least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the
repurchase Encisos, is a “legal heir” of the latter. As such, and even
the contested property under Section 119 of the Public on
Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase.
the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase This
had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law
65
must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, period for the petitioners to repurchase their property
in had
speaking of “legal heirs,” makes no distinction. Ubi lex not yet prescribed
non The case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,10 cited as
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts
respondent and the appellate court would be to obtaining
contravene there are substantially different from those in this case.
the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act In
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every Monge, the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro
chance sale
to preserve for himself and his family the land that the and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the
State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor question
in clearing and cultivating it.9 Considering that petitioner raised there was whether the five-year period provided
Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso for
and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing in Section 119 “should be counted from the date of the
her sale
(Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from
would the
be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have date the ownership of the land has become consolidated
time in
and again said that between two statutory favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader’s
interpretations, failure
that which better serves the purpose of the law should to redeem it.11 It is therefore understandable why the
prevail. Court
_______________ ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately
9 Santana vs. Mariñas, No. L-35537, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853;
vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the
Vargas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-35666, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 195;
Simeon vs. Peña, No. L-29049, December 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 610. property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right
836 of
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated
Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding The cases12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of
to their position, on the other hand, present facts that are
the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases
involved properties the titles over which were obtained
66
either through homestead or free patent. These purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the
properties rate of one per centum per month up to November 17,
were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, 1983,
upon together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on
failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the the
mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court property that the private respondent might have paid
ruled that the five-year period to repurchase a after
homestead purchase and interest on the last named amount at the
sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 same rate as that on the purchase price.13
begins on the day after the expiration of the period of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated
thereby formally transferring the property to the May 7,
purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated
the September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22,
mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
sold Norte,
at a public auction to are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
______________ ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey
10 Supra.
the subject property and to execute the corresponding
11 Id., 564.
12 Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; and Manuel vs. Philippine deed
National Bank, et al., supra. of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon
837 the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and
VOL. 169, JANUARY 31, 1989 837 the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus
Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both
the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the amounts
“Sheriff’s s Final Deed” issued on July 12, 1983, the two up to November 17, 1983.
offers of the petitioners to repurchase—the first on No costs.
November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August SO ORDERED.
31, 1984—were both made within the prescribed five- Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and
year Regalado, JJ., concur.
period. Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 Notes.—The issue that the petitioners have the right of
of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners redemption of the parcels of land within five years from
should reimburse the private respondent the amount of date of
the ______________
67
13PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et al, No. L-60208, December 5, 1985, 140 ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
SCRA 360; Dulay vs. Carriaga, No. L-52831, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA _______________
794; DBP vs. Zaragosa, No. L-23493, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 668. * EN BANC.
838 81
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 81
Medios vs. Court of Appeals Comendador vs. De Villa
sale under the Public Land Law is a new issue that cannot FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT.
be raised for the first time on appeal. (Anchuelo vs. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 434.) G.R. No. 95020. August 2, 1991.*
Period to exercise the right of redemption or pre-emption BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A.
by co-owners over a property is a non-extendible. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI,
(Etcuban COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA,
vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507.) and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners, vs.
——o0o—— HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC.
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED JACINTO LIGOT, PA., respondents.
Comendador vs. De Villa G.R. No. 96948. August 2, 1991.*
G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991.* BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARCELO
BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT.
BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M),
ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA,
GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON
GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, PA, LTC.
AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, LTC. FRANKLIN FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS
BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
DE LA PEÑA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT.
DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL ELMER AMON PAF, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. GEN. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. BGEN. DEMETRIO
RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT.
DAGZA, MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, PRESIDENT AND
ESTELITO L. PORNEA, and GENERAL COURTMARTIAL MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14,
NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: BGEN. DEMETRIO respondents.
CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
68
G.R. No. 97454. August 2, 1991.* hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN RODOLFO BIAZON, General
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings
AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. on
the applications of bail of the petitioner, interve-nors and
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
which
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
may as well include other persons facing charges before
Center/Jail, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, General
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Court-Martial No. 14.
Branch 86, CAPTAIN Same; Bill of Rights; Due Process; Due process is satisfied as
82 long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED is not
Comendador vs. De Villa availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation
REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1LT. SERVANDO A. BAOANAN of the
PN(M), 1LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF, 1LT. Bill of Rights.—Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
ATANACIO T. MACALAN, JR PM(M), 2LT. ELISEO T. accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it
RASCO PC, 2LT. JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT. JAIRUS JS. is
GELVEZON III PM(M), 2LT. JOSELITO CABREROS deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of
PM(M), 2LT. MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT. Rights.
Criminal Procedure; Pre-trial; Jurisdiction; Pre-trial
HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
investigation is directory, not mandatory, and in no way
Constitution; Bail; Constitution grants the right to bail to all
affects the
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all
jurisdiction of a court martial.—There was in our view
military men facing court-martial proceedings.—On August
substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
22,
Moreover, it is now settled that “even a failure to conduct, a
1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a)
pretrial
Declaring,
investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the
jurisdiction.” x x x But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
right
investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable
jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial
and
investigation
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No.
jurisdiction of a court-martial.
14
Statutory Construction; It is a basic canon of statutory
denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken
construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing
itself
courtmartial
ceases;
proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are 83

69
VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 83 different from others. The accused officers can complain if
Comendador vs. De Villa they
Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.—It is a basic canon of are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But
statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, they cannot say they have been discriminated against because
the they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This civilians.
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; Appeal; A petition for
the certiorari in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional
reason of law is its soul. grounds because, as long as respondent acted with
Jurisdiction; Certiorari; Habeas Corpus, Quo warranto; jurisdiction,
Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court any error committed by him or in the exercise thereof will
of amount
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
prohibition or mandamus against inferior court and other reviewed
bodies or corrected only by appeal.—Regarding the propriety of the
and on petition for habeas corpus and quo warranto.—The petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following
Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court observations of
of the Court in Arula: The referral of charges to a court-martial
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
bodies jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent
and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto. In the acted
absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the
ruling of exercise
a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judg-
questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 84
Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
similar Comendador vs. De Villa
jurisdiction. ment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.
Constitution; Bill of Rights; Bail; Equal Protection; That Even an
denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the
equal issuance
protection clause is not acceptable.—The argument that denial of a writ of certiorari.
from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal G.R. No. 93177:
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires PETITION for certiorari prohibition and mandamus to
equal review the decision of the General Court Martial No. 14.
treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially G.R. No. 96948:
70
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
General Court Martial No. 14. Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Peña.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
G.R. No. 95020: Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
Regional The Solicitor General for respondents.
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 104. Asuncion, J. CRUZ, J.:
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. These four cases have been consolidated because they
G.R. No. 97454: involve practically the same parties and related issues
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the arising from the same incident.
Regional The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 86. Solano, J. private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed
petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson coup
Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Amon, Vergel Nacino, d’etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza. The charges against them are violation of Articles of
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim. War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson. Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros. relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison. (Murder).
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari,
Pizarro. prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo. conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador. constituted to investigate the charges against them and
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for the
Marcelo Blando. creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and try them.
Ericson Aurelio. In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging
Efren C. Moncupa for A.L. Tecson. the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as
Ison. granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
85 In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of
VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 85 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on
Comendador vs. De Villa certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over
71
GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of
denying bail to the private respondents. witnesses,
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the and death and medical certificates of victims of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a rebellion.
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners
private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
likewise prompting
raised as in G.R. No. 95020. the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file
86 their objections in writing. This was done through a
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Motion
Comendador vs. De Villa for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
I In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI Panel
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre- denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, the
to affidavits of their witnesses.
investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel
January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to
petitioners, writing. This was done on March 14, 1990.
to wit: The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of
undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 War
a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and
71, which provides:
there
Art. 71. Charges; Action upon.—Charges and specifications
to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your
must
witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the
be signed by a person subject to military law, and under the
charge/charges against you for viol of AWs
oath
_______________. DO 87
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS. VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 87
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the Comendador vs. De Villa
date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated,
submit controverting evidence. the
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact,
of to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
72
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial P.D. No. 39.
until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on
have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.
the 14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges,
Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
and
prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of
justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity injunction. After considering the petition and the answer
shall thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.
be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against 14,
him if Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting
they are available and to present anything he may desire in provisional liberty to Ligot.
his On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion
own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
investigating contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for
officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the disobeying the said order. He later also complained that
accused.
Generals De Villa and
If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they 88
shall be 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony
Comendador vs. De Villa
taken on both sides. (Italics supplied.)
Aguirre had refused to release him “pending final
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges
resolution of the appeal to be taken” to this Court.
consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits.
provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc.
While
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj.
the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the
Alfredo
motion
Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc. Romelino
for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R.
inter alia:
No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
right granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
to raise peremptory challenges against the president and exception
members of GCM No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General
that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under Court-

73
Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on side at the
the 89
mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 89
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is Comendador vs. De Villa
no pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to their
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until
petitioner,
intervenors and which may as well include other persons
March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that
facing date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
charges before General Court-Martial No. 14. reconsideration
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before which they were again asked to submit in writing. This
General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect
of denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that
release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as the
well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson. charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been
No. denied due process because the investigation was
97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus resolved
on against them owing to their own failure to submit their
the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned in
without charges. The petition was referred to the the
Regional subpoena sent them that “failure to submit the
Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above
respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to
hearing submit
that no formal charges had been filed against the controverting evidence.” They chose not to heed the
petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the
trial court ordered their release. PTI
II Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No.
The Court has examined the records of this case and 14
rules without waiting for the petitioners to submit their
as follows. defense.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded
96948 were given several opportunities to present their an
74
opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
deemed xxx
waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate
There was in our view substantial compliance with General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial
Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this
holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge
settled that “even a failure to conduct a pre-trial Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
jurisdiction.” We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus: effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department’s
xxx interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the
language here under consideration.”
deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it
pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course
is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
be
jurisdiction
altogether irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless
of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one
ed
obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect
986 (1949), the Court said:
“We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70
that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
(The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the
408) proceedings.
can properly be construed as an indis As to what law should govern the conduct of the
_______________
1 28 SCRA 540.
preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more
90 than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED declared:
Comendador vs. De Villa _______________
pensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial 2 168 SCRA 264.
jurisdiction. The Article does serve important functions in the 91
administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 91
to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object
Comendador vs. De Villa
to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners,
the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law
reversing a court-martial conviction where failure to comply with Article as
70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended
Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments by
wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging
prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous
pretrial
petitioners
procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct
unbecoming an
75
officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de
military law, after he had investigated the matter through an Villa
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of as Chief of Staff.
respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the Article of War No. 8 reads:
truth Art. 8. General Courts-Martial.—The President of the
of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn Philippines,
to by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Maj. Ruiz, the “accuser,” in accordance with and in the manner Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President,
provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that the
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a
in military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the
the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops
administering the oath has personally examined the affiant may
and appoint general courts-martial; but when any such
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and commander is
understood the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be
his affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. tried,
Thereafter, a the court shall be appointed by
“pretrial investigation” was conducted by respondent Maj. 92
Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by 92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
P.D. Comendador vs. De Villa
No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their superior competent authority. x x x
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed
untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it
them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses because the order itself said it was issued “By Command
against them was their own doing, for they never even asked
of
Maj.
Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be General De Villa” and it has not been shown to be
made spurious.
to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary
77, Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of
as amended by P.D. No. 911. Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been appointed
constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of its president and members. It is significant that General
War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way
disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done
if
76
his authority had been improperly invoked. On the _______________
3 32 SCRA 106.
contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, 93
he VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 93
sustained General Order No. M-6 in the Comment filed Comendador vs. De Villa
for quate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the
him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General. national defense program. Because of these considerations it
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we was
note then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the
meanwhile
that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. number,
Act would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War
No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit: (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
Art. 18. Challenges.—Members of general or special 1938,
courtsmartial the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or
may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge reference
advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate
determine of
the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a a court-martial or by the accused. After December 17, 1958,
challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by when
the the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became
trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided effective, the Judge Advocate General’s Service of the
before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be Philippine
entitled Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of
to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court training
shall not be challenged except for cause. and education in military law, encompassing the length and
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the
Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus: outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the
the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had
known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of expanded
Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had
military and naval acade-mies who were on duty with the been
Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental
learned circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June
in military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps 12,
of 1948 to entitle “each side” to one peremptory challenge, with
the developing army was numerically inade- the
77
sole proviso that “the law member of court shall not be challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this
challenged decree.
except for cause.” On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No.
On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial
General law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed revoked
Forces to create military tribunals “to try and decide General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
cases military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final
of military personnel and such other cases as may be determination of the cases pending therein.
referred to them.” P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No.
On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, the
Procedure, and other matters relevant to Military termination of martial law and the dissolution of the
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
challenge, thus: existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when
cause
the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
may be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith.
Cessante
Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also
tie expressed
vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is
successfully its
challenged member shall be immediately replaced. soul.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the
No. right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became
1498, or the National Security Code, which was a ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045.
LOI As
and policies intended “to meet the continuing threats to a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act
the No.
existence, secu- 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the
94 right to peremptory challenge.
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948
Comendador vs. De Villa that the right to peremptory challenge remains
rity and stability of the State.” The modified rule on withdrawn
78
under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question
was the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus
itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private
17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon
be City.
considered no longer operative, having been cast out It is argued that since the private respondents are
under officers
the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles
Constitution, one of the “iniquitous vestiges of the of
previous War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
regime.” their
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present proceedings.
government should invoke the rules of that discredited The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of
body to justify its action against the accused officers. BP 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with “exclusive
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
in and
a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
his commissions.” Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also
deserved punishment. It is hoped that the accused cite
officers the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals,4 where this Court
in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, held
the that “appeals from the Professional Regulation
wisdom of Com. Commission
95 are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.”
VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 95 It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the
Comendador vs. De Villa case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the
Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a remedies
matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this employed by the accused officers before the respondent
Court. courts.
The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws In Martelino, we observed as follows:
without It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or
regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and
is a problem only the political departments can resolve. that
79
mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed
The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that
that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts- “the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
martial military where the right to bail does not exist.”
may commit such an abuse of discretion—what in the
The justification for this exception was well explained by
language of
the Solicitor General as follows:
Rule 65 is referred to as “grave abuse of discretion”—as to
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason
give
to
rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point
exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the
at
right
issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari
to bail.
and prohibition x x x.
_______________
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
4 186 SCRA 287. mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
96 system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED government for the discharge of their duties and
Comendador vs. De Villa responsibilities
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over other
insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and
petitions
against the existing political system.
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior xxx
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas National security considerations should also impress upon this
corpus Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
and quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that constitutes a
the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000
Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before putschists
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed
that July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on “provisional” bail. The
the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction. sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their
heinous
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not
activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly
been constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
recognized and is not available in the military, as an replace the same with a system consonant with
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of _______________
Rights. 5 Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Sec.
9(1) and Sec. 21(1), B.P. 129.
97

80
VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 97 charge sheets and specifications and were required to
Comendador vs. De Villa submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11,
their own concept of government and justice. 1991.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the
bail would violate the equal protection clause is not investigation and preparation of the charges against the
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only private respondents. However, this was explained by the
of Solicitor General thus:
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply x x x The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to
where the subject of the treatment is substantially complete its pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year
different from others. The accused officers can complain because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
if were
they are denied bail and other members of the military involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other
are witnesses,
not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably
against because they are not allowed the same right that took
months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered
is
doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed
extended to civilians.
and
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases,
97454 that they had not been charged after more than command
one units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been
year from their arrest, our finding is that there was disbanded.
substantial compliance with the requirements of due After the charges were com-
process and the right to a speedy trial. 98
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with 98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Comendador vs. De Villa
this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
pleted, the same still had to pass review and approval by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and AFP
decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the Chief of Staff.
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless
charge memorandum and specifications against the must reiterate the following admonition:
private This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress
respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, the
1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup
was created and initial investigation was scheduled on attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant
March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the General
private respondents received the copies of the charges,
81
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well
filed to
against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:
trial The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise
before a military commission is wanting, it behooves of
respondent judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in
then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release order to
petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a _______________
military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then 6 Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991.

Articles 99
of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 VOL. 200, AUGUST 2, 1991 99
thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try Comendador vs. De Villa
prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as
the
person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any long
as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed
officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating by
or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more
punished as than
a court martial may direct.6 an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only
by
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was
appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the to
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No.
denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48-hour 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the
of intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
Court did not run until after notice of such denial was complained of by the petitioners. Such action is
received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary indicated,
to however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right
the private respondents’ contention, therefore, the to
decision peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and
had not yet become final and executory when the special in
civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private
March 12, 1991. respondents
III should not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is
82
DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the is suspended.”2 To deny the military officers here
petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are concerned
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive
peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of meaning
War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are of “all persons”—the coverage of the right.
also I believe that military officers fall within “persons”.
GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of “a
the scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of
release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED the
and SET ASIDE. No costs. Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order
SO ORDERED. were sustained, on ‘provisional’ bail... [t]he sheer
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, number
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly
Griño-Aquino, Me-dialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their
concur. heinous activity which could very well result in the
Sarmiento, J., See Concurring and Dissenting overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this
Opinion. Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
SARMIENTO, J.: Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. consonant with their own concept of government and
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, justice.”3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or
Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny drug
bail to accused military personnel. pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to “all denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture
persons” before conviction, with the only exception of painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000
“those “equally dangerous” elements of society?
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I
when evidence of guilt is strong.”1 The Charter also states find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted
that “[T]he right to the same right.
_______________ The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be
1 CONST., art. III, sec. 13.
firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit,
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED however, that tradition is no argument. First, the
Comendador vs. De Villa Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a
bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas government
corpus of laws, not tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I
submit that a reexamination is in order.
83
G.R. No. 93177, petition dismissed; G.R. No. 96948, of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: No person shall be
petition granted; G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, petitions deprived
granted, orders reversed and set aside. of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
Note.—What due process abhors is not lack of previous any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” “x x x
In
notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the
(Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438.)
equal
——o0o—— protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
_______________
2 Supra.
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
3 3 Decision, 20.
subject
101 of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 65 (2)
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.* classification
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions
COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
ADMINISTRATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
the
AND MANAGEMENT, respondents. classification applies only to those who belong to the same
Political Law; Constitutional Law; No person shall be class.”
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law
law.— would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind respondents’ submission that the benefits of said law are to
where, be
workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired denied a class of government employees who are similarly
continuously situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio
from one project to another were considered non-project- unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim
regular in
and permanent employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired this case but the doctrine of necessary
and _______________
re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen * EN BANC.

(15) 66
years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can 66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
be Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
implication.
assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded. Art. III,
Sec. 1 Statutory Construction; Doctrine of Necessary Implication;
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that

84
which is expressed.—“No statute can be enacted that can application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as
provide they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such
all the details involved in its application. There is always an purpose.
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing 1990
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires, as
events a
of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill total of seven (7) years of government service which need not
in be
the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual
thereof or
as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by coterminous, including military and police service, as
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary evaluated
to and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all No.
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly 6683 of coterminous personnel who survive the test of time.
and This
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And would be in keeping with the coverage of “all social legislations
every enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to public
include servants.” After all, coterminous personnel are also obligated
all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the to
greater includes the lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus the government for GSIS
sit, 67
simper inest et minus.” VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 67
Political Law; Administrative Law; R.A. 6683; A co-terminous Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the
emergency general disadvantage of transience.
employees, R.A. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency decision of the Civil Service Commission.
employees. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
—Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who PADILLA, J.:
have Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the
rendered years of continuous service should be included in the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2
coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
85
December 1988 providing for benefits for early Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
retirement xxx
and voluntary separation from the government service as “With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the
Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those beneficent
purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual,
“Sec. 2. Coverage.—This Act shall cover all appointive officials
should have two consecutive years of government service in
and employees of the National Government, including
order
governmentowned or controlled corporations with original
to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the
charters, as well as the personnel of all local government
requirement.
units.
Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that
regular,
the
temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of
Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain
age,
portion of the benefits to be alloted to government
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
corporations.
of
Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects are entitled
government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
to
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement
those
and
of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.”
the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to
RA
avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application 6683.
on x x x”2
30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; Commission (CSC) emphasized:
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent “x x x
to We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted.
one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years
Civil Service Commission yielded negative result.1 Her of
letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but
thus: further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
_______________ temporary or regular employment status as of December 2,
1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Barlongay, 17 March 1989. 1988,
68 the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED contemplate
86
contractual employees in the coverage. including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the National Police (PC-INP).
Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be
date of your separation from the service, is co-terminous with
separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity
the under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, as amended, or viceversa.
shall Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the
sustain its original decision. enactment of this law and have received the corresponding
x x x”3 benefits of that retirement/separation.
Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by
mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service
way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
she employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only
if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
6683. Her arguments: accepted and approved by the head of office concerned.’
“It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not
Joint belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be of
on NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil
a Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
a)
b)
Personnel
c) Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative
d) Service. x x x If casuals and emergency employees were given
e) the
_______________ benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who
2 Annex “E”, Rollo, p. 13.
3 Annex “F”, Rollo, p. 14.
was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and
69 has
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 69 rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient
casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. (sic)
Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM- purpose of the law.”4
CSC 1.
Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 2.
6683, provides that: 3.
‘2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
4.
Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
_______________
perform specific activities or services with a definite expected
4 Rollo, pp. 24-25.
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
70
Consultant/Employees.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
87
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission nature of special projects, there is no necessity for
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in offering its personnel early retirement benefits just
their comment petitioner’s exclusion from the benefits of to induce voluntary separation as a
Republic Act No. 6683, because: _______________
Petitioner’s employment is co-terminous with the 5.
project per appointment papers kept by the 1.
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA 2.
AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY RETIREMENT AND
(the service record was issued by the Watershed 5
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE AS
Management and Erosion Control Project WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE
(WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE
funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 ORDERS AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER
THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING
December 1988, after which petitioner’s position FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
became functus officio. 71
Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 71
NIA—her position is not included in its regular Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need
6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short
temporary and transient; on the other hand, and limited life-span.6
retirement presupposes employment for a long The law applies only to employees of the national
period. The most that a non-career personnel can government, government-owned or controlled
expect upon the expiration of his employment is corporations with original charters and local
financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified government units.
to retire under the GSIS law. Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting
Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s appointment interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to
is permanent, security of tenure is available only define the different classes of employees in the public
for the term of office (i.e. duration of project). sector (i.e. government civil servants).
The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280
to grant separation or retirement benefits but (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment
reorganization5 to streamline government functions. regular
The application of the law must be made consistent where the employee has been engaged to perform
with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as activities
the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
the government, it will not have any application to business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
special projects such as the WMECP which exists definition
only for a short and definite period. This being the can be found in P.D. No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October
88
1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965— Rollo, p. 61.
7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular
R.A. No. 11, S. of 1991, 5 April 1991.
No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 72
(Executive 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely civil service eligible becomes available.8
includes The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the
such class of employees (regular employees) in its Career
coverage, Service as:
unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public Open Career positions for appointment to which
sector. prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
The appointment status of government employees in the required;
career service is classified as follows: Closed Career positions which are scientific, or
permanent—one issued to a person who has met highly technical in nature; these include the faculty
the requirements of the position to which and academic staff of state colleges and
appointment is made, in accordance with the universities, and scientific and technical positions
provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules in scientific or research institutions which shall
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;7 establish and maintain their own merit systems;
temporary—In the absence of appropriate eligibles Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
and it becomes necessary in the public interest to Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
issued to a person who meets all the requirements Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
“(1) Department Service and other officers of equivalent
(2) rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
(3) Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
(4) President.
(5) Career Officers, other than those in the Career
(6) Executive Service, who are appointed by the
for the position to which he is being appointed President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in
except the appropriate civil service eligibility: the Department of Foreign Affairs;
Provided, That such temporary appointment shall Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed
not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
be replaced sooner if a qualified system;
_______________
Personnel of government-owned or controlled
6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988,
corporations, whether performing governmental or
89
(7) contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
1. government is in accordance with a special contract to
2. undertake a specific work or job requiring special or
3. technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
4. be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
5. shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
non-career service; and minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, agency.
emergency and seasonal personnel.”10
or unskilled.”9
There is another type of non-career employee:
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is
“Casual—where and when employment is not permanent but
characterized
occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro
by: v.
“x x x (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co.,
tests of 96
merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure Phil. 945)”
which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
Consider petitioner’s record of service:
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
“Service with the government commenced on 2 December
his
1974
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
designated as a laborer holding emergency status with the
project
NIA—
for which purpose
_______________
Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.11 From 24
8 Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata March
v. Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320. 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with
9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987).
temporary
73
status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 73
December
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
employment was made.” 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III, R & R Division, then on 1
Included in the non-career service are: January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA-UPR IIS
elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; (Upper
secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation systems) DRD. On 1
their positions at the pleasure of the President and their June
personal confidential staff(s); 1980, she went to NIA-W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management &
Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary
fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential employee. While with this project, her designation was
staff; changed to

90
personnel assistant on 5 November 1981, starting 9 July 1982, pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the
the ‘1.
status became permanent until the completion of the project 2.
on 31 3.
December 1988. The appointment paper12 ‘a)
________________ Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section
10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77.
11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.
6
12 Rollo, p. 70. (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual,
74 emergency
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or casual status are non-creditable services;
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions
attached to the OSG’s comment lists her status as co-terminus inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual
with the Project.” employment
The employment status of personnel hired under are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by
foreign— the
assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, Commission.
they NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services
are considered employees for the duration of the project rendered
or on contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the
mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as
until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC
creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following
Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990). conditions: (Italics supplied)
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits These services are supported by approved appointments,
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees official records and/or other competent evidence.
who Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive proof of said services;
years of Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to
government service. Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No.
21 966; and
April 1987, provides: The services for the three (3) years period prior to
“WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June retirement are continuous and fulfill the service
22, requirement for retirement.’ ”
75
1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the
function VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 75
of determining creditable services for retiring officers and Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
employees of the national government; What substantial differences exist, if any, between
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 casual,
provides that all previous services by an officer/employee
91
emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed
contractual abolished.’
personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, It is stressed, however, that in the last two classification (c)
non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not
the
of
appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of
denial13 characterized herein petitioner’s employment as
the
coterminous appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the
with the NIA project which in turn was security of tenure is limited to a specific period.”
contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner’s status is A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum like
Circular casual and emergency employees. We see no solid
No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the reason
status of a co-terminous employee— why
“(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose _______________
entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by 13 Page 3, this decision.
the 76
appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
coexistent with his tenure. Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified the latter are extended benefits under the Early
into the following: Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted
co-terminous with the project—When the appointment is that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
co-existent with the duration of a particular project for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
b)
emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
c)
d)
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including
which purpose employment was made or subject to the those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio
availability of funds for the same; unius
co-terminous with the appointing authority—when est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have
appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the made a
appointing authority. specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention
co-terminous with the incumbent—when appointment is been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and
co-existent with the appointee, in that after the benefits to those expressly mentioned14 or casus omissus
resignation, separation or termination of the services of pro omisso habendus est—A person, object or thing
the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically omitted
abolished; and
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
co-terminous with a specific period, e.g., ‘co-terminous for
a period of 3 years’—the appointment is for a specific
intentionally.15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can
92
result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal classification applies only to those who belong to the same
protection clause of the Constitution. class.”17
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,16 comes to Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early
mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and Retirement
re-hired continuously from one project to another were Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to
considered non-project-regular and permanent sustain respondents’ submission that the benefits of said
employees. law are to be denied a class of government employees
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) who
successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The
Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded. be
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: “No the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property necessary implication, which holds that:
without “No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may
equal protection of the laws.”
not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time
“x x x In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled
of
that
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
inadequate
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called
classification of
gaps in
the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
where
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
in
(3)
a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
the classification applies not only to present conditions but
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
also to
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
the
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
present; (4) the
_______________ subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 161. from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant
15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664. of
16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910.
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
77
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 77 power,
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
93
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et government, including government-owned or controlled
minus.”18 corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
(re: regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual
Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman employees,
Dimaporo’s interpellation on coverage of state university regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2)
employees who are
_______________ consecutive years government service as of the date of
17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February separation.
1968. The term ‘contractual employees’ as used in this Act does not
18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited
citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. period to perform specific activities or services with definite
L- expected output.
37251, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-
30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v.
“Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L- including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage
32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, of
102 this Act.” (emphasis supplied)
Phil. 679 (1957) and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949). The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary
78
Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence,
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
vacated
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for
retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of
two
coterminous
(2) or three (3) years,19 he explained:
personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early
retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the objective? In their case, upon termination of the project
actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but and
if he separation of the project personnel from the service, the
opts to retire under this, then he is covered.” term of employment is considered expired, the office
It will be noted that, presently pending in Congress, is functus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only
the have
Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the to establish two (2) years of continuous service to
submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualify.
qualified group of civil servants, Sec. 3 of said House bill, This,
on coverage of early retirement, would provide: _______________
19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942—8 March 1988, 6:30 p.m.
“Sec. 3. Coverage.—It will cover all employees of the national 79
94
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 7, 1992 79 a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government
incidentally, negates the OSG’s argument that service
coterminous which need not be continuous, in the career or non-
or project employment is inherently short-lived, career
temporary and transient, whereas, retirement service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
presupposes seasonal, contractual or co-terminous, including military
employment for a long period. Here, violation of the and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the
equal Civil
protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring Service Commission.21 A similar regulation should be
because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of
they coterminous
are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can personnel who survive the test of time. This
the would be in keeping with the coverage of “all social
objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental
bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement well-being of public servants.”22 After
benefits to a group of employees (casuals) without _______________
20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to
plantilla
Government Employees Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who
positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of have rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for
permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it other
would Purposes.
21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series
merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the of 1990, 21 May 1990.
positions 22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto. 80
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, 80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
who have rendered years of continuous service should be Chua vs. Civil Service Commission
included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as all, co-terminous personnel are also obligated to the
long as they file their application prior to the expiration government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
of income
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC tax payments, with the general disadvantage of
regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this transience.
connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial
(5 by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850,20 requires, application
as for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
95
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner No. L-14129. July 31, 1962.
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
said Electioneering; Officers prohibited from engaging in politics;
law. While the application was filed after expiration of her Justices of the peace.—Ajustice of the peace is included
685
term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 685
originally People vs. Manantan
filed the application on her own without the assistance of among the officers enjoined from active political participation
counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her by
application must be granted; after all she served the Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no need
government not only for two (2) years—the minimum of
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) including justices of the peace in the enumeration in said
years Section
in four (4) successive governmental projects. 54 because the Legislature had availed itself of the more
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. generic
and broader term "judge".
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a
Same; Same; "Judge" construed.—The term "judge" not
favorable disposition of petitioner’s application for early modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend
retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in all
accordance kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of first instance,
with the pronouncements in this decision. judges of
SO ORDERED. the Courts of Agrarian Relations, and justices of the peace.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Statutory Construction; Rule of "casus omisus" when
Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, applicable.—The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. est"
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but only insofar as our can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
rulings are applied to R.A. 6683 applicants. clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did not
exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of
Petition granted.
officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Note.—Statutory exceptions are to be strictly but Rather, they were merely called by another term—"judges."
reasonably construed. (Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 The
SCRA 654). rule, therefore, has no applicability to the instant case.
——o0o—— Same; Penal Statutes; Rule of Strict Construction.—The rule
81 that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. only
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the
People vs. Manantan rule
96
merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is
as complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here
an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3 adopted, to wit:
Sutherland, "In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court may consider the in
spirit the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant
and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a Guillermo
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the
injustice, Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted
or would feat the clear purpose of the lawmakers (Crawford, by
Interpetation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the
Same;Same; Rule of Exclusion.—Where a statute appears on crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter,
its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular the
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense
why moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have of
been the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated
included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including in
them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius,should Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court
not denied
be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 P. 307, 22 Cal. App. the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
519). within
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by
Pangasinan. defense
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. of
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee. Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54
REGALA, J.: Off.
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the
peace is
of
excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the
information against the defendant. answer of the prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the
686
opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED information against the accused upon the authority of the
People vs. Manantan ruling
The records show that the statement of the case and of in the case cited by the defense."
the Both parties are submitting this case upon the
97
determination of this single question of law: Is a justice exercising the right to vote."
of When, therefore, Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the omitted the words "justice of the peace," the omission
Revised Election Code? revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude
Section 54 of the said Code reads: justices
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any of the peace from its operation.
province, no The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It
officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, is to be noted that under Section 449 of the Revised
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or
classified qualified by the phrase "of First Instance", while under
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such
exert
modification exists. In other words, justices of the peace
any influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein, were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein
if he were specified,i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice
is a peace officer." of
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
not necessity
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section anymore to include justices of the peace in the
54 enumeration
of the Revised Election Code. He submits that the because the legislature had availed itself of the more
aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not
Revised Administrative Code, which provided the modified by any word or phrase and was intended to
following: comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
687 of
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 687 First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations,
People vs. Manantan judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.—No of
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, the peace.
fiscal It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is
or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the
sometimes addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is
Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert
because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A
influence "judge" is
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed
than with
98
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). approved. Included as its basic provisions are the
According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605,
officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions 666,
according to law. In its most extensive sense the term 657. The present Code was further amended by Republic
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session
questions of
while acting in that capacity, including justices of the Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Act Nos. 3036 and
peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of 3038. In the history of our election law, the following
facts." should be noted:
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
688 "No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED elections,
People vs. Manantan nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public
will help to justify and clarify the above conclusion. office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly
The first election law in the Philippines was Act No. election, except for reelection to the position which he may be
1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, and holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the
which was later amended by Act Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 peace,
provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine
and
Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
1709 municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty
has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as of
shall being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any
be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 public office whatsoever for a term of 5 years: Provided,
amendments were later on incorporated in Chapter 18 of however,
the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive
Legislature, any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
several amendments were made through the passage of election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January
Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 15,
1907.)
amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinence to the
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6,it was likewise provided:
case
"x x x No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace,
at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the provincial fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of
Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candi-
Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted 689
Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 689
until June 21, 1947, when the Revised Election Code was People vs. Manantan
99
date or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provisions of this section or takes part in any election
provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the otherwise
provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of
employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office not
or less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by
employment whatever for a term of 5 years: Provided, imprisonment
however, for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all
That the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive cases
any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the
election." (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on right
September of suffrage for a period of 5 years." (Approved December 3,
15, 1907.) 1927.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated (Italics supplied.)
in Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was
the Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the enacted on August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section
provisions 48:
in question read: "SEC. 48. Active Intervention of Public Officers and
"SEC.449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections.—No Employees.—
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province,
fiscal no
or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the
Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the national,
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil
influence service
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence
than in
exercising the right to vote." (italics supplied) any manner in any election nor
690
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent
legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads: 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
"SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the People vs. Manantan
election.— take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
Anyjudge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, preserve
fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of public peace, if he is a peace officer."
the This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of
Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or the Revised Election Code was taken.
any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of
service, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the

100
the legislative development or history of Section 54 of additional clarifications from these records proved futile.
the Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical
Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of by
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code reason and equity.
as 691
averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 691
that in the two instances when the words "justice of the People vs. Manantan
peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act justice of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a
No. province but of a municipality.
180), the word "judge" which preceded in the Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If
enumeration it is true that the phrase "of any province" necessarily
did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for
other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the
the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of reason that they are municipal and not provincial
the officials,
peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the
"judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that
phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion that Justices
when of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not
the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
in interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals,
Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said treasurers and assessors who are generally known as
officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the provincial officers.
said officer as already comprehended in the broader term The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is
"judge". likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World said
War had destroyed congressional records which might rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
have enumeration
offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that
No. rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of
357 which legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated the
for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having peace must be held to have been intentionally and
been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and
101
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
of construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law
the Revised Election Code. intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 813).
when the omission has been clearly established. In the The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not
case proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
under consideration, it has already been shown that the nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace particcular person, object or thing has been omitted from
from the enumeration of officers precluded from a
engaging legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for
in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely reasons already mentioned, there has been no such
called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
the The rule that penal statutes are given a strict
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just construction is not the only factor controlling the
called interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
"judges." serves
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid
omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites authorities in
to determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been
the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, recognized time and again by decisions of various courts.
has (3
more particular application to statutes that should be Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases
strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must will
be frequently be found enunciating the principle that the
strictly construed against the government since intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215
proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction
jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be should
strictly interpreted against the state. not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the
692 statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this
People vs. Manantan particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts that clear
the purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of
102
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the "Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in
U.S. Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
has well said: "judge"
"The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the
such scope of
construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether
Penal of
statutes must be construed in the sense which best first Instance, justices of the peace or special courts, such as
harmonizes judges of the Court of Industrial Relations." xxx.
with their intent and purpose." (U.S. v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the
53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.) peace court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, thereof
to engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather
the language of criminal statutes, frequently, has been
than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are
narrowed where the letter includes situations
cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why
inconsistent justices of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering.
with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the
693
Courts of First Instance, they are given authority and
VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 693 jurisdiction
People vs. Manantan over certain election cases. (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123),
also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law Justices
(1915, 25 Yale L.J. 129.) of the peace are authorized to hear and decide inclusion and
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for
herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute is to candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their
enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the decisions
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
judges, believe
that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations,
Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation." (p.
judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were 708,
not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are Appellant's Brief.)
now within its encompass. If such were the evident Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached
purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the herein is the fact that the administrative or executive
justice department has regarded justices of the peace within the
of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit: In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary,
"On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the
phrases
103
the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it
Court has
did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and become a law, cannot be considered to contain or
694 manifest
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the
People vs. Manantan reasons expressed by the individual members of the
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, into
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a statute
the (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-
President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as 376),a
justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
note On law, reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's
that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner contention that justices of the peace are not covered by
was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in the
electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is
Code. to
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on January 25, down by the legislature.
1955. Our law-making body has consistently prohibited
In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of justices of the peace from participating in partisan
the peace are already expressly included among the polities.
officers They were prohibited under the old Election Law since
enjoined from active political participation. The argument 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they
is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress were
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another
justices of the peace from partisan political activities. law which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill 695
No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. VOL. 5, JULY 31, 1962 695
180 Teresa Realty, Inc. vs. Vda. de Garriz
as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
No. Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and
180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed the trial court applied the rule of "expressio unius, est
re-codification of the existing election laws at the time exclusio alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that
that justices
104
of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the on the merits.
Court ____________
of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
it J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano
would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an No. L-33140. October 23, 1978.*
intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. x x x" A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and
The rule has no application. If the legislature had SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO
intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
purview Instance of Rizal, MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL,
of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, CORDOVA, respondents,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, Statutory Construction; Principle of stare decisis; Action to
the invalidate an original certificate of title cannot prosper due to
settled jurisprudence that the title is valid and no longer open
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has been
to
erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
attack; Matters already decided on the merits cannot he
"Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of
relitigated
its
again and again. Reasons; Case at bar.—The issue is whether
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating
OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
them,
questioned
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding,
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim
which
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked."
led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT No. 735 was
(Blevins v. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.)
based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases No. 3621,
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal 3622
entered by the trial court should be set aside and this and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge
case Eulogio
is remanded for trial on the merits. Mencias in those cases, invalidating OCT No. 735, is annexed
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, to
Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur. the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part. their
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave. action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their
Order set aside and case remanded to trial court for trial action in court. On appeal to this Court, that decision was
reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
105
therefrom was once more upheld. Considering the governing that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past located
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled), it at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and
becomes bounded
evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain
on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the
their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long
land
settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no
longer open to attack. “It is against public policy that matters of Eladio Tiburcio, on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan,
already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, and
consuming the courts’ time and energies at the expense of on the west by Sapang Kuliat. The land, which has an
other area
litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium.” (Varsity Hills, of three hundred eighty-three quiñones, was allegedly
Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title
______________ issued
* SECOND DIVISION.
645
to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
VOL. 85, OCTOBER 23, 1978 645 They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land,
ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari and prohibition. they discovered that it had been fraudulently or
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of
petitioners. defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials. Augusto,
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas. all surnamed Tuason, pursuant to a decree issued on July
AQUINO. J.: 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the Registration.
much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 They further alleged that transfer certificates of title,
covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J.
Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and M.
1,625 hectares, respectively (Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and
Phil. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa)
888; Benin case, infra). which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial Golf
filed a complaint in fortna pauperis in the Court of First Club.
646
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano
106
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed
derived therefrom be declared void due to certain memoranda
irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They in lieu of oral argument.
asked for damages. The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by
dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed
venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which
plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. led
The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason was
and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos.
preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. 3621,
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of
Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in
of 647
the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to VOL. 85, OCTOBER 23, 1978 647
intervene in the case. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of
requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to the
produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and Aquials. It is cited by them to support their action and it
certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in
or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court.
court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and
allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the the Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all
lands decided on once more upheld (Benin vs. Tuason, L-
claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included 26127,
therein. Alcantara vs. validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & derived
Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and therefrom was June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was
ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrelia, L-40511, July 25, 1975,
proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or
the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was continuation of the holding in the following cases directly
issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I.
vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477;
107
Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612, Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr.,
Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Tuason & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Fernando, J., did not take part.
vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Case dismissed.
Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Notes.—The full transcription of the decree of
Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. registration in the Registration Book although made in a
Aguirre, disorderly manner is valid. (Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 531.)
116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, A torren’s title issued pursuant to homestead patent is
114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, no longer susceptible to collateral attack by a private
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People’s Homesite person even on the ground that the homestead was sold
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August within the 5-year prohibitory period of Section 118 of the
16. Public Land Act. (Lopez vs. Padilla, 45 SCRA 44).
1967, 20 SCRA 1031. After one year the decree of registration cannot be
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et impugned or collaterally attacked, nor could title to that
non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not land in derogation of that of the registered owner under
disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that a
respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their Torrens Title be acquired by prescription or adverse
action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long possession. (Bolaños vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 37
settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid SCRA
and 223). Courts may judge title over non-registerable land.
no longer open to attack. (Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647).
“It is against public policy that matters already decided Where neither the first vendee nor the petitioner took
on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming trouble of securing certificates of title in their names they
the courts’ time and energies et the expense of ofher could not be considered as innocent purchasers for value.
litigants: Interest, rei publicae ut finis sit litium.” (Varsity (Quiñano vs. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 221).
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). A decree of registration can be set aside only within one
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be year after entry on the ground of fraud, provided that no
meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil innocent purchaser for value had acquired the property.
Case Upon the expiration of one year within which a review of
No. 8943 with prejudice and without colts. No costs. the decree may be had, the decree as well as the title
648 issued
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED pursuant thereto becomes in controvertible. (People’s
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Mariano Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, 20 SCRA
SO ORDERED. 1031.)
108
It is well settled that in order for a petition to review the “informacion posesoria” or title existing prior to the
decree of registration to prosper, the land must not have issuance thereof not annotated on the title. (J.M. Tuason
passed on to an innocent purchaser for value. The decree &
issued in favor of Bernardina Dusaban is conclusive upon Co., Inc. vs. Jurilla, 76 SCRA 347.)
and against A decree of registration may be set aside for want of due
649 process provided it does not affect an innocent purchaser
VOL. 85, OCTOBER 23, 1978 649 for value. (Tiongco vs. De la Merced, 58 SCRA 89.)
People vs. Moreno ——o0o——
all persons, including the insular government and all the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
branches thereof whether mentioned by name in the VOL. 245, JULY 11, 1995 759
application notice, or citation, or included in the general Pilar vs. Commission on Elections
description “To all whom it may concern.” (Demantaño G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995.*
vs. JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 286.) ELECTIONS, respondent.
The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid Election Law; Section 14 of RA No. 7166 states that every
possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to candidate has the obligation to file his statement of
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public contributions
the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of and expenditures.—Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that
title and to dispense with the need on inquiry further, “every
candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
contributions
of and expenditures.
facts and circumstances it should impel reasonable Same: Same; The rule is well recognized that where the law
cautious man to make such further inquiry. While an does not distinguish courts should not distinguish.—
inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be Wellrecognized
cancelled even after proof of its defect, the law is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,
nevertheless courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
safeguards the rightful party’s interest in the title land distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v.
from freud and improper use of technicalities by allowing Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf.
such party, in appropriate cases, to judicially seek Olfato v.
reconveyance to him of whatever has not been transferd Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No
distinction is
or
to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.
conveyed to a purchaser in good faith. (Pascua vs. Same; Same; The term “every candidate” must be deemed to
Copuyoc, refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign but
77 SCRA 78.) also to
A torrens title is incontrovertible against any one who withdrew his candidacy.—In the case at bench, as the
109
law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the fine.
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
term Election Law; Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every
“every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate has the obligation to file his statement of
candidate contributions
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his and expenditures; The term “candidate” is used to designate
candidacy. a
Same; Same: Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our
refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of election.—But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden
candidacy."— change of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate to
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and begin
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
conduct bound
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple
(The reason that the term ‘candidate’ is used to designate a person
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. who
2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or actually submits himself and is voted for at our election
interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on (Santos
election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch,
Resolution 125
No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary,
certificates of candidacy.” 1972
Same; Same; Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not 2nd ed., p. 84). Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate
extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.—Lastly, we of
note that candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for
_______________ at an
* EN BANC.
760 election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
Pilar vs. Commission on Elections petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such
under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 charge, of
or utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to raise funds or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided to
that extort money from other candidates in exchange for the
“[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not withdrawal.
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
a Certiorari.
candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
110
Diosdado G. Gozar for petitioner. Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
QUIASON, J.: and for Other Purposes” provides as follows:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the “Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of
Revised Failure to
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28, File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political
1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election,
file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
No. 94-040.
true
I
and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his in
certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the connection with the election.
Sangguniang “No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
761 duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
VOL. 245, JULY 11, 1995 761 contributions and expenditures herein required.
Pilar vs. Commission on Elections “The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
candidacy. “Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, the statements or reports in connection with electoral
1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC contributions and expenditures as required herein shall
imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos constitute
an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be
(P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of
liable to
contributions and expenditures. pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the (P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of discretion of the Commission.
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94- 762
0065 762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(Rollo, p. 14). Pilar vs. Commission on Elections
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. “The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13). writ
Hence, this petition for certiorari. of execution issued by the Commission against the properties
of
We dismiss the petition.
the offender.
II
“It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for registered
111
mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all contributions and expenditures in connection with the
candidates elections.
residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates
file residing
their statements of contributions and expenditures. in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation” (Italics
“For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under supplied).
this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two “Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement.—(a) No person
Thousand elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in office
the until he has filed the statement of contributions and
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall expenditures
be herein required.
subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office” “The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which
(Italics nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement
supplied). required within the period prescribed by law.
To implement the provisions of law relative to election “(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to
contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC file statements or reports in connection with the electoral
promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 contributions and expenditures as required herein shall
(Re: constitute
an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be
Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions
liable to
and Expenditures in Connection with the National and
pay an administrative
Local Elections on May 11, 1992). The pertinent 763
provisions VOL. 245, JULY 11, 1995 763
of said Resolution are: Pilar vs. Commission on Elections
“Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty
Reminders Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the
to candidates to file statements.—Within five (5) days from Commission.
the “The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of
day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a
the writ
regional election director of the National Capital Region, the of execution issued by the Commission against the properties
provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall of
advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all the offender.
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them “For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under
to this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two
comply with their obligation to file their statements of Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the
112
discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
be the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.” referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure of
to the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution
file a statement of contributions and expenditures No.
because 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the
he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his provisions
certificate of Republic Act No. 7166 on election
of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits 764
that “it is x x x clear from the law that the candidate must 764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
have entered the political contest, and should have either Pilar vs. Commission on Elections
won or lost” (Rollo, p. 39). contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that “every candidate” their certificates of candidacy.”
has the obligation to file his statement of contributions Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word
and “shall.” As a general rule, the use of the word “shall” in a
expenditures. statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not imposes
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo,
SCRA 520 [1987]; cf. Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
the The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]). of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or to
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his pass legislation regulating contributions and
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every expenditures
candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a of candidates, and compelling the publication of the
candidate same.
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for
his candidacy. the purpose of influencing the results of the elections
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement (B.P.
113
Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
laws Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas],
and regulations prescribe what contributions are 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky.
prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95; Resolution No. 2348, 423,
Sec. 109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his
expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
R.A. expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign.
No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful The
(Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8). evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In remote.
“corrupt and illegal practices acts” of several states in the It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even
United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures contemplates the situation where a candidate may not
of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of have
statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such
money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes a
also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is
(26 in
Am Jur 2d, Elections § 287). These laws are designed to fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under
compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that “[i]f
statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the a
improper candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending
of obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact.”
their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 289). These Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of
statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or
to withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect
furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which
elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal
Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]). of
765 his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
VOL. 245, JULY 11, 1995 765 administrative fine.
Pilar vs. Commission on Elections WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
114
Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and Francisco, 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
JJ., concur. 2nd
Padilla, J., I join Mr. Justice Melo in his dissenting ed., p. 84). Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate
opinion. of
Melo, J., Please see dissent. candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted
Kapunan, J., On leave. for at an election. And considering the shortness of the
DISSENTING OPINION period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the
MELO, J.: certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted
including one who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for purposes to raise funds or to extort money
candidacy, is from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.
766 I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Petition dismissed.
Pilar vs. Commission on Elections ———o0o———
obliged to file his statement of contributions and 767
expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec 714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Resolution People vs. Evangelista
No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word “shall” G.R. No. 110898. February 20, 1996.*
in PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.
the main statute as well as the implementing rules JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge
generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, RTC of Misamis
candidates. Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S.
But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden TUGONON, respondents.
change of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate Criminal Law; Probation; Statutes; Until its amendment by
to P.D. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. 968 (The
Probation
begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is
Law) for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing
thus not bound to render an accounting subsequent to
probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed
election for the simple reason that the term ‘candidate’ his
is sentence and failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as he
used to designate a person who actually submits himself had
and is voted for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 not yet started to serve the sentence.—Until its amendment
Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., by P.D.
207; No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 968,
otherwise
115
known as the Probation Law, for the accused to take his People vs. Evangelista
chances peal.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court
on appeal by allowing probation to be granted even after an and
accused had appealed his sentence and failed to obtain an having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals
acquittal, just so long as he had not yet started to serve the had
sentence. Accordingly, in Santos To v. Paño, it was held that affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly
the precluded
fact that the accused had appealed did not bar him from from the benefits of probation.
applying Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; If the law makes
for probation especially because it was as a result of the appeal no distinction, neither should the Court.—Private respondent
that his sentence was reduced and made the probationable argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between
limit. meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the
The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction) and
effect on January 15, 1986 precisely to put a stop to the unmeritorious
practice of appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence neither
is should the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the
probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and accused would be set free and not only given probation.
applying for probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Same; Same; Same; Same; The perfection of the appeal
Same; Same; Same; A person who files his application for referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment
probation after the effectivity of P.D. 1990 is covered by the of
prohibition that “no application for probation shall be conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate
entertained court.—
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the The ruling of the RTC that “[h]aving not perfected an appeal
judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application against the Court of Appeals decision, [private respondent] is,
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.”—Since therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990” is
private an
respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal
1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect, it is covered by referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment
the of
prohibition that “no application for probation shall be conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court,
entertained since under the law an application for probation is filed with
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the the
judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application trial court which can only grant the same “after it shall have
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to ap_______________ convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon
*SECOND DIVISION. application by
715
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal.”
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 715
PETITION for review of a decision of the Presiding Judge
116
of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Br. After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year
21. of
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to
The Solicitor General for petitioner. pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense,
Carlito P. Somido for private respondent. without subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC
MENDOZA, J.: appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon was charged with circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the
frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private
alleging respondent’s conviction but modified his sentence by
— imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months
716 of
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of
People vs. Evangelista prision correccional, as maximum.1
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C.
9:00 Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation
o’clock in the evening at Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
on
Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
January 4, 1993.
_______________
the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use 1 Decision dated January 23, 1992, per Associate Justice Lorna S.
of a Lombos-dela Fuente and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo M.
knife, which he was then conveniently provided of, did then Marigomen and Jainal D. Rasul, Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 44-49.
and 717
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 717
stab Roque T. Bade thereby inflicting upon him the following People vs. Evangelista
injuries, to wit: On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a
Stab wound, right iliac area, 0.5 cm. penetrating non perforating
petition
lacerating posterior peritoneum, 0.5 cm.
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce for probation,2 alleging that (1) he possessed all the
the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
nevertheless, probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
of Appeals had in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him
the accused, that is by timely medical attendance which by
prevented his death. the trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to took no action on a petition for probation which he had
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. earlier filed with it so that the petition could be filed with
117
the trial court; (4) in the trial court’s decision, two 718
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and 718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
voluntary surrender were appreciated in his favor; and People vs. Evangelista
5
(5) On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated5 his “respectful
in Santos To v. Paño,3 the Supreme Court upheld the right recommendation that private respondent’s application
of the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that for
he had appealed from his conviction by the trial court. probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be
On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private issued
respondent to report for interview to the Provincial for him to serve his sentence in jail.”
Probation Officer. The Provincial Probation Officer on the The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s
other hand was required to submit his report with recommendation and granted private respondent’s
recommendation to the court within 60 days.4 application for probation in its order of April 23, 1993.6
On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Hence this petition by the prosecution.
Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a
private grave abuse of its discretion by granting private
respondent’s application for probation on the ground that respondent’s application for probation despite the fact
by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he that
could he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of
have then applied for probation, private respondent the
waived trial court.
the right to make his application. The Probation Officer The Court holds that it did.
thought the present case to be distinguishable from Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was
Santos possible under P.D. No. 968, otherwise known as the
To v. Paño in the sense that in this case the original Probation Law, for the accused to take his chances on
sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial appeal by allowing probation to be granted even after an
court accused had appealed his sentence and failed to obtain
(1 year of imprisonment) was probationable and there an
was acquittal, just so long as he had not yet started to serve
no reason for private respondent not to have filed his the
application for probation then, whereas in Santos To v. sentence.7 Accordingly, in
Paño the penalty only became probationable after it had _______________
been reduced as a result of the appeal. 5 Petition, Annex N, Rollo, pp. 66-67.

_______________ 6 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 28-33.

2 Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 51-53. 7 P.D. No. 968, §4, as amended by P.D. No. 1287 provided:

3 120 SCRA 8 (1983). Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.___Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court
4 Petition, Annex I, Rollo, p. 56.

118
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
begins to
serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of said
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and and
conditions as it may deem best. upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of
the application for probation and he may submit his comment on such application Provided,
within ten days from receipt of the notification. That no application for probation shall be entertained or
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of granted
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The of
719 conviction.
VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 719 Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
People vs. Evangelista term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
Santos To v. Paño, it was held that the fact that the probation
accused had appealed did not bar him from applying for shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application
probation especially because it was as a result of the shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appeal
appealable. (Emphasis added)
that his sentence was reduced and made the _______________
probationable filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
limit. automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the
application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court,
The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which said
took effect on January 15, 19868 precisely to put a stop application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of
the appellate court.
to An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis
the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction added)
even 8 P.D. No. 1990 was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and was published
in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985. Under its effectivity clause
if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of it shall take effect “after 15 days following its publication in the Official
securing Gazette.”
an acquittal and applying for probation only if the 720
accused 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
fails in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, §4 People vs. Evangelista
of Since private respondent filed his application for
the Probation Law now reads: probation
§4. Grant of Probation.—Subject to the provisions of this on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken
Decree, effect,9 it is covered by the prohibition that “no application
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
a
119
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment the administration of justice, but should be availed of at
of the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be
conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be reformed and rehabilitated.”
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” Having appealed The ruling of the RTC that “[h]aving not perfected an
from the judgment of the trial court and having applied appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, [private
for respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the
probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed amendment
his in] P.D.
conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded _______________
9 P.D. No. 1990, §3 provides that the “provisions of Section 4 of P.D.
from
No.
the benefits of probation. 968, as above amended, shall not apply to those who have already filed
Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction their respective applications for probation at the time of the effectivity
should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his of
this Decree.”
appeal notwithstanding the appellate court’s affirmance 721
of VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 20, 1996 721
his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law People vs. Evangelista
does not make any distinction and so neither should the 1990” is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection
Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused of
would be set free and not only given probation. Private the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken
respondent’s original sentence (1 year of prision from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not
correccional in its minimum period) and the modified that of the appellate court, since under the law an
sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months of application for probation is filed with the trial court which
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of can only grant the same “after it shall have convicted and
prision correccional, as maximum) are probationable. sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said
Thus defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal.”
the fact that he appealed meant that private respondent 10

was taking his chances which the law precisely frown Accordingly, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,10 it was held
upon. that the petitioner who had appealed his sentence could
This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. not
1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the subsequently apply for probation.
preamble WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order
to the amendatory law, “probation was not intended as of April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
an Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private
escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.
delay SO ORDERED.
120
Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Puno, JJ., offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore,
concur. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon
Petition granted. Judgment granting probation set aside. the
Notes.—Order of the court granting or denying Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the case and over the person of the accused upon the
probation is not appealable. (Heirs of the Late Francisco
filing of
Abueg vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 78 [1993])
a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal
The act of an accused, who is immediately committed to action (Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
jail after judgment of conviction despite his being out on Same; Same; Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22;
bail, of filing an application for probation instead of Bouncing Checks; Venue; In offenses involving violations of
challenging the legality of the trial court’s act of issuing the
such commitment order forecloses his right to appeal. Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22), the determinative factor in
(Cal determining venue, is the place of the issuance of the check.—
vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 523 [1995]) Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the
——o0o—— Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People
_______________ v.
10 174 SCRA 566 (1989). Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that “the determinative factor
722 (in
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check.”
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED On
De Villa vs. Court of Appeals the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991.* the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People v. Yabut (76
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. pertinent portion of which reads: “(1) Venue of the offense lies
LORAYES, respondents. at
Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal Procedure; Information; Since the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2)
the
the information alleges that the offense was committed in
place where the check was written, signed or dated does not
Makati,
the same is controlling, and it sufficiently vests jurisdiction necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final
upon
the RTC of Makati.—In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla act
essential to its consummation as an obligation; x x x (Res. No.
(156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim v. Rodrigo, 167
SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled “that jurisdiction 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28,
or 1980).” (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge
venue is determined by the allegations in the information.” Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 &
The 12,
October-De-
information under consideration specifically alleged that the
121
_______________ of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction
* SECOND DIVISION.
723
of a
VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991 723 statute of doubtful meaning.—More importantly, it is well
De Villa vs. Court of Appeals established that courts may avail themselves of the actual
cember, 1983, p. 14). It is undisputed that the check in proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the
question construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City
was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private of
respondent at Makati, Metro Manila. Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Foreign checks, provided to
they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
payable outside thereof, are within the coverage of the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on
Bouncing the
Checks Law.—However, petitioner argues that the check in bill may be adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA
question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner 318
with a [1978]).
foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But it will be noted that the law of Appeals. Melo, J.
does The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial San Jose, Enriquez, Lacas, Santos & Borje for
court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988: “Under petitioner.
the Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided 724
they 724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
outside thereof x x x are within the coverage of said law.”
PARAS, J.:
Statutes; Where the law does not make any exception, courts
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and
may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to
justify set aside the decision** of the Court of Appeals
it.—It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that promulgated
where on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled
the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. “Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and
Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make Roberto Z. Lorayes”, dismissing the petition for certiorari
any filed therein.
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court
reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. of Appeals, is as follows:
IAC, “On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged
150 SCRA 520 [1987]). before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Same; Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings
122
Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa merit.
Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows: ‘Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
‘That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the
willfully, coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. current accounts in foreign currency.’
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company “Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated
complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to September 6, 1988, and which reads:
P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had ‘Accused’s motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was
no opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.
sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check ‘The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against
in full upon its presentment which check when presented to the drawee current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang
bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now
dishonored for the reason ‘INSUFFICIENT FUNDS’ and despite receipt Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero’s The Ramifications of the Law on
of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. Bouncing Checks, p. 5).’ ” (Rollo, Annex “A”, Decision, pp. 20-22).
LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
after receiving said notice.’ the
“After arraignment and after private respondent had testified aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September
on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the 6,
Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
has no wherein he contended:
“(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank,
was respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same
committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction
hence,
of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang
the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act
22 could have not contemplated extending its
No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and
Currency). coverage over dollar accounts;
_______________ “(b)
** Penned by Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by “(c)
Associate Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial. That assuming that the subject check was issued in
725
connection with a private transaction between
VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991 725
petitioner and private respondent, the payment
De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
could not be legally paid in dollars as it would
“On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned
orders stating: violate Republic Act No. 529; and
‘Accused’s motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of That the obligation arising from the issuance of the
123
questioned check is null and void and is not Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the
enforceable within the Philip- action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
726 defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED (Balais, v. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]).
De Villa vs. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
pines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such the statute in force at the time of commencement of the
premises, action (De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this
check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of review, can not be questioned.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.” (Rollo, Annex “A”, Decision, Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
p. specifically provide that:
22). “Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a complaint or
decision, the decretal portion of which reads: information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against the
petitioner. 727
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, Annex “A”, Decision, p. 5) VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991 727
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients
by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p.
thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the
6)
court,
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its unless the particular place wherein it was committed
resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex “B”, p. 26). constitutes
Hence, this petition. an essential element of the offense or is necessary for
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second identifying
Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and the offense charged.
required the parties to submit simultaneously their “Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to
respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81). existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in where the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.”
question.
In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279
The petition is without merit.
[1987] cited in the case of Lim v. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested
[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled “that jurisdiction or
for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding
venue is determined by the allegations in the
cases (Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147
information.”
[1988]).
The information under consideration specifically alleged
124
that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila 728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
vest It is undisputed that the check in question was executed
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The and delivered by the petitioner to herein private
Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or However, petitioner argues that the check in question
information in court which initiates a criminal action was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a
(Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]). foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People Bouncing
of Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the
of currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly
People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that “the ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place “Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign
of checks,
the issuance of the check.” provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa though payable outside thereof x x x are within the coverage
of
Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People
said law.”
v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that
guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated
where the law does not distinguish courts should not
December
distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law
15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
does not make any exception, courts may not except
“(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check
was something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
written, [1987]).
signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was More importantly, it is well established that courts may
executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
thereof legislative
which is the final act essential to its consummation as an body to assist in determining the construction of a statute
obligation; x x x (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil.
Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980).” (See The Law on Bouncing 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a
Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p.
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion
14).
728

125
on the bill may be adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, supplied, for emphasis).
82 PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for
SCRA 318 [1978]). lack of merit.
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show SO ORDERED.
that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento
whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The and Regalado, JJ., concur.
discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa Petition dismissed.
fully sustains this view, as follows: Note.—Jurisdiction to try a criminal case is determined
“x x x x x x x x x. from the allegations in the information. (People vs.
“THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is Masilang, 142 SCRA 673.)
recognized. ——o0o——
“MR.TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker. 730
“THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed. © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
“MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 267
of Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
729 No. L-14787. January 28, 1961.
VOL. 195, APRIL 8, 1991 729 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
De Villa vs. Court of Appeals vs. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and
the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL
involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
about Statutes; General terms limited by specific terms.—General
checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that
the
checks
general language will be limited by specific language which
in our currency, and many others.
indicates the statute's object and purpose, The rule is
“THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry. applicable
“MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items
Speaker, in
and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The Same,—Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or distinguish.
deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply. Same.—The rule of construction, that general and unlimited
“MR. TUPAY. So, it include U.S. dollar checks. terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when
“MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.” used
in connection with them, does not require the rejection
xxxxxx 268
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Italics 268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
126
Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez and household remedies. On several occasions, it
of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in imported
ascertaining the legislative intent and is to be considered in from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract,
connection with other rules of construction. sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate, precipitated
Taxation; Exchange Tax Law (Rep. Act No. 601); Exchange or
calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
special excise tax; Stabilizer and flavors.—The words
"stabilizer stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it
and flavors" in a provision of the Exchange Tax Law, manufactures. For every importation made of these
enumerating materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the
"rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
beans, exchange used for the payment of the cost,
butter fat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and transportation
flavors, and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed", cannot be Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the
construed Exchange Tax Law.
as referring only to those materials actually used in the On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central
preparatíon or manufacture of food and food products. Said
Bank three applications for refund of the 17 % special
words
may include "dental cream stabilizers and flavors". While the
excise tax it had paid in. the aggregate sum of
said P113,343.99.
terms are preceded by a number of articles that may be The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic
classified Act
as food of food products, it is likewise true that the other items 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for
immediately following them do not belong to the same 269
classification. On the basis of the grouping of the items alone, VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 269
it Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
cannot be validly maintained that the terms "stabilizer and the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other
flavors" refer only to food and food products. charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of
PETITION for review of a decision of the Auditor General. x x x stabilizer and flavors x x x shall be refunded to any
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory
Ross, Selph & Carrascoso for petitioner. proof of actual importation under the rules and
Solicitor General for respondents. regulations
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a After
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine the applications were processed by the Officer-in-Charge
laws engaged in the manuf acture of toilet preparations of
the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank,
127
that official advised the petitioner that of the total sum other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of
of rice,
P113.343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans,
P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and
flavors,
the
vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry feed; textbooks,
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract,
reference
sodium books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board of
benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been Textbooks and/or established public or private educational
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in
refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines
reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the 270
Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. and newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the for
latter on December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the the printing of supplementary readers (approved by the Board
of
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term
Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contracts
"stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the to
preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not be certified by the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-
satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court biotics,
thru vitamins, hormones, X-Ray films, laboratory reagents,
the present petition for review. biologicals,
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for
foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed
of in
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the the appendix to this Act, in quantities to be certified by the
Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals
17% special excise tax. imposed by the Exchange Tax
applying
Law therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and
(Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under such other drugs and medicines as may be certified by the
section 2 thereof, which reads as follows: Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect
"SEC. 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on the
foreign health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof
and/or of
128
actual importation under the rules and regulations to be to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle",
promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Italics which
supplied.) is among those listed preceding the term in question,
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer includes not only those intended for slaughter but also
and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those those
materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture 271
of food and food products is based, apparently, on the VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 271
principle of statutory construction that "general terms Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. vs. Gimenez
may for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under
be restricted by specific words, with the result that the Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section
general language will be limited by the specific language of
which indicates the statute's object and purpose." Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not
(Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p. 324- always refer to food for human consumption, was added
325.) among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors".
The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone,
cases where, except for one general term, all the items it
in cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and
an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the
In Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and manufacture of food and food products. This view is
flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may be supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not
that the other items immediately f ollowing, it do not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers
belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53
"poultry feed" do not fall under the category of food or Off.
food Gaz. No. 15, page 4831). Since the law does not
products because they are used in the farming and distinguish
poultry between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation
industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears of
to food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or
be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as dental cream, we are not authorized to make any
a distinction and must construe the words in their general
matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in sense. The rule of construction that general and
the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals
129
when used in connection with them, does not require the specific words, with the result that the general language
rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely will be limited by the specific language, which indicates
as the statute's object and purpose" is applicable only to
an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and cases where, except for one general term, all the items in
an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
is
ID.; RULE THAT GENERAL TERMS ARE LIMITED BY
to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
PARTICULAR RECITALS; INTENTION OF THE RULE.
(See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of —The rule of construction that general and unlimited
Laws by Black, p. 215-216, 2nd ed.) terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals
Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now when used in connection with them, does not require the
idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely
parties. as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and is to be taken in connection with other rules of
and the respondents are hereby ordered to audit construction.
petitioners PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the
applications for refund which were approved by the Auditor General.
Officerin- The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in the total Ross, Selph & Carrascoso for petitioner.
amount of P23,958.13. Asst. Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor
Bengzon, Bautista, Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Emerito Salva for respondents.
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. GUTIÉRREZ, DAVID, J.:
Labrador, J., reserves his vote. The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc., is a
Decision reversed. corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
——————— laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations
272 and
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. household remedies. On several occasions, it imported
1. from
2. abroad various materials such as irish moss extract.
[No. L-14787. January 28, 1961] sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate, precipitated
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as
vs. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as AUDITOR GENERAL stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it
and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL manufactures. For every importation made of these
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. materials, the petitioner
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE THAT 875
GENERAL TERMS MAY BE RESTRICTED BY VOL. 110, JANUARY 28, 1961 875
SPECIFIC WORDS; To WHAT CASES APPLICABLE.—
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines Inc. vs. Gimenez
The principle that "general terms may be restricted' by
130
paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the
special reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that
of toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under
the cost, transportation and other charges incident section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
thereto, Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, latter on December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling of the
commonly auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term
known as the Exchange Tax Law. "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not
excise satisfied, the petioner brought the case to this Court thru
tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The the present petition for review.
claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 876
601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the 876 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez
incident to the importation into the Philippines of * * * The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the
stabilizer and flavors * * * shall be refunded to any foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation
importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory of
proof of actual importation under the rules and dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the
regulations 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law
to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under
After section 2 thereof, which reads as follows:
the applications were processed by the Officer in-Charge "SEC. 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on
of foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation
the Exchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank,
and/or
that official advised the petitioner that of the total sum other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of
of rice,
P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans,
P23,958.13 representing the 17% special excise tax on butter, fat, chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and
the flavors,
foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer poultry feed; textbooks,
sodium reference
benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate had been books, and suplementary readers approved by the Board on
approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however, Textbooks and/or established public or private educational
131
institutions; newsprint imported by or for publishers for use in principle of statutory construction that "general terms
the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and may
newspapers; be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing general language will be limited by the
of 877
supplementary readers( approved by the Board of Textbooks) VOL. 110, JANUARY 28, 1961 877
to Colgate-Palmolive Philippines Inc. vs. Gimenez
be supplied to the Government under contracts perfected
specific language which indicates the statute's object and
before
the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by
purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed.
the p.
Director of Printing; anesthetics, antibiotics, vitamins, 324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion,
hormones, applicable
X-Ray films, Laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, only to cases where, except for one general term, all the
and items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compounding medicines; specific
medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, class. In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer
in and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may
quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise
actually
true
needed by the hospitals applying therefor; drugs and
medicines
that the other items immediately following it do not
listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicine belong
as to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry
may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time feed" do not fall under the category of food or food
to products
promote and protect the health of the people of the Philippines because they are used in the farming and poultry
shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, industries, respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears
upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules to
and be more of a medicine than food or food product, for, as
regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven a
thereof"
matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in
(Italic supplied.)
the list of medicines and drugs appearing in the appendix
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer
to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle",
and flavors" as used in the law refers only to those
which
materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture
is among those listed preceding the term in question,
of food and food products is based, apparently, on the
includes not only those intended for slaughter but also
132
those for breeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction
under Republic Act 814 amending the above-quoted and Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215-216, 2nd ed.)
section Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now
of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does idle to pass upon the other questions raised by the
not parties.
always refer to food for human consumption, was added Wherefore, the decision under review is reversed and
among the items grouped with stabilizer and flavors". the respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioner's
Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, applications for refund which were approved by the
it OfficerIn-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration in
cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and the total amount of P23,958.13.
flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B.
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
manufacture of food and food products. This view is Decision reversed.
supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish". (Ligget & Myers
Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 101
Phil., 106; 53 Off. Gaz. [15], page 4831). Since the law
does
not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in
the
pre-
878
878 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Jesus vs. Coloso
paration of f ood and those used in the manufacture of
toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to
make
any distinction and must construe the words in their
general sense. The rule of construction that general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular
recitals when used in connection with them, does not
require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is
intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of
the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other
133