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FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE

UNITED
STATES

1969–1976
VOLUME XX

SOUTHEAST ASIA,
1969–1972

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Washington
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Foreign Relations of the

United States, 1969–1976

Volume XX

Southeast Asia
1969–1972

Editor Daniel J. Lawler

General Editor Edward C. Keefer

United States Government Printing Office

Washington
2006
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 11356

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
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Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official
documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and
significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The
Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibil-
ity for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of
the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches,
compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank
B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific stan-
dards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March
26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the se-
ries through 1991.
Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991,
established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series.
Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of
State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough,
accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy de-
cisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes
of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehen-
sive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the
United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing prin-
ciples established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is
guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records
should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the pub-
lished text that a deletion has been made; the published record should
omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and
nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in
policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be pub-
lished not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are
convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and schol-
arly standards of selection and editing.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Rela-
tions series that documents the most important issues in the foreign
policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The sub-
series presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary
record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the adminis-
trations of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This specific volume documents
III
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IV Preface

U.S. policy towards three important countries of Southeast Asia: Thai-

land, the Philippines, and Indonesia, 1969–1972, a period when the fu-
ture of Southeast Asia was a major concern of American foreign pol-
icy makers.
Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations,
1969–1976, Volume XX
This is the last print volume to document U.S. policy towards
Southeast Asia, other than those print volumes that document the Viet-
nam War during the Nixon–Ford administrations. For the January 1973
to January 1977 period, U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia (nations
other than Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) is covered in an electronic-
only volume. The decision to cover Thailand, the Philippines, and In-
donesia for 1969–1972 in detail in this print volume was based on the
fact that each country was a key ally—either formally or de facto—of
the United States during the Vietnam war, and each played a specific
role during the conflict. Thailand sent troops to fight in Vietnam, pro-
vided bases for U.S. airpower in Southeast Asia, and secretly provided
training, troops, and arms to support U.S.-backed guerrilla forces in
Laos. The Philippines sent a 2,000-man civic action group to South Viet-
nam, and Filipinos made up many of the administrative contractors in
South Vietnam. Indonesia provided key arms support to the Lon Nol
government at a crucial time. In addition, Thailand, the Philippines,
and Indonesia were important countries in their own right, with key
U.S. military and economic assistance programs, large embassies, and
close relations with the United States. In each country, the United States
had a considerable interest in their government’s success.
The chapter on Thailand, the largest in the volume, has the most
obvious and closest associations with the Vietnam war. A principal
theme of this chapter is U.S. efforts to assure the Thais that unilateral
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and a projected settle-
ment of the war did not mean a lesser U.S. commitment to Thailand.
These efforts were difficult due to congressional investigations into the
U.S. relationship with Thailand and charges that there were secret un-
derstandings and commitments. Another development that concerned
the Thais was the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which led them to think that
the United States was withdrawing from the area. A second key theme
of the volume is the covert military role that Thailand’s military forces
played in supporting the anti-communist forces in Laos and the po-
tential role they could play in supporting the Lon Nol government in
Cambodia. The presence of the Thai Division fighting in Vietnam and
whether it could be used elsewhere is yet another related theme. As
U.S. troops withdrew from South Vietnam, Thailand, after some con-
sideration, moved to draw down its own forces. Other themes covered
in the chapter are less directly related to the conflict in Indochina: the
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Preface V

fate of parliamentary government in Thailand, U.S. economic and mil-

itary assistance, U.S. concern over the insurgency in northeast Thai-
land, rice sales, imports of Thai textiles to the United States, and ef-
forts to prevent drug production and interdict drug trafficking in
Thailand.
The second largest chapter in this volume documents U.S. policy
towards the Philippines. The relationship between President Ferdinand
Marcos and the Nixon administration is the dominant theme of this
chapter. U.S. officials had to assure Marcos that they were neutral in
the 1969 Philippines presidential elections and discourage his desire
for a special channel to Washington. Corruption in the Marcos gov-
ernment, Marcos’s desire to revise the constitution to his benefit, and
his eventual declaration of martial law in September 1972 in the face
of student riots caused U.S. officials in Manila and Washington to as-
sess whether he was the best man to lead the Philippines from the U.S.
point of view. It was in Washington’s interest to have “more flags in
South Vietnam,” so the fate of the Philippines Civic Action Group in
South Vietnam was a key issue between Washington and Manila. The
Group’s fate was affected both by general U.S.-Philippines relations,
the unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, and U.S. con-
gressional hearings on U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia. Other
themes that are documented in the chapter are ones that predate the
Vietnam war, such as preference for Philippines exports to the United
States, U.S. benefits for Filipino veterans who served in the Second
World War, and U.S. bases in the Philippines. The seriousness and
threat of insurgency in Central Luzon was an emerging concern. Fi-
nally, President Nixon’s insistence that U.S. armed forces stationed in
the Philippines be drastically cut caused considerable bureaucratic and
political difficulties.
The final chapter in the volume deals with Indonesia, officially a
non-aligned nation, but under strongman General Suharto, a de facto
ally of the United States. The principal themes of this chapter are the
question of Indonesia’s international debt left over from the Sukarno
years and U.S. support for multilateral Indonesian debt relief among
international lending organizations. A related theme is the amount of
U.S. bilateral aid provided to Indonesia. Because Indonesia’s armed
forces used Soviet equipment, the United States asked Indonesia to
provide AK–47 rifles and ammunition to Cambodian armed forces,
which were also armed with Soviet small arms, at a point when the
Lon Nol government was fighting against North Vietnamese troops. In
return, the Indonesians gained from Washington an expanded—
although still small—U.S. military assistance program. Generally U.S.-
Indonesia relations were good, and Indonesia enjoyed the kind of sta-
bility that the Nixon administration appreciated. There was, however,
a dawning realization among the President and his key foreign policy
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VI Preface

advisers that they too often took Indonesia for granted. As a result, the
Nixon administration made a special effort to consult periodically at a
high level with Suharto and other key Indonesian government officials.
Like all recent Foreign Relations volumes, the emphasis of this vol-
ume is on policy formulation and on important issues, rather than the
day-to-day implementation of policy. President Nixon and his Assis-
tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, still dominate the
policy process, but the role of Secretary of State William Rogers and,
in the case of Thailand, Vice President Spiro Agnew, are significant. In
Southeast Asia, with the exception of issues relating to the Vietnam
war, the Secretary—and Department of State—was granted a larger
policy role by the President.
While the editors believe that this volume stands on its own
through the use of annotation and especially editorial notes relating to
other volumes, this volume is best read in conjunction with the four
Nixon Vietnam volumes for January 1969–January 1973, volumes VI–IX.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Wash-
ington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the
date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum
was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed
copies, unless otherwise noted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Re-
lations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guid-
ance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as ex-
actly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are
described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according
to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents
within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been sup-
plied by the editors for each document included in the volume.
Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the
original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently cor-
rected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected
by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in
roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original text are
printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as
found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the
front matter of each volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that
deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classi-
fied after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where
possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by
indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. En-
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Preface VII

tire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been ac-

counted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of
pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that ap-
pear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. With the excep-
tion of Presidential recordings transcribed in the Office of the Histo-
rian for this volume, all ellipses are in the original documents.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s
source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information.
This note also provides the background of important documents and
policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy ad-
visers read the document.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent
material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional
documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-
ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide sum-
maries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elu-
cidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and
other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supple-
ment or explicate the official record.
The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than
to page numbers.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documenta-
tion, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records,
advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations
series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and
editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the prepa-
ration and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does
not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series,
but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and
reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statu-
tory obligations.
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review
Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the
Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the
PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Pres-
idential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public ac-
cess regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in
order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon
White House officials, since these officials were not given the oppor-
tunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus,
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VIII Preface

the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA

formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House
staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon
White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White
House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon his-
torical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned.
Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to
segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal mate-
rials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s
Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in ac-
cordance with the PRMPA.
Declassification Review
The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Ad-
ministration, conducted the declassification review for the Department
of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was
conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Or-
der 12958, as amended on Classified National Security Information and
applicable laws.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all in-
formation, subject only to the current requirements of national secu-
rity, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions en-
tailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional
bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the
U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding
specific documents of those governments. The declassification review
of this volume, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2004, re-
sulted in the decision to withhold 19 documents in full, excise a para-
graph or more in 7 documents, and make minor excisions of less than
a paragraph in 48 documents.
The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research
conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassifi-
cation review process described above, that notwithstanding the num-
ber of denied and excised documents, the record presented in this vol-
ume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. foreign
policy towards, and significant relations with, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, and Indonesia.
Acknowledgments
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the
Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and
Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The
editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing ac-
cess to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon
Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due
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Preface IX

to Scott Koch, formerly of the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence

Agency, who was extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files
of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Con-
gress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers.
The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the tran-
scripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry
Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her
valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of
Defense.
Daniel J. Lawler collected the documentation for this volume,
made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervi-
sion of Edward C. Keefer, then Chief of the Asia and Americas Divi-
sion. Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Kristin
L. Ahlberg prepared the list of names and abbreviations and terms. She
and Vicki E. Futscher performed the copy and technical editing. Breffni
Whelan prepared the index.
Marc J. Susser
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
November 2006
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Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII
Abbreviations and Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII
Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXV
Note on U.S. Covert Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XLIII
Southeast Asia, 1969–1972
Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723

XI
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Sources
Sources for the Foreign Relations Series
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in
the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide com-
prehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and
significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government
agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-
gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate
with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete
access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and
by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted
in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are avail-
able for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to
all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the cen-
tral files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”)
of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of
the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of
international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence
with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and mem-
oranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State
and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All
the Department’s indexed central files through 1974 have been per-
manently transferred to the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Depart-
ment’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period,
which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention,
have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from
the Department’s custody to Archives II.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to
the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy
records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presiden-
tial libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II
include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documenta-
tion from the Department of State and other Federal agencies includ-
ing the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger
has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The pa-
pers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of Foreign Relations.
Research for this volume was completed through special access to
restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the
XIII
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XIV Sources

Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed
in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-
classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials staff is process-
ing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but
they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.
Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX
In preparing this volume the editors made extensive use of the
Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives in College Park,
Maryland. The most valuable records within the Nixon Presidential
Materials are in the National Security Council (NSC) Files, Country
Files, Far East, specifically the country files for Indonesia, Philippines,
and Thailand. These are the files maintained by the National Security
Council Staff members responsible for the respective countries and they
provide the day to day information on U.S. policy, as well as drafts and
final versions of many of Henry Kissinger’s memoranda to the Presi-
dent. This file provides the basic context for presidential decisions.
President Nixon and/or Vice President Spiro Agnew visited In-
donesia, the Philippines and Thailand during this period. Records in
the Nixon Presidential Materials relating to these trips and related
letters and other communications are in the NSC Files, Presidential
Trip Files, the Presidential Correspondence Files, and the President/
Kissinger Memoranda on Conversation File. Also of key importance in
the NSC Files are the Backchannel Files. President Nixon and Henry
Kissinger communicated on sensitive issues with ambassadors in
Southeast Asia secretly through backchannel messages without the rest
of the foreign affairs bureaucracy’s knowledge. These files are of key
value.
Also important in the NSC files of the Nixon Presidential Materi-
als are the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) which are part of the NSC
files, but not to be confused with the less complete NSC Institutional
Matters Files. The former contains minutes of National Security Coun-
cil Meetings, as well as minutes of such key NSC subgroups as the
Review/Senior Review Group and the Washington Special Actions
Group. For each set of meeting minutes there are corresponding meet-
ing folders that contain the papers that Kissinger, who chaired all of
these NSC groups, used in preparing for the meeting. Also in the
H-Files are the complete set of National Security Study Memoranda
(NSSM), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), and related
studies and papers. The President used this NSSM/NSDM mechanism
to generate policy options from the foreign affairs bureaucracy for In-
donesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
Of second importance in the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential
Materials are the Kissinger Office Files, the Lake Chronological Files,
and the Haig Chronological and Special Files, all of which have occa-
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Sources XV

sional material of value. The President’s Daily brief in the NSC Files
provides sporadic information on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land, sometimes with handwritten comments or orders by President
Nixon. Finally, the Subject Files of the NSC Files including such sub
files as HAK/Richardson Meetings, Presidential Determinations, and
Symington Subcommittee often provide documents of value.
Besides the NSC Files, the Nixon Materials include the White House
Special Files, including the President’s Personal Files with its valuable
Memoranda for the President, the President’s Office Files, and Staff Mem-
bers and Office Files. Material on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land is sprinkled through these files. Also of value are the Presidential
tape recordings, Nixon’s secret sound-activated taping system that began
in 1971. The volume contains conversations transcribed specifically by
the Office of the Historian, primarily relating to the visits of Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines to Washington.
The Kissinger Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress often replicate documentation found in other collections, es-
pecially the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials, but have
some documents unique to that collection. The most useful parts of the
Kissinger Papers are the Chronological Files, Memoranda of Conver-
sations, Memoranda for the President, and a collection of documents
organized by countries under the Geopolitical Files heading. The tran-
scripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations are in this collection and
have a number of conversations about Indonesian aid to Cambodia,
especially in May and June 1970. While the original transcripts are not
open to the public, Dr. Kissinger has allowed the National Archives to
make available copies at College Park, Maryland.
The volume also draws heavily on the records of the Department
of State. Along with the President and Vice President, Secretary of State
William Rogers had meetings with prime ministers, foreign ministers,
and other high-level leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Mar-
shall Green had a keen interest in relations with Indonesia and South-
east Asia. Many records of high-level meetings and communications
are in the Department of State Central Files located in Record Group
(RG) 59 at the National Archives.
For high-level meetings the best collections in RG 59 are POL 7
INDON, POL 7 PHIL, and POL 7 THAI. POL 7 US/NIXON and POL
7 US/NIXON MOONGLOW contain records on President Nixon’s trip
of July 1969 to Southeast Asia. (Moonglow was the code name given
for this trip.) POL 7 US/CONNALLY covers former Treasury Secretary
Connally’s trip of June 1972 to Southeast Asia and other destinations.
POL 7 US/AGNEW documents Vice President Agnew’s January 1970
trip. POL 15–1 INDON, POL 15–1 PHIL, and POL 15–1 THAI contain
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XVI Sources

important high level communications with and information about the

respective heads of Government of these three countries.
For general political relations with Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand, the best files are POL 1 INDON, POL 1 PHIL and POL 1
THAI and POL US–INDON, as well as POL US–PHIL, POL US–PHIL
and POL US–THAI. In the Philippines a strong partisan political tra-
dition existed and POL 12 PHIL, POL 13, and POL 14 PHIL provide
documentation on the political system, as do POL 23–7 and POL 23–8,
which are files that contain material on the opposition to the Marcos
administration. For Thailand, the POL 23–7 and POL 23–8 THAI files
relate mostly to the incipient insurgency in the northeast. Both Thai-
land and the Philippines contributed troops to the Vietnam war effort
and were official members of the so-called Troop Contributing Coun-
tries (TCC). The file for this issue is POL 27 VIET S, the catchall file for
military operations in South Vietnam.
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand were recipients of major
U.S. aid programs, so the AID(US) INDON, AID(US) PHIL, and
AID(US) THAI files and their related numerical sub files are impor-
tant. Thailand and the Philippines had large U.S. military assistance
programs, and Indonesia had an incipient one that was expanding, so
DEF(US) INDON, DEF(US) PHIL, and DEF(US) THAI and their nu-
merical sub-files are also of value. A specific file worthy of mention is
DEF 1–1 INDON–US, a file for U.S.-Indonesia military contingency
plans, that contains documents on the U.S.-initiated Indonesian effort
to provide small arms and ammunition to the Lon Nol government in
Cambodia. Another file in which documentation on this issue can be
found is POL 27 CAMB/KHMER. DEF 15–4 PHIL–US contains docu-
ments on U.S. bases and installations in the Philippines.
Indonesia suffered from large foreign debt left over from the
Sukarno years and had limited ability to repay it. Records of consul-
tation and cooperation among Indonesia’s creditors are in the FN (fi-
nancial) series of the Central Files, especially FN1–1 INDON. The ques-
tion of foreign investment and land ownership in the Philippines was
a difficult one, and FN 9 PHIL is the basic starting file. Trade with In-
donesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are often files under INCO
(short for international commodities) with the actual commodity:
INCO RICE 17 INDON–THAI relates to rice sales from Thailand to
Indonesia or INCO COTTON 17 US–THAI, documents the U.S.-Thai
cotton trade.
Some Department of State “Lot” Files are worthy of mention. The
basic conference files at the National Archives, entry 3051B, covering
1966–1972, and consolidating a number of Department of State con-
ference files, contain records of the trips of Nixon, Agnew, Rogers, and
others to the area. The files of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96 D 695, which
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Sources XVII

include both personal and official records, are valuable, especially for
Johnson’s service as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
1969–1973. This volume relied on Department of State Lot files relat-
ing to the NSC and the Under Secretaries Committee, S/S NSC Files:
Lot 80 D 212 and S/S Under Secretaries Files: Lot 83 D 276. Addition-
ally, the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) at the Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials have a more complete record of NSC related materials than these
State lot files.
Intelligence related files of particular value are the Helms DCI Files
at the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B0125A, the INR/IL Histor-
ical Files at the Department of State, and the Nixon Intelligence Files
at the National Security Council in Washington. The latter will even-
tually be transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library.
The Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, known as the Symington Subcommittee, conducted a se-
ries of investigations and hearings on various countries of Southeast
Asia, including the Philippines and Thailand. Senator Stuart Syming-
ton (D–MO) was especially critical of what he alleged to be the mer-
cenary nature of the Philippines and Thai troop contribution to the war
in Vietnam, corruption in the Philippines and Thailand, and unwar-
ranted U.S. Government commitments to the Philippines and Thailand.
The declassified version of the hearings was printed by the U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office in 1970, after having been released by the Sub-
committee on June 8. (United States Security Agreements and Commit-
ments Abroad, Republic of Philippines, Kingdom of Laos, Kingdom of
Thailand, hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad of the Committee of Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, Parts 1–3, Sep-
tember-November 1969).
Department of Defense records of most value were the official
records of Secretary of Defense Laird for 1969–1972, FRC 330 74 0142.
In addition, worthy of mention are the Laird Papers at the Ford Li-
brary. These papers are copies of Laird’s official records, chosen by his
key aides at the end of his term that document some of the main themes
of his tenure. Most of the documents of value for this volume are filed
under Cambodia or Vietnam. Other Defense Department Records that
are now available, but were not used when this volume was researched,
deserve mention as potentially valuable resources. They are the Offi-
cial Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler and
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, both RG 218, National Archives, College
Park, Maryland.
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XVIII
304-689/B428-S/60007

XVIII Sources

Unpublished Sources
Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records
Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and
Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Indonesia
Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971
Thailand Lotus File 1969–70
Thailand, 1972–1975

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

AID (US) INDON, general U.S. aid policy, Indonesia

AID (US) 8 INDON, U.S. grants and technical assistance to Indonesia
AID (US) 15–8 INDON, PL–480 Title I commodity sales, Indonesia
AID (US) PHIL, general U.S. aid policy, Philippines
AID (US) THAI, general U.S. aid policy, Thailand
AID (US) 10 THAI, strategic and political economic aid to Thailand
AID (US) 15 THAI, PL–480, Food for Peace program, Thailand
AID (US) 15–8 THAI, PL–480 Title I commodity sales, Thailand
DEF 9–5 CHINAT, training of Republic of China forces
DEF 6 PHIL, armed forces of the Philippines
DEF 15–4 PHIL–US, U.S.-Philippines base agreement
DEF THAI–US, defense affairs, Thailand-United States
DEF 1–1 THAI–US, contingency military planning, Thailand-United States
DEF 19 THAI–LAOS, Thai military assistance to Laos
FN 1–1 INDON, general Indonesian finance policy
FN 9 PHIL–US, foreign investment
INCO–COTTON 17 US–THAI, Thailand-United States cotton trade
INCO–RICE INDON, Indonesian rice industry and commodities
INCO–RICE 17 INDON–THAI, Indonesian-Thailand rice trade
ORG 7 EA, organization and administration, visits by officials of the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
ORG 7 JCS, organization and administration, visits by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ORG 7 S, administration and organization, visits by Secretary of State
ORG 7 U, organization and administration, visits by the Under Secretary of State
POL CAMB–INDON, political affairs and relations, Cambodia-Indonesia
POL 27 CAMB, military operations in Cambodia
POL 27 CAMB/KHMER, military operations, Cambodia/Khmer Republic
POL CHICOM–US, political affairs and relations, People’s Republic of China-United States
POL INDON–US, political affairs and relations, Indonesia-United States
POL 7 INDON, meetings with Indonesian leaders
POL 7 INDON, visits to Indonesia and meetings with Indonesians
POL 15–1 INDON, Indonesian head of state, executive branch
POL PHIL, political affairs and relations, Philippines
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XIX
304-689/B428-S/60007

Sources XIX

POL PHIL–US, political affairs and relations, Philippines-United States

POL 1 PHIL, general policy, Philippines
POL 1 PHIL–US, U.S.-Philippines relations, general
POL 7 PHIL, meetings and visits with Philippines officials
POL 7 PHIL, meetings with Filipino leaders
POL 12–6 PHIL, political parties and memberships, Philippines
POL 13–2 PHIL, students and youth groups, Philippines
POL 14 PHIL, Philippines elections
POL 15 PHIL, Government of the Philippines
POL 15–1 PHIL, Filipino head of state, executive branch
POL 15–4 PHIL, administration, Philippines
POL 15–5 PHIL, constitution, Philippines
POL 23 PHIL, internal security, Philippines
POL 23–7 PHIL, infiltration, subversion, and sabotage in the Philippines
POL 23–8 PHIL, demonstrations, riots, and protests in the Philippines
POL THAI–US, political affairs and relations, Thailand-United States
POL 1 THAI–US, U.S.-Thai relations, general
POL 7 THAI, meetings with Thai leaders
POL 15 THAI, Government of Thailand
POL 15–1 THAI, Thai head of state, executive branch
POL 17 THAI–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Thailand-United States
POL 23 THAI, internal security, Thailand
POL 23–7 THAI, infiltration, subversion, and sabotage in Thailand
POL 30 THAI, defectors and expellees, Thailand
POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D, condolences upon the death of former Pres-
ident Eisenhower
POL 7 US/AGNEW, visits and meetings, Vice President Agnew
POL 7 US/CONNALLY, visits and meetings, John Connally
POL 7 US/GREEN, visits and meetings, Marshall Green
POL 7 US/KENNEDY, visits and meetings, David Kennedy
POL 7 US/NIXON, visits and meetings, President Nixon
POL 15 US, government, United States
POL 27 VIET S, military operations in South Vietnam
PS 7–6 US–HK/BEAMS, DOVIE, protective services, welfare and whereabouts, Dovie
Beams
SEATO 3, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization meetings

Lot Files

Conference Files, 1966–1972: Entry No. 3051 B

Files of the meetings and conferences of the President, Vice President, Secretary of
State, and Under Secretary of State, 1966–1972. Formerly S/S Lot Files: 67 D 586, 68
D 453, 69 D 182, 70 D 387, 71 D 227, and 73 D 323

EA/PAB Files: Lot 74 D 471

Letters and Memoranda file for 1972–1973 maintained by the Office of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

Green Files: Lot 74 D 471

Files of Marshall Green

Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695

Files of U. Alexis Johnson, 1958–1973, including both personal and official records
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XX
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XX Sources

S/S National Security Council Files: Lot 80 D 212

NSSMs and Related Papers January 1965–May 1980

S/S NSC Under Secretaries Files: Lot 83 D 276

Records of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Decision
Memoranda, 1962–1977
Subject Files

Nixon Presidential Materials Project

National Security Council Files

Backchannel Files
Country Files, Far East: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand
Haig Chronological Files
Haig Special File
Kissinger Office Files
Lake Chronological Files
Nixon Intelligence Files
President’s Daily Briefs
Subject Files: HAK/Richardson Meetings; National Security Study Memoranda;
Presidential Determinations; Symington Subcommittee
Trip Files
Vietnam Subject File
VIP Visits

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

Review Group/Senior Review Group Minutes
Review Group/Senior Review Group Meetings
Vietnam Special Study Group Meetings
Washington Special Actions Group Meetings
Washington Special Actions Group Minutes

White House Special Files

Memoranda for the President
President’s Office Files
Staff Member and Office Files

White House Central Files

Staff Member and Office Files, Daily Diary

White House Tapes

National Security Council

Nixon Intelligence Files

Subject Files: Minutes of 40 Committee; 303/40 Committee Records; Philippines;
Thailand

Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Job 80–B01285A
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXI
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Sources XXI

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: Secretary Laird File: FRC 330 74 0142

Library of Congress

Manuscript Division
Papers of Henry A. Kissinger: Chronological File; Geopolitical File; Memoranda of
Conversations; Memoranda to the President; Telephone Conversations

Published Sources
Documentary Collections

Congressional Quarterly, ed., Congress and the Nation, Volume III, 1969–1972 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973)
U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thai-
land, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969)
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 1969–1972
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973)
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXII
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXIII
304-689/B428-S/60007

Abbreviations and Terms

A–1 (Skyrider), single engine propeller-driven attack plane with one crew member
A/A, anti-aircraft
A/AID, Office of the Administrator, Agency for International Development
AA, Afro-Asian
AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
AAT, Additional Assistance to Thailand
ABF, attacks by fire
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACM, Air Chief Marshal
ADB, Asian Development Bank
ADOA, Air Defense Operations Agreement
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Air Force, also Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, air force base
AFP, Agence France Press
AG, Attorney General
AH or AMH, Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr.
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/ASIA/NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International
Development
AID/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
AK–47, Soviet-designed Kalasknikov assault weapon
Amb, Ambassador
AMCITS, American citizens
APC, armored personnel carrier or Accelerated Pacification Campaign
ARA–LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (State), Bureau for Latin America (AID)
Arc Light, code name for U.S. B–52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia
ARD, Thai Accelerated Rural Development
ARDF, Aerial Radio Direction Finding
ARDL, Accelerated Rural Development Loan
ARDP, Accelerated Rural Development Program
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASA, Association of Southeast Asia
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPAC, Asian and Pacific Council
ASW, anti-submarine warfare

B–52, United States Air Force strategic bomber

Backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the
White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department
of State
BNDD, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BPP, Border Patrol Police (Thailand)
XXIII
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXIV
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XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

C–47, propeller driven twin engine low wing aircraft used for transportation of troops
and/or equipment
C–123, high wing 2 prop engine transport aircraft
C–130, United States Air Force transport plane
C–141, high wing 4 turbo prop engine aircraft used for rapid transportation of troops
and/or equipment
C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CAP, Combined Action Platoon
CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEG, College Editor’s Guild
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CF, contingency funds
CH–47, heavy transport helicopter (“Chinook”)
Chicom(s), Chinese Communist(s)
CHJUSMAG, Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CI, counterinsurgency
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/ONE, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates
CIAP, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress
CIDG, Citizens’ Irregular Defense Group
CIF, Chinese Irregular Forces
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia and Africa South of the
Sahara
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREPPHIL, Commander in Chief, Pacific’s Representative in the Philippines
CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command
CINCUNK, Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea
CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific
CIP, commodities import program
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CL, classified
CM, Chairman’s (of JCS) memorandum
CMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps
CND, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Codel, Congressional delegation
COMECON, Council on Mutual Economic Assistance
Comint, communications intelligence
Comite, committee
COMNAVBASE Subic, Commander, Naval Base, Subic Bay
COMUSMACTHAI, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ConCon, Philippine Constitutional Convention
CONGEN, Consulate General
CONUS, Continental United States
CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam
CPDC, Central Pacification and Development Council
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXV
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Abbreviations and Terms XXV

CPP/ML, Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist-Leninist

CPT, Thai Communist Party
CSA, Chief of Staff of the Army
CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CSM, Philippine Christian Socialist Movement
CSOC, Thai Counter Insurgency Operations Command
CST, Central Standard Time
CT, Thai Communist Insurgents; also Country Team
CTZ, corps tactical zone
CY, calendar year

D, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
DA, Department of the Army
DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DATT, Defense Attaché
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDI, Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO/EA, Deputy Directorate of Operations, East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
DefSec, Defense Secretary
del, delegate; delegation
Delto, delegation to (telegram series indicator from the Delegation to the Paris Peace
Talks on Vietnam)
Depcirtel, circular telegram from the Department of State
DepFonMin, deputy foreign minister
Deptel, telegram from the Department of State
DEYMO, Philippine Democratic Youth Movement
DGNP, Director-General National Police
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DirGen or DG, Director General
Dissem, dissemination
DL, development loan
DMZ, demilitarized zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs
DOS, Department of State
DPM, Deputy Prime Minister
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DPRG, Defense Program Review Group
DRV or DRVN, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTG, date/time/group

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

E/ORF/ICD, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Pol-
icy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State
EA/IND, Office of Indonesian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXVI
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XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

EA/PHIL, Office of Philippines Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, De-
partment of State
EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department
of State
EA/TB, Office of Thailand and Burma Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State
EAP, former designation for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of
State
EC–121, unarmed, four engine propeller driven reconnaissance aircraft
ECAFE, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
ELR, Elliot L. Richardson
Emb, Embassy
Emboff, Embassy officer
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EOB, Executive Office Building
EST, Eastern Standard Time, also estimated
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of
State
Exdis, exclusive distribution
Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank of Washington

F–4 (Phantom), twin engine turbo jet, all weather, supersonic tactical fighter bomber with
two crew members
F, fighter
FAC, Foreign Assets Control
FANK, Forces Armées Nationales Khmeres (Khmer National Armed Forces)
FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FAR or FARK, Forces Armées Royales Khmeres (Royal Khmer Armed Forces)
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDF, Free Democratic Forces (of South Vietnam)
FEOP, Foreign Exchange Operations Fund
FFF, Philippine Federation of Free Farmers
Flash, indicates message of highest priority requiring the attention of the Secretary of
State
FM, from; also Foreign Minister
FMS, Foreign Military Sales
FODAG, United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FWF, Free World Forces
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

GA, United Nations General Assembly

GAO, General Accounting Office
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP, Gross Domestic Product
Gen, general
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
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Abbreviations and Terms XXVII

GNP, Gross National Product

GOC, Government of Cambodia
GOI, Government of Indonesia
GOJ, Government of Japan
GOP, Government of the Philippines
GRC, Government of the Republic of China
GSA, General Services Administration
GUB, Government of Burma
GVN, Government of Vietnam
GVR, Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
H.E., His Excellency
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government, United Kingdom
hq, headquarters
HR, House Resolution
HRH, His Royal Highness
Huks, Hukbong Magpapalaya Sa Banyan (paramilitary arm of Philippines Communist
Party)

I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank
ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICC, International Control and Supervision Commission
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee, Red Cross
IFI, International Financial Institution
IG, Interdepartmental Group
IGGI, Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INCB, International Narcotics Control Board
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DCC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
INR/DDR/REA, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IR–8, rice strain developed at the International Rice Research Institute
IRBM, Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile
IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ITAC, Interagency Textile Advisory Committee

J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

J/PM, Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JHH, John Herbert Holdridge
JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Group
JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXVIII
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XXVIII Abbreviations and Terms

K, Kissinger
kg, kilogram
KHR, Khmer Republic
KIP, Lao currency unit
KK, Khmer Krom
KL, Kuala Lumpur
KMT, Kuomintang
KW, kilowatt

L, Legal Adviser of the Department of State

LA, Latin America
LDC, less developed country
LDX, long distance xerography
Limdis, limited distribution
LOC, lines of communication
LP, Philippines Liberal Party
LPF, Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao)
LTA, Long-Term Agreement (textiles)
LTG, Lieutenant General

M–1, World War II-era U.S. military rifle

M–14, semi automatic U.S. military rifle
M–16, U.S. military field rifle
M–113, armored personnel carrier
M, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management
mm, millimeter
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Military Assistance Command
MACTHAI, Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MASF, Military Assistance Service Funded
MBA, Military Base Agreement
MemCon, memorandum of conversation
MENU, code name for U.S. bombings in Cambodia
Meo (Hmong), mountain tribes in Laos that fought on the U.S. side during the Vietnam
War
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIL, military
MILAD, military adviser
MinDef, Minister of Defense
Misoff, Mission Officer
ML, military list
MOD, Ministry of Defense
MP, Member of Parliament
MR, military region or memorandum for the record
MT, metric ton

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCO, non-commissioned officer
NE, northeast
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEC, Thai National Executive Council
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Abbreviations and Terms XXIX

NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development
Niact, night action
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NLF, National Liberation Front
NLFSVN, National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
NOC, National Operations Council
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
Nodis/Khmer, special Department of State channel established to handle issues such as
third country military assistance to Cambodia
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
Notal, not received by all addressees
NPA, New People’s Army
NSA, National Security Agency
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NSC IG/EA, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group on East Asia
NSDF, National Socialist Democratic Front
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSF, National Salvation Front (of South Vietnam)
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NUSP, National Union of Students of the Philippines
NVA (also NVNA), North Vietnamese Army
NVA/VC, North Vietnam/Viet Cong
NVN, North Vietnam
NZ, New Zealand

O & M, operations and maintenance

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OBE, overtaken by events
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONE, Office of National Estimates (CIA)
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, also President

PA, purchase authorization
PACAF, Pacific Air Force
PACFLT, Pacific Fleet
PACOM, Pacific Command
PanAm, Pan-American Airways
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
Para, paragraph; also Policy Analysis Resource Allocation
PARU, Police Aerial Resupply Unit (Thailand, paramilitary arm of BBP)
PAVN, People’s Army of Vietnam
PBR, river boat patrol
PD, presidential determination
PDB, President’s Daily Brief
PDJ, Plain of Jars (Plaine des Jarres)
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXX
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XXX Abbreviations and Terms

PermRep, permanent representative

PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PHILCAG, Philippine Civil Action Group
PHILCAGV, Philippine Civil Action Group-Vietnam
PI, Philippine Islands
PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKP, Philippine Communist Party
PL, Public Law; also Pathet Lao
PL–480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)
PLA, People’s Liberation Army
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also prime minister
PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs, Department of State
PMG, Politico-Military Group
PNG, persona non grata
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POLAD, Political Adviser
PolOff, Political Officer
POW, prisoner of war
PPP, Philippines Peoples’ Progressive Party
PR, public relations
Prairie Fire (PF), code name for U.S.-led South Vietnamese reconnaissance teams sent
into Laos to seek targets for U.S. bombing operations of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
to assess bombing damage
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government
PriMin, Prime Minister
PSDF, People’s Self Defense Force
PSYOP(s), psychological operation(s)

QTE, quote

R & D, research and development

RCD, Organization of Regional Cooperation for Development
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
RD, rural development
Recce, reconnaissance
reftel, reference telegram
rep, representative
res, resolution
RF/PF, Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RG, Record Group, also Review Group
RKG, Royal Khmer (Cambodian) Government
RLA, Royal Lao Army
RLAF, Royal Lao Air Force, also Royal Lao Armed Forces
RLG, Royal Lao Government
RLGAF, Royal Lao Government Armed Forces
RMN or RN, Richard Nixon
ROC, Republic of China
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROVN, Republic of Vietnam
RTA, Royal Thai Army
RTAF, Royal Thai Air Force
RTARF, Royal Thai Armed Forces
1255_chfm 10/18/06 12:16 PM Page XXXI
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Abbreviations and Terms XXXI

RTARFRV, Royal Thai Armed Forces Representation-Vietnam

RTG, Royal Thai Government
RTN, Royal Thai Navy
RVN, Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/AL, Ambassador at Large
S/NM, Office of the Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of
State
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
S/S–S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State
SA, supporting assistance
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAR, search and rescue missions
SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
SCI/EN, Office of Environmental Affairs, Bureau of International Scientific and Techno-
logical Affairs, Department of State
SE, southeast
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEACOORD, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee
SEAMEC, Southeast Asia Monetary Exchange Council
SEATO, South East Asian Treaty Organization
Secdef, Secretary of Defense
Secstate, Secretary of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from
Washington
septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SGU, Special Guerrilla Units
Sierra Romeo, code name for Thai artillery units in Laos
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SITREP, situation report
SLAT, Supply and Logistical Agreement
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNO, Special Narcotics Organization, Thailand
SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement
SOP, standard operating procedure
Sov, Soviet Union
SPT, Saha Pracha Thai (United Thai Peoples’ Party)
SR, strategic reserve
SR–71, U.S. high altitude reconnaissance aircraft
SRG, Senior Review Group
STAFD, Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Defense
Steel Tiger, U.S. Air Force-Navy interdiction of North Vietnamese infiltration routes in
southern Laos
Subj, subject
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XXXII Abbreviations and Terms

SVN, South Vietnam

SYG, United Nations Secretary-General

T–28, single engine propeller driven 1950s era trainer extensively modified as coun-
terinsurgency aircraft
TA, technical assistance
TAC, tactical, also Tactical Air Command
TACAIR, tactical air
TACS, Tactical Air Control System
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TC, technical cooperation
TCC, Troop Contributing (to Vietnam) Countries
TDY, temporary duty
TKV, Thai Khmer Volunteers
Toaid, series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for International Development
Todel, series indicator for telegrams to the delegation at the Paris Peace Talks
TOR, terms of reference
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while outside of
Washington
Tosit, to the White House Situation Room
TPLAF, Thai Peoples’ Liberation Armed Forces
TS, top secret

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; also unclassified

U/SM, Under Secretaries’ Memorandum
UAR, United Arab Republic
UH, utility helicopter (Huey)
UK, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland
UN, United Nations
UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSTO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States of America
USAF, United States Air Force
USAID, United States Agency for International Development
U.S.C., United States Code
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDAO, United States Defense Attaché Office
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USINFO, United States Information Service
USIS, United States Information Service (overseas branches of USIA)
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USN, United States Navy
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaty
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VA, Veteran’s Administration

VC, Vietcong
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Abbreviations and Terms XXXIII

VC/NVA, Vietcong/North Vietnamese

VCI, Viet Cong Infrastructure
VN, Vietnam
VNAF, Vietnamese Air Force
VOLAGS, voluntary agencies
VP, Vice President
VSSG, Vietnam Special Studies Group

WESTPAC, Commander, Western Pacific

WH, White House
WHO, White House Office (series indicator for White House messages)
WHSR, White House Situation Room
WNRC, Washington National Records Center
WPR, William P. Rogers
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

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Persons
Abrams, General Creighton W., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam; Army Chief of Staff from July 1972
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States
Aichi, Kiichi, Japanese Foreign Minister until July 1971
Alamsjah, H., Indonesian State Secretary
Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States from 1972
Anderson, Jack, syndicated newspaper columnist, “Washington Merry-Go-Round”
Aquino, Benigo S., Jr., Philippines Liberal Party Secretary-General
Arun Panupong, Thai Chargé d’ Affaires, Thai Embassy
Asa Sarasin, Director of Southeast Asia Division, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, March 1970–April 1974

Barger, Herman H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, 1970–1973
Barnett, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs until 1970
Behr, Colonel Robert M., USAF, senior staff member, National Security Council Oper-
ations Staff for Scientific Affairs, 1969–1971
Bekker, Konrad, Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, until 1971
BeLieu, Kenneth F., Under Secretary of the Army from September 1971
Bergesen, Alfred E., Acting Director for Thailand/Burma Affairs, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Bergsten, C. Fred, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International
Economic Affairs, January 1969–June 1971
Black, Eugene R., Special Adviser to President Johnson on Southeast Asia
Blee, David, Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency
Brandt, Willy, West German Foreign Minister until October 1969; thereafter, Chancellor
Bray, Charles W., III, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State from March
1971
Brewster, Robert C., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, July 1969–August
1971
Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Brown, Winthrop G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs until April 1972
Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until March 1969; head of the
U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1970–1971
Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until
May 4, 1969
Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President
Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to the Philippines from August 29, 1969

Cargo, William I., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from Au-
gust 4, 1969
Carver, George A., Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to the Director of Central
Intelligence
Case, Clifford, Representative (R–New Jersey)
XXXV
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XXXVI Persons

Cau Van Vien, General, Chairman, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces
Chapin, Frank M., member, National Security Council staff and Staff Secretary to the
303/40 Committee
Charunphan, Isarangkun, Thai Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Chiang Ching-kuo, Son of Chiang Kai-shek; Minister of Defense, Republic of China, un-
til 1969; Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan from 1969–1972; Premier from 1972;
member, Kuomintang Standing Committee and the Republic of China National Se-
curity Council
Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China
Chi P’eng-fei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, until April
1971; Acting Foreign Minister until February 1972; Foreign Minister from February
1972
Chou En-lai, Premier of the People’s Republic of China
Church, Frank, Senator (D–Idaho)
Churchill, Malcom H., Country Officer, Office of Indonesian Affairs, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from
October 26, 1969
Connolly, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971–May 1972
Cooper, John Sherman, Senator (R–Kentucky)
Curran, Robert, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, August 1970–August
1972
Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intel-
ligence, May 1969–December 1971; thereafter, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps,
from January 1, 1972

Dawee Chullasaspyra, Marshal, RTA; Deputy Minister of Defense, Thai Chief of Staff
of the Supreme Command of Thailand
Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs
Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970–1971; Staff
Secretary, NSC Staff Secretariat, after 1971
De Palma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
from February 7, 1969
Dexter, John B., Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State from August 1969
Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Doolin, Dennis J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Af-
fairs responsible for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President, January–November 1969; Assistant to

the President for Domestic Affairs after November 1969
Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, 1953–1961
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the
Department of State from August 10, 1969
Esenbel, Melih, Turkish Ambassador to the United States

Finch, Robert, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Frelinghuysen, Peter H., Representative (R–New Jersey)
Froehlke, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, January 1969–
June 1971; thereafter, Secretary of the Army
Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
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Persons XXXVII

Galbraith, Francis J., Ambassador to Indonesia from May 1969

Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India
Getz, John I., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Jan-
uary 1969–1971
Gleysteen, Dirk, Director, Secretariat Staff, Department of State, until 1971
Godley, George McMurtire, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Laos after July 24, 1969
Goldwater, Barry M., Senator (R–Arizona)
Grant, Lindsey, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, Febru-
ary 1969–August 1970; member, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of
State, June 1971–November 1972
Green, Marshall, Ambassador to Indonesia until January 1969; thereafter, Assistant Sec-
retary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 1, 1969–May 10, 1973; also,
Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970
Greene, Joseph N., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza-
tion Affairs, August 1969–March 1970
Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
Gross, Nelson G., Ambassador and Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coor-
dinator for International Narcotics Matters from August 1971

Habib, Philip C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
until May 1969; member of U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks until October
1971; thereafter, Ambassador to Korea
Haig, Brigadier General Alexander M., Jr., USA, Senior Military Adviser to the Assis-
tant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969–June 1970; Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970
Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff
Halperin, Morton, Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff until Sep-
tember 1969
Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs until May 1969; thereafter, Ambassador to Turkey
Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development from April 1969
Hannah, Norman B., Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Bangkok
until 1970
Hardin, Clifford M., Secretary of Agriculture, January 1969–December 1971
Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, January
1969–January 1970; thereafter, Counselor to the President
Hatfield, Mark O., Senator (R–Oregon)
Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director
for the National Security Council Under Secretaries’ Committee until August 1969;
thereafter, Deputy Director for Coordination
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence
Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party and President of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969
Holdrige, John Herbert, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the
Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969;
thereafter, member, National Security Council Operations Staff responsible for East
Asia
Hongladarom, Sunthorn, Thai Ambassador to the United States until 1972
Hormats, Robert D., member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International
Economic Affairs, 1970–1972
Houdek, Robert, member, National Security Council staff, January 1969–July 1971
Howe, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan, member, National Security Council Staff,
1970–1972
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XXXVIII Persons

Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State,
until August 1969
Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., Ambassador to Burma until July 22, 1971; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from February 1972
Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States until January 20, 1969; Sen-
ator (D–Minnesota) from January 1971

Ingersoll, John, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of

Justice
Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D–Hawaii)
Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; thereafter, Deputy
Secretary of State

Jenkins, Alfred le Sesne, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, from July 1971
Jira Vichitsonggram, General, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on Security,
Thailand
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, November 1963–January 1969
Johnson, Vice Admiral Nels C., USN, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff until July 19, 1970
Johnson, U. Alexis, Ambassador to Japan until January 1969; Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs from February 1969

Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury, January 1969–January 1971; thereafter,
Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development from February 11, 1971;
U.S. Permanent Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from March 17,
1972
Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., USA, member, National Security Council Planning Group
Kishi, Nobusuke, former Japanese Prime Minister
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs after Janu-
ary 1969
Knowles, Richard T., member, National Security Council staff
Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Kotschnig, Walter M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza-
tion Affairs until 1971
Kriangsak Chamanan, Lieutenant General, Thai Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme
Command
Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union

Lagdameo, Ernesto V., Philippine Ambassador to the United States, 1969–1970

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense after January 1969
Lake, W. Anthony, member, National Security Council Planning Group until April 1970
Lodge, Henry Cabot, II, Head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Viet-
nam, January 20–November 20, 1969
Lon Nol, General, FARK, First Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister
of Defense of Cambodia; Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense,
June 1969; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970
Lon Non, head of the Phnom Penh police and younger brother of Lon Nol
Lord, Winston, member, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
until 1969; member, National Security Council Planning Group; staff member for
United Nations Affairs, National Security Council Operations Staff, from 1971
Lowman, Shepard C., Country Officer, Office of Philippines Affairs, Bureau of Near East-
ern and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
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Persons XXXIX

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff,
1969–1971

Macapagal, Dosado, former President of the Philippines

Macomber, William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations un-
til October 2, 1969; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed
to Management after July 12, 1971) from September 1969
Maestrone, Frank E., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Manila
Malik, Adam, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President, United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly, 1971
Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D–Montana), Senate Majority Leader
Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People’s Re-
public of China
Marcos, Ferdinand E., President of the Philippines
Marcos, Imelda, First Lady of the Philippines
Martin, Graham M., former Ambassador to Thailand; Ambassador to Italy from Octo-
ber 30, 1969
Masters, Edward E., Country Director for Indonesian Affairs until September 1970; there-
after, Director for Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, De-
partment of State
Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, January 1969–July 1970; thereafter,
Counselor to the President, July 1970–1972
McAfee, William, Deputy Director, Directorate for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
McCain, Admiral John S., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific until September 1,
1972
McCarthy, Eugene, Senator (D–Minnesota)
McClintock, Robert, Ambassador to Venezuela, 1970; Chairman, Interdepartmental Co-
ordinating Group (Symington Subcommittee), Department of State representative
to White House Working Group
McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations and Spe-
cial Assistant to the Secretary from July 1969; also Ambassador at Large
McGovern, George S., Senator (D–South Dakota) and Democratic nominee for presi-
dent in 1972
McNamara, Robert S., former Secretary of Defense; President, International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, World Bank
Meyer, Charles A., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Co-
ordinator, Alliance for Progress, from April 1969
Moore, Jonathan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
September 1969–June 1970
Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; there-
after, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Moose, Richard M., member, National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970
Murphy, George, Senator (R–California)

Nelson, William E., Director, Office of Asian Affairs, Directorate of Operations, Central
Intelligence Agency
Newman, George S., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, June 1970–No-
vember 1971
Nguyen Cao Ky, Vice President of the Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Giap Vo, General, PAVN, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National De-
fense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Nguyen Thi Binh, Head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s Delegation to
the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam
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XL Persons

Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Vietnam

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States
Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
March 4, 1969–January 30, 1972

Odeen, Philip, Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff, from No-
vember 1971
Okum, Herbert, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European
and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Packard, David M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 24, 1969–December 13, 1971
Palmby, Clarence D., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
Passman, Otto, Representative (D–Louisiana)
Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor of the Department of State after January 24, 1969
Percy, Charles, Senator (R–Illinois)
Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and
Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971–1972, Sec-
retary of Commerce from January 1972
Pickering, Laurence G., Officer in Charge of Thai Affairs, Department of State, until June
1970; thereafter, Counselor, U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Pierson, George K., Office Director for Southeast Asia, Bureau of East Asia, Agency for
International Development
Pogorny, N.V., Chairman, Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet
Popple, Paul M., Office Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pa-
cific, Department of State
Pote Sarasin, Thai Minister of National Development, Thai SEATO council member
Praphat Charusthein (Prapass Charusathiara), General, RTA, Deputy Prime Minister of
Thailand
Prasit Kanjonawatana, Thai Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs
Pursley, Brigadier General Robert E., USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of De-
fense until November 1972

Rafferty, James F., Special Assistant, U.S. Embassy Manila

Ratliff, Rob Roy, Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee
Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969–June 1970
Robinson, Davis R., staff assistant, Office of the Secretary of State
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State, January 21, 1969–September 1973
Romualdez, Benjamin (Kokoi), Marcos’ campaign minister and brother-in-law
Rush, Kenneth W., Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 8, 1969–Feb-
ruary 20, 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 23, 1972–January 1973; Deputy
Secretary of State, February 2, 1973–May 29, 1974
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State until January 20, 1969
Russell, Richard B., Senator (D–Georgia)

Sani, Ch. Anwar, Director General for Political Affairs, Indonesia

Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1971
Sawaeng Senanarong, General, Thai Government House Secretary-General
Selden, Armistead, I., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Secu-
rity Affairs
Shakespeare, Frank M., Director, United States Information Agency, after February
1969
Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 20, 1969–June 10, 1970; Director, Office of
Management and Budget, June 1970–May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of Treasury
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Persons XLI

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Cambodian Head of State until March 1970; thereafter,
leader of Cambodian Government in exile in Peking
Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until
February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs; also Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East
and South Asia
Sison, Jose Maria, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines
Smith, K. Wayne, Director, National Security Council Policy Analysis Branch, 1971–
1972
Smyser, W. Richard, adviser to the delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1969;
member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, 1970–1972
Sneider, Richard L., member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia Divi-
sion, May 1969–September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan, September 1969–
July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs from August 1972
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Prime Minister of Laos
Spear, Moncrieff J., Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, Department of State, until October 1970
Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, August–
September 1969; thereafter, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Srey Saman, General, Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Army
Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969–January 1972
Starbird, Linwood, Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pa-
cific Affairs, Department of State
Stennis, John D., Senator (D–Mississippi)
Sudjatmoko, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States
Sudomo, Vice Admiral, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy
Suharto, President of Indonesia
Sukarno, former President of Indonesia
Sullivan, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs from April 1969; also Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam
Surakit Mayalap, Thai Army Chief of Staff
Suthi Nartworathat, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Thai Ministry of Economic Affairs
Swank, Emory C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, June
1969–September 1970; thereafter, Ambassador to Cambodia
Symington, W. Stuart, Senator (D–Missouri); Chairman, Subcommittee of U.S. Security
Arrangements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Thajeb, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States

Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand until November 17, 1971
Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal, RTA; Prime Minister of Thailand, 1969–1971; Thai
Foreign Minister from 1972
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971
Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia
Tomseth, Victor L., Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, from April 1970
Tran Thien Khiem, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam until late 1969
Tran Van Huong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam after late 1969
Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott, Prime Minister of Canada
Truehart, William C., Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State, until September 1969

Umar Wirahadikusumah, Lieutenant General, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff

Unger, Leonard, Ambassador to Thailand
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XLII Persons

Usher, Richard E., Country Director, Philippines, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969

Vaky, Viron P. (Pete), Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Jan-
uary–May 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Latin Amer-
ica, May 1969–September 1972; thereafter, Ambassador to Costa Rica from Septem-
ber 11, 1972
Vang Pao, General, RLA, Commander of Military Region II and leader of the Meo
(Hmong) forces
Vicharn Nivatvong, Director-General, Department of Foreign Trade, Thai Ministry of
Economic Affairs

Walsh, John P., Acting Executive Secretary, Department of State, February–October 1969
Wanzeck, William T., Narcotics Attaché, U.S. Embassy Bangkok
Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Army Chief of Staff until June 1972
Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 2, 1970
Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, Indonesian National Planning Board
Williams, G. Mennen, Ambassador to the Philippines until April 1969
Wolff, Lester, Representative (D–New York)
Wright, W. Marshall, Country Director, Philippines, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State until May 1970; member, National Security Council
Operations Staff/African and UN Affairs, June 1970–April 1972; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, April–December 1972

Yost, Charles W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 22,
1969–February 25, 1971

Ziegler, Ronald, L., Press Secretary to the President

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Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute
that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive
documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the edi-
tors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and
intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some
organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence op-
erations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved
within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified doc-
uments, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.
Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency
The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological
warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in
NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action
operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence re-
sponsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the
principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch func-
tion. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural
choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the
Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be
funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.1
The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied
officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of
State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and
concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action of-
fice in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibil-
ity for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18,
1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.
NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely
“psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are
conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign
states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but
which are so planned and executed that any US Government respon-
sibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-
covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility
for them.”

1
NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emer-
gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.
XLIII
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XLIV Note on U.S. Covert Actions

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new di-

rective included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct
action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; sub-
version against hostile states, including assistance to underground re-
sistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and
support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened coun-
tries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed con-
flict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and
cover and deception for military operations.”2
The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the
CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed re-
sponsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC,
which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peace-
time and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the
State Department and to the military without having to proceed
through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and
decisions.3 In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that pol-
icy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.
During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime com-
mitments and other missions soon made covert action the most ex-
pensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Con-
cerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked
the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper
“scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House re-
sponded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created
the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate
government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in
October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2
and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.4 The PSB was
soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the ex-
pansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that
covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.
As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak
of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although
the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from
the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally del-

2
NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed ibid., Document 292.
3
Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC–
10/2,” August 12, 1948, printed ibid., Document 298.
4
NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, in Michael
Warner, editor, The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence
Agency, 1994), pp. 437–439.
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Note on U.S. Covert Actions XLV

egated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and
the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or cur-
tail operations.
NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee
The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s lati-
tude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council
directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for
the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisen-
hower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central
Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions
abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made
responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Sec-
retary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert op-
erations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S.
foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board
was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert
operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to
be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the
CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such pro-
grams and secure coordination of support among the Departments of
State and Defense and the CIA.5
A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical
to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group
as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2
of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of as-
sistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end
of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as
the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged
as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs
initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied de-
pending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959
when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Spe-
cial Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group;

5
William M. Leary, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents
(The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 is scheduled for
publication in Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community.
6
Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Fi-
nal Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelli-
gence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp.
50–51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 are scheduled for publication in For-
eign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community.
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XLVI Note on U.S. Covert Actions

initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agen-

cies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.7
After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor
reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request
and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-
level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the
Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secre-
tary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell
Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater re-
sponsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963
the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to
the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but
informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for ex-
posure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted
by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were sub-
mitted to the Special Group.8
From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Aug-
mented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus
Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman),
exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action
program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When Pres-
ident Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated
Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations
to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale
coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Depart-
ments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami
had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations,
which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.9
President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-
Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The
Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities
separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to
confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and re-
sisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression
in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President John-
son assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of
counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who es-

7
Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, p. 63.
8
Ibid., p. 82.
9
See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278.
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Note on U.S. Covert Actions XLVII

tablished a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging

these responsibilities.10
NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State
and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412”
to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or re-
sponsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.11
The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert
actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the John-
son administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of
the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thou-
sand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were
considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its pre-
decessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee
were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a
February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the
mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303
Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended,
and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Depart-
ment of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and
the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the
CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by
Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.12
The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any
administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the diffi-
culty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October
1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee re-
views for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and au-
tomatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On
February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision
Memorandum 40,13 which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the
name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part
because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney
General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM
40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and
conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval
from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert

10
For text of NSAM No. 124, see ibid., vol. VIII, Document 68. NSAM No. 341,
March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 56.
11
For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.
12
Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp.
56–57.
13
For text of NSDM 40, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Document 203.
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XLVIII Note on U.S. Covert Actions

operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual re-

view by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.
The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administra-
tion, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and busi-
ness came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Com-
mittee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI
submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved
operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the
40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individ-
ual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided
broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received brief-
ings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, more-
over, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970
instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’ etat against Chilean President
Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14
Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group
The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government
approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President
for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of
the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on
covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and in-
formed Congress that the proposed operation was important to na-
tional security.15
Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18,
1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activi-
ties by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with
the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant
for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained re-
sponsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations.
The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommen-
dations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct peri-
odic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned
all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassi-
nations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders,
and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.16

14
Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence,
pp. 54–55, 57.
15
Public Law 93–559.
16
Executive Order 11905, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.
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Southeast Asia
Thailand

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, January 14, 1969, 1119Z.

513. 1. This morning I called at my suggestion on the Prime Min-

ister2 and took advantage of my prospective visit with Ambassador
Johnson in Saigon later this week to raise with him questions about
important developments in Thailand. Present at our conversation were
Foreign Minister Thanat and Government House Secretary-General,
General Sawaeng.
2. I first said that Amb Johnson will undoubtedly have been in-
formed in general terms about the insurgency situation and I would
like to pass on the Prime Minister’s assessment, particularly with re-
gard to the recent intensified action in the three-province area of the
North. The Prime Minister replied in rather general terms noting the
importance to the counter-insurgency effort of the kind of matériel and
equipment which the US is providing, both for security forces and for
development activities. The Prime Minister specifically mentioned
communications equipment for the police, the helicopter delivery
schedule, modernization of weapons, and assistance to support pro-
grams to improve the livelihood of the hill tribes and we agreed that
we would have our respective staffs see that everything necessary was
being provided. This gave me an opportunity to emphasize the im-
portance of the Thais making full utilization of equipment already on
hand and being sure that they were ready to receive and use on arrival
new equipment in the pipeline. I also warmly endorsed the Prime Min-
ister’s reference to helping the hill tribes and mentioned to him our
impression from discussions in the North that Thai officials had not
been given as concrete policy directive concerning their dealings with
the hill tribes as would be useful. I emphasized the importance of Thai
Government officials recognizing the hill tribe population as part of the

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Ambassador Johnson.
2
Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand.
1
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2 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thai nation and dealing with them in such a way as to make friends
and avoid building any additional hostility. The Prime Minister read-
ily agreed with these observations. I also emphasized the importance
of collecting more and better intelligence and we noted as a useful first
step the setting up of a new JSC in Phitsanulok. In general we con-
cluded that Mr. Tanham will keep in close touch with Generals Surakij
and Saiyud and others as pertinent to follow up on these matters.
3. I then asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything on
the coming elections and he said that there was “nothing worth say-
ing” to Ambassador Johnson at this time, although he indicated his
general satisfaction with the way matters were proceeding.
4. I then mentioned that the new administration will undoubtedly
be occupied with the question of security and US military posture with
regard to Southeast Asia in the period following a Vietnam settlement.
I asked the Prime Minister whether there was any Thai Government
thinking on this subject which he would like me to pass on to Am-
bassador Johnson. After some expressions of concern about the mili-
tary situation in Laos the Prime Minister in effect passed the ball on
this question to Foreign Minister Thanat. The latter first went through
his familiar recitation about American journalists, senators, professors
and others who obviously wanted no part of any American presence
or activity in this part of the world. Contrary to earlier comments, he
did not express confidence about the new administration in this regard.
He concluded by saying, with the Prime Minister’s agreement, that the
Thai Government was not in a position to comment on these matters
until the new US administration was able to provide some kind of a
picture of what will be its security policy for Southeast Asia, and Thanat
emphasized that given all the uncertainties of the past many months,
the RTG hopes that clarification on this matter will be available soon.
Before we left this subject the Prime Minister volunteered that, with
regard to the current situation, Thailand does not need any more US
forces; I accepted his point but noted that my question had related to
a period following a Vietnam settlement when there would be a new
situation.
5. At one point in our conversation the Prime Minister referred to
the Anderson article in Parade and indicated his distress. He seemed to
feel that my statement to the press had been helpful and was pleased
that I had made my position clear to His Majesty when received in au-
dience last Saturday morning.3
Unger

3
January 11.
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Thailand 3

2. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, January 16, 1969.

SUBJECT
LOTUS

PARTICIPANTS
Minister Pote Sarasin
Ambassador Unger

After I asked Minister Pote for his assessment of how the election
campaign was going and about the prospects for the government party
and received some generally optimistic comments, I then proceeded to
some specific points. In the first place I mentioned the party image and
the fact that to many voters it might be important to know that the
government party has a strong civilian component and was not just a
party of military men. For this reason it seemed to me important that
Pote and other civilians be brought to the voters’ attention so that they
are aware of these important civilian elements. Pote said, as he had be-
fore, that he was not very skillful at public rallies, but that he would,
for example, be going with the Prime Minister for the opening of sev-
eral roads in the Northeast which would get a good deal of publicity.
He also mentioned a very large meeting he had had awhile back with
taxi drivers who have been organized into a kind of mutual benefit co-
operative, and he said that when he has some kind of entrée as in this
case, he has made efforts to reach the public. I noted that this was a
point that could also be covered in campaign literature with pictures
and brief reference to his activities.
As to election prospects, Pote specifically expressed concern about
the Northeast, where one-third of the country’s population resides and
where he feared that Thep and other small parties and independents
might be able to pick up considerable support. He said the Northeast-
erners are congenitally opposed to the establishment and that Thep is
also busy trying to win them over by promising to eliminate the rice
premium, etc. Pote explained some of the more abstract economic ar-
guments as to why Thep was wrong, but he acknowledged that these
were unlikely to make much of an impact on voters. I said instead that
the government party could make it clear what the premium is used

1
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand Lotus File 1968–69.
Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Unger. The meeting was held at Sarasin’s residence.
A notation on the upper right hand memorandum indicates Godley saw it.
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4 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

for and how much benefit the farmer gets back from this tax. It was
important that all the people being reached by Thep be reached by
these counter arguments, whether in person or through graphic hand-
bills or whatever.
I expressed concern about the discontented ex-SPT members who
might be dividing the vote upcountry and thus preventing either the
government candidate or themselves from getting into power and open-
ing the way instead to an anti-government candidate. Pote acknowl-
edged this problem and I asked whether some of those break-away can-
didates were now getting support from some of the people in the
government party. Pote said that now that Chamnan is out of the polit-
ical scene this was not the case. I asked what had happened to Cham-
nan’s well organized political machine in the provinces and Pote said
that he felt it had lost a good deal of its organization and effectiveness.
On party organization Pote averred that headquarters are now be-
ing set up in every one of the changwats and they would be appro-
priately identified and advertised. Pote also confirmed in reply to my
question that funds had now been provided to all of the candidates
and all of the provincial headquarters, along the line he had earlier
sketched out to me (see my message of Dec 17 [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified]). I emphasized at this point and several other times
the importance of candidates in the provinces being well supplied with
points of argument and information that they could use effectively with
the voters. For example, I said it was very important to the candidate
to be able to say what the government had done and what it contem-
plates doing in that particular area, where projects would have special
meaning for those voters.
I referred to government party policy and asked whether this
would now be disseminated and whether this was related to the Pra-
mane Grounds meeting scheduled for next week. Pote confirmed that
this was the case, but he minimized the importance of a party policy
statement saying that the voter was interested only in very concrete
and specific matters and not in broad general principles.
I then told Pote I would like to “kibitz” a little bit about the elec-
tion campaign and pass on to him some thoughts that I had developed
on the basis of experience with our own elections in the US as well as
other areas. I realized that some of these points would have limited or
no pertinence to the Thai scene, but I nevertheless would pass them
along for what help they might provide. I then reviewed the two mem-
oranda, “Points To Be Made” and “How?”2 Pote listened rather more

2
Attached but not printed. The two memoranda outline points to stress for win-
ning elections, including emphasizing economic achievement.
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Thailand 5

carefully than I had anticipated to my review of these points and ap-

peared to take a number of them in. When I had finished he asked to
have the papers so that he could translate them into Thai and pass
them to a few people who could make good use of them. I said I would
give them to him if he liked, but obviously it was very important that
a US role of this sort not be known. Pote said that if they were trans-
lated into Thai any appearance of a US origin would be removed and
that he would bear in mind to restrict use.
In discussing the points contained in these two memoranda Pote
made a few specific observations of interest. He was particularly re-
ceptive of the idea of making full propaganda use of the government’s
contribution in the economic and social fields and cited many addi-
tional specific examples, and agreed with the importance of these ac-
complishments of the government and future projected accomplish-
ments being brought to public attention. He specifically mentioned
a film which we had provided which he would be shortly showing
to His Majesty on his return from Chiang Mai, which would then be
shown on television all over the country just a week before the elec-
tions; this sets forth the Thai Government’s accomplishments over re-
cent years. With regard to the Prime Minister, Pote mentioned that al-
though he is not very aggressive, he does make a very effective contact
with the people and that his modest manner had very considerable ap-
peal to the Thais. On some of the specific Saha Pracha Thai activities,
Pote indicated that many of these had already been considered and
adopted by the party but they were waiting to use some of these un-
til the campaign was further along. He made the point that the party
wished to wait long enough so that the other parties would not have
an opportunity to answer whatever campaign lines were launched.
I mentioned to Pote my conversation several days earlier with Gen-
eral Sawaeng3 and said that I had contemplated having Minister Han-
nah pass on some of these same thoughts to Gen. Sawaeng. Pote said
he would be handing the translation of what I had given him to Gen-
eral Sawaeng and it was not necessary to pass it along separately, to
which I agreed.

3
After his meeting with Thanom, Thanat, and Sawaeng on January 14 (Document
1), Unger met alone with Sawaeng to discuss the upcoming Thai election. (Memoran-
dum of conversation, January 14; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand
Lotus File, 1968–69)
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6 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

3. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee1

Washington, February 7, 1969.

SUBJECT
Covert Support of the Thai Government Party in the Thai National Parliamen-
tary Elections

1. Summary
On 11 November 1965, in response to a request from Ambassador
Graham Martin and after 303 Committee approval, high authority au-
thorized covert funding support [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] to a political party to be formed by responsible Thai Gov-
ernment leaders.2 Approval for this support was reaffirmed by higher
authority on 15 September 1967 after favorable review by the 303 Com-
mittee. A final review was made on 16 August 1968. Funding which
commenced on 31 August 1968 was completed on 4 February 1969. The
Thai general elections will be held on 10 February 1969. A general ac-
counting of the use of the funds by category has been obtained by Am-
bassador Leonard Unger. A recommendation is made that a report on
the results of the election be made to the 303 Committee and, if possi-
ble, a relationship drawn between the results and the effectiveness of
the financial support provided.
2. Background
In June 1965 a final draft constitution for Thailand had been com-
pleted providing for general elections which were assumed would be
held in mid- or late 1966. With this in mind, [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] in June 1965 approached Ambassador Martin with
a request for covert U.S. assistance to be used in conjunction with the
upcoming general elections. Ambassador Martin subsequently pro-
posed to Washington that CIA draw up a program of covert election
support with the primary objective being to develop a viable political
apparatus in Thailand under the present pro-U.S. leadership and to en-
sure the continuity of this leadership. A memorandum requesting 303
Committee authorization for such a program was presented to the 303
Committee on 7 October 1965. It estimated that initial funding re-
quirements would be on the order of [dollar amount not declassified],

1
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Thai-
land. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the bottom left-hand corner of the first page reads,
“303 Committee briefed on 11 February 1969.”
2
See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Documents 305 and 306.
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Thailand 7

stated that the number of witting Thai officials could probably be kept
to six, [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified]. The 303 Committee ap-
proved the proposal for the expenditure of [dollar amount not declassi-
fied] subject to approval by higher authority which was given on 11
November 1965.
The draft constitution of June 1965 was delayed in debate, how-
ever, and the proposal remained in abeyance. Following the passing
of the third and final reading of the constitution in February 1968, the
subject of covert political support was reopened by the Thais. [1 line
of source text not declassified], approached [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified], Bangkok with a request for covert election support
based on past commitments. [less than 1 line of source text not declassi-
fied] was advised that this question would have to be discussed with
the Ambassador. [name not declassified] subsequently discussed the
same matter with Ambassador Unger on 22 March 1968, noting that
he was aware of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] level
of support previously considered. [name not declassified] emphasized
that only [1 line of source text not declassified], were aware of the previ-
ous U.S. commitment. After a series of informal talks, Ambassador
Unger requested authority from Washington to proceed with this
covert support. After 303 Committee consideration on 16 August 1968,
a message was sent to Ambassador Unger from Assistant Secretary of
State Mr. William Bundy authorizing the initiation of a covert fund-
ing program. This message was specifically cleared by both the Sec-
retary of State and the Special Assistant to the President. [5 lines of
source text not declassified]
[2 paragraphs (30 lines of source text) and 1 heading not declassified]
4. Recommendations
A report on the outcome of the Thai elections scheduled to be held
on 10 February 1969 will be made to the 303 Committee. If possible,
an analysis of the relationship of this outcome to the effectiveness of
the support provided should be made.
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8 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Memorandum of Conversation1

CM–4011–69 Bangkok, March 9, 1969, 10–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok on 9 March 1969

1. Prime Minister Thanom invited Secretary Laird to visit Thai-

land during his trip to Vietnam. Since Mr. Laird was unable to accept
the Prime Minister’s invitation due to time limitations, the Prime Min-
ister suggested through Ambassador Unger that I come to Bangkok in
his stead. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Froehlke and I traveled to
Bangkok on 9 March. We met with Prime Minister Thanom and Air
Marshal Dawee, Deputy Minister of Defense, at the Prime Minister’s
residence, for about an hour and a quarter, beginning at 10 A.M. Pres-
ent at the meeting were Prime Minister Thanom, Air Marshal Dawee,
Ambassador Unger, Deputy Chief of Mission Hannah, Major General
McCown, the Chief of our Military Assistance Group in Thailand, As-
sistant Secretary Froehlke and myself. Air Marshal Dawee acted as in-
terpreter as necessary.
2. After the usual pleasantries, I briefed the Prime Minister on the
military situation in South Vietnam, using a map, and pointing out that
the situation was militarily favorable. I stated that the enemy had
achieved no military successes and, contrary to the effects of the Tet
offensive of 1968, little or no psychological success. Nevertheless, the
enemy had not committed sizeable main force VC and regular NVA
formations; therefore, the enemy continued to have the capability to
mount substantial attacks, particularly in the I Corps Tactical Zone and
the III Corps Tactical Zone. I observed that General Abrams and his
subordinate commanders were confident that they could defeat any
initiatives undertaken by VC/NVA forces.
3. As to the attitude of the South Vietnamese regarding rocket at-
tacks on Saigon, I stated that I had been surprised at the calmness of
President Thieu, Prime Minister Huong and General Vien and their
feeling that these attacks did not as of the moment constitute a dis-
turbing political factor for the Government of Vietnam. Of course, were
these attacks to be continued over a long period of time or if they were

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Coun-
try Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. The meeting was held at Prime Minister
Thanom’s residence. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. The
memorandum of conversation was attached to a March 18 covering memorandum from
Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to Kissinger.
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Thailand 9

increased in magnitude the situation could change radically and sud-

denly. The Prime Minister appeared to be completely satisfied with my
presentation and showed great interest in the location of enemy main
combat elements.
4. I then asked the Prime Minister if he would be good enough
to discuss the insurgency problem in Thailand and to give me the ben-
efit of his thinking as regards the magnitude of the dissidents and the
counter action being undertaken by the Thai Government. He re-
sponded willingly. He stated that the dissident group in the North was
comprised of hill tribesmen who were being subverted by agents from
the outside. The group is not large nor does he consider the danger
of expansion great so long as the Government moves promptly to sup-
press the insurgents’ efforts. In this connection, he pointed out that
the dissident elements were located in very remote and extremely dif-
ficult country which required that the insertion of Government forces
and their resupply be done by helicopter. He expressed the view,
backed up by Air Marshal Dawee, that the Thai forces need more heli-
copters in order to cope with the threat and to maintain an accept-
able number of helicopters at all times ready for operational use. Turn-
ing to the dissident problem in southern Thailand he stated that the
insurgent group there was also quite small; however their activities
were tied in with those of similar Malaysian groups and this compli-
cated the problem. Nevertheless the Thai High Command is now
planning with Malaysian officials joint operations against the south-
ern dissident elements.
5. The conversation then turned to the need of the Thai forces for
more helicopters and for the provision of M–16 rifles. The justification
for the latter one was the usual one: the enemy dissidents are better
armed with communist-type weapons than are the Thai forces. I re-
sponded by citing the production limitations on M–16 rifles and the
priority which, of necessity, had to be given the Free World forces in
South Vietnam. I added that we were in the process of expanding M–16
production and that it was a matter which could be discussed in the
usual channel; namely with Ambassador Unger and General McCown.
6. The meeting ended on the same friendly note that had been
maintained throughout our interview. The Prime Minister thanked As-
sistant Secretary of Defense Froehlke and myself for coming to Bangkok
and expressed the hope that Secretary Laird would be able to visit Thai-
land at some future time. He also asked me to convey his warm re-
gards to President Nixon.
7. After we left the Prime Minister’s residence, Ambassador Unger
stated that he felt that our meeting had been a great success; the Thais
are very sensitive as to their status as one of the troop-contributing na-
tions and are desirous of being able to publicize the visits of ranking
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10 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

U.S. officials to consult with their leaders regarding the war. The Am-
bassador’s observation was borne out by newspaper articles emanat-
ing over the next three days from Bangkok sources.
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, March 11, 1969, 1154Z.

2928. Subject: Message to Prime Minister.

1. With Field Marshal Thanom already renamed PriMin by the
King, expected to announce his new cabinet momentarily, and expected
to present his new government’s program to joint session of Parliament
March 19 or 20, I believe it would be most appropriate for US to take
formal note of Thailand’s installation of a government constitutionally
responsible to Parliament. I therefore strongly recommend the Presi-
dent send Thanom a message of congratulations on his new appoint-
ment. Most suitable delivery time would be just after Thanom presents
government policy statement to Parliament.
2. We have been encouraged by Thai return to constitutional gov-
ernment. We have not, however, sent formal official congratulatory
messages either at time of promulgation of constitution in June 1968
or following February 10 national elections,2 largely because such mes-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI.
Confidential.
2
The Thai national elections of February 10 resulted in a victory for the govern-
ment parties, albeit a limited one. The Saha Pracha Thai (SPT) party of Thanom elected
75 deputies to the 219-member Lower House. Independent candidates, over half of whom
were financially supported by Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, won 72 seats. The op-
position Democrats won 57 seats, with the remaining 15 going to various minor groups.
INR Intelligence Note No. 114, February 20, reported that the election “enhanced”
Praphat’s position and was likely to result in “a stronger behind-the-scenes role” for him.
Forty-four Senators were appointed later in the month in order to bring the Senate
up to its new constitutional size, and it remained securely under the control of the gov-
ernment party. Note No. 114 reported that Praphat was “unlikely to seriously threaten
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Thailand 11

sages could have been construed here as paternalistic and elsewhere if

known as indicative of US influence behind Thai developments. As-
sumption of office by PriMin is, in contrast, an appropriate occasion to
offer congratulations and to testify to our continuing cooperation with-
out incurring disadvantages noted above.
3. Moreover, while RTG leaders have to date adjusted rather well
to new political arena in which they are operating, taking opposition
attacks during electoral campaign and failure to achieve absolute ma-
jority by balloting process more or less in stride, strains will continue
and may well increase when opposition speaks out in elected House.
Temptation to return to “good old days” and avoid all this parlia-
mentary unpleasantness will still lurk in some leaders’ minds. An ex-
pression of favorable US view toward Thai constitutional development,
at time and in manner that avoid any aura of interference in Thai in-
ternal affairs, could help to encourage RTG leaders to accept incon-
venient aspects of constitutional government.
4. I suggest text along following lines: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I wish to congratulate you on your appointment by His Majesty the
King of Thailand to serve once again as Prime Minister. Your forma-
tion of a new government, following elections under the new consti-
tution, marks an important milestone in Thai political history and is a
tribute to your leadership. I look forward to a continuation of our close
cooperation in pursuit of peace and freedom.”3
5. Although no congratulatory messages on election results have
been publicized, we have had indications that Koreans and perhaps a
few others have sent them in one form or another.
Unger

Thanom’s position as Prime Minister” and was “probably aware that he would be an
unacceptable Prime Minister to many Thais, from the King on down.” It added, how-
ever, that the composition of the post-election cabinet would probably reflect his wishes
“that Thanom’s leadership position will be more circumscribed,” and that the influence
of civilian leaders, such as Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin and Foreign
Minister Thanat Khoman, could be decreased.” (Ibid., POL 14 THAI)
3
See Document 7.
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12 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

6. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President

Nixon1

Washington, March 17, 1969.

SUBJECT
Congratulatory Message to Thai Prime Minister

Recommendation
For reasons set forth below, I recommend that you approve the at-
tached message of congratulation to Marshal Thanom on his reap-
pointment as Prime Minister.2 This message includes a general re-
statement of our security commitment to Thailand.
Discussion
On March 7 the King designated Field Marshal Thanom Kitti-
kachorn as Prime Minister under the new Thai Constitution. A mes-
sage from you congratulating him on his reappointment would be
appropriate.
We believe it would be in our interest to use this message as an
occasion for reaffirming the U.S. security commitment to Thailand.
We have reliable intelligence that the Thai leaders are currently in
a mood of questioning and doubt with regard to the firmness of the
U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia. This has been heightened by the
Communist offensive in Viet-Nam (which the Thai view as a breach of
the “understandings” which led to the total bombing halt) and the U.S.
reaction to it. They are also apprehensive about the forthcoming Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee review of U.S. commitments. Many
of these concerns have been reflected in recent public statements by
the Thai Foreign Minister.
While initially reassured by your election, the Thai leaders are in
some doubt about the policies of the new Administration. They have
made it clear that they are hoping for a full discussion of where we ex-
pect to go in the war in Viet-Nam and the Paris peace talks during the
SEATO and TCC meetings. But it will be risky to leave them in doubt
regarding our basic intentions in the two and a half months until these
meetings.
Early in the last two Administrations the President sent a message
reaffirming in general terms the United States security commitment to

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret.
Drafted by Spear and cleared by Godley and William P. Bundy.
2
Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 13

Thailand, so there are precedents for such a message. Conversely, the

absence of a message could be noted by Thai leaders and add to their
concern in their present mood.
WPR

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Washington, March 26, 1969, 0152Z.

46292. 1. Request Ambassador transmit following message to

Prime Minister from President:
2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Congratulations and sincere good
wishes on your designation by His Majesty as Prime Minister. Under
your continued leadership, I am confident that Thailand will sustain
the remarkable rate of development it has experienced in past years,
and will remain firm in the defense of freedom.
I want to reaffirm to you, at the outset of this Administration, that
the United States will continue to support Thailand and its resistance
to Communist aggression and subversion. We fully intend to honor our
SEATO obligation.
Secretary Rogers will report to me on his conversations with you
and your colleagues when he returns from the May SEATO Council
Meeting in Bangkok. This meeting will provide an excellent opportu-
nity for you and the Secretary to review in depth the various issues of
mutual concern. It will, as well, be a most welcome occasion for our
two new governments to reaffirm the close ties between our countries
that are so essential to the maintenance of freedom in East Asia.
Sincerely, Richard Nixon”
3. The White House does not plan to make this communication
public.
Rogers

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Confi-
dential. Drafted by Spear on March 10; cleared by William Bundy, Secretary Rogers, and
in the White House by Richard Moose; and revised in the White House on
March 25.
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14 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

8. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 1, 1969.

SUBJECT
Meeting With The President

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign
Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Thai Minister of Communications
Arun Panupong, Thai Chargé d’Affaires
United States
U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Moncrieff J. Spear, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

Referring to his meeting with the President at the reception the

previous evening,2 Dawee said he had had a good talk. The President
has asked his views on Viet-Nam. He had replied that every day that
went by was a loss of time because American casualties continued to
grow. He also relayed a message from the Prime Minister that follow-
ing the bombing halt the situation in Southeast Asia had gotten worse.
One way or another, we should find a way to resume bombing in North
Viet-Nam. Dawee also felt that we should be prepared to use South
Viet-Nam ground forces to cut the infiltration. They were both capa-
ble and had the will to do this job.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL THAI–US. Secret.
Drafted by Spear and approved in J on April 9. The meeting was held in Johnson’s of-
fice. The memorandum is part 6 of 6; parts 1 through 5 are ibid.
2
A memorandum of this conversation, March 31, is ibid.
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Thailand 15

9. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (Godley)1

Bangkok, April 10, 1969.

Dear Mac:
Thanks very much for your March 28 letter.2 You have identified
some of the really tough questions which are likely to face us in more
or less direct fashion at the SEATO and TCC meetings in May, but
whether or not there, then surely in increasingly active form later on.
In this letter I’ll try to give you some first answers and perhaps we can
fit in an exchange or two more3 before the meetings themselves.
Thanat Ploy
You are quite right to raise questions about Thanat’s role and mo-
tivations in his rather excessive recourse recently to the press and
public platforms. I have been troubled for some time by the apparent
inconsistency between his deploring what he regards as serious wa-
verings in American determination and resolve with regard to con-
tributing to the defense of the Free World in Southeast Asia and his oc-
casional insistence on a bilateral security treaty, no doubt motivated by
these concerns; and on the other hand, his verbal approaches to Com-
munist China and occasional expressions of reservations about a con-
tinued American military presence here. In a way I think we have to
read this ambivalence as a product, at least in part, of our own current
ambivalence in which we are on the one hand stoutly devoting great
blood and treasure to the defense of Southeast Asia, which even Thanat
cannot deny, but at the same time exhibiting to the world (no doubt in
exaggerated form) a body politic, including much of the press, most of
the youth, highly influential congressmen, and a preponderance of the
articulate intellectual community, which condemns our involvement in
Vietnam and which is obviously apprehensive even about our present
degree of involvement in Thailand, which it tends to see as going the
way of Vietnam. The Thai, to oversimplify somewhat, have increasingly

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret;
Eyes Only. A notation on the letter indicates Godley saw it. Copies were sent to John-
son, Ambassador Marshall Green, and Spear.
2
Not found.
3
Copies of this and follow-up letters from Unger to Godley, April 15 and 17, were
forwarded by Unger to Kissinger along with a May 9 covering letter. Kissinger replied
in a June 2 letter to Unger that: “Your discussion of issues in Thailand as well as your
views on Laos and Vietnam are directly relevant to our NSSM 51 study of Thailand and
provide valuable assistance to us.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Mate-
rials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I)
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16 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

based their national policy on collective security since 1954, and many
of their own initiatives, and even more their agreement to actions of ours,
including those on their territory, have been based on the continued
availability of a protective cover from the US in case of trouble. Now
Thanat and the Thai ask themselves to what extent that cover is still
available and relate that question also to our readiness to see through
the Vietnam process to the point where South Vietnam is going to be at
least tolerably able to decide its own future without outside interference.
Most Thais don’t take seriously the threat of massive Communist
invasion as a likelihood in present circumstances, although they would
undoubtedly argue that if there is an obvious American disengagement
from Southeast Asia, the deterrent to such an invasion will have been
largely removed and the possibility increased that the Chinese might
return to something like Korean War methods. The President’s recent
message to the Prime Minister4 and the assurances provided by Mar-
shall Green, together with what I presume Secretary Rogers will be say-
ing in May, will probably keep those apprehensions in the background
for most of the Thai leadership even though Thanat will probably not
desist from carping comments. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
the Thai don’t want our direct military involvement in their insurgency,
although they certainly are counting on our continued contribution
through MAP and AID to the support of their own counter-insurgency.
There is, unfortunately, an ambiguous middle area between an inva-
sion and the insurgency and I think it is here that our most difficult
policy problems lie. This brings us to the Laos problem above all, and
I’ll save further discussion of it for the next section.
Thanat has become increasingly over the past ten years, and partic-
ularly since Thanom has been Prime Minister, the architect of Thai for-
eign policy. In fields such as the promotion of regional activities, the po-
sition in the UN and dealing with the US on matters such as the Paris
negotiations, he has, in my opinion, an almost completely free hand. He
also has been one of the three or four most influential decision-makers
on such matters as sending forces to South Vietnam and on relations with
neighboring countries. However, I think it is questionable whether Thanat
would have won out if, for example, he had opposed the sending of the
Queen’s Cobras and Black Panthers to Vietnam, or if he had insisted on
strong initiatives to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cambodia; the
fundamental military leadership still controls these matters in the last
analysis. Thanat has been able to play the role that he has because he has
been basically in agreement with the military leadership on these mat-
ters. Similarly, on the question of future US military presence here, in-
cluding in the post-Vietnam period, Thanat’s voice will probably not be

4
See Document 7.
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Thailand 17

decisive since prime matters of national security will be involved and

the military leadership will make the final decisions.
In spite of this, however, Thanat is heavily depended upon by the
military leadership and especially the Prime Minister, and his famil-
iarity with the American scene makes him particularly important as an
advisor about relations with us. Thus, Thanat could be very influen-
tial in convincing the leadership that a collective security policy based
on US participation was no longer realistic for Thailand. If he should
undertake this (and I do not believe he is presently doing so) and be
successful, then the military leadership would have a much more neg-
ative attitude about Thai participation in Vietnam and the future US
military presence in Thailand than they have today. At the present time
I believe Thanat’s role with the military leadership is to raise some
warning signals about the future American role and to stimulate some
thinking about contingent actions in case the US should in fact disen-
gage from Southeast Asia. The military leadership consists largely of
simplistic thinkers in the foreign policy and military strategy fields; the
subtleties of regional security organizations and Paris negotiations do
not interest or concern them very much.
There are others on the Thai scene who play some role in the for-
eign affairs field, notably Pote Sarasin who undoubtedly does advise the
Prime Minister in a somewhat conservative and definitely pro-US vein.
While Pote has on occasion made some dubious comment about some
of Thanat’s more unbridled statements, he has shown no disposition to
challenge Thanat’s leading role in the foreign affairs field. A possible fu-
ture figure of importance is Bunchana Atthakorn and in this regard I call
your attention to the enclosed press article on a recent speech of his. As
time goes on, there possibly will also be new members of the military
leadership who will have some more sophistication about foreign
policy and military strategy, including emerging leaders like General
Kriangsak. Today, however, the field is left very largely to the Prime
Minister, Praphat, Dawee and Thanat for the basic decisions.
Another factor of increasing importance in Thanat’s thinking, I be-
lieve, is his growing concern as a somewhat over-sensitive Thai na-
tionalist about the impact of the presence here of 50,000 American mil-
itary. Thanat, and most other Thais for that matter, are enough aware
of what South Vietnam looks like today from the inside to know that
they do not want American ground forces participating in fighting in
Thailand. Thanat, and even more some members of the new Parlia-
ment and younger, semi-intellectual Thais, are increasingly disturbed
about what happens to Thai communities under heavy GI influence
and they are also vaguely uneasy about the effect on Thailand’s free-
dom of decision in an increasingly tricky and uncertain period. Thanat
is also over-sensitive at the twitting he no doubt gets occasionally from
his colleagues in neighboring countries (although I would guess this
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18 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

is less true than in the past) and in international forums such as the UN
about Thailand’s having become so closely tied to the US. None of these
things, in my opinion, will lead Thanat to begin to press for the pullout
of American forces here, or even a substantial reduction, as long as the
Vietnam war requires their presence. He does not like to have it assumed,
however, that once that is past Thailand can be taken for granted as a
home for indefinite US deployments in the future. You have noted, I am
sure, however, that Thanat has carefully left a loophole in all of his state-
ments about US withdrawal from Thailand which makes it clear that the
Thais might find that there were compelling reasons why some US forces
should remain here. I believe that in the absence of a virtually utopian
settlement of Southeast Asia’s security problems, Thanat will in fact,
along with the military leadership, wish to have some continued US
presence unless we seem to have gone the total disengagement route.
You are undoubtedly right in suspecting, too, that Thanat is in part
addressing the American public. He bitterly resents the references
which occasionally (and a good deal less frequently than he alleges)
appear in the American press about Thailand’s sending “mercenaries”
to Vietnam and about Thailand’s being a US puppet and one of “our
boys”, ready slavishly to do the US bidding as long as we continue to
throw a few bones its way. Thanat is also acutely conscious of the “Thai-
land: the next Vietnam” theme. For all of these reasons he is intent on
conveying to the American public the sense of an independent RTG
posture, even some reservations about or hostility to the US, and re-
moving the black and white image of Thailand as a single-minded,
anti-Communist US ally. In my mind this is surely one of his reasons
for making such repeated loud noises about a willingness to talk with
Communist China. Thanat, not unjustifiably in my opinion, has iden-
tified the peculiar American syndrome of denigrating and scorning its
close and loyal allies and being attracted to those who kick us in the
teeth from time to time; I think he is carrying out what is largely a one-
man campaign to move Thailand toward the second category.
Finally, a last little intriguing twist. You will see from Bangkok’s
42995 that Thanat probably is going to make a bid for the ICJ seat in
1970. Could it be that he has been working on his image and trying to
be sure that he is regarded as an international statesman of broad views
and not tied to the US kite, so that he does not lose the votes on which
he must depend for election?
This first answer has gone on for so long that I will send it off by
itself and proceed to the questions of post-Vietnam planning and Viet-
nam and Paris prospects as soon as I can turn to them.
Yours,
Len
5
Not found.
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Thailand 19

10. National Security Study Memorandum 511

Washington, April 26, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Administrator of the Agency for International Development

SUBJECT
Program Analysis of Thailand

The President has directed that a program analysis of Thailand be

undertaken in accordance with the procedures described in NSDM 4.2
If appropriate, two or three alternative outcomes to the Vietnam
conflict should be assumed.
The study will:
1. Analyze U.S. interests and objectives in Thailand and their impli-
cations for future U.S.-Thai relations, giving due consideration to the his-
torical background as it relates to Thai interests and U.S.-Thai relations.
2. In the light of alternative views of U.S. interests and objectives
in Thailand, analyze those policy issues which will have a bearing on
the size, mix and composition of U.S. programs to support these ob-
jectives over the next five years.
3. Analyze the program and budget implications of the key pol-
icy options.
4. Develop alternative statements of U.S. objectives, policy options
and their program implications for consideration by the National Se-
curity Council.
The study should include an analysis of the following U.S. pro-
grams and possible trade offs among them:
1. Military assistance and its role in the development of Thai se-
curity forces.
2. The AID programs and their role in helping the Thai control the
insurgent threat and in developing Thailand’s economy.
3. U.S. forces and bases in Thailand in the light of possible post-
Vietnam war contingencies in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.
4. CONUS-based and Theatre-based U.S. forces required as a re-
serve for Thai contingencies.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Sub-
ject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2
NSDM 4, January 20, authorized program analysis studies for certain countries.
(Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, NSDM Files, NSDMs 1–50)
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20 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

5. U.S. research activities and their contribution to U.S. and Thai

program effectiveness.
6. The programs of the U.S. Information Agency, the Peace Corps,
and the Central Intelligence Agency in Thailand.
Field research activities to obtain information needed for the
analysis shall be undertaken as required.
The study will be performed by an Ad Hoc group chaired by the
NSC Assistant for Programs; the Country Director for Thailand will be
the Vice Chairman of the Ad Hoc group. The Chairman will consult
periodically with the East Asia Interdepartmental Group. The Ad Hoc
group will comprise members from the addressee agencies who shall
be selected after consultation with the agencies and designated by the
undersigned in a separate memorandum.
To assist the Ad Hoc group in its study, the Secretary of Defense
should provide an analysis of possible Southeast Asia contingencies,
including the defense of Thailand, and their implications for required
U.S. forces and bases. This analysis will incorporate the results of analy-
ses of the effectiveness of past operations conducted from Thailand and
reflect agency views on the major outstanding issues. This study will
be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
fairs by July 1, 1969.
The Department of Defense will provide administrative support
for the Ad Hoc group.
The study should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs by October 1, 1969. Subsequently, the
study will be referred to the NSC IG/EA for comment prior to con-
sideration by the Review Group.
Henry A. Kissinger

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, May 23, 1969, 1217Z.

6750. Subject: Secretary Rogers, Prime Minister Thanom Bilateral.

Following is an uncleared record of the Secretary’s conversation with
Prime Minister of Thailand Thanom Kittikachorn.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Prior-
ity; Limdis. Also sent to New Delhi for the Secretary’s party.
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Thailand 21

1. Following seven nation meeting Thursday, May 22, Secretary

Rogers, accompanied by Amb Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary Sul-
livan and DCM Hannah called on PriMin Thanom accompanied by
Foreign Minister Thanat, Minister of Communications and Chief of
Staff Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Minister without Portfolio General
Sawaeng Senanarong, and General Jira Vichitsonggram, Special Advi-
sor to the Prime Minister (on security).
2. After pleasantries, Secretary Rogers expressed our deep interest
in Thailand and our intention to continue to cooperate and assist in any
way we could. The Prime Minister said that the main thing Thailand
needs today is military equipment to assist it in coping with the infil-
trated Communist subversion. He mentioned specifically transport
equipment, helicopters, signal equipment and hand-held radar. Secretary
Rogers asked Ambassador Unger to comment on this point. The Am-
bassador explained that we are in regular touch with the Thai with re-
spect to military equipment programs in various fields. With respect to
transport, helicopters and signal equipment, we have fully coordinated
continuing programs, primarily in MAP. Much equipment has been de-
livered and more is programmed. With respect to the hand radar, this is
a subject on which we require further knowledge of Thai requirements.
3. Secretary Rogers asked if the most serious subversion is in the
North. The Prime Minister replied that there are infiltration and subver-
sion threats in both North and Northeast. Marshal Dawee interceded at
this point to explain that there is serious infiltration in both areas and this
is why the hand radar equipment is needed as well as helicopters with
miniguns. He also mentioned reports of infiltration by enemy helicopter
and pointed out that the Thai had disagreed with their American friends
who had contended that enemy infiltration by helicopter was impossible
and there were no authentic instances of craft having been seen. Marshal
Dawee indicated that several confirmed sightings have in fact been made.
4. Ambassador Unger invited the Prime Minister to give the Sec-
retary a fuller appraisal of the Communist terrorist campaign, partic-
ularly in the North where the counter-insurgency concept of the RTG
may not yet be entirely clear. The Prime Minister said that internally
there is no need for undue worry because subversion within Thailand
can be controlled. But the Thai Government is very deeply worried
about the external threat which comes from Laos. He said the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese are advancing in Laos. The Chinese Com-
munists are building roads to points close to Thai borders. The North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao are developing concentrations at points
near the Thai border for purposes of infiltration. In this connection he
mentioned particularly Campassak Province in Southwestern Laos
which lies west of the Mekong, creating a special danger for Ubol
Province. The Thai support the Lao Government and want it to keep
up the fight in Laos outside of Thailand, but the Lao Government is very
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22 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

weak. Dawee interjected that recently General Quan visited Thailand

saying “my pockets are empty.” Dawee said the Lao Govt is in very se-
vere financial difficulties and is unable to pay or care for its soldiers. He
feared this would create a dangerous sag in morale, desertions, etc.
5. Secretary Rogers inquired as to the quality of Lao soldiers. Am-
bassador Sullivan replied that it depends on how well led they are and
where they are fighting. He said that shortly before leaving Laos he
had recommended provision of M–16s to the Lao Army and also con-
version of 2 AC–47s into gunships of the kind which have worked so
well on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in recent months. With respect to the fi-
nancial situation, he pointed out that the RLG has always paid its own
forces but we, with help from some others, have put in considerable
financial help to bolster the kip. He thought that Japan could very well
make a significant contribution to this cause without infringing its
“constitutional limitations”. He suggested that FonMin Thanat urge the
Japanese to make such a contribution. Thanat said he has talked with
the Japanese in the past about making a greater effort in this area and
is not optimistic that they will do so.
6. Secretary Rogers expressed his satisfaction with the two meet-
ings that have occurred this week, and paid tribute to Thanat for his
role in them. After a courteous response, Thanat expressed the Thai
Govt’s appreciation for Secretary Rogers’ reaffirmation of US commit-
ments in his opening speech at SEATO,2 indicating in particular the
1962 communiqué. Thanat thought the Secretary’s speech had an ex-
cellent effect on the whole meeting. Secretary Rogers indicated that this
was why he had reiterated our commitments in his opening speech at
the beginning of the meeting. As for the 1962 communiqué, he said
that he regards it merely as a valid statement, not an interpretation, of
the commitments undertaken in the Manila Pact.
7. Before the meeting broke up, Secretary Rogers made a special
point of expressing his deep appreciation to the Thai for the excellent
treatment they have accorded US servicemen in Thailand.
Unger

2
Rogers, in his opening statement at the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting in
Bangkok on May 20, said that SEATO had provided “a credible sense of security” in Asia
and that “this is why we continue to adhere to the treaty and to regard the Rusk–Thanat
communiqué as a valid restatement of the responsibility set forth in Article IV (Para 1) of
the Treaty.” (Telegram 14754 from Bangkok, October 30; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materi-
als, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I) Article IV (1) of the
SEATO Treaty provided that “Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which
the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own
peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.” When the Treaty was executed the U.S. Gov-
ernment clarified that its response was limited to Communist aggression.
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Thailand 23

12. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to President

Nixon1

Bangkok, June 17, 1969.

Dear Mr. President,

May I draw your attention to a matter of prime concern with re-
gard to Thailand and our relations with that country.
As you well know Thailand and the United States are intimately
associated in many of the security arrangements related to the protec-
tion of Southeast Asia, and the fighting in Viet-Nam in particular. It is
essential for this reason that mutual confidence be maintained between
us particularly at a time like the present when critical decisions and
actions are being taken with far-reaching consequence for Southeast
Asia’s future.
Now that the first step has been publicly taken with regard to the
replacement of U.S. forces by South Vietnamese forces in South Viet-
Nam and the initial need for absolute secrecy no longer applies so
strongly, I deem it essential that we open a dialogue on this subject
with the Royal Thai Government which has always held in strictest
confidence the many highly sensitive matters we have discussed in the
past. We have already reviewed with the Thai the considerations re-
garding withdrawal raised in your May 14 speech.2 At an early date
we would like to resume these discussions along the following lines:
1. As indicated by the Midway announcement it is the judgment
of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments that the expansion and
strengthening of the forces of South Viet-Nam have reached a stage
which makes it possible to begin the withdrawal from Southeast Asia
of some of the U.S. forces there. The U.S. Government would like to
discuss this process with the Royal Thai Government in general, as it
relates to our further actions on the ground and in negotiations toward
a satisfactory solution of the Viet-Nam problem, and in particular as it
relates to the U.S. air and army support forces presently stationed in
Thailand.
2. We would also like to solicit the views of the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment concerning the continuing role of the division of the Thai
Army now fighting in Viet-Nam.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret.
2
In his May 14 address to the nation, Nixon proposed the withdrawal of all non-
South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, thus initiating the process of U.S. troop
withdrawals from that country. The overall idea implied in this address, and in subse-
quent remarks from Midway Island, June 8–10, was that Asian nations should determine
their own destinies. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 369–375)
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24 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

3. These matters also suggest the desirability of our looking ahead

to the situation following a Viet-Nam settlement and beginning to con-
sider, in that context, such matters as the future of the Royal Thai Air
Force bases now very heavily utilized by the U.S. Air Force, of the air
defense radar and communications system, and of the U.S. logistic sys-
tem based on Sattahip and Korat.
I am persuaded, Mr. President, that unless we undertake to con-
sult with the Thai Government on their forces presently deployed to
Viet-Nam they may reach a decision unilaterally to begin the with-
drawal of these forces. Since this would detract from the multinational
force fighting there now and providing an important political symbol,
I believe our consultations should begin promptly to avoid this.
A source of continuing preoccupation in Thai-American relations
is our massive presence there today, made up primarily of U.S. air
forces engaged in the defense of Viet-Nam and, to a lesser extent, Laos.
For this reason and also for sound budgetary reasons, I am seeking by
every means to reduce the number of official Americans in Thailand
whenever this can be done without a loss in our effectiveness. In par-
ticular, I believe we should plan to begin a modest withdrawal of such
of our Air Force units as may no longer be essential to the fighting in
Viet-Nam and are not needed for air support in Laos. However, I would
strongly recommend against any move of this sort or any indication of
our intention to take such action until after we have carried out with
the Royal Thai Government the kind of consultation outlined above
which will give the Thai the full context of any actions we plan to un-
dertake. Without such consultation the Thai may misread a withdrawal
as premature and signalling a weakening in our resolve to see the strug-
gle through in Viet-Nam to an acceptable resolution.
With this in mind, we will be formulating an authorization for Em-
bassy Bangkok to undertake these consultations with the Royal Thai
Government as a matter of urgency in accordance with instructions to
be provided from Washington.
Leonard Unger3

3
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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Thailand 25

13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, June 19, 1969.

SUBJECT
Appointment with U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger

Ambassador Unger will pay a brief courtesy call on you at 11:15

a.m., Friday, June 20.2 He is currently on home leave from his post in
Bangkok and will be returning there for a second tour.
Ambassador Unger has three major points to raise with you. They
are:
1. Insurgency in north and northeast Thailand: While the Thais have
been fairly effective in dealing with insurgency in the northeast, their
effort in northern Thailand has been discouragingly poor. There has
been some consideration to a greater U.S. involvement, but Ambas-
sador Unger feels strongly that U.S. forces should not become involved
in counterinsurgency operations. If the Thai cannot do the job, it will
not be done, and excessive U.S. involvement tends to weaken the Thai
sense of responsibility. Preferably, we should continue to advise and
assist the Thais, but let them conduct counterinsurgency operations.
2. The U.S. presence in Thailand: Ambassador Unger is concerned
over the need both to reduce the U.S. presence in Thailand and make
it as little visible as possible. He would particularly like to see some
military units, no longer essential to the Vietnam war effort, withdrawn
at an early date. At your direction, we have asked the Under Secre-
taries Committee to study this question and come up with recom-
mendations to you.
3. Fuller consultations with Thailand: Ambassador Unger suggests
there is a need for fuller consultations with the inner circle of the Thai
Government on both withdrawals from Vietnam and U.S. military de-
ployments in Thailand after the Vietnam conflict. He believes this can
be done with minimal risk of public leakage. He will be bringing a let-
ter to you on this subject, a copy of which is attached at Tab A,3 in view
of the short time available for discussion with you.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by R. L.
Sneider on June 19. The memorandum is unsigned but bears Kissinger’s handwritten
initials in the upper right-hand corner.
2
No other record of this meeting has been found.
3
See Document 12.
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26 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Talking Points
I recommend that:
1. You encourage Ambassador Unger in both efforts to avoid di-
rect U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency and to reduce the U.S. pres-
ence in Thailand.
2. Indicate your support in principle for fuller consultations with
the Thais, if this can be done without breach of security and without
becoming enmeshed in the process of clearing specific troop replace-
ments with the Thais.
3. Ask him to convey to Prime Minister Thanom your apprecia-
tion of Thai determination to continue the close cooperation with us
for common objectives in Southeast Asia. (We have recently received a
copy of Thanom’s letter to you expressing appreciation for your recent
messages to him. This is attached at Tab B.)4

4
Nixon had sent Thanom several courtesy messages in advance of his May 14 and
Midway Island Vietnamization speeches; attached but not printed. Attached at Tab B but
not printed is Thanom’s undated letter thanking Nixon for his messages received on
May 14 and 22. Telegram 115643 to Bangkok, July 12, asked the Embassy to thank Prime
Minister Thanom for his letter of May 29 and for his assurances of continued coopera-
tion between Thailand and the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 27–14 VIET)

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Washington, July 9, 1969, 2353Z.

113614. Ref: Bangkok’s 9168.2 Subj: Response to Fulbright Allega-

tion of Secret Thai-U.S. Agreement.
Summary.
1. Sen. Fulbright has alleged both publicly and in top secret mem-
orandum to the Secretary that U.S. has secret agreement with Thailand

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Linwood
Starbird (EA/TB); cleared by Cross and Brown (EA), Dennis Doolin (OASD/ISA), Robert
McCloskey (P), and Davis R. Robinson (S); and approved by Green.
2
Telegram 9168 from Bangkok, July 9, requested a full text of the Fulbright letter
and an opportunity to comment on it. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4
THAI–US)
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Thailand 27

much broader than any publicly-known commitment. Department will

continue inform you of significant press coverage and other public de-
velopments. Top secret reference is to Project Taksin military con-
tingency planning. We plan both public and top secret response. End
Summary.
Public Response
2. McCloskey held to same non-commital line July 9 as he used
July 8 (State 112736).3 However, rather than allow speculation to build
up, we hope we can make clarification at regular Department press
briefing July 10. Statement has not yet been fully cleared, but repre-
sents careful study and evaluation of pertinent documents and other
material. Would appreciate your immediate comments on whether it
would cause any significant problems with Thais.4 Also request you
talk with appropriate RTG leaders, explaining how matter has arisen,
reassure that as our intended public statement makes clear our SEATO
commitment remains unchanged and urge calm public posture in or-
der to help put to rest in interest of all.
Suggested Statement
3. “Our commitments involving the defense of Thailand are de-
fined by the SEATO Treaty of 1954. These were restated in the
Rusk–Thanat Communiqué of 1962. There is no defense commitment
to Thailand going beyond that Treaty. We believe Senator Fulbright
refers to contingency military planning. For more than a decade
we have participated in formulating contingency military plans in-
volving the defense of Thailand. This planning involves no further
commitment.”
Fulbright Letter to Secretary
4. Senator Fulbright has also sent Secretary a letter5 and top se-
cret memorandum on, inter alia, our commitments to Thailand. Mem-
orandum: 1) expresses concern over growing influence of DOD in for-
eign policy; 2) notes statement in recent Department letter to effect
that our contingency planning, both multilateral and bilateral, is sim-
ply normal activity undertaken pursuant to SEATO Treaty commit-
ment and does not enlarge that commitment; 3) refers to existence of

3
Dated July 8. (Ibid., PPB 9 US)
4
See Document 15.
5
Senator Fulbright sent Rogers a June 5 letter concerning U.S. commitments to
Thailand. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, SEATO 3 THAI) Assistant
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber, Jr., responded to
Fulbright on behalf of the Secretary in a June 27 letter, stating that U.S. obligations ex-
isted under Article IV (1) of the SEATO Treaty without any extension. (Ibid.)
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28 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

“COMUSTAF Plan 1–646 and subsequent plans” and provides sum-

mary; 4) claims that such plans lead the other party to believe that U.S.
has firm commitment—already made in accordance with our consti-
tutional processes—to specific action involving use of substantial mil-
itary forces; and 5) argues plan already given partial effect by the sta-
tioning of 40,000 Americans in Thailand. Summary of “COMUSTAF
Plan 1–64” included is full direct quotation of Top Secret June, 1965
“Hoopes Report” on military assistance reappraisal pages V–35
through V–37.7

6
Senator Fulbright contended that the Thais might believe that the United States
had committed itself to take specific action involving substantial use of American troops
through the Taksin contingency plan, known also as Project 22 or by its DOD acronym,
COMUSTAF 1/64. The Department of State had tried to assure the Senator that both it
and the Thai Government agreed that military contingency plans did not affect com-
mitments and were only operational details to be used if, as, and when agreed upon.
Furthermore, Fulbright insisted upon seeing a copy of the plan, rather than having a
briefing on it, as the Department of Defense proposed. On July 29, Fulbright renewed
his request to the Department of State for text of COMUSTAF Plan 1/64. The text of Ful-
bright’s July 29 letter to Acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson is in the Congressional
Record, August 8, 1969, p. S9504. The Department of Defense continued its resistance to
providing a copy of the plan as Richardson informed Fulbright several days later. The
text of Richardson’s letter, August 4, to Senator Fulbright is ibid. On August 8 Fulbright
stated unequivocably on the Senate floor that the Department of Defense offer of a brief-
ing in lieu of the text of the plan was not acceptable. (Ibid., pp. S9503–S9505) On August
19 Kissinger informed Laird that he had spoken with President Nixon about the con-
tingency plans and that “they should be looked at only at the Pentagon.” Also the Sen-
ate Committee could only see the Thai plan “and no others are to be shown.” (Notes of
a telephone conversation, August 19, 11:30 a.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
7
Printed from an unsigned copy.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, July 10, 1969, 1049Z.

9229. Ref: State 113614.2

1. Reftel arrived just as I was departing with Secretary to the Cab-
inet John Whitaker to call on Foreign Minister Thanat. During our re-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate.
2
Document 14.
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Thailand 29

view with Thanat of President’s forthcoming visit to Thailand, I found

an occasion to refer to Bangkok Post publicity regarding Fulbright
charges. I reviewed the subject with Thanat on the basis of paras 1 and
2 reftel. Thanat seemed perplexed concerning the charge that there is
a top secret agreement which commits the U.S. beyond the SEATO
Treaty. When I mentioned Project Taksin, he seemed nonplused but his
secretary, Birabhongse, confirmed to him that Taksin is a military con-
tingency plan. Thanat expressed the opinion that all military contin-
gency planning is within the SEATO context, but Birabhongse informed
him that Taksin is purely bilateral. In any case, Thanat fully under-
stands that military contingency plans do not affect commitments and
are only operational details to be used if, as and when it is agreed to
do so.
2. I read to Thanat the suggested statement in para 3 reftel and he
commented “that seems very good.” As for himself, he said that if he
is questioned publicly, he will simply say that he has no knowledge of
any additional Thai-U.S. defense agreement beyond SEATO. Based on
our own judgment, as well as this interview with Thanat, we concur
with the suggested statement.
3. We will forward additional comments re reply to Senator Ful-
bright. We believe the question of historical context is very important
particularly since we will be talking in those terms to Pincus and Paul
who will undoubtedly report to the Senator. We reiterate our desire to
see proposed reply before it goes forward.
4. On incidental interest, Thanat remarked that Fulbright’s charges
appear to be similar to some of the things written in The Washington
Post and he speculated on the possibility of some kind of “cabal” be-
tween Fulbright and The Washington Post. This quite inevitably led him
into a pithy review of his feelings about Stanley Karnow,3 who he hopes
will not seek to visit Thailand during the President’s visit (being re-
ported septel).
Hannah

3
Washington Post reporter Stanley Karnow.
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30 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

16. Department of State Briefing Paper1

NCV/T–5 Washington, July 10, 1969.

THAILAND
Background—Thailand’s Role in Viet-Nam
The Thai regard the Viet-Nam war as part of the defense of South-
east Asia. Therefore, the Paris talks, the status of Laos in a Viet-Nam set-
tlement, the stability of the GVN, improvement of the South Vietnamese
fighting effectiveness, withdrawal of U.S. forces, the post-Viet-Nam U.S.
force structure in Southeast Asia, all are matters in which the Thai are
vitally interested and wish to feel involved in decisions on them. It is
highly desirable that the U.S. initiate a dialogue with the RTG on these
matters as soon as U.S. thinking reaches a point at which it can be shared.
A. The Paris Talks
The Thai are very interested and concerned about the Paris talks.
They will be alert to any indication that they are not being kept as fully
briefed as other TCC’s, particularly since their record of maintaining
security in sensitive matters is excellent. Thailand is less fully informed
about the Paris talks than certain other TCC’s (GVN, Australia, NZ)
and less regularly briefed than Korea and the Philippines; only Foreign
Minister Thanat is kept informed, and he has been only partially briefed
by Ambassador Unger.
Their special interest vis-à-vis Paris will be the inclusion of Laos
in any settlement. (See background paper on importance of Laos to
Thai security.)2 The Thai may also feel lingering anxiety about the pos-
sibility of unreciprocated U.S. withdrawal and its adverse effect on
Asian security, and doubts about the viability of any government in
South Viet-Nam that would include Communists. They understand
that now is not the time to include TCC’s in the talks but they (like the
other four participants) expect that the time will come.
B. U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Viet-Nam
Although Thai leaders have commented favorably and helpfully in
public on the results of the Midway meeting, they are watching very
closely the developing pattern of U.S. actions for indications of U.S. in-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, Pres-
ident’s Trip Files, President Nixon’s Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thai-
land. Secret. Drafted by Starbird and Martin (EA/TB) and cleared by Spear, Sullivan,
and Devine (OASD). Prepared for the President’s July around-the-world trip to Guam,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 17.
2
Not printed. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 31

tentions in Southeast Asia. In discussing the Midway meeting with RTG

leaders, we have reviewed the progress in the expansion and moderniza-
tion of the Vietnamese regular and territorial forces and the Midway agree-
ments growing out of our collective assessment with the GVN of these sit-
uations. We have assured the RTG that our actions did not involve a
diminution of Allied combat capability or a lessening in American deter-
mination for an equitable and honorable settlement, and have told them
that there will be further review in August of troop replacement.
C. Thai Forces in South Viet-Nam
Thailand recognizes the intimate relationship of its security with
that of Viet-Nam and Laos, and the dangers which would attend Com-
munist successes among its Southeast Asian neighbors. Consequently,
although indigenous Communist insurgency threatens many regions
of the country, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has sent approxi-
mately 11,500 men to South Viet-Nam, including an army light divi-
sion, small naval units, and an air force transport contingent.
When queried about the status of these Thai forces in Viet-Nam
following the Midway Conference developments, Prime Minister
Thanom stated on June 12 to the press that Thai forces would be nei-
ther increased nor withdrawn at this time, that the subject of their with-
drawal was being studied, and that when SVN strength was sufficient,
Thai forces would be gradually withdrawn.
We have not yet sounded out the RTG’s views concerning the fu-
ture of the Thai division in Viet-Nam. There are a number of factors
which need to be considered: (a) the need for Thai forces in their own
country to counter insurgency and provide a credible deterrent to
Communist advances in Laos, (b) the capability of Vietnamese forces
to replace the Thai, (c) the political importance of Thai forces partici-
pating in the defense of its Southeast Asian neighbor, and (d) the need
to forestall a unilateral decision to withdraw on the RTG’s part which
might adversely affect the political significance of the multinational
and Asian support for South Viet-Nam.
D. Future of U.S. Forces in Thailand
Good behavior by U.S. servicemen and energetic efforts by the
Embassy and military commanders have kept the incident rate low, but
sheer numbers, language, and cultural and income differences have led
to inevitable incidents affecting the Thai community. And as the at-
mosphere in Bangkok has become increasingly political with the ad-
vent of elections and a national assembly, the RTG has become in-
creasingly sensitive to these incidents.
The large U.S. military presence in Thailand—primarily U.S. air
forces engaged in the defense of Viet-Nam and Laos—now totals about
48,000, including 35,000 USAF personnel; 11,000 Army personnel
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32 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

involved in support of air operations, in construction work, and in main-

tenance of prepositioned equipment; and 1,200 in JUSMAG involved in
training Thai forces. We have built about $400 million worth of military
facilities, including major expansion of five of the six Thai air bases we
are using, the new port-airbase complex at Sattahip/U Tapao, and im-
provements in roads, communications networks, supply depots, etc.
In April 1968 Prime Minister Thanom asked that “American Air
Force personnel now stationed at Thai bases remain in country, even
though in reduced numbers, following U.S. withdrawal from Viet-Nam
and thereafter be taken out only gradually.” During his visit to Wash-
ington in May 1968 we agreed to consult on this matter.
Foreign Minister Thanat has several times stated (e.g. interview
with Terrence Smith of New York Times, February 14, 1969; Foreign Min-
istry statement of February 20, 1969) that U.S. forces are in Thailand in
connection with the war in Viet-Nam and will leave afterwards unless
there is some compelling reason for them to stay. In that event, a new
agreement would have to be drawn up between the two governments.
On February 21, 1969, the Department’s spokesman affirmed that
“the bulk of U.S. forces are in Thailand in connection with the war in
Viet-Nam . . . that obviously large numbers of U.S. forces would not
continue to be stationed in Thailand after a satisfactory settlement in
Southeast Asia unless there were some compelling reason for them to
stay. It is also quite clear that U.S. forces would remain only with the
agreement of the two governments.”

17. Department of State Briefing Paper1

NCV/T–18 Washington, July 11, 1969.

THAILAND
Scope and Objectives
A. Background
With a prospering economy and remarkable social and political
stability—in spite of military coups which have been bloodless and

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, Pres-
ident’s Trip Files, President Nixon’s Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thai-
land. Secret. Drafted by Spear and Nelson (EA/TB) and approved by Green. Prepared
for the President’s July around-the-world trip to Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thai-
land, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 16.
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Thailand 33

largely of the “palace” variety—Thailand’s problems are largely exter-

nally instigated, and as yet barely felt by the population as a whole.
The insurgency is small, affecting the lives of relatively few and remote
rural villagers. Thai leaders are concerned because they realize its Com-
munist Chinese instigation and potential seriousness. Progress in gov-
ernment, by Western standards, is being demanded by Thailand’s ed-
ucated elite, while the mass of Thai people still complacently accept
Thai government in traditional terms, demanding little from the gov-
ernment. The leading opposition party is royalist, conservative, and ur-
ban, while the pro-government party was strongest in rural areas.
Thailand is approaching a cross roads in basic policy directions as
Thai leaders anticipate an end to the Viet-Nam war and try to plot their
post-Viet-Nam course. Since World War II Thailand has been increas-
ingly committed to a pro-U.S. policy in reaction to the Chinese Com-
munist threat. During the last five years—with our heavy involvement
in Viet-Nam—Thailand’s commitment to this policy has been almost
total. Foreign Minister Thanat has been one of the most outspoken of
Asian champions of resistance to Communist aggression in South Viet-
Nam. Now, with demands for peace and withdrawal being publicized
in the United States, the Thai are beginning to wonder whether they
have stuck their necks out too far by sending forces to South Viet-Nam
and allowing our use of Thai air bases to bomb North Viet-Nam.
Though still maintaining a pro-U.S. stance they are seeking to widen
their policy options by strengthening regional ties and increasing con-
tacts with other nations, such as the Communist countries of Eastern
Europe.
Thai leaders have been basically reassured by your letters to Prime
Minister Thanom and by Secretary Rogers’ statement at the SEATO
Council meeting last May. However, contrary press reports and agita-
tion in this country continue to disquiet them, making continuing re-
assurance necessary. Your visit, and re-affirmation of U.S. firmness in
seeking a genuine peace in Viet-Nam without sacrificing the freedom
of our allies, will help to maintain Thai confidence and stability.
The Thais have smarted under criticisms that their government is
military and un-democratic. Their new Constitution, adopted June 20,
1968, and election of a House of Representatives on February 10, 1969,
have reflected both a desire to improve Thailand’s image before the
Free World and genuine democratic aspirations on the part of Thai-
land’s educated people generally. By low-key notice of this political lib-
eralization your visit can encourage the Thais in these efforts.
We feel that by and large the Thai are meeting their present prob-
lems effectively. They are improving their counterinsurgency efforts—
though encouragement to do still better in north Thailand is needed.
They have responded helpfully to the peace talks in Paris and to our
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34 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

efforts to de-escalate the fighting. They have publicly maintained a pos-

ture of confidence in their pro-U.S. policy, in spite of underlying anx-
ieties. They are supporting regional developments in the hope of some-
day building a foundation for a regional security system. They have
taken modest but significant steps toward democratic rule. Your visit
can dispel existing doubts on their part as to the constancy of U.S.
friendship and the feasibility of their continued support to U.S. objec-
tives as a means of ensuring their own security.
B. Outstanding Issues
—Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam and its effect on the
Paris negotiations;
—The future of Thai forces in Viet-Nam;
—Redeployment of U.S. forces from Thailand and what forces, if
any, should remain post-Viet-Nam;
—Thai concerns about Communist gains over the last year in Laos
and the related Communist insurgency in north Thailand.
C. U.S. Objectives
Maintain Thai confidence in their policy of alignment with the United
States.
By giving the Thai leaders assurance of our determination and con-
tinued support and an insight into our thinking on such subjects as Viet-
Nam, the future of our forces in Thailand, and our shared concern about
developments in Laos and the insurgency in north Thailand, you can help
shape Thai policy in the direction of further support for U.S. objectives.
Help the Thai to improve their image as a Free World nation.
The Thai are proud of their long record of independence, and are
very sensitive to insinuations that they are dominated by the United
States. Communist propaganda harping on that theme accentuates
their sensitivities. It is important therefore to emphasize the equal and
independence status of Thailand in all possible ways.
It would also be helpful to use this visit to publicize Thai politi-
cal liberalization as evidence of Thailand’s dynamic, progressive
development.
(Caution: It should be borne in mind that the powers of the new Par-
liament are quite circumscribed. References to progress toward democ-
racy in Thailand should therefore be in low key.)
Encourage Thai efforts promoting regional organization in Southeast
Asia.
Your visit provides an opportunity to encourage Thai leadership
in Southeast Asian regional development. Congratulatory remarks
would be appropriate concerning the skillful and constructive role the
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Thailand 35

Thai have played in mediating differences and stimulating cooperation

between nations of the region.
D. Thai Objectives
To “size up” your Administration. While Thai leaders know you as
a person from several private visits, and while they got an initial “feel”
for your Administration from Secretary Rogers at the SEATO Council
meeting, they will want to use the visit to form their own assessment
of the directions you will take as President.
To assure themselves of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The Thai will
seek continued assurances of U.S. determination to “stay the course”
in Southeast Asia; this inquiry may well focus on Laos. They will also
be seeking our forward thinking on the war in Viet-Nam and the Paris
peace talks.
E. The Message
We want to initiate a dialogue with the Thai regarding the future
of U.S. forces in Thailand, so that they will not misinterpret with-
drawals when they occur. (We want to avoid initiating any proposal
that our forces remain in Thailand after the Viet-Nam fighting is over.
This proposal should come from the Thai side.)
We want to convey:
—American respect for their status as an independent country, and
our pleasure at their progress as reflected in their new Constitution and
their recent Parliamentary elections.
—Confidence that Thailand can rely on U.S. firmness in support-
ing the freedom and independence of its allies in Southeast Asia while
seeking an enduring peace in Viet-Nam.
—Recognition of the need for continued counterinsurgency efforts,
particularly in northern Thailand.
—Our admiration and approval of their efforts to promote regional
organization and cooperative development in Southeast Asia.
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36 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

18. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, July 29, 1969, 10:10 a.m.–2:28 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
President Richard M. Nixon
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Thanom said that the communiqué of the 9th Party Congress

shows that Peking has reaffirmed its intention to carry on war with its
neighbors. Thailand will be under pressure. Many countries in South-
east Asia are not strong enough to resist.
Thailand does not want ground forces—but not having an indus-
trial base, it does need assistance with matériel. It would need help
with ground forces in a general war. As long as it is an unconventional
revolutionary type war, however, the Thais want to depend on their
own ground forces. The Thai government wants to pursue a vast pro-
gram of civic action. The Thai government wants, (1) to work to cre-
ate a viable grouping of non-Communist nations, (2) to receive matériel
assistance, (3) to repel force with force—but with its own men, and
(4) to continue to pursue economic reforms to supplement other means
of defense.
So far the Communist intruders have chosen remote spots where
economic development has not reached. They promise a paradise. The
President said, “like China.” Thanat responded that in rural areas of
Thailand, nothing is known of China.
The President said he wanted the Prime Minister to know his own
thinking. In case of overt aggression, we would expect to react. Where
major powers act, they must expect reaction from other major powers.
If the Communist Chinese were to try that, there will be a very strong
reaction from the U.S. But this is not likely.

1
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105,
Geopolitical File, Asian Trips, July–Aug. 1969. Another copy is in the National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff Files, Tony Lake Chron File,
[June 1969–May 1970], [4 of 6]. Secret; Sensitive. According to President Nixon’s Daily
Diary, the participants included Nixon, Thanom, Thanat, Kissinger, and Dawee. Pre-
sumably, Lake was also present. The meeting was held in the Conference Room of the
Government House in Bangkok. The closing time of the meeting is also from the Presi-
dent’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The President’s ideas, only very
briefly outlined here, became known as the Nixon or Guam doctrine.
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Thailand 37

Thanom said he fully agreed about the unlikelihood of overt ag-

gression. From the pattern we have been seeing, we can expect that
Peking and Hanoi will continue to rely on war by proxy.
The President noted Thanom’s statement that the Thai wish to rely
on their own manpower. There is a difficult political problem in the
U.S., he continued, but the U.S. public will endorse matériel support.2
Thanom said that in meeting subversion, the Thais will meet force
with force, using a combination of military personnel, police and
civic action. They are increasing security measures for all areas, with a
three-pronged program. Attention will be given to getting produce to
market.
The President noted that one can’t deal with subversion by force
alone—the causes must be removed. But he doesn’t agree with soft-
heads who think that you can solve every problem with another bowl
of rice. Thus he was glad that Thanom referred to his determination to
use force.
The President said he wanted to ask a critical question, and asked
that Thanom not spare our feelings. He referred to our handling of
Vietnam. How the war is ended will be critical for peace and freedom
in the Pacific. Is there concern that the U.S. may move too fast in with-
drawing its forces? Is there a feeling that regardless of what he says
publicly, we will let the GVN go down the drain gracefully? He asked
for an honest answer.
Thanom smiled and said that since the President asked him to be
frank, he wanted to recall the views of leaders of previous Adminis-
trations. If a decisive step had been taken, the will of the enemy would
now be broken. Because of the importance of public opinion, one must
take measures to meet its demands. He hoped the other side would re-
spond. If the other side does respond, the war can end. But so far the
other side has not responded. What does the U.S. intend? If conces-
sions are made by only one side, we have cause for concern. He hoped
the U.S. wouldn’t go too far.
The President responded that nothing substantial has happened
on their side. If after a year the enemy refuses to talk, we can’t

2
En route to the Far East on July 25, President Nixon held a press backgrounder
on Guam. The President believed that, following the conclusion of the Vietnam war, there
should be no U.S. withdrawal from Asia: “the way to avoid becoming involved in an-
other war in Asia,” he said, “is for the United States to continue to play a significant
role.” But at the same time, he said, the United States should avoid policies that would
make countries in Asia so dependent that it would be dragged into conflicts such as that
in Vietnam. Later, the President added that the United States was determined to keep
its treaty commitments, for example with Thailand under SEATO, but that it would en-
courage Asian countries to solve their own internal security problems. (Public Papers:
Nixon, 1969, pp. 546, 549)
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38 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

continue to talk in Paris and fight in Vietnam with one hand tied be-
hind our back. U.S. opinion won’t tolerate this. What did the Prime
Minister think of that?
Thanom said that other government leaders understand our mo-
tivation and our desire to meet public opinion. In certain quarters in
this part of the world and in Vietnam, there is fear that the U.S. may
appease the enemy too much.
The Thai government understands that the Vietnamese forces are
to be trained. Thus it is not overly worried by U.S. withdrawal. If the
enemy does not respond public opinion in the U.S. will recognize that
the U.S. has no other choice but to end the war satisfactorily. Thus, if
after the withdrawal of another 50,000 troops, there is no response, the
U.S. will have no choice but to take these measures.
The President turned to the views on Peking and Moscow in In-
donesia, noting that some people there think we have a condominium
with the USSR. Others see too much significance in the easing of re-
strictions with China. With respect to Moscow, a condominium is out
of the question. Moscow’s objectives are the same as Peking’s but their
tactics differ. With respect to China, we took some tactical steps. But
we play an even-handed game—depending on how each country con-
ducts its policy. There is no sign of a Chinese change in this regard.
Until this happens, no major alterations are possible.
Thanom thanked the President for this insight into U.S. policy. He
expressed deep faith in the policy of the U.S., which has never known
defeat in its history and, he was sure, had no intention to do so now.
The Prime Minister hoped that some measure of assurance could be
extended to other countries which have troops in Vietnam.
The President asked for Thanom’s view on Laos. What should be
done, other than our sending troops?
Thanom passed on information he said was provided by the Lao-
tian government: The Lao capital is encircled by enemy forces. Enemy
forces are coming closer to Vientiane. Laotians have asked for help from
Thailand. The Prime Minister is reluctant to do so—although willing
to help Laos with volunteers. They must get material assistance from
outside. If the need is urgent, the Laos government should talk to
the U.S. Thanom is willing to send volunteers provided he gets U.S.
support.
The President returned to his previous point: the Thai contingent
in Vietnam is extremely helpful with U.S. public opinion. Though our
withdrawals will continue on a major basis as South Vietnamese troops
are trained, the President hopes the Thai troops will stay.
Thanom replied that his government has faith in its ability to re-
sist pressures from MP’s who want to withdraw forces from Vietnam
and reserve them for combatting subversion here in Thailand. From
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Thailand 39

his standpoint the priority is clear: Thai forces should join in the strug-
gle against Communist aggression in Vietnam. The presence of Thai
forces there is justified. He will resist pressures to withdraw.
In response to the President’s questions, Thanom said there are
45,000–50,000 Americans in Thailand. The majority conduct the air war
in Vietnam and Laos. In addition, there are engineer troops.
The President asked if it would cause concern if we reduced some
support forces related to bombing of North Vietnam, but not engi-
neers working with Thai support forces.3 Thanom said it was up to the
President.
The President asked if the troops are behaving themselves.
Thanom replied there are very few incidents. He would like to make
a suggestion, he said, with respect to B–52’s. Laotians have indicated
eagerness for their use. The Prime Minister recalled having asked our
headquarters for B–52 strikes: he welcomes B–52’s here. As for frictions,
he has talked to the military authorities regarding arrangements for a
Status of Forces agreement similar to Korea and Taiwan.
The President asked what he believes the Chinese Communists
will do after Vietnam.
Thanom replied that it depends on the Vietnam settlement. If the
settlement is satisfactory for the Communists, China may have less op-
portunity for pressure. But whatever the outcome, the countries of
Southeast Asia will be subject to pressure. There is roadbuilding to-
ward Thailand from China and then from Burma to Thailand. China
has not given up the possibility of interference. They are using prox-
ies, influencing attitudes by means of these roads.
The President noted the Chinese Communists have their own
problems. The Sino-Soviet disagreement may produce its own prem-
ises. Thanom replied that the Chinese are not losing their own men—
they are losing others.
The President stated that we must bring the war to an end in
a way that contains a message to China and USSR to discourage
other aggression of this type. This should have been done three years
ago.
Thanat asked if the Soviets have shown any indication of help-
ing. The President replied that they have on procedural points—
and in some oral comments. But he has been disappointed. There is
a chance the Soviets might find a way. Until Vietnam is out of the

3
Concerning the question of possible reductions in U.S. troop strength in Thailand,
the President said in his July 25 background briefing that this would be discussed with
the Thai in light of a general U.S. review of military and civilian personnel abroad. (Ibid.,
p. 552)
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40 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

way, we will not talk to them on other issues such as the Middle East,
trade, etc.
Thanom noted that the USSR is not more liberal, as was shown in
the case of Czechoslovakia. The President replied that we must avoid
armed conflict. Self-survival requires that. On the other hand, Soviet
policy is not soft. The Brezhnev doctrine completely discourages in-
dependence. We are therefore approaching them in a hardheaded way.
Thanom asked how about Romania. The President said he had vis-
ited Romania in 1967. He was invited by Ceausescu shortly after the
inauguration. His visit is not an affront to Russia or a move toward
China. What we are saying is that any country not threatening its neigh-
bors can have good relations with us. It would be a mistake for the
U.S. to recognize the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty. Some
believe we should have an immediate conference with the Soviets
and control of arms. We have not done so—not because the President
doesn’t want these things, but because U.S. power is essential to pro-
tect the free world. We will not tolerate Soviet superiority.
Thanom turned to the Middle East and asked about the balance
of forces between Egypt and Israel. The President said that Israel is
stronger than its neighbors not because of better equipment but be-
cause it is more capable, and will be for 3–5 years. The Soviets are con-
tinuing to send arms into Egypt and also for other Arab forces. In the
long run, the balance may change because the Arabs have more peo-
ple. Therefore we try to work for a peaceful solution and to prevent a
change in the balance. Until there is a settlement, no change in the arms
balance can be tolerated. Thanom drew a comparison between Israel
and Thailand—a small country can resist outside pressure only with
outside help. The President agreed this was a good analogy.

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State

Bangkok, August 12, 1969, 1123Z.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1

THAI. Secret; Limdis. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]
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Thailand 41

20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, August 25, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S.–Thai Relations

The following is a preliminary draft prepared by CIA analysts in

response to a request for an objective unbiased view of current
U.S./Thai relations. An updated and more in-depth analysis will be
provided early next week.
The analysis makes the following points:
—Thai/U.S. relations have been severely strained in past weeks
by the public dispute over the contingency plan.
—The Thais are looking for assurance that Secretary Laird’s re-
marks2 are not meant as U.S. reneging on a commitment made by the
Johnson Administration.
—Bangkok will almost certainly conclude that:
(1) Domestic forces tending to undermine the U.S. commitment
are becoming stronger.
(2) The U.S. government may be powerless to uphold its com-
mitments even if it chooses to do so.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn; Nodis. A note to Kissinger on
the first page in Nixon’s hand reads: “Urgent. K—Give me a brief statement as to [how
to] handle this issue if Fulbright raises it Tuesday A.M.” According to an attached Sep-
tember 15 memorandum from Ken Cole to Kissinger, the President was referring to a
September 16 meeting with Fulbright. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was
of high priority.
2
Secretary of Defense Laird had held a press conference on August 21 during which
he elaborated on Rogers’ theme that the present administration was neither involved in
nor responsible for formulation of the contingency plan. Rogers had called it “an ap-
pendage that is a hangover from bygone days” in his August 20 news conference. (De-
partment of State Bulletin, September 8, 1969, pp. 205–208) Speaking of the contingency
plan, Laird said that it “does not have my approval and does not have the approval of
the Administration.” Respecting Rogers’ allusion to consultation with Congress on use
of troops, Laird said, “I don’t agree with the plan, I don’t agree with using American
troops without proper consultation and advice by the Congress of the United States, and
I can assure you that this Administration would follow the procedures that were out-
lined by the Secretary of State yesterday.” A verbatim transcript of Laird’s news confer-
ence is in Annex 11 of the Department of State Historical Office’s study entitled “The
Reexamination of the United States Commitment to Thailand, June 5–August 31, 1969,”
Research Project No. 978, November 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)
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42 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—The impact on U.S.-Thai interests will depend on assurances

given the Thais and actions taken in Vietnam and Laos.

Intelligence Memorandum
U.S.-THAI RELATIONS
1. The events of the past several weeks have not only largely dis-
sipated the good will and the sense of congruent interests that Presi-
dent Nixon engendered during his short visit in Bangkok, but they
have also placed Thai-U.S. relations under the greatest strain since the
Laotian crisis in 1961 and 1962. Much of the difficulty involves Thai
sensitivity to being treated as something less than a full partner in the
struggle for Southeast Asia, and displeasure that its contribution to the
Vietnam effort has not been fully appreciated. But it would be a mis-
take to dismiss the current unpleasantness as nothing more than a dis-
play of the ephemeral of the Thai psychology. We are witnessing the
surface manifestations of underlying problems that have plagued U.S.-
Thai relations since the 1961 Laotian crisis, and which have grown
worse as a consequence of the Vietnam war.
2. The principle cause of the current difficulties has been the pub-
lic dispute over Project 22, the so-called Taksin Military Contingency
Plan for the defense of the Mekong Valley. The Thai have been upset
over the way the U.S. has managed the controversy. Caught in a cross-
fire between the U.S. Senate and the ill-conceived remarks of Thai lead-
ers regarding the juridical basis for the plan (Air Chief Marshal Dawee
asserting at one point that the plan was a SEATO document and could
not be shown to anybody without the consent of the SEATO partners),
U.S. spokesmen have labored to set the record straight.3 In so doing,
they have bruised Thai sensitivities. In a recent talk with Ambassador
Unger, Foreign Minister Thanat made a special point of protesting what
the Thai regard as the unseemly alacrity with which State Department
spokesmen have challenged Thai statements on Taksin. The Thai not
only regard coordination on the Taksin affair as insufficient, but they
are also opposed to showing the plan to Senator Fulbright (we would
guess that this was the real message that Dawee was trying to get
across), and his Senate Foreign Relations colleagues.
Opposition on this score not only reflects Thai misconceptions of
how the U.S. constitutional system works, but much more important,
reflects their belief that Senator Fulbright is nothing less than a sworn
enemy of Thailand. (“Why is it”, Thanat has asked rhetorically, “that
of all of the many military contingency plans, Fulbright has picked on

3
See Documents 14 and 15.
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Thailand 43

this one.”) Turning the Taksin Plan over to the Senator then, is in Thai
eyes, tantamount to giving the plan to the enemy. The fact that Sena-
tor Fulbright could pressure the Administration into showing him the
document was a vivid—to the Thai at least—display of power on the
part of those who are opposed to the U.S.-Thai alliance.
3. As upsetting as the Taksin imbroglio was up to this point, it still
involved little more than strengthening the Thai belief that they had
been once again misunderstood and pilloried for no other reason other
than that they have been a strong supporter of U.S. policy in South-
east Asia. In order to get this monkey off their back, Thanat suggested
to Ambassador Unger that the two countries publicly announce that
they would soon open talks on reducing the number of U.S. military
personnel based in Thailand. Thanat asserted that only in this way
could Bangkok demonstrate that U.S. forces were in Thailand for the
sole purpose of supporting the war in South Vietnam and that the Thai
had no need nor desire for direct U.S. support in fighting their insur-
gency. Thanat argued that this would undercut the position of those
elements in the U.S. who were warning against additional commit-
ments to Thailand. It also seems likely that Thanat had other purposes
in getting troop withdrawal talks. What better way to demonstrate to
the U.S., the contribution Thailand has made to the war effort, and at
the same time, that such support could not necessarily be taken for
granted.
4. From the Thai point of view, the Taksin affair took a much more
ominous turn when Secretary of Defense Laird made reference to the
lack of support in the plan on the part of himself and President Nixon.
Prime Minister Thanat lost no time in making it clear to Ambassador
Unger that they regard the Secretary of Defense’s statement not only
as a disavowal of a joint contingency plan, but a reneging on a com-
mitment that has been made by the Johnson Administration. The Thai
are clearly looking for some assurance that this is not what Secretary
Laird or the government had in mind.
5. Even if such reassurances are forthcoming, the Taksin affair will
probably leave a long-standing mark on U.S.-Thai relations.
6. How much Taksin effects U.S.-Thai interests will depend not
only on what assurances we give the Thai, but also on what action we
take with respect to Vietnam and, much more important, Laos. Viet-
nam is important to the Thai insofar as it is a bellwether of U.S.
policy in Southeast Asia. Bangkok has been concerned over U.S. troop
withdrawals, but once we made clear that the withdrawals would be
something a good deal less than an indecent bug-out, Thai concern has
centered on what they regard as their prerogatives as a troop contrib-
utor to the Vietnam war effort. They want the U.S. to truly consult with
them before firm decisions are made on withdrawals. In the present
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44 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

atmosphere, such consultations are likely to loom even larger in Thai

thinking than they have in the past.
7. The question of Laos is much more difficult. For the Thai, Laos
cuts a good deal closer to the bone than Vietnam, and Bangkok will
take a long hard look at how the U.S. meets the current threat on the
other side of the Mekong. Whether this becomes a major testing ground
in the coming weeks and months depends, in the final analysis, on
what the Communists do. The Taksin affair and its aftermath, however,
will serve to further exaggerate the importance the Thai attach to the
Laotian problem and the willingness of the U.S. to stabilize the situa-
tion there.

21. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, August 26, 1969.

SUBJECT
US Commitments to Thailand

I attach a summary of US commitments to Thailand and state-

ments regarding the defense of Thailand (Tab A).2 You may find this
of use, given the current furor in the Senate. I would call your atten-
tion particularly to the Air Defense Operations Agreement described
below.
In brief, these are the key points concerning our formal and Pres-
idential commitments:
—SEATO obligates “each party” to the Treaty to “act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” in the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. No drafting
information appears on the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, the
memorandum was returned from the President on September 16.
2
Attached at Tab A but not printed is a Background Paper that the Department’s
Executive Secretary Eliot forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 12 memo-
randum. It stated that while various bilateral agreements, including support of Thai
troops fighting in South Vietnam and air defense agreements formalizing arrangements
for defense against hostile aircraft, involved obligations on the part of the United States,
“they do not extend our commitment to the defense of Thailand beyond that set forth
in the SEATO treaty.”
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event of an armed attack. We are obligated only to consult in the case

of subversion, or of armed attack by others than Communists.
—The Rusk/Thanat communiqué of 1962 affirmed that our SEATO
obligation is “individual as well as collective.” Secretary Rogers in May
reaffirmed this interpretation of the SEATO Treaty.
—SEATO contingency planning is under the SEATO Military Plan-
ning Office, and covers most contingencies, including Communist in-
surgency in Thailand or Communist aggression against it. This plan-
ning is intended to effectuate our SEATO commitment.
—The Johnson–Thanom joint communiqué of May 9, 1968, in-
cluded Thanom’s statement that “the Royal Thai Government regarded
defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by
its own forces.”
—You and your three predecessors have affirmed your intention
to honor our SEATO (or “treaty”) obligations. Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy spoke of “unswerving support in resisting Communist
aggression and subversion.” You have spoken of US “support,” and
have said that “the US will stand proudly with Thailand against those
who might threaten it from abroad or from within.”
Project Taksin is a bilateral US/Thai military contingency plan to
meet potential Communist moves in Laos. Its terms of reference pro-
vide specifically that it will be “implemented only upon mutual agree-
ment and consent of both governments.”
We have specific bilateral arrangements with Thailand covering
atomic detection systems, radio research activities, and the logistic support
of Thai troops in South Vietnam. None of these involve US military
commitments.
The USAF/RTAF Joint Use and Integrated Air Defense Operations
Agreement. We have a technical agreement with Thailand governing de-
tection of and protection against hostile aircraft. This involves elements
of timing and decision-making which could, it might be argued, carry
our commitment beyond the language of our SEATO commitment.
The Agreement states that the Thai Air Defense/Tactical Air Con-
trol System “has been integrated and incorporated into” the US Air
Force’s Pacific Air Defense Network. It provides for the assignment of
USAF personnel to units of the Thai system.
It provides that: “Hostile aircraft, including unidentified aircraft,
will be destroyed when determined by the RTAF Air Operations Cen-
ter and/or the USAF Tactical Air Command Center to pose a threat to
forces and installations in Thailand . . . USAF rules (of engagement)
will apply for all USAF fighter and interceptor aircraft.” The language
does not distinguish between Thai and US “forces and installations”
which will be protected by this Agreement.
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46 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The Agreement states, somewhat ambiguously, that: “The air de-

fense of Thailand is a sovereign responsibility of the Government of
Thailand which has been vested in the RTAF. United States Forces de-
ployed to, and at the request of, the Government of Thailand, will as-
sist in the Thailand Air Defense/Tactical Air Control System”. It was
perhaps this language which led Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee to state
publicly, shortly before the Agreement was formally signed, that US
aircraft in Thailand could be called into action by the Prime Minister
to defend Thailand.
Ambassador Unger transmitted this Agreement to the Thai Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs (at the latter’s request), with a Note stating that
the “Agreement will improve coordination between our respective air
forces, in furtherance of our common commitments to the defense of
Thailand under the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty.” The reference to
SEATO was thus explicit, though the phrase concerning “common com-
mitments” was apparently new.
So far as I know, Senator Fulbright is not yet aware of this agree-
ment. Senator Symington’s investigating team (Messrs. Pincus and
Paul) have listed this among the documents which they wish to re-
ceive. I have requested that State clear with the White House before
replying to their request.
A copy of the Agreement with its covering Note is at Tab B.3

3
The Air Defense Operations Agreement is attached but not printed.

22. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, August 28, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand

I understand proposals to reduce U.S. strength in Thailand by 7,000

and 10,000 are under consideration.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an
unsigned copy.
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Thailand 47

It is also my understanding that CINCPAC proposes to accomplish

the reduction with the following withdrawals.
7,000 man reduction 10,000 man reduction
2 A–1 squadrons Same as for 7,000, plus:
1 A–26 squadron 3 F–105 squadrons and related
2 EB–66 squadrons plus support units
related support units
These CINCPAC proposals raise important questions regarding
the role of the remaining U.S. forces in Thailand. CINCPAC is pro-
posing to take out virtually all of those forces best suited for missions
over Laos (to assist the Laotian government and to bomb the Ho Chi
Minh Trail), leaving in Thailand the forces best suited to bomb North
Vietnam and clearly inferior for Laotian missions.
There are now 16 “fighter/attack” squadrons in Thailand. Twelve
of these are high-performance jet squadrons (8 with F–4s; 4 with
F–105s). Four are equipped with propeller-driven aircraft (3 with A–1s;
one with A–26s).
Either CINCPAC proposal would remove all but one propeller
squadron (which would remain primarily for search and rescue oper-
ations). According to available evidence on the comparative efficiency
of these versus high performance jets, this would be a very poor allo-
cation of our resources in Thailand.
Comparison of the effectiveness of jet aircraft and propeller-driven
airplanes in attacking ground targets in Southeast Asia has shown that
the prop planes are considerably more efficient than the jets. A recent
study (August 1969) indicates that in Laos in 1968 propeller-driven air-
craft were roughly twice as effective as jets in terms of targets destroyed
per attack.

Prop-Jet Comparison of Targets Destroyed or

Damaged per 100 Attacks

Prop Planes Jets

Target Type A–1 A–26 F–4 F–105

Trucks 46.8 49.0 23.0 18.5
Truck Parks 3.4 5.2 2.5 1.9
Roads 53.6 55.0 25.9 23.3
Logistics Storage Areas 13.2 N/A 6.6 6.8
Air Defense Targets 12.6 12.9 8.3 12.7

Furthermore, the costs per year per squadron are substantially less for
prop squadrons compared with jet squadrons.
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48 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Total Southeast Asia Operating Costs per

Squadron per Year

Prop Jet

A–1 A–26 F–4 F–105

$41 m $30 m $56 m $61 m

The primary combat advantage of the prop aircraft is their ability

to loiter, locate a target, and make multiple attacks on it. (Jets have a
comparative advantage against sophisticated defenses, but these are
not an important factor in Laos.) Prop aircraft also perform as well at
night as during the day,2 while jets are only half as efficient after dark.
Most of the targets appear at night. One study has shown that the cost
of destroying a target at night with a jet is 13 times greater than with
a propeller aircraft. Finally, prop aircraft losses per target destroyed are
about the same or lower than for jets.
Considering this evidence, it is hard to fathom CINCPAC’s ra-
tionale for their proposed force cuts. An alternative proposal to take
out three more jet squadrons instead of the A–1s and A–26s would pro-
vide more manpower reductions, considerably larger budgetary sav-
ings, and would have the least impact on the war effort. The disad-
vantage in doing so is that if bombing of North Vietnam were resumed
jets would be preferable. Nevertheless, even an all jet redeployment
would leave six squadrons of high-performance jets in Thailand, and
if we decide to bomb North Vietnam again we can redeploy additional
jet squadrons as necessary.
The proposal recommended by CINCPAC demonstrates again our
inclination to attempt to suit the war to our equipment and techno-
logical preferences rather than the other way around. Our policies in
this respect also serve to indicate to our allies that high-performance
jets are better counter-insurgency aircraft than props, when in fact the
reverse is true.

2
It has been suggested that the reason the effectiveness of prop aircraft does not
decline at night is that the enemy cannot make visual sightings at night, there is more
truck traffic at night, and the enemy’s visually targeted anti-aircraft weapons are less ef-
fective at night. These factors permit the low flying, slower prop aircraft to operate more
effectively whereas the high-speed jet cannot operate at low altitudes at night without
greatly increased risks. [Footnote in the source text.]
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Thailand 49

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, September 9, 1969, 0955Z.

12246. Please pass White House. Subject: Thai-US Contingency

Planning.
1. The following background information describes the role
played by bilateral planning in Thai-US relations over recent years. We
have gone into this at some length because a full understanding of this
role is important in assessing the impact the controversy over Project
Taksin has had on the Thai and on their views of basic trends in US-
Thai relations. We also believe this background of US-Thai planning
may be useful in preparing for further Congressional scrutiny.2 We will
address in immediately following telegram the effects of the recent con-
tingency planning controversy on US-Thai relations.3
2. Project 22 now called Project Taksin sprang from US and Thai con-
cerns over Communist failure to observe the 1962 Geneva Accords and
what appeared to be a growing threat to Thailand developing through
Laos. In July 1965 reacting to this Thai concern, the DCM called on Prime
Minister Sarit under instructions to say “we intend to do whatever is nec-
essary to meet the obligations of the US in Southeast Asia. The United
States will not sit idly by and allow the Communists to become en-
trenched on the borders of Thailand. The United States considers the
Communist advance in Laos as a threat to United States security as well
as to that of Thailand. As we have publicly confirmed in the Rusk–Thanat
communiqué, “the United States considers Thailand’s integrity and in-
dependence as vital to its own.” (Bangkok 79, 7/15/63)4 A generalized
version of this appeared in the Bangkok newspapers.
3. Two months later Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs U. Alexis Johnson consulted in Bangkok with Prime Minister

1
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64,
Memoranda to the President, 1969 September. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at
1056Z. Repeated to SECDEF, JCS, and CINCPAC.
2
Kissinger forwarded the telegram to the President under a September 26 cover-
ing memorandum in which he said that “Project Taksin itself originated as a Democra-
tic effort to convince the Thai that we meant business when we said that we would do
anything necessary to defend the Mekong, including the re-introduction of American
troops.” Kissinger also summarized that the “history of negotiations shows clearly that
the plans were developed at our initiative more than that of the Thai.” Attached but not
printed.
3
Dated September 9; not printed. (DEF 1 THAI–US)
4
See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Document 479, footnote 1.
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50 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Sarit, Foreign Minister Thanat and others. When Secretary Johnson sug-
gested it might be a good idea to return US combat troops to Thailand
if the PL continued their advance, the Thai said that bringing troops
to Thailand without intending to do more than in 1962 would not be
good enough; if troops were to come the US should give a clear indi-
cation that they would move further if necessary.
4. On May 30, 1964, with continued deterioration in Laos, Secre-
tary Rusk called on PM Thanom. When asked what the United States
would do if the Communists continued their advances, the Secretary
replied that a specific concrete answer would have to come from the
President and that one would be forthcoming shortly. He added, how-
ever, that there was no limit to what the US would do if necessary to
defend Thailand. The Prime Minister said the Thai were undertaking
defense measures and might be compelled to cross the Mekong. He ex-
pected that if such steps were necessary the US and Thailand would
act together. The Secretary said he was encouraged by this Thai plan-
ning and suggested the desirability of advance consultation. (Secto 27
5/30/64)5
5. At a June 1964 high-level US planning meeting in Honolulu at-
tended by the Secretaries McNamara and Rusk it was decided that the
US should request urgent consultations with the RTG regarding meas-
ures to be taken in the event of a PL drive towards the Mekong. On
June 8, 1964, Ambassador Martin called on Thanom, reviewed the Hon-
olulu discussions, and said he was convinced of the “complete firm-
ness of the US decision to do whatever was necessary to prevent Com-
munist domination in Southeast Asia.” The Ambassador then referred
to Rusk’s discussions in May and said that he had been instructed that
the US desired to consult urgently about measures to be taken. He said
that “our willingness to engage with the Thai in immediate planning
was further evidence of the complete seriousness of our intentions.”
He also pointed to the prepositioning of military equipment at Korat
as further proof. (Bangkok 2106 6/8/64)6
6. On June 18, 1964, the first meeting took place with Dawee chair-
ing the Thai side and with representatives from CINCPAC leading the
US delegation. Dawee said he spoke for the Prime Minister. Thai pol-
icy was that they would hope to fight side-by-side with the United
States, but would require substantial US logistical support should
action be necessary against Communist advances in Laos. General
Easterbrook, Chief, JUSMAG emphasized that this conference was a
follow-on of the discussions held between Secretary Rusk and the

5
Secto 27 is printed ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Document 272.
6
Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 THAI-US)
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Thailand 51

Prime Minister. General Milton from CINCPAC said that he under-

stood that Dawee was speaking for the Prime Minister but he was in
a position only to transmit his views to CINCPAC and the JCS. Dawee
said he understood how the United States Government works.
7. The US side pressed for Thai views on just what Communist
acts would be required to trigger joint Thai-US actions. The Thai gave
no definite answer but indicated that the situation would have to be
judged against existing circumstances. Dawee also said that he as-
sumed that this plan involving possible movement of forces to Laos
would be implemented with the approval of the RLG but that we
should be prepared to move without it.
8. In a letter to the Prime Minister from President Johnson trans-
mitted on June 27, 1964,7 the President said “We regard Communist ad-
vances in Laos as a threat to the security of the United States as well as
to that of Thailand. In accordance with this concept, I have authorized
Ambassador Martin to open consultations with you looking toward joint
Thai-US military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Com-
munist drive towards the borders of Thailand. I understand joint plan-
ning meetings will begin in Bangkok this week. We must be prepared
to act promptly and effectively to check such a drive as necessary.”
9. On August 11, 1964, State concurred in the terms of reference
(TOR) in a letter from Bundy to Solbert8 which said “We see the pos-
sibility of real political as well as military advantages arising from joint
planning with the Thai and we hope that it can begin soon.”
10. The TOR called for planning to provide for the defense of Thai-
land to include military operations to hold the Mekong Valley, its prin-
cipal cities, and its military facilities (in Laos as well as Thailand). The
threat is defined as Communist operations in Laos as more than subver-
sion but less than overt aggression. The defense of Thailand could require
any of a combination of the following: definitive and punitive actions
in the event of Communist border incursion into Thailand; counter-
insurgency actions against Communist forces in Laos in the event of
Communist border incursion into Thailand; counter-insurgency actions
against Communist forces in Laos in the event of an insurgency in Thai-
land; and interdiction operations against North Viet-Nam. The TOR also
stated that joint Thai-US consultations could be undertaken at any time
to determine what portions of the plan should be implemented.
11. On October 26, 1964, the basic draft force level plan was sub-
mitted to the “national authorities” for approval. On August 23, 1965,

7
Dated June 18, 1964; the letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII,
Document 277.
8
Not found.
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52 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the final force level plan was promulgated by Prime Minister Thanom
at MOD. In November of 1965 a draft field force plan was submitted
to the national authorities and on December 23, 1966 the final field
force plan was promulgated by Thanom at MOD.
12. At the signing of the field force plan by Thanom and General
Stilwell on December 23, 1966, Amb. Martin noted he was participat-
ing “on behalf of and as the personal representative of the President of
the United States.” He traced the plan’s beginning at the President’s be-
hest. He said the plan did not really deepen American determination to
do whatever is necessary to carry out American commitments to insure
the defense of Thailand and that “as the President pointed out in his
recent visit to Thailand that commitment is full and complete and as
the President reiterated then ‘America keeps its word.’” Ambassador
Martin said, however, “that the act witnessed today does translate into
effective operational terms the modalities of carrying out our joint com-
mitments should events dictate that our respective governments would
authorize the implementation of the plan. As such it is of tremendous
political importance in this translation into effective operational plan-
ning for the use of our combined resources.” He then coupled the plan
with the recent approval of SEATO Plan 8 and concluded by saying
that he had been authorized by the President “to convey to your Ex-
cellency his personal gratification and congratulations on the comple-
tion of this exercise.” (A–498, 12/28/66)9
13. On January 5, 1966, Ambassador Martin sent a letter to PM
Thanom. The PM was under criticism from Praphas and Thanat to the
effect that recent American construction projects and deployments had
no relevance to Thailand’s security needs and that America was “oc-
cupying” Thailand. To help the PM fend this off the letter linked these
construction projects to existing agreements and to both SEATO and
Project 22 contingency planning.
14. In June 1967, the draft air, naval and unconventional warfare
component plans of the project were approved in draft form and in Oc-
tober of the same year the draft ground component plan was approved
by MACT.
15. In early 1968 a top secret working paper which gave a fairly
clear picture of the plan disappeared from the trunk of a car belonging
to a Thai member of the Project 22 working group. We do not know
whether or not the plan fell into unfriendly hands. Following this the
name of the exercise was changed from Project 22 to Project Taksin.
Unger

9
Not printed. (DEF 1 THAI-US)
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Thailand 53

24. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, September 15, 1969.

SUBJECT
Talking Points for Your Use with Senator Fulbright at the Leadership Meeting,
September 152

At the Leadership Meeting on September 15 it is possible that Sen-

ator Fulbright will want to speak to you about the US role in Thailand.
Although he has said that his differences with Secretary Laird over re-
lease of the Project Taksin plan (a contingency plan covering joint US-
Thai operations to defend Thailand against aggression under the more
general provisions of the SEATO Treaty) have now been eliminated, he
may still wish to have a copy of this document turned over to the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee. He may also reiterate the line which
he has taken publicly to the effect that Project Taksin is in effect an au-
tomatic commitment by the US to use its forces to fight in Thailand.
Your Recommended Position
—The US commitment to Thailand exists wholly in the context of
the SEATO Treaty, which in the event of aggression by an armed at-
tack on any of its parties calls on them to act to meet the common dan-
ger in accordance with their constitutional procedures. In the case of
subversion, all that the parties undertake to do is to consult. The
Rusk–Thanat Declaration of 1962 adds that our obligations are indi-
vidual as well as collective but we regard this as simply a valid re-
statement of the responsibilities set forth in the SEATO Treaty.
—Project Taksin represents nothing more than a contingency plan
undertaken within the framework of the SEATO Treaty. This type of
contingency planning is a normal military function. The plan cannot
be put into effect without the specific approval of both the Thai and
US Governments, and emphatically does not automatically commit US
troops to fight in Thailand.
—The US SEATO commitment to Thailand is a firm one, however,
and affects the entire political relationship between our two countries.
You have said, and you wish to reiterate, that the US will live up to
commitments of this nature.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret.
2
Holdridge indicated in a September 15 memorandum to Kissinger that he had
drafted the talking points for the President “in the event that Senator Fulbright uses the
Leadership Meeting” to bring up his “reservations about the US role in Thailand.”
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54 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—You have also stated that our commitment does not extend to
using US forces to help fight internal subversion. Our role is limited to
providing military equipment and economic assistance where needed.
The Thai understand this, and have publicly said that they do not want
US troops to assist them in dealing with their insurgency.
—Demonstrating the Thai attitude toward the presence of US
troops in Thailand, the Thai Government has encouraged us to reduce
the level of US forces in Thailand if not needed for Vietnam. It under-
stands that these troops are present in connection with the Vietnam
war, and can be withdrawn as their need diminishes.
—You consider that the Thai deserve a great deal of credit for their
staunchness as a US ally. Despite their tradition of not becoming iden-
tified with any great power, they joined with us as long ago as 1950 to
help resist aggression in Korea, they have cooperated with us fully in
regional and world affairs, and they have sent troops to fight in Viet-
nam in recognition of the issues involved there. But they are a very
sensitive Asian people, and feel that somehow their contributions are
overlooked or misunderstood. You personally believe that it is impor-
tant to reassure them on this score.
—(If asked) Concerning release of the Project Taksin plan, you un-
derstand that arrangements have been worked out whereby the docu-
ment is available at the Department of Defense for scrutiny by mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.3 You hope that this
arrangement is satisfactory. To do more would of course raise a Con-
stitutional question over executive privilege and separation of powers,
and you believe that this issue deserves further study.

3
A notation next to this sentence in Nixon’s handwriting reads: “H.K. Does this
make sense? I question revealing any contingency plan. 9–15–69”

25. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President

Nixon1

Washington, September 15, 1969.

SUBJECT
Reduction in Thailand

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret.
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Thailand 55

As you know, Ambassador Unger and Major General Seith in

Bangkok have just completed a negotiation with the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment for a reduction of 6,000 military personnel in Thailand. All as-
pects of the reduction have been settled by normal State/Defense/
JCS/NSC staff discussion with the exception of the precise timing of
the withdrawals. Announcement of this reduction has been deferred
temporarily, with the upcoming discussion between Secretary Rogers
and Foreign Minister Thanat on September 20 at the TCC meeting in
New York2 the most likely time for release. The purpose of this mem-
orandum is to secure your decision on a date for the completion of the
first 6,000 withdrawal. I recommend that December 31, 1969, be
adopted as the deadline.
Advantages
—The budget effect will be greater during this fiscal year.
—It might be a useful item to include in your State of the Union
Message and my posture statement next year.
Disadvantages
—It may leave us open to a charge of bad faith by the Royal Thai
Government, inasmuch as Ambassador Unger provided the Thai with
a tentative timetable indicating that this withdrawal will not be com-
pleted until about 1 September 1970.
Note: The schedule given to the Royal Thai Government was in
terms of effective date of cessation of functions and packing up time
was added. Assuming the maximum packing time given (60 days) in
all cases, the Royal Thai Government would see the schedule about as
follows:
Departure Date Cumulative Total
December 1, 1969 1,950
March 1, 1970 1,800
June 1, 1970 3,900
September 1, 1970 6,000

—Phasing out the 18 A–1s, 16 A–26s and 12 U–10s included in the

package in December 1969 rather than in June and September 1970 may
degrade the air support to the Laotian Forces during much of the next
Dry Season enemy offensive (November to May) by about 10%.
—The Thai and other Southeast Asia nations might assess this as
a decision to “cut and run”.

2
See Document 28.
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56 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Given all of the above, I believe on balance that the domestic ad-
vantages outweigh the Southeast Asia-related disadvantages. Thus, I
recommend that December 31, 1969, be established as the completion
date now so that the field may begin the necessary planning.
Melvin R. Laird

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, September 16, 1969, 0910Z.

12592. Ref: A. State 156149, B. State 156407, C. State 156733,

D. Bangkok 11910, E. State 156752.2
1. This morning I secured appointment with Prime Minister be-
fore he opened cabinet meeting and carried out instructions contained
ref A. The Prime Minister had with him General Sawaeng and Deputy
Foreign Minister Chitti acting in place of Thanat.
2. I first conveyed to Prime Minister text of announcement3 as con-
tained ref A, as amended by ref B. Unfortunately, ref C arrived after I
had departed from Embassy; to say nothing of ref E. I explained that
short advance notice unavoidable because of inadvertent revelation
from Saigon which Thais had all already read in morning newspapers
here. I also related this announcement to our earlier discussions about
troop replacement in Vietnam (latest of which reported ref D).
3. Prime Minister’s first question was to ask for more information
on reference to “offer of withdrawal of US and allied forces over 12 month
period.” I pointed out that this and other points made in same context
all refer to efforts already made which are here being reiterated and I re-
called that some time ago we had specifically offered to make such a
withdrawal if accompanied by responsive action by other side.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret;
Immediate.
2
Telegrams 156149, 156407, and 156733 to Bangkok, all September 16. (Ibid., POL
27–3 VIET S) Telegram 11910 from Bangkok, September 2. (Ibid., POL 7 THAI) Telegram
156752 to Bangkok, September 16. (Ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S)
3
The final text of the President’s announcement on troop withdrawals from Viet-
nam was transmitted in telegram 156895 to Paris, September 16. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
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Thailand 57

4. Prime Minister then pointed out that total projected US with-

drawal by December 15 will amount to more than ten percent of US
forces in Vietnam. In view of this he considered it may be necessary to
reduce Thai contingent in Vietnam and said that he would be dis-
cussing this with President Thieu when latter makes anticipated visit
to Thailand in latter part of October. Marshal Thanom added that peo-
ple here will feel that if US can make such a reduction, Thailand should
also be able to do so. I acknowledged this and fact that Prime Minis-
ter had discussed this with President Nixon during July visit, but I also
received his confirmation that he was speaking only of a reduction and
not a total withdrawal of Thai forces from South Vietnam. I empha-
sized the importance the USG attaches to the continued presence of
other allied forces in South Vietnam.
5. Marshal Thanom then inquired whether we will in fact go
through with the reduction of 40,500 additional men if there is no im-
provement in the military situation. I said I believed we would since
the reduction was based, as far as I could tell, primarily on the enlarged
capacity of the ARVN to carry the load, thus permitting South Viet-
namese to replace American manpower. I added that our carrying
through of the projected reduction might have to be reconsidered, on
the other hand, if the military situation should seriously worsen.
6. The Prime Minister asked whether the projected reduction was
based on any indication of a greater willingness on the part of Hanoi to
negotiate. I replied that I was not aware of any improvement in that
quarter and reiterated my interpretation of Washington’s action as be-
ing based above all on the improved capacity of South Vietnam to carry
additional military responsibility. I added, however, that it may also have
been thought that the projected announcement could possibly provide
a helpful influence on the course of policy discussions which may now
be taking place in Hanoi following the death of Ho Chi Minh. Marshal
Thanom asked for any information I could give him about who may be
assuming leadership in Hanoi but I told him I had no useful informa-
tion on this subject beyond identifying the four well-known figures gen-
erally assumed to be the leaders principally in charge there today.
7. The Prime Minister made no further inquiries about the an-
nouncement but did go on to make some observation which he said
he had also discussed with President Nixon during the July visit.
Thanom said that here in Thailand and around the world people have
noticed a basic change in American actions. In World Wars I and II
there was determination to fight for the achievement of military vic-
tory. This has now changed as illustrated by our actions in Korea and
Vietnam where the US appears to have lost this determination and is
prepared to settle for something less. I said that the important thing to
keep in mind was the objective which, both in Korea and South Viet-
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58 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

nam, has been to help a free nation to preserve its independence; this
was achieved in Korea where there is now a thriving and prosperous
Republic of Korea and, I was persuaded this would also be achieved in
Vietnam. The Prime Minister did not dispute this except to say that in
the Korean case we had expelled the Communists from South Korea by
military action which has not been done in South Vietnam. I replied that
while this was true today the situation at the present time was vastly
improved over that of 1965 when the collapse of South Vietnam seemed
a real danger and when American forces were introduced. Now the Com-
munists know they cannot win a military victory. I said again I was per-
suaded that ultimately a settlement would be reached which would pre-
serve for the people of South Vietnam their independence and right to
decide their own fate. On Thanom’s general point I added only that there
was a new element on the international scene since the days of World
Wars I and II, namely the reality of nuclear war and its dangers for all
of humanity; the US must take this into full account in its actions.
8. Comment: I would naturally have much preferred to have given
the Prime Minister more advance notice of the announcement. Thai
negative feelings on this score were, of course, heightened by Ky’s leak
in Saigon. I also would have been in a better position to discuss the
announcement and Washington’s thinking and intentions intelligently
if I had either been provided with some background at this time or
been kept currently informed as the talks in Paris and the deliberations
in Washington proceeded.
Unger

27. Memorandum of Conversation1

New York, September 18, 1969, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Thai
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
Ambassador-designate Sunthorn Hongladarom

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL THAI–US. Secret.
Drafted by Dexter (EA/TB) and approved by Kissinger on October 6. The meeting was
held at the Waldorf Towers. This conversation was also reported in telegram 160368 to
Bangkok, September 19. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Coun-
try Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)
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Thailand 59

United States
The President
Secretary Rogers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. John B. Dexter, Country Director

Highlights
—President deplored Senate and press statements regarding U.S.
commitments to Thailand, contingency planning, etc.
—Assured Thanat U.S. will keep commitments under SEATO to
help defend against external aggression and will continue help Thai
strengthen capability to defeat internal insurgency.
—Advised that RTG should not be too disturbed about unfavor-
able Senatorial and press statements but should discuss problems with
USG.
—Reassured Thanat that USG not disavowing controversial con-
tingency plan, which is necessary and remains valid for implementa-
tion in the appropriate contingency if so decided by two governments.
—Re U.S. troops in Thailand, President and Secretary noted false
impression created by critics to effect these troops there to protect
Thailand.
—Secretary referred to Thanat’s talks with Ambassador Unger re
troop withdrawals and said he understood RTG wanted gradual with-
drawal. President and Secretary both told Thanat we wished with-
drawal schedule to follow Thai wishes.
—Thanat said RTG not misled by Senate and press criticism but
saw it as dangerous to both U.S. and Thailand.
—Thanat said his request for U.S. troop withdrawal was tactic to
reveal truth about purpose U.S. troops in Thailand and relieve U.S. do-
mestic pressures. Intent was not to drive U.S. troops out.
—Responding President’s question, Thanat said he foresaw no im-
mediate change in North Vietnamese policy following Ho’s death and
believed current U.S. policy correct.
—Thanat concurred in troop withdrawals from Viet-Nam as politi-
cally necessary but noted importance of preparing ARVN to take over.
—Thanat said Prime Minister asked him reaffirm assurance that
RTG would not call on U.S. to help fight insurgency, though it did want
U.S. to maintain current level of aid to support Thai counterinsurgency.
—In response President’s request, Thanat indicated RTG concerned
over Laos and would keep U.S. informed of its appraisal of situation.
Details
After introductory remarks, the President told Thanat he was glad
to have this private talk because he had been disturbed over the effect
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60 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

on Thailand of recent Senatorial and press statements concerning our

commitments to Thailand, contingency planning, etc. These statements,
he said, might cause some Thai to think the United States was going
to renege on its commitments and, worse still, seemed to reflect use of
Thailand as a “whipping boy” in U.S. domestic politics. Also, he said,
these were inconsistent with what he, the President, had told the Thai
personally. He wanted Thanat to know that because the Thai had stood
with us in the past, the United States would not let them down now.
We will keep our treaty commitments. He commented that the fate of
Thailand was to a large extent what the Vietnam war was all about.
The President explained that in the Senate and in other circles in the
United States there were many who wanted the United States to pull out
of all of its overseas commitments. For them, Thailand was merely a con-
venient target even though most of them did not understand anything
about Thailand itself. The President then urged Thanat, whenever any
public “flare-ups” of this sort should occur in the United States, to check
with Ambassador Unger, with the Secretary or with the President to de-
termine the facts. If any real differences should develop between us, he
said, the RTG will not learn about them first from the press.
Referring to the controversy over the contingency plan, the Pres-
ident commented that such planning was obviously necessary and
added that we would not disclose it to anyone who ought not to see
it. The Secretary then called attention to the fact that, before joint plan-
ning with Thailand had come under Senatorial fire, there had been an
earlier controversy regarding military planning with Spain. This
showed that Thailand itself was not the objective of the critics. He
added that there had been some misunderstanding about the United
States position on the contingency plan and that, specifically, some re-
marks of Secretary Laird’s taken out of context had been misinter-
preted. When Secretary Laird characterized the plan as not having been
approved, he meant simply that its implementation had not been ap-
proved; implementation would not, of course, be considered unless the
appropriate contingency should arise.
The President then interjected to say that more important than any
plan is the United States commitment. He said again, with emphasis,
that the United States would help to resist external aggression against
Thailand and would support Thai efforts to counter internal insurgency
and subversion. He asked that this be conveyed to the RTG (the Pres-
ident then commented to Secretary Rogers that the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister had stood with the United States and were friends
“whom we did not like to see kicked around”). The Secretary said there
had been distorted statements in the press to the effect that United
States troops were in Thailand to protect Thailand and this was false.
He then referred to Thanat’s talks with Ambassador Unger on troop
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Thailand 61

withdrawal and said we wanted to follow Thai views on the timing

which, he understood, the RTG wanted to be gradual. The President
commented jokingly that, in light of Senatorial attacks on our troop
presence in Thailand, those troops could stay as far as he was con-
cerned “till hell freezes over.” He said the Thai should let us know
what they wanted in this regard and we would do it.
Thanat said he was grateful for the President’s assurances and
would pass them to his Government. The RTG was not misled by the
U.S. press but was concerned that the publicity campaign and politi-
cal controversy were dangerous to both U.S. and Thai interests. He
feared the U.S. public was being deceived about the role of U.S. troops
in Thailand and the effect would be to drive a wedge between the
United States and Thailand. He said he had discussed the subject be-
fore a correspondents’ gathering in Thailand following conversations
he had with Mr. Shakespeare, USIA Director, and Ambassador Unger.
As he had told them, his purpose in calling for withdrawal of U.S.
troops was not to drive them out but to bring the truth to the atten-
tion of the U.S. public and the world. He added that he thought that
this tactic had succeeded. The President concurred.
The President said we understood the RTG position regarding our
troops and advised that the RTG could help in minimizing harm done
by unwarranted public criticism by keeping U.S. press and Congres-
sional comments in perspective. He assured him again that, if any real
troubles or differences should develop between us, Ambassador Unger,
the Secretary and the President would be certain to discuss them.
The President then asked Thanat’s views on the new situation in
North Viet-Nam following Ho Chi Minh’s death. He wondered if
Thanat anticipated that the new leaders would be more intransigent or
less or about the same. Thanat said he expected that North Viet-Nam’s
policy would continue about the same for some time. He said the new
leadership has not made up its mind yet and would require time to
determine any new course of action. In the meanwhile, its eyes and
ears would be directed at U.S. public opinion.
In response to the President’s question as to what the United States
should be doing on Viet-Nam, the Foreign Minister answered that cur-
rently the United States policy is in general accord with Thai views.
He said they realize that the United States must withdraw troops to
ease domestic pressures and he drew attention to the fact that the RTG
had never objected to announced troop withdrawals. He cautioned,
however, that we must make sure that the South Vietnamese are trained
and equipped to take over the combat burden as U.S. troops leave.
Thanat then said the Prime Minister had asked him to reaffirm to
the President that the RTG would not call upon the United States to
help fight its insurgency. The RTG only hopes the United States would
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62 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

continue helping the RTG in its own efforts. He asked that there be no
reduction in U.S. assistance.
The President inquired about Thai concern over Laos and whether
the Thai were more or less optimistic now than they have been in the
past. The Foreign Minister said recent developments have been favor-
able though the situation is of continuing concern. In response to a
question from the President about the strength of the North Vietnamese
forces in Laos, the Foreign Minister commented that they were not so
powerful as they seemed but were reckless with human lives. The Pres-
ident concluded by urging Thanat to keep us closely informed of Thai
views of Lao developments.

28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

New York, September 24, 1969, 2030Z.

Secto 44/3193. Subj: Secretary’s Bilateral with Thai ForMin, Sept

23.
1. Following summary based on uncleared memcon, noforn and
FYI only subject to revision upon review:
2. Secretary began substantive conversation by asking if ForMin
Thanat would agree to a slight alteration in troop reduction scheduled.
He said we would like to complete draw down by July 1 to meet our
fiscal year.2 ForMin agreed to July 1 date, saying RTG would leave
scheduling to us. Secretary said he understood troop reduction an-
nouncement wording was agreed3 and we would like simultaneous

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Priority. Repeated to Bangkok.
2
In a September 19 memorandum to the President, Kissinger recommended ap-
proval of the withdrawal of the 6,000 troops by July 1, 1970, noting that, at his request,
the Departments of State and Defense had compromised their divergent views. Laird
had wanted the troops out by December 31, 1969, while State “as a result of a working
level agreement with the Thais in Bangkok” had the withdrawal projected to Septem-
ber 1970. Kissinger noted that “State believes this revised schedule will be readily ac-
cepted by the Thais and Mel agrees providing you approve.” Nixon checked and ini-
tialed his approval on September 23. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, 1969–74, Feb. 1969–Feb. 1970.
Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box
560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)
3
The text of the agreed joint announcement is in telegram 164797 to Bangkok, Sep-
tember 27. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 63

announcement in Washington and Bangkok, leaving handling Bangkok

release to RTG. Thanat said his govt would follow US lead. Secretary
responded that he would discuss exact timing with President and be
in touch with ForMin.
3. Secretary asked Thai appraisal prospects success Thanat’s ICJ
candidacy and asked what we could do. After saying opposition
spreading rumors US would prefer his withdrawal in order retain serv-
ices as ForMin, Thanat said Colombian vote crucial. Amb Yost noted
we had spoken to Colombians and received reply they committed to
Indian candidate. Thanat raised possibility Colombia could vote for
both Indian and himself. Amb Yost said we would check it out. It was
agreed that work in SC was the most important, Amb Yost informed
Thai that Finns presently studying issue. Secretary volunteered to dis-
cuss Thanat’s candidacy with Colombian ForMin at LA dinner this
evening and recommend vote for Thanat and Indian. Amb Anand said
Thanat now had 7 votes for SC but 8 needed and 9 better.
4. Secretary turned to present attack on US administration in
Washington on Laos. Thanat asked what we proposed to do. Secretary
said we have time to prepare and he would have better fix following
his return from Washington later this week. Thanat said in his view all
part of same problem. It first focused on Thailand, now shifted to Laos,
including charge US backing Lao units and 5,000 Thai troops in Laos,
this last charge ridiculous. He regretted lack press coverage Lao reps
GA address including fact 40,000 North Vietnamese troops now in Laos.
Thanat said he was going to Washington Oct 3 to address Institute For-
eign Affairs and, if Secretary agreeable, would hit North Vietnamese
troop figures and fact no regular Thai army troops now in Laos. Sec-
retary agreed that this approach would be helpful and expressed wish
to see Thanat in Washington.
5. Thanat asked about results Gromyko dinner previous evening.
In particular, anything new on Vietnam. Secretary replied he had not
raised matter since we had previously made clear our willingness ac-
cept Russian initiatives to aid in settling Vietnam conflict. He said we
do not want to appear overeager or panicky, which we are not. As re-
sult, neither Vietnam or China discussed. Secretary offered his opinion
that Russians not settled on many aspects of foreign policy and these
matters pretty much up in air. Only positive aspect was tone of meet-
ing. Sov proposals on European security conference cloudy, only
wished large conference to ease tension. ForMin and Secretary agreed
that there was equally little substance in Asian security proposal.
ForMin mentioned Sov overtures re Aeroflot service and Secretary ob-
served that they appear willing only supply good will but no help.
6. ForMin said he supported US gestures to gain settlement but
wished reaffirm need for US to maintain strong position. If such position
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64 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

held, he felt confident something would develop. Secretary reiterated

that it was firm intention President maintain firm position on South-
east Asia.
7. ForMin asked if it would be possible for him to have more ad-
vanced consultation on US troop replacement. Secretary replied we will
of course consult and asked if he were referring to B–52 36-hour pause
or cessation B–52 action. He assured Thanat that we had no intention
cease B–52 activities. Secretary then outlined our hope for evenly paced
troop withdrawal, discussed problem of leaks which reduce President’s
flexibility, and undertook to give Thai more advanced notice. He said
we expect to consider this problem again in mid-Nov.
8. Secretary asked if RTG considering troop reduction in Vietnam.
ForMin replied not without full consultation with Vietnam allies and
not unless reduction would not affect SVN war effort. In response to
Secretary’s suggestion that Thai need troops for internal use, Thanat
replied that RTG might possibly require them in northeast.
9. ForMin then asked about effect of Cooper amendment. Secre-
tary replied it intended prevent use of US ground forces in undeclared
war and would not affect US commitments under SEATO. In response
to ForMin’s question re Chinese invasion, Secretary said that if Chi-
nese attacked, SEATO obligation would become operative. Secretary
went on to say concern was mainly over possible use US ground forces
in Laos. He said this was a one-year amendment on an appropriation
bill and he would get exact wording and discuss with Thanat in Wash-
ington. ForMin asked if it were not similar to Tonkin Gulf Resolution
and Secretary replied negatively and repeated previous explanation.
Secretary promised to get exact amendment wording and give a memo
on subject to Thanat in Washington.
10. Tone of meeting very cordial and Thanat appeared pleased
with answers to points raised.
Rogers
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Thailand 65

29. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT
Washington Special Action Group’s Recommendations for Providing Military As-
sistance to Laos

The Washington Special Action Group has developed a plan for

providing military assistance to the Lao Government forces.2 This plan
lists actions which are already under way, and also contains agreed rec-
ommendations on further actions for your approval. The actions al-
ready taken include providing the regular and irregular Lao Govern-
ment forces with M–16s and more artillery, giving the Air Force
additional T–28s, improving and maintaining US aerial reconnaissance
capability and tactical air operations, increasing Thai training and sup-
port of the Lao forces, and supporting political moves by Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma to improve his posture as a genuine neutralist.
Actions for which your approval is requested are:3
1. Working out with our Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok the
introduction of a small Thai fire-control element into Laos to assist Meo

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, WSAG Meeting 10/6/69 Laos. Top Secret; Sensitive.
Sent for action. Drafted by Holdridge. According to a handwritten and stamped nota-
tion, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 22.
2
The record of the October 6 WSAG meeting, and attached documents, are in For-
eign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Document 131. The minutes of this meeting also men-
tion two other items related to Thailand: T–28 aircraft and 155 mm. howitzers. U. Alexis
Johnson “brought up the matter of T–28 aircraft for the RLAF and the Thais, stating that
the provision of additional aircraft is a high priority action. Kissinger was strong on the
point that T–28s should not be taken from the Thais to be given to the RLAF. Vice Ad-
miral Nels C. Johnson agreed,” and reported that the JCS would probably recommend
getting 22 aircraft from the VNAF and giving them to the RLAF. There followed a lengthy
discussion of artillery support. It was reported that Thai Prime Minister Thanom had
recommended introducing a Thai artillery unit equipped with 155s into Laos. It was
noted that at “the present time Thai volunteers are training the Meo in the use of 155s.
This gun is not particularly suited for operations in Laos. Moving them about from moun-
tain to mountain by helicopter is an awkward task. Nevertheless, field recommendations
favor introduction of Thai 155s with a combat defense force of about 300 troops. CINC-
PAC recommends a return of the Sierra Romeo 8 package to train the Meo, and then
move it back out of country.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting 10/6/69 Laos.
3
The President initialed his approval of all recommendations. In an October 23
memorandum, Kissinger directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence to implement the five approved recommendations. Kissinger
noted that he “would appreciate regular reports on the progress which is being made to
implement the President’s directive.” (Ibid.)
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66 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

gun crews, phasing the Thai out when Meo have been adequately
trained to replace them. The assumption is that immediate reintro-
duction of the full Thai artillery battery which was withdrawn earlier
(“Sierra Romeo VIII”) might reveal the Thai presence and leave Thai-
land vulnerable to charges of violating the 1962 Geneva Accords.
2. Continue studying with Embassies Vientiane and Bangkok the
possible utilization of “Sierra Romeo VIII” elsewhere in Laos where it
can be both effective and not readily visible or vulnerable. Defense be-
lieves that this battery is a useful asset; Ambassador Unger wants it to
show the Thai that US interests continue in maintaining a military bal-
ance in Laos.
3. Consider via our Ambassadors in Bangkok and Vientiane giv-
ing specialized and intensive training to Thai forces for possible future
operations against the North Vietnamese in Laos. Although the Thai
forces would not necessarily be committed, their extra capabilities
would be available in the event that their help becomes needed.
4. Once a North Vietnamese offensive begins and suitable targets
are identified, implementing B–52 reconnaissance to develop strike in-
formation and possibly to give Hanoi a signal. This action would be
withheld for the present, however, to give us an opportunity to study
countermeasures for dealing with the risks involved and to provide for
necessary advanced planning.
5. If an enemy offensive assumes a size indicating an intention of
going beyond the previous pattern of attacks, giving commanders in
the field authority to increase manned tactical reconnaissance activi-
ties over North Vietnam and the Lao border area below 19 degrees
north and initiate tactical reconnaissance in the border area above 19
degrees north. Such activity would enhance intelligence collection ca-
pability, provide target data for possible future actions, serve as a sig-
nal to the DRV that we might bomb portions of North Vietnam, and
possibly cause the DRV to disperse supplies and reconsider plans for
an offensive.
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Thailand 67

30. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT
Symington Subcommittee Hearings

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign:
Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the U.S.
United States:
U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
John B. Dexter, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

Under Secretary Johnson opened the conversation by referring to

our current concern about the Symington Subcommittee hearings.2 He
informed the Ambassador confidentially that Ambassador Unger was
returning to Washington shortly to testify before the Subcommittee on
Thailand. He assured Sunthorn that we would do all we could to pro-
tect Thailand’s interests in connection with public release of testimony
but outlined the problems involved and warned that we could give no
guarantee that the Subcommittee would not eventually publish infor-
mation that we and the RTG would prefer to keep confidential. The
Ambassador expressed appreciation and urged that every effort be
made.
The Under Secretary noted that Senator Fulbright and the Sym-
ington Subcommittee were motivated largely by fear that in Laos and

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Con-
fidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The
memorandum is part 1 of 3; part 3 is ibid.; part 2 is Document 31.
2
In an October 10 letter to Rogers, Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) an-
nounced that the third phase of hearings of the Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
would take place the week of November 10 and would focus on Thailand. He requested
that Unger, among others, be available for testimony in executive session. Symington
noted that some of the subjects with respect to Thailand would include treaties, joint
planning and exercises, U.S.-built military facilities and military forces in Thailand, mil-
itary assistance, external and internal security threats to Thailand, U.S. electronic intel-
ligence gathering in Thailand, the Thai roles in the Laotian and Vietnamese wars, and
Thai companies controlled or run by Thai Government or military officials. (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1–1 THAI–US) Subsequently, in a lengthy
telephone conversation with Kissinger on November 17, Fulbright insisted that “Unger
should testify by himself,” rather than with Helms, who “throws a cloak of secrecy” over
the testimony. Kissinger demurred, stating that his instructions were that they testify to-
gether. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone
Conversations, Chronological File)
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68 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thailand we might have undertaken commitments that could lead to

direct involvement as in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador commented that
Thailand was much better off than Viet-Nam in terms both of leader-
ship and national will and thus the situation was not likely to become
as serious as it had in Viet-Nam. The Under Secretary agreed and as-
sured him that this point would be made in the hearings and put in
the public record. He agreed with the Ambassador that it was in United
States interest for us to help the Thai maintain their security but that
there should be no need for United States troops. He told the Ambas-
sador he believed the USG had nothing to apologize for in either Thai-
land or Laos, and that both we and the Thai should be proud of the
story we had to tell about our relationship.

31. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT
Thai Economic Problems

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign:
Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the U.S.
United States:
U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
John B. Dexter, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

The Under Secretary asked the Ambassador what he saw as his

most important problems as Ambassador in Washington. Sunthorn
immediately responded that his most important concern was that the
United States Government maintain economic assistance at past lev-
els. Past assistance had been successful, he said, but Thailand’s eco-
nomic outlook was such that continuation of substantial assistance was
desirable. He pointed out that the trade balance was adverse, prima-
rily because of declining rice exports, and noted that the World Bank
had reported that this year for the first time Thailand would suffer a
balance of payments deficit. The decline in exports is a major factor

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Con-
fidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The
memorandum is part 2 of 3; part 3 is ibid; part 1 is Document 30.
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Thailand 69

and another is increasing domestic expenditures for development pur-

poses, especially the accelerated rural development program (ARD)
which has been sufficiently successful to justify increasing allocation
of Thai resources.
The Under Secretary asked how U.S. economic assistance com-
pared in magnitude with U.S. military expenditures in Thailand. The
Ambassador could not give statistics but said military expenditures
were considerably larger. He added that, while U.S. assistance has been
substantial, U.S. exports to Thailand have also been increasing. In re-
sponse to a question by the Under Secretary the Ambassador indicated
there was also a growing trade deficit with Japan.
There followed a discussion of Thailand’s efforts to diversify its
agricultural production and exports through development of corn, mil-
let, tapioca, cassava, etc. The Ambassador said there was little expan-
sion of exports of manufactured goods, the development of manufac-
turing thus far serving primarily for import substitution (with the
exception of cement).
Ambassador Sunthorn then reiterated that the main problem was
rice and commented that our Department of Agriculture was familiar
with RTG complaints about PL–480 sales in the area and exports of
U.S. rice to Hong Kong, an important traditional Thai market.
The Under Secretary said one of the problems affecting decisions
on U.S. aid to Thailand was Thailand’s high level of foreign exchange
reserves. Some argue that this means Thailand does not need foreign
assistance. On the other hand, one could question whether the Thai
should be “penalized” for the good management which resulted in ac-
cumulation of reserves. In any case, the high reserve level was a prob-
lem when we tried to justify aid to Thailand on the Hill.
The Ambassador explained that the RTG had to maintain sub-
stantial reserves because it needs flexibility in the event of contingen-
cies such as drought, floods, etc. which might suddenly reduce exports
and require rapid drawdown of reserves. He added that Thai reserves
will probably be down this year about $30 million and this trend is ex-
pected to continue for the next few years. This is one reason the RTG
hopes U.S. economic assistance will remain at a high level.
Under Secretary Johnson responded that it was nevertheless de-
sirable to look toward a termination of all foreign assistance to Thai-
land as soon as possible, as had occurred with Taiwan. Thailand, he
said, is a “success story” and it is healthy for both sides in the
circumstances to anticipate an end to aid and to placing relations on
an equal footing. The Ambassador agreed but argued that timing is
important.
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70 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, October 31, 1969, 0245Z.

14764. Subject: Symington Sub-committee Hearings (Thai Role in

Viet-Nam). Ref: State 178591.2
1. This message contains all of the material we have been able to
gather in response to the sub-committee’s question.3 We have found
several gaps, particularly concerning the onset of negotiations with the
Thai about the possibility of their sending ground troops to SVN. What
follows should serve as a solid basis for a prepared statement:
2. The Thai arrived at their present force level in SVN in four
stages. In 1964 they sent a small air force contingent, in 1966 a naval
unit, in 1967 an infantry regiment and in 1968 they increased the reg-
iment to a division. We began supporting their effort in 1966. This sup-
port evolved through several stages and for a time varied from unit to
unit. There is consequently some overlap in the following account of
the various Thai contributions.
[Omitted here are paragraphs 3–10 describing details of the Thai
military involvement in Vietnam.]
11. Thailand can notify the GVN at any time that it wishes to with-
draw some or all of its forces in SVN. While our records do not contain
information specifically on the duration of the Thai commitment to SVN
it is reasonable to assume that neither we nor the Thai are under an ob-
ligation to continue support of the Thai military contribution to VN in-
definitely; therefore, the US could terminate its support of the Thai forces
after, of course, notifying the RTG. Also we feel certain that we could per-
suade the RTG to withdraw its forces from SVN if it were prudent to do
so. The Thai have indicated their desire to coordinate closely with the
other allies in SVN. We have not suggested to the Thai that they reduce
or withdraw their forces; however both we and they are aware of the in-
surgent threat in Thailand and the related threat of enemy advances in
Laos. There has been some speculation among individual RTG authori-
ties that it might be necessary to withdraw or reduce their forces if the
threat to Thailand becomes worse. However, recently the RTG has pub-
licly announced its intention to continue its military contribution to the
GVN as long as each believes it is a necessary contribution.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1–1 THAI–US. Se-
cret; Limdis. Repeated to SECDEF, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.
2
Telegram 178591 to Bangkok, October 21, transmitted the text of Senator Syming-
ton’s October 20 letter to Rogers. (Ibid.)
3
For a summary of the information Symington requested, see footnote 2, Docu-
ment 30.
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Thailand 71

Assistance to the Thai

12. USG direct assistance to the Thai to support their troop contri-
bution is described above.4 This aid is outside the regular Military As-
sistance Program. The MASF program was used to meet Thai require-
ments stemming from a deployment decision in 1967. Amb Unger’s Nov
7, 1967 5 letter outlines this. The Thai had two major concerns when they
decided to increase its infantry contribution to a division in late 1967.
A. They were concerned that sending their best troops out of coun-
try in substantial numbers would weaken their military posture in
Thailand. They sought to meet this by accelerating their moderniza-
tion efforts and sought our assistance. In response we agreed to in-
crease the MASF level from $60 million to $75 million for FY 68 and to
a $75 million planning figure for FY 69. We also agreed to consult with
the Thai on the composition of the program.
B. With the decision to send a division, longstanding Thai anxieties
about air attack surfaced once again. They asked for a Hawk battalion
and after considerable discussion we settled on a Hawk battery to be de-
ployed after the RTG had acquired the necessary land and completed
the requisite construction. We also agreed to train the Thai to operate the
battery and turn it over to them. The cost of the battery, not to be borne
by the MAP Program, is about $7 million. The annual O&M cost to the
MAP Program is estimated to be about $1.2 million. To date the site has
not been prepared and the Hawks have not been deployed.
13. The dispatch of forces to Vietnam has had a nearly uniform
positive political impact in Thailand. The Thai believe that their par-
ticipation in the conflect reflects credit on the nation, particularly be-
cause it is a volunteer expeditionary force. The Thai believe that unit
performance has been creditable and they take pride in the recognition
given for specific actions by the allied command.
During the election campaign, nearly a year ago, a few voices were
raised by left-wing fringe candidates advocating withdrawal of Thai
forces from Vietnam (and US forces from Thailand), but as noted else-
where these had no effects on the campaign or its outcome. More re-
cently, in the wake of the beginning of the US troop reduction program,
some similar comments have appeared. These have been divided
among the handful who advocate withdrawal in principle, and who
are still regarded as aberrant by most Thai, and a few who have

4
Paragraphs 3–10 describe U.S. financial support of overseas allowances, meals,
and accommodations for Thai forces in Vietnam, and death and disability gratuities. The
United States also agreed to equip and pay for the training of the Thai ground forces
going to Vietnam.
5
Not printed.
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72 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

argued that Thai forces should be drawn down along with other allied
forces in the light of security requirements at home.
RTG and Viet-Nam Strategy
14. The Thai Government has participated as one of the troop con-
tributing countries in periodic meetings and in the process of consulta-
tion on major political and military moves to which the US Government
is pledged. The more formal acts of consultation have, of course, been ac-
companied by a continuing exchange of information, ideas and views.
15. By these means, key Thai leaders have been given a sense of
participation commensurate with their contributions to the joint ef-
fort—contributions which in their minds include not only the dispatch
of Thai forces to Vietnam, but the provision of bases and facilities for
use by US forces in Thailand. They have neither had nor sought a di-
rect role in development of strategic or tactical plans by COMUSMACV
and the GVN. But they have felt free to express their judgments as to
the general course of action best calculated to bring the war to a satis-
factory ending. They have consistently advocated, and still prefer, that
efforts at negotiation be accompanied by application of sufficient mil-
itary pressure to make the negotiations meaningful and to protect the
fundamental principles on which US and Republic of Vietnam partic-
ipation in the Paris Talks has been premised.
RTG and Viet-Nam Settlement
16. The Thai Government expects to have a voice in the eventual
Vietnam settlement and, indeed, desires to have a part in the post-
hostilities efforts to maintain stability and promote regional recon-
struction and development.
17. The Thai Government has accepted the propriety of the cur-
rent phase of the negotiations being conducted by the US and the Re-
public of Vietnam, speaking for all the troop contributing countries.
They expect to be kept informed of developments in and related to the
talks. This has been done on a very selective basis, and there has been
no indication that the Thai feel their legitimate interests are being dis-
regarded. They have however emphasized their desire for more timely
consultation in advance of actions. They have made no requests to par-
ticipate in the Paris Talks themselves at this stage, but expect to par-
ticipate in negotiations leading up to the eventual settlement.
18. The claim of the Thai and other troop contributing govts to
participate in appropriate ways in the eventual settlement is recorded
in the Manila Communiqué of 1966.6 The Thai understandably and

6
For text of the Manila communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, November
14, 1966, pp. 730–735. Paragraph No. 28 dealt with the participation of troop-contribut-
ing countries in the settlement. It stated that “they would act on this basis in close con-
sultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.”
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Thailand 73

properly take this seriously. The US Government has given expression

to the need for consultation as events unfold through meetings of the
foreign ministers of the troop contributing countries, which have been
held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the SEATO Council
and, in Sept. 1969, at Secretary of State Rogers’ initiative in New York.
In the absence of clearer indication of the time when negotiations will
become meaningful, and in what kind of forum, the Thai Govt has not
spelled out its ideas on the way in which it could appropriately par-
ticipate. In the meantime, however, as noted above, they have wished
to maintain a dialogue on the substance of the Vietnam problem. We
believe that the Thai do this with the other allies as well as with the
US and that the views of the Govt of Vietnam are given special weight
in the development of Thai positions. Throughout the period of the
Paris Talks, Thai leaders have spoken in opposition to the imposition
of a coalition govt on South Vietnam, taking in this respect at least as
hard a position as that of the GVN.
19. Foreign Minister Thanat has indicated in a general way the
disposition of the Thai Govt to continue to play an active role in South-
east Asian affairs following achievement of a settlement. The Thai seem
attracted to the idea of entrusting the task of supervising provisions of
the settlement to a largely Asian group of nations, more broadly based
than the International Control Commissions established in the 1954 and
1962 Geneva Agreements. If such a step were feasible now, it seems
likely that the Thai Govt would itself be willing to contribute to such
an effort.
20. The prospect of a coordinated attack on the problem of re-
construction and continuing development in the Southeast Asian re-
gion has held great appeal for the Thai ever since President Johnson’s
speech at Johns Hopkins in 1965. The Royal Thai Govt is already an
active participant in virtually all regional organizations, either indige-
nous to Asia or involving participation of outsiders as well, and be-
lieves there is the prospect both for further strengthening of such in-
stitutions and for the Asian members to carry a progressively greater
share in the effort. The Thai do not believe, however, that either such
organizations or the region in general can achieve its potential with-
out support from the US and other nations outside the region contin-
uing for a further period.
Unger
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74 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 1, 1969, 0402Z.

14847. For Under Secretary Johnson & Asst. Secretary Green.

1. Before departing Bangkok to return to Washington I would like
to give you a sketch of the way things look from here with regard to
Thai-US relations. Some of the points mentioned are not at this time
known to the Thai but if and when they are, I anticipate a cumulatively
negative reaction which could well jeopardize close and effective rela-
tions which we have sought to maintain with the Thai over many years.
My concern is further heightened because of the unfavorable public-
ity which I very much fear may result from the Symington hearings on
Thailand.
2. The factors I have in mind are in a number of different fields
but they all have in common what the Thais will take as an indication
of acceleration disengagement on our part. These are the more perti-
nent factors:
(A) The decision which has apparently been taken to terminate
the activities of USIS in Thailand which are “on behalf of the Thai Gov-
ernment” (see memo from Henry Kissinger to Frank Shakespeare Oc-
tober 9, copy to SecState).2 We have been working steadily for some
time now to get the Thai Government to assume more and more in-
formational activities but I have been intent on continuing our support
of necessary functions until the Thai were ready and able to take over.
The order cited appears to foreclose any such orderly handover.
(B) Reduction of US military forces in Thailand: Although this ac-
tion also has its constructive side if carefully executed, it nevertheless
adds to the preoccupation of the Thais when combined with the other
factors mentioned here. Furthermore, it would become a strongly neg-
ative factor if we should move too quickly to proceed beyond what is
already programmed.
(C) The serious doubts raised about the continuing validity of the
contingency planning with the Thai (Project Taksin) and therefore
growing doubts about the credibility of our SEATO commitment.
(D) The downward trend in our economic aid as contrasted with
high level assurances that we will continue to assist Thailand to han-
dle its own problems through economic and military aid.
(E) The continuing Congressional and press criticism of Thailand
(and our other allies in this region) which seems to concentrate on cas-
tigating just those who are most willing to help the US; the most re-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Priority; Nodis.
2
Not found.
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Thailand 75

cent unhappy case is Otto Passman in the Thai and other loans to the
US to help out on the balance of payments.
(F) Our apparent reluctance to continue Sierra Romeo which has
been a major element in our close cooperation with the Thais to em-
ploy all of the limited means available to us to try to stave off disaster
in Laos.
3. I continue to assume that Thailand is of importance to us and
that we wish to continue to enjoy the facilities and privileges we have
here, such as those relating to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam
and our actions in Laos, as well as certain highly classified vitally im-
portant activities. I also assume that Thailand, as the heart of South-
east Asia, is important to us as the key probably to assuring that that
part of Southeast Asia which lies beyond continues in friendly hands.
4. Unless my assumptions are in error, the independence and
friendly disposition of Thailand towards us must continue to be a pri-
ority objective in this part of the world. Heretofore our shared convic-
tion with the Thais that we were working toward essentially the same
goals and that we were both prepared to make contributions toward
those goals assured a relationship of mutual confidence. We are now
beginning to raise real doubts about our future intentions and begin-
ning to undermine our close relations without which we could not ex-
pect to enjoy here the advantages we have had in the past. The reports
about the RTG’s reviewing its foreign relations (Bangkok 14722)3 is
one of a few significant straws in the wind of and “agonizing reap-
praisal” which the Thais may in due course reluctantly decide they
must take.
5. These are fundamental points which have to be considered
when we are weighing the nature and the level of our programs in
Thailand in the coming period. Decisions on these matters which cu-
mulatively signal growing US disinterest and disengagement will
surely undermine and perhaps in due course destroy the effective and
constructive relations we have had with the Thais for so long. I hope
this is not where we mean to be heading.
Unger

3
Dated November 1. (Ibid.)
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76 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

34. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, November 5, 1969.

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Ambassador Unger, November 6

You have a brief meeting scheduled with Ambassador Unger on

Thursday.2
Unger remains a “big commitment” man to the last; his soul is
rooted firmly in the days before the Guam doctrine. He is not happy
with much that is going on now, and in recent weeks his mission has
orchestrated a set of messages to support his line:
—It has cited declining Thai foreign exchange reserves and an al-
leged new Thai grasp of Thailand’s problems to argue that “we should
broaden our support to Thailand’s efforts” (in counterinsurgency).
—It has reported in extenso (and I think over-interpreted) a
Bangkok Post article to the effect that Thailand may have to make pol-
icy “readjustments” in view of US policy changes.
—It has dwelt upon evidence of the expansion of insurgency on
the Malaysian border and of Communist re-grouping in the Northeast.
Unger’s present preoccupations are stated in a recent Nodis cable
(Tab A).3 He cites recent US decisions (including the instruction on USIS
operations in Thailand)4 as evidence of an “accelerating disengagement”
by the US. He warns that this disengagement will raise Thai doubts as
to whether we share common objectives, and that these doubts may lead
to an “agonizing reappraisal” by the Thai of their relations with us.
Unger is here to testify before the Symington Sub-Committee, and
he is most concerned that the Hearings—and release of the testimony—
will further damage Thai/US relations.
Suggest You Say:
—We are readjusting our policy, and it is natural and desirable that
the Thai also engage in “readjustments.” (e.g. broadened international

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on
the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.
2
No other record of the Kissinger–Unger meeting has been found.
3
Document 33.
4
The USIA instruction was, according to Holdridge, very preemptory and allowed
no time for winding down this operation. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]
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Thailand 77

contacts; self-reliance in counter-insurgency; social and economic meas-

ures to avert disaffection; planning to live within their economic means)
—You wonder what the content really would be of a Thai “ago-
nizing reappraisal.” Would the Thai leadership seriously think they
could go over to the Communists? Or would they more likely seek
means and redouble their efforts to maintain Thai independence and
their own positions by making limited accommodations as necessary
with Communist China but continuing to fight Communist subversion
at home?
—On the USIS issue, you wish to make clear that you heard the
Thai themselves express the feeling that popularization of the Thai King
and Government should be done by the Thai. The President feels this
very strongly, and has instructed that we look not only at Thailand but
at our USIS operations elsewhere to see whether they are over-involved
in the internal affairs of host countries.
—On the Symington hearings, you agree heartily with Unger’s
concerns. You hope that he will make his point forcefully in State. You
are looking now at possible ways of controlling Senate release of con-
fidential materials which damage our international relations.
—(Unger has not indicated whether he has asked the King about
his views on the timing of a visit to the US.) Ask whether Unger has
had a chance to raise the question of a visit to the US with the King.5

5
No record of a U.S. visit by the King or of the Nixon–Unger meeting has been
found.

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 11, 1969, 0623Z.

15295. Subject: Symington Subcommittee Hearings. Ref: Bangkok

15212.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Sub-
ject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.
2
Telegram 15212 from Bangkok, November 9, reported Deputy Chief of Mission
Hannah’s recent contacts with Thai officials concerning the upcoming Symington sub-
committee hearings. Hannah included an account of Hollings’ statement to Thanat on
November 7, in which Hollings warned that the hearings would produce press accounts
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78 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

1. Foreign Minister Thanat received me at his home Tuesday

morning before going to Cabinet meeting. I conveyed the substance of
State 189585.3 Thanat listened attentively and expressed appreciation,
but made clear his sense of deep concern, not only over the Syming-
ton subcommittee hearings but over the fact Plan Taksin had been
shown to Senators.4 He said that despite our assurance, he must as-
sume that for all practical purposes “Plan Taksin is out in the open
now.” I pointed out that we hoped to keep the content of the plan se-
cret, but he shrugged his shoulders and remarked that the essence of
the plan has already been revealed in the papers to the extent of re-
vealing that it is a Thai-U.S. contingency plan for responding to a threat
through Laos. He therefore feels that the other side knows more about
our plans than we do about theirs.
2. I reminded him of the assurances contained in para 2 of State
1603685 to the effect that we still support Plan Taksin. Thanat replied
that he accepts implicitly the President’s support of the plan but that
he cannot overlook the fact that “a lot of water has flowed under the
bridge in the past two or three months.” He said that it is no longer
possible to have confidence that the Senate would permit the plan to
be executed even were the appropriate contingency to arise.
3. He appreciated my offer to keep him informed regarding the
progress of the hearings and concurred with my expression of hope
that press leaks or critical public statements would not be allowed to
pit US and the RTG against each other. Nevertheless, he argues that
the problem is in the United States—not in Thailand, which he de-
scribed as “a silent partner.”
4. On the whole I believe that my representation to him, and in
particular the expression of desire to coordinate with the Thai to avoid

contrasting sharply with the expressions of friendship which both sides had made dur-
ing the just-concluded Codel Sparkman and urged “very close coordination between the
United States and Thailand governments during this difficult period immediately
ahead.” Hannah also requested that the Department provide him with daily reports on
the hearings, so that he could maintain close liaison with the Thai Government on this
matter. (Ibid.)
3
Telegram 189585 to Bangkok, November 6, requested that Hannah confer with
the Thai Government about the fact that the Taksin contingency plan would soon be
shown to select Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee, and to inform its officials
about other aspects of the subcommittee hearing. (Ibid.)
4
The Department of Defense finally let the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
see a copy of the Taksin Plan on November 7. A Marine one-star general brought it to
the Capitol, where it was perused by Senators Fulbright and Church; it was returned to
the Pentagon later that same day. As reported by major newspapers the next day, in-
cluding the Baltimore Sun and The New York Times, Fulbright said, “I really don’t want a
copy . . . This resolves it.”
5
Not printed.
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Thailand 79

misunderstandings, was useful. Although it is quite apparent that

Thanat is deeply worried about the hearings and their impact and that
he relates this to “the water which has flowed under the bridge,” which
in his view undermines the solidity of our relationship. I believe the
foregoing illustrates how important it is that we be provided with daily
reports on the hearings in order that we may maintain regular liaison
with the Foreign Minister.
5. Since drafting foregoing, I have just received State 1903756 de-
scribing Assistant Secretary Green’s briefing of Sunthorn. I will relay
substance of this telegram to Thanat. When I told him earlier this morn-
ing that Sunthorn would be briefed, this reminded him that he had re-
ceived a letter two or three days ago from Sunthorn in which the lat-
ter had said that he had called at the Department (possibly on Under
Secretary Johnson)7 and had been told that we would not reveal Plan
Taksin to the Senate. I explained that the Department intended to call
Sunthorn in again and bring him up to date.
Hannah

6
Telegram 190375 to Bangkok, November 11, reported the highlights of Green’s
meeting with Ambassador Sunthorn on November 10, including Green’s notice to the
Ambassador that the Project Taksin Plan had been shown to certain selected Senators,
but that the classified nature of the document would continue to be protected. Green
said that it had been decided that it was “a tactical necessity” to let the committee see
the document itself to forestall further criticism so that the committee “would recognize
it for what it was, a contingency plan.” During the Symington subcommittee hearings,
Green informed Sunthorn, “there were some topics on which there would be no testi-
mony, others which we would explain but keep classified, and a third category which
would eventually appear on public record.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)
7
See Documents 30 and 31.

36. Editorial Note

Hearings on Thailand before the Subcommittee on United States

Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, were held on November 10–14,
and 17, 1969. The declassified version of the hearings was printed by
the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1970, after it was released by
the subcommittee on June 8. (United States Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session,
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80 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Part 3, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969) The record

pertaining to the subcommittee hearings is further amplified by De-
partment of State telegrams to the Embassy in Thailand, as cited below.
The November 10 hearings were described as mostly harmonious,
“although the Senators, especially Fulbright and Symington, were pre-
dictably antagonistic toward U.S. policies in Southeast Asia (not con-
fining their questions and comments to Thailand) and especially to an
alleged failure of the executive to keep Congress fully informed of what
it was doing and the ‘commitments’ that it was alleged to be develop-
ing. They doggedly persisted in tendentious questioning about Project
Taksin and the Rusk–Thanat communiqué, both viewed by them as
unauthorized executive commitments going beyond SEATO.
“The most critical questions were on contingency planning
(Taksin) and U.S. payments for Thai troops in Vietnam and Laos.
Symington also fulminated against failure of the Thai and other
SEATO allies to bear their proportionate share of the fighting burden
in Vietnam.
“An impasse developed between Ambassador Unger and Ambas-
sador McClintock, and Symington and Fulbright over (1) the Ambas-
sador’s position that he was not authorized to testify on the contents
of the Taksin contingency plan, specifically the political implications of
its provision for possible U.S./Thai intervention in Laos, and (2) on
U.S. arrangements with the RTG concerning financial support of Thai
military activities (especially the Artillery battery) in Laos.” (Telegram
190428 to Bangkok, November 11; National Archives, Nixon Presiden-
tial Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcom-
mittee, Vol. II)
In addition, the hearings record provides a wealth of statistical and
descriptive information about the nature of the U.S. commitment to
Thailand, U.S. assistance to and forces in Thailand (as well as USAF
reconnaissance and bombing in Laos from Thailand), and Thai efforts
and contributions in Vietnam and Laos. Included in this information
was testimony that revealed that under a secret accord entered into in
1967, the United States had been paying $50 million a year to Thailand
for sending a combat division to South Vietnam. In addition, the United
States agreed to increase its military assistance by $30 million for 2
years and to supply Thailand with a battery of Hawk anti-aircraft mis-
siles in return for the 11,000-man Thai unit in Vietnam. It was also dis-
closed the United States had invested $702 million in construction of
military bases in Thailand. (United States Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, Part 3, passim.)
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Thailand 81

Telegram 190484 to Bangkok, November 12, summarized the first

2 days of the hearings. It reported that the subcommittee had asked
probing questions about the meaning of the phrase “constitutional
processes” in connection with implementing the Taksin contingency
plan, and had asked about “what expectations Thai have as to how we
will execute commitments.” It noted that some of the Senators had been
strongly critical of U.S. payments to the RTAVF and of the alleged fail-
ure of Thailand to bear its “proper share of Vietnam war burden.” The
telegram reported that when Fulbright and Symington expressed
doubts that either North Vietnam or China were sufficiently serious
threats to justify the costs of U.S. security programs in Thailand, Am-
bassador Unger and other witnesses tried to emphasize that the “bulk
of U.S. presence and expenditures in Thailand have been in relation
Vietnam war and not directly for Thailand’s security, either external or
internal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)
Telegram 191152 to Bangkok, November 13, reported that “today’s
questions were largely directed at possibility U.S. through military assist-
ance and counterinsurgency programs was being drawn into implied
commitments or creeping involvement in Thai internal security opera-
tions. We believe, however, that Ambassador Unger and other witnesses
were able to establish clear record that subcommittee’s apparent pre-
sumptions were unfounded and that mission and executive branch gen-
erally acting with great prudence to avoid the dangers mentioned.” (Ibid.)
Telegram 192811 to Bangkok, November 15, reported on Ambas-
sador Martin’s testimony before the subcommittee on November 14,
based on his tenure as Ambassador in Bangkok preceding Unger. Asked
whether joint U.S.-Thai activities had enlarged the basic U.S. SEATO
commitment, “he expressed conviction that they had not in a legal
sense, but everyone was free to make his own judgment whether the
kind of loyalty and help extended by one partner created a ‘moral’
commitment. In his opinion, the Thai performance had been such as
to fully merit our continued support.” Regarding the nature of the U.S.
SEATO obligation to Thailand, Martin “maintained his view that it ob-
ligates the United States to help Thailand against overt communist ag-
gression or massive external support to insurgency but does not spec-
ify precisely what we should do or obligate us to provide combat
support against purely internal insurgency.” The telegram also re-
ported that “up to now” the hearings had received “virtually no press
treatment” and urged the Embassy to “make sure you have minimized
possibility information leaking out that RTG has any knowledge sub-
committee hearings.” (Ibid.)
Secretary Rogers called Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs Henry Kissinger at 5:50 p.m. on November 17 to inform
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82 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

him that Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms had called “and
said he was very unhappy and that it wasn’t going too well. Having
Unger go up there with Helms and pretend it is intelligence.” Helms
had stated that what Ambassador Unger was telling the committee
about Thai troops “can’t be presented as intelligence. K said he thought
it considered military operations run by CIA. Rogers didn’t think so.
These are Thai troops that go into Laos. K asked what Rogers thought
should be done.” Kissinger later asked, “what would happen in Thai-
land if we let it get into the record. Rogers thought there would be trou-
ble. Rogers thought on these things we should go to the Committee and
tell them frankly what the problem is and say this is going to be harm-
ful to the national interest and have them keep that in mind. When
Symington agreed with the President about intelligence, he didn’t
have this in mind. K agreed that it didn’t mean we could shift non-
intelligence issues into intelligence and keep it out of the record.”
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361,
Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Thus, telegram 196666 to Bangkok, November 22, reported that
“as a result extensive discussions with Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and Symington subcommittee over questions concerning Thai
involvement in Laos and U.S. support thereof, Ambassador Unger
called back to testify again today on this subject. Testimony given be-
fore full committee in executive session with understanding that it in-
volved matters of highest sensitivity and would not appear in public
record.
“Ambassador Unger’s testimony covered following questions:
number of Thai troops in Laos; U.S. arrangements for financial sup-
port; U.S. pay for Thai pilots; funding procedures; Thai casualties in
Laos; and various special payments such as death benefits. Am-
bassador answered factually and apparently to full satisfaction of
committee.
“In view special consideration on which this hearing based,
you should not inform RTG.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee,
Vol. II)
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37. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 13, 1969, 1146Z.

15438. Subject: Symington Subcommittee Hearings. Ref: A.

Bangkok 15212;2 B. State 190484;3 C. Bangkok 15369.4
1. I spoke today to Marshal Dawee in great confidence and en-
tirely alone, mentioning only very generally some of the points in ref
B. I mentioned the agenda topics in para 2, ref B, explained the reasons
for showing Plan Taksin to the Committee, and pointed out that Am-
bassador Unger had been at great pains to protect Plan Taksin in the
hearings and to reassure the subcommittee that our commitments are
limited to SEATO. Characteristically (and unlike Thanat), Dawee was
inclined to be sympathetic and understanding of our problems and ap-
preciative of our efforts to minimize the danger. He understands that
there will inevitably be some unfortunate leaks or public statements,
and while he will be angry when they occur, he is not inclined to pun-
ish us before they occur.
2. Without mentioning subcommittee criticisms of the Thai con-
tribution in Vietnam or U.S. personnel, payments to the RTAVF, etc., I
did tell Dawee that the committee is, of course, interested in obtaining
a review of these aspects of Thai and U.S. cooperation in the Vietnam
war. I emphasized that while we would have to explain to the com-
mittee our support to the RTAVF we would expect to keep this kind
of thing confidential.
3. I believe this very once-over-lightly treatment with Dawee was
useful and will be helpful at some future time. In view of Thanat’s rather
cool attitude two days ago and Birabhongse’s critical attitude to our po-
litical counselor yesterday, I believe we will go slowly with the Foreign
Minister. The Department should know that under my instructions to

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Sub-
ject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2
See footnote 2, Document 35.
3
See Document 36.
4
Telegram 15369 from Bangkok, November 12, reported on the Embassy political
counselor’s talk with Foreign Minister Thanat’s Secretary, Birabhongse. The latter re-
vealed his and Thanat’s pessimism about the subcommittee hearings, especially the rev-
elation of the Taksin Plan to Fulbright and Symington, saying that “Thanat fears that, in
wake of this first step contents of plan will ultimately be revealed, rendering it worth-
less.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files,
Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)
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84 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

be cautious and because of Bira’s absorption with the successive John-

son and Green interviews with Ambassador Sunthorn, political coun-
selor did not mention a number of items in ref B, including contentious
points paras 4, 6, and 7, which perhaps is just as well.
Hannah

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 20, 1969, 1132Z.

15793. Subject: Symington Subcommittee. Ref: State 193723.2

1. I briefed Foreign Minister Thanat today on the basis of reftel,
giving him the text of subparagraphs 3 a, b, and c. I did not take up
the questions and answers in paragraph 4 since those deal solely with
the Philippines and would probably have alarmed Thanat prematurely
since he would regard them as a harbinger of future questioning re-
garding the Black Panthers.
2. Even so, the relatively bland contingency guidance of para-
graph 3 stimulated his blood pressure. He resented the necessity to
deny the characterization “mercenary” and remarked that “if the sen-
ators are opposed to the presence of Thai forces in South Vietnam, we
could very easily withdraw them and on quite short notice as well.” I
tried to explain to Thanat that the focus of the subcommittee’s interest
was quite different and that, if anything, some Senators had been
critical of other east Asian countries for not having contributed to the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Sub-
ject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis.
2
Telegram 193723 to Bangkok, Manila, and Seoul, November 17, reported that, in
response to public transcripts and press releases by the Symington subcommittee im-
plicitly criticizing Asian allies in Vietnam for needing U.S. assistance, the Department of
State had contingency guidance “which could be used along general following lines:
a) the United States provides equipment and supplies, training, overseas allowances,
and other kinds of support. b) The contribution by these nations to the Vietnam conflict
and the support they receive from the U.S. cannot be characterized as ‘mercenary’ in na-
ture since each of the countries concerned decided on its own to contribute to a cause it
supports by reason of its own national interests and security. c) All three countries (Thai-
land, Philippines, and South Korea) had needed military and economic assistance for
years and would be obviously unable to finance an overseas force without assistance
while still facing considerable challenges at home.” (Ibid.)
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Thailand 85

Vietnam war, even though their security was at stake. However, this
charge certainly could not be levied at Thailand, which had supported
US in the war in countless ways, I had some difficulty making this ex-
planation in the face of several interruptions from Thanat who was in-
tent upon insisting that I report fully what he had said regarding the
ability of the RTG to withdraw the Black Panthers, “if the Senate does
not like them.”
3. I informed Thanat that the hearings were completed and that
as far as I knew they had gone better in the latter part than during the
first two days. Thanat quizzed me on the “sanitization process” which
preceded publication of the report on the Filipino hearings. He is ob-
viously fearful that the sanitization will not be very thorough and he
clearly expects the worst when it comes to Thailand’s turn.
Hannah

39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew1

Washington, December 17, 1969.

SUBJECT
Your Visit to Bangkok

1. The Current State of Relations: US-Thai relations are basically

sound. However, we are presently undergoing a period of strain due
in particular to Thai fears that the US troop withdrawals from Vietnam
may represent a US pull-out from Southeast Asia, but also due to a
number of lesser irritants including US PL 480 rice shipments to tra-
ditional Thai markets and to sensationalized press reporting of the
Symington Subcommittee hearings on Thailand which alleged that the
US paid a billion dollars for the Thai troop contribution in Vietnam.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 450, Pres-
ident’s Trip Files, V.P. Trip East Asia, January 1970. Secret.
2
Telegram 16597 from Bangkok, December 9, contains a report of efforts by the
President and Department of State Spokesman Charles Bray to expose the inaccuracy of
this allegation and to give the public “a better appreciation of Thai contribution.” (Ibid.,
Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)
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86 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The implication of the latter issue of course is that the US paid for Thai
“mercenaries”, and the Thai resent this implication as well as what they
regard as another instance of unfair criticism of them in the US press—
in itself, a long-standing irritant in our relations.
Behind the immediate problems in our relations is a belief on the
part of the Thai leaders that the US commitment in the area will in-
deed decrease over time, and they are seeking means to assure Thai
independence in the changed context. They are worried over the
prospect that the US withdrawal from Vietnam will proceed at a rate
which would leave Thailand and other free nations exposed to a Chi-
nese and North Vietnamese communist threat. The long-term threat
from China is their greatest concern.
Most immediately, the Thai leaders are apprehensive that once the
US withdraws from Vietnam, Laos may fall to the Communists who will
then give direct large-scale aid across the Mekong River to the insur-
gency in the Northeast. Over the longer-term, they are worried about
their ability to contain the Peking-backed insurgency in the North.
The constancy of US support, then, becomes a matter of great im-
portance to the Thai. Any developments in the US which appear to
question this constancy cause over-reaction in Thailand. Our Embassy
is anxious to smooth things down and prevent the Thai tendency to
over-react. At the same time, we feel that some officers in the Embassy
may be over-solicitous on behalf of their Thai clients, who are perhaps
more mature and capable than the Embassy gives them credit for, and
who appreciate the realities of Southeast Asian developments despite
a tendency to react emotionally to the issues of the moment. (For ex-
ample, the Embassy is upset at our decision to cease the activities of
USIS mobile information units which have been doing what the Thai
themselves should be doing in calling for loyalty to the King and the
Government. The Thai themselves expressed criticism of these units to
me last summer.)
The President’s visit to Thailand last July helped to reassure the
Thai as to the continued US role in support of Thailand, as restated in
the President’s Guam doctrine, and your visit should have the same
effect. They are on our side, and are proceeding in the directions which
we favor such as supporting regionalism and self-help measures. We
have no reason to believe they will want to withdraw their troops from
Vietnam out of pique over their treatment in the US press.
2. What the Thai Will Want
a. The Thai will want to unburden themselves on what they con-
sider unjustified US public and Congressional criticism of their role in
Vietnam. They may do so in emotional terms. This may be more of a
means of blowing off steam than an expression of a real crisis in our
relations, and may, in fact, have a therapeutic effect.
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Thailand 87

b. The Thai will be worried about the present situation in Laos,

and whether the US is doing enough to hold back the Communists
there. They are also worried that an eventual Vietnam settlement will
provide adequate protection to the integrity of Laos, or prevent Com-
munist infiltration through Laos into Thailand. They will want your
reassurances.
c. They may want to elicit your thoughts on the future of South-
east Asia and of US-Thai relations.
d. US “interference” with Thai rice sales.3 The Thai have long re-
sented US PL 480 rice sales. Right now, they are highly indignant be-
cause they think we “ordered” the GVN to back away from a purchase
of 20,000 metric tons of rice from Thailand. (In fact, we have regularly
supplied Vietnam’s rice requirements through PL 480, to save foreign
exchange. The possibility of a Thai sale arose from a momentary short-
age in Saigon which we were able to meet through a diversion of a
PL 480 shipment from a third country to Vietnam. We did not order
the Vietnamese to do anything, but their requirements were met by this
arrangement. While we do not regard South Vietnam as a normal mar-
keting area for Thai rice, we are very sensitive to Thai feelings on the
question of PL 480 rice sales, and will continue to consult and to en-
deavor to minimize frictions. You should use this line only if the Thai
raise the issue.)
e. They are unlikely to raise specific bilateral issues directly, but
may touch on some of the problems I have outlined above in passing.
3. What We Want:
a. To reassure the Thai of the constancy of US backing, under the
principles outlined by the President in his Guam Doctrine. (The Thai
appear to understand the revised US approach and even to be pleased
at the confidence placed in them that they are capable of handling in-
ternal subversion.)
b. To downplay the effects of what may appear to the Thai as un-
justified criticism. This of course represents only a small percentage of
American opinion and certainly is not indicative of the attitude either
of the Administration or the great majority of Americans.
c. To reassure the Thai of their own ability to handle the insur-
gency in Thailand.
d. To encourage the trend toward self-confidence, self-help and
regionalism.
4. Points to Stress:
a. On Laos:
—The Administration is acutely aware of Thailand’s particularly
exposed position and the importance of Laos to Thai security. Recall
that our side has insisted that a satisfactory settlement in Laos is an in-
tegral part of any solution in Vietnam.

3
Extensive information on Thai complaints of U.S. interference in Thai rice sales
is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 THAI and, es-
pecially, INCO–RICE 17 INDON–THAI, from December 1969 to December 1970.
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88 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—Refer to the steps we have undertaken in concert with the Thai

to strengthen the ability of the Lao Government to cope with the threat
posed by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces (see State Talk-
ing Points).4
b. On Vietnam:
—Stress the great appreciation which the President has expressed
for the Thai troop contribution. The fact that these troops are volun-
teers demonstrates how clearly the people of Thailand see the issues
in Vietnam.
—We are also grateful for the great assistance which Thailand has
provided through the US-Thai airbases in Thailand in support of the
Vietnam war. We recognize that countless American lives have been
saved because of the existence of these bases.
—Ongoing US troop withdrawals will be carried out in keeping
with the South Vietnamese ability to take over. We will consult with
the Thai beforehand.
5. Points to Avoid:
—The Thai Government has little love for Sihanouk, although it
has expressed willingness to normalize relations if he takes the initia-
tive. The Thai are probably unenthusiastic about our decision to re-
sume diplomatic relations with Cambodia. If they raise the issue, you
might turn it aside with the observation that Sihanouk has caused all
of us problems, but that none of us want to see Cambodia pulled to-
ward the Communists, and that we might both derive some advantage
from a US presence in Phnom Penh.
6. Meeting with the King: Your discussions with the King will prob-
ably parallel those with Prime Minister Thanom and other Government
leaders but be much briefer and more general. The same line of ap-
proach applies.

4
Ibid.
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Thailand 89

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, December 23, 1969, 0936Z.

17214. Subject: Thai Volunteer Forces in Vietnam. Ref: Bangkok

17181.2
1. During conversation I had this morning with Thanat on another
subject, he volunteered brief rundown his discussions in Kuala Lumpur
with RVN FonMin Lam on subject of withdrawal of Thai forces in Viet-
nam. Thanat told me his purpose in discussing this was to establish
the principle that Thai forces were not intended to remain in RVN in-
definitely and that they could be withdrawn once circumstances per-
mitted. In response to my question whether the RTG was currently
making any such plans to withdraw, Thanat said this was not the case.
He said underlying objective in making his statement to the press about
the possibility of Thai withdrawal reftel was to convey to Hanoi an-
other indication of the growing capability of the South Vietnamese to
take care of their own problems and also to blunt thrust of Hanoi prop-
aganda. He asked me to keep in strictest confidence his acknowledg-
ment that no plans for withdrawal were actually underway as well as
his motivation, with Hanoi as the target, of raising in public the pos-
sibility of Thai withdrawal.
2. I said that we are also convinced of the value of the Viet-
namization policy as means, inter alia, undercutting the NVN propa-
ganda effort. I added that at same time we saw continuing value in hav-
ing some Thai forces in Vietnam. He said he knew this and we did not
need to convince Thailand on this score. He added that some of the peo-
ple in the government, including some military, did not understand the
political and psychological reasons for his public statement re with-
drawal Thai forces from Vietnam. He then left for the Tuesday cabinet
meeting at which he said this issue would be discussed and, presum-
ably, his initiative will be explained to those less sophisticated.
3. Department please transmit Embassies Saigon, Vientiane and
Paris and CINCPAC for Adm. McCain and Polad.
Unger

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2
Telegram 17181 from Bangkok, December 22, reported on Thanat’s “obviously
planned” statement to newsmen upon his return to Bangkok from an ASEAN meeting
in Kuala Lumpur that he had met with the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister during
the conference and had discussed with him the subject of Thai troop withdrawals from
Vietnam. (Ibid.)
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90 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

41. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, December 24, 1969.

SUBJECT
Representations by Thai Chargé on U.S. Interference with Thai Rice Deal

The Thai Chargé called on you this afternoon to pursue the mat-
ter of US interference with the sale by the Thai of 20 million tons of
rice to the GVN, which lost them $2.5 million. [2 lines of source text not
declassified]
The points which the Chargé stressed in his presentation to me
were: (a) this is viewed by Thailand as a very serious matter (the word
“blatant” was used in describing the incident,) (b) the Thai government
is nevertheless willing to work closely with us to find ways in which
the US might make “amends” by purchase of other goods from Thai-
land to an equivalent amount for use in aid to Vietnam and Laos, and
(c) it is urgent that such amends be made by January 3–4 when the Vice
President arrives in Bangkok “so that the circumstances of the Vice
President’s visit will be the most favorable.” [2 lines of source text not
declassified]
The amends business was suggested by Len Unger to Foreign Min-
ister Thanat. [31⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] Nevertheless, if any-
thing can be done, I believe that appropriate steps should, in fact, be
taken. The element of “face” is deeply bound into the situation, since
the Thai Minister of Economic Affairs was actually in Saigon and the
deal was all set to be concluded except for his signature when we in-
tervened and killed it. I believe that they are smarting under what ap-
pears to them to be a low, and totally unexpected blow from a coun-
try which professes to be an ally. In addition, a great part of Thailand’s
foreign exchange earnings comes from rice sales, and we have hit them
where it really hurts even though their economy is not likely to col-
lapse through loss of this one deal.
In my conversation with the Chargé, I simply told him that I would
report carefully to you what he had said, and also expressed sympa-
thy with the Thai position. I assured him of the constancy of our rela-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret; Umbra. Sent for information. Two
notations in Kissinger’s handwriting read: “Let me call Allen tomorrow” and “Please
move on this. HK”
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Thailand 91

tionship with Thailand, and that we regarded the Thai as true friends
and good allies. This, I said, was exemplified by the President’s re-
marks in Bangkok last July. I asked the Chargé if he had passed the
word to the Department of State to which he informed me he had ear-
lier today called on Under Secretary Johnson. The Under Secretary, it
seemed, had taken the responsibility for having ordered the course of
action which the U.S. had taken in this case.
As per your instructions, I have informed the Chargé that we will
try to work something out by January 3rd.

42. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant of the National Security

Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, December 29, 1969.

SUBJECT
Amends to the Thai for the Rice Transaction

You asked for a recommendation as to what we can do to salve

Thai feelings over the recent cancellation of the GVN rice contract.
I have told State that something needs to be done, that we leave
it to them to propose specific measures, but that there must be some-
thing which the Vice President can offer when he arrives in Bangkok.
I am told by State that—accidentally, I hope—one of the two di-
verted ships containing PL 480 rice for Vietnam has sunk.
As a result, there are two immediate possibilities:
—we can encourage the Vietnamese to go to the Thai for 10,000
tons of rice, and the Vice President can let the Thai know that we are
doing so.
—we can encourage the Vietnamese to buy some 30,000 tons of
sugar from Thailand. Ambassador Unger has already been informally
discussing this idea with the Thai Government.
I believe that with the application of continuing pressure from
here, I can be confident that we will have a firm policy decision on one
of these two possibilities for the Vice President to use in Bangkok.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. A notation in
Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “Let’s get this moved.”
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92 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Other possible ways of recompensing the Thai seem somewhat far-

ther down the road and therefore less attractive.2
Recommendation
That you approve my continuing to press State and AID for a fa-
vorable decision on one of these gestures to the Thai.

Approve3
Disapprove
Other

2
We are asking Lindsey for a memo on what these are. [Handwritten footnote in
the source text.]
3
Kissinger initialed his approval on December 30.

43. Telegram From the Vice President’s Party to the Department

of State1

Bali, January 11, 1970, 0813Z.

Vipto 10/11. Dept pass Bangkok. Subj: VP’s Meeting With P.M.
Thanom.
1. Vice President Agnew met for nearly two hours on Jan 4th with
Prime Minister Thanom and other Thai officials. Those attending the
meeting on the Thai side included: Thanat, Pote, Dawee, Generals
Sawang and Chira, Ambassador Sunthorn, and Dr. Sompong (Director
General of Economic Affairs in the Foreign Office). Ambassador Unger
and Messrs. Crane and Duemling attended with the Vice President.
2. Problems in US-Thai Relations. The Prime Minister stated that
the Thai had been very pleased with President Nixon’s visit last sum-
mer but several problems had cropped up since then. They were there-
fore delighted to have another chance to discuss matters of common
interest with the Vice President. The Vice President responded that he
was making his trip at President Nixon’s request and noted that we

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Se-
cret; Immediate. U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Francis Galbraith was traveling with the
Vice President.
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Thailand 93

too felt the need for a forthright dialogue. Although it would proba-
bly be difficult to get into detail, he felt that a discussion of intent would
be useful at this time. Simply stated the intent of the US is to maintain
the excellent relations which we have enjoyed with Thailand over the
years.
3. US Intentions. The PM said he would appreciate clarification
on “the so-called commitment of the United States to Thailand and
Southeast Asia.” The Vice President stated that his response would re-
flect U.S. integrity and intent in the area and that was just the sort of
thing he wanted to discuss. He stated that the United States stands by
its commitment to Thailand and will discharge its responsibilities as a
Pacific power. There might be changes in technology which would call
for specific readjustments in our defense posture, but this would in no
way affect our commitments to SEATO or any of the other less formal
arrangements with Thailand.
4. The Vice President then took the initiative to provide brief as-
surances on several other questions affecting US/Thai relations:
A. The Vice President felt that we could have consulted more ef-
fectively with the Thai prior to making announcements of troop with-
drawals in Vietnam. He felt we should and could do better in the fu-
ture and planned to make a strong recommendation on this score to
President Nixon.
B. The United States greatly regretted the inconvenience and em-
barrassment to Thai officials which occurred when their projected sale
of 20,000 tons of rice to South Vietnam fell through. We hope to be able
to find some new economic opportunities which would make up for
the loss of the sale. In this regard, the Vice President was encouraged
to note that the South Vietnamese may be needing another 10,000 tons
of rice from Thailand since the United States is not in a position to pro-
vide this.
C. The United States will continue to assist Thailand in combat-
ting insurgency. We intend to continue our economic and military aid
programs. The US is looking favorably upon Thailand’s requests for
additional helicopters and M–16 rifles. Without going into detail, the
Vice President stated that we hoped to deliver a substantial number of
M–16s early this year.
D. The US clearly understands the importance of Laos to Thai-
land and we are concerned with the situation there. The Vice President
assured the Thai that we felt any agreement reached at the Paris
Peace Talks should recognize the integrity of Laos and call for the with-
drawal of North Vietnamese troops from that country back into North
Vietnam.
5. Project Taksin. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation
for the reassurances offered by the VP. He said that he had raised the
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94 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

issue of US commitments because the Thai were concerned over recent

comments by high-ranking officials in the United States, not only Sen-
ators but Secretary Laird. The Thai could not understand our Defense
Secretary’s statement that Plan Taksin did not have either his or the
President’s approval.2 Although Amb Unger had sought to clarify this
statement, it was still most disturbing to the Thai. The Vice President
replied that Secretary Laird’s statement could be best understood in its
local Washington context. The Secretary had merely been attempting
to put out a political fire—a fire which the Vice President felt had be-
gun with some rather irresponsible comments in the Senate. Mr. Laird
had been attempting to dispel the false impression created by the me-
dia that the United States had secret contingency agreements which
could be automatically activated without further review by the Secre-
tary of Defense or the President. The Sec of Defense frankly had not
had the occasion to review in detail and approve Project Taksin since
this would likely take place only in an emergency situation when the
USG would be considering how best to help the RTG.
6. Thai Support for SEATO. The Vice President expressed concern
that troublemakers were attempting to drive a wedge between the US
and its friends by implying that the US was planning to withdraw from
this part of the world. We should not put much stock in such rumors
and propaganda. As an example of how such rumors could upset peo-
ple, the Vice President mentioned that we had heard that the Thai might
be planning to drop out of SEATO. Although just a rumor, this con-
cerned us greatly and we certainly hoped it was not true.
7. The Prime Minister responded that recent insulting comments
by US Senators had been most upsetting to the Thai, Filipinos and oth-
ers. These insults, plus revelations of what the Thai regarded as clas-
sified defense plans, adversely affected the normal SEATO relation-
ships. However, the Thai have no desire to withdraw from SEATO or
to see it broken up. As a matter of fact, the Thai have tolerated the luke-
warm attitude and actions of certain European members of the Treaty
Organization. The Prime Minister stated flatly that the Thai intend to
keep working hard to preserve the regional defense arrangement.
8. The Vice President agreed that a few Senators have done seri-
ous disservice to the US in the way they have talked about our allies.
Their statements were being played up by our enemies in an effort to
try to destroy SEATO. On this score the Vice President had told Pres-
ident Marcos, and he wished now to repeat to the Prime Minister, that
the US remained firm in its resolve to support SEATO. It was most im-
portant, in the Vice President’s view, not to allow troublemakers to dis-

2
See footnote 3, Document 20.
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Thailand 95

turb the good relations which existed between the US and its allies.
The Vice President noted that Senators have many prerogatives but he
felt that recent actions by some Senators had been less than states-
manlike. Leaving the question of substance aside for the moment, he
regretted that their manner had been so insulting. As an American the
Vice President felt obliged to apologize, even though neither he nor the
President had any control over members of the Legislative Branch.
9. Symington Hearings. The Prime Minister expressed his appre-
ciation for the Vice President’s statement, however he still felt obliged
to touch upon those very derogatory statements which alleged that
Thai soldiers were being used as mercenaries in Vietnam. Feeling was
running high in Thailand over these insults, and many people felt the
US does not appreciate what the Thai are doing in Vietnam. The Prime
Minister could not hide the fact that the Thai had been dismayed by
such statements as “the Thai are the best allies money can buy.”
10. The Vice President again expressed his regret, and noted that
such comments certainly do not reflect a majority of American views.
He said that he himself had come in for a great deal of abuse, often
from the same sources. The mercenary argument was so weak, in the
Vice President’s opinion, that he doubted any fair-minded American
would subscribe to it. Mercenaries had historically fought far from
home and had never felt any particular “involvement” in the conflicts
they participated in. It is impossible to imagine that the Thai are not
vitally concerned with what happens in Vietnam, so the mercenary ar-
gument really makes no sense. On the contrary, people in the US are
most grateful for the efforts of Thai volunteers in Vietnam and realize
that any support we can give the RTG is but a small token of our ap-
preciation for its help. The Vice President was certain that such outra-
geous statements would never strike a responsive chord in the minds
of the US public. He hoped that a more cool appraisal by the Cabinet
would indicate that the offending Senators certainly did not speak for
the United States.
11. The Prime Minister said he would like nothing better than to
believe these assurances, but after all, in a democracy the repetition of
falsehoods, even by a small minority, might snowball into a situation
which could force a change in US policy. He pointed out that even in
Thailand five Peace Corps volunteers had demonstrated against the
Vice President’s arrival. (Note: Investigation is still underway to ascer-
tain the precise nature of this demonstration and its participants.)
12. The Vice President indicated he felt that the anti-war demon-
strations had reached their highpoint with the Moratorium marches in
November. Despite the media treatment of the demonstrations, it now
seemed clear that they had so completely failed to attract public sup-
port that additional announced demonstrations had been cancelled.
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96 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Rather than provoking changes in US policy, the demonstrations had

in fact caused Americans to coalesce behind the administration’s posi-
tion. Public opinion polls and mail received since the President’s No-
vember 3 television speech had clearly shown the public support for
our policies in Vietnam.
13. Insurgency Problems. The Vice President asked the Prime Min-
ister to give him a rundown of the current status of the insurgency in
Thailand. The Prime Minister replied that the situation was generally
under control, but that since the end of the rainy season, infiltration
from Laos appeared to be increasing. In response to a question, he
stated that increased infiltration in the north and in the northeast
seemed to be under a centralized command. The Thai were working
hard to interdict the infiltrators. The Prime Minister wished to reiter-
ate that while Thailand intends to rely on its own forces to combat
insurgency, the RTG will need to receive material support for its forces.
The Prime Minister had spoken to President Nixon on this point and
had felt that he was receptive. The Vice President confirmed that we
wished to be receptive to Thai military aid requests.
The Prime Minister stated that the RTG counter-insurgency policy
was not simply one of meeting force with force, but also relied heav-
ily on attempting to improve economic conditions. He claimed the Thai
were committing “enormous resources to rural development.” In ad-
dition, they were working hard to improve the quality of local officials
and to involve the local populace directly in government programs.
The Vice President stated that President Nixon was most impressed
with the way the Thai were approaching their insurgency problem, and
added that we respect their right to chart their own course in this area.
14. PL–480. The Prime Minister touched briefly on the Thai con-
cern over their loss of the rice sale to South Vietnam. Rice sales, after
all, were not economically important to the United States, but were of
vital importance to Thailand where they were taxed by the Govt. and
were thus of importance as a source of revenue as well as foreign ex-
change. He felt that there had not been sufficient consultation between
the United States and the RTG on this question. The Vice President said
we were very aware of the problem which had developed and hoped
that some sort of compensatory deal could be worked out between the
RTG and GVN. In addition, the Vice President pledged that we would
try harder to consult more closely on matters of economic importance
to Thailand in the future.
15. In a related discussion on economic development, the VP un-
derlined the importance of the role which can be played by private
business and investment, and mentioned the residence problems of US
businessmen in Thailand. The PM acknowledged this and said he had
asked the Cabinet to find a solution.
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Thailand 97

16. Thai Troop Withdrawals. The Prime Minister moved to the

question of future Thai troop withdrawals from Vietnam. He said that
any withdrawals would be related to improvement in the Vietnam sit-
uation and to security requirements in Thailand, and would not be
based on US or Australian withdrawal schedules. If problems develop
in Thailand requiring more troops, the RTG will simply have to with-
draw from Vietnam. However, the Thai will consult first with their al-
lies, particularly the US. The Vice President agreed that adequate ad-
vance consultation is of major importance to prevent doubts from
clouding our relations and to avoid providing our enemies with prop-
aganda opportunities. We have been deficient in this regard ourselves,
and will make every effort to consult more closely on our plans in the
future.
17. US Relations With Communist Countries. The Vice President
asked the Prime Minister for his views on the Sino-Soviet split. After
brief comments the Prime Minister said that since the US had entered
into discussions with both the Russians and the ChiComs, he hoped
the Vice President might provide the Thai leaders with some new in-
sights. The Vice President replied that President Nixon believes he has
a responsibility to try to lessen world tensions. Accordingly, we have
begun some very important discussions on strategic arms limitation
with the Soviet Union. It is too early to tell how the talks will turn out,
but we are sincere in our attempt to plumb Soviet intentions.
18. In addition, we have made some small moves toward Com-
munist China which are designed to determine how intransigent their
policies are. As the Thai know, we have received no encouragement
from the ChiComs so far. The Prime Minister commented that these
moves toward the ChiComs had raised some doubts in the minds of
our Asian friends, especially in the Republic of China. The Vice Presi-
dent once again offered assurances that our intentions to reduce ten-
sions should in no way be construed as a diminuation of our commit-
ments to our allies.
19. In closing the Vice President expressed appreciation for the
candor and understanding expressed by the Prime Minister. The dis-
cussions were valuable to the Vice President personally, and to the USG.
The Vice President looked forward to a continued, mutually beneficial
relationship with the RTG, and in response the Prime Minister ex-
pressed appreciation for the assurances which the Vice President had
offered.
Galbraith
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98 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

44. Telegram From the Vice President’s Party to the Department

of State1

Bali, January 12, 1970, 0330Z.

Vipto 12/19. Dept pass Bangkok. VP Channel. Subj: Vice Presi-

dent’s Meeting With the King and Queen of Thailand January 4, 1970.
1. The meeting was held at the Royal Palace. In attendance were
the King, Queen, Prime Minister, Ambassador Unger, Commander Cer-
nan, as well as other aides.
2. The meeting began with an exchange of gifts between the prin-
cipals and presentation to the King of the Thai flag and moon rocks by
Commander Cernan.
3. Surprisingly, there was very little small talk between the King
and me, and he moved quickly to the substantive matters. He expressed
his concern over the Symington Subcommittee’s testimony with par-
ticular regard to the characterization of the Thai soldiers as “merce-
naries”. I assured him that this was not the prevalent American opin-
ion and that President Nixon wished the Thai people to be aware of
the continuing appreciation of the United States for their support in
Vietnam and for their effective battle against insurgency in the north
and northeast of their own country.
4. The King expressed grave concern over the situation in Laos,
indicating that very serious mistakes were made at the time of the 1962
Geneva Accords—principally the failure to partition Laos in such a
manner as to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. When I inquired about the ac-
tivities of the Pathet Lao, he indicated that their effort would collapse
without active North Vietnamese cadres prodding them and threaten-
ing them with execution should they not continue the fight against the
Laotian Government.
5. The King indicated that the Thais were very concerned that a
possible settlement in South Vietnam would not include a satisfactory
requirement that the North Vietnamese withdraw entirely from Laos.
I assured him that his position was understood and that we would con-
sult in advance with the Thai Government to make certain that the
Laotian situation was satisfactorily covered in any final agreement with
the Communists.
6. I asked the King about Sihanouk and how he appraised the
present Cambodian position. I expressed concern over the augmenta-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Se-
cret; Immediate.
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Thailand 99

tion of shipments through Cambodia, particularly since the Viet-

namization program was under its severest test in the Delta area. The
King said that he felt Sihanouk was playing a dangerous game, but
that he was virtually the captive of a nearly impossible situation. The
moment that Sihanouk ceases to cooperate marginally with the Com-
munists, the King said, he would be faced with wide-spread and ef-
fective insurgency which would probably result in his overthrow.
Moreover, the King felt that so long as Sihanouk closed his eyes to the
flow of Communist materials through his country he was in a better
position to at least allow some American observation. He indicated that
the Thailand-Cambodia ill feeling had receded to some extent and that
he appreciated the difficulty of Sihanouk’s position.
7. The King is very worried about increasing Communist capa-
bility in stimulating the insurgency in Thailand. The intention of the
Communists is demonstrated by their focus of effort on the road con-
struction program in Laos, and particularly the road that leads south-
west toward Thailand. The King said that he did not think Souvanna
Phouma wanted to encourage this venture, but that he did not know
how to cut it off, having agreed to Communist road building assistance
in other northern areas of Laos. The King’s fear is that a good road will
allow the rapid movement of troops and materials from North Viet-
nam to the Thai borders and that the supplying of the insurrection will
become much easier.
8. My general impression of the King was very favorable. I assess
him to be an extremely brilliant and intense young man who has a re-
markable capability of concentration. Whatever he attempts he seems
to throw himself completely into, and I would judge that he has a
greater effect on the foreign policy of Thailand than the conventional
monarch. He seems to have great social awareness and indicated that
he was moving to provide increased social assistance to his people in
the areas of education, health and land reform.
Galbraith
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100 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President

Nixon1

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT
Economic Assistance to Thailand—FY 1970

I. Recommendation:
That you approve the continuation in FY 1970 of the A.I.D. pro-
gram in Thailand, consisting primarily of advisory and financial sup-
port of Thai police and developmental measures to prevent the growth
of Communist insurgency in the North and Northeast, at a total obli-
gational level of approximately $30 million of grant funds. No PL 480
assistance is proposed.2
II. Issue: Political Interpretation of Reduced FY 1970 Program Level
Discussion:
We are nearing the time in our discussion with the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment when we will be ready to make the major FY 1970 commit-
ments in the A.I.D. program for Thailand. Prior to this agreement, we
are submitting this Country Memorandum describing the program and
the major policy issue for your consideration.
As shown in the table below, our obligations in the Thailand pro-
gram rose to a peak of $53.3 million in FY 1967, fell slightly to $46.7
million in FY 1968, and last year were only $35.5 million.

FY 1964 FY 1965 FY 1966 FY 1967 FY 1968 FY 1969

Grant 12.7 19.03 43.3 49.83 46.7 35.5
Loan 3
3.53
Total 12.7 19.0 43.3 53.3 46.7 35.5

Our FY 1970 Congressional Request for the Thailand program was

$45 million. Due to Congressional action on our request for funds,

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) THAI. Confi-
dential. A covering January 13 memorandum from Hannah to Rogers, attached but not
printed, indicates that both memoranda were drafted by George K. Pierson, Office Di-
rector for Southeast Asia, Bureau of East Asia, Agency for International Development,
and were cleared by Green and Dexter, among others.
2
The approve option was checked and a typewritten notation at the top of the first
page reads: “The President approved (Jack Murphy to jmj, 3/10/70).”
3
A $20.3 million loan was authorized in 1965 and then deobligated in 1967 and
therefore is not shown in these figures. [Footnote in the source text.]
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Thailand 101

A.I.D. expects to reduce many of its country programs this year. Be-
cause Thailand competes with Vietnam for scarce supporting assist-
ance funds, we will not be able to provide the full FY 1970 amount
originally proposed. Taking into account funds still in the pipeline from
prior year obligations, we believe our FY 1970 program requirements
can be satisfied with up to $30.0 million: $22 million supporting assist-
ance, and $8.0 million technical assistance, including family planning.
Our assistance to Thailand plays a three-fold role by: (1) provid-
ing actual resources to help carry out Thailand’s counterinsurgency ef-
fort; (2) promoting greater Thai attention and resource allocation to
counterinsurgency measures and providing us an opportunity to in-
fluence the direction of this Thai effort—the primary aim of our pro-
gram; (3) demonstrating continuing high-level interest in Thailand.
With respect to the above, we believe a program level of about
$30.0 million essentially is adequate for the first two considerations.
However, a $30.0 million program will not completely satisfy the third.
The Thais have become increasingly concerned that a Vietnam set-
tlement will affect adversely their own security. At the same time, they
have a growing doubt about the nature and extent of U.S. interest in
Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular. A.I.D. obligations
for the Thailand program are considered by the Thais as one indica-
tion of this interest. Thus, anything less than last year’s obligation level
of about $35.5 million will raise questions in their minds about our
commitment. However, since a program of about $30.0 million is all
our projects usefully can absorb, a consideration understood by the
Thais, we believe adverse political reaction can be minimized and there-
fore are recommending this program level for Presidential approval.
III. U.S. A.I.D. Objectives and Strategy:
Thailand’s importance to the U.S. lies in its key position in South-
east Asia, its key role in the economic and political development of the
region, and its close cooperation with the U.S., particularly in support
of our Vietnam effort. The basic U.S. assistance objective is to improve
the Thai capacity for dealing with a Communist-supported insurgency
threat.
The primary purpose of our program is to try to get the Thais to
devote greater attention and allocate more resources to the security
problem than they would in the absence of our program. Since the
Thais contribute about $2 from their own budget for every U.S. dollar
of support to our joint projects, we exert influence not only through
our advisory assistance, but also directly upon their budget allocation
itself.
Both U.S. and Thai governments recognize that the fundamental
responsibility for countering this insurgency belongs to the Thais. We
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102 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

have concentrated our assistance in the North and Northeast of Thai-

land where incident rates have been highest and conditions conducive
to insurgency are most acute. In combating the insurgency in other
areas, the Royal Thai Government is using the strategy developed in
our joint programs in the North and Northeast.
In dealing with the pressures of insurgency, Thailand has a num-
ber of strengths—its history of national independence, a widely-
respected Royal Family, its well-established structure of government,
and its strong economy. However, its highly-centralized government
does not yet provide adequate channels for responding to local needs.
Awareness and understanding on the part of Thai Government offi-
cials of the needs and aspirations of rural people and the increased
commitment of resources are essential to the solution of Thailand’s se-
curity problem. This weakness, even more than limitations of Thai man-
power and fiscal resources, has been the greatest restraint on Thai Gov-
ernment efforts. It is this problem which is the principal focus of the
A.I.D. program.
IV. Nature of Program:
Within the FY 1970 program, supporting assistance funds will be
used primarily to facilitate Thai efforts to improve security in rural
areas and to support Thai rural development programs. Technical as-
sistance will be used to assist in more broadly developmental programs
such as agriculture research and training, a river basin survey, private
sector development, and improvements in Thai administration in civil
service.
A. Rural Security
Against a $30.0 million program level, about $7.0 million of sup-
porting assistance is proposed in FY 1970 for rural public safety pro-
grams. Our primary objective will be to help develop a rural security
capacity of sufficient strength and efficiency to counter anticipated
threats of communist terror and subversion to the rural populace.
A.I.D. will continue to equip the new township police stations and
vehicles and ammunition will be provided to the expanding police
forces in the villages and to the mobile backup units now being
manned.
B. Rural Development
The FY 1970 A.I.D. program includes about $9.0 million for a num-
ber of rural development projects aimed primarily at increasing the
government’s responsiveness to village needs. This is a major part of
our counterinsurgency strategy and is accomplished by providing ad-
visory services and construction equipment to provincial authorities
for impact programs such as feeder roads and small ponds.
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Thailand 103

C. Education and Health

A.I.D. also will help the Thais expand and improve their educa-
tion and health services in the North and Northeast as an important
part of our security-related program, and we are planning to provide
about $9.0 million for these purposes. We will continue to support mo-
bile training units which provide vocational training to villagers as well
as provide advisory services to a major Thai and International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) financed vocational edu-
cation project. Similarly, A.I.D. will provide commodities, advisory
services, and participant training support to Thailand’s rural health
centers as well as its family planning program.
D. Government Administration
Consistent with our aim of narrowing the gap between the villager
and government officials, A.I.D. support to in-service training will de-
vote particular attention to provincial and local officials, as well as in-
volve villagers in local self-government and project planning tech-
niques. Our program includes about $1.0 million for this purpose.
E. Longer-Range Regional Development
To establish a more rational framework for allocating Thai and U.S.
resources to the development of the security-sensitive Northeast, we
are providing advisory assistance to the Thai Economic Planning
Agency and operating ministries in developing a plan for that area,
and among other activities also are helping finance a study of a river
basin in Northeast Thailand. We are planning to obligate about $4.0
million for these activities, as well as for a few other projects such as
private sector development.
V. Planning for the Future:
While our program rationale has been under continual review, this
year the Agency will need to examine our program objectives and strat-
egy for Thailand even more closely to determine if they will be valid
in the near future. Our recent experience indicates the internal security
problem in Thailand, while real, is a longer-range problem than was
believed a few years ago. It does not pose an immediate threat to Thai-
land’s political stability. This suggests that we should devote increased
attention to identifying and bringing about fundamental changes in the
political, social and economic conditions that foster insurgency, while
stressing less short-run impact activities. Our strategy of concentrating
our assistance in the North and Northeast of Thailand also must be re-
considered in this context.
Further, the situation in Thailand is being examined to determine
the program implications of your statements at Guam and in the cap-
itals of Southeast Asia, as well as the Administration’s new Vietnam
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104 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

policy. We will need to consider the program consequences of a post-

war Vietnam settlement, with emphasis on the proper balance between
the Agency’s bilateral and regional assistance programs.
The National Security Council study on Thailand, now in the fi-
nal stage of preparation, will address the major options open to the
U.S. in our relations to Thailand, as well as the program implications
of these options. This study will prove particularly useful to A.I.D. in
conducting our review of the Thailand program.
Our current year program will not be affected by these examina-
tions. Some program adjustments will be possible in FY 1971 and the
FY 1972 presentation will take into full account the results of the cur-
rent examination.
WPR

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Bangkok, January 28, 1970, 1515Z.

13154. Subject: Ambassador Sunthorn Meeting with Deputy As-

sistant Secretary Barnett. Ref: Bangkok 508.2
1. On January 23, at Department’s initiative, Sunthorn met with
Barnett to discuss rice situation. Sunthorn presented aide-mémoire3
which reviewed importance of rice to Thailand including importance
of timing of export shipments and adverse effects of “cutting in ef-
fected by American shipments to South Viet-Nam and expected sup-
plies to Indonesia.” Aide-mémoire concluded with statement “reme-
dial measures of long-range effects are therefore essential.”
2. Sunthorn began by stating Thailand has between 1.3 and 1.4
million tons of rice to sell and suggested U.S. could find a way to dis-
pose of surplus rice in a way that Thailand might participate in sales
to above countries, especially brokens which India and Ceylon also

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
Confidential. Drafted by Joseph B. Kyle (E/ORF/ICD) and Walter West (EA/TB) on Jan-
uary 27; cleared by Dexter; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Bar-
nett (EA).
2
Dated January 12. (Ibid.)
3
Not found.
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Thailand 105

use. Better grades of rice would be exported to traditional markets of

Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
3. Barnett stated Thai should not imagine that we indifferent to or
ignorant of problem, mentioning among other things Vice President’s
discussion of problem in Bangkok. Also referred to Thai good fortune
in having second opportunity sell 20,000 tons to SVN, which would
compensate original frustrated sale.
4. Barnett then reviewed history of rice shortage in Asia and U.S.
rice acreage increase to avoid potential famine followed by acreage cuts
to restore world supply demand equilibrium. Then explained differ-
ences of various types of markets including (1) usual Thai commercial
markets (i.e. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore), (2) Indonesia, (3) Viet-
Nam and Korea and reasons for rice requirements of each. Main dis-
tinction emphasized was difference between aid channels and normal
commercial outlets. Mutual interests and benefits of greater stability in
Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, were stressed and rationale for
assistance to Indonesia explained in detail.
5. Barnett mentioned long term problem of dependency on rice
exports and expressed gratification of Thai progress in other areas such
as corn. Viet-Nam and Indonesia were characterized as undependable
and unpredicatable markets for Thai exports since, under normal cir-
cumstances, neither should be food importing countries. However, Bar-
nett stressed that we not meeting all of Indonesia’s requirements and
it up to Thai to compete for commercial rice imports which amounted
to about 400,000 tons during past year.
6. Sunthorn indicated appreciation of our position and agreed
with desirability of long range diversification and industrial develop-
ment but stated that flexibility limited in short run.
7. Memcon4 and copy of aide-mémoire being pouched.
8. Re consultation procedures, we did not tell Sunthorn that pres-
ent system would be changed to accommodate RTG. As Embassy
aware, we do not initiate consultations until interagency approval of
proposed program obtained. Consultation period of ten working days
generally accepted by members FAO Consultative Subcommittee on
Surplus Disposal and unilateral decision by U.S. to give additional time
to any consultee would meet with opposition, including within U.S.
Government. Regarding Embassy follow-up in Bangkok, including
supplying material to local press, information on proposed agreements
is not to be made public, although occasionally such information has
been [is] leaked. Procedures have been set up for the simultaneous pub-
lic release of information at the time of signing between the U.S. and

4
Not found.
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106 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the recipient government. On occasion, final agreements differ from

the proposal communicated to the consultees. This is due not only be-
cause of consultation with third countries, but also subsequent nego-
tiations with the recipient government. Thus, premature announce-
ment proposal could prejudice U.S. position during negotiations as
well as cause embarrassment to government with which we are
negotiating.
Rogers

47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, February 6, 1970.

SUBJECT
Thai Relations

Ambassador Unger recently reported his concern2 that the Thais

were seriously considering moving towards the Soviets in reaction to
a perceived reorientation of U.S. policy away from strong support of
Thailand.3 You will recall that on Saturday last you would not clear

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.
2
Telegram 1333 from Bangkok, January 30, reported Unger’s conversation with
Thanat on January 29, in which the latter spoke with deep pessimism about the future
of the U.S.-Thai relationship and of SEATO. (Ibid.) Unger reiterated his concerns in a
February 2 letter to Kissinger; attached but not printed.
3
In the conversation reported in telegram 1333 from Bangkok, Thanat concluded
that the Church amendment, a legislative ban on the introduction of U.S. combat troops
into Laos and Thailand, originally proposed by Senator John S. Cooper (R–Kentucky),
later modified by Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho), and passed by Congress on December
18, 1969 (H–PL 91–171), would force Thailand to rethink its positions and policies and
perhaps base its security on a pre-World War II, “or perhaps even pre-World War I,”
model. Unger told Thanat that it was his conviction that the United States Government
“would respond to a situation such as that envisaged in SEATO article IV–1 and would
have the support of the Congress. Circumstances at the time would dictate the nature
of the response and whether or not it needed ground forces.” Thanat replied that he
could not ask his country to base its policy on “what decision that body (Congress) would
take when his country might be about to be engulfed.” (Ibid.)
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Thailand 107

State’s proposed response which is attached at Tab A4 and states, inter

alia, that:
—Thailand faces an uncertain future security environment.
—U.S. posture in east Asia in the 1970’s will be different and in-
evitably affect U.S.-Thai relations.
—The U.S. policy trend represented by the Guam Doctrine will
continue in a direction emphasizing Asian self-reliance and more rig-
orous definition of U.S. security commitments.
—Reductions in U.S. general purpose forces indicate that the ex-
ecutive branch must be more conservative than before in considering
contingencies in which it would risk armed conflict.
—U.S.-Thai relations are likely to be affected by “continuing, even
increasing, stringency in economic and military assistance appropria-
tions.”
—U.S. intentions will not require a relationship with Thailand as
close and dependent [on Thailand’s part]5 as in the past. Some loos-
ening of our relationship would be healthy.
—In the process of moving to a more independent stance Thailand
could become less closely aligned with the U.S. and more involved
with the Soviets, which would not necessarily be an undesirable de-
velopment. Thai initiatives to the Soviet Union are viewed without
alarm.
—If the Thai relations became less one-sided the Soviets might be
willing to contribute to multi-lateral institutions.
—The U.S. should no longer expect the degree of exclusiveness in
U.S.-Thai relations that grew from the early cold war period and spe-
cial conditions of the Vietnam War. More flexibility in Thai foreign pol-
icy is desirable.
Because you would not clear the message I have some indication
that State is making its views known to Unger via back channel mes-
sages. Under the circumstances, there is every reason to expect Unger
to become totally confused about your actual policies. Therefore, I
would like to send a letter to Ambassador Unger6 giving him a clear
interpretation of what is meant by the Nixon Doctrine.7

4
Attached but not printed.
5
Brackets in the source text.
6
An attached draft telegram to Unger bears the notation OBE.
7
Nixon initialed the approve option.
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108 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

48. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
U.S. Commitment and U.S. Congressional Attitudes

PARTICIPANTS
Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand
Ambassador Sunthorn, Thai Embassy, Washington
Ambassador Anand, Thai Permanent Representative to the United Nations
The Secretary
John B. Dexter, Country Director for Thailand and Burma

After a few opening remarks, the Secretary asked Thanat about

conditions in Thailand, remarking that he gathered the Thai are “wor-
ried” about their security. Thanat confirmed this, indicating that they
were worried mainly about U.S. congressional attitudes which, they
fear, might limit the Administration’s ability to fulfill U.S. commit-
ments.
The Secretary assured him that congressional actions and attitudes
would have no effect on U.S. treaty commitments. Even the Church
Amendment was not a restriction, the Secretary explained, because the
Executive would in any case seek congressional concurrence if it
wanted to use combat troops abroad. Thanat asked why in that case
the Church Amendment was necessary. The Secretary explained that it
was inspired by concern on the Hill about the war in Vietnam and a
feeling that President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had misled the Con-
gress as we became involved in that conflict, specifically in their pres-
entation of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Now he said they want to be
sure that they are properly informed and consulted.
The Secretary then recalled that the SEATO Treaty contains a pro-
vision that in taking action the signatories will follow their “constitu-
tional processes,” to which Thanat commented bitterly, “Yes, an escape
clause.” The Secretary continued that the Church Amendment merely

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret.
Drafted by Dexter; approved by Moore (EA) and Okun (S) on March 12. The memo-
randum is part 1 of 4; part 2 is Document 49; part 3, entitled “Thanat Views on Rela-
tions with China,” and part 4, entitled “SEATO Council Meeting,” are not printed. (Na-
tional Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US) The meeting was held in
the Secretary’s office.
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Thailand 109

reiterates the Senate’s expectation that constitutional processes will be

followed.2
Thanat observed that the Church Amendment refers to introduc-
ing “ground combat troops” and noted that the U.S. already has
“troops” in Thailand. He wondered if those troops had the right to de-
fend themselves. The Secretary explained that from our viewpoint the
Church Amendment had no effect on the activities of U.S. military per-
sonnel now in Thailand who will naturally be expected to defend them-
selves if attacked. He said the amendment deals with a possible land
war in Asia and the possibility that we might become involved in such
a war without congressional approval. However, he repeated we would
seek congressional approval in any case, just as had been done in Ko-
rea and as President Johnson thought he had done in Vietnam through
the Tonkin Gulf resolution.
Thanat remarked that the Thai do not doubt the Administration’s
words in offering such reassurances but that the words of Congress
raise doubts. He said he understands there is a struggle going on be-
tween Congress and the Executive for the control of foreign policy. He
thought this was exemplified in congressional questioning about U.S.
activities in Laos, adding that he thought attacks on U.S. policy in Laos
were really intended indirectly for Thailand.
The Secretary responded that the real target is the Administration,
that congressional attacks represent a feeling that Congress has not
been adequately consulted and their determination that in the future
they will be consulted. He repeated the point that the Executive would,
under any circumstances, feel obliged to consult Congress on any meas-
ures that might involve armed combat.
Thanat asked about the “secret agreement” (Plan Taksin) and the
Rusk–Thanat communiqué. What is the Administration’s view on
these? With regard to the latter, the Secretary recalled that when he was
in Bangkok last year he reaffirmed the Rusk–Thanat communiqué and
added that subsequent events had not in any way altered that posi-
tion. As for the “secret agreement”, he repeated the by-now-standard

2
Telegram 19972 to Bangkok, February 10, complimented Unger on the “lucidity”
of his response to Thanat’s concerns as reported in telegram 1333 from Bangkok (see
footnotes 2 and 3, Document 47). It noted that if “Thanat and others remain uneasy de-
spite repeated assurances and explanations by the most authoritative U.S. Govt. spokes-
men, then we have little hope that we could put their fears to rest by prefabricating new
forensic ammunition. On the contrary we conclude that Thai concern is based largely
upon their interpretation of the facts and we cannot deny that the facts of their situation
do indeed give them reason for concern.” It continued that “we see no profit for either
ourselves or Thai in trying to gloss over the problem by proffering unrealistic and in-
flated reassurrances. We cannot rid SEA of all conditions potentially threatening Thai se-
curity and we cannot expand our commitment to help them beyond what is stated in
the SEATO treaty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 THAI–US)
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110 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

explanation that we regard this as a contingency military plan which

clearly provides that both governments must approve before it can be
put into effect. He said Congress had been concerned because it thought
it was a “secret treaty” but it is really no more than a plan. (Thanat
then muttered, “Yes, like an executive agreement.”) The Secretary re-
peated that the plan required agreement between the two governments
before it could be put into effect and that we thought of it as coming
under the SEATO Treaty with its provision for constitutional processes.
Later in the conversation, after other subjects had been discussed,
Thanat reverted to his concern about Congress, stating that his Prime
Minister follows events on Capitol Hill closely and is worried. He men-
tioned that Ambassador Unger had given him (Thanat) shortly before
he left Bangkok a useful memorandum on congressional developments
but said the RTG is not happy. He said, “We want to establish squarely
where responsibility lies.”
The Secretary explained that from our viewpoint there is no prob-
lem at this time. He said that when he was in Bangkok last year there
had been a problem because of strong sentiment in the United States
against our Vietnam war policy, but that the situation was now quite
different. He cited a recent Gallup poll indicating that 64 percent of the
people favored the President’s policy in Vietnam as compared with
only 24 percent opposed. Previously he said there had been a problem
of congressional pressure on our Vietnam policy but this was no longer
serious except to the extent that it caused the Thai to be disturbed and
fearful that we might disengage from the region. He elaborated on the
point by comparing U.S. sentiment which had compelled President
Johnson to decide against seeking reelection with the relative lack of
interest in Vietnam today.
The Secretary expressed confidence that there is general public ac-
ceptance today of the President’s policy, of which key elements are that
we will not disengage from our responsibilities in Asia but will phase
down our presence at a rate geared to the ability of local governments
to take over. He mentioned as an example that we now have many troops
in Korea but that, in due course, we will probably want to reduce them
gradually, though not to withdraw them entirely. In any case, he said,
we will not disengage or renege on our treaty commitments.
Thanat commented that the Thai for their part would also keep
their promise not to call on outside manpower to help them with their
internal insurgency problem, though they will appreciate continuing
U.S. assistance.
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Thailand 111

49. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
RTG Views on Laos

PARTICIPANTS
Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand
Ambassador Sunthorn, Thai Embassy, Washington
Ambassador Anand, Thai Permanent Representative to the United Nations
The Secretary
John B. Dexter, Country Director for Thailand and Burma

The Secretary asked how the Thai view things in Laos. Thanat re-
sponded that they were worried and that just before he left Bangkok
there had been several Security Council meetings on the subject. He
said they are not sure of Communist intentions. Possibly the Commu-
nists merely intend to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but there are other
indications that they may also have designs on Thailand. He cited the
Chinese road. (He noted as a “nuance” that in the construction, after
a certain village had been reached—he could not recall the name—the
Chinese no longer used Chinese personnel but only Pathet Lao or North
Vietnamese.) He said the Thai fear that the road is being constructed
to serve potentially as another “Ho Chi Minh Trail” if the Chinese
choose to move against Thailand in the future.
The Secretary remarked that since his last conversation with Thanat
the war in Vietnam had been going worse for the North Vietnamese and
that both infiltration and the intensity of combat were considerably re-
duced. Thanat observed that this was offset by increased Communist ef-
forts in Laos. He added that there was also increased guerilla infiltration
into Thailand. He said his Prime Minister was much concerned and had
asked him specifically to express his concern to the Secretary.
Thanat said the Thai would be willing to help the effort in Laos
by operating helicopter gunships and added that the RLG would also
like them to do this. He said the Thai had trained personnel to oper-
ate them but would need help. He indicated vaguely that they might
require additional helicopters (though he may have been referring to
equipment needed to convert existing helicopters to gunships).

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret.
Drafted by Dexter and approved by Moore and Okun on March 12. The meeting was
held in the Secretary’s office. The memorandum is part 2 of 4; regarding parts 1, 3, and
4, see footnote 1, Document 48.
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112 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

50. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, February 25, 1970.

SUBJECT
Economic Assistance to Thailand for FY 1970

State (Tab A)2 requests your approval of $30 million in grants for
economic assistance to Thailand in FY 1970. Treasury and BOB (Tab B)3
concur.
This is a reduction from our FY 1969 obligations of $35.5 million
and FY 1968 obligations of $46.7 million. The reduction adds to Thai
doubts about U.S. interest in them. State feels that the Thais under-
stand that the reduction is due to Congressional cuts in AID appro-
priations and a shortage of projects, so the adverse political reactions
can be minimized.
The program’s primary objective is to help preserve the security
of Thailand, partly by inducing the Thais to allocate more resources to
their own security programs. Our program concentrates on providing
advisory and financial support to the Thai police, and assisting in de-
velopment programs, to try to prevent the growth of Communist in-
surgency in the North and Northeast.
Specifically, the program provides:
—$7 million for a public safety program, to help develop a secu-
rity capacity sufficient to counter the growth of Communist insurgency
in the rural areas.
—$9 million for the accelerated rural development program, which
emphasizes road construction and other projects aimed at increasing
the Government’s responsiveness to village needs.
—$14 million to help increase support for the Thai Government in
the North and Northeast, by helping their programs in health, educa-
tion, agriculture and public administration.
In addition to the bilateral program proposed in State’s memo-
randum, AID conducts a $14 million East Asia Regional Program,
roughly half of which benefits Thailand. The regional program is grow-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the first
page reads: “Holdridge action.”
2
Attached at Tab A but not printed is a January 22 memorandum from Rogers to
the President.
3
Attached at Tab B but not printed is a February 11 memorandum from Mayo to
the President.
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Thailand 113

ing in importance and could expand rapidly if its support for Mekong
River Basin projects moves beyond the feasibility study phase.
The NSSM 51 study of Thailand, now in the final stages of prepa-
ration, will address the major options open to the U.S. in our overall
relations with Thailand. Issues which will be considered in that study
are, inter alia:
—Have we overemphasized quick-impact counter-insurgency
programs at the expense of longer-term development programs?
—Have we pushed the Thais into programs which they feel are of
low priority, and will be discontinued by the Thais after U.S. inputs
are withdrawn?
—Can the Thais take full responsibility for their public safety pro-
gram and their accelerated rural development program?
Your approval of the recommended program for FY 1970 will not
prejudge these decisions for FY 1971, which can be made in the con-
text of the NSSM 51 study.
Recommendations4
1. That you approve the $30 million economic assistance program
for Thailand in FY 1970 proposed by State.
2. That you authorize me to instruct State/AID to develop eco-
nomic assistance options for FY 1971, consistent with the broader op-
tions of NSSM 51.

4
Nixon initialed both approve options; a notation indicates S/S was notified on
March 10.
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114 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, March 3, 1970, 1140Z.

2550. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister. Ref: A. State 027316

(Joint State/Def); B. State 030190; C. Bangkok 2522; D. State 023802.2
1. During cordial meeting with PM at Government House March
2 to discuss deployment of Sierra Romeo IX3 (reported ref c), I took the
opportunity to inform him, in general terms (without divulging spe-
cific or sensitive information), of items I considered would be perti-
nent to his interests that were recently discussed at SEACOORD meet-
ing. I covered the military situation in SVN, status of pacification, our
views of Hanoi’s post-hostilities planning and the Vietnamization pro-
gram, including a word about its relation to third country forces.
2. The PM was very interested and brought up several points the
most important of which concerned Vietnamization. He pointedly
asked whether the U.S. was training and equipping the RVNAF to re-
place U.S. forces only or whether we also planned to replace Thai and
other allied forces. I explained to him that for the purposes of the Viet-
namization program we were now discussing the revitalized VN forces
were intended to replace a substantial share of U.S. forces in SVN but
that in the longer run I assumed their eventually replacing FWF was
also contemplated. (I had already said that some U.S. troops which
would be remaining in SVN through the Vietnamization process would
continue to provide the Black Panthers with the various kinds of sup-
port from U.S. forces they are receiving today; my comment was based
on my discussions last week in Saigon.) He responded that he had been
under considerable pressure from Parliament to withdraw Thai forces
from SVN in face of continued U.S. and allied reductions. In response
to my direct question on whether it was his feeling that he would be
obliged to carry our reductions, he did not say he intended to reduce
the Thai troop contributions in SVN, but again stressed that he was un-
der growing pressure from the representatives in Parliament and said
that “when the people feel very strongly about a situation, the gov-
ernment must do something to ease that situation.”

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 THAI–US. Secret;
Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.
2
Reftels A–D are not printed.
3
Sierra Romeo was the codename for the Thai artillery unit which was periodi-
cally inserted into and withdrawn from Laos in response to Communist pressure against
the Lao Government forces, mostly the Meo tribesmen on the mountain front; see Doc-
ument 29.
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Thailand 115

3. I replied that I was aware of and sympathetic to his problem.

The USG had warmly appreciated his statement that the RTG intended
to maintain the Thai forces in SVN as long as the GVN needs them or
until Thailand itself requires those forces. I added that my government
hoped the RTG would retain all of the Thai forces in SVN, or at least
a substantial part of them, at least during the Vietnamization process.
I had already emphasized, however, that the Vietnamization program
did not have a specific schedule for completion but its rate depended
upon intensity of enemy activity on the battlefield, the capacity of the
Vietnamese to take over the combat role and progress in Paris, if any.
I then pointed out the psychological and political importance of hav-
ing not only U.S. forces but Thai and other allied forces as well to sup-
port the GVN during the period of its takeover of the combat respon-
sibility. I also pointed out the importance of the Thai forces in protecting
the eastern and southeastern approaches to Saigon and thus freeing
GVN forces, as Vietnamization proceeds to establish a stronger Viet-
namese military presence in remote areas along the Cambodian bor-
der. I requested that, if at any time he felt he had to decide to with-
draw some of the Thai forces, I be given the opportunity to discuss his
plans with him before he takes any action. He said that he would dis-
cuss such plans with the cabinet, GVN, and indicated that I would also
have an opportunity to talk with him.
4. In connection with Vietnamization I told the PM that the U.S.
forces in Thailand might have some additional functions to perform
here because some of the combat support activities now being con-
ducted in SVN such as air defense, air interdiction and reconnaissance
might, as Vietnamization proceeds, have to be continued from outside
SVN, e.g., Thailand and elsewhere. I added that while there appeared
to be a continuing need to have U.S. forces and personnel in Thailand
to support the VN effort until Vietnamization is well down the road, I
did not believe this ruled out a continuation of the gradual reduction
of U.S. forces in Thailand which we and the RTG had jointly got un-
derway last September. I speculated that we might have a follow-on
reduction to the present one in the next fiscal year which would re-
duce our forces by about the same magnitude and that I would con-
sult with the RTG as our plans developed. He acknowledged these
points without comment.
5. Comment. The PM carefully avoided saying that he would at
some point have to withdraw all or part of the Thai forces. However,
it was clear that he wished to register the point of Parliamentary pres-
sure and I did not press the matter beyond making clear our interest
in maintaining Thai forces and in being consulted about any reduction
plans. I believe that in sharing with the PM some of our thinking on
questions I know weigh heavily on his mind we have restored some
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116 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

substance to our dialogue. I hope I will have made available to me

timely information with which to continue such exchanges of infor-
mation on matters of importance to the Thai, which also give us an op-
portunity to gain valuable insights into their thinking.
Unger

52. Editorial Note

In February 1970, North Vietnam began an offensive in Laos which

caused great concern to both the Thai and U.S. Governments. The
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) began a series of meetings
on the crisis in Laos in March 1970 that are covered in depth in Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Documents 203, 204, 207, 209, and
211–213.
One of the key issues discussed by the WSAG was the question of
whether Thai troops should reinforce friendly troops in the Long Tieng
and other areas of Laos. In the March 19 WSAG meeting, the CIA’s
briefing officer, [name not declassified], noted that “the recently deployed
Sierra Romeo IX Thai artillery battalion” was among friendly forces at
Long Tieng facing severe North Vietnamese pressure. Assistant to the
President Henry Kissinger wondered about the consequences if any of
the Thai were captured by the North Vietnamese. The CIA Deputy Di-
rector for Plans, Thomas H. Karamessines, said [text not declassified],
“but that there certainly might be problems if some of them were cap-
tured.” In response to Kissinger’s question about what further forces
could be put into the defense of Long Tieng, U. Alexis Johnson men-
tioned a Thai regimental combat team (RCT) that had been advocated
by the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley. However, Johnson
noted that neither the Thai nor the Lao Governments had yet ap-
proached the United States about that step. Assistant Secretary Green
pointed out that the RCT in question was the one designated in the
Taksin Plan, “and its employment might raise the question of US ac-
tion under the plan. He noted that Ambassador Unger thought that the
RCT would not be suitable for anti-guerilla operations.” In response to
Kissinger’s asking whether anyone favored using Thai troops, Admi-
ral Nels Johnson said that the JCS thought that the possibility should
be explored. Green said that the North Vietnamese might retaliate
against the Thais if the Thais became more involved in Laos. When
Kissinger asked if the introduction of Thai troops at this time would
restrain the North Vietnamese, Green replied that on the contrary, the
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Thailand 117

North Vietnamese “would very much like to give the Thais a beating,
and Karamessines agreed.” When Admiral Johnson circulated a draft
JCS cable calling for the transfer of the 13th RCT and the Thai unit in
South Vietnam to Laos, Green objected that the Thai unit in South Viet-
nam was made up of volunteers who were entitled to discharge if with-
drawn from Vietnam. Green added that it was “highly important to
maintain the multinational character provided by TCC units in South
Vietnam.” Johnson raised the question of briefing Congress about the
Sierra Romeo operation, but Kissinger said that this should not be done
yet. Kissinger cautioned that the United States did not want a Thai
debacle at Long Tieng. His final comment was that he would discuss
the use of additional Thai forces with the President. (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files
(H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

53. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman1

Washington, March 22, 1970.

I am grateful for your personal message of March 222 and wish to

reaffirm the assurances provided during my discussions with you as
well as those given by President Nixon earlier.
We are watching the situation in Laos very closely and have in-
stituted on an urgent basis additional measures to strengthen Lao de-
fenses. You should be aware that we have just delivered three B–52

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret.
In a March 22 memorandum Haig requested that the message be passed “on an urgent
basis through established backchannel” to Thanat.
2
Thanat had cabled Kissinger earlier that same day through the same backchan-
nel to advise that “The Lao Government has appealed to the Thai Government for ur-
gent help especially for despatch of combat units to stem the Communist advance” and
that the Thai Government was ready to respond favorably to this request. Thanat noted
that the Thai Government was prepared to send one battalion immediately, to be fol-
lowed by two more, if needed, “provided necessary material and logistic support is re-
ceived from the United States Government. Such support may be accorded [text not de-
classified] through the [text not declassified] unit now operating in cooperation with Laotian
forces.” Attached but not printed.
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118 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

strikes in support of Lao forces in Plain des Jarres area. This infor-
mation is provided for your exclusive knowledge and should not be
divulged.
We are also urgently studying the proposal outlined in your mes-
sage, as well as other possible emergency steps. I will be in touch with
you on this matter in the immediate future.
Best wishes.

54. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the
President’s Military Assistant (Haig)

Washington, March 22, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat
(Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages of source text not
declassified.]

55. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman1

Washington, March 23, 1970.

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

My colleagues and I have had an opportunity to study your let-
ter of March 22.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret.
In a March 24 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kissinger noted that his
message to Thanat had been drafted by the Department of State and had “been approved
and slightly modified by the President. It was dispatched via the same channel that For-
eign Minister Thanat’s message was sent to me.” Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 119

You can rest assured that we are deeply concerned about recent
developments in Laos and we appreciate the Thai wish to accede to
the Royal Lao Government’s appeal by dispatching an infantry battal-
ion and possibly other units as well if future needs should dictate. We
fully recognize the danger that Communist advances in Laos could ul-
timately pose to the security of Thailand which is, of course, a matter
of highest importance to the United States. It is for this reason that we
have recently taken the air actions of which I informed you yesterday
as well as other steps designed to bring home to Hanoi the seriousness
of our view of its actions.
Nevertheless, we are not convinced that the proposed deployment
of Thai troops additional to those now serving in Laos with the Sierra
Romeo artillery battery would be effective at this time. It is our cur-
rent assessment that the fate of Long Tieng is not likely to be decided
by introduction of such additional ground troops. Perhaps the best
move that could be made at this time would be for you to assemble
these battalions into an RCT at an advanced base (i.e., Udorn) and see
that it is trained and readied against the contingency of further moves
the North Vietnamese may make.
In expressing this judgment, I do not wish to imply in any way
that, from a military viewpoint, Thai contributions to the Laos strug-
gle have not been or will not continue to be extremely valuable. The
Thai artillery battery now at Long Tieng has, according to our reports,
been performing extremely well and may be given a large part of the
credit for the fact that that outpost is still in Lao Government hands.
We are also conscious that your Government’s contributions, through
your advisors in Laos, have been most important in improving the ca-
pability of the Lao Government forces. Our decision with respect to the
proposed additional deployment of infantry is based upon our judg-
ment that at this time, the risks and costs of this move would not be
justified by the prospects of military success.
The President hopes that our two Governments will continue to
maintain the closest contact with each other and with the Royal Lao
Government on developments in Laos and on possible military and
political means to stabilize the situation.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger2

2
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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120 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

56. Editorial Note

According to the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group

meeting of March 25, 1970, which lasted from 6:30 to 7:30 p.m., As-
sistant to the President Henry Kissinger told the group that he had just
been with President Nixon, “who wasn’t inclined to let Laos go down
the drain and let the record show he had disregarded the appeals of
the King of Laos, Souvanna and Thanat.” Under Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson noted that the group had just been discussing alter-
natives and he outlined them for Kissinger. The first two alternatives,
1) acceding to the Thai and Lao request by introducing the Thai bat-
talion as [text not declassified] and 2) agreeing to move the Thai battal-
ion in and providing pay and allowances, but as openly declared Thai
forces [text not declassified], were given the most attention.
When Kissinger asked what advantage there would be in declar-
ing the Thai presence, Johnson replied that “there would be an ad-
vantage in the U.S. showing that we were not continuing to fight a
secret war, but rather that the Thais felt strongly enough to take a clear
stand.” Kissinger then asked if the Thais would be willing to declare
their forces. Johnson responded that this remained to be seen, stating
that with respect to Long Tieng, the Thais were reluctant, “but if the
RCT crossed the border, he didn’t see how they could be expected to
act in any other way.” General Earle Wheeler of the JCS said that this
issue raised the question of SEATO commitments. Kissinger added to
this, wondering [2 lines of source text not declassified]
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Mar-
shall Green noted, however, that the more covert the operation, “the
more suspect it would be, and the more press criticism would arise.”
Green thought that they might get away with a small operation, “but
if it were larger it wouldn’t jell.”
The WSAG went on to discuss the numbers, mechanics, and de-
tails of Thai troop assistance. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential
Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114,
WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970) The full text of the minutes of this
meeting are in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 211.
The WSAG met on March 26 from 8:53 a.m. to 9:22 a.m., again in
the White House Situation Room, concerned about the seriousness of
the Laos situation and the gravity of the decisions to be made. Kissinger
asked if anyone had had any second thoughts during the night. Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Packard replied “We would prefer not to
put Thai troops into Laos now.” Kissinger asked if the United States
was in a position to make a commitment to move Thai troops. General
Cushman of the CIA replied that “the troops would be in place 36 hours
after approval is received.”
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Thailand 121

Kissinger then advanced two options: option 1 was an airlift of a

Thai battalion of 600 men to Long Tieng, and option 2 was a commit-
ment to Souvanna and Thanat to prepare a full RCT of three battalions
for introduction into Laos at a later date. Kissinger gave a detailed ex-
planation of the pros and cons of each option.
Kissinger noted that “The President’s preference [for putting Thai
troops in Laos] has not abated.” Johnson warned against building up
Long Tieng into “a turning point of the struggle in Laos” and against
the “Dienbienphu factor.” Kissinger stated that the President wanted
to know whether, “if we move in a Thai battalion, the enemy could
then isolate it.” General Wheeler replied: “Sure they could but it would
be a difficult operation. I don’t think the Meo and Thai would sit in
Long Tieng for a long siege. They would just fade into the bush.”
In weighing option 2, Kissinger noted that if Long Tieng fell the
North Vietnamese would have moved closer to the Thai border, the ef-
fectiveness of the Lao forces would be less, “our commitment would
be greater,” and that it “would be difficult to avoid linkage to SEATO
and Plan Taksin.”
[text not declassified] He added that the “Thais want to involve us.
They consider that U.S. involvement is tantamount to victory.”
Kissinger concluded the meeting by stating that the President
wanted to make a decision by noon and that he was leaning toward
option 1, moving the Thai battalion to Long Tieng as soon as possible.
In response to Cushman’s question as to whether the CIA could go
ahead with the movement, Kissinger replied that “I will be in touch
with you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Origi-
nals, 1969–1970) The full text of the minutes of the meeting are in For-
eign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 212.
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122 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, March 26, 1970.

SUBJECT
Thai Forces for Laos

As I discussed with you, Souvanna and Thanat both have urged

again that we agree to movement of a battalion-size unit to assist in
the defense of Long Thien. Therefore we convened a meeting of WSAG
at the Undersecretary’s level2 to consider available options. Two were
developed:
Option 1: We could quickly flesh out the equipment needs of a Thai
battalion (about 900 men) now located at Udorn Air Base and airlift it
to Long Thien. This could be accomplished in about 72–96 hours.
Pro: If this unit is put into position before an all-out attack by North
Vietnamese forces it would increase the probability of holding Long
Thien against the forces now deployed against it. But it would not as-
sure that the position could be held. It would delay the NVA forces,
however, at least for the time they would need to move forward the
division now held in reserve 40 miles away. It would boost the morale
of Vang Pao and his Meo forces and toughen their resistance. It would
stabilize Souvanna and Thanat for the time being and reduce the risk
of the whole situation unraveling. The chances for an organized retreat
should that become necessary, and thus the saving of those forces,
would be increased. Moreover, this action would be a clear signal to
North Vietnam that we would not let a major threat to Laotian sover-
eignty go unchallenged. This response also would strengthen Sou-
vanna’s hand against those rightist elements who seek his removal and
whose succession could complicate our relations.
Con: On the other hand, Long Thien might fall despite the intro-
duction of the Thai unit. We could face the same dilemmas com-
pounded by an additional commitment especially if the retreat is not
orderly. We would also face a strong domestic outcry which could re-
sult in increased inhibitions on our air operations in Laos. If the Thai
battalion were lost in the action, it could be a serious blow to Thai
morale.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Se-
cret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.
2
See Document 56.
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Thailand 123

Option 2: We could tell Souvanna and Thanat that the best way to
use Thai forces would be to prepare a full regiment of three battalions
for introduction at a later stage should North Vietnam take Long Thien
and continue to move southward. We would commit ourselves to pro-
ceed on this course if the need were to arise. We would consult with
them now on how to equip and train the unit readying it for use when
the time came and decide on a place for putting it.
Pro: This course would avoid the danger of a disaster involving
substantial Thai forces at Long Thien (although over 300 Thais are al-
ready there with an artillery unit). We would be giving a favorable re-
sponse to the urgent plea of Souvanna and Thanat. The domestic po-
litical problem would be somewhat reduced—we could point to the
fact that we had waited until North Vietnamese intentions to overrun
Laos had become unambiguous and that we had shown great restraint
in the face of earlier strong pleas for our help. Since it is not certain
that North Vietnam intends to move much beyond Long Thien, we
might not have to move the Thais at all.
Con: This response is less than Souvanna has asked—it might not
prevent him from stampeding—and seeking a deal with North Viet-
nam in the belief that we are not prepared to support him. Moreover,
by waiting we may be in a worse position when and if we have to
move the Thai forces. The North Vietnamese would have moved closer
to the Thai border, effectiveness of the Lao forces would be less and
our commitment would be greater. Moreover, it would be harder in
those circumstances to avoid the involvement of our SEATO commit-
ments and our Taksin plan understanding with the Thais.3
Recommendation

Option 1
Option 2
Neither

3
There is no indication that the President approved these recommendations, but
Document 59 suggests that the President verbally instructed Kissinger to implement
option 1.
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124 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

58. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman1

Washington, March 26, 1970.

As a one-time exception and because of the need to initiate coor-

dination and local action promptly I have cleared a response to your
message of March 22 through Ambassador Unger. He will therefore be
informing your Government shortly of the President’s favorable deci-
sion on your request to introduce one of your battalions into Laos.2
In addition to the information which Ambassador Unger will be
providing, you should also be aware that we have approved another
two B–52 missions in support of the battle for Long Tieng. The latter
is exclusively for your information.

Best regards.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret;
Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a March 26 memorandum Haig requested that the message be
transmitted “through our special channel” and “not be shared with any other individual.”
2
On March 27 a message from Thanat for Kissinger was received over the same
special channel, stating that the “Prime Minister has asked me to convey to the Presi-
dent and to you his deep appreciation for the very significant decision which the Pres-
ident has taken, which will go a long way to strengthen the defence of Laos as well as
the security of the area, particularly that of Thailand.” (Ibid.)

59. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, March 26, 1970, 2:34–3:06 p.m.

SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sen-
sitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
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Thailand 125

State JCS
U. Alexis Johnson Gen. Earle G. Wheeler
Marshall Green NSC Staff
CIA Gen. Haig
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr. Col. Kennedy
Thomas H. Karamessines Col. Behr
William Nelson Mr. Holdridge
Mr. Guthrie
Defense
G. Warren Nutter
Lt. Col. Gerald H. Britten

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. The WSAG was informed of the President’s decision to move
a Thai battalion, on an unacknowledged basis, to Long Tieng as soon
as possible in response to the requests received from Thanat and
Souvanna.2
2. CIA will have responsibility for making arrangements to move
the Thai Battalion to Long Tieng. In carrying out the operation, it should
be understood clearly that an orderly retreat from Long Tieng, if nec-
essary, is considered preferable to encirclement.
3. The State Department will prepare and submit to Dr. Kissinger
draft messages to Thanat and Souvanna informing them of the Presi-
dent’s decision.3
a. The message to Thanat will take the form of a letter from Mr.
Kissinger and will be delivered to Thanat by Ambassador Unger. The
letter should include a statement to the effect that we consider it would
be a prudent measure that a regimental combat team be assembled. We
will not make any U.S. commitment to provide support for this regi-
mental combat team or for its employment.
b. The message to Souvanna will take the form of a letter from the
President. It will note the need for Souvanna to make a formal request
to the Thai Government for the battalion. However, preparations to
move the battalion will not be delayed awaiting confirmation that a
Lao request has been transmitted to the Thais.
4. Our public position, on an if-asked basis, will be the same as
that already taken on Sierra Romeo, namely, that reports of movement
of Thai troops to Laos are exaggerated and that the question is one for
the Thai and Lao Governments, to whom inquiries should be directed.
We will ask the Thai and Lao Governments to adopt a position of no

2
On March 28 800 Thai troops were airlifted from Udorn to Long Tieng and took
up positions in the Long Tieng defensive perimeter. (Memorandum from Karamessines
to Kissinger, March 28; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box
101, Vietnam Subject Files, SENSITIVE/Laos Souvanna Phouma/Long Tieng)
3
See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Document 214 and footnote 6 thereto.
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126 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

comment in response to inquiries. We will urge the Thai and Lao Gov-
ernments not to deny that additional Thai troops have been sent to
Laos.
5. It was the consensus of the WSAG that the Administration
should take the initiative in informing the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee of the movement of the Thai Battalion to Laos. The WSAG
recommended that the Committee be told that in response to requests
from the Governments of Thailand and Laos, we are assisting with the
movement of a few hundred more Thai troops to Laos. The new move-
ment should be explained as an extension of the Sierra Romeo program
about which the Committee has already been informed. Mr. Kissinger
will seek the views of Bryce Harlow and will ask the President’s ap-
proval of the WSAG proposal.
6. All operational communications involving the movement of the
Thai battalion are to be handled through CIA channels. Other com-
munications are to be transmitted through the most secure channels.
Knowledge of the movement is to be restricted within each agency.
7. The letters which the President has already approved to signa-
tories of the Geneva Convention other than Great Britain and the So-
viet Union are to be dispatched.4
8. The WSAG and Laos Working Groups will revise their contin-
gency plans to take into account the President’s decision to move a
Thai battalion to Laos.5
[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

4
See ibid., footnote 5, Document 204.
5
Kissinger talked on the telephone with Nixon who was in Key Biscayne, Florida,
at 5:10 p.m. on March 26. The portion of the conversation dealing with Laos follows: “P:
And the Thai battalion, are we going to get them in there? K: That’s done also. P: And
there’s going to be no announcement. We are just going to do it. We don’t have to ex-
plain it. The Thais are defending their own country. Hell, I would do that, wouldn’t you
Henry? K: I had a long talk with Alex Johnson and he feels the same way. P: He’s a nice
guy.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, March 26;
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1009, Alexander M. Haig
Special Files, Haig’s Vietnam File—Vol. 5 [2 of 2])
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Thailand 127

60. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, April 8, 1970.

SUBJECT
Potential Thai Assistance to Cambodia

You have asked for an analysis2 of the potential Thai contributions

to improving the situation in Cambodia.3
In the short term, the Thai can help the Lon Nol Government by:
—Issuing a statement recognizing the Cambodian border along
the present frontiers. This is something which Sihanouk never got from
the Thai, and issuance of such a statement now might help to give the
Lon Nol Government extra credit in the eyes of the Cambodian peo-
ple. The Cambodians have long wanted the Thai to accept the existing
frontiers, since Thailand has maintained a traditional claim to large ar-
eas of Western Cambodia.
—Getting the word to the Lon Nol Government that Thailand has
no intention of causing any military problems for Cambodia along the
Thai-Cambodian frontiers. This would permit the Lon Nol Government
to shift military forces from the Thai borders to more critical areas in
Eastern and Northeastern Cambodia.
—Backing up Cambodian political and diplomatic initiatives, e.g.
supporting UN consideration of the Cambodian situation if Cambodia
wants this, and helping out where possible to bring about reactivation
of the ICC in Cambodia. Thai help in this sphere would be most use-
ful if other Asian nations without too close ties to the US (for example
Indonesia and Singapore) were also in the act.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the
memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.
2
An attached but not printed April 7 memorandum from Haig to Holdridge re-
layed Kissinger’s request. A notation on that memorandum in Haig’s handwriting
reads: “HAK—This is a very sound analysis in my view. But who can muster the cour-
age?” A notation beside it by Kissinger reads: “I want to discuss Thai contribution in
Cambodia.”
3
By “the situation in Cambodia,” it is assumed that Holdridge was referring to the
recent replacement of Prince Sihanouk by General Lon Nol as head of the Government
of Cambodia and to the North Vietnamese occupation of significant portions of eastern
and northern Cambodia, in order to assist in their infiltration of South Vietnam.
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128 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Over the longer term, Thailand might provide additional help by:
—Offering military aid to Cambodia. Cambodia still possesses
sizeable stocks of US-supplied weapons, and the Thail might be able
to provide (or act as a transit point for) ammunition, spare parts, and
additional arms in the event that the Lon Nol Government finds it
necessary to draw upon its US-supplied stocks to supplement the Com-
munist arms with which the FARK is now mostly equipped. Conceiv-
ably, Thai LOCs to Cambodia could become very important in sus-
taining the Lon Nol Government.
—Once a sufficiently large number of other nations have recog-
nized the Lon Nol Government, extending Thai diplomatic recogni-
tion. Lon Nol will probably need all the international backing he can
get, but it would be unwise for Thailand to act too soon because of
Thailand’s close association with the US and the desirability of keep-
ing Lon Nol’s neutral credentials intact.
The Thai may already be thinking of taking some of the above
steps, both short and longer-term, but could be stimulated into fo-
cussing more closely on possible actions through conversations with
Ambassador Unger and others on his staff.
One step which I would not recommend would be introducing
Thai troops into Cambodia. From our Laos exercise, we know that
trained Thai troops are in any event hard to come by and might not be
particularly helpful if the Lon Nol Government were attacked by
NVA/VC forces. In addition, in view of Thailand’s territorial claims,
the presence of Thai troops on Cambodian soil would probably not be
welcomed by the Cambodian people or could play into Sihanouk’s
hands. Finally, we would have the SEATO commitment to worry about
if Thai troops were introduced into Cambodia.
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Thailand 129

61. Summary of Conclusions of WSAG Meeting1

Washington, April 14, 1970.

Laos
The WSAG discussed the pros and cons of responding to Sou-
vanna’s request for an additional Thai battalion. The principal argu-
ments put forth in favor were that the battalion would strengthen the
defensive situation and that it would deter the North Vietnamese from
advancing further along Routes 7 and 13. The principal arguments cited
against were that the presence of additional Thai troops might increase
the incentive to the North Vietnamese to attack, that the Thai commit-
ment to a conventional role in Laos would be increased at the expense
of counterinsurgency activities within Thailand, that the Chinese might
be led to step up their support for insurgency in northeast Thailand,
and that the Thais might request additional military assistance from
the US. The WSAG members noted the lack of Congressional and pub-
lic reaction to the earlier introduction of a Thai battalion.
It was the consensus that the Thais would be willing to make an-
other battalion available in return for the same sort of US support pro-
vided to the previous battalion. The WSAG members agreed that an
immediate Presidential decision should be sought2 regarding the sec-
ond Thai battalion. Dr. Kissinger will prepare and clear with the State
Department a memorandum to the President setting forth the advan-
tages and disadvantages and requesting a decision.3

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–073, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia and Laos, 4/14/70. Top Se-
cret; Sensitive. Attached to an April 15 memorandum from Jeanne Davis to U. Alexis
Johnson, Nutter, Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson of the JCS, and Karamessines.
2
According to the April 16, 1970, WSAG meeting summary of conclusions, the
WSAG was informed at that time of “the President’s decision to go forward with mov-
ing a second Thai battalion to Laos.” The summary stated the movement would be
“arranged on the same basis and according to the same procedures as were set forth at
the WSAG meeting of March 26, 1970 to govern meeting of the first Thai battalion.” It
also added that the press guidance for the movement and the need for a contingency
plan for orderly withdrawal would remain the same. (National Archives, Nixon Presi-
dential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–073, WSAG Meet-
ing, Laos and Cambodia, 4/16/70.)
3
Document 231, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI.
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130 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

62. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to Secretary

of Defense Laird1

Bangkok, May 11, 1970.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deeply appreciated your letter of March 27, with which you en-
closed the text of your statement before the House Sub-Committee on
Defense Appropriations. I have reviewed this very significant docu-
ment and I noted particularly the emphasis which you placed upon
the Nixon Doctrine. As you know, the Thai have fully endorsed the
Guam Doctrine. They have repeatedly stressed the identity of their and
our views that U.S. forces should not become involved in Thailand’s
internal security operations. They have also stressed the very point you
made in your presentation, namely, the need to obtain critical resources
and skills to do the job themselves. The Thai attitude can be illustrated
by reference to three specific points which are currently active issues,
i.e. military assistance, Laos and U.S. force reductions. These points
and some others that are also relevant are discussed in greater detail
in a memorandum attached to this letter.2
U.S. military assistance is regarded by the Thai as a key measure
of the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. Unfortunately, military assist-
ance is declining. Viewed in isolation the projected downward trend
for Thailand would probably not be unmanageable, but the Thai will
regard it as only one among several recent developments that have pro-
duced a sense of uncertainty about our future intentions. I was en-
couraged, however, by your remarks in the March 27 letter about the
importance of improved training and sales programs. We are making
certain recommendations regarding intensified training and the Thai
are interested in increased military sales.
With respect to Laos, it is obvious from the map, why the Thai re-
gard the situation there as being even more directly related to their
own security than the situation in Viet-Nam. You are familiar with the
rather considerable commitment Thailand has already made in coop-
eration with us to support the neutral Government of Laos. We are con-
sidering ways in which that support may be expanded. From the Thai
point of view a Viet-Nam settlement which does not include a satis-
factory stabilization in Laos would leave them under a very grave

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504, Box 1. Top Secret;
Exdis. Copies were sent to Rogers, CINCPAC, and Kissinger.
2
A more detailed analysis of Laird’s reduction recommendations, summarized in
an April 29 memorandum from the Embassy’s Political-Military Counselor, George F.
Muller, to Unger, is attached but not printed.
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Thailand 131

threat. In the light of recent developments in Cambodia,3 the same

would apply to that country. Accordingly, the Thai have been gratified
and encouraged by the strong actions and position announced by the
President in his statement of April 30.
The reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand is inseparable from the
Laos question. It is for this reason that I take this opportunity to ex-
press to you personally my grave reservations regarding the impact of
the 10,000-man force reduction which is now under consideration in
Washington.4 The removal of seven out of 15 USAF squadrons, three
of A–1s and four of F–105s, would necessarily gravely weaken our ca-
pability in Laos and, accordingly, the capability of the Lao forces to re-
sist. As seen in Thailand, it would comparably increase the threat to
Thailand’s security. The Thai expect us to propose a new force reduc-
tion and I believe that a reduction of approximately the size of the last
one, 6,000 men, could be managed without either cutting too deeply
into the Air Force muscle required for Laos, or arousing acute Thai con-
cern over a too rapid withdrawal.
I understand that the projected Vietnamization program requires
the continued availability of Thai bases and facilities as well as Thai
forces in South Viet-Nam well into 1973, if not beyond. I don’t think we
will have any difficulty retaining the use of these facilities if we main-
tain Thai confidence in our intentions as manifested in military assist-
ance under the Nixon Doctrine, our firmness in Laos, and the utilization
of U.S. military facilities in Thailand. A further point which is most
germane you yourself made very clearly on page 29 of your summary
when you emphasized the need to maintain the confidence of our allies
that we do not intend to renounce our long-standing obligations here. It
is because of the close relationship between the success of the Viet-
namization program and the availability of Thailand facilities over the
next few years that I have taken this opportunity to emphasize the fore-
going points. I appreciate the political and budgetary pressures at home
and I assure you that we will do our utmost, given the situation in Thai-
land, to assist in the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia.
Sincerely,
Leonard Unger5

3
President Nixon announced in an address to the nation on April 30 that the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong had stepped up their infiltration and occupation of the part of
Cambodia that bordered South Vietnam and, in response, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
were moving into Cambodia to attack them. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410)
4
The Thai reduction package recommended to the Secretary of Defense by the JCS
was submitted as part of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement
and Modernization Program.
5
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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132 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

63. Editorial Note

The Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Army (FANK), General Srey

Saman, arrived in Bangkok on May 11, 1970, to discuss the Thai pro-
posal to train ethnic Khmers in Thailand to fight for the Lon Nol gov-
ernment against the Communists in Cambodia. This followed South
Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and U.S. incursions into Cambodia to hit
Communist supply centers and routes.
The Thai planned to form two regiments of 1,826 men each, ac-
cording to an undated Central Intelligence Agency memorandum from
Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, U. Alexis Johnson, David Packard,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler.
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Insti-
tutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia, 5/12/70)
Further details of the Thai-Cambodian meetings emerged a short
time later. A memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger, Johnson,
Packard, and Wheeler, dated May 13, noted that Cambodian General Srey,
meeting with General Chairatana Intuputi, Commandant of the Thai
Armed Forces Security Center, and with Prime Minister Thanom, Gen-
eral Praphet, and Air Marshal Dawee, gave full approval to the Thai pro-
posal, but with a number of provisos, including that the “undertaking
should be a joint Thai-Cambodian-U.S. operation with U.S. representa-
tives to be invited to participate fully in formalizing the plans,” that the
“operation is to be accomplished covertly,” and that the “Thai regiment
would be paid in a similar manner to the Thai troops in Laos.” (Ibid.)
The Thai-Cambodian proposal was discussed in the Washington
Special Actions Group Meeting on May 13, with Karamessines noting
the above-mentioned aspects of the plan, as well as some additional as-
pects, such as the training of the two regiments in Thailand. He described
the proposed pay arrangements last. Kissinger noted that the “difference
is on the Thai regiment. They want us to pay in Cambodia.” U. Alexis
Johnson responded that this was “out of the question,” and Kissinger
agreed. Packard noted that the “training and equipment are service
funded.” After a discussion of various pay scenarios, the following no-
tation was made in the minutes: “[All agree that we will go back to the
Thai and tell them to pay for their own regiments. We will pay for the
training.]” (Ibid., Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)
In backchannel message 405 to Bangkok, May 14, Johnson advised
Unger that he could inform the Thai Government “that in principle we
would be prepared to help with supplies and equipment requested of
the Thais by the Cambodians either by directly turning over to the
Thais U.S. stocks available in the area or elsewhere, or replacing ma-
terial provided by the Thais from our own stocks.” (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far
East, Thailand, Vol. III)
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Thailand 133

64. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for

Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand
(Unger)1

Washington, May 20, 1970.

510. Ref Bangkok 6452 (being repeated Saigon and Honolulu). For
Ambassador Unger from Alexis Johnson.
1. This message responds, to extent we are now able, to questions
you raised reftel and which were not answered in my message of May
14 (in this channel).3 In all of this we should be careful not to get too
far ahead of RTG and GOC.
2. In addition to our previous concurrence with general philoso-
phy of para 3 reftel, subject to approval its application in specific cases,
we agree our special forces should not become involved directly in
training of two regiments. We envisage a supply program which would
not contemplate MAP or USOM style follow up or supervision. [1 ⁄ lines 1
2

of source text not declassified]

3. We note (re para 4) that you have already approached Dawee
and PM (Bangkok 5941 and 6030, both notal)4 on setting up Thai-
Cambodian coordinating organization and Thai internal staff to central-
ize management and control of Thai assistance programs for Cambodia.
We concur in your suggestion and emphasize the importance of [less than
1 line of source text not declassified], MACTHAI, or Embassy officers not
becoming part of this organization. They should assist and keep in touch
with activities only through exercise of their advisory role with Thais.
No special advisor should be assigned to the coordinating body.
4. We concur (para 5) in keeping communications on two regi-
ments in this channel; other questions should be handled in
Nodis/Khmer or other controlled distribution series following guide-
lines set up in Washington (State 061378 or 066129).5

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only;
Immediate. Repeated to Saigon for Bunker and Abrams and to CINCPAC for Admiral
McCain.
2
In backchannel message 645 from Bangkok, May 14, Unger urgently requested
guidance on details of U.S. cooperation in the Thai-Cambodian plan to train and equip
two regiments for Cambodia. In paragraph 3 Unger recommended that “our role should
be to provide advice and counsel, technical knowledge, equipment and some financial
support but not to become intimately involved in the conduct of the Thai-Cambodian
programs.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)
3
See Document 63.
4
Both dated May 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,
Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)
5
Neither printed.
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134 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

5. On para 6, while provision by Thais of equipment and funds

which are their property need not be protected, use of U.S.-supplied
or funded equipment for the two regiments should be protected on a
closely held basis. Provision by Thais of U.S. supplied equipment for
any other projects must also be carefully protected.
6. In regard second para reftel numbered 6 (number duplicated),
we would expect to furnish initial equipment for the two regiments
from three to four 1000-man packs of arms, ammo and communica-
tions equipment which we have allotted for Cambodian assistance.
Uniforms would be required. We would hope to provide uniforms from
DoD stocks in RVN which would be moved [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] to training sites to avoid any major draw down of
DoD stocks in Thailand. We do not believe this project could be kept
covert if DoD stocks in Thailand are used. We expect [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] covertly to fund for both regiments during
period of training in Thailand, costs of food, housing and training, and
following training to fund transportation to Cambodia. While in Thai-
land, Cambodian regiment will be paid covertly [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified], but we would expect Thais to assume responsibil-
ity for paying their regiment during training period. In Cambodia, am-
munition and some replacement of original equipment will be required
and we are planning to do this under same arrangement we have made
for support of Khmer Krom troops now in Cambodia, i.e., from DoD
stocks in RVN using South Vietnamese military transportation and de-
livered to FANK. After arrival in Cambodia, pay, food and housing for
Cambodian regiment would become responsibility of FANK. Thai reg-
iment presents special problem. We are proceeding on assumption that
Thais will take direct responsibility for pay, food and housing for their
regiment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is essential that
(a) both regiments (officers and men) be composed entirely of or, in
Thai regiment, almost entirely of ethnic Khmer troops and (b) follow
same process as have Khmer Krom of being folded into FANK. Press
and public seem to have accepted return of Khmer Krom to fight in
Cambodia as natural and normal state of affairs. We realize Thais may
have a different concept of operations for their regiment and need more
information on Thai plans before we can make final commitment on
this half of project.
7. On questions para 7, we are and will keep aware of what oth-
ers may do to assist Cambodians. Question on supply while in Cam-
bodia answered para 6 above.
8. Regarding para 9, question A, we have a Presidential determi-
nation establishing a small (7.9 million dollars) MAP program for Cam-
bodia. This determination permits use of DoD stocks in RVN or those
in possession of GVN or RTG which will then be replaced (unless
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Thailand 135

equipment is excess of U.S., Thai or Vietnamese requirements) from

Cambodian MAP funds of $7.9 million. We would hope to avoid any
major use of RTG or DoD stocks in Thailand for reason stated para 6
above.
9. In response to para 9, question B, we wish to make it completely
clear to Thais that the two regiments cannot become a U.S. responsi-
bility in event they get into a situation in Cambodia like that faced by
SR VIII last June in Laos. As is case for other FANK units, U.S. ground
forces could not be committed to assist them; and it should not be as-
sumed USAF air support would be available. You should make clear
to RTG that our support for this project does not carry any implica-
tion of a decision on our part to commit U.S. forces to Cambodia or
Thailand.

65. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)1

Washington, May 21, 1970.

Dear Dave:
I understand2 that in response to Secretary Laird’s February 19
memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,3 a copy of which has been
shown to me, the Joint Chiefs have provided the Department of De-
fense with their recommendations regarding the possible withdrawal
from Thailand during fiscal year 1971 of some 10,000 U.S. military per-
sonnel, broken down into two packages of roughly 5,000 personnel
each. As was noted in the SecDef memorandum, the problem is a com-
plex one with important political implications that must be fully con-
sidered, particularly because of the likelihood of base closures and sig-
nificant force readjustments.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot
96 D 695, Box 11, May 1970. Top Secret. Drafted by Hicks (EA/TB) and Colonel Arthur
Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation in Johnson’s handwriting reads: “P.S. There is also an as-
pect on this I want to discuss directly with you. UAJ.”
2
Green and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Ronald I. Spiers
informed Johnson in a May 18 memorandum that they “had been made aware infor-
mally” that Laird had directed the JCS to begin planning a 10,000 man troop reduction
in Thailand; attached but not printed.
3
Attached but not printed.
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136 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Because U.S. troop withdrawals are of most serious concern to the

Royal Thai Government, it is important that the foreign policy impli-
cations be fully taken into account. In addition, we must be mindful
of the necessity in any planning we do, to provide adequate time for
genuine consultations with the Royal Thai Government (anticipated to
take about 60 days minimum) on any U.S. troop withdrawals we may
desire to undertake. Some of the questions which will undoubtedly
arise during discussions with the Thai are outlined in the attachment.
With these in mind, I suggest we ask our staffs to review together the
troop withdrawal proposals so that foreign policy problems can be re-
solved prior to consultations with the Royal Thai Government.4
Sincerely,
Alex

4
Attached but not printed is a list of questions that were likely to arise during con-
sultations with the Thai Government. Most of them dealt with rationalizing a 45 percent
reduction in Thai-based air resources in the face of increased North Vietnamese activity
in northern Laos and Cambodia, the projected reduction in the sortie rate in those ar-
eas, and compensating for that “loss of firepower which is required to deter, delay, or
defeat in NVN/Pathet Lao advance into critical areas of Laos.”

66. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand

(Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson)1

Bangkok, May 21, 1970.

Ref: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 510.2

Ref is very much appreciated by Ambassador [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified]. We will have a number of questions to raise,
but the most immediate problem is set forth in the following message
from Ambassador Unger. For Under Secretary Alexis Johnson from
Ambassador Unger
1. Dawee asked to see me on urgent basis this afternoon. As an-
ticipated, he wanted above all to discuss support arrangements for Thai

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70.
2
Document 64.
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Thailand 137

forces that might go to Cambodia. Present at our discussion also were

General Kriangsak and General Prasert, Deputy Commander AFSC.
Dawee said that after the Prime Minister had received another urgent
letter for help from Lon Nol both the Cabinet and the Security Coun-
cil had again discussed this issue. The Thai were prepared to send two
regiments (3,600 men) of [1 line of source text not declassified], but could
do so only on the basis of support arrangements similar to those made
for the three battalions in Laos. He said, “If you cannot help Cambo-
dia directly, help us to help them.” Dawee stressed the importance of
holding Cambodia and that the situation there required immediate de-
ployment of Thai forces; there was no time to await completion of
a training program as previously discussed. Yem Sambour is still in
town and he will meet again with Deputy PriMin Praphat tomorrow.
Next week Praphat and a Thai delegation including Dawee and
Chairatana will leave for Phnom Penh to conduct further discussions
on Thai assistance.
2. Agreeing with him on the importance of assisting Cambodia, I
went into the basic differences between the situation in Cambodia and
that in Laos and Viet-Nam and explained Washington’s thinking about
support arrangements in terms of para 6, reftel. I stressed that we would
help out with training and equipment while the forces were still in
Thailand, but once they went into Cambodia we could no longer sup-
port their subsistence the way we do in Viet-Nam or Laos. We do not
and will not have the means we have in both of those places to set up
direct supply channels for Thai personnel. Dawee accepted this but re-
torted that if we don’t find some means to help the Thai with the fi-
nancial burden of supporting the forces, there would be no chance of
sending any Thai forces to Cambodia; Thailand has the men, but needs
matériel assistance. He confirmed that the RTG would pay basic pay,
but would look to us for payment of subsistence and other allowances,
various benefits, as well as for matériel and equipment. He said the
reason they were thinking in terms of the same support arrangements
as in Laos was that they would not send regular troops, but [2 lines of
source text not declassified]. In this manner, the question of budgetary
support would not come to public attention. He felt this was politically
the most acceptable arrangement for us and would not stir up trouble
in the U.S. such as charges about Thailand and/or Lon Nol trying to
involve the U.S. a la Vietnam.
3. The forces provided by Thailand could be immediately used to
stabilize the situation around Phnom Penh, and generally along the
route from Thailand as, for example, around Kompong Thom; perhaps
also on the west bank of the Mekong. He also said it was important to
destroy enemy forces in the border triangle of Laos, Cambodia and
Thailand. After the forces drawn from the Khmer Serei and other Cam-
bodian groups had had their training (in about 3–4 months) they could
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138 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

be rotated in to replace the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Thai forces. The latter can be phased in one battalion at a time, begin-
ning practically immediately.
4. In a separate development, Pote Sarasin asked [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] to call on him this morning in order to urge
U.S. reconsideration of decision re non-support for Thai troops once
deployed in Cambodia. Pote pointed out that the RTG intends to com-
mit all the help to Cambodia that it can from its own resources and
that the National Security Council had allocated 20 million baht to pro-
vide the kinds of finished goods which can be produced in Thailand
such as shoes, uniforms, mosquito nets, and canteens. The RTG, how-
ever, needs U.S. assistance of the kind provided in Laos for Thai regi-
ments in Cambodia and, in any case, could not fund such support
from the Thai budget, even if it were able, without the knowledge
of parliamentary reviewing committees and the consequent exposure
of the covert nature of the effort. He pointed out that with U.S. as-
sistance the Thais can maintain a credible cover story, if the presence
of Thai troops in Cambodia subsequently comes to public attention, by
claiming that these Thais are volunteers who are fighting with the Cam-
bodian Army. Finally, Pote cited the contributions Thailand is now mak-
ing to support free world efforts to resist aggression in Vietnam, Laos,
and now Cambodia as evidence of RTG commitment to participate fully
in this effort within the limits of its means.
5. To summarize, the Thais have undertaken to make two regi-
ments of total of 3,600 men available as rapidly as possible in response
to Lon Nol’s urgent request. To the maximum extent possible, these
troops will be familiar with the Cambodian language [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified]. In the meantime, the Thais are proceed-
ing to recruit former Khmer Serei and other Cambodian-speaking
men on both sides of the Thai/Cambodian border. [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] has independent confirmation that this
recruitment is proceeding. When these troops trained they can be ro-
tated to replace the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thai
forces.
6. It seems to me that we should agree to pay such allowances as
we are now paying the battalions in Laos in addition to the training
expenses which you have authorized in reftel. These include subsist-
ence, combat allowance, and death and disability payments. I have
made it clear to Dawee that we cannot provide subsistence in kind as
in Vietnam. It seems to me, therefore, that a monthly sum based on a
daily baht rate should be negotiated as a reimbursement for the out-
lay the RTG will have to make. I think it is clear from the reasons which
have been cited by Dawee and also by Pote that the Thais are unlikely
to feel able to respond to Lon Nol’s urgent request for these troops un-
less arrangements similar to those in Laos can be worked out. I am sat-
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Thailand 139

isfied that Thais do intend and have already started providing signif-
icant assistance to the Cambodians from their own resources, namely
finished goods which can be produced here. They are also ready to
continue the basic pay for the [less than 1 line of source text not declassi-
fied] troops just as in the case of all of the other troops now fighting
outside of Thailand.
7. I urge therefore that you give this matter urgent and favorable
consideration3 since it is highly desirable for the Praphat delegation to
be able to discuss further and complete the arrangements for Thai
troops when it visits Phnom Penh, possibly as early as Monday, the
25th of May.

3
This request for U.S. financial support for the two [text not declassified] regiments
received extensive consideration at the WSAG and other high levels in Washington, but
was never given an affirmative response. Instead, Washington’s basic negative response
was given in message 637, May 28, in which Johnson informed Unger of the “number
of legal and operational questions” concerning the requested financial support. (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thai-
land, Vol. III)

67. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for

Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand
(Unger)1

Washington, June 2, 1970.

691. For Ambassador Unger from Alexis Johnson. Ref: Bangkok

680.2
1. You authorized to proceed as requested reftel in further explo-
ration of scheme for expansion of Black Panthers and for their use

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Repeated to Saigon
for Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams and to CINCPAC Honolulu for Admiral
McCain.
2
Backchannel message 680, June 2, reported Unger’s belief that he would be ap-
proached by the Thais the following day to resume the dialogue on the “short range pro-
posal,” in the form of an expansion of the Thai Black Panthers division in Vietnam and
for its partial use in Cambodia. (Ibid.)
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140 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

in Cambodia along lines discussed para 3 of Bangkok 669.3 In ex-

ploring this proposal with Thais, you should make clear to them that
Black Panthers would have to be used in a fashion consistent with
the theory of operations which we developed here and which was
sent to you as para 3 of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
637.4
2. You should emphasize to Thais that particularly since this mat-
ter remains in exploratory stage, and no decision yet made, it is es-
sential that Thais do not make any public comment concerning it.
3. During course of exploration you should also make clear to
Thais that as in the case of two Thai Khmer regiments ([less than 1
line of source text not declassified] 510, para 9),5 it should not be as-
sumed by Thais that USAF air support would be available to Black
Panthers.6
4. For our planning purposes here, it would be helpful if in the
course of exploration you could also elicit from Thais their thinking
with regard to the timing of this deployment.

3
Backchannel message 669, May 30, discussed various aspects of the “short range
proposal,” the quick deployment to Cambodia of two regiments of Thai regular troops
to meet the emergency need for forces. Paragraph three covered a number of points, in-
cluding that the Black Panthers were not up to their allocated full strength, would prob-
ably deploy personnel “presently in South Vietnam” after being reinforced, would re-
ceive “all repeat all support arrangements” for the two additional regiments as for those
already there, and would consult with the South Vietnamese Government concerning
“some reduction in Black Panther area responsibility in Vietnam.” (Ibid., Vol. III)
4
See footnote 3, Document 66.
5
See Document 64.
6
Unger responded, in backchannel message 687, June 3, by stating that “it is hard
to see the logic of air support changes” (considering U.S. air support for Thai forces in
Laos and also its use of Thai air bases). Unger concluded by stating that “I would not
be surprised, for example, if my telling the Thais that USAF air support could not be as-
sumed to be available to Black Panthers operating in Cambodia would mean the end of
any further consideration of that project by the RTG.” Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 141

68. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT
Thai Actions on Cambodia

From Ambassador Unger [less than 1 line of source text not declassi-
fied] in Bangkok we have received a number of reports covering ac-
tions which the Thai are planning to take on Cambodia. These are:
—The Thai Cabinet has agreed to send two regiments to Vietnam
for augmentation of the Black Panthers, and the commitment of Black
Panther units inside Cambodia in the sanctuary area. These will go
probably a battalion at a time.
—The decision has been made to proceed with the recruiting and
training of two Thai ethnic Khmer regiments, with U.S. support. These
will be trained in Thailand by battalions, and the process might take
8–16 weeks.
—The Thai will train 8 Cambodian pilots (but characteristically
want us to pay).
—The Thai will also train regular Cambodian Army and Navy
personnel.
—The question of giving Cambodian forces Thai Air Force sup-
port is being looked into. The Thai are also considering using the RTAF
to support their forces in Cambodia.
—There is some possibility that the Thai will give a few (perhaps
5) T–28’s to the Cambodians2 while their T–28’s are being prepared.
In addition to the foregoing, the Thai would like our help on the
following:
—Furnishing trucks. They want us to provide 30–50 and are un-
willing to take them from their own MAP.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A
notation on the memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting (in addition to his initials)
reads: “Take up in June 9 WSAG.” Another notation in Haig’s handwriting reads: “John
next WSAG.”
2
A notation in Kissinger’s handwriting next to this sentence reads: “Let’s push
this.”
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142 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—Provide 5–10 kilowatt transmitters for giving psychological war-

fare assistance to the Cambodians. It would be set up in Thailand near
the Cambodian border.3

3
Kissinger wrote next to this paragraph: “Why not.”

69. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Washington, June 13, 1970.

Dear Alex:
This responds to your letter of May 212 regarding troop with-
drawals from Thailand.
As you probably know the FY 71 Department of Defense budget
is facing serious pressure from both the Congress and inflation. We an-
ticipate that these difficulties will increase sharply in FY 72. For this
reason it is essential that we reevaluate the essentiality of each SEA
program. As part of this review Secretary Laird asked the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to assess the relative priorities of all Department of Defense
programs. In their response they found that, in the absence of supple-
mental FY 71 funding from Congress, reductions in SEA air operations
must be made if we are to support other essential SEA and non-SEA
Department of Defense programs. Since the mood of the Congress,
in our judgment, prevents consideration of supplemental funding at
this time, Secretary Laird has approved the proposed air reductions in
Thailand.
The decisions on this matter, which have been provided to the
President for review and final approval, are attached as in the sched-
ule for force reductions in Thailand3 as developed by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. These decisions will result in only slight modifications of this
very excellent plan which I believe goes as far as possible toward meet-
ing legitimate political concerns within budget constraints.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box
1. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2
Document 65.
3
Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 143

At the juncture, it is essential that we initiate the discussions with

the RTG as soon as possible. On June 5, Secretary Laird emphasized
the urgency of this step. I believe that the appropriate next step is for
our staffs to prepare negotiating instructions covering some of the ques-
tions in your letter and, consequently, I have not included detailed an-
swers in this reply. However, I am satisfied that planned air resources
will be adequate to continue Vietnamization progress and provide air
support to the RLG forces.4
Sincerely,
Dave

4
Printed from a copy that indicates Packard signed the original.

70. Editorial Note

Because he “had the feeling” that the U.S. Government was “pro-
ceeding at too leisurely a pace,” President Nixon made his views about
assistance to Cambodia directly known to his senior staff (including
Kissinger, Helms, Packard, Moorer, Johnson, Green, Pickering, and
Holdridge) at the Washington Special Actions Group meeting of June 15,
1970. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC
Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–
1970) After initial discussion among these advisers, the President entered
the room and, according to a June 17 memorandum from Kissinger to
Helms, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, immediately reaffirmed that it “is
our national policy to preserve the neutrality and integrity of Cambo-
dia. It is important for such countries as Indonesia, Thailand and Laos
to know that we are standing firm; we must keep the psychological fac-
tor in mind.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285 A, Executive
Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Box 11 of 13)
According to the WSAG minutes, the President said that the “sit-
uation might appear dubious” in Cambodia but that he equated the
current views “with the decisions which he had made on March 17 re-
garding the defense of Long Tieng in Laos. There we had decided to
use our air power and commit the Thailand battalions. It had been a
close decision, but this decision had eventually had some effect. We
had perhaps saved the decision for another year.” (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files
(H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)
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144 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

“Regarding the Thais, the President mentioned that he knew the

legal arguments and problems, but even Frank Church and several
other Senators who had objected to Americans in Cambodia under-
stood the principle of Asians helping Asians. This might be a costly
business, and Congress didn’t like it, but the South Vietnamese, the
Thai, the Indonesians, and others had an economic excuse for not as-
sisting on their own. In addition, there would be a great psychological
effect.” (Ibid.) The complete minutes of the June 15 WSAG meeting are
in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 326.

71. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)1

Washington, June 20, 1970.

Dear Dave:
I refer to your letter of June 132 with regard to the force reductions
in Thailand. I agree wholeheartedly that time is of essence, if we are
to consult meaningfully with the Thais. We are proceeding as you sug-
gest to prepare negotiating instructions for Ambassador Unger on an
urgent basis. However, I believe we must adhere to the following
ground rules if we are to keep from jeopardizing important programs
in Southeast Asia.
a. As I pointed out to you in my letter of May 21, we must pro-
vide adequate time for genuine consultations with the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment. It is therefore urgently requested that any overt actions to
withdraw our forces from Thailand, which have not already been
agreed to by the Thais, be held in abeyance until our consultations can
be satisfactorily completed. Furthermore, I think we must assure that
any discussions of this matter with the Thais be coordinated by Am-
bassador Unger in Bangkok. In preparing these instructions we would

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box
1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation on the memorandum
reads: “P.S. You will recall Henry expressed interest in this. When we have our ducks in
a row I suggest that we brief him. UAJ”
2
Document 69.
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Thailand 145

want to address jointly with your staff those questions we can expect
the Thais to raise, and assure that Ambassador Unger will be in the
best possible position to answer them persuasively. In addition, it
would appear that the evaluation directed by the President of our cur-
rent air activities in Southeast Asia, as outlined in Mr. Kissinger’s mem-
orandum of June 15, could also affect the extent of our troop with-
drawals for Thailand. I am well aware of the budgetary problems in
DOD and I can assure you that we will proceed with these consulta-
tions with dispatch as soon as we have the necessary data to make a
persuasive case to the Thais.
b. I have no doubt that US troop withdrawals from Thailand at
this point will create political problems. Although we are working
out plans with your staff based on the recommended DOD reduction
package, it is necessary that the door be left open to reconsider the
timing and extent of the program in light of the Thai reactions
and reactions from other Asian allies as well as the Presidential di-
rected evaluation mentioned previously. Changes would be recom-
mended only if essential US programs and objectives in the area stand
in jeopardy.
I note that the decisions made by Secretary Laird with respect to
Thailand are but part of a broader package of decisions affecting our
world-wide force posture for FY 1971. I think it would be useful, par-
ticularly in connection with the forthcoming DPRC budget review, if
I could have a copy of the document approved by Secretary Laird;
and if you could arrange in the future for similar documents reflect-
ing major program decisions and which bear on our relations with
our allies and other friendly states, to be made available to us. I will,
of course, see to it that they will be used on a close-hold restricted
basis.
Sincerely,
Alex
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146 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

72. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 26, 1970, 11 a.m.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Meet-

ings Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, WSAG Papers. Top Secret; Nodis;
Khmer. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]

73. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Washington, June 30, 1970.

Dear Alex:
After our discussion over the weekend, I reviewed our force
planning for U.S. forces in Thailand. I have concluded our plans to
withdraw 10,000 men during FY 71 are militarily sound and should be
executed expeditiously. Let me briefly review our plans for the 10,000-
man phasedown.
About 40% of the 10,000-man reduction relates to the phaseout of
four F–105 squadrons and the closure of Takhli Air Base. The F–105s
were very effective during the bombing of NVN, but they are not well
suited for interdiction in Southern Laos, particularly strikes against
moving vehicles. Also, they are not as effective against enemy troop
targets as are other aircraft in our force which will remain in Thailand.
The eight F–4 squadrons which will remain in Thailand, in conjunction
with carrier and SVN-based tactical air forces, will provide adequate
capability for requirements in Northern and Southern Laos.
The air base at Takhli is the most appropriate candidate for phas-
ing out U.S. operations, being the farthest away from targets in Laos.
By closing out all U.S. activity, we can maximize the manpower and
budget savings with the least impact on military capability. After we
phase out of the Takhli base, we will still be able to increase the num-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box
1. Top Secret; Sensitive.
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Thailand 147

ber of aircraft deployed in Thailand quickly, should the need arise. Each
of the remaining bases has some limited expansion capability and can
handle additional aircraft on an emergency basis. In addition we be-
lieve the Takhli Air Base will be kept open by the Royal Thai Air Force
(RTAF). A skeleton U.S. Air Force element will remain there for the rest
of FY 71 to assist the Thai in learning to operate and maintain the base.
Re-entry should be relatively easy since the base will be in full opera-
tion. In addition, we could move another Navy carrier into the South
China Sea, or return forces to South Vietnam where ample air base fa-
cilities exist.
Another 15% of the planned 10,000-man phasedown concerns
turnover of A–1 aircraft to the South Vietnamese in July 1971. These
aircraft will be used in Laos until that time. Their turnover is part of
our Vietnamization program and Vietnamese pilots are being trained
to fly them. The loss of their truck-killing capability will be more than
offset by the addition of new B–57G sensor-equipped aircraft and wider
use of aircraft gunships. In this regard, I recently directed the Air Force
to modify additional C–130 aircraft as gunships for use in the next dry
season campaign. Planned reductions in reconnaissance forces consti-
tute another 15% of the total Thailand force reduction. These are pos-
sible because of reduced overall sorties levels from Thailand.
We also plan to reduce Army engineers and transportation per-
sonnel (15% of the total phasedown) because they have largely com-
pleted their road-building efforts. A few parts of the projects may not
be finished at their planned deployment date. If necessary, a small en-
gineer force will be left to complete them, or local contractors will be
used. The remainder of the 10,000-man phasedown consists of miscel-
laneous support, personnel, whose reduction will have little impact.
The 10,000-man phasedown reflects due consideration of the at-
tendant military risks and I fully support it. Many of the redeploy-
ments were planned for the July–September period. We budgeted funds
accordingly and any delays will force us to reprogram funds from other
activities. You are well aware of our budget constraints and will ap-
preciate our interest in getting these decisions carried out promptly.
For the above reasons I believe Ambassador Unger should pro-
ceed promptly with the necessary consultations with the Royal Thai
Government. In his discussions he can assure the Thai that:
1. Reduction of F–105 and A–1 aircraft in Thailand will be com-
pensated by additional AC–130 and B–57G aircraft which are consid-
erably more effective for the type missions being flown in Laos.
2. The A–1 capability will remain in Southeast Asia, although the
aircraft will move to South Vietnam to be flown by the VNAF.
3. The withdrawal of the Army engineers will not jeopardize the
projects which we have promised the Royal Thai Government would
be completed.
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148 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Remaining bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia

have ample capability to support promptly an increase in our air as-
sets, should the need arise. Also Takhli will be available for re-entry
should it be needed.2
Sincerely,

Dave

2
A joint State–Defense message to Unger on July 3 instructed him to “immediately
initiate consultations with RTG re next reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand.” (Telegram
105295 to Bangkok; ibid.) However, a July 2 note to Spiers attached to the telegram noted
that “entire instruction was withdrawn Friday night at White House instruction” and
“DOD is now instructed to defer any action.” (Ibid.) This action was precipitated by a
July 2 telegram from Rogers to Kissinger, in which the Secretary stated that he “had not
had chance to talk to Johnson before departure about my conversation with President
about slowing down our steps because of need to maintain strong position in Thailand
for future. Telegram does not seem to take that conversation into account. Could you
look into this with a view to revised instructions. In the meantime I have asked Unger
to delay action on what he has received until we hear from you.” (Telegram 765 to Manila;
ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thai-
land, Vol. IV) In telegram 10662 from Saigon, July 5, Rogers added that “as a result of
my talk with the President at San Clemente I am confident that he would not want any
reductions made in Thailand that would reduce our air power there. Also the timing is
particularly bad because our present efforts to encourage Thailand to do more in Cam-
bodia.” (Ibid.) A July 2 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger indicates that Kissinger
wanted “to hold up on the Thai force reductions until Larry Lynn’s TACAIR studies are
completed.” (Ibid.) An attached note and handwriting on the memorandum indicate that
Packard was informed of the delay.

74. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

Saigon, July 5, 1970, 0940Z.

Secto 45/10660. Subject: Following uncleared memorandum of

Secretary’s Manila Bilateral with Thai FonMin Thanat (July 3).
(1) FonMin Thanat responded to the Secretary’s mention of Cam-
bodia and described the position of the RTG with regard to military
assistance to that country. He explained that he had exerted some re-
straint on the Thai military leaders on the grounds that Thailand should

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–72: Entry 3051 B: Box
516. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger and approved in S by Peter Johnson and
William Brandt. Repeated to Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Rogers had been in Manila for
the SEATO meeting and in Saigon for the TCC meeting.
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Thailand 149

not move too quickly until the military situation in Cambodia became
clearer and also until the results of the Djakarta meeting follow-up were
known. Furthermore, it was essential for the RTG to have an under-
standing of US Government intentions and to know what support
would be available for whatever Thailand felt able to do. He empha-
sized that the Thais could not afford to become militarily deeply in-
volved and find themselves left high and dry with the US having
washed its hand of the Cambodian problem.
(2) The Secretary then reviewed for the FonMin the actions which
we contemplate, including the provision of small arms and equipment
and economic assistance as well as the provision of some continuing
air support of specified types. He referred also to the help which US
would provide Cambodia through a new MAP program for fiscal year
1971 (beyond the $8 million provided for fiscal year 1970), surplus
weapons and equipment, the hand-over of captured items and perhaps
some loans. The Secretary mentioned in addition the military help
which we anticipate South Vietnam will provide to Cambodia and ex-
pressed the hope that others in the region will also help.
(3) The Secretary expressed specific hope that Thailand will do as
much as it possibly can and he inquired how the US could help in this
regard. FonMin first referred to the Black Panther unit now deployed
to Vietnam and suggested that it might be wise in view of the new de-
velopments in Cambodia and the dangers closer to home for Thailand
to use some of the Black Panthers to provide for Thailand’s forward
defense in Western and Northern Cambodia. In the discussion that fol-
lowed the Secretary generally endorsed this idea after ascertaining that
the FonMin was speaking of only a part, say about 4,000, of the Black
Panthers and that he contemplated keeping some of the Panthers in
Vietnam for some time yet. He also made clear that the US could not
support the Panthers either in border areas of Thailand or in adjacent
areas of Cambodia in the same way as they are now supported; specif-
ically subsistence and various allowances could not be paid by the US
under the circumstances although we could probably re-supply them
with ammo, spare parts, etc. through the Cambodian MAP program.
In answer to a direct question from the FonMin, the Secretary said it
is US policy to encourage the Thais to provide direct military assist-
ance to Cambodia as it may be necessary. He referred also to the Pres-
ident’s view that we would understand that the Thais would put a pri-
ority on the use of their troops to defend their own home ground. In
answer to the FonMin’s question, the Secretary said that he did not be-
lieve that there would be any obstacles, generally speaking, put up by
Congress which would stand in the way of US support of its allies who
wish to help Cambodia, but there were certain specific kinds of assist-
ance which were in question and would remain so until decisions were
taken on some pending legislation.
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150 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

(4) The discussion then turned to possible Thai assistance in train-

ing Cambodians and the help which the US might provide for this.
Aside from the special arrangements which have been almost com-
pleted for US support for the training of Thai ethnic Khmer, we are not
able at the moment to say precisely what help we can give although it
almost surely would include some outfitting and equipping and pos-
sibly additional supply of consumables in Cambodia through Cambo-
dian MAP. FonMin emphasized the teamwork he envisaged under the
Nixon Doctrine in which Thailand and other countries in the area
would provide manpower and the US would assist with weapons,
equipment and financial and other support.
(5) The Secretary then turned to FonMin’s obvious distress over
statements made by US Senators and US press. He said that it was es-
sential to recognize that these are personal and individual views and
do not represent position of the Administration which deeply appre-
ciates Thailand’s position and the help it has rendered. He said it was
essential to have a thick skin about critical comments and see them in
perspective.
(6) Returning to Cambodia, the FonMin again expressed Thai-
land’s very deep concern at this point about Cambodian situation and
the threat posed to his country. The Secretary acknowedged this and
said it was important for us to think about the measure it might be es-
sential to take if a collapse of the government in Phnom Penh should
threaten. He expressed the need to see that the supply route via Kom-
pong Som (Sihanoukville) not be re-established by the Communists
and he also mentioned the need to keep open access to Phnom Penh
via the Mekong.
(7) The Secretary then referred to the FonMin’s mention the pre-
vious year of his efforts to establish some contact with the government
of Communist China. Thanat said that nothing had come of these. He
said that he was sure that the Chinese would be glad to receive a se-
cret mission from Thailand and then would undoubtedly seek to ex-
ploit it to Thailand’s disadvantage. The Minister had no intention of
playing this game, but was ready to talk openly; the Chinese were ap-
parently not interested in pursuing this at this time.
(8) At the conclusion Ambassador Unger mentioned possible
closer cooperation among the four nations of the region to make bet-
ter provisions for their own security. Thanat generally endorsed this
idea, noting the obvious common interests which Thailand, Laos, Cam-
bodia and Vietnam had in this regard. He also mentioned the reticence
of the Lao to deal with the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese; the
Lao preferred to work on security matters only with the Thais.
Department repeat as desired.
Rogers
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Thailand 151

75. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, July 9, 1970.

SUBJECT
PL 480 Program for Thailand

Introduction
I understand:
—the WSAG is considering a proposal to provide a PL 480 loan of
up to $20 million to the Thai,2
—that this loan is intended to indirectly compensate the Thai for
costs associated with possible Thai and Thai Khmer force deployments
to Cambodia.
Although I have not seen all the cable traffic on this proposal, I
understand the Thai have not asked for the PL 480 program or even
an explicit quid pro quo for their Cambodian contribution. Rather, Am-
bassador Unger has suggested that such a program could be used to
help the Thai defray the expenses of their Cambodian effort. We would
give the RTG $20 million in PL 480 commodities (e.g., wheat, tobacco,
cotton). Thai importers would purchase these commodities from the
RTG with local currency (Baht). According to the Unger proposal, sixty
percent of the budget receipts, $12 million, would be used by the RTG
in agricultural development while the remaining $8 million would be
allocated to U.S. uses. The theory is that the Thai would divert cur-
rently budgeted agricultural development funds to their Cambodian
effort.
Ambassador Unger proposed this PL 480 program on May 19,
1970. It was not clear why Thailand needed the program at that time
(the economic circumstances of Thailand do not warrant such a pro-
gram—see below) and his proposal was not favorably received at the
working level in State, AID, or BOB.3

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for action.
2
See Document 76.
3
In a July 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for In-
ternational Affairs and Commodity Programs Clarence D. Palmby noted that his De-
partment also opposed this program “based on normal economic considerations and
normal Title I program criteria.” He added, however, that “if you believe that such a
program is in the national interest, we will cooperate with other agencies in its imple-
mentation.” Palmby’s memorandum is also attached but not printed.
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152 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Raising this proposal again, as a possible quid pro quo for Thai
assistance to Cambodia, may be justified by the desire to obtain Thai
help in Cambodia. On the other hand, a PL 480 action in this context
raises serious political and legal problems in addition to its question-
able economic merits that should be addressed.
Incrementalism versus Fundamentalism
As a policy proposal the PL 480 program represents a clear case
of “incrementalism.” It is an example of a policy proposal made in re-
sponse to immediate circumstances, that has not been viewed in the
larger context of U.S.-Thai relations, the total U.S. program effort in
Thailand, the requirements of the Thai economy and U.S. strategy in
Southeast Asia:
—In 1969, the Thai economy continued the high rate of economic
growth it has achieved throughout the 1960’s:
—GDP increased by 7.5%,
—budget revenues rose by 11.3%,
—foreign exchange reserves stood at a relatively high level of $875
million at the end of the year, having suffered a slight decline from the
over $900 million level achieved in 1968 as a result of U.S. war-related
expenditures in Thailand.
—Over the period 1971–1975 the Thai budget and balance of pay-
ments will come under serious pressure if the Thai expand their forces
and if U.S. war-related military spending is reduced. This pressure
could be alleviated by increases in U.S. military assistance and in-
creases in the U.S. program assistance. Nevertheless, the NSSM 51
economic model indicates that in the near term the Thai economy
clearly has the capacity to support increases in military and civilian
expenditures.
—The Thai have been sensitive to U.S. press and Congressional
criticism of our commitment to Thailand. They have repeatedly sought
and obtained assurances of our commitment to defend Thailand. How-
ever, the NSSM 51 study concluded4 that by responding to these re-
quests piecemeal the U.S. has broadened its commitment beyond what
it can defend against its critics and possibly beyond what U.S. inter-
ests could justify. The study concluded that a diplomatic strategy more
closely gauged to the basis of our commitments—SEATO as interpreted
by Rusk–Thanat—would be easier to defend, less likely to raise Thai
expectations beyond what we can meet, and more consistent with sta-

4
See Document 82 for excerpts from the NSSM 51 Thailand Analysis Program
Study.
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Thailand 153

ble U.S.-Thai relations instead of the hot-cold cycle we have experi-

enced recently.
—The Thai view the level of U.S. program assistance to Thailand
as one of the most important benefits of close cooperation with the U.S.
and as a signal of U.S. intentions to back up its commitment. The NSSM
51 analysis concluded that our past program effort has been too dif-
fuse and volatile to take full advantage of the Thai perception of it. The
study concludes that we should focus our program effort in fewer
areas, and set long-term program strategy and funding goals in con-
sultation with the Thai. Such an approach would have the important
ancillary benefit of improving Thai performance in key areas, e.g.,
ground force performance.
—The NSSM 51 study presents several U.S. assistance program
packages. The package choices most consistent with the threats to Thai-
land, and therefore the most likely to be selected, will increase the level
of U.S. assistance to Thailand. Assistance to the army and air force and
possibly economic assistance can be expected to rise.
—You have asked for a study of U.S. strategy alternatives for
Southeast Asia. A decision to embark on a new style of assistance to
Thailand, which is what Ambassador Unger’s proposal amounts to,
should be made after a review of alternative burden sharing arrange-
ments, the forms of assistance we are able to give, etc. While all deci-
sions cannot await the formulation of a Southeast Asian strategy, this
one probably can.
Conclusion
In sum:
—the PL 480 proposal:
—is not justified on economic grounds,
—will probably not have any lasting impact on U.S.-Thai relations,
—is unlikely to result in Thai performance improvements.
In addition, major Congressional opposition can be expected on
political and on legal grounds as soon as the PL 480 agreement is
signed.
—an alternative approach would entail:
—assuring the Thai that our overall assistance will be responsive
to the threats to Thailand.
—informing them that we have just completed an analysis of our
supports to Thailand which will be reviewed for decision in the near
future. The resulting decision will determine how our economic and
military assistance programs will be modified in response to recent de-
velopments in Southeast Asia. We expect to make a major assistance
contribution to the overall Thai defense effort in the foreseeable future,
and our contribution will be in proportion to the overall Thai defense
burden which we recognize is increasing.
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154 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Recommendation
I recommend disapproval of the PL 480 proposal. If action is re-
quired to assure the Thai of our financial backing for additional de-
fense costs they will bear as a result of the deteriorating security situ-
ation on their borders, I recommend the U.S. inform the Thai of the
pending review of our assistance effort and assure them that the up-
coming decision will be responsive to the requirement for an expanded
Thai defense effort.

76. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, July 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Support for Cambodia

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
CIA State
Mr. Richard Helms Ambassador Johnson
Mr. Thomas Karamessines Mr. Moore
Mr. Nelson Mr. Tom Pickering
JCS NSC Staff
Admiral Thomas Moorer Col. Richard Kennedy
General Vogt Mr. John Holdridge
Defense
Mr. Nutter
Admiral Flanagan

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
[Omitted here is discussion on Cambodia.]
Turning to funding, Dr. Kissinger first brought up Thai activities
with respect to Cambodia. It emerged that Senator Russell did not want
CIA to finance Thai activities in Cambodia, and that Senator Stennis
on the other hand believed that CIA rather than Defense should finance
these activities. On the equipment costs for the Thai/Khmer regiment

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret;
Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
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Thailand 155

($1.2 million) following a discussion of alternatives including Cambo-

dian MAP, CIA funds, Thai MASF, or PL–480 trade-offs, the decision fa-
vored using prior-year Thai MASF, but with the possibility of using some
Cambodian MAP. Action was assigned to Mr. Nutter.
In addressing the question of Thai operations in Western Cambo-
dia, it was agreed that RTAF operations took precedence over providing the
initial equipment for an RCT. The initial equipment costs for the RCT
seemed highly loaded. The funding route of using prior-year Thai MASF,
with replacement of run-downs via PL–480 funds used to make purchases
from U.S. military sales was agreed upon. This would be used first to sup-
port a sortie rate by the RTAF of 900 per month. Ambassador Unger
would be asked to discuss this with the Thai, and also to review with
them the requirements for the RCT. This cable should reflect the urgency
of the need for Thai air support. In the course of this discussion it was
brought out that there was no economic justification of a PL–480 pro-
gram for Thailand, but that there was no choice other than to go for a PL–480
program up to $20 million2 as a source of funds for trade-offs.
The issue of Thai training for 15,000 Cambodian troops was raised,
with several members questioning the effectiveness of such training. It
was generally accepted that all training should be carried out in South
Vietnam, where the job could be done more effectively, more quickly,
and more cheaply. However, Admiral Moorer would be asked to look into a
comparison of South Vietnam versus Thailand for training Cambodians, to
include an estimate of the training times required.
The question of pay and allowances for the Khmer Krom and the
Thai/Khmer units was addressed, with the alternatives being Defense
funds, AID supporting assistance, the AID contingency funds, or CIA
funds. The decision was made to rely on Defense funds for the 1st quarter of
FY 71 and AID supporting assistance used later, subject to the views of the
Secretary of Defense. (This was based on the assumption that an increase
in the AID appropriation for general supporting assistance would not
get through Congress at this time; Mr. Nutter, however, quoted Secre-
tary Laird as believing that the issue should be carried to the Hill now.)
A Defense switchback would be required to pay separation allowances
of $1.7 million for the Thai/Khmer and Mr. Nutter agreed to talk to Mr.
Packard on this. The size of the Cambodian MAP was considered. The

2
Telegram 110878 to Bangkok, July 10, proposed a PL–480 program made up of
tobacco, cotton, and wheat, as well as other aid programs. The telegram stated that “it
may be desirable to provide some additional assistance to Thailand in recognition of
Thai support of common effort to maintain Cambodian independence.” It added that it
was “important, however, that no impression be given to RTG or others that the U.S.
would be providing such additional assistance on any kind of matching basis with the
Thai contributions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 10 THAI)
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156 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

consensus was to go for a Presidential Decision calling for a $40 mil-

lion Cambodian program to be drawn from other programs, and to ask
for a supplemental later when Congressional response might be bet-
ter. The $40 million was estimated as being sufficient to carry through
January or February 1971. Admiral Moorer felt that this sum was
insufficient.
The meeting agreed to consider the retention of Thai forces in Laos
at the next session. Agreement was noted on providing SAR operations
in Cambodia for the RTAF, and on providing communications jeeps to
Cambodia for use in air-to-ground control.
[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

77. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 16, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject File, Coun-

try File, Thailand, 1969–1972. Secret; Eyes Only. 5 pages of source text
not declassified.]

78. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 18, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject File, Coun-

try File, Thailand, 1969–1972. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text
not declassified.]
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Thailand 157

79. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of

Defense for National Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of
Defense Laird1

I–35764/70 Washington, July 23, 1970.

SUBJECT
Redeployment of US Forces from Thailand (BANNER SUN)

Your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff dated

5 June 1970,2 approved a plan to redeploy 7,300 USAF and 2,565 USA
personnel from Thailand during FY 71. These redeployments were to
begin 15 July 1970, except for the small F–102 detachment at Don
Muang which redeployed 25 June 1970.
A State/Defense message was sent on 2 July3 directing American
Embassy Bangkok to initiate consultations with the RTG concerning
these planned reductions of US forces in Thailand. At State’s request
the redeployments were rescheduled to begin 1 August, instead of 15
July, to provide Ambassador Unger additional time to facilitate nego-
tiations with the RTG. Later, on the same day, State Department di-
rected separately that action on redeployment of US forces in Thailand
be suspended pending further instructions. This action was taken at
the request of Secretary Rogers from Manila. Subsequent information
indicated that the decision concerning this redeployment package
would be withheld pending review of the FY 71 DoD budget and the
VSSG study of air operations in Southeast Asia.
On the basis of the foregoing, JCS directed CINCPAC to take no
further action to redeploy or prepare for redeployment of these forces.
The FY 71 DoD budget is predicated, in part, on the planned reduc-
tions of forces in Thailand. A decision is required as soon as practical
in order to begin negotiations with the RTG, preparatory to redeploy-
ing these forces.
Recommend you sign the attached memorandum to Dr. Kissinger4
reemphasizing the necessity for expeditious resolution of the questions

1
Source: Washington National Records Center, FRC 330 74 0142, Signers Copies
Folder #24. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2
Not found.
3
See footnote 2, Document 73.
4
Attached but not printed. The memorandum states that its purpose is “to reaf-
firm strongly” the Department of Defense position that negotiation with the RTG “should
be started immediately so that we can retain our credibility with the Thai and minimize
the adverse budgetary impact of the unplanned delay.” It also states the hope that “no
additional delays in completing the VSSG study will be encountered.”
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158 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

which are directly related to FY 71 force reductions in Thailand. (BAN-

NER SUN). A talking paper on the subject for your use in California is
also appended.5
RA Ware

5
Attached but not printed. The paper provides a chronology of the plan for mili-
tary reductions in Thailand. It also asserts that the loss of the F–105 aircraft there would
“be fully compensated for by the additional AC–130 and B–57s as in terms of interdic-
tion in Laos” and that the Takhli base in Thailand “will no longer be needed” and that
its closure “should have no impact on Thai decision-making regarding Cambodia.”

80. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, July 30, 1970.

SUBJECT
U.S. Air Force Reduction in Thailand

In accordance with your request there is attached the memorandum

which I received from our Thai people concerning the problem of United
States reduction of Air Force units in Thailand. This memorandum ad-
dresses itself only to those reductions which our Embassy in Thailand
knows are included in the Fiscal Year 1971 program. Our Embassy in
Bangkok is not yet aware of the fact that one of the alternatives in the
tactical air package for Southeast Asia might result in the elimination of
additional squadrons and in the evacuation of the base at Korat.
Naturally, if there were any decision taken to accept the alterna-
tive which involves the Korat evacuation, our problem with the Thai
would be even greater than is suggested in the attached memorandum.
On the other hand, if we are going to make such a decision we should
not break the news to the Thai piecemeal but should give them the bad
news all at once.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret. A notation in Kissinger’s hand-
writing reads: “Al—I agree, I want the whole ’71 package spelled out and communicated
to DOD along the lines of VSSG decisions.”
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Thailand 159

Our very strong recommendation is that the decision on the tacti-

cal air package should leave the Korat installation intact. Therefore, if
and when the decision is made to instruct Embassy Bangkok to im-
plement the Fiscal Year 1971 package2 we trust that will be a definitive
decision concerning the total redeployments to be made from Thailand
and that it will involve only the redeployment of the air squadrons and
the evacuation of Takhli.

Attachment

Washington, undated.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of
State Rogers3

SUBJECT
U.S. Air Force Reduction in Thailand

During your forthcoming visit to San Clemente, the Viet-Nam Spe-

cial Study Group will take up with the White House the reduction of the
USAF sortie rate from Thai bases. Whatever decision is taken with re-
spect to the sortie rate will be the foundation for subsequent actions to
reduce U.S. military forces in Thailand. As you know from your conver-
sations with Ambassador Unger in Manila and Tokyo, he is greatly con-
cerned not only over the size and pattern of the cuts themselves but also
over the political importance that there be thorough, unhurried and gen-
uine consultations and that in these consultations we genuinely take into
account Thai problems. In this connection there are two important points:
A. That there be adequate lead time for consultation and planning
process to take place. In practice this would mean that there should be at
least 60 days following the initiation of consultations with the Thai and
prior to the actual commencement of reductions. Thus if a decision were
communicated to Bangkok to commence consultations on August 1,

2
The decision was made at the WSAG meeting of August 4, which was held in the
White House Situation Room from 5:10 to 6:45 p.m. The WSAG agreed that DOD should
pull its F–105s out of Takhli, but that the base should be kept open at least until Octo-
ber 1971. Excerpts relating to Thailand are in Document 81.
3
Green crossed out the Secretary as the addressee on this memorandum and wrote
in Ambassador Sullivan’s name with a note that reads: “Bill—I’m not sending this to the
Secretary since he won’t be at VSSG or even later at S. Clemente. However, you may
find points here valid and relevant in your VSSG meeting. MG”
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160 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

actual reductions in operations and/or redeployment actions should

not commence until October 1. This is important not only for political
reasons but to permit sound planning of what will prove to be a very
complicated process for the Thai.
B. That the close out of Takhli Air Base be phased so as to gear
into the Thai budgetary cycle, i.e. October 1, 1971, rather than on the
proposed date of June 30, 1971. I understand our budgetary rationale
behind the June 30 date, but there are substantial considerations argu-
ing in favor of an October 1 close-out. Some 1900 locally hired work-
ers will be thrown out of work in what is otherwise a tiny village com-
munity. There will be substantial local economic dislocation. In
addition, if the Thai Air Force is to continue to keep Takhli open on a
standby basis it will have to make budgetary arrangements to do so.
All of these considerations will require budgetary and appropriation
action by the RTG. To close out on June 30, 1971 will leave a three-
month gap which will plague both the RTG and us in the future. If the
consultation process is to be meaningful, we must be prepared to take
account of this genuine problem. Even though the flying air squadrons
may have already redeployed the USAF skeleton ground element
should remain in Takhli until October 1.
I note from Under Secretary Packard’s letter of June 30 to Under
Secretary Johnson4 that Defense expects the RTAF to keep Takhli open.
Mr. Packard goes on to indicate that “reentry should be relatively easy
since the base will be in full operation”. Since we are counting on the
Thai to maintain the base in a operational status, it is in our own in-
terest to facilitate Thai administrative and budgetary take over by phas-
ing out our final withdrawal until October 1.
While the meeting in San Clemente is primarily concerned with
the sortie rate and may not take specific questions of timing, yet the
decisions to be made on the sortie rate will to a large extent determine
our flexibility with respect to phasing and timing. I hope full consid-
eration will be given to these points in considering the reduction of the
sortie rate.

4
Document 73.

81. Editorial Note

During the Washington Special Actions Group meeting of August

4, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry
Kissinger announced first that the organization of several different
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Thailand 161

groups of principals dealing with various aspects of the conflict in

Southeast Asia would be simplified, and that “this group of principals
will now be called the Senior Review Group on Southeast Asia.”
A summary reads as follows:
“Support for Thai Khmer Units. DOD is to pay initial family sepa-
ration allowances for the first 2,000 troops, and to cover the first Quar-
ter’s pay and allowances after deployment in Cambodia. AID will off-
set this cost later by making available supporting assistance to cover a
Vietnam cost which otherwise would be funded by DOD. The State
Department is to make sure the Thais understand that these units must
at least nominally be folded into FANK in order that initial equipment
needs and operative support can be covered by Cambodian MAP.”
The WSAG also agreed “that projects for recruitment of two ad-
ditional Lao SGU battalions and six Thai SGU battalions for paramili-
tary operations in South Laos should go forward.”
The last discussion of the meeting concerned the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Thailand. Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson asked
about the withdrawal of air support and stated that the “Black Panthers
are leaving Vietnam, and some U.S. troops are leaving Thailand.” (Prime
Minister Thanom announced on August 27 that his Government had in-
formed the South Vietnamese Government that it planned to withdraw
its troops from that country.) In response to Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard’s question as to whether there was any reason to keep
Takhli open, Kissinger made the following response:
“When you draw down your involvement in Thailand, it will be
hard to get back in. Since one could conclude that Thailand will be our
anchor in Southeast Asia, we might wish to pull troops now in South
Vietnam into Thailand. If this should be the case, we would want to
keep as much presence as possible in Thailand at this time. This is the
argument that Sullivan has been giving me, and I understand that Sec-
retary Rogers agrees.”
Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms added that “We
shouldn’t indicate that we are closing Takhli at this time.” Kissinger then
stated, “I agree. Let’s take out the F–105s, but keep open the base for
now.” Kissinger concluded by stating that if “we tell the Thais that we
are getting out, we will have to pay the political price. On the other hand,
if we just take the F–105s out, but leave the base open, we can come back
at any time that we choose.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG
Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)
The discussions and agreement with the Thai Government concern-
ing the redeployment of the additional 10,000 U.S. military personnel from
Thailand during FY 1971 were publicly announced on September 8.
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162 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

82. Summary Paper in Response to National Security Study

Memorandum 511

Washington, August 5, 1970.

A PROGRAM ANALYSIS STUDY OF U.S. POLICY AND PROGRAM

OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 1971–1975
[Omitted here is Part I, Introduction.]
Part II
Analysis of Issues
(1) U.S. Interests in Thailand, the Threats to Thailand, and Alternative
U.S. Commitments to Thailand.
U.S. Interests in Thailand. In his February 18, 1970 message to the
Congress the President prescribed the following relationship between
U.S. interests and U.S. commitments: “Our interests must shape our com-
mitments rather than the other way around.”
U.S. strategic, foreign policy, military, political, and economic in-
terests are involved in Thailand.
U.S. Strategic and Military Interests in Thailand—The U.S. has made
extensive use of air bases and support facilities in Thailand for wartime
bombing and intelligence operations in Vietnam. The bases, however,
remain under nominal Thai control. Thailand is in an ideal position for
staging operations in Laos and for support efforts to help Cambodia.
Thailand has also made a contribution to the war effort in Vietnam as
a Troop Contributing Country.
In the event of a Sino-U.S. war, the U.S. would mount attacks from
its East Asian bases e.g. Japan, Philippines, Korea, etc., because they
are close to China’s industrial and population centers. Bases in South-
east Asia would be an asset but not of critical importance. Therefore,
Thailand is not of great strategic value vis-à-vis China. However, Thai-
land is and will remain an important intelligence base for the moni-
toring of Chinese activities. Thai-based installations are useful for mon-
itoring Chinese missile developments and potential military
preparations, particularly for attacks on Southeast Asia. However, with

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box
2. Top Secret. According to a September 16 memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the response to NSSM 51 was not completed, but in-
stead was incorporated into NSSM 99, Southeast Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, NSC
Files: 80 D 212, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 1, NSC Admin. Matters, January 1970)
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Thailand 163

satellite air and seaborne capability, the loss of Thailand as an intelli-

gence base would deal a severe blow to U.S. interests only with regard
to our ability to have the necessary warning to defend Thailand it-
self. Therefore, in the absence of other U.S. interests, the intelligence
value of Thailand alone would not justify a U.S. commitment to de-
fend Thailand.
As the major industrial power in Asia, Japan’s security interests
are important to the U.S. However, unlike its attitude toward Korea,
Japan does not view its security to be closely linked to Thailand.
With regard to Southeast Asia, although the U.S. has stated that it
does not seek permanent bases in Thailand after the Vietnam war, it is
conceivable that U.S. interests in preserving the outcome in Laos or
Vietnam may require U.S. access to bases in Thailand. A U.S. presence
in Southeast Asia maintained by the U.S. SEATO commitment to Thai-
land, may also provide a security umbrella against an overt Chinese
or other threats for nascent Southeast Asian regionalism or for indi-
vidual nations (e.g. Cambodia) where the U.S. has interests but no
commitments.
In relation to East Asia and the Pacific Area. To the South, Singapore
possesses in the form of one of the largest and most modern non-
American naval bases in the world—airfields, and ship and aircraft
maintenance facilities—assets that could be used to support military
forces in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.
A continued British and Australian presence in Singapore would
probably preclude the hostile use of these naval facilities as well as pro-
vide a barrier to aggression across the Straits of Malacca. If Thailand
were neutral or under Communist control, the U.S. would have the op-
tion of basing its own forces at Singapore in addition to the British and
Australian presence.
About 800 Free World ships each month pass through the Straits
of Malacca, but this route is of primary economic importance not to
the U.S. but to Japan, which is the world’s largest importer of oil (90%
of which comes through the Straits). Even Japanese interests would not
be seriously endangered if the Straits were closed as oil tankers could
pass south of Indonesia.
Indonesia itself constitutes a major U.S. security interest in East
Asia, although it is doubtful that a neutral or hostile Thailand would
significantly alter Indonesia’s2 determination and capability to remain
non-Communist.

2
A notation next to this underlined passage (from ‘doubtful’ through ‘Indonesia’s’)
reads “nuts! Heartland of SE Asia.”
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164 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

In the Pacific area, as long as Indonesia remains independent, there

is no direct link between the security of Thailand and the defense of
Australia, New Zealand or other Pacific powers friendly to the U.S.
Nor is there any direct link between Thailand’s security and the secu-
rity of the U.S.
Foreign Policy Interests: SEATO and the Problem of U.S. Commit-
ments—To the extent that other powers gauge U.S. intentions on the
basis of the U.S.’s performance vis-à-vis Thailand—for example, our
willingness to honor our commitment to Thailand—our actions in Thai-
land will have wider repercussions in Asia, particularly for those Asian
nations such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan that rely on the U.S. to bal-
ance the influence of China.
The same is true, although to a lesser extent, world-wide. While
Thailand may not be considered an area of vital U.S. interest, and the
Thai may be able to deal with their internal security problems on their
own (or at least without U.S. combat troops), the U.S. has an interest
in demonstrating fidelity to its international commitments. As the only
mainland Asian subscriber to SEATO, Thailand ranks with South Ko-
rea and Taiwan as an area where the credibility of the U.S. commit-
ment in Asia could be put to the test.
Thus, the U.S. commitment and involvement in Thailand are an element
of the Asian balance of power. The size and nature of our role can vary sig-
nificantly in relation to alternative estimates of the extent of U.S. involve-
ment required to maintain regional stability in the face of the likely threats.
While the present equilibrium in SEA may be acceptable to U.S. interests,
other stable arrangements could also be compatible with U.S. goals. For ex-
ample, in the post-Vietnam period a Thailand less dependent on the
U.S. either as a result of increased Thai military capability, diminished
threats, or diplomatic realignment or some combination of these three
would not necessarily threaten the balance of power in Asia and
thereby U.S. interests.
Political Interests—In addition to the SEATO relationship, informal
or implied U.S. commitments to Thailand stem from communications
and contingency plans relating to the formal commitment, implicit un-
derstandings regarding U.S. programs in Thailand, and from Thai co-
operation in collective security actions in Asia, particularly in Vietnam.
The net effect of these informal obligations, over a period of twenty
years, has been a considerable deepening of the intimacy of U.S.-Thai
relations.
Therefore, while there are no historic U.S. ties of friendship with
Thailand, there is a measure of intimacy that has resulted from a past
close U.S.-Thai relationship, particularly through the Vietnam war.
Economic Interests—The U.S. does not have major economic inter-
ests in Thailand. U.S. investments amount to about $200 million. Thai-
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Thailand 165

land is not an important trading partner of the United States; total U.S.-
Thai trade in 1968 was $267 million. Thailand is not an indispensable
source of scarce resources for the U.S. It is not a major market for U.S.
industry. However, U.S. access to Thai airspace and U.S. landing rights
in Thailand are a decided convenience for the U.S.
Conclusion—Thailand is not of vital interest to the United States.
Our greatest interest in Thailand derives from our foreign policy ob-
jective of bringing the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion.3
Beyond this, however, U.S. interests are not inconsistent with a
new equilibrium in Southeast Asia resulting from either a change in
the military balance or from diplomatic realignment. Whether U.S. in-
terests would be served by such developments depends largely on how
the new situation is arrived at. That is, if the U.S. acted precipitously in
rejecting its alliance with Thailand, U.S. foreign policy interests in Asia
and world wide could be seriously harmed.
On the other hand, if the threats to Thailand diminished as a re-
sult of action by China, the Soviet Union or North Vietnam, or if Thai
actions increased Thailand’s defense capabilities or improved its rela-
tions with Peking or Hanoi and thereby lessened Thailand’s depend-
ence on the U.S., such developments would not threaten U.S. interests.
The issue then is not whether U.S. interests can tolerate a Thailand
less intimately linked to the U.S., but whether ways can be found to
diminish Thailand’s dependence and scale down the U.S. commitment
to Thailand without: (a) jeopardizing our immediate goals in South-
east Asia, or (b) abandoning the Thai in a precipitous manner that
would jeopardize U.S. foreign policy goals.
[Omitted here is Part III, Issues for Decision.]

3
A notation next to this sentence reads: “more a non-commie SE Asia.”

83. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]

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166 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

84. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.,

and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, August 14, 1970.

SUBJECT
Banner Sun Reductions in Thailand

The Banner Sun package represents total reductions of about

10,000 U.S. personnel. This includes about 4,000 personnel associated
with the withdrawal of F–105s and 6,000 other personnel including en-
gineer and transportation units, and other miscellaneous personnel.
The package was “approved” by Packard and Johnson and Am-
bassador Unger was advised to inform the Thai by a cable in early July2
(on what basis is not clear to us), but a hold was placed on this at Sec-
retary Rogers’ direction3 following his discussion with the President.
The Banner Sun package was discussed at the VSSG meeting in
Los Angeles and subsequently in the WSAG meeting on August 4.4 In
both cases the discussion turned on whether Takhli should be kept
open. In Los Angeles the discussion was in the context of sortie levels.
At the WSAG meeting the discussion centered on whether we should
inform the Thai of our intention ultimately to close Takhli or whether
we should agree to keep it open and manned until October 1971, de-
ferring until early spring informing the Thai of our decision. At the
WSAG meeting it was agreed that we would keep Takhli open through
October 1971, would withdraw the F–105 units, and would defer un-
til spring 1971 decision as to whether to continue our operation of the
base after October 1971 or to turn over responsibility to the Thai and
to inform them of our intention to do so. NSDM 77 confirmed the de-
cision on Takhli and set sortie levels.
The draft cable which Alex Johnson used as a springboard for the
discussion at the WSAG meeting,5 and which he left with you, au-
thorized Ambassador Unger to inform the Thai of the full Banner Sun
reduction package modified by the decision on Takhli, and to advise

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2
See footnote 2, Document 73.
3
See Document 74.
4
See Document 81.
5
Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 167

the Thai about September 1. (Our redraft taking into account your
changes but still reflecting the Johnson/Packard “approval” of the en-
tire Banner Sun package is at Tab A.)6
Both Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Packard are agreed that we
should go forward on this basis, but we are unclear as to whether you
agree or whether the reductions other than those associated with F–105s
require further approval either by you or by the President.
We would appreciate your guidance.

Banner Sun approved in full with modification for Takhli7 (approve ca-
ble at Tab A)
Air Force reductions modified by Takhli approved but do Memo for
the President on other reductions

6
Attached but not printed.
7
This option was checked.

85. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, August 14, 1970.

SUBJECT
Your Request for Chronology of Thai Moves in Providing Regular RTA Forces
for Service in Cambodia

At Tab A is the chronology of Thai moves in providing regular

RTA forces for service in Cambodia2 as we have pieced it together from
regular and back-channel messages.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for information.
The memorandum is unsigned.
2
The 5-page chronology references the regular and backchannel messages that cor-
respond to each Thai/U.S. move; attached but not printed.
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168 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

In brief, I believe that these messages bring out the following

points:
—In May, soon after the U.S./GVN operations began in Cambo-
dia, the Thai became concerned about the implications for them of the
Communist aggression in Cambodia and began to consider the possi-
bility of deploying regular RTA forces into Cambodia to help prevent
a Communist takeover.
—An initial Thai concept was to deploy a regiment of the Black
Panthers from Vietnam into Eastern Cambodia, replacing it with other
regular forces from Thailand. The Black Panthers would thus have
stayed on in Vietnam.
—After State determined that we could not legally support the
Black Panthers in Cambodia unless operations were confined to the
sanctuaries (“fighting the Vietnam war in Cambodia”) and we discov-
ered also that the Thai intended to cover a broad area of Cambodia
with these forces, an alternative was considered of supporting Thai
forces (two regiments) from Thailand moving into Western Cambodia.
—We then (about the end of May) spoke of upgrading the two reg-
ular Thailand regiments but retaining them in Thailand as “fire
brigades” pending deployment of the Thai/Khmer regiments.
—At this point we also began to engage in discussions with the
Thai—from the Thai standpoint the word “haggle” might be a better
term—on how U.S. support for these activities might be provided. We
offered various combinations such as prior-year Thai MASF, trade-offs
from economic assistance, and increased PL 480. It may have appeared
to the Thai from this that we were fiddling while Rome was burning.
—As the June 30 date for the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia
neared and no definitive arrangement for support of Thai forces in
Cambodia was arrived at, the Thai began to consider the withdrawal
of all Black Panther units from Vietnam to cope with dangers closer to
Thailand, possibly by committing them to Cambodia.
—However, the Thai themselves began to have some second
thoughts about too obvious a Thai military presence in Cambodia. Thai
public opinion did not appear enthusiastic about involvement. Foreign
Minister Thanat apparently exercised some influence on planning to as-
sure that Thai contributions to Cambodia would be kept clandestine. In
addition, a “high level political decision” was allegedly required before
Thai troops would be committed. The Thai were also concerned that
their moving into a military role in Cambodia would vitiate their influ-
ence as one of the three Djakarta Conference convener governments.
—Once again, misgivings about the level of U.S. support may have
played a role in the Thai reservations. They have consistently found it
very difficult to understand why the U.S. has not moved more vigor-
ously to support them in coping with what they regard as clear and
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Thailand 169

present threat to Thailand, and have apparently not comprehended the

legal, financial, and Congressional complexities with which we must
deal.
—The Thai concept which finally began to emerge from the with-
drawal of the Black Panthers (which has still not been formally an-
nounced) was not to use them as a fire brigade but as the trained nu-
cleus of expanded Thai forces—apparently not for immediate use in
Cambodia.

86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Chronology of Moves in Connection with Provision of Regular Thai Forces for
Service in Cambodia

You are aware that there have been numerous problems in putting
into effect your strategy for Cambodia of mobilizing maximum U.S.
and third country efforts to prevent the collapse of the Cambodian Gov-
ernment. As an illustration of these problems, the chronology at Tab
A2 summarizes the sequence of events surrounding a plan for de-
ploying two regular Thai regiments in Cambodia, which has now been
dropped by the Thai.
When the Thai first proposed this on May 22 they emphasized the
need for [1 line of source text not declassified], and (b) the need for U.S.
support essentially as provided for their forces in Laos and South Viet-
nam. These two regiments were to be in addition to the Thai Khmer
regiments which we were already committed to support. At that time

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ap-
parently drafted by Holdridge and Kennedy, as evidenced by their attached August 26
memorandum to Kissinger. There is no indication that the President saw this memo-
randum, and a notation in the margin of the Holdridge/Kennedy memorandum in
Kissinger’s handwriting reads “Al—I think this is probably OBE. What do you think?
At any rate please put in the files (as well as my personal files).” A notation next to it
in Haig’s handwriting reads: “Agree.”
2
At Tab A, attached but not printed, is the same chronology as that mentioned in
footnote 2, Document 85.
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170 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the Thai had agreed to pay the salaries and expenses of the Thai Khmer
regiments after they were deployed in Cambodia. Our initial reaction
was to go slow on the regular Thai regiments, getting them ready (con-
tributing equipment and training support) but keeping them in reserve.
When the Thai persisted, we discussed with them the possibility
of overcoming the complex problems of support for these units in Cam-
bodia by employing them as an augmentation of the Thai Black Pan-
ther unit in Vietnam. Some of the Black Panthers would then have
moved into the sanctuary areas.
Meanwhile, plans for the Djakarta Conference were advancing and
a great deal of emphasis was being placed on “neutrality” and “non-
alignment” in the Asian capitals. Our Embassies with State’s backing
were taking every opportunity to remind governmental leaders of the
need to protect their “neutral” credentials to (a) get the conference off
the ground, and (b) assure a reasonable prospect for its success. This
probably contributed to the Thai Cabinet’s decision to defer sending
the Thai “volunteers” to Cambodia—the Djakarta Conference called
for removal of all foreign troops from Cambodia.
Thai desire for moving at least a regiment of the Black Panthers
waxed again in mid-June, but despite our offers of indirect help to make
this possible, they began to temporize. (The military situation in Cam-
bodia, which had seemed critical in early and mid-June had improved
somewhat which may have relieved some of the pressures on the Thai
to move.) The way in which our offers were couched may have con-
tributed at this point to a general uneasiness on the part of the Thai.
State continued to paint a picture of the legal complexities which we
had to overcome in giving any support. The effect probably was to sug-
gest to the Thai that we really did not favor their movement. At the
same time we were pursuing in all capitals the need for a vigorous
follow-up to the Djakarta conference—the inferences were “remember
your neutral status” and remember the Djakarta declaration that all
foreign troops should withdraw.
The net effect of all this seems to have been that the Thai doubted
either our willingness or at least our ability to come through with the
kind of financial support they wanted. Behind their desire for finan-
cial support was also a clear hope for a U.S. commitment on behalf of
their military actions in Cambodia. On this aspect, too, there must have
been growing doubts. Despite occasional suggestions that they might
be willing to go ahead without substantial help from us, the weight of
the evidence is on the side that they wanted support of a kind they al-
ready were receiving for their forces in Northern Laos and in Vietnam.
Our “explanations” of the difficulties of providing such support in
Cambodia probably led them to conclude that we would only reluc-
tantly acquiesce in such support and might not continue it for long.
There would be no commitment.
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Thailand 171

Thus our position probably may have been interpreted as compar-

atively negative. This led the Thai in turn to reach a “political” decision
not to go ahead. It also reinforced their concern as to our future inten-
tions in the region—our Vietnam withdrawals, our ground force with-
drawal from Cambodia and our planned reductions in Thailand all
added up to produce a growing sense of uneasiness in Bangkok. When
we discouraged (with General Abrams’ concurrence) the use of the Pan-
thers in Cambodia and didn’t come forward with a positive and simple
solution to the support problems for the Thai regiments in western Cam-
bodia, the Thai probably concluded that the better part of valor was to
tighten their belts and bring the Panthers home to protect Thailand it-
self before we withdrew the support we were then providing.
Ambassador Unger continued to suggest to Washington his en-
thusiasm for the project. State’s instructions, however, tended to imply
some reticence to move ahead and left Unger to carry the ball without
positive evidence of full support from the Department for the project.
As evidenced at the WSAG meetings neither Ambassador John-
son nor Ambassador Green were enthusiastic at the prospect of regu-
lar Thai forces in Cambodia. This accounts for the fact that most cables
originally were drafted in negative tone.

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Washington, September 5, 1970, 1824Z.

146291. CINCPAC For POLAD.

1. Following is approved memorandum of conversation between
Vice President Agnew and Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok from
10:00 a.m. to 12 noon on August 29, 1970.
2. Summary: Vice President had wide-ranging conversations with
PM and other Thai leaders on situation in Thailand and neighboring
areas and on political background of United States policies. Some spe-
cific problems related to US support of Thai efforts in Laos and Cam-
bodia also discussed.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 449, President’s Trip
Files, Vice President’s SEA Trip, Aug 1970. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon,
Phnom Penh, Taipei, Rangoon, CINCPAC, and the White House.
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3. Meeting opened with briefing by Dawee on insurgency in Thai-

land and situation in Cambodia and Laos. PM raised Souvanna
Phouma’s request for three Thai battalions in Laos and need for US
support of these. Vice President discussed this in relation to domestic
US political situation and danger of exacerbating opposition’s ob-
structive actions by attempting to provide direct support to this type
of operation. He emphasized need to find indirect means of compen-
sating Thai for cost of such operations. Vice President went on to dis-
cuss background of political situation in United States, political pres-
sures of forthcoming election and Senate attitudes. He stressed need to
keep Thai-US disagreements “in the family” to avoid giving advocates
of isolationist policy ammunition for use against administration.
4. Vice President spoke briefly on visit to Viet-Nam and Cambo-
dia, stressing impressive performance of Lon Nol.
5. Vice President informed Thais that FANK trained in Thailand
could be equipped out of Cambodian MAP, assuming this met with
GOC approval. When Thais urged that US make decision to divert
funds for this purpose, VP cautioned against expecting United States
to act without consulting Cambodians or to put pressure on Cambo-
dians on this kind of issue.
6. Thais referred to US press attacks on them, citing recent Newsweek
article by Maynard Parker. Vice President urged them not to be too sen-
sitive and not to mistake this type of criticism for voice of the US peo-
ple. Thais complained of being described as “bending with the wind”
when in fact they had taken strong position against Communism.
7. Thais expressed appreciation for US aid, including PL–480 of-
fer. Thais made strong appeal to Vice President not to reduce aid in
face of increased threat. Vice President pledged to so recommend. Vice
President expressed gratitude for Thai commitment and assistance in
many parts [garble].
8. Meeting ended with brief discussion of situation in Burma. End
summary.
9. Participants on Thai side were Prime Minister Thanom, Deputy
Prime Ministers Praphat and Pote, Air Chief Marshal Dawee, General
Sawaeng (chief of PriMin’s office), Dr. Renoo (Secretary General NEDS)
and Service Chiefs of Staff Bunchoo (Air), Charoon (Navy) and Surakit
(Army). On American side were Vice President, Mr. Sohmer, Brig. Gen.
Dunn, Mr. Duemling, Mr. Houdek, Ambassador Unger, DCM New-
man, COMUSMACTHAI Major General Seith and Political Counselor
Pickering.
10. PriMin Thanom led off, saying Thai had no formal agenda but
would simply try to provide VP with picture of latest developments in
Thailand as basis for his report to the President. He said Thais would
appreciate getting from VP report of US policy, VP said this was com-
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Thailand 173

pletely agreeable, that he wanted briefing on the situation in Thailand

and on this part of the world. For his part, he would try to help them
understand certain aspects of the complex political situation in the
United States which he knew were difficult to comprehend. He said he
hoped they would not be inhibited by the well known and much ap-
preciated Thai courtesy, but would go to the heart of all matters. He
said we are engaged together in a difficult war with a determined en-
emy and must be completely frank with one another about problems.
11. Situation in Thailand and Neighboring Areas: Dawee pre-
sented this briefing. With respect to North Thailand, he said Commu-
nists had limited capability because they were mostly hill tribes and
received no support from lowland Thai. Only danger was that of linkup
with Pathet Lao in Sayabouri. Chinese Communist road leading to
Sayabouri indicates ChiCom intention to support insurgency in Thai-
land. Northeast now “under control” thanks to combined civilian po-
lice and military effort. Situation a “little bad” in mid-South, but only
real danger is possible linkup between CTS in mid-South and those on
Malaysian border who are residuals from Malaysian emergency. Lat-
ter now recruiting and training Thai and some Malaysians.
12. In Laos, Dawee identified principal threat to Thailand as com-
ing from Sayabouri and Champasak. Noted Thai assistance to RLG cit-
ing forces assisting Vang Pao and harrassment and interdiction teams.
Said Thai wish to help further but require support from US.
13. On Cambodia, Dawee praised US operation in sanctuaries, but
said Communists now establishing new sanctuaries in area in North-
west Cambodia. He estimated that no more than 20 percent of people
(including those in Communist-occupied areas) support Sihanouk or
Communists. Rest loyal to Lon Nol.
14. Additional Thai Forces for Laos: PriMin Souvanna Phouma
had asked for three Thai battalions, one to serve in Sayabouri and two
in Campassak and Sithadone. They were to relieve Lao forces to move
into other, more critical areas. PM said he understood Washington ap-
proved establishing six Thai SGU battalions, but noted they had a four-
month training cycle and could probably not be deployed before Jan-
uary 1, 1971. He said Souvanna Phouma wants help immediately and
therefore the three battalions should move in in the meantime. He
asked US support.
15. VP said this is difficult because of the political problems in the
US. We are working on means to provide assistance, but it may not
take the traditional form.
16. The Ambassador referred to discussions held with the PM and
others the previous day concerning this problem. He said we can help
with SGUs for use in trail interdiction, but he expressed doubt as to
how much we can do in connection with a requirement for regular
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174 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

battalions in Sayabouri, Champassak, and Sithandone. However, we

were seeking a complete answer on this from Washington.
16. The VP said the situation in Southeast Asia is so distorted in
the press coverage that people do not get a clear picture of the nature
of actions such as the assistance Souvanna is seeking. The Senate is fo-
cusing intensely on this type of action in a very hostile way. While we
know it is needed and worthy of our support, that support cannot be
provided in the usual way at this time. (At this point, FonMin Thanat
(who has kept himself very closely informed on the various amend-
ments which the Senate is considering) spoke to the PriMin in Thai for
some time explaining some implications of the Cooper–Church, Ful-
bright, and other proposed amendments.)
17. The VP said that press is generally aware that there were some
Thai forces in Laos, although we had not confirmed their presence. He
said US support of additional Thai forces for Laos could cause a real
explosion in US public opinion. Thus it was necessary to look for other
kinds of assistance which would permit the Thais to transfer funds now
allocated to other purposes to support such measures as Thai battal-
ions for Laos.
18. Impact of Political Situation in the US on Southeast Asian
Policy: Against this background the VP discussed further the pressures
from the forthcoming elections and current attitudes in the Senate.
He noted that Humphrey had recently come out in support of the
McGovern–Hatfield Amendment. Many voices are now calling upon
us to leave Asia now regardless of the consequences. The VP described
the severe inflationary situation the President had inherited from the
previous administration. Thus he had been forced to trim spending in
an effort to reestablish a sane fiscal policy. Congress, however, had in-
sisted on large education and housing appropriations, even overriding
the President’s veto, forcing the administration to trim the defense es-
tablishment by $10 billion. This meant applying the knife heavily all
over the world, and facing considerable resultant unemployment in the
US. He said the present was as tough a period of national adjustment
as we had ever had to cope with.
19. The VP said President Nixon understands that we should ful-
fill our role as a Pacific power and was determined that we would keep
our treaty obligations. He said the President would not have sent him
back after only seven months if he didn’t think this part of the world
was important.
20. The VP expressed the belief that if the administration gets
through the off-year election without erosion of its position on the Hill,
the situation would right itself. He said that in many key races the is-
sue was not partisan politics but was drawn between isolationism and
continuation of the administration’s foreign policy. He noted the do-
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Thailand 175

mestic political importance of his ability to go back and report first-

hand on the situation in Southeast Asia.
21. He said the mood of isolationism in certain parts of American
society is directed strongly at Southeast Asia. He noted the contrast be-
tween Fulbright’s position on the Middle East and that on Southeast Asia.
It is politically tempting to appeal to people who are tired of the war, to
students and to the media who want immediate withdrawal from Asia.
22. He appealed to the Thai leaders not to construe our actions as
lessening support for them or weakening of our resolve. That would
cause the administration further difficulty in the US.
23. He said if our allies seem to be complaining and criticizing all
the time, people may get sick of it and go along with those who de-
mand that we get out. This would make it impossible for the President,
the real advocate of helping our friends. We must face the fact, he con-
tinued, that we cannot say things in the same way or operate in the
same way as before. Even the limited statements he had made in rela-
tion to Cambodia, for example, had attracted criticism. He said the US
faces an absolute crisis in government, and that the administration can-
not operate without Congressional support. He concluded these re-
marks by noting that Ambassador Unger would help find less direct
ways to meet the needs of the situation.
24. Impact on Vietnamization of Situation in Neighboring Coun-
tries: The PriMin said that he agrees with the program on Viet-
namization and the need to strengthen the Vietnamese ability to stand
on their own feet. However, he emphasized that if we do not assist vic-
tims of Communist aggression such as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand,
and if they are weakened and lack support, it will be difficult for Viet-
nam itself to stand on its own feet.
25. The Vice President agreed, recalling his observations to news-
men concerning the effect on our withdrawals from Vietnam should
Cambodia fall to the Communists. Administration policy is to do ex-
actly what the PriMin suggests but unfortunately that is not the pol-
icy favored by some in the legislative branch who believe that coun-
tries of Southeast Asia can be allowed to go Communist without any
serious repercussions.
26. The Vice President said he would like to see assistance accel-
erated, especially in light of the troop withdrawals we are making, but
we must have appropriations to do this and these are under pressure
in every respect. He noted that the DoD appropriation today is the low-
est in terms of percentage of GNP since 1950. Even so, there are mem-
bers of the House and Senate who would cut it further. They seem to
want complete abandonment of our foreign obligations and total focus
on our domestic problems. They apparently assume that Communists
have suddenly become benign.
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176 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

27. In sum, while the administration wants to assist countries of

this area, it must play a cautious game so long as public opinion re-
mains in its present state.
28. The PriMin commented that if dove views prevail there will
be great danger in due course not only to this part of the world but to
other parts as well. The Vice President agreed.
29. Thailand and the Future of the Nixon Doctrine: The PriMin
said Thailand agrees with the Nixon Doctrine and is trying to imple-
ment it as it had been described to them by the President. They do not
require manpower, but must have material assistance or the doctrine
could not be implemented. He suggested that Congress may destroy
or negate the Doctrine.
30. The Vice President said a fight is going on for the confidence
of the American public. At stake is the course we will take in foreign
policy. He said he thinks the administration will win this fight. He
asked them not to attach too much importance to the gloomy picture
he had painted because he regularly looks at the darker side so as to
be prepared for the worst. He believes that when the full importance
of our material and economic assistance is better understood, and as
we reduce our armed forces in the area to acceptable levels, public opin-
ion can be turned around. He believes people will ultimately under-
stand that the cost of preventing the war from spreading is vastly less
than that of fighting it after it expands.
31. The Vice President said he recognized the necessity of finding
the means of turning the tide politically so that we can carry out our
policy for this area directly and proudly as it should be carried out. He
said many people had been sold a bill of goods to the effect that peo-
ple of this area want communism.
32. He again appealed to the Thais to recognize the difficulties the
President faced and not let disappointments go beyond the family to
the point where they were exploitable by isolationist politicians and
others who would say our allies want only our money and endlessly
criticize us.
33. Press Attacks on Thailand: The FonMin said that Thailand was
attacked less by the Communist side than by the “Eastern Seaboard
Establishment” and “The Washington–New York Axis.” He then read
from the recent Newsweek article on Thailand. He said millions of peo-
ple would read this and be influenced by it.
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Thailand 177

88. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, September 10, 1970, 4:05–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Cambodia

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State JCS
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Mr. Marshall Green Lt. Gen. John Vogt
Mr. Thomas Pickering Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais
Mr. James Wilson NSC Staff
Defense Mr. John Holdridge
Mr. David Packard Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Dennis Doolin Mr. D. Keith Guthrie
CIA
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. William Wells

[Omitted here is the Summary of Conclusions.]

Thai-Khmer Units
Mr. Johnson: The Cambodians have now decided they don’t want
the Thai Khmer units, and the Thais are in the process of disbanding
them.
Dr. Kissinger: Are they already disbanding them?
Mr. Johnson: They will start very shortly. There would be an ad-
vantage in converting the Thai Khmers into SGUs, which could be used
in Laos, where they are needed. We prepared a draft message—which
is now being circulated—suggesting to Ambassador Unger that he dis-
cuss this possibility with the Thai. In the meantime, Unger has come
in with a similar proposal. I would like to move that we dispatch our
cable.
Mr. Packard: What does the cable say?
Mr. Johnson: It tells Unger to talk to the Thais about turning the
Thai-Khmer units into SGUs.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret;
Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
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Dr. Kissinger: If these troops are partially Khmer, will they be en-
thusiastic about fighting in Laos?
Mr. Johnson: We have raised this question in our draft cable. It
can be pointed out to the Thai Khmers that they would be helping in
the defense of Cambodia. The pay will also be an inducement. Of
course, some of them may nevertheless drop out. We also ought to
take into account that we already have the money available for the
SGU program.
Mr. Packard: I think these operations in Southern Laos are useful.
Dr. Kissinger: That may be true; but before the year is out, we may
be hard pressed in Cambodia and may be wishing we had two regi-
ments to put in. I am reluctant to see our assets disappear. We should
also keep in mind the President’s view that he does not want Cambo-
dia to go down the drain without some effort on our part.
Mr. Packard: In Southern Laos the units will be doing just as much
good for Cambodia.
Mr. Johnson: Possibly they will be more helpful if used there.
Dr. Kissinger: If that is the case, why didn’t we think of putting
them there in the beginning?
Mr. Packard: Our concern then was about the immediate problem
of bolstering the capabilities of the FANK. Since that time, they have
given evidence of having some staying power.
Mr. Green: Also, the Cambodians won’t integrate the Thai Khmer
units into the FANK sufficiently to make it possible for us to employ
Cambodian MAP funds in the program.
Mr. Johnson: The SGU operation is undoubtedly more pertinent
to the present situation.
Mr. Green: If the Thai Khmer units are needed later in Cambodia,
they can be relocated.
Lt. Gen. Vogt: The Thai Khmers can be used right now. They have
equipment and ammunition. They will be a wasted asset unless we
make some use of them now. Placed astride the enemy supply lines
in southern Laos, they can make a real contribution to the defense of
Cambodia.
Dr. Kissinger: We were going to establish the SGUs anyway. Us-
ing the Thai Khmers won’t add anything to our total assets.
Mr. Johnson: It will mean that those assets will be more immedi-
ately available.
Mr. Karamessines: Actually, the Thai Khmers will add to the total
of SGUs.
Dr. Kissinger: Then the Thai Khmers would be in addition to the
SGUs earlier planned for Southern Laos?
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Thailand 179

Mr. Karamessines: Yes. There would eventually be a total of eight

Thai SGUs. In addition, we have been having difficulty finding per-
sonnel for the proposed Lao SGUs. Using the Thai Khmers will permit
us to move ahead immediately.
Mr. Green: Then we will end up with eight Thai and four Cam-
bodian SGUs.
Mr. Karamessines: That’s right.
Mr. Wells: One of the Cambodian SGUs is at Pakse now. The sec-
ond is in training, and the third and fourth will be coming in at the
end of the month.
Adm. Moorer: (to Kissinger) I feel the same frustration you do with
the Thais. On the other hand, Lon Nol has had more success than we
anticipated.
Dr. Kissinger: And possibly more than he can sustain.
Mr. Karamessines: We will be significantly assisting Cambodia if
we choke the enemy supply lines.
Dr. Kissinger: If Lon Nol knew that the present Cambodian MAP
might be supplemented, do you suppose he would continue to refuse
the Thai Khmers?
Mr. Helms: Basically, he doesn’t like having Thai troops in his
country.
Mr. Karamessines: The Cambodians have had a lot of trouble with
the South Vietnamese troops. They would rather do without foreign
troops now that their needs are less pressing.
Mr. Johnson: I think there is no doubt that using the Thai Khmers
in southern Laos is the best way to help Lon Nol.
Lt. Gen. Vogt: CINCPAC thinks so too.
Mr. Helms: I agree.
Dr. Kissinger: We will probably never see any Thai troops anyway.
Mr. Wells: We still have one problem. General Praphat is concerned
about pay scales. This has been holding up the SGUs for four weeks.
Praphat says that it isn’t possible to have Thai units in Laos on two
different pay scales.
Mr. Johnson: How much is the difference?
Mr. Wells: It is significant. The SGUs are much cheaper. An SGU
costs us $1,250,000 a year. The three artillery batteries and three bat-
talions in Long Tieng cost about $25 million.
Mr. Johnson: Couldn’t we take the position in dealing with the
Thais that we can’t have SGUs being paid at varying rates?
Mr. Wells: We already have pay differentials among SGUs.
Mr. Green: It would be much better to allow a dual pay scale con-
tinue for a short period.
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180 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Mr. Karamessines: Praphat’s proposal is eventually to have all Thai

units in Laos be SGUs.
Dr. Kissinger: Did he think that up himself?
Mr. Karamessines: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: Why did he suddenly come up with the idea? Every-
one has told me that having units in Long Tieng has been financially
very advantageous to the Thais. Why should they give this up?
Mr. Wells: General Praphat is looking forward to the return of the
dry season. He doesn’t want to have regular Thai units exposed to a
major North Vietnamese offensive.
Dr. Kissinger: Has there been a rainy season offensive by our side?
Adm. Moorer: There has been some action in connection with Op-
eration Leapfrog.
Mr. Holdridge: There is another explanation for Praphat’s pro-
posal. It would mean putting a substantial portion—thirty-eight bat-
talions—of the Thai Armed Forces on the US payroll.
Dr. Kissinger: Is everyone satisfied with this state of affairs? Let
me take a look tonight at Alex’s proposed telegram.2 Are you sure that
we won’t just be creating a complete vacuum everywhere by replac-
ing the Thai units at Long Tieng?3
[Omitted here is discussion of Operation Prairie Fire and AK–47
ammunition for Cambodia.]

2
See Part I for the record of the WSAG discussion in the Middle East which im-
mediately preceded the discussion of Cambodia. [Footnote in the source text.]
3
Kissinger was evidently not satisfied with the idea of shifting the Thai Khmer
regiments to SGUs in southern Laos. In a draft memorandum to the President, attached
to a September 14 covering memorandum, Kissinger identified the following “serious
risks: The Cambodians probably will need all the help they can get two or three months
from now.” He also noted that the SGU battalions “would not be readily available—they
would be dispersed and hard to redeploy.” Finally, he claimed that “there is no assur-
ance that the personnel of the regiment (who volunteered for Cambodia) would be will-
ing to accept the SGU role in Laos. We run the risk therefore that in pursuing this course
we may in fact be acquiescing in the disbanding of the unit.” (National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)
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Thailand 181

89. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT
George Tanham’s Priorities for Thailand

You are probably aware that a strongly held view in the State De-
partment is that the U.S. should not urge the Thai to deploy ground
forces outside Thailand, e.g., in Laos and Cambodia, except perhaps
on short-term cross-border operations.
Those who favor this “Fortress Thailand” view do so for a variety
of reasons, including a fear that Thai ground operations outside Thai-
land will provoke a retaliatory response from Hanoi or Peking. One of
their strongest arguments is that the limited Thai military capabilities
that are available should be deployed against the insurgent threat
within Thailand.
Marshall Green has called your attention2 to the views of George
Tanham, one of the proponents of the view just described, and sug-
gested you might want to talk with him. (The Green and Tanham mem-
oranda are at Tab A.)3
Tanham, who until recently served as Ambassador Unger’s Spe-
cial Assistant for Counterinsurgency, argues as follows:4
—The RTG does not take the insurgent threat seriously enough
and is not devoting adequate attention or resources to its insurgency
problems. For example, RTG units deployed against the insurgents are
poorly trained and undermanned.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the
memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “They have proven their contention ad
nauseum.”
2
In a July 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Green recommended Tanham as “one of
the foremost authorities on insurgency problems, particularly in Thailand.”
3
Attached but not printed.
4
Although Smith summarized Tanham’s two main points, the latter made numer-
ous other observations in his June 1970 memorandum. Some of his points are specific,
e.g. “too many young officers in Bangkok,” while others are more general. For example,
in his speculation concerning the reason for Bangkok’s “probably complacent” attitude
towards the insurgency, Tanham theorizes that “their successful experience in main-
taining their independence,” their “leaders’ belief in the basic loyalty of the Thai peo-
ple,” and “an inadequate understanding of the real threat of communist revolutionary
warfare” all played a part.
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182 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—Efforts by the U.S. to involve the Thai outside Thailand indi-

rectly divert Thai attention from their internal problems. Moreover, in
responding to U.S. requests to deploy “forward,” the Thai may believe
that such deployments increase the U.S.’s obligation to help Thailand
meet its insurgent threat.
Tanham’s reasoning drastically simplifies an exceedingly complex
problem. Thai decisions on out-of-country deployments turn more on
their view of their security interests than anything else, although fi-
nancial inducements play an important role. Furthermore, the NSSM
51 study has found no one-to-one trade-off between RTG capability to
meet the external versus the internal threat. It is more likely that the
Thai will:
—meet neither threat if they do not reform their forces or receive
appropriate U.S. assistance, or
—meet both threats if they do take the necessary reform actions
and U.S. assistance is provided intelligently.
NSSM 51 lays out several options designed to promote Thai force
effectiveness against the internal and external threats and weighs the
advantages and disadvantages of external deployments as a separate
political and strategic military issue.

90. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand

(Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson)1

Bangkok, September 18, 1970.

RE
Bangkok 149, 18 September 1970

1. We received a cable this morning from [less than 1 line of source

text not declassified] Bangkok discussing preliminary negotiations with
the Thais on the conversion of the Thai Khmer regiment and the for-
mation of SGU’s. Ambassador Unger asked that this information be

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410,
Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages—1970, Southeast Asia. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes
Only. An attached September 21 memorandum to Kissinger requested that this and other
messages to Johnson and Green also be forwarded to Kissinger.
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Thailand 183

passed to Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Green, and Am-

bassador Swank. Following is the text of the cable:
“2. At ceremony on morning of 18 September, Ambassador Unger
raised general subject of what to do now in Laos with Surakij and
Praphat in which climate established for working level exploration to
see what might be done. Ambassador emphasized that Washington has
not agreed any specific plan.
“3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] followed up in
working skull session with Surakij on afternoon 18 September. Fol-
lowing are results of this meeting, all of which subject to specific agree-
ment between Ambassador Unger and General Praphat that these
arrangements are desirable after some more working level negotiation.
“4. General Surakij agreed our understanding of the principle of
‘one pay scale’ for Laos and said it could be at the SGU rate. He ac-
cepted the desirability of an eventual 13 Thai SGU’s to include Long
Tieng replacements. He had some reservations that Thais might not be
able to recruit and train 13 in end of year timeframe, but he did not
raise this as an objection. Finally, he agreed in principle that the 13
could be used ‘anywhere’ in Laos after consultation; and he endorsed
the current [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pattern of op-
eration, agreeing that the arrangements for command and control of
the Thai regulars currently at Long Tieng are not really satisfactory.
“5. Surakij’s problems grew out of the conversion of the TKV reg-
iment to three SGU’s. First, he had in mind that agreement with the Cam-
bodians that these troops would be held in some sort of ready reserve
in case the call came from Phnom Penh. Second, he saw problems with
morale inherent in the conversion which he would prefer to avoid.
“6. Surakij expressed desire to have first Thai SGU deployment put
in Champassak, Sithandone, and Sayaboury. He went on, however, that
the units would not be irrevocably tied to these locations. First, these ar-
eas would be considered rotational; and second, if no NVA/Pathet Lao
presence established, units would be moved to areas where needed.
“7. Wish reiterate that all of above is exploratory with both sides
carefully repeating that no decisions have been made and in par-
ticular Washington has not given approval for any specifics.” (End of
Message)
“8. This information was passed [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] at Phnom Penh for delivery to Ambassador Swank in the
field.
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91. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 7, 1970, 2:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
Henry A. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT
Thailand Foreign Minister’s Comments on Southeast Asian Developments

After expressing pleasure at seeing Dr. Kissinger again, Foreign

Minister Thanat asked about the President’s European trip and whether
it had been regarded as useful. Dr. Kissinger replied that the trip had
been very good, considering what had been attempted. Its purpose had
been to demonstrate U.S. power in the Mediterranean, and as an old
friend of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Kissinger could tell him that we had
achieved what we had wanted. Even in a Communist country such as
Yugoslavia, President Tito had found it more important to remain and
talk to the President than to go to Cairo for Nasser’s funeral. Foreign
Minister Thanat remarked that he had been glad to watch the effective
way that the trip had been conducted.
Dr. Kissinger said that the President had specifically asked him to
convey his, the President’s, personal respects to Foreign Minister
Thanat and to inform him of the high regard in which he was held by
the President. The Foreign Minister then declared that the people and
the government of Thailand consider the President their friend. This
also applied to the people of Asia as well. Some unfortunate develop-
ments may have occurred in the U.S.-Thai relationship, but on funda-
mental things the relationship between the two countries remained
firm.
Dr. Kissinger asked for Foreign Minister Thanat’s frank opinion
with respect to one question. Last April and May, there had been talk
of putting two regiments of regular Thai troops or two regiments of
Thai Khmer volunteers into Cambodia. Since then endless discussions
had ensued. Was it because the Thai had become distrustful of our bu-
reaucracy that their interest in sending their forces into Cambodia had

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat, (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Se-
cret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a memorandum from Holdridge to
Kissinger, October 9, this memorandum of conversation was drafted by Holdridge and
approved by Kissinger. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
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Thailand 185

cooled? The Foreign Minister said that he would give a frank and
straightforward reply. There were a number of reasons as to why the
Thai had not sent in their forces. First, long debates had been held in
Bangkok in which some people, particularly the military, had wanted
to send Thai soldiers to Cambodia; others, however, had felt that this
would not have been desirable because if the Thai had sent in two bat-
talions or two regiments, the Communists might have sent in the same
number or more.
Continuing, Foreign Minister Thanat said that in the second place,
the mood in the U.S., as far as could be judged from the press and from
Congressional comment, was very hostile toward Thailand and not ap-
preciative of its role. Therefore, he had thought that nothing should be
done to aggravate the situation and increase the President’s political
burden. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the trouble was some liberals here
disliked the U.S. so much they felt that any country which appreciated
the U.S. had to be punished. They talked about what Bangkok should
and should not do, and not about Hanoi. Foreign Minister Thanat ob-
served that despite all, “you’re with us and we’re with you.”
Foreign Minister Thanat mentioned as a third consideration in the
Thai judgment on sending troops into Cambodia the fact that they had
worked out an arrangement with Prime Minister Lon Nol during his
visits to Bangkok whereby the Cambodians could ask for Thai troops
if they were in great need of them. In such a case, Thai forces stationed
along the Cambodian border would join with the Cambodians in task
forces to “beat up the Communist side.” This arrangement was one
of the reasons which had prompted the Thai to bring back some of
their troops from Vietnam. These troops would be moved to the Thai-
Cambodian frontier.
Dr. Kissinger declared that if the Thai received any advice from
our people to the effect that the Thai should not be there on the fron-
tier but rather in the Northeast, this would be a violation of the inten-
tions of the President and the Foreign Minister should get in touch with
Dr. Kissinger about it. We wanted Thai forces to be stationed near the
Cambodian frontier. The Foreign Minister remarked that he was not
aware of anyone on the U.S. side who wanted Thai troops in the North-
east. Dr. Kissinger went on to say, however, that if any such advice was
actually given to them they could tell the advisers what the President’s
intentions were. He could assure the Foreign Minister that he spoke
for the President. The stationing of Thai troops on the Cambodian fron-
tier was exactly what we were looking for.
Commenting further on the plan to bring Thai troops back from Viet-
nam, Foreign Minister Thanat said that this move would cost less than
raising new units. New units might cost millions of baht, require an in-
crease in taxes, and create a political tempest. The Vietnam situation did
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186 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

not appear so urgent now as to require the whole Thai complement, and
it was felt that “some” of the Thai troops could be brought back.
Dr. Kissinger said that we welcomed this Thai move. We thought
that the situation in Cambodia could deteriorate, and it was com-
forting to know that there were forces available which might be able
to do something. Foreign Minister Thanat confirmed that the Thai were
prepared to act in Cambodia, but not on a permanent basis. Dr.
Kissinger mentioned in passing that the Thai troops in Long Tieng had
made a big difference. Referring again to the Thai rationale on troops
in Cambodia, Foreign Minister Thanat recalled at the Djakarta Con-
ference Thailand had pledged in the joint communiqué along with the
other participants to support a call for the withdrawal of all foreign
forces in Cambodia. Accordingly, if Thai troops had been sent in, the
spirit of the joint communiqué would have been violated. Thailand felt
that it had assumed a moral obligation under this communiqué. In the
light of all these circumstances, the Thai believed that they would gain
advantages on all sides by bringing some troops from Vietnam, and
stationing them on the border in agreement with the Cambodians. Dr.
Kissinger endorsed this as a good solution.
Foreign Minister Thanat then asked if the U.S. could support Thai-
land logistically if Thai troops went into Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger
replied affirmatively. We had tremendous legal problems because of
Congressional actions, but believed it would be possible for us to re-
place in Thailand those stocks of military equipment which the Thai
used in Cambodia. The Thai could employ the stocks which they had
on hand at present. In response to a question from Foreign Minister
Thanat as to whether it would be possible for the U.S. military repre-
sentatives in Thailand to tell the Thai this, Dr. Kissinger said that if the
Thai talked to our Ambassador, he would give five million reasons as
to why there was a problem. However, he could assure the Foreign
Minister that if Thailand had to go in, we would find a way to give
support. It was hard to say now just how this would be done. It would
be best to use the stocks Thailand presently had on hand and we would
replace them. We would need to figure out just how this would be
done.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked in what way this matter could be
undertaken—supposing that Thailand was seized with a request from
Cambodia, could he get in touch with Dr. Kissinger personally? If and
when the needs arose, could he let Dr. Kissinger know? Dr. Kissinger
referred to the private channel which existed between the Foreign Min-
ister and himself, and said that if it turns out we couldn’t help he would
tell the Foreign Minister. He reminded him, though, that we had kept
our promises to the government in Bangkok, and had not given up any
territory to the Communists. We did not want Cambodia to go under.
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Thailand 187

The President was not like Senator McCarthy, who had wanted to aban-
don South Vietnam. We had a massive internal problem, but if we were
lucky, we would have an easier time after the November elections.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked if the election prospects were good,
to which Dr. Kissinger replied that he was not a domestic expert and
couldn’t say too much. While this was an off-year election in which
everyone in the House had to run for reelection and in which the Ad-
ministration party usually lost seats, there would be no problem here
and we expected some losses. In the Senate, it was possible that the
Administration might gain two or three seats. It might not seem like
this would make much difference, but many votes had been running
close to 50/50, and three seats more would make a significant differ-
ence. If the Administration gained seven seats, it could organize the
Senate and get rid of Senator Fulbright. In this case it would be in great
shape and could do a lot of things for Thailand which were not now
possible. Arithmetically, the prospects were in our favor. Lots of Re-
publicans had lost in 1964 because Goldwater had been running for
President and had taken them down with him; hence there were more
Democrats in the Senate now than would normally have been the case.
Unfortunately, to speak frankly, in two big states we had poor candi-
dates. In California, Senator Murphy had cancer but was resisting all
efforts to induce him not to run, while in New York, Senator Goodell
had decided to run to the left of Fulbright. We were not supporting
him. Nevertheless, even though our gains were limited to only three
seats, this would make a lot of difference. 51 to 49 votes against the
Administration would be reversed.
Foreign Minister Thanat expressed the hope that Dr. Kissinger’s
prediction would come through. Dr. Kissinger said he felt that we had
the Democrats on the defensive over a lot of issues. For example, in
May they thought they could defeat the Administration on Southeast
Asia, but today we had the public on our side. The Foreign Minister
thought that the President had indeed handled the Vietnam question
very well, and was interested in knowing anything Dr. Kissinger could
tell him about what the President would say that evening. Dr. Kissinger
was surprised that the Foreign Minister had not yet been informed as
to what the President would say, and gave a quick run-down on the
President’s five points.2
In connection with U.S. troop withdrawals, Foreign Minister
Thanat asked if we were going to set a withdrawal deadline. Dr.
Kissinger’s reply was “absolutely not.” In principle we were willing to

2
For President Nixon’s Southeast Asia peace proposals put forward in his televi-
sion speech on the evening of October 7, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 825–828.
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188 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

withdraw completely and give a fixed deadline, but not before all other
issues were settled. This would be conditional on everything else, in-
cluding a North Vietnamese withdrawal. When questioned by the For-
eign Minister about elections, Dr. Kissinger declared that we were will-
ing to have the North Vietnamese participate in the electoral process
and gain their support in elections to which they were entitled, but
would not accept their demands for a coalition government.
Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that he had made a suggestion
in his UN General Assembly speech that if the four great powers could
join together for a Middle East settlement, they might also work with
the Asian countries toward a settlement in Asia. Dr. Kissinger noted
that the exception would be the French, who were not steady. The For-
eign Minister said on this point that it would be necessary to work for
their support, since they claimed to play a role. He had felt that the
French were not entirely negative, and cited a speech by Schuman as
containing some positive elements. In any event, the difference between
the Middle East and Southeast Asia was that the four powers were
working alone in the Middle East, while he did not want this to apply
to Southeast Asia but preferred that they worked together with the lo-
cal people. Dr. Kissinger declared that this was the reason why we
wanted a larger conference on Indo-China. The U.S. had done well to
get a cease-fire in the Middle East, and a similar situation might be at-
tained in the Far East working in concert with the nations of the area.
The Foreign Minister stressed that he wanted these nations to play
a more effective role. He also was wondering about the possibility
of reaching an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—if the
Soviets stopped supplying Hanoi with the sinews of war the fighting
would end.
Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign Minister for his views on the sit-
uation in Vietnam. The Foreign Minister stated that he had last been
in Vietnam for the July TCC meeting and had been impressed with the
improvement in the situation and in the general appearance of the
country which had occurred since his previous visit. It was his belief
that the enormous amount of U.S. war matériel available should en-
able the South Vietnamese to take over a good part of the defense of
the country once they were trained to handle this matériel. Dr. Kissinger
observed that we thought the same thing. The Foreign Minister then
cited his Prime Minister as believing that Vietnamization alone would
not have a lasting effect if the Communists could use Laos and Cam-
bodia—if these countries were available to them, they could launch
new attacks on South Vietnam and offset the improvements which had
taken place there. The present situation in Vietnam would be only
temporary if the military balance in Laos and Cambodia could not be
improved.
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Thailand 189

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Foreign Minister thought we were be-

ing as active as we could be in operating against the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The Foreign Minister referred to the problem of supply, noting that the
U.S. seemed to be finding it increasingly difficult to assist local forces
in terms of economic and logistical support. He went on to refer to a
lack of agreement on the use of local forces in Laos. The Thai would
prefer to have forces of countries closest to the scene conduct the op-
erations. Dr. Kissinger agreed with this, and pointed out that we had
already undertaken to train 2,000 Cambodians for operations in Laos.
Foreign Minister Thanat indicated that he knew of this, and noted also
that at the time of his departure there had been discussions about send-
ing Thai forces “far into Laos” to fill up the vacuum while the Cam-
bodian troops were being trained. Dr. Kissinger expressed some sur-
prise, and wondered when the Foreign Minister had left Bangkok.
Foreign Minister Thanat said his departure had been three weeks ear-
lier, at which time the U.S. had wanted to send Thai forces to the ex-
treme southeast region of Laos beyond the Bolovens Plateau to a point
close to the Cambodian frontier. The Thai had disagreed. They were in
agreement on stationing Thai SGUs in Sithandone and Champassak,
but the other area was too far east. Dr. Kissinger referred to the diffi-
culties which the bureaucracy had created over the Thai troops, and
said that this issue of the Thai SGUs would be put on the agenda for
the next WSAG meeting. In the ensuing discussion, the Foreign Min-
ister made it clear that he was not opposed to the recruiting of six Thai
SGUs for use in operations against the North Vietnamese LOCs along
the Se Kong River and in the Bolovens area of South Laos, but would
object to any plans which would call for deployment further east. It
was pointed out to him that we were in general agreement on this con-
cept as well as with the Thai concept of stationing some of their SGUs
in Sayaboury, Sithandone, and Champassak.
Dr. Kissinger inquired about the use of the Thai Khmer volunteers
for service as SGUs in South Laos. Foreign Minister Thanat said that
there would be no major difficulty regarding this concept.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked if Dr. Kissinger had any plans to
come to the Foreign Minister’s part of the world, or if the President had
any further travel plans. Dr. Kissinger replied that he personally would
be delighted to go back, but did not know when he could get away. The
President would not be making any more trips until next year. The main
thing he wanted the Foreign Minister to know was that everything
the President had ever said concerning Thailand could be believed. The
President had a great admiration for the Foreign Minister, and for self-
ish reasons was very glad that he had been elected to the Thai Parlia-
ment last year. Foreign Minister Thanat assured Dr. Kissinger that the
Thai for their part hadn’t changed. What he personally had said with
respect to some critics of Thailand did not affect Thai-U.S. friendship.
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190 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

He had felt it necessary to defend the honor of his country, and hoped
that the President would understand. The Thai government had no
problems with the President or with the Administration. With the U.S.
press, though, there were indeed some problems.
Dr. Kissinger concluded by urging the Foreign Minister to keep in
close contact with him through the special channel. If the Thai decided
the time had come to move into Cambodia, he should get in touch and
we would work out the modalities.

92. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 7, 1970, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Southeast Asia and Peace Prospects

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
Thai Ambassador to U.S. Sunthorn
Thai Ambassador to U.N. Anand
Mr. Birabhongse, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson, J, Undersecretary of State
John B. Dexter, Country Director, EA/TB

The Secretary took advantage of a previously scheduled call by

Foreign Minister Thanat to brief him on the Southeast Asia peace pro-
posals that the President intended to put forward in a television speech
that evening.2 After he had heard the outline of the President’s pro-
posals, Thanat expressed the cautious judgment that it would be a use-
ful initiative.
Thanat’s first question concerned the concept of an enlarged con-
ference that the Secretary had mentioned. He was relieved to know
that we did not have a “Geneva-type” conference in mind. He then
went on to comment that there were a number of Asian nations who
would probably be willing to assist in cease-fire supervision measures.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret.
Drafted by Dexter and approved in S on October 21. The meeting was held in the Sec-
retary’s office.
2
See footnote 2, Document 91.
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Thailand 191

He mentioned Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Burma and Malaysia. He

commented that the Japanese would want to participate only through
civilians and that he supposed that, if the Pakistanis participated, the
Indians would also wish to do so. Thanat then noted the importance
of the Soviet role in any peace negotiations. He said that if the two su-
per powers can agree, then peace can be obtained. He went on to say
that in New York he had been talking with other Asian leaders such
as Romulo and Malik about a plan to appeal to the big powers, espe-
cially the Soviets, to work for peace in Southeast Asia.
In response to a question from the Secretary, Thanat characterized
relations with the GVN as quite good. He said in connection with the
Thai forces in South Vietnam, the GVN wants the Thai to leave a to-
ken force there.
Further concerning Thai troops in Vietnam, he said the Thai want
them back in Thailand as a back-up force along the Cambodia/Laos
border. He said that they did not think it desirable now to send forces
into Cambodia but that it was necessary to have troops ready nearby
to take action in Cambodia if necessary. To send troops in now on a
permanent basis would give rise to problems of financing,3 friction with
the Cambodians and charges that the Thai were “mercenaries”.
After a brief discussion of Thai domestic affairs (Thanat com-
mented wryly on the Parliamentary Opposition’s desire to “over-
throw the Government”), Thanat inquired about conditions in the Mid-
dle East. The Secretary responded with comments indicating that he
thought prospects for peace there were somewhat improved. Thanat
observed that the most helpful sign was the apparent fact that the US
and the Soviet Union were both willing to work for peace. This he saw
as a lesson for Southeast Asia. He said that he was convinced that, if
the Soviets would give the word, the North Vietnamese would accept
peace.
Thanat then mentioned the Djakarta Conference and the follow-
up actions of the Committee of Three. He said they had reached a dead-
end and there was now need for a new initiative. He said, “We can’t
sit down and twiddle our thumbs.”

3
In a memorandum to Rogers, October 5, Green noted that the Fulbright amend-
ments to the 1971 Military Procurement Appropriations Act excluded “the use of any
such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to pro-
vide military support and assistance to the Governments of Cambodia or Laos.” This
amendment was approved by the Senate-House conference committee and was await-
ing the President’s signature to become law. Green added that although the legal ad-
visers were “reviewing the language,” “it appears that it will preclude U.S. support from
the DOD budget of Thai forces in Cambodia or Laos except for operations which per-
suasively could be said to be for the defense of Vietnam.” (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 THAI)
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192 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The Secretary suggested that the Djakarta Three could make use
of the President’s proposals and give their support to them. Thanat
said that they would have to determine this after they had studied the
speech. He said he would be seeing Malik and Romulo the next few
days in New York and would discuss it with them. He added that he
had asked Malik and some of the other Asian leaders to work on the
Russians. Malik had agreed to talk with Gromyko during the UNGA
session.

93. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Washington, October 9, 1970.

SUBJECT
Proposed WSAG Consideration of Thai SGU in Laos

We have, as you know, authorized Ambassador Unger to com-

mence discussions with the Thai on the proposals for supporting up
to 13 Thai SGU’s in Laos, of which eight would be for the South (two
for Champassak/Sithadone) and four for North Laos to replace the
present Thai RCT and SR–IX. A fifth is under consideration for North
Laos for Sayaboury but this has not yet been agreed upon by all par-
ties. We have wanted to consider this overall question as two separate
projects, i.e. as a “Thai-in-South Laos proposal” and a “Thai-in-North
Laos proposal”. Unger’s discussions with the Thai on the Thai-in-North
Laos proposal was conditioned only upon a budget review to assure
that presently available funds would be adequate.
Messages were sent to Ambassador Unger on September 23 telling
him we wanted to go ahead with these two proposals (see State 156373
and State 156387)2 but subsequently the Fulbright Amendment to the
Defense Procurement Act has given rise to a new problem with regard
to the Thai-in-North Laos proposal. The Fulbright Amendment would
in effect prohibit use of DOD funds for Thai troops in Laos except for

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Se-
cret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter, cleared by Wilson and Corcoran (EA), and approved by
Green.
2
Both dated September 23. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 193

those associated with interdiction of NVN infiltration to South Viet-

nam. Senator Stennis has advised Director Helms and Deputy Secre-
tary Packard that this would permit DOD funding of Thai troops in
South Laos but would not cover those in the North. CIA believes there
is an outside chance that it would be acceptable legally for CIA funds
to continue to be used for this purpose in North Laos and, if so, the
two projects could both go forward. All that would be required is a
shifting of funds to put the Thai SGU’s in the South under DOD fund-
ing and those in the North under CIA, for which Bill Wells assures us
their funds would be adequate. However, the legal authority for this
is extremely shaky and I believe it would be hazardous to proceed with-
out a green light from the Hill.
In the meanwhile, it does not seem advisable to commence talks
with the Thai on the South Laos project independently. To do so would
inevitably open the question as to our intentions with respect to North
Laos, where we and the Thai will soon have to make important deci-
sions about the future of RCT and SR–IX. As you recall, one reason for
shifting to SGU’s in North Laos was to put all Thai forces in that coun-
try on the same footing with regard to command and control and pay
and allowances. While we would like to keep the two projects sepa-
rate for planning purposes here, we agree with Ambassador Unger that
it would be unwise to start talking with the Thai about the South be-
fore we are prepared to talk about the North as well.
I therefore recommend that this problem be brought up at the
WSAG meeting scheduled for next Tuesday and that WSAG consider
how to resolve the legal uncertainty regarding support for the Thai in
North Laos.3 This is an urgent matter because the proposed change-
over in Thai units will have to take place in January and we will need
all the time we can get in the meanwhile for recruiting and training of
the new SGU’s.

3
In a meeting on October 16, the WSAG reviewed [text not declassified] plans for
the use of Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU) in northern and southern Laos. The con-
sensus was that these activities should continue to be justified to Congress on the basis
that they constituted a continuation of programs already under way and that they served
to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam by attacking enemy supply lines and sanctuaries. The
WSAG also agreed in principle to the proposal to replace Thai regular units in Long
Tieng with SGUs. However, the Departments of State and Defense were tasked with
studying whether this would degrade “friendly military capabilities in Northern Laos.”
Finally, the WSAG was reminded by Kissinger “that in considering the question of Thai
military involvement in Cambodia, the President’s deep interest in insuring that all fea-
sible measures must be taken into account.” The October 16 meeting summary of con-
clusions states: “In this connection, it is essential to obtain as soon as possible Thai agree-
ment to contingency plans for employment of Thai ground and air forces in Cambodia
as required.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)
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194 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

94. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms

to President Nixon1

Washington, October 23, 1970.

SUBJECT
Report on Southeast Asia Survey Trip: 7–22 October 1970

I. Purposes of the Trip.

1. This memorandum constitutes my report to you on my 7–22
October 1970 trip to Southeast Asia. On this trip, I had three major
objectives.
a. To survey the situation in Indochina and Thailand at first hand
and to form my own estimate of the probable course of events in that
area through personal observation augmented by direct conversations
with people themselves directly involved on the ground. This latter
group, as outlined in the Annex,2 included [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] State Department officials, senior U.S. military officers
and local political and military leaders in the Indochina area.
b. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
c. [13 lines of source text not declassified]
II. Conclusions and Findings.
A. The Situation in Southeast Asia: Dynamics and Prospects.
[Omitted here is discussion of Southeast Asia.]
25. Thailand. Though Thailand is not technically part of Indochina,
the Thai are directly involved in the Indochina struggle and Thailand’s
leaders are deeply concerned about its outcome. Not surprisingly, this
concern is viewed through the prism of what its leaders regard as Thai-

1
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry Files,
DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Box 9 of 16. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2
Helms noted in the Annex that he “carefully reviewed the Thai situation [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] including programs involving Cambodia and Laos,
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with Ambassador Unger and his senior as-
sociates.” He also stated that he had official meetings with Thanom, Praphat, Dawee,
and the King, and that he had lunch with Thai National Police General Chamras. Helms
added that he also attended “an instructive, informal dinner hosted by Thanom which
included Praphat, Dawee, General Surakit (Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army), Gen-
erals Bunmag and Sawaeng (of the Prime Minister’s staff) and General Dhep (who runs
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the organization that controls all Thai regu-
lar and irregular troops in Laos).” He also stated that he spent a day at Long Tieng “mak-
ing a thorough survey on the ground of the situation there.” “I looked carefully into the
role, performance and functions of the Thai troops and personally surveyed their em-
placements and disposition.” Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 195

land’s own vital interests, and these tend to focus on Laos. There the
Thai are particularly concerned about the trans-Mekong border
provinces of Sayaboury, Champassak and Sithadone. These provinces
used to belong to Thailand, a fact that lends a strong emotional col-
oration to the views of the Thai leaders, who feel that Vietnamese Com-
munist control over any Lao territory on the west bank of the Mekong
would be tantamount to an invasion of Thailand. The King made this
clear in our conversation when he pointed out that France had delib-
erately wrested these three provinces from Thai control in the 19th cen-
tury in order to point “a dagger at our heart.” General Praphat and
other senior Thai leaders expressed similar sentiments. This attitude
about the border provinces obviously colors the whole Thai approach
to the utilization and disposition of Thai regular and irregular forces
in Laos, including the Thai-Khmer Volunteers and the Thai SGU’s. The
Thai want to make sure that Sayaboury, Champassak and Sithadone
are adequately protected before they discuss use of Thai resources in
other areas of Laos which they consider of less immediately urgent im-
portance to Thailand itself.3
26. While the Thai welcome the Nixon doctrine, they are inclined
to interpret it quite literally. Believing that they have already done
much to aid us in providing bases in Thailand, sending troops openly
to Vietnam, and deploying them [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] in Laos, the Thai feel that if they provide the human resources
for additional activities against North Vietnam, the material and eco-
nomic costs of raising and supporting these assets should be borne by
the United States. Their bargaining position is framed accordingly. But
the Thai do recognize that this is a common struggle and are far from
indifferent to its outcome. They are convinced that a North Vietnamese
victory in Indochina would leave them boxed on the north and east by
borders under hostile Communist control, Chinese or Vietnamese. Un-
der such circumstances, they feel that external support to the already
troublesome but presently manageable insurgency threat within Thai-
land would rise sharply and the Thai government would find itself
faced with serious internal problems. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] the Embassy officials with whom I talked believe that
in such an eventuality, the whole political complexion of Thailand
and her international posture would promptly change to a left-leaning
neutralism.

3
In paragraph 35 of his memorandum to the President, Helms noted that his “per-
sonal inspection and conversations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]” had con-
vinced him “that without the Thais, Long Tieng would have fallen last March. The Thai
artillery whose emplacement I surveyed and the stiffening of Thai forces—regulars or
SGUs—are both essential to MR II’s defense and will have to be provided, if MR II is to
be held.” Attached but not printed.
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196 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

27. Barring a North Vietnamese victory in the Indochina struggle,

however, U.S. officials believe that Thai politics will probably continue
on their current course without radical change. Thanom is planning to
retire, but the path to a reasonably smooth succession by Praphat ap-
pears to be well paved. If Praphat should disappear from the scene, all
bets are off.
28. [16 lines of source text not declassified]
[Omitted here is discussion of the Indochina area.]
Dick

95. Letter From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to
Thailand (Unger)1

Washington, October 27, 1970.

Dear Len:
You will recall that when I was in Bangkok you suggested that it
would be helpful for me to write you to give you the benefit of the
President’s thinking on issues of concern to you. In this light, I am pass-
ing on the President’s interest in doing everything that we can to as-
sure that third-country assistance to Cambodia is made available. He
has issued specific directives concerning Thai air and ground actions
in Cambodia if the need should arise.
First, the President wants everything possible to be done prior to
the end of the rainy season to mobilize our own and third-country as-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Country Files, Box 563,
Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached October 22 memorandum
from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger reads: “Following the WSAG meeting on Oc-
tober 16 you asked that a letter be drafted from you to Ambassador Unger to make it
clear to him what the situation is here with respect to the emergency employment of
Thai air and ground forces in Cambodia. A draft letter for your signature is at Tab A.”
The approval line of the memorandum is checked next to a recommendation that reads:
“That you approve transmittal of this letter by back-channel message to Bangkok.” A
notation on the memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “urgent for dispatch.”
A notation at the end of the memorandum reads: “Dispatched. Rec’d in Bangkok 10:15
on the 27th.”
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Thailand 197

sistance to Cambodia to enable that country to survive an anticipated

intensification in North Vietnamese attacks after the rains. He com-
municated this personally to senior officials of the Government in a
meeting last June.
Second, the President has now directed that contingency plans be
prepared for employment of Thai air and ground forces in the event
of an NVA/VC offensive in Cambodia when the dry season begins.
These might include: (a) the stationing of Thai forces along the Thai-
Cambodia border in preparation for deployment in Cambodia, (b) use
of Thai air support in Cambodia up to 900 sorties per month, to in-
clude areas beyond the present 30 kilometer zone agreed to by the Cam-
bodians, (c) use of the Black Leopard units redeployed from South Viet-
nam as appropriate, and (d) provision of U.S. funding and matériel
support for the Thai deployments including the use, as appropriate, of
trade-off economic programs. These plans are to be completed and sub-
mitted to the Washington Special Actions Group for review no later
than November 5.
Third, the President has further directed that the United States Am-
bassadors in Bangkok and Phnom Penh be instructed that the devel-
opment of contingency plans to match our own by the Governments
of Thailand and Cambodia be given their high priority attention.
I have the impression that we may have misled you in some of the
cables which we sent to you by giving you a welter of technical details
which obscured the imperative nature of the President’s concerns. I
want to assure you that he considers the situation in Cambodia to be
extremely urgent, and wants all of us concerned to bend every effort
to see that the assistance which Cambodia may need shortly on an
emergency basis will be provided. This of course requires full under-
standing on the part of our Thai and Cambodian allies as to our think-
ing and as to the kinds of support which we are prepared to offer. There
should be nothing left undone either by them or by us which actions
on our part could have avoided.
Warm regards,
Henry
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198 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

96. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Washington, November 19, 1970.

SUBJECT
Thai SGU’s for Laos

Attached is a memorandum [less than 1 line of source text not de-

classified]2 reporting the status of negotiations with the RTG concern-
ing the SGU program. The main points to which we would call your
attention are that the RTG is now committed to recruiting and assist-
ing in the training of 14 Thai SGU’s (13 infantry and one artillery), of
which two are to be primarily composed of former TKV’s. Of these 14,
it is anticipated that two SGU’s (the TKV’s) will be ready for deploy-
ment to Laos in mid-December, six others will be ready in early March
and the final five, including the artillery SGU, should be ready in April.
The availability timing is determined by factors of recruiting and
training. A twelve week training program is planned for all except the
two “TKV” SGU’s who will require only a few weeks training in ad-
dition to what they have already received. Those TKV’s, we under-
stand, are now available in sufficient number for the two battalions. In
addition to these, we understand that there are about 2200 volunteers
already signed up who will man the next batch of six SGU’s. So far as
we know, the RTG does not yet have volunteer enlisted personnel for
the last six.
Initially, there appears to have been a problem in recruitment. The
RTG wisely sought to get volunteers with previous military experience
and other high qualifications, but apparently were not very successful
on the basis of the pay and allowance scale initially proposed. Recent
negotiations in Bangkok [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] re-
sulted in an agreement to raise subsistence and per diem allowances

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Se-
cret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter and Brown and cleared by Wilson.
2
The [text not declassified] November 18 memorandum [text not declassified] to
Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, is attached but not printed. It noted that on
November 16 “the Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief General Praphat confirmed
to Ambassador Unger his concurrence with the final negotiated agreement (on the Thai
SGU program) with only one exception—the composition and size of the Thai artillery
SGU. Praphat indicated that he was prepared to implement the SGU program as soon
as he had a formal request in writing from the Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.”
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Thailand 199

and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the recruiting problem
has been solved.
Another problem has arisen with regard to training facilities. There
are now three sites in Thailand being used for SGU’s and these are ad-
equate for the first eight battalions, but we understand could not ac-
commodate any more. [1 line of source text not declassified] this problem
can be resolved by establishing an additional training facility, and the
matter is under negotiation through COMUSMACTHAI in Bangkok.
A final decision on the matter is expected about the end of this month
when General Surakij returns from his present visit to Australia.
The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum does
not discuss the timing question in relation to the RTA, RCT’s and Sierra
Romeo now in Laos. We have been told, however, that in negotiations
with the Thai it is being made clear that those forces will not be re-
moved from Laos until the SGU’s, fully trained and equipped, are ready
to replace them.
In general, the SGU training program is not split in terms of fu-
ture assignments to north or south Laos. However, it is understood that
the first two battalions, the TKV, will go to Champassak/Sithadone and
that the highest priority for the next batch will be Sayaboury. The rea-
son for Sayaboury’s priority is that the Thai cadre for Project Sayavong
are being drawn down for the SGU program and the Thai feel that an
SGU battalion should be sent in to fill the vacuum. Deployment of the
rest of the SGU’s will be determined by circumstances at the time their
training is completed.

97. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Green)1

Bangkok, November 20, 1970.

Dear Marshall:
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
I agree that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] role in
Thai counterinsurgency operations should be limited to training and

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 THAI. Secret;
Official-Informal.
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200 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

advice designed to improve Thai institutional capabilities to deal with

this problem. This principle, I assure you, is reflected in the Mission
CI Guidelines and governs our activities here. I am particularly alert
to this principle because of my testimony before the Symington Com-
mittee when I assured the Committee that US personnel do not par-
ticipate in counterinsurgency operations in Thailand.
The importance of adhering to this principle has been repeatedly
reviewed with the senior personnel [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified], and I have stressed the need to err on the conservative side
in such matters. On the other hand, I want to be very careful that in
the interests of maintaining this principle we do not imbue [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] personnel with a frame of mind and
attitude that becomes too restrictive and unintentionally limits their
performance in their advisory role with the Thais [1 line of source text
not declassified].
From time to time it will probably be necessary [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] to undertake specific [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] operations within general program approvals that
I have given them to satisfy requirements that have been levied by
Washington. Such operations may become involved with some aspect
of the counterinsurgency effort of the RTG. When this type of situation
can be foreseen I have asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassi-
fied] to bring these specific operations to my attention so that I can de-
termine whether we should go beyond the role we have set for our-
selves in the counterinsurgency field.
Finally, I wish to assure you that I have and will continue to do
my utmost to see that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agen-
cies leave the initiative in the counterinsurgency field to the Thais and
that our activities here are such that there is no question in any-
one’s mind about our non-involvement in Thai counterinsurgency
operations.
Sincerely,
Leonard Unger
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Thailand 201

98. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, November 20, 1970, 10:44–11:19 a.m.

SUBJECT
Cambodia and Laos

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State CIA
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. James Wilson Mr. William Nelson
Defense NSC Staff
Mr. David Packard Mr. John H. Holdridge
Mr. Dennis Doolin Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. D. Keith Guthrie
JCS
Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

Summary of Conclusions
1. Thai SGUs in North Laos. A decision on whether to replace Thai
regular forces in North Laos with Thai SGUs will be deferred until the
Thai SGUs complete their training in March, 1971.
2. Thai Khmers. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will
provide data on the number of Thai Khmers who volunteer to join the
Thai SGUs.2
3. Economic Trade-offs for Thailand. The WSAG agreed in principle
that negotiations should proceed with a view to reaching agreement
with Thailand on providing PL–480 assistance to offset increases in the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret;
Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
2
In a November 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, [text
not declassified] stated that Bangkok had advised “that 704 out of 1320 Thai Khmers from
the Thai Khmer volunteer regiment had volunteered for the SGU program.” With refer-
ence to the replacement of the Thai regulars in north Laos, [text not declassified] noted
that he had been advised that “the following statement was included in the final draft
of the agreement given to the RTA: ‘The replacement of the 13th RCT and SR IX will be
accomplished only after all parties have had an opportunity to assess the then existing
military situation and the state of proficiency of the SGUs.’ [text not declassified] reports
that the RTA staff concurred with this statement but noted the possible problem of keep-
ing the units beyond the agreed service of one year. [text not declassified], however, that
General Surakij had previously agreed to extend SR IX beyond the one year if necessary
and they believe he will also be willing to extend the RCT in circumstances where in-
sertion of the SGUs would involve unacceptable risk.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 563, Coun-
try Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)
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202 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thai defense budget made necessary to prepare Thai forces for opera-
tions in Cambodia. The State Department will prepare a plan covering
provision of PL–480 support in return for Thai agreement to bring up
to strength regimental combat teams earmarked for operations in Cam-
bodia. The Defense Department will investigate the feasibility of pro-
viding military equipment and supplies to Thai forces under the terms
of the Supply and Logistical Agreement with Thailand of 1963.
4. Armored Vehicles. The WSAG noted that all agencies were agreed
on going forward with supply of 25 M–113 armored personnel carri-
ers to Cambodia.
The WSAG agreed that Australia should be encouraged to provide
Ferret and Saladin vehicles to Cambodia. The Defense Department will
continue discussions with the Australians on this subject; and if an Aus-
tralian offer is forthcoming, the NSC staff will solicit agency views be-
fore a final understanding is reached with the Australians.
(Mr. Johnson and Mr. Wilson were not present at the opening of
the meeting.)
[41⁄2 pages of source text not declassified.]
[Omitted here is discussion of APCs for Cambodia.]

99. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Bangkok, November 27, 1970.

Dear Alex,
The recent bombing of North Vietnam targets by US aircraft is yet
another in a series of cases that found me totally unprepared to tell the
RTG anything about operations from Thai bases involving a significant
departure from existing policies and practices as they know them.
While fully appreciating the sensitivity of the subject, I strongly feel
that my inability to communicate some of this information—at least at
the top level—has prevented me from discharging commitments and
responsibilities to the RTG that form an important part of the arrange-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Official–Informal.
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Thailand 203

ments and understandings under which US forces were permitted to

operate from Thai bases. Initially, you will recall, they asked for ad-
vance information on our operations. Our present arrangement of giv-
ing them post-strike summaries is predicated on the assumption that
we will keep them informed of unusual operations, especially when
the deviation from established practice has political dimensions of in-
terest to the Thai.
I am enclosing a brief list of Thai-based operations2 that took place
this year without our knowing in advance or being able to inform the
RTG except after the fact.
As far as last weekend’s strikes against North Vietnam are con-
cerned, despite my urgent inquiry to Washington,3 I was again unable
to offer the RTG any information about the involvement of Thai-based
USAF resources beyond what had already appeared in the papers. The
Prime Minister’s first question when I introduced General Clay was
about this operation. Had Thanat been present, he would surely have
probed more deeply and perhaps gotten off one of his barbs about our
failure to consult. To compound the problem, Secretary Laird’s No-
vember 23 statement about the helicopter rescue operation (which I
was instructed to convey urgently) was sent only Priority, did not ar-
rive here until after lunch, and could not be conveyed before the RTG
read it in the afternoon papers. In view of today’s press stories that
the helicopters used Thai bases, we may yet have some inquiries about
this one.
I strongly feel that the requirement to keep the RTG fully informed
on operations of Thai-based aircraft is fundamental to the smooth con-
duct of air operations from Thai bases. It has a direct bearing on the
continuation of the operational freedom we have enjoyed here and
which I presume it is desirable to maintain.
I know you will share my growing concern over these disturbing
episodes and hope you will find opportunities to take them up at ap-
propriate levels in DOD, perhaps by drawing Dave Packard’s4 and Tom
Moorer’s attention to them. With every understanding for the need for
operational secrecy, I believe our policy of dealing out the RTG (whose

2
Attached but not printed.
3
Telegram 14761 from Bangkok, November 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presi-
dential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)
4
In a December 4 letter to Packard, Johnson enclosed a copy of Unger’s letter and
commented: “I feel that his points are very well taken and, as we draw down in the area
and the Thai look to what they feel are the policy implications for themselves, I feel that
we should no longer necessarily expect the same degree of Thai complaisance in our use
of bases in Thailand.” (Ibid.)
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204 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

record on security has been excellent) is short-sighted and someday

may boomerang. Informing the RTG after the fact, and then only in-
completely, simply will not do!
Looking forward to seeing you soon in Washington.
Sincerely,
Len

100. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 1, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 29, President’s Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.
Excerpt—1 page of source text not declassified. A notation in President
Nixon’s handwriting in the margin of this memorandum reads: “K—a
disturbing report—Perhaps we need a stronger Ambassador.”]

101. Diplomatic Note From Secretary of State Rogers to the

Ambassador of Thailand (Hongladarom)1

Washington, December 10, 1970.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency

the Ambassador of Thailand and has the honor to inform him2 as
follows.
With regard to the proposed PL–480 sale of rice to Indonesia,3 the
American Embassy in Bangkok has relayed to the Department of State

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
No classification marking. Drafted by West and cleared by Alexander Shakow
(AID/EA/I), Malcolm H. Churchill (EA/IND), and Elizabeth M. Denham (S/S).
2
The note was delivered by Barger on December 10 during his meeting with Thai
Ambassador Sunthorn. (Telegram 202614 to Bangkok, December 11; ibid.)
3
The Department had advised Thailand of the planned sale in a diplomatic note
of November 20. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 205

a request, received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,4 that the United
States consider buying a portion of the rice from Thailand in a man-
ner similar to Japan’s purchase for Indonesia. Should this be impossi-
ble the message suggested that the proposed sale be delayed until the
end of April.
At the December 1969 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group
on Indonesia (IGGI) the United States pledged to contribute a fair share
of the $140 million estimated food aid requirement for the 15-month
period ending March 31, 1971. This assistance is still considered vital
not only for its direct impact in conserving foreign exchange and sta-
bilizing prices but also because of the local currency generated for sup-
port of the development program. Although Indonesia had anticipated
that the United States would provide up to 450,000 tons of rice and
had in fact requested a greater quantity, the total to be provided is not
expected to exceed 400,000 tons. This would include 240,000 tons from
the April agreement, the proposed sale of 110,000 and a possible ad-
ditional 50,000 tons early next year. Any delay in arrival of PL–480 rice
beyond March 1971 would fail to accord with understandings reached
at the December 1969 IGGI meeting.
With regard to the suggestion that the United States buy Thai rice
as has been done by Japan, it is regretted that this would not be feasi-
ble in view of availabilities of United States rice and the United States
balance of payments considerations. It is understandable that Japan,
which has a large surplus in its bilateral payments with Thailand,
should wish to find measures to ease this imbalance. On the other hand,
the United States is still a net contributor to Thailand’s balance of
payments.
Although the assistance provided by the various countries has
helped to improve the situation following the serious financial strains
which led to formation of the international assistance group in 1966,
Indonesian recovery and development requires that foreign exchange
resources allocated to food purchases be kept to a minimum. However,
as a result of this assistance Indonesia has had the resources to pur-
chase commercially on the average as much or more rice than was pos-
sible in 1965 when no rice imports were obtained under the United
States PL–480 program. In supplementing Indonesia’s resources and
enabling them to continue to make commercial purchases of rice as
well as other vital commodities this Government believes that the pro-
gram, on the whole, has been helpful rather than harmful to Thailand.

4
Telegram 15262 from Bangkok, December 6, relayed the Thai request. (Ibid.)
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206 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

102. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 15, 1970, noon.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Leonard Unger
Henry A. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT
Dr. Kissinger’s Conversation With Ambassador Unger on US-Thai Relations

Dr. Kissinger expressed his pleasure in seeing Ambassador Unger.

He went on to say that he had developed a number of obsessions about
Thailand. One of these involved the use of Thai troops in Cambodia.
After he had sent his letter to Ambassador Unger2 he had come to be-
lieve that they both were on the same track;3 on the other hand, for
many months he had the strong impression that Unger’s colleagues
wanted the Thai troops to stay in Thailand, especially in the Northeast,
and not get in trouble in Cambodia. Somehow, by hook or crook, Thai
units intended for Cambodia would disappear. Because Ambassador
Unger probably didn’t know the origins of the interest here in having
the Thai prepared to go into Cambodia, he, Dr. Kissinger, wanted to
provide some of the background. He had to deal with the President,
who would repeatedly telephone about this. One evening the Presi-
dent had called about the two regiments of Thai regulars which were
supposed to be a strategic reserve, and said that he wanted them in
Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger noted that he had then gone back to the WSAG
to say that these regiments should be sent in.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger on December 17 for approval under
cover of an attached memorandum with the notation: “Due to the sensitivity of the sub-
ject matter, no further distribution appears warranted.” The meeting was held in
Kissinger’s office.
2
See Document 95.
3
In a December 14 memorandum to Kissinger, however, Holdridge stated that
Unger had only partly “gotten” the President’s desires with respect to the Thai helping
out in Cambodia. Rather, he noted that Unger “has been inclined to push his own ideas
first, notably in trying to focus upon the counterinsurgency requirements in Thailand as
first priority. He probably shares the general State view that ‘Thai troops should serve
in Thailand,’ as well as State’s concerns over possible U.S. military involvement along
with the Thai via our SEATO relationship. Thai in addition favors direct U.S. military
assistance to Thailand in support of Thai activities in Cambodia, even though this is
legally not possible—he wants the laws changed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presiden-
tial Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)
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Thailand 207

He happened to be a member of the school of thought, Dr. Kissinger

continued, which believed that a Presidential order should be carried
out. He referred to the complicated sequence of events involving the two
regiments of Thai regulars which were supposed to go into Cambodia,
the forces which were to be sent from Thailand to Vietnam to free units
of the Thai forces in Vietnam for service in Cambodia, and then the plan
to train two regiments of Thai/Khmer volunteers. We had ended up with
no Thai regulars in Cambodia, no units sent to Vietnam, and no
Thai/Khmer regiments. Ultimately, the Thai decision was to pull out
from Vietnam, leaving nothing in reserve. This had not looked like the
most enthusiastic compliance with the President’s orders.
Dr. Kissinger observed that Thai military planning now appeared
to be coming along satisfactorily. However, if the occasion ever arose
for the Thai to move, we should give the impression that we were re-
ally behind them rather than engaging in discussions over the details
of our aid. This would give them the wrong impression. Ambassador
Unger said that he felt our negotiations with the Thai on support were
now proceeding satisfactorily, and that if we could carry these negoti-
ations through we would have Thai units prepared and in place ready
to move out for operations in Cambodia this dry season. Nevertheless,
if the Thai went into Cambodia we would have a big financial prob-
lem in paying for the ordnance (bombs and ammunition), POL, and
other supplies which the Thai would need. Ambassador Unger added
that nobody had told him where these funds were to come from. He
assumed that Dr. Kissinger probably remembered the last frank mes-
sage from Bangkok in which he had pointed out these difficulties. Dr.
Kissinger asked if Ambassador Unger had suggested any solutions,
and Ambassador Unger replied that he hadn’t offered any because he
had been knocked down on using Thai MASF, and had also been in-
formed that Cambodian MAP was unavailable because it was over-
committed. Dr. Kissinger noted that the situation as to Cambodia MAP
was now remedied by the supplemental appropriation.
Ambassador Unger stated that he wanted Dr. Kissinger to know
his, Unger’s, thinking. When the question of the Thai operating in Cam-
bodia through South Vietnam had arisen, he had thought this was a
great solution. However, it had been knocked down somewhere in
Washington. The question was apparently how deeply into Cambodia
the Thai should operate. The Thai had been ready to go, but somebody
back here had killed the idea. He understood that it had been knocked
out as a practicable possibility over the issue of how funds could be
used, and also because of the possibility of Congressional flak. With
respect to the Thai/Khmer idea the question was where the money
would come from when the troops moved into Cambodia. Funds
couldn’t come from Thai MASF, or from Cambodia MAP either (al-
though this might now be changed).
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208 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Ambassador Unger explained that the situation he had just de-

scribed was why he had jumped on the SGU idea for using trained
people—the two SGU battalions formed out of the Thai/Khmer vol-
unteers—against the Ho Chi Minh trail. He understood that these units
had just taken off from Korat for commitment to the Bolovens. Dr.
Kissinger asked Ambassador Unger’s opinion of the capability of these
troops, to which Ambassador Unger replied that the units ought to
be good because they had been well-trained. Because of this, the
judgment had been made to put them into the Bolovens area, but
we wouldn’t know until later how well they would do. Thai troops
were good on the defensive, although not so good on the offensive.
Ambassador Unger cited Thai regulars in North Laos as an example
of effective Thai performance on the defensive, noting that although
they had recently been hit very hard and had suffered substantial
casualties, they had held very well. He believed that the situation in
the Bolovens was also one in which the Thai would do well. SGUs were
a better kind of unit than the regulars, since they were more mobile.
He hoped to see all the Thai troops in Laos eventually put into the SGU
mode, with the RCT pulled back. It could also help defend Long Tieng
and Sam Thong. Going back to the South Laos picture, if all went well
and the situation didn’t get out of hand, we would work out a smooth
transition for putting in SGUs.
Dr. Kissinger declared that he was willing to go along with this
since we had an assessment that the SGUs were as good as the RCT.
The Joint Chiefs did not think so. Ambassador Unger remarked that
the test would come soon in the South.
Dr. Kissinger then asked Ambassador Unger why the Department
of State was so interested in SGUs instead of Thai regulars. Ambas-
sador Unger replied that General Praphat had told him that the Thai
could not have their soldiers fighting side by side at different rates of
pay, and that types of units and pay scales should be standardized. In
addition, the Thai were hesitant to put in RCTs except in places where
they could be covered up. This was so as to avoid the appearance of
violating the Geneva Accords. Ambassador Unger observed that his
own conclusion was that the SGUs were preferable because they cost
less and were more suitable for the type of fighting involved. Did Wash-
ington feel that the cost was an important factor?
Dr. Kissinger stated that what the President wanted was success—
he wouldn’t care about an additional $10 million if success was as-
sured. There was a school here which interpreted the Nixon Doctrine
as favoring a semi-neutralist Thailand. This was a brilliant theory, ex-
cept for the fact that it didn’t meet the President’s ideas. The President
did not want to encourage a semi-neutralist Thailand, or a defeat in
Laos. When the chips were down, Thai regulars would be pulled in
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Thailand 209

anyway. The President wanted reports on what Ambassador Unger be-

lieved, not reports on what Ambassador Unger believed conformed
with the views of the White House. We then would proceed to give
definite instructions. Dr. Kissinger suggested that every once in a while
Ambassador Unger should sum up what he really thought for his, Dr.
Kissinger’s, use.
Ambassador Unger reiterated the belief that over the long run
SGUs were the better deal. Dr. Kissinger said that he had no brief for
the SGUs over the RCTs except that we knew that the RCT had worked
in North Laos. What we would do was to put the SGUs in when they
were trained, which would be at the beginning of the rainy season.
Ambassador Unger told Dr. Kissinger that he would so inform Praphat,
who wouldn’t simply pull out the RCT but would keep it there in or-
der to maintain his assets. Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was very
important.
Ambassador Unger said that the Thai were not planning to put an
RCT into South Laos, to which Dr. Kissinger commented that he did
not see the need for an RCT where one was not already in place. In the
Long Tieng situation we had waited a long time after being told the
Thai regulars were needed before deciding to go ahead. The President
had made the decision, which obviously had made all the difference.
Ambassador Unger mentioned that he had no complaint over this de-
cision, only over the fact that he had not been brought in on all of the
preliminary communications. Dr. Kissinger explained that back chan-
nel messages had been used only because we had wanted to make sure
before hand that the Thai were willing to go. There was no sense here
that Ambassador Unger was doing anything but loyally carrying out
his instructions. The difficulty was in making sure that the President’s
policy and wishes filtered through.
Ambassador Unger noted that there were misunderstandings
among the Thai, too. He was now speaking to them on an entirely dif-
ferent basis from what he had been saying two years ago. Neverthe-
less, the Thai understood the Congressional problem, and knew that
what Congress said was not necessarily the President’s policy. Dr.
Kissinger expressed understanding of the difficulties the Thai faced,
recalling some of the problems which the President’s advance men had
caused prior to the President’s trip last year.
Ambassador Unger declared that in our relations with the Thai we
should not overlook small but important issues such as the Son Tay
raid. The aircraft involved had all taken off from Thai bases, but he
had been given absolutely nothing which he could pass along to the
Thai about this. Dr. Kissinger stated that the problem here did not lie
with Ambassador Unger or himself, but was due to the fact that when
the decision had been made Secretary Rogers had not agreed to a
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210 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

suggestion from him that others in State such as Ambassador Johnson

and Ambassador Green should be brought in. He personally had been
prohibited from talking, and had called Ambassador Johnson over
against orders to tell him about the raid while it was in progress. This
was of course too late, and we should have had Ambassador Unger
talking to the Thai about that same time. Ambassador Unger asserted
that even an hour of advance notice would have been helpful. Only to-
day, with the help of Secretary Rogers, he had gotten Secretary Laird
to clear an anodyne message which could be given to the Thai.
In conclusion, Ambassador Unger mentioned that there were two is-
sues which caused him considerable concern: first, the matter of close-in
air support for the Thai if they went into Cambodia, and second the mat-
ter of our longer term commitment to Thailand under these circumstances
and the relationship of the Thai actions to SEATO. Dr. Kissinger agreed
that these were important issues, and instructed Mr. Holdridge to see that
they would be put before the WSAG for consideration.
(Note: After the meeting Ambassador Unger elaborated on the
close-in air support issue to Mr. Holdridge, saying that he believed the
Thai air resources were inadequate to maintain the authorized sortie
rate of 900 per month, and that in any event the Thai had no real ex-
perience in providing the kind of close-in support which might be nec-
essary in Cambodia. There was also the related matter of how to pro-
vide logistical support.)

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in

France1

Bangkok, January 5, 1971, 1233Z.

130. Paris For SecDef. Subj: Thai Assistance to Cambodia. Ref:

Bangkok 125.2
1. Thailand’s long-standing security concerns have been com-
pounded by Communist aggression in Cambodia. However, initial Thai
receptivity to sweeping requests for assistance from Lon Nol was tem-
pered not only by reserved response by U.S. concerning support, but

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Secret;
Priority; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State and to CINCPAC.
2
Dated January 5. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 211

also by serious assessment of their priorities and capabilities in light

of existing troop commitments in Vietnam and Laos and requirements
to meet mounting insurgency problems at home. Moreover, after it be-
came evident that RTA ground combat presence would raise number
of touchy issues (including command and control), Cambodians indi-
cated to Thai that there was no immediate requirement for their troops
and Cambodians also limited that airforce operations, thus reducing
number of sorties RTAF could fly in support of Cambodia.
2. In response Washington directives to discuss with Thai meas-
ures to meet dry season emergency in Cambodia, we and Thai costed
out their contingency plan for western Cambodia (Chakri Plan). We
have recommended to Washington our moving ahead at this time only
with package of readiness measures drawn from Chakri Plan for: RTAF
operations of 900 sorties per month; preparing five regiments for com-
bat; command and control; and activating reserve division. Total one-
time costs of these packages would be about $36 million to achieve
readiness; continuing O&M and personnel costs to maintain readiness
would be $1.6 million per month. We would not intend to finance per-
sonnel costs of these packages and Thai have agreed in principle to as-
sume them. One-time personnel costs are $2.66 million and continuing
personnel costs are $1.8 million per month.
3. While consideration has been given to deploying Black Leop-
ard units returning from RVN to Cambodia, if requested by Cambo-
dia, this is not practicable since Black Leopards cease to exist as units
shortly after returning to Thailand; about 40 percent of the personnel
are volunteers for Vietnam and under the law must be released from
active duty in accordance with their contracts; the other 60 percent (RTA
regulars) normally return to their former units, and are badly needed
there to bring forces up to acceptable strength levels.
4. Pending an answer from Washington on our recommendation
(see para 2 above), we have not resumed dialogue on readiness meas-
ures with Thai. We expect Thai will take occasion of SecDef visit to in-
quire into status of project (which was undertaken at our initiative) and
U.S. views on Thai assistance to Cambodia. Thai may also raise ques-
tions about U.S. support if in fact deployment to Cambodia should be
required. This would include our help with logistics and air support
as well as with greatly expanded costs for material in actual combat
conditions.
Unger
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212 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, January 11, 1971, 0909Z.

384. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with Thai Leaders.

1. Summary: In after-dinner meeting January 7 with Secretary
Laird, Adm. Moorer, and their aides, and US mission reps, Thai lead-
ers stressed following: their support for Nixon Doctrine and Viet-
namization, but concern that success of latter may be gravely impaired
by continued enemy capability mount threat in Laos and Cambodia;
recognition that SEA nations must make growing contribution to their
own defense, especially in manpower; determination to assume full
responsibility for their defense needs without US troops, but require-
ment for continuation of US military assistance; need for helicopters,
ammo, T–28’s and excess equipment that can be used to develop Thai
forces; rice problem (reported Bangkok 276)2. Secretary gave forceful
presentation of Nixon Doctrine (including assurance of continued
regular military assistance and fullest exploitation of excess pro-
gram), stressed need for regional cooperation and will of regional
countries to make effective use of their resources. In response to
Thanat’s expressed doubts whether the administration will be able
to carry out the programs underpinning the Nixon Doctrine, Secretary
explained importance of recent vote of defense appropriations and
stated his conviction that President will get the support to carry
through his program. Thai leaders did not seek additional meeting,
evidently feeling that they got their main problems off their chests.
End summary.
2. Following is uncleared account of Secretary’s after-dinner dis-
cussion with RTG leaders. Present were: PriMin Thanom, DepPriMin
Pote, FonMin Thanat, ACM Dawee, Gen. Jira (military advisor to
PriMin), RTA C/S Gen. Surakij, Dep C/S Supreme Command (fwd)

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF THAI–US. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis.
2
Telegram 276 from Bangkok, January 8, noted that “Thai leaders (especially Fon-
Min Thanat) made impassioned plea to SecDef for U.S. reconsideration of PL–480 rice
shipments to Thailand’s traditional markets.” It noted that Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin told Laird that “U.S. deliveries were
cutting into Thailand’s most important source of income. This applied especially to In-
donesia which normally buys Thai rice. If U.S. were to compete in open market and at
a fair price, the Thai would not mind, but PL–480 sales not made under competitive con-
ditions.” (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 INDON)
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Thailand 213

Gen. Kriangsak, and FonMin’s Secretary Dirabongse. Secretary Laird

was accompanied by Amb Unger, Adm. Moorer, Asst. Secretaries Nut-
ter and Henkin, Dep Asst. Secretary Doolin, DCM, COMUSMACTHAI,
and PolMil Counselor. Gen. Praphat had to be absent to manage budget
debate; Gen. Sawaeno also originally on guest list was not present.
3. PM opened with brief review of instances of Thai cooperation
with free world (Korea, Laos, SVN, basing of US forces in Thailand).
He expressed full support for Nixon Doctrine and understanding for
US troop reductions, but argued that these reductions be planned care-
fully, taking into account assessments of communist strength and ac-
tion. Communist threat to SEA was still great as the small countries
here were developing their own defenses while simultaneously trying
to improve living standards. All sea nations should bear responsibility
for their own defense, but continued substantial US assistance was re-
quired. Concept of Vietnamization should be broadened to “Southeast-
Asianization.”
4. In commenting on implications of US troop withdrawals, Thai
leaders several times stressed danger that as war in Vietnam winds
down, threat to Laos and Cambodia (and thus to Thailand) could well
increase. In their view, success of Vietnamization depended on how
well the US could manage situation in Laos and Cambodia. Thanks
to US and other SEA assistance, Cambodia had resisted much better
than anticipated, but “some sort of US guard must be maintained;
otherwise Vietnamization will fall flat” (Thanat). Saigon was still
the enemy’s principal target, but he is now attempting to get at it
through Laos (where he is building up LOCs in the panhandle) and
Cambodia.
5. Secretary several times stressed theme of regional cohesion, co-
ordination and self-help. Enemy capabilities and intentions are not the
only factors being considered in US troop reductions; willingness and
capability of our friends to use their energies effectively and well were
also very important. SVN forces were now much larger and more ca-
pable while enemy capabilities had declined since 1968. Secretary said
in applying Nixon Doctrine we will give as much help as possible;
while we are terminating our combat role, we will continue other im-
portant roles such as air, logistic and artillery support; we not fully
withdrawing now, but only reducing and cutting back particularly in
our direct involvement in combat.
6. Secretary made several inquiries about the insurgency, most of
which brought little substantive response; Dawee stated however, gov-
ernment was successful in keeping insurgents from moving into vil-
lages, but Hanoi-trained Meo were operating in several provinces in
the north; particularly disturbing aspect of the trouble in the mid-south
was that the terrorists were ethnic Thai. Recent operations by 700 young
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214 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Chinese refugees (Dawee rejected term kmt) in the process of resettle-

ment in the north had resulted in discovery of larger ct forces stores
and facilities than had been anticipated, including a 300–500 man re-
ception center for trainees and infiltrators from NVN and Laos.
Throughout the meeting, PM, Dawee, and also Thanat stressed that
Thailand wants to take care of its own defenses; it will do its own fight-
ing and wants no US forces (presumably US ground combat troops);
but it needs US material support to subdue threat before it is too late.
Secretary said he got the message on US forces which Thais appeared
to mean to apply to Cambodia as well.
7. Thai made strong plea for excess equipment left behind by US
forces. Secretary explained legal requirements for transfer of excess
items; if RTG could meet necessary criteria it would have priority
on excess items located in country. Secretary stated that increase in
military assistance effort was important aspect of Nixon Doctrine
and that excess program offered in some ways better vehicle than di-
rect appropriation; Thai should identify their needs and explain
how they proposed to use items so one could move ahead with ex-
cess program.
8. In response to Secretary’s query re RTG’s assessment of possi-
bility arriving at some sort of arrangement with NVN as result recent
Thai contacts with NVN Red Cross repatriation delegation, Thanat
stated that talks had not yielded any results. (Note: In context Secre-
tary’s query he presumably referred to political results, not question
whether some repatriation may in fact take place.) Thanat said only
one member of NVN team was bona fide Red Cross; others were in-
telligence types. He interpreted NVN initiative largely as probing ac-
tion. Even though several subjects, including POWs, had been touched
upon, there had been no real communication or signal.
9. Thanat said in his personal opinion NVN were using Paris Talks
as propaganda forum and no results should be expected there. To the
NVN, the real meaning of Vietnamization is how long the US can stand
behind SVN, since they are confident of their ability to dispose of GVN
once US departs scene. Referring to situation in Laos and Cambodia,
he expressed doubt whether successful implementation of Viet-
namization in 1972 was possible unless situation those two counties
could be contained; despite expressed intention of President Nixon and
his administration, he was not certain whether in light of Congressional
opposition these measures could be taken and whether American peo-
ple were really behind Nixon Doctrine.
10. Secretary stressed legislative debate was often misunderstood,
misinterpreted and misrepresented; he pointed out that though Viet-
namization was first major thrust of Nixon Doctrine, it was only small
part of it and should not be taken in isolation. He then explained im-
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Thailand 215

portance of recent positive Senate vote on defense appropriations,

stressing administration had done well on every test vote. Thanat con-
ceded recent success but insisted there will continue to be opposition
to President’s program. Secretary said he thought President meant
what he said.
11. Dawee briefly referred to Thai defense plan (Chakri), saying
that costing exercise carried on with help of MacThai had demonstrated
tremendous defense costs which Thailand unable to bear with its lim-
ited resources. Secretary said he aware of planning effort which now
being considered in Washington in light of this back to RTG in next
few weeks.
12. Dawee said RTG planning for a new division in 1973 which
meant equipment requirements being developed now. Thai needed hel-
icopters to replace combat attrition; they were running ammo war re-
serve down to dangerously low level due to high expenditure rates in
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand; and speed-up of T–28 delivery would
be most desirable. (Secretary held out no hope that this last was pos-
sible). Dawee stressed RTAF purchase of OV–10s as example of Thai
modernization effort without US assistance.
13. Bangkok press Jan. 8–9 gave frontpage coverage to Secretary’s
visit. Stories highlighted his references to Nixon Doctrine; his “Promises
of US military aid for next decade” (world) and “Aid Increases” (post);
and his undertaking to convey to President Thai concerns about PL–480
rice shipments.2 Thanat was reported as having stated that US had
agreed in principle to “speed up” transfer of US arms and military equip-
ment now being used by US forces in Thailand. Press also emphasized
Secretary’s remarks on regional cooperation and statement in his toast
that differences between friends (US and Thailand) should make bonds
of friendship stronger rather than weaker.
14. Dept may wish repeat CINCPAC for Secretary Laird and Em-
bassies Phnom Penh, Vientiane.
Unger
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216 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

105. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, January 18, 1971.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between The President, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Admiral
Moorer, Director Helms and Dr. Kissinger (10:55 a.m.–12:00 noon and 12:42 p.m.
to 1:36 p.m.)

The meeting was convened at 10:55 a.m. in the President’s Oval

Office so that the President and his principal advisors could hear a per-
sonal report from Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer on their trip to
Thailand and South Vietnam with stop enroute in Paris.
After a brief discussion of the professional football championship
game (Superbowl) which took place the preceding day, the President
asked Secretary Laird to provide the group with a report on his trip to
Southeast Asia and Paris.
[Here follows discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]
Secretary Laird then stated that in Thailand his team had met with
all of the principal Thai leaders and had participated in a dinner and
an extensive after-dinner working session. The Thais made the fol-
lowing points to Secretary Laird:
—They complained bitterly about U.S. PL 480 rice sales to In-
donesia and other Thai market areas. (Secretary Laird said that he
avoided substantive comment.)
—Thai officials were not as concerned about the counterinsur-
gency problem in Northeast Thailand as Secretary Laird thought they
should be. (The Secretary stated that two large insurgent base camps
had been developed in Northeast Thailand, with the most serious prob-
lem being the camp located at the projected end of the Chinese road
complex.)
—The Thais asked for assurances of continued U.S. military as-
sistance, emphasizing they wished us to maintain our bases in Thai-
land but that they would have no need for U.S. ground power.
The President remarked to Secretary Laird that his past discus-
sions with the Thais suggested that they were very much concerned
about internal insurgency. Secretary Laird replied that the threat had

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Spe-
cial Files, President’s Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret;
Sensitive.
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Thailand 217

actually increased over the past 12 months and that the Thais had few
forces involved in this role.
The President stated that if the Thais fell we would be in deep dif-
ficulty because of our treaty arrangements and, therefore, we will have
to push them on the insurgency issue. More importantly, we are going
to have to assure that they get all the military assistance in terms of
equipment and funds that they need. Dr. Kissinger stated that an ad-
ditional problem was the fact that the Thais have forces in Laos and
that while the insurgency in the Northeast may be a problem, the via-
bility of Laos and Cambodia is the decisive factor in terms of Thai-
land’s future. It is essential that they not pull their forces out of Laos.
The President then commented that he had been encouraged by
the recent report on the performance of Thai forces in Laos.2 Admiral
Moorer stated that this was the first SGU battalion that had been
formed by the Thais. He noted that the conduct of the battle was well
executed by the Thais, who permitted the enemy to get inside their po-
sitions and then inflicted great damage on them.
The President then remarked that he had recently read an excel-
lent press story on Cambodia and that these were the kinds of stories
which would insure the proper attitude in the U.S. Mr. Helms stated
that the Cambodians have certainly demonstrated an outstanding will
but that now their requirement was to learn how to operate their forces.
Secretary Rogers reopened the question of insurgency in Thailand
and asked Mr. Helms to comment on the seriousness. Mr. Helms replied
that action programs are initiated each year with the anticipation that
they will succeed but that at the end of the period it always appears
that there has been further deterioration. Secretary Laird indicated that
he had raised this issue on three separate occasions with the Thais but
that they had appeared to want to avoid the issue. The President then
reiterated that because of our treaty commitments, it was important
not to permit the situation to deteriorate. He directed that necessary
spending be undertaken now rather than to find ourselves involved in
another massive insurgency in the future.
Secretary Laird stated that he sensed the need by the Thais for con-
tinual hand-holding with respect to our presence in Thailand and our

2
The President had recently sent Prime Minister Thanom a message, in telegram
6319 to Bangkok, January 14, stating that “I want you to know how impressed I have
been with the performance of the Thai personnel who are assisting the Lao in the com-
mon defense interests of Laos and Thailand, first in successful actions at Long Tieng and
Sam Thong, then at Ban Na and now at Ban Houay Sai. I wish in particular to commend
the irregular forces at Ban Houay Sai who recently inflicted very heavy casualties on
three regular North Vietnamese battalions with the loss of only one Thai.” (Ibid., RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US)
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218 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

assistance program. For this reason, the Secretary provided additional

assurances to the Thai leadership. Secretary Laird added that we have
already cut our forces by 16,000 in Thailand and that further reduc-
tions should be avoided. He expressed special concern about the re-
tention of our naval base and the air base at Utopa.
The President confirmed that he wanted our bases retained in Thai-
land. The slight draw-downs accomplished thus far were acceptable
but the bases must be retained. The President stated that the Thais have
always needed constant reassurances and suggested that it might be
of value to include a visit by the King on this year’s state visit sched-
ule. Secretary Rogers interjected that he agreed that this would be a
good idea.
The President then stated that specific assurances should be given
to the Thais after our next troop withdrawal announcement. He pointed
out that the Symington Subcommittee hearings had done great dam-
age to our overall relationships with the Thais and that this damage
had to be rectified. Secretary Laird remarked that the Thai Foreign Min-
ister was the principal problem in Thailand. The Secretary had em-
phasized to the Prime Minister that the supplemental vote in the U.S.
Congress represented a major victory for those who supported strong
U.S./Thai relations.
The President stated that he wanted it clearly understood that the
U.S. was on a razor’s edge with respect to the Nixon Doctrine in South-
east Asia. While we have made our policy clear, the press has consist-
ently distorted it to our disadvantage. The President stressed that we
must retain our presence in Thailand, and in all Southeast Asia, to in-
clude the Philippines, South Vietnam and Korea. The idea that the
Nixon Doctrine constituted a formula for reducing our presence to zero
was neither true nor in our interest. The President emphasized that it
was important that we reassure our allies in this respect. Secretary Laird
remarked that military assistance was the essential element since our
Asian allies have the manpower resources.
In continuing his discourse on our relationships with our allies,
the President stated that this same philosophy applied worldwide. That
was why Senator Percy had been so much in error. We need a contin-
ued presence in Europe and in terms of our worldwide position, we
cannot permit ourselves to slip into a weak conventional force posture.
We need a strong conventional posture abroad. We should now be
thinking about permanent U.S./Asian and European force deploy-
ments. Our Soviet and Chinese friends watch this issue intensely and
they draw great comfort and attach great significance to reductions in
our force levels abroad.
Secretary Laird remarked that we have to sell this issue to the
American people. He commented that a 11⁄2 war strategy was not
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Thailand 219

saleable but rather we should sell it on the grounds of a realistic de-

terrent consisting of adequate conventional, tactical nuclear and nu-
clear forces.
The President commented that Congressional proponents were the
first to complain when we cut bases here in the U.S. if they involved
their constituents. Mr. Helms stated it was obvious that the Thais must
have continued reassurance from us and that they had already started
to refurbish their lines with the Chinese Communists. The President
restated that we should bring the Thai King on a visit to the U.S. The
President instructed Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and Dr.
Kissinger, as appropriate, to bring Senators in and to talk about the im-
portance of Thailand and the need to avoid future hearings such as
those conducted by Senator Symington.
Secretary Rogers commented that he was convinced the situation
in the Foreign Relations Committee was now a great deal better. Sec-
retary Laird added that the Committee was now obviously split and
that the Son Tay operation had been largely responsible for this. Sec-
retary Rogers stated that the Department of State was also breakfast-
ing with members of the Committee and that this had improved com-
munications immeasurably. Secretary Laird remarked that the
Department of Defense was also working with the Committee on a reg-
ular basis.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.3
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

3
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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220 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, January 25, 1971, 1230Z.

1108. Subject: PL–480. Ref: A. State 012354;2 B. State 012350.3

1. I made presentation to Prime Minister this afternoon following
closely reftel A. PriMin was accompanied by FonMin Thanat and Min-
ister in Prime Minister’s office General Sawaeng. I was accompanied
by political and economic counselors.
2. In my presentation, I laid particular stress on: a) joint interest
of our two governments in Indonesia’s economic and financial stabil-
ity. This importantly furthered by IGGI efforts, in context of which U.S.
PL–480 and other assistance provided. b) Opportunity for additional
commercial sales which may be presented if GOI decides to forgo
50,000 tons of PL–480 rice in favor of other PL–480 commodities; and
c) Evidence that our activity has not been disruptive of commercial
opportunities provided by fact that 400,000 tons of rice commercially
imported by Indonesia in their FY 1969–70 (almost double the 1965–66
total).
3. Thai side argued extensively with all three of these points, with
Thanat carrying the attack.
4. PriMin did not argue against aid to Indonesia, but made one
point in this respect which he held to politely but persistently—the U.S.
should aid Indonesia, but with commodities other than rice or with cash.
He said that the amount of money involved in 400,000 tons rice sale
meant little to the U.S., but was fundamentally important to Thailand.
5. Thanat, nominally acting as interpreter but in fact presenting
most of the argumentation himself, said “the IGGI has nothing to do
with U.S. Simply because it is a member of IGGI, the United States can-
not arrogate to itself the right to take actions seriously detrimental to
this country.” He said Thailand is trying hard to stand on its own feet,
as Marshall Green in a recent speech was quoted as saying they should
do. Then he added their ability to do so is seriously affected when the
United States unfairly disrupts its markets for its principal export, rice.
6. I said that the U.S. had not disrupted Thailand’s market, but
that our actions had greatly helped Indonesia, a country badly in need.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
Secret; Priority.
2
Dated January 23. (Ibid.)
3
Dated January 23. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 221

Like Thailand, Indonesia was a very important country in Southeast

Asia, its security, stability and financial health was very important to
the area, including to Thailand, as well as to the U.S. Therefore we were
working with others to try to restore Indonesia’s economic health, at
the same time minimizing the ill effects on the export markets of oth-
ers. I said the fact that Indonesia’s commercial imports were up showed
both that the program was in fact contributing to the health of the In-
donesian economy and that our program had not interfered with com-
mercial markets. (Thanat picked this point up somewhat later.)
7. A second point stressed by PM was that if we had to use rice
as a commodity in aid program for Indonesia, we should do as Japan
did, i.e., buy some of the rice in Thailand to give to Indonesia. Thanat
added that Japan had much larger rice stocks than the U.S., yet found
it possible to take account of the interest of countries such as Thailand
and to forestall the ill effects of its “politically motivated” sales.
8. I said I was happy that the Japanese had been able to take this
action. I said that in making comparisons with this action and that of
the U.S., however, we must remember that Thailand’s heavy trade im-
balance with Japan, which was not offset in any other way, contributed
importantly to Thailand’s balance of payments problems. By contrast,
the total effect of U.S. activities and direct assistance made an impor-
tant positive contribution to Thailand’s overall balance of payments.
Thus I could understand why the Japanese would be especially con-
cerned to compensate at least in some small measure for the overall ef-
fect of their role.
9. Thanat then said that if we are going to compare Japan and the
U.S., we must remember that Thailand is not extending the same co-
operation to Japan and opening the same facilities to Japan that it is to
the U.S. He said the Thai contribution to the security of this area and
to U.S. interests in particular was persistently overlooked by some in
Washington. I said I did not in the least minimize the Thai contribu-
tion, but that if we were going to look at the matter in the perspective
he had suggested we should also round out the picture and recall the
enormous expenditures which the U.S. had made and the enormous
role it had played in other respects in Southeast Asia to contribute to
the security of the countries of the area.
10. On the question of the commercial opportunity being open to
Thailand, Thanat was thoroughly scornful of the 600,000 ton figure
originally requested by the Indonesians (“Only a bargaining figure”;
“They may just as well have asked for a million tons”). He was equally
scornful of the possibility of a further 50,000 ton increase from the
400,000 ton planning figure. He said that 50,000 tons of rice was “an
almost ridiculous amount,” and said that if we were to say we were
cutting that 350,000 tons had already been shipped or was in the late
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222 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

stages of preparation for shipping and therefore the 50,000 tons were
all that could be cut from the program. He said (referring to the Viet-
namese case of last year) that “ships can be diverted”. He asked “What
makes you think they will buy the 50,000 ton balance from us any-
way?” I replied that they have been pressing us for more rice, and that
we will be supplying other kinds of needs if they decide to forgo the
rice which should free the necessary foreign exchange. Thus the pos-
sibility seemed good.
11. Picking up my point about the 400,000 tons of commercial sales
in FY 69–70, he denied that Indonesia had purchased that much, say-
ing he did not question that I had been told that, but that I had been
“misled” by Washington. He said in any case it was “specious reason-
ing” to say that commercial imports of rice had gone up as the result
of our PL–480 sales. I responded firmly that I had not argued that, but
had said that the total effect of our activities, including the PL–480 sales,
had obviously not been disruptive when commercial purchases by In-
donesia were double the 1965–66 level. I said we thus saw no evidence
that our activities had been disruptive. He said if we would stop our
sales we would see immediately how disruptive they had been because
Thai export sales would immediately rise. I responded by raising again
the question of why Thailand had not obtained more of the rising com-
mercial purchases Indonesia was making. Thanat then challenged me
saying did I mean to say that PL–480 has not disrupted normal com-
mercial sales: what about sales which Thailand in the past has been on
the point of making which were cancelled at the last minute because
of this program. I said I was addressing the present case of Indonesia.
12. Thanat again spoke of “intrusion into a perfectly normal mar-
ket”. I asked why Germany and others couldn’t just as well use such
an argument to prove that we were “interfering” with their market in
Thailand for equipment, weapons, etc. He simply said that was up to
the Germans to raise with us. He said it was up to us to prove we were
not causing disruption, not the other way around. He said everyone in
Thailand, including the people on the streets, knew that disruption was
being caused. I said these people were of course guided by what they
were being told by the newspapers and others. I said I knew there was
a problem, but the question was why. In the face of the large Indone-
sian commercial imports in the past year, I was still uncertain why Thai-
land did not get more of that market. Thanat again took the position
that our figures were simply wrong.
13. I said our actions have shown that we do mean to work closely
with the Thais to avoid damaging their interests. I said the USG has
many commitments, including to Indonesia, but we attempted to dis-
charge them without disrupting the markets of others. I recalled again
the two reductions already made in the figure for PL–480 rice for In-
donesia, and that we were now proposing another.
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Thailand 223

14. Thanat denied that we had taken their interests into account.
He said we had not really consulted them, but simply presented them
with faits accomplis. He said Ambassador Sunthorn has been treated
with “arrogance” in his talks on this subject in Washington. I said I was
very surprised to hear him say that, pointing out I had seen no reflec-
tion of it in my talks in Washington.
15. Thanat then said the U.S. does not raise rice for consumption
but only to dump on the markets of the world, and asked why we don’t
do something about production. I pointed out that we had increased
rice production to meet a grave world shortage starting in 1965, and
that we had thereby saved many people from starvation. We recog-
nized that the supply situation had changed and we had cut back
acreage in the past two years, but such an adjustment takes time. He
said I was “evading” the U.S. domestic political element. I said of
course that element was there, but it was there largely because of the
investments American farmers had made to gear up production where
it was needed. He said the American economy could adjust more
quickly than it was doing.
16. At the end I agreed to report the views I had heard to Wash-
ington and again urged them to be prepared to follow up on the com-
mercial opportunity that might open. This earned a scornful “thanks”
from Thanat.
17. Comment: While Thanat carried the ball and did most of the
talking, Thanom obviously agreed with him on at least a couple of ba-
sic points, i.e., that Thailand is being hurt, and that they got previous
little from us in response to his appeal through SecDef.
18. It is worth noting in particular that to reinforce one point about
PL–480 rice sales Thanat cited (and obviously endorsed) a highly crit-
ical Malaysian comment about our rubber disposal program.
19. We are withholding any press release or comment until we see
how RTG plays that aspect but are preparing for a substantial effort to
get our side of story told if they go on the offensive again.
Unger
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224 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, February 2, 1971, 1003Z.

1492. Subject: PL–480 Rice.

1. In informal, wide ranging session with Deputy Prime Minister
Praphat and two of his close aides and advisors (General Surakit May-
alarp and Dr. Malai Huvanandana), subject of PL–480 rice assistance
to Indonesia came in for extended discussion. I ran through all of our
principal arguments and found that he had been well briefed on them
in advance by staff members to whom we had earlier provided back-
ground material.
2. All of our efforts, however, went for little because of the fact
that he has also been informed that, when Thailand was negotiating
for a commercial sale with Indonesia, the Indonesians, who at first
showed considerable interest, later broke off the negotiations and told
the Thais they had learned that the U.S. would be supplying Indone-
sia’s rice needs through a PL–480 deal. In light of this, he said it was
of no use to try to “prove” that our program did not interfere with Thai
exports to Indonesia.
3. He went on to make it quite clear that he regards this issue as
potentially damaging in the extreme to the long standing friendship
between the Thai and American peoples—to him it is not just a
government-to-government matter. He said that virtually every Thai
person knows about this issue and believes that it strikes at the very
heart of Thailand’s economy, its rice production and trade. He said this
was an issue which could easily put placard-bearing students on the
march and which could get out of hand to the point where Americans
could not appear on the streets of Bangkok “without getting their heads
broken.” All this was said without any personal rancor on his part and
in fact with explicit recognition of the political and economic problems
we face at home and in full knowledge of the steps we have taken to
try to ease the situation from Thailand’s point of view.
4. I think we must take this as a very serious indication from our
friends in the RTG, in this case a most important one, that while they
are prepared to accept the fact that nothing can be done about our rice
shipments to Indonesia during the present Indonesian FY, they do not

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta.
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Thailand 225

feel it will be possible to face a similar outcome next year without it

spilling over to the serious detriment of our general relations with Thai-
land. (I am not sure myself that we will not feel those consequences a
good deal sooner.)
5. With this in mind, I would appreciate the earliest possible in-
dication of our planning with respect to the IGGI food aid package for
the coming Indonesian FY, as well as our other plans for PL–480 rice
programs in the region.2 With that information in hand I will come in
with recommendations (a) as to how we should handle consultations
with the RTG, and (b) for a broader economic strategy for Thailand in
the context of which the PL–480 problem can hopefully be presented
more successfully.
Unger

2
In telegram 23361 to Bangkok, February 10, the Department agreed “that Praphat’s
remarks are a significant indication of how seriously RTG leaders have taken PL 480 pro-
gram” and shared “your concern about future relations.” It noted, however, that “we
have little flexibility as to what we can do with respect to U.S. rice shipments. Although
it may not be possible completely to avoid untimely PL 480 sales, we hope that future
agreements which involve Thailand’s traditional markets will not be signed during the
November–April period when Thailand is searching for markets for its new crop and
prices are particularly vulnerable.” (Ibid.)

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Commanding

General of the U.S. Air Force in Thailand (Evans)1

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1121Z.

2566. Subject: ARC Light Capability. Ref: 7/13AF 230900Z Feb 71.2
1. PoMil counselor conveyed to Air Chief Marshal Dawee this
morning on urgent basis our plan bring additional nine B–52’s into
U-Tapao to support maximum air effort in SEA. Dawee made note of
fact that this would bring total number of B–52’s to 51 and that five
combat lightning K–135’s would be removed. He asked how soon RTG
approval was required. Counselor did not reveal fact that aircraft were

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504. Top Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State, CINCPAC, and SAC.
2
Not found.
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226 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

at this point already airborne but said he hoped approval could be

granted on the spot. Dawee did so, saying he would immediately in-
form PriMin.
2. While Dawee indicated full support for currently ongoing op-
erations to cut enemy lines in Laos and expressed understanding for
urgency of B–52 deployment, he clearly registered point that RTG ap-
proval was required for this deployment.
3. Ambassador subsequently touched base on B–52 deployment
with Prime Minister who had already been informed by Dawee.
Unger

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1205Z.

2569. Subject: PL–480 Rice Sales. Ref: (A) Bangkok 2359;2 (B) State
029914.3
Summary. In preliminary consultations concerning PL–480 aid to
Indonesia during coming year, Thanat stressed gravity of Thailand’s
rice problem at present, above all depressed price, and concern that US
and Japanese activity would leave little room for commercial sales to
Indonesia. Our willingness to begin consultations this early and our
commitments re timing of agreements are major new positive factors,
and were acknowledged as such by Thanat. End summary.
1. I told Thanat at meeting on February 23 that Department had
authorized me to open preliminary consultations with him concerning
PL–480 portion of our aid to Indonesia for coming year. He was evi-
dently appreciative of our willingness to begin process this early in the
game. He said the rice problem, particularly severely depressed price,
was a matter of deep concern to the RTG. This concern was shared by
the King, he said, who was taking the closest interest in the problem.
In all fairness, he said, they had to accept that there were a great many

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
Secret; Priority.
2
Dated February 20. (Ibid.)
3
Dated February 23. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 227

factors other than PL–480 which contributed to the problem. However,

the latter did aggravate the problem at a time when it was already ex-
tremely serious. He said the RTG might well have to adopt a highly
expensive price support program for rice this year to avoid widespread
and serious hardship and dissatisfaction in rural areas. He said that
the timing and magnitude of our PL–480 sales, while only one factor,
could be an extremely important one.
2. I then spoke as outlined in ref A as authorized and modified by
ref B. I stressed that what I had given him and the fact that I had been
authorized to open these consultations at this time was in further re-
sponse to the Prime Minister’s request to the President made through
Secretary Laird. Thanat took note of this and instructed his secretary
(Birabhongse) to record the facts so that the substance of my presen-
tation would be passed to the Prime Minister’s office.
3. Commenting on the substance of our presentation, he noted that
our planning figure of 350,000 was half of the minimum estimate of
Indonesian requirements. Considering that the Japanese would be ac-
tive in this market with non-commercial sales as well, he expressed
concern that there would be precious little left for commercial sellers.
He asked whether we knew what Japan was planning to do this year.
I agreed to find out what if anything the USG held on that. (Thanat
mentioned, incidentally, that RTG had also complained to GOJ con-
cerning its rice program for Indonesia.)
4. In discussion of level of commercial sales in past years, Thanat
acknowledged that there were other competing suppliers, including
Italy and Egypt. However, he said Thailand was much less concerned
about them, considering their competition as commercial in contrast to
that of US and Japan.
5. Comment: It would be helpful to be able to go back to Thanat
as promptly as possible with whatever information we can provide
concerning Japanese intentions. This will of course have a bearing on
the position RTG will take concerning the 350,000 ton figure. In any
case, our commitment with respect to timing, which was obviously re-
sponsive to one of the primary concerns Thanat expressed prior to my
presentation, will be of major help.
Unger
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228 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, March 11, 1971, 0957Z.

3380. Singapore For Amb. Kennedy. Ref: A. State 034153;2

B. Bangkok 29283 and previous.
1. Late yesterday afternoon Amb. Kennedy was received in audi-
ence by Their Majesties the King and Queen; also present were Mrs.
Kennedy, Mrs. Whittle, Mrs. Unger and myself. Amb. Kennedy at the
outset explained President Nixon had asked him to convey his greet-
ings to His Majesty, reaffirm his high regard for Thailand and close in-
terest in developments here, his determination to continue working
closely with countries in this region to assure their security, and to so-
licit any message which His Majesty would like to convey to the Pres-
ident through Amb. Kennedy.
2. The President’s letter of invitation to Their Majesties was then
presented.4 His Majesty was obviously pleased but expressed his doubt
about leaving his country this year in view of the many pressing prob-
lems and unsettled situation here. Amb. Kennedy made it clear that
the President hoped that if this year were not possible, next year might
be. (I arranged with His Majesty’s aide to get the King’s more consid-
ered reply for transmittal to the President as soon as it is ready.)
3. The remainder of the discussion between His Majesty and Amb.
Kennedy was taken up in a lengthy and intense discussion by the King
of several critical issues now facing Thailand. First on the list and ob-
viously of profound concern to His Majesty was Thailand’s severe in-
ternal and external economic problems deriving from the depressed
price of rice and the important contribution to this problem made by
U.S. PL–480 sales, above all to Indonesia. His Majesty’s review of the
problem was along familiar lines but I think we must not underesti-
mate the strength of his feelings on this matter and his conviction that
the rice problem will have not only mounting economic consequences
but serious political repercussions as well, potentially very damaging
to U.S.-Thai relations. Without going into detail His Majesty also al-
luded to the problem of disposal of rubber surpluses.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY.
Secret; Priority. Repeated to Singapore.
2
Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 7 THAI)
3
Dated March 3. (Ibid.)
4
The approved text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 38103 to Bangkok,
March 5. (Ibid., POL 7 US/KENNEDY)
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Thailand 229

4. The other major topic was a review by His Majesty of the grow-
ing insurgency problem. Here his principal emphasis was laid in the
first place on the need for equipment (above all helicopters) for the bor-
der patrol police who should receive support largely according to the
same criteria as the military forces since their role is largely a military
one. He also made clear his dissatisfaction with inept administration
and even oppression by public officials as a contributory factor to the
growth of the insurgency.
5. At the close of the audience His Majesty expressed apprecia-
tion for the President’s having sent Amb. Kennedy and the opportu-
nity it provided for him to convey his messages in return.
6. Amb. Kennedy has approved this message.
5. [sic] foregoing message classified Exdis because ref A. Unless
Dept. sees objection suggest it be reduced to simple confidential.
Unger

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, March 16, 1971, 1105Z.

3136. The following telegram sent action Singapore March 12, 1971
is h/w being repeated for Dept’s action and Djakarta’s info.
“Subject: Ambassador Kennedy’s Call on PM Thanom.
1. Summary: Ambassador Kennedy’s call on Prime Minister, who
had with him four cabinet members and DG of National Economic De-
velopment Board, was used by Thai officials for emphatic presentation
their views on PL–480 rice sales. They returned to this subject almost
to exclusion all other topics raised by Ambassador Kennedy. In
Thanat’s absence atmosphere was more friendly than when same sub-
ject raised previously, but seriousness of Thai concern and unanimity
of all top officials was presented even more effectively. Thai presenta-
tion focused on RTG’s efforts to help itself, essential role of exports in
Thailand’s economic viability, central position of rice in this regard,
and impossibility shift from rice to more diversified exports in short

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/KENNEDY.
Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Djakarta.
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230 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

run, say next two years. New element was repeated request that United
States lend Indonesia funds for rice purchases in Thailand. Request was
presented in fashion reflecting, for first time, full recognition and ap-
preciation of great value of IGGI program and US contribution not only
to Indonesia, but to Southeast Asia as a whole and to Thailand in par-
ticular. Ambassador Kennedy expressed appreciation for informative
presentation and assured Prime Minister of US intention give full con-
sideration to Thai concerns. End summary.
2. Ambassador Unger yesterday took Ambassador Kennedy to
call on Prime Minister Thanom who had with him Minister of National
Development Pote, Minister of Finance Serm, Minister in Prime Min-
ister’s office Sawaeng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sanga (rep-
resenting FonMin in Thanat’s absence), and Secretary General of Nedb
Renoo. Pote acted as Thanom’s interpreter and principal spokesman.
3. Ambassador Kennedy opened discussion with brief explana-
tion of his Presidential mandate. In his response Thanom immediately
turned to Thailand’s balance of payments problem. Thailand was still
a low income country depending for economic viability heavily on a
few export commodities. Rice was by far the most important export.
Current trends toward self-sufficiency in neighboring countries, which
constituted Thailand’s markets, were seriously reducing export op-
portunities and depressing price. This problem was intensified by
PL–480 sales. Besides rice, the important rubber market was weak, and
the surplus disposal issue is a depressing effect. Tin, although of some-
what less importance to Thailand, was another export commodity
whose price was declining. Ambassador Kennedy briefly commented
on the importance of agricultural diversification in coping with exces-
sive dependence on one or a few export commodities, but Thanom,
speaking through Pote, returned to his theme. Diversification required
both time and markets. For Thailand rice was now and would in-
evitably remain for some time the principal export commodity. For the
US, rice was a marginal product. Thailand was able and prepared to
compete even in the present depressed market on normal commercial
terms, but was unable to compete against concessional terms offered
to its traditional customers. Thailand’s problem was intensified by the
increasing financial burden of essential security measures and need to
expand development activities just to keep even with population in-
crease. Security was a precondition for economic development, and
economic development without security would be meaningless.
4. Ambassador Kennedy said the United States was anxious to be
helpful in assisting Thailand in working its way out of its present
predicament. Among the major tasks with which we might be able to
be helpful were the development of expertise and education, and par-
ticularly with diversification and market development. DepFonMin
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Thailand 231

Sanga immediately returned to the theme of rice, saying that the biggest
single problem in finding a market for the rice available for export was
Indonesia.
5. Ambassador Kennedy expressed understanding of the impor-
tance of this problem, and asked whether tourism was expanding. Pote
replied that the number of tourists was increasing, but money was get-
ting scarce and the hotels were suffering. Returning to rice, he said that
Thailand had considered subsidizing the Thai farmer, but there was re-
ally no way to do this which the country could afford. Sanga added
that current prices were far below last year’s. Ambassador Unger said
that, recognizing Thailand’s concern about this matter, we wanted to
be extremely careful regarding next year’s PL–480 program. We would
consider what the ministers had told us, continue our consultations,
which had already begun, both here and in Washington and avoid, in
particular, timing of sales which would fall within Thailand’s princi-
pal marketing period.
6. Pote, for the first time raising a subject other than rice, said
tourism was very important to Thailand. Thailand was providing all
possible incentives for its expansion. He was, therefore, concerned
about reports that PanAm was taking its 747’s to Singapore and hoped
that they would not bypass Bangkok. He and Ambassador Kennedy
then briefly discussed character of tourist industry here.
7. Returning to rice Pote said the RTG hoped that the United States
might be able to lend money to Indonesia on favorable terms to buy
rice from Thailand. Ambassador Unger explained that American rice
to Indonesia was in effect not supplied on a loan basis but as outright
aid. In a sense it did double duty: the rice itself met an urgent imme-
diate requirement in foreign exchange field, and the rupiahs paid for
it were channeled into development. Pote said he understood well that
the American program was very helpful to Indonesia, and Thailand
‘could not make too much noise about it.’ Indonesia needed rice and
had no foreign exchange to buy it. But even if the US lent money to
Indonesia for only two years to purchase this rice from Thailand, this
would help Thailand get over the worst of its readjustment to the new
situation. The Minister of Finance commented that for the same reason
Thailand warmly welcomed other US assistance to Indonesia, includ-
ing American investment in Indonesia. The inflow of American re-
sources in turn enabled Indonesia to purchase other requirements from
Thailand. Ambassador Kennedy said part of the problem was that In-
donesia’s problems were long-term. It took the IBRD and other inter-
national lenders to work out an approach that seemed appropriate to
the Indonesian situation, and this type of solution was not addressed
to Thailand’s short-term problem. He was most anxious to understand
Thailand’s problem and to have this opportunity to discuss it with Thai
leaders.
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232 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

8. Thanom, speaking through Pote, said Thailand was happy to

know that the US helped Indonesia which has turned toward the free
world. This assistance helped in strengthening the whole region.
Thanom wanted this help to continue, and was only concerned that
it should not create problems for Thailand’s own endeavors to help
itself.
9. Ambassador Kennedy said he was here to learn and appreci-
ated the friendship extended to US over many years. It was the Presi-
dent’s personal determination to build strength throughout the region
and to work together with Thailand. It was his conviction that a good
potential for a stronger economy existed throughout the whole area.
He was also well aware of the fact that sometimes we ourselves were
slowing down deliberately and tightening our budget in a manner that
made itself felt in many contexts, in particular in our aid programs and
in American tourism.
10. Thanom raised the question of special funds. The Asian De-
velopment Bank had substantial resources by now but its terms were
such that Thailand did not appear able to receive much help from it.
Ambassador Kennedy said that the administration had been unable to
obtain Congressional approval for special funds for the ADB. It had
been his own endeavor to have the United States make a contribution
to ADB’s special funds equal to that which the Japanese were making.
This position which envisaged a US contribution of approximately $100
million had the firm support of the executive, and had been included
in a bill providing for appropriations for other international lending
institutions. Even though special funds for the ADB had been deleted
by the Congress, the request will be resubmitted. The ADB, which had
been slow in getting started, was nevertheless now in a better position
to contribute to the development of the region.
11. Pote asked whether the US could help Indonesia with com-
modities other than rice. Was the US discouraging farmers from grow-
ing rice? Ambassador Kennedy said technological progress such as use
of fertilizers sometimes permitted increases in yields even though
acreage was restricted. Ambassador Unger referred to the recent dis-
cussion of our Indonesian aid program in Bangkok and Washington
and pointed out that we had in fact offered to substitute other com-
modities this year for some rice scheduled for Indonesia. Indonesia
needed a great deal of rice at certain times, and he repeated the hope
that by beginning consultations on this complex problem early our ef-
forts to reduce or eliminate an unfavorable impact on Thailand would
be as effective as possible. Pote repeated that the Prime Minister wanted
to stress the key importance of rice to Thailand. Indonesia constitutes
a traditional market for about 300,000 tons of rice. With a disposable
surplus of about 1 million tons, and with few other large markets (such
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Thailand 233

as Hong Kong), sales to Indonesia were critical. He wished to repeat

the suggestion that the US assist Indonesia by lending to it, perhaps
through banking channels, an amount corresponding to the present
level of American assistance. This would help solve Thailand’s prob-
lem and satisfy everyone. Thailand itself would need PL–480 assistance
and was looking forward to further talks about this matter.
12. Ambassador Kennedy expressed his deep appreciation for the
opportunity to meet with his hosts and to explore these important prob-
lems with them.
13. Comment: In addition to underlining once more the central po-
sition of rice in this country’s economy and therefore the sharply ad-
verse impact of US PL–480 rice transactions on our relations, the dis-
cussion between Ambassador Kennedy and the Prime Minister and his
group (heavily weighted on economic side) also strongly suggested
that we will be adding another serious problem to US-Thai relations if
surplus rubber disposal is not handled exceptionally carefully.
14. Ambassador Kennedy has approved.
Unger”
Unger

112. Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting1

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 10:26–11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT
Various—see summary of conclusions

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Defense
Mr. David Packard

1
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Files,
Minutes, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the conference
room of the Western White House. A notation on the minutes indicates Nelson, [name
not declassified], and Blee of CIA were not present for the entire meeting.
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234 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

JCS
Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. Thomas Karamessines
Mr. William Nelson
Mr. [name not declassified]
Mr. David Blee
NSC Staff
Mr. Frank M. Chapin
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed to:
1. Approve a proposal for employment of Thai SGUs in Sayaboury
Province in Laos. (pages 2–3)
2. Use gunships stationed at Udorn, Thailand to provide cover for
medical evacuation flights in North Laos. (pages 3–4)
[Omitted here are summaries unrelated to Southeast Asia.]
Dr. Kissinger: I take it you have been discussing Thai deployments
to Sayaboury.
Mr. Johnson: Yes. We have just now received some new informa-
tion which changes Dave Packard’s and my views on this.
(Mr. Johnson showed the telegrams to Mr. Kissinger.)
Gen. Cushman: This group would be composed of regulars and
would count against the total of regulars projected for SGUs. No extra
money would be required for this program, since these troops would
proceed into SGU programs. The regulars are part of the 1,174-man
cadre already planned for the program.
[6 paragraphs (61⁄2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, why not go ahead and do it?
Mr. Johnson: There is a second item that was a late starter for this
meeting. This is medevac for Ban Na. We were talking this over before
the meeting and agreed that there would be great difficulty in station-
ing gunships in Laos. The Joint Staff is going to CINCPAC to see if it
would not be possible to put the gunships in Udorn, realizing that they
might have to refuel in Laos. There are two questions: whether we have
the necessary assets and whether they should be stationed in Udorn.
Dr. Kissinger: Weren’t Air America pilots to be used for this?
Mr. Packard: We were talking about gunships.
[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]
Gen. Knowles: We were talking about gunships other than Cobras.
I will ring out CINCPAC to see what is available.
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Thailand 235

Gen. Cushman: Cobras are not available.

Gen. Knowles: We will check this out, but it is unlikely that we
can get any Cobras.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me see if I understand what has been agreed.
We are going to station gunships in Udorn.
Gen. Knowles: We are going out to CINCPAC to see, first, if we
can station gunships (probably of the UHB type) at Udorn and, sec-
ond, whether they can be provided with range-extension kits or
whether we can put some bladders in Laos for refueling. The B-type
gunships have greater utility, since they can also do some medevac.
Dr. Kissinger: We can find out if it is feasible. If it proves to be fea-
sible why not go ahead and do it?
Mr. Packard: We decided that we should not base the gunships in
Laos. We can approve a program that bases them in Thailand but pro-
vides for refueling in Laos.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t see what more we can learn once we deter-
mine whether this is technically feasible. Is everyone agreed that we
should go ahead if this proposal is feasible?
All agreed. [1 line of source text not declassified]
Dr. Kissinger: Now let’s turn to the regular 40 Committee agenda.
[Omitted here is discussion of Laos and other countries.]

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, April 4, 1971, 0549Z.

4528. Saigon Pass General Abrams. Subj: General Praphat’s Con-

cern over Lam Son 719.
1. Summary. Deputy Prime Minister Praphat on April 1 expressed
grave concern about outcome of Lam Son 719. He has heard from Viet-
namese that poor US support made retreat inevitable. He is generally
worried about what he sees as evidence of uncertainty in US about
concrete support to strengthen Thailand and other sea countries. Dis-
cussion demonstrated need urgently a) to move ahead with effective

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret;
Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
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236 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

STAFD2 program and b) if possible, to offer DPM chance to discuss Lam

Son 719 with top level military officer from Vietnam. End summary.
2. Evening Thursday, April 1 I had a long, highly informal session
with Deputy Prime Minister Praphat over drinks. He had only RTA
Chief of Staff Surakij and his civilian adviser Malai with him. I was ac-
companied by political counselor.
3. It soon became clear that the DPM was in generally gloomy
mood about situation in this area. After brief and very general discus-
sion of problems that had arisen during two decades of US military as-
sistance to Thailand, and somewhat more specific reference to prob-
lems and ambiguities in US support for Thai operations and
contingency plans in recent months, General Praphat said he was
deeply worried about the uncertainties that had arisen concerning US
support for the countries of Southeast Asia in the future. He said the
US seemed to be wavering in its commitment to this area because of
domestic politics—he referred to pledges to strengthen countries in the
region but didn’t see evidence of this in Thailand. He said he and the
other RTG leaders were strongly committed to continue cooperation
with the US, but that if the uncertainties about US intentions were
allowed to deepen no one could tell when the Thai people, or Asian
people generally, would feel obliged to change their attitude toward
the US.
4. He then introduced the subject of Lam Son 719, and it was
quickly apparent that this had contributed greatly to his disturbed
frame of mind. Reiterating several times that he was giving us an
“Asian view” as a close friend, he said he was extremely worried about
what he characterized as the premature withdrawal from the route 9
area of Laos. He said he had heard from South Vietnamese sources that
their retreat was made necessary by poor US support—the source
claimed some units were not even kept supplied with basics such as
ammunition. He expressed the view that if we were not prepared to
stay in key parts of the trail area until the end of the dry season, it
would have been much better not to go in at all. He compared the ac-
tion to striking a bee hive with a stick, which makes the bees go out
and sting everyone, but which does not prevent their return, leaving
everything as before. In fact he said the enemy would be even better
prepared next year to meet attempts to block their efforts, attempts
which would have even less US support than the present ones had. He
said it appeared that political considerations had prevailed over mili-
tary in this operation. He expressed concern that the intent may have

2
STAFD was the acronym for the Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Defense
program.
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Thailand 237

been merely to keep the situation in the South quiet so as to permit

continued US withdrawals that would leave the countries of the area
to cope with a worsened situation afterwards.
5. I said I was quite certain he was misinterpreting the purpose
of the operation and not giving enough credit to its achievement. I
noted that from the beginning it had been said publicly and privately
that the intent was to destroy and to disrupt the flow of supplies and
ammunition, not to hold territory. The strength of the enemy reaction
seemed to have been a factor in determining the length of the opera-
tion, but indications were the ARVN generally fought well. As for our
support, I said that weather was always a problem in connection with
air operations, especially helicopter operations. I said the President had
to be realistic about what he could do on a continuing basis since this
could be done only with the support of the American people, and there-
fore could not put US ground forces in Laos in support of the Viet-
namese troops. But I said our air and logistic support had been mas-
sive and unstinting. With respect to the effect of the operation, in
addition to the casualties inflicted and the impact on supplies, it seemed
almost certain now that the operation had given the Cambodians an-
other year in which to train and equip their forces. By next dry season
they should be a much more significant factor in the picture. Likewise
other friendly countries in the area would be stronger by then so that
the outlook was by no means bleak in spite of the fact that US troop
withdrawals from Vietnam would be continuing.
6. While he took note of and understood my arguments, it was
perfectly clear that he still believed the friendly forces should have gone
in to stay until the end of the dry season, or not have gone in at all.
With respect to strengthening the countries of the area, he did not ques-
tion this with respect to South Vietnam and Cambodia, but he asked
how much stronger will Thailand really be by the end of next year. He
said old plans we had begun on had not been completed, and new
plans have been discussed but implementation has not begun. He re-
minded me gently that he has been waiting for months to hear from
me concerning plans and preparations which we asked them to begin
making for Cambodian contingencies. Meanwhile he said he gets con-
stant requests for his armed forces to loan equipment to others, and to
provide training to others who “arrive naked” looking to Thailand to
supply them from the ground up. While we have promised to replace
what Thailand is giving he has seen little evidence so far that we will
do so. Meanwhile Thailand is getting more pressure from the enemy,
with new and heavier weapons being used against them, especially in
northern Thailand.
7. Comment: The need to get on with discussion of the STAFD
package is too evident to need further stress and I told the DPM that
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238 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I expected to be able to begin useful discussions with him soon con-

cerning plans to improve the capability of their forces in a truly mean-
ingful way.
8. On Lam Son 719, in view of the weight Praphat’s views carry
in RTG councils I consider it important to expose him to a well-
informed assessment of Lam Son by one of our top military people
from Vietnam. I am currently trying to work something out with
Saigon.
Unger

114. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, April 8, 1971.

SUBJECT
PL–480 Rice Sales

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Suthi Nartworathat, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Economic
Affairs;
Mr. Vicharn Nivatvong, Director-General, Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry
of Economic Affairs;
Mr. Herman H. Barger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State;
Mr. Laurence G. Pickering, Political Counselor, Embassy;
Mr. Konrad Bekker, Economic Counselor, Embassy;
Mr. Norman L. Smith, Economic Officer, Embassy;
Mr. Victor L. Tomseth, Political Officer, Embassy.

During the course of a wide-ranging luncheon conversation on

Thailand’s present rice marketing difficulties Mr. Barger reviewed ac-
tions the United States has taken or is prepared to take with respect to
our PL–480 food assistance to Indonesia. He noted first that this past
year the total amount of U.S. PL–480 rice provided to Indonesia totaled
350,000 tons as compared to their original request for 600,000 tons. He
said that part of this reduction—50,000 tons—had been in direct re-
sponse to an appeal made by the Prime Minister to President Nixon.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON.
Confidential. Drafted by Tomseth with the concurrence of Bekker and Barger, and ap-
proved by Pickering. The meeting was held at the American Embassy.
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Thailand 239

Moreover, we began early consultations with the Thai on next

year’s program. Such consultations have been virtually continuous on
this subject between the State Department and the Thai Embassy in
Washington and Thai and American officials in Bangkok since the prob-
lem was originally raised several months ago. Out of these consulta-
tions had come our decision to stay out of the Indonesian market dur-
ing the peak period of Thai rice sales. This had come at the specific
request of the Thai Government and we had duly informed the For-
eign Ministry of our willingness to cooperate. Mr. Barger also said that
the U.S. would try to avoid piecemeal sales and attempt to cover all
PL–480 rice sales to Indonesia for the year under one agreement. Fur-
thermore, the U.S. was willing to discuss at the IGGI a “Usual Mar-
keting Requirements” provision in agreements with the Indonesians.
This would guarantee that Indonesia would then procure a fixed pro-
portion of her rice import needs on the commercial market.
At various points in the conversation Mr. Barger pointed out that
the real problem facing Thailand stemmed from the “Green Revolution”
and the desire of almost all countries to be self-sufficient in rice. The es-
sential task is to come to grips with this phenomenon but the issue of
U.S. PL–480 rice sales has tended to divert Thai attention from it.
Mr. Suthi said that the U.S. decision to stay out of the Indonesian
market during the period immediately following the Thai harvest,
which is the time when the bulk of Thailand’s commercial sales abroad
are made, was really meaningless since the Indonesians would attempt
to avoid buying from Thailand during that period. First, he said, the
Indonesian warehouses were full then, making it impossible to import
more rice at that time. Moreover, they wanted to know the size of their
own harvest before making any decisions on import requirements.
They would then seek to cover as much of their deficit as possible
through aid. Even if they were finally forced to make some commer-
cial purchases the effect of their waiting would have been to force down
the price of Thai rice. Mr. Barger said that the Thai Government’s view
as expressed to us through the Foreign Ministry was that it was im-
portant for us to stay out of the Indonesian market during Thailand’s
peak trading period.2

2
Telegram 5615 from Djakarta, June 30, reported the sale of 100,000 tons of Thai
rice to Indonesia and emphasized “how crucial our numerous representations with In-
donesians (President Suharto, Fonmin Adam Malik, Widjono and others) were” to that
success. It added that the “Indonesians were not disposed to buy rice from Thais against
whom they harbor resentment for what they consider past price gouging. This resent-
ment could be exacerbated if Thais again agitate about U.S. supply of PL 480 rice to In-
donesia during critical period of Indonesia’s development (apparently Thais have at In-
donesian insistence agreed desist for one year.)” (Ibid., RICE 17 INDON–THAI)
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240 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

At another point Mr. Vicharn said the new principle of the World
Food Organization was that food aid should not only benefit the re-
cipient country but should also help the other developing countries
that could supply that country’s needs. He said that it was in accord-
ance with this principle that the Japanese had agreed last year to pur-
chase part of the rice it had undertaken to supply to Indonesia from
Thailand. He said that Thailand would be very pleased if the U.S. could
also adhere to this principle in supplying Indonesia with rice.
Mr. Barger pointed out that there was a significant difference be-
tween the U.S. and Japan in this instance. The U.S. is already supply-
ing Thailand with considerable aid in other forms. Moreover, Thailand
does not have a payments deficit with the U.S. Finally, since the U.S.
has balance of payments problems of its own and a rice surplus the U.S.
Congress is hardly likely to provide money for rice purchases in Thai-
land. Mr. Vicharn said that the amount would not have to be large
whereupon Mr. Barger said that if Thailand was only interested in a
cosmetic effect it could be done with a pencil; all that would be neces-
sary would be to make a slight adjustment in the accounting procedures
we are now using for the aid we are already providing to Thailand.
Comment. Suthi’s comment should not be regarded as overly sig-
nificant. In the first instance it probably reflects the usual lack of Thai
interministerial coordination. Beyond that it is indicative of the Thai
frustration over their lack of success in capturing a significant propor-
tion of the Indonesian commercial market during the last few years.
Suthi was right to the extent that U.S. activity in the Indonesian mar-
ket whenever it may occur is not likely to affect Thailand’s lack of com-
petitiveness. Vicharn’s proposal was certainly not new. He realizes,
however, that political considerations effectively eliminate such action
from the realm of possibility. His advancement of it was more in the
way of a pro forma plea rather than as a serious proposal.
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Thailand 241

115. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(Green)1

Bangkok, April 19, 1971.

Dear Marshall:
Our projection of future developments in Thailand involves us at
the very outset in consideration of developments in United States pol-
icy. The major developments in Thai foreign and defense policy which
are now taking place are a direct reaction to changes and anticipated
changes in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. These changes have been
most apparent in the context of the Indochina war, particularly in our
reaction to events in Laos and Cambodia. In addition, over the past year
the insurgency has grown in terms of the strength of the insurgents, the
areas affected and in the impact on national life. Furthermore, the Thai
have become alarmed over adverse trends in their economic situation.
Their economic difficulties have given stimulus to a new nationalist and
restrictionist outlook, and have placed additional strains on the fledg-
ling parliamentary system. Thailand faces a difficult period of adjust-
ment over the next few years, and Thai leaders face difficult decisions if
they are to meet urgent defense requirements without sacrificing devel-
opment needs. While we are not, on balance, pessimistic in our general
projection, we recognize that our ability to influence Thai decisions on
these important issues is declining with the shift in U.S.—and Thai—
policy. In reading what follows it should be borne in mind that there are
differing trends and currents in the Thai leadership’s thinking and the
issues identified are not necessarily seen in the same light by all.
Thai-U.S. Relations
Thailand is taking the first reluctant and tentative steps toward a
partial disengagement from the close relationship with the U.S. which
she has maintained over the past two decades. This process is painful
to the Thai, but will doubtless continue—at a rate, I believe, closely re-
lated to the reduction of the American presence in Southeast Asia and
of the credibility of the American commitment to Thailand.
Thai leaders have accepted the Nixon Doctrine as a reasonable and
responsible statement of U.S. policy, but they are increasingly doubt-
ful that the President will be able to carry out his policies in the face
of political and especially Congressional resistance. As Deputy Prime

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323,
Folder 943. Secret.
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242 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Minister (and heir apparent) Praphat remarked when I presented him

a copy of Secretary Rogers’ Foreign Policy Report 1969–70, Thai lead-
ers find no fault whatever with statements of U.S. Policy—it is the im-
plementation which sometimes troubles them.
Changes in U.S. policy, as they affect Thailand, have been revealed
to the Thai most clearly in the context of the Indochina war, particu-
larly in Laos and Cambodia, where the Thai see the U.S. ability to pros-
ecute the war increasingly hedged in by Congressional restrictions.
These restrictions alter the security situation for Thailand in basic ways,
and have led the Thai to question the validity of the American com-
mitment to Thailand.
In forward defense of their homeland, the Thai have been willing
to commit forces in Vietnam and, covertly, in Laos. However, their in-
volvement was undertaken with full U.S. backing and assistance, and
with the expectation of U.S. support in the event the conflict should
spread to threaten Thailand directly. This concept—of American sup-
port to enable a Southeast Asian country to go to the defense of a neigh-
bor—had to be discarded when, after the conflict spread to Cambodia,
the USG was legally constrained from supporting Thai military oper-
ations in Cambodia. As a result, the Thai increasingly question the pos-
sibility of our past partnership’s continuing. Although they still attach
great value to the alliance, I think that in the future they will view with
increasing care and skepticism any new American proposals for coop-
erative actions which would expose them to a potentially dangerous
situation, unless they receive concrete evidence that adequate Ameri-
can support will be forthcoming.
On military matters, U.S.-Thai relations continue to reflect a high
degree of cooperation, and I expect that this will generally continue to
be the case with activities which the Thai consider to be directly re-
lated to their security. They recognize that U.S. military and economic
assistance are needed to meet Thailand’s development and security
problems. They also recognize the importance to Thailand of U.S. ef-
forts to bring the Indonesia war to an acceptable conclusion, and in
this context the still considerable U.S. military presence continues to
be only a relatively minor source of friction. It will in the future be in-
creasingly difficult, however, to secure Thai cooperation in nonmilitary
areas, and even in some U.S. military activities in which the Thai do
not consider that there is a mutual benefit. We are already feeling the
effects of an increased Thai nationalism in our dealings with civilian
branches of the RTG, and we expect that these frictions will increase.
This could lead to acute issues between us and the RTG over the
status of U.S. military personnel still stationed here.
Another rapidly emerging problem is that of drugs. We can expect
strains in our relations as accusations are levelled at Thailand from the
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Thailand 243

U.S. because of frustrations there over this tragic U.S. domestic prob-
lem and as we work with the RTG to try to control the traffic in drugs.
New Foreign Policy Directions
Disillusionment with the 20-year old relationship with the United
States has led the Thai to consider new foreign policy directions—they
are moving cautiously toward expanded trade and other relations with
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, they have made
tentative overtures to initiate some kind of dialogue with Peking, and
they have attempted exploratory talks seeking some way of reducing the
hostility of North Vietnam. The Thai are, however, too realistic to aban-
don the protection which the remaining U.S. presence in Southeast Asia
affords them, as the price of a risky accommodation with Peking.
We expect that the Thai will continue their role of active leader-
ship in moves toward regionalism, especially in economic and social
matters. I believe they will also emphasize the political aspects of re-
gionalism, in an attempt to gain for Southeast Asia a measure of in-
fluence in international councils which can be attained only by joint
action. On security issues, the essential and continuing Thai view is
that, without the support of a major power, the military effectiveness
of the nations of Southeast Asia would not be enhanced significantly
through a regional alliance. They recognize that Japan is unlikely, in
the foreseeable future, to play a major security role, although they view
the expanding Japanese influence and participation in Southeast Asian
affairs as largely inevitable and, on balance, in Thai interests.
Economic Prospects
Increasing pressures on the Thai economy will also be a key fac-
tor influencing Thai foreign policy, U.S.-Thai relations, Thai internal
politics, and Thailand’s defense capabilities.
Thailand’s very substantial rate of economic growth during the
decade of the 1960’s obscured from the Thai Government the pressing
need to make changes in law and policy, and in its economic devel-
opment strategy, if it were to sustain the rate of growth. Since 1965,
however, earnings from some major commodity exports—principally
rice, tin and rubber—have stagnated because of falling external de-
mand and/or falling prices. By mid-1969 the softening markets for Thai
exports, lower U.S. military expenditures, and reduced net inflows on
capital account, together with a continuation of the heavy demand for
imports which built up during the booming 60’s, combined to produce
a sizeable balance of payments deficit and a consequent drawdown in
Thai foreign exchange reserves. We anticipate continuing depressed
markets for traditional Thai exports, and continuing reductions in U.S.
military expenditures; thus we foresee no relief from the balance of
payments disequilibrium for some time.
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244 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The Thai economy continues to be basically sound, but there is a

growing urgency for government action to maximize inflow of foreign
investment capital needed to spur industrial development, to maxi-
mize foreign exchange earnings, and to spur and diversify agricultural
production. The immediate challenge is to accomplish this sufficiently
within the next one or two years to reverse the downward trend in for-
eign exchange reserves, or at least stabilize them at a level above a dan-
ger point. The longer range challenge, of course, is to sustain growth
so that Thai economic capabilities can support Thai defense needs and
the educational, social and other developmental programs required,
given the very high rate of population growth.
While the need for corrective action by the Thai Government is
becoming increasingly urgent, we find that our ability to influence their
decision is declining. This results from a number of factors including
Thai attitudes toward the United States discussed above, increasing na-
tionalism, and a scaling down and refocusing of our aid programs and
other U.S. inputs into the economy.
Rice, rubber and tin, major Thai exports which are now suffering
from depressed international markets, are all commodities on which
U.S. Government actions—PL–480 sales and stockpile disposals—
threaten (at least in Thai minds) to reduce Thai export earnings.
Needless to say, it is extremely important for us to bear in mind not
only the real economic effects our actions may have on Thailand, but
also the effects such actions may have on overall Thai cooperation
with us.
Political Evolution
While the past two years have brought experience and increased
self-confidence in their ability to work within a parliamentary gov-
ernment, the Thai have hardly begun to develop the political parties
and other institutions needed to make a workable democratic political
system. The parliamentary process frequently has been a source of ir-
ritation to the military men who still dominate the Council of Minis-
ters, and few of them show a real understanding of its workings. How-
ever, the desire to be counted among the democratic countries of the
world, shared by virtually all important groups and leaders in Thai-
land, continues to encourage leaders to work within the democratic
process and to inhibit impulses toward drastic solutions.
Over the next two or three years, the economic difficulties Thai-
land is encountering will place increasing pressures on the parliamen-
tary system. Members of Parliament are growing more vocal in their
criticisms of government performance on economic problems, partic-
ularly the problems of the rice farmers who constitute over 80 percent
of the Thai population. The issue will inevitably become more heated
as the 1973 elections approach, and political considerations will weigh
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Thailand 245

heavily in RTG decisions on economic problems. Thus political and

economic pressures on the RTG will combine in a way likely to increase
the irritation potential of the Thai parliamentary process, and this may
inhibit rational economic decisions by the government.
The top leadership of the RTG will inevitably undergo some
changes during the next few years. All of the key men are very near
the same age and will soon reach sixty, the mandatory retirement age
in both the military and civil service. It is virtually certain that Field
Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn will not be Prime Minister after the elec-
tions in early 1973, and he may step down before that date. Deputy
Prime Minister General Praphat Charusathien now seems to be the
unchallenged heir apparent but he too is getting older. General Kris
Sivara is waiting in the wings but age would make his tenure at most
a brief one. Beyond that the picture is less clear. While any change of
leadership is bound to involve a certain amount of maneuvering, the
present leaders appear to have put trusted general and field grade
officers into the key military positions, thus greatly reducing the
uncertainties as to what group—if not which individual—is likely to
succeed them.
Future difficulties, arising possibly from a depressed economic sit-
uation or an internal or external threat to Thai security, could at some
point affect Thailand’s internal political stability. However, I believe
the likelihood is that the changing of the guard that must come before
too many years will be relatively smooth.
The Insurgency
Communist insurgent capabilities and organization accelerated
sharply over the past year. The most significant CPT gains have been
the establishment in both the north and northeast of reasonably secure
base areas for supply and training purposes, and the substantial up-
grading of insurgent weaponry from external sources. These bases will
facilitate more rapid insurgent expansion.
In the northeast, Communist cadre have undertaken a systematic
expansion of party influence and control by organizing more formal
village militia units, providing full-time presence in about 100 villages,
and providing a recruiting and training ground for subsequent pro-
motion upwards into local units and thence to hardcore regular “Thai
People’s Liberation Armed Forces” (TPLAF). Government efforts to
counter the insurgency have been weakened by lack of vigorous na-
tional policy direction, diversion of the leadership’s attention to threats
to Thailand’s security from Cambodia and Laos, frictions between the
major responsible elements of the RTG, lack of integrated planning and
resource allocation, and—in some instances—poor performance on the
ground because of inadequate training and leadership. Government
countermeasures will probably limit CT growth to some extent, but
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246 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

will not contain it unless radically new measures of government

organization are undertaken, and more consistent top-level attention
is given to the insurgency.
Sincerely,
Len

116. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, April 20, 1971.

SUBJECT
Strengthening Thai Forces for Defense

At Tab A is a telegram from Ambassador Unger2 reporting his April

15 conversation with Thai Prime Minister Thanom and his senior ad-
visors. Unger was called in by the Prime Minister to clarify questions
that had arisen during the Thai Government’s consideration of our
proposal.3 The main points of Ambassador Unger’s message follow:
—The Thai questioning centered on the relationship of the pro-
posed PL–480 program to on-going military and economic assistance
programs and revealed considerable Thai misgivings on the proposed
program.
—The Thai challenged what they considered to be the requirement
for “double consultation” (on both the economic and military sides)
for the same fund contribution. Unger was subsequently told that
Thanom has decided to set up separate civilian and military groups to
plan implementation of the proposal with us. Discussions will start
next week.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed
the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.
2
Telegram 5202 from Bangkok, April 16, reported on the “RTG’s consideration of
STFD proposal.” Attached but not printed.
3
The U.S. proposal consisted of allocating new increased PL–480 funds to Thai-
land for its social and economic programs, with Thailand thus able to divert funds from
its budget to handle the increased military expenditures that the United States was en-
couraging. The proposal and the Thai reaction to it are described in telegram 5202.
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Thailand 247

Comment: Ambassador Unger believes that the Thai understand

the dimension of our proposal. Their attitude toward the size of the
new resources available and toward the complications of the inter-
locking military and economic programs was reserved but Unger be-
lieves that Thai suspicions and concerns, at least in part, are due to the
difficulty they are having in grasping the new concept of indirect
assistance.
The Thai view that the new program constitutes a double intru-
sion into their budget process is also an obvious irritant. However,
Unger believes that in practice the Thai will adapt to this system and
he hopes that this new military assistance tool, Baht resources, will en-
able the U.S. to get the program under way.

117. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and John H.

Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 22, 1971.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensi-
tive. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

118. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

London, April 28, 1971, 0545Z.

Secto 29/3878. Subject: SecVisit SEATO: Secretary’s Bilateral Con-

versation with Thanat.
1. In a private conversation between the Secretary and Thai For-
eign Minister Thanat Khoman, the latter said that he was satisfied with
the outcome of our discussions thus far on the PL 480 rice question.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SEATO 3. Secret. Re-
peated to Bangkok, Taipei, Hong Kong, and USUN.
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248 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thanat indicated however that he felt it important that in the coming

year we avoid handling the matter as we did over the past fall and
winter.
2. In a much more extended discussion on the China question, the
Secretary told Thanat that we still have under consideration the choice
of continuing our present policy or adopting the principle of univer-
sality: no decision has been reached as yet. The Secretary did make
clear that whichever way we move, we cannot accept the expulsion
from the United Nations of the Republic of China, something which
would generate a very strong dissent in the United States and could
undermine our support of the United Nations.
3. After a discussion of the various options available, Thanat rec-
ommended against proceeding at all this coming fall with the “im-
portant question” approach. He is persuaded that this will surely be
defeated and in the aftermath the Republic of China will be put out of
the United Nations. Instead of that formula, he and the Secretary dis-
cussed one which would be more positively based on seeking approval
for the admission in the United Nations to the People’s Republic of
China. Thanat felt such a tactic offered better possibilities of avoiding
the expulsion of the GRC which Thailand also opposes. In the course
of this discussion with Thanat the related question of representation in
the Security Council was not raised.
Rogers

119. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and

Burma (Dexter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Washington, May 12, 1971.

SUBJECT
Thoughts on US-Thai Relations

As Vietnamization proceeds, and as the US military presence and

capability in East Asia declines in the coming years, Thailand’s role in

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Nodis. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Green saw it. Copies
were sent to Wilson, Masters, and Corcoran.
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Thailand 249

regional affairs will become increasingly important as an issue in

United States policy. The “Nixon Doctrine” enunciates some general
principles that are relevant to Thailand but the Doctrine is compatible
with a wide range of policy options and needs more precise definition.
We have in essence a choice between two general roles that we
might want Thailand to play in Southeast Asia. In one, Thailand would
serve as an agent of the United States, while also defending its own
security interests, through a primarily military posture of defense and
deterrence against further Communist expansion in the region. This
role would envisage a line drawn somewhere in Indochina which
would represent the perimeter of US balance of power interests and
would correspond with our assessment of what we could expect to
hold, relying in part on Thai manpower resources and probably also
on our use of Thai bases for supportive US air operations. That line
would also represent a Thai forward defense perimeter, though it
would lie well beyond the vital zone that the Thai would be willing or
capable of attempting to hold without US subsidy and support. The
line would of course contain within it other political regimes (e.g. non-
Communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) which we
felt it essential to back indirectly, without U.S. ground combat forces,
and which the Thai could be persuaded to support directly, with our
aid, in its own security interests. This role for Thailand would be con-
sistent with those portions of the Nixon Doctrine which emphasize US
fidelity to our security commitments, US willingness to support the de-
fense capabilities of friends and allies, and US interest in promoting re-
gional cooperation—in this case military cooperation involving Thai
assistance to its neighbors.
A major argument in favor of US support for Thailand in the role
sketched above is that, if Thai forces proved effective, it would help to
keep the Communist threat away from Thai borders and therefore
would reduce the risk of armed attack that could bring into play our
SEATO commitment. While we are pledged to uphold that commit-
ment, we obviously do not want to have it tested because we wish to
avoid the choice between further US fighting in Southeast Asia and
reneging on the commitment.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether this militant role for
Thailand is feasible in the current political atmosphere in the United
States and in light of the proclivities and capabilities of the Thai them-
selves. Successful implementation of this concept would be heavily de-
pendent upon the willingness of Congress and the US public to back
it, both in funding Thai military forces (and associated economic as-
sistance requirements) and in the security reassurances that the Thai
would seek if they were asked to continue exposing themselves in this
fashion to Communist military power in areas forward of their own
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250 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

vital security zone. It would also be dependent on Thai confidence that

US promises of support and US commitments would remain firm over
a relatively long period of time. It could have serious consequences if
the Thai should be ineffective in their military role or if the US, be-
cause of political and legislative developments at home, should have
to have to cut off support for the Thai after starting them down this
path.
As an alternative to this role for Thailand, we could see that coun-
try confining its security attention to Thailand itself, though with due
concern for certain adjacent border areas of truly vital interest to Thai-
land, and seeking to settle its affairs with both North Vietnam and
Peking by political rather than military means. In this role, the Thai
might use the possibility of their intervention in support of neighbor-
ing non-Communist regimes (and the fact of their current presence in
Laos) as a bargaining tool in attempting to reach an understanding with
North Vietnam. The US security commitment and the actuality or pos-
sibility of Thai bases being used by the United States could also be
helpful for this purpose and to strengthen Thai hands in working for
accommodation with Peking. The US would confine its assistance to
developing Thai strength economically and militarily for defense and
internal security. We would terminate as soon as possible our subsi-
dization of Thai mercenaries in Laos and desist from further planning
on U.S. support of Thai forces in a regional role.
This alternative role for Thailand would, like the first, be compat-
ible with the Nixon Doctrine, especially with the Doctrine’s emphasis
upon local initiative and a reduced American “profile” in Southeast
Asia. It would, on the other hand, call for us to downplay the security
commitment element of our relationship with Thailand and to reduce
Thai dependence upon that commitment. It could lead to a “neutral”
Thailand, with SEATO eventually reduced to a dead letter. This alter-
native would be consistent with present trends in US public opinion
and legislation which do not favor subsidizing Asians to fight Asians
in support of US interests—or in support of our SEA friends’ interests
as we see them. This alternative would also be compatible with tradi-
tional Thai methods of dealing with the outside world and with a
strong current of opinion within RTG political circles which is press-
ing for moves to accommodate with Hanoi and Peking.
While it may be argued that the first alternative role for Thailand
would have the advantage of insulating the US SEATO commitment,
the same argument can be made for this second alternative. There is
little evidence today that either North Vietnam or the PRC have any
intention in the foreseeable future of attacking Thailand. There is little
reason to suppose that they would expand their ambitions and develop
such an intention if North Vietnamese forces should come nearer to
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Thailand 251

Thai borders. On the other hand, should Thai military forces, at US be-
hest and with heavy US subsidy, become a major obstacle to North
Vietnamese objectives within Indochina, North Vietnam and the PRC
could well be provoked into a more hostile attitude toward Thailand
and even into military threats. Such threats would probably cause the
Thai to turn to the United States for further reassurances, possibly in-
cluding deterrent military actions to support our SEATO commitment.
The second alternative would probably be preferable to the first in re-
ducing the risk of having our SEATO commitment put to the test in
this manner as a result of Thai provocation.
There are of course limits to the degree the United States can de-
termine Thailand’s role in the region and further limits to what the Ex-
ecutive Branch in the United States can do in the face of current Amer-
ican political trends. To the extent that we can rationally plan US policy
and exert influence on Thailand however, our interests would be best
served by a policy which pushed Thailand in the direction of the sec-
ond alternative described above. The first alternative would lead, with-
out real hope of success, toward continuation of the Cold War divi-
sions in Asia of previous decades. The second alternative would
contribute to a more flexible US diplomatic posture that will be ap-
propriate to the multi-power system that we now see emerging in East
Asia. Most important, this role for Thailand would be compatible with
current US assessment of our real interests in Southeast Asia, with our
national reluctance to become involved again in ground combat in that
theatre and with our desire to expand and normalize relations with the
Peoples Republic of China.

120. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)1

Bangkok, May 28, 1971.

Dear Alex:
You may remember a rather special operation which was con-
ducted here in 1968 and early 1969 on a very limited basis, [2 lines of

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret;
Eyes Only; Nodis; Special Handling.
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252 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

source text not declassified]. Most correspondence with Washington was

carried on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with a code word
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and I can give you in that
connection a specific reference to my close-out message on the subject
which was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of about Febru-
ary 10, 1969.2
The reason I am raising this matter is because [name not declassi-
fied] has again come to me with a request [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] that we engage in a similar operation, involving about
the same magnitude of funds and serving the same general purposes.
In this case, the purpose is not quite so immediately related to the elec-
tions which are not due to take place here until 1973, but rather to
building up of the government political party, the Saha Pracha Thai
(United Thai People’s Party), having those elections, of course, ulti-
mately in view.
[name not declassified] reviewed many of the same considerations
he had put forward before, such as that [1 line of source text not de-
classified] do not want the government party to become beholden to
wealthy businessmen for funds lest they run into the kinds of prob-
lems currently faced by, among others, the Philippines. Neither do
they want to make improper use of RTG budgeted funds. [21⁄2 lines
of source text not declassified] said he has and would continue to be
putting some of his own money into this as would the others who
were able to do so; however, the requirements were beyond their
resources.
[name not declassified] emphasized how enormously useful our help
had been previously. On the political side he said that [11⁄2 lines of source
text not declassified], the government party can provide stability in Thai-
land for some time to come. He referred to many years of close coop-
eration with the U.S. and the assurance that this would continue and
the strong implication that our interests would also be served by the
continuing dominance of the local political scene by the government
party.
Obviously [name not declassified] approach raises two questions: Do
we have a means of providing help [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified], and do we consider it in the U.S. interest to do this? The first
point can only be answered in Washington. As for the second, I have
my doubts.
In the first place, this is a very delicate business to be engaged in
and should it ever become public knowledge there would be acute em-

2
See Documents 2 and 3 for discussion of [text not declassified] program.
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Thailand 253

barrassment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is quite true
that the last time the matter was handled successfully without any leaks
whatsoever, but you can never be sure. In the second place, I strongly
suspect that if money is really needed, some of the well-heeled gov-
ernment party supporters [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
could find the money without getting it from us. Finally, I think it is
probably inadvisable for us at this time to be making such an implied
political commitment to the government party. To be sure, our close
working relationship is of great importance to us, particularly as long
as we have thousands of servicemen still in-country and the need to
use Thai bases. I don’t, however, see our cooperation as hanging on
whether we do or don’t provide this help, nor do I think this help is
likely to be critical to the success or failure of the government party in
the next election.
[name not declassified] asked me [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] to support his request in Washington. I told him only that I
would report it, mentioning that I would probably be in touch with
you in the first instance. [21⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] I would
appreciate at least your preliminary reaction at an early date. I am send-
ing copies of this to Marshall Green [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified];3 you will know whether or not you wish to discuss it with
the White House.
Yours,
Len

3
Johnson forwarded copies of this letter to the 40 Committee principals under a
June 10 covering memorandum.
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254 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in

Hong Kong1

Bangkok, May 28, 1971, 1131Z.

7419. Deliver at the opening of business. Hong Kong for S/S only.
Subject: Report of Under Secretary Irwin’s Talk With Foreign Minister.
Ref: Bangkok 7415.2
1. Immediately after call on PriMin May 27, Under Secretary Ir-
win met with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. Also present were As-
sistant Secretary Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan, Ambas-
sador Unger, FSO Colebaugh, and Thanat’s Secretary Birabhongse
Kasemsri.
2. Thanat said the Thai look on US troop reductions in the region
as implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. President Nixon said the
prime American objective was to keep from using American man-
power. The Thai agreed and are using their own men and resources,
but they need outside help—economic, technical and logistical help.
But now it appears that there will be no American manpower and no
economic support either. The Under Secretary explained that the prob-
lem arises from anti-war elements who want to move in every way to
stop the war immediately. However, the administration believes in
building up our allies in Europe, Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
3. Thanat commented that the problem is deeper than just the anti-
war groups, it is also a struggle between the Executive and Legislative
branches of the US Government. Under Secretary Irwin agreed, but
pointed out that the struggle arose over Vietnam and desire of
Congress to curb the war powers of the President, and Ambassa-
dor Sullivan commented on the make-up and tactics of the anti-war
movement.
4. Replying to a question on the NVN position during the recent
talks on repatriation of Vietnamese refugees, Thanat said that NVN

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Immediate. Repeated to the Department of State.
2
Telegram 7415 from Bangkok, May 28, reported on Irwin’s May 27 meeting with
Prime Minister Thanom. Irwin, who visited Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand May 19–27,
told Thanom that “he came with no specific purpose or message, but rather to become
better informed.” The Prime Minister expressed concern about the situation in Laos and
had General Surakij describe the North Vietnamese and Chinese threats there. Irwin de-
scribed positive developments with the South Vietnamese but “then mentioned the lack
of progress at the Paris peace talks.” (Ibid., ORG 7 U) Irwin’s more closely held con-
versations with Thanom are in Documents 122–123.
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Thailand 255

continued to accuse others of intervention while refusing to talk about

their own. There is not much hope that they will argue reasonably. As-
sistant Secretary Green said there are two kinds of negotiations, the
kind we are conducting in Paris, the kind the Thais are conducting
here. In the second kind, one side takes tacit steps and then awaits re-
sponse of the other side. Taking Cambodia for example, Green noted
that Thailand uses minimal force in providing tactical air support to
Cambodia, but holds its deterrent force on Thai territory. This appears
to have kept the war from Thailand’s borders. Thanat remarked that
the Thai are looking for ways to open reasoned discussions to reduce
hostilities. In this regard, Chinese appear more flexible than North
Vietnamese.
5. The Under Secretary then explained the background behind re-
cent moves in US–China relations. The US does not expect China to
change her goals, but hopes that by coming out of isolation and re-
suming contact with rest of the world, China will begin to conduct her-
self according to internationally accepted modes of conduct. Thanat
commented that President Nixon would have a better chance to im-
prove relations with China if Congressmen and Senators were not ham-
pering his efforts. Under Secretary Irwin pointed out that President
Nixon’s position on China has majority support.
6. The Foreign Minister asked if the US has taken a firm deci-
sion on China policy. The Under Secretary replied that no decision
has been made, but one is expected soon. Assistant Secretary Green
noted the belief encountered in Cambodia that ping-pong diplomacy
might have some damaging effect in Southeast Asia, particularly on
their own situation. Thanat said he and the Prime Minister under-
stood what the United States purposes were even if some politicians
were critical. Green said that there is not likely to be any change soon,
that gradually over the long term contact with the outside should
lessen China’s sense of alienation from the world. He cited the recent
prompt return of the hijacked Philippine aircraft and of a yacht which
had strayed into Chinese waters, as examples of the new approach
taken by China.
7. Thanat said the Thai will try to persuade the Chinese to stop
providing arms to Communist insurgents in Thailand, and to stop in-
filtrating men. He noted that Communist propaganda has dimin-
ished, but has not ceased. If the Chinese really changed their policy,
for example, by a change of position in the Paris negotiations, Thai-
land will get the message that Communist China plans to play its part
in the area. Thailand hopes eventually to involve China in a Bandung-
type conference, which Thanat thought would mean that Communist
China had shifted back to a foreign policy similar to the pre-Bandung
period.
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256 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

8. Assistant Secretary Green raised the issue of Chinese represen-

tation at the United Nations. Thanat remarked that this is a very diffi-
cult problem for Thailand, especially because the Republic of China is
inflexible on the subject. In response to comments from the Under Sec-
retary and Assistant Secretary that the GRC is aware it must change
tactics, Thanat remained firm in his view that the GRC is inflexible and
thinks in very simplistic terms. Thanat noted that Thailand has not
changed its policy on China—”not yet, anyway.” It was agreed that we
will keep the RTG in touch with our thinking on the question through
Ambassador Unger.3
Unger

3
After meeting with Thanat, Irwin met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for National Development Pote Sarasin for 15 minutes. Irwin discussed the concern ex-
pressed at the U.S. East Asian chiefs of mission conference about the lack of Japanese
aid in Southeast Asia. He stated that it was felt that what the Japanese called aid “ap-
pears to be largely commercial credits.” Pote observed that the Japanese should be able
to do more and that the Thai looked on the Japanese as “ghosts.” (Telegram 7420 from
Bangkok, May 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US) Ac-
cording to telegram 7441 from Bangkok, May 29, which reported on all three of Irwin’s
meetings, the Under Secretary “expressed U.S. concern that Japan live up to her com-
mitment to contribute one percent of GNP to genuine aid and be prepared to take meas-
ures to reduce the great imbalance of trade between the Southeast Asian area and Japan.”
“Pote generally adhered to line that Thailand’s bargaining position with Japan is very
weak due to lack of trade items.” (Ibid., ORG 7 U)

122. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the

Department of State1

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 1630Z.

3515. Subject: Report of Under Secretary’s Talk with Prime Minis-

ter: Thai SGU Units.
1. Following is cleared record of Under Secretary’s conversation
May 27 in Bangkok with Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn on
Thai SGU units in Laos.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, With-
drawn Box 14/15, Folder 943. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by James L. Carson (S/S), cleared
by Nicholas A. Veliotes, and approved by Green. Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to
Bangkok and Vientiane.
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Thailand 257

2. After general discussion of security situation in Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia, and Thailand, Under Secretary raised question of Con-
gressional restrictions on use of funds. Because of these restrictions
funds have been provided through [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] to support Thai SGU units in Laos. The Under Secretary asked
for Thai views on the issue, noting that Senators Case and Fulbright
have raised the SGU publicly, and that it may be necessary for Assist-
ant Secretary Green to testify before Congress. In such event, and al-
though in executive session, the Assistant Secretary would have to tes-
tify truthfully and candidly. Under Secretary Irwin expressed gratitude
for what the Thai have done, and regret for the publicity.
3. Foreign Minister Thanat commented with irony that everything
had come out already, and attributed this to fact that two former For-
eign Service officers, Lowenstein and Moose, had unearthed the infor-
mation for the Senate. (After the meeting, Assistant Secretary Green
and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan pointed out to Thanat’s pri-
vate secretary, Birabhongse Kasemsri, our inability to control the ac-
tions or statements of Lowenstein and Moose in their present status.)
The Under Secretary again stated the regret of President Nixon and
Secretary Rogers for the publicity. Thanat again remarked that, as vir-
tually all has been revealed already, Assistant Secretary Green’s testi-
mony shouldn’t have a great deal more impact. Under Secretary Irwin
explained that anti-war elements in the U.S. will try to prove that funds
have been used illegally, and Assistant Secretary Green explained how
his testimony may well have to go beyond what has already appeared
in the press and cover in specific detail some of the arrangements which
are not now public knowledge.
4. Ambassador Unger called attention to the manner in which the
RTG has heretofore explained the presence of Thais in Laos, i.e., that
there are individual Thai fighting in Laos as volunteers with the RLG
forces but no regular Thai forces are there. He suggested that this pro-
vided a satisfactory general basis for our answers to queries. Thanat
responded that he has used this formula, and that no regular Thai
troops are in Laos. He emphasized that such RTA cadre as are with the
SGU units have officially signed resignations from the Thai army, and
that all persons now in Laos are “volunteers” [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified].
5. Assistant Secretary Green pointed out that there are two sides
to the issue—a legal side and a political side. Leaving aside the legal
aspect, it is important to argue the question on the basis of why the
SGU units are used, in terms of the protection of US forces in Vietnam
and the fact that the countries of the area are helping one another in
accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. Green said that this should also
carry a signal to the other side, and asked the Foreign Minister if such
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258 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

a signal acted as a deterrent to NVN. Thanat did not reply directly, but
remarked that both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese had accused
the Thai of enlarging the war. These accusations have been made not
only in propaganda attacks but from private sources speaking on be-
half of the Chinese and North Vietnamese.
6. This meeting also provided an opportunity to call attention to
General Sanga’s remarks (Deptel 93462)2 and counsel against any com-
ments which might suggest that regular Thai military are in Laos.
Irwin

2
Not found.

123. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the

Department of State1

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 0730Z.

3516. Subject: Report of Under Secretary’s Talk With Prime Minis-

ter: Narcotics.
1. Following is cleared record of discussion of narcotics problem
which took place during call by Under Secretary Irwin on Prime Min-
ister Tham Kittikachorn May 27. Other topics covered in meeting are
reported septels.
2. At close of call on Prime Minister, the Under Secretary ex-
pressed appreciation for Thai cooperation during the recent visit of
BNDD director John Ingersoll, and noted U.S. concern over the in-
creased availability of heroin to our troops in SVN. He noted that the
major sources are in Burma, Laos, and Southern China, and that ma-
jor traffic routes run through Laos and Thailand. Congress and those
opposed to the Vietnam War will also use the drug question to arouse
further opposition to the war. The Prime Minister responded that ever
since the President and Vice President visited Thailand, the Thai have
done what they could to help. He noted, however, that when even a
big, powerful country like the U.S. has a problem controlling drugs,

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Confidential.
Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to Bangkok.
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Thailand 259

Thailand with its limited means finds it very difficult to control. Un-
der Secretary Irwin expressed our understanding of the problem for
the Thai. He also mentioned the joint U.S.-Thai committee on which
DCM Newman will be the U.S. representative2 and expressed the hope
that it would be able to do effective work.
Irwin

2
Telegram 7155 from Bangkok, May 25, reported on Ambassador Unger’s meet-
ing with Thanom that morning on “the alarming increase in drug traffic.” Unger men-
tioned “the repeated evidence of movement through Thailand and some processing in
this country.” He also cited “the apparently reliable reports about ships, ostensibly en-
gaged in fishing, that leave Thai ports daily and rendezvous with other traffickers off-
shore from Hong Kong.” Unger stated that Thanom “acknowledged what I had said and
indicated his unqualified agreement on the need for effective action.” (Ibid.)

124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to

President Nixon1

Washington, June 9, 1971.

SUBJECT
Visit to Southeast Asia, May 19 through May 27

My trip to Southeast Asia strengthened my belief in the value of

the Nixon Doctrine, not only as the best means of pursuing U.S. pol-
icy objectives in Asia, but also as a formula for developing self-reliance
and determination in the Southeast Asian nations.
Those themes emerged again and again in conversations with gov-
ernment leaders in Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. They all
emphasize the continuing need for U.S. military and economic assist-
ance, but most seem prepared and even anxious to do more for their
own defense and development. They also seem somewhat more will-
ing to face the internal and international implications of drugs and cor-
ruption, particularly as those issues bear on the willingness and the
ability of our government to sustain its effort in their behalf.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and Laos.]

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323,
Folder 943. Secret.
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260 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thailand
Thailand has a special importance in the security of Southeast Asia,
both for its own sake and for the assistance the Thai are providing and
may be able to provide to the defense of Laos and Cambodia.
As you know, Thai regular army troops have all been replaced in
northern Laos by Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU’s). Vang Pao speaks
of the effectiveness of these SGU’s primarily in a defensive or consol-
idating role, thus freeing Meo and Lao SGU’s for offensive operations.
The Thai, along with U.S. air power, have been a key factor in resist-
ing North Vietnamese attacks on Long Tieng. There are at present 10
Thai SGU battalions (approximately 3,500 men) in northern Laos with
4 more battalions now being trained.
Although the Lao need and want the help of the Thai, they show
some concern about the long-term objectives of Thailand regarding
those areas of Laos which once were Thai. We heard occasional com-
ments to the effect that the Thai may be eventually almost as difficult
to evacuate from the country as the North Vietnamese.
The Cambodians too view the prospect of Thai troops in their
western provinces (which also once were under Thai rule) with some
apprehension. At the same time, they have welcomed the limited air
support provided by the Thai.
In both Laos and Cambodia, the Thai appear to be concerned about
the risks of direct confrontation with Hanoi. While desiring to avoid
direct confrontation, they are hoping that the use of their SGU’s in
northern Laos and their limited air sorties in Cambodia will signal to
the North Vietnamese the seriousness with which Thailand views
Hanoi’s approach to Thai borders. During my meeting with Prime Min-
ister Thanom Kittikachorn, General Surakit Mayalap, Chief of Staff of
the Royal Thai Army, gave a briefing on the military situation in which
he stressed the serious Thai concern over Hanoi’s approach to Thai
borders.
While the Thai need encouragement to continue their support to
Laos and Cambodia, we should be alert to avoid the development of
a situation vis-à-vis the North Vietnamese that might prompt the Thai
to invoke our SEATO commitment at a time when public and Con-
gressional attitudes inevitably raise a question as to our ability effec-
tively to meet that commitment.
The Thai and North Vietnamese have been engaging in negotia-
tions in Bangkok for some months, ostensibly with respect to the repa-
triation of Vietnamese who have settled in northeastern Thailand, but
undoubtedly touching on wider issues. Foreign Minister Thanat told
us frankly that the Thai have been trying to feel out both Hanoi and
Peking, and acknowledged that Thai actions in Laos and Cambodia
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Thailand 261

have been designed in part as a tacit negotiating process in which the

Thai have been attempting to signal Hanoi. Although the repatriation
talks have now been broken off and the North Vietnamese delegation
has returned home, it would seem that the Thai, in traditional fashion,
remain willing to cover their bets by talking with North Viet-Nam or
China when an opportunity arises.
Heroin
In all conversations with government officials in Viet-Nam, Laos
and Thailand, I stressed the deep concern of the U.S. Government over
heroin and its impact on U.S. troops and the imperative need for ac-
tion by the governments of the three countries. In Viet-Nam and Laos,
the groups involved in the heroin trade seem to have high level pro-
tection and often to be more or less immune from local police en-
forcement. On the other hand, the leaders with whom we met gave the
appearance of understanding the seriousness of the drug traffic and
evidenced a desire to act to suppress it.
In Viet-Nam, President Thieu has taken initial steps toward better
enforcement in response to representations made by Ambassador
Bunker. In Laos, after Ambassador Godley and I spoke to Souvanna
Phouma, he assured us that new legislation aimed at controlling the
trade in opium and its derivatives would be passed by the National
Assembly in the near future. In Thailand, at the instigation of our Em-
bassy, a joint U.S.-Thai planning group is to be formed to develop plans
to control the drug traffic in that country.
In spite of the attitude expressed by Thieu, Souvanna Phouma and
Thanom, it seems unlikely, given the high level involvement in the drug
traffic in both South Viet-Nam and Laos, that domestic forces alone
will be sufficient. If some external police authority, perhaps under the
cover of an international body such as the United Nations or Interpol
were feasible, it might offer additional hope for positive action. The
Department will explore this idea. In selected cases, the United States
might also consider encouraging the use of guerrilla forces against
identified processing facilities.
[Omitted here is discussion of China and Japan.]
John N. Irwin II
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262 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

125. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 9, 1971.

SUBJECT
Thailand: The Latest Charade

The purpose of this memorandum is to:

—inform you of the latest charade in the bureaucracy’s conspir-
acy to screw up our relations with Thailand;
—seek approval of a hold on and reconsideration of STFD (our
currently proposed assistance package to Strengthen Thai Forces for
Defense) with the idea that we should extract ourselves from this ap-
parently doomed and ineffective proposal and face the issues of Thai
force effectiveness head on;
—provide you with talking points for conversation with Under
Secretary Irwin to set in motion a reconsideration of our assistance to
Thai forces.
Background
STFD was initiated by State and DOD in response to the Presi-
dent’s guideline to the agencies (NSDM 89 on Cambodia, October 26,
1971) that, in recognition of possible dry season threats, “contingency
plans should be developed with Thailand for the possible deployment
of Thai forces to aid in the defense of western Cambodia.”
Proposed to the Thai in April (five months after the NSDM and
well into the dry season we were concerned about), the STFD package
contains the following principal elements of program assistance:
—Foreign Military Sales Credit—We would provide up to $12 mil-
lion in credit to finance Thai purchases of military goods from the
United States. Most of these goods, consumables, would be in support
of Thai air force operations in Cambodia.
—PL 480—We would provide $20 million of agricultural com-
modities over the next two years. This assistance would save Thai for-
eign exchange expenditures. The foreign exchange savings would
offset the Thai purchase from the U.S. of ammunition and other con-
sumables under the foreign military sales credit program. DOD and
State layers contend that this complicated arrangement is necessary be-
cause military grant assistance could not legally be given to Thailand

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Top Secret. Sent for information.
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Thailand 263

for use in Cambodia. The local currency receipts from the Thai sale of
the commodities would support increases in the Thai defense budget
to meet increased local costs (e.g., for airfield construction).
—MASF add on—Imports in the amount of $10–15 million in ad-
dition to those already provided or programmed for FY 71 and FY 72
MAP, i.e., $60 million annually, would be financed. Such imports would
provide equipment and military consumables for the RTA and RTAF
in Thailand, and as such could be covered by the regular MASF grant.
The proposal has not been accepted. The prospects for agreement
as reported by the Mission (see cable at Tab B)2 are “only fair.” The
RTG is balking because it is:
—uncertain about the benefits of military deployments and pre-
paredness which we have linked specifically to Cambodia when Thai
concern is much more focused on the insurgency and on developments
in Laos;
—confused about the complicated assistance trade-off and offset
mechanism associated with the proposed assistance imposed by our
legal restrictions.
The STFD proposal was poorly conceived from the beginning. We
have received the very distinct impression that the motivation of some
individuals involved in its design, who are against any external role
for the Thai, was simply to provide a “sop to Henry,” perhaps know-
ing all along that the proposal would bring little or no results. It is, at
best, one more illustration of the ad hoc piecemeal manner with which
we provide assistance to Thailand. The White House guidance on the
program was consistently of the “we don’t care about the details—get
on with it” variety.
The Real Issues
The STFD proposal does not deal with serious manpower short-
ages in the RTA/MC and the Thai budget constraint on more rapid ad-
ditions of trained and skilled personnel to the force.
It does not provide the Thai with any indication of our long-run
intentions with respect to Thai defense support. In effect nothing has been
done to implement the Nixon Doctrine in Thailand.

2
Attached at Tab B but not printed was telegram 7581 from Bangkok, June 2. Unger
reported that it was suggested to Irwin and Green during their visit to Thailand that
“substantial reduction in expenditures required (of the Thai for munitions for RTAF sor-
ties in Cambodia) would be very helpful in gaining Thai acceptance of STFD.” Unger
suggested that this reduction could be justified by reduced number of sorties forecast
for RTAF in Cambodia (from 300 to 60 per month).
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264 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The real issues are:

—(1) The Threat. The overriding consideration that bears on the
content or timing of STFD or alternative proposals is that the RTG is
capable of sustaining probably no more than the equivalent of ten bat-
talions in combat—the approximate force currently operating against
the insurgents. With this limited capability the RTG faces:
—Expansion and consolidation of insurgent forces. A fifty percent in-
crease over the last six months in armed insurgent strength in the North (in-
cluding for the first time recruitment of ethnic Thai in the North) and
strengthening of organizational infrastructure in the Northeast signal
mounting difficulties for the RTG in containing the insurgency. (Ex-
cerpts from mission reports on the insurgency are at Tab C.)3
—Encroachment by NVA/PL forces into areas of Thai security interest
in Laos. Enemy pressure and advances in Laos, particularly in Saya-
boury province in the North, raise the RTG’s perception of threats to
its national security.
—Allied requirements for greater participation in regional defense and
military support for Vietnamization as the U.S. withdraws. Souvanna
Phouma has asked for regular Thai battalions in the South to contest
NVA/PL advances in the Bolovens plateau area (the RTG has decided
not to meet this request) in addition to the irregular Thai forces already
deployed in North Laos. The Thai could, with the South Vietnamese,
deploy to interdict supply movements in the panhandle and divert
NVA/PL forces from targets in Cambodia and South Vietnam as in
Lam Son 719. But in my opinion a principal obstacle to Thai deploy-
ments is the paucity of Thai ground force capability.
—(2) Deployment Sustainability. Thai deployments out-of-country
in Vietnam and in Laos have been sustained by U.S. personnel giving
direct logistics support as well as financial assistance. By itself the RTG
at present could probably sustain no more than 8–10 battalions in com-
bat out-of-country and then only at the sacrifice of deployments against
the insurgents in-country. Thus, while we may be able to buy addi-
tional Thai deployments, the price will be an expansion of the Ameri-
can logistics support presence in Thailand or a reduction in Thai de-
ployments against the insurgents. If we or the RTG are unwilling to
pay this price, then additional out-of-country deployments can only be
obtained with improvements in the Thai’s own deployment capability,
e.g., extensive manpower recruitment, training and advancement, and
logistics infrastructure improvement.
—(3) Local Currency Support for the Thai Military Budget. Shortages
of personnel, particularly trained officers and NCOs appear to be a
binding constraint on increases in the Thai defense capability. To over-

3
Attached at Tab C but not printed was telegram 4862 from Bangkok, April 9, and
Airgram A–175 from Bangkok, April 23, which reported increased numbers and ag-
gressiveness of armed insurgents in northern Thailand.
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Thailand 265

come these shortages, large increases in local currency expenditures in

the military budget will be necessary. Without a substantial U.S. con-
tribution, it is unlikely that the Thai will undertake these expenditures
because of the declining economic situation. Inasmuch as our programs
in the past have been for military imports rather than local currency
support, improvements in Thai defense capability will require a major
program change for the U.S. and significant increases in U.S. costs, e.g.,
U.S. costs for Thai ground forces in FY 72 including financing for ad-
ditional imports could reach $150–200 million compared to about $50
million in FY 71.
—(4) Alternatives to Irregular Deployments. In lieu of support for the
current irregular Thai deployments, the U.S. could offer to support [21⁄2
lines of source text not declassified].
—The irregular deployments siphon off scarce trained personnel
and financial resources from the RTA/MC and thus slow the develop-
ment of a self-reliant Thai defense capability.
—Regular force deployments are difficult on political grounds
both in Thailand and domestically.
Alternatives
STFD has not provided us with any substantial progress with the
Thai on improvement or deployment of their forces. We are again faced
with the necessity to consider the issues of Thai preparedness and force
deployment in the broad context of overall policy and program options
for Thailand and to prepare reasonable alternative assistance packages
on this basis. The Thailand interagency analysis provides the frame-
work within which this can be accomplished. Delayed last fall at
Kennedy and Holdridge’s request in support of Marshall Green and
delayed again because of State pressure for STFD instead (after I re-
viewed it with you in San Clemente) the interagency analysis will fi-
nally be ready for review by the VSSG next week.
We are confronted with basically two alternatives:
—(1) Persist with STFD, continuing to offer some or all of the pro-
posed assistance with the knowledge that we are buying little or noth-
ing in the way of increased Thai defense capability or deployments.
—(2) Extract ourselves from STFD, minimizing the political costs
as necessary. Inform the Thai that we are re-evaluating our assistance
proposals in the context of recent developments in Cambodia and
Laos, and in their insurgency. And tell them that we will be ready
to discuss with them, in the near future, additional U.S. assistance in
FY 72 and beyond to help build a more self reliant Thai defense
capability.
Recommendation
I recommend that you opt for alternative 2, Extract ourselves from
STFD. If you approve, I urge you to raise the appropriate issues at your
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266 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

upcoming luncheon with Under Secretary Irwin.4 Talking points to ac-

complish this are at Tab A.5

4
Not found.
5
Attached but not printed.

126. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, July 5, 1971, 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Deputy Prime Minister Praphat of Thailand
General Sirikit
Dr. Malai Huvananda, Advisor to Minister of Interior
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Mr. Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand
Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Political Officer, American Embassy, Bangkok

SUBJECT
General Praphat’s Comments on U.S.-Thai Relations

Dr. Kissinger began by commenting on the improvements in the

security situation in South Vietnam. General Praphat said that he had
received similar reports from the Thai soldiers in Vietnam. He noted
that the first members of the Thai contingent which was returning from
Vietnam had arrived that day and that the main body would be re-
turning on July 22.
Dr. Kissinger asked General Praphat about the status of the in-
surgency in Northeast Thailand. General Praphat stated that things
were going quite well, and that the Thai forces were now able to han-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and
approved by Kissinger on August 5. Davis sent an August 5 covering memorandum to
Kissinger in which she noted that the “State Department has inquired in a low key as
to whether and/or when they might receive copies of the memcons from your Far East-
ern trip.” At the same time Kissinger approved the memcons (including Documents 127
and 128), he also initialed his approval that the copies be provided to the Department
of State. Attached but not printed. The meeting was held at General Praphat’s residence.
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Thailand 267

dle the insurgents. Ambassador Unger wondered if General Praphat’s

estimate included the Chieng Rai area. Had the situation there quieted
down? General Praphat replied that things had been better during the
past month.
Dr. Kissinger requested General Praphat’s views on the situation
in Vietnam. According to General Praphat, everything seemed to be
quiet, but this made him suspicious. He anticipated that if the U.S. ne-
gotiations with the Communists were not successful, the Communists
would undertake a new act of aggression. The North Vietnamese had
the capacity for this.
Asked by Dr. Kissinger for his estimate of developments in Laos,
General Praphat said that the situation there depended very much on
the situation in Vietnam. If there was peace in Vietnam, then the same
condition would apply to Laos. Dr. Kissinger said that he was not so
sure—if things were quiet in Vietnam, the Communists would be able
to shift forces to Laos. It was too early to tell about the negotiations.
What the Communists had proposed was unacceptable. They were
asking us to stop all aid to the Government in Saigon, which we could
not do. We would not overthrow the government with which we had
been working for so long. General Praphat asked if cessation of aid
meant both military and economic assistance, and Dr. Kissinger
replied that this was the implication of their demand. They were phras-
ing their proposals in a very complicated way, speaking like oracles
to every Congressman who went to Paris; these then thought they had
the road to peace. The North Vietnamese were speaking to them in
ambiguities.
General Praphat said that he didn’t know the detailed language
of the Communist proposals, but from what he had heard and read in
the newspapers he did not have the impression that the seven points
would include a limitation on aid. Dr. Kissinger explained that they
were putting their proposals in a complicated way. Their requirement
that we cease all aid to the Thieu Government was interpreted by us
as meaning that we had to stop all economic and military assistance.
General Praphat remarked that after reading the newspaper articles
about the seven points, he had thought the U.S. would accept them.
He felt that we had an obligation to accept them quickly. Dr. Kissinger
described the Vietnam situation as being extremely complicated, and
foresaw the possibility of serious negotiations later on this year. He felt
that General Praphat was correct, however, in sensing that the Com-
munists were in a slightly better bargaining attitude now than in the
past. General Praphat said that, speaking as a military man, long ne-
gotiations were undesirable because the enemy would gain more time
to prepare for an attack against Thailand. Dr. Kissinger agreed, but
noted that unfavorable negotiations would also be undesirable.
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268 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

General Praphat wondered if the United States was considering

reducing its military strength in the area. Dr. Kissinger noted that we
had some difficult domestic problems. There was no question but that
we had a number of Senators who were making a great deal of noise
and were behaving in a way which made the conduct of foreign pol-
icy difficult. Nevertheless, the President was convinced that we had to
maintain our military posture in Asia. In Dr. Kissinger’s opinion the
domestic situation had improved, and opposition to the Administra-
tion’s policy had reached a high point. There was every possibility that
we would not be in a better situation.
General Praphat said that negotiations were one thing, but after
the rainy season the situation in Cambodia and Laos might be a good
deal worse. Dr. Kissinger noted our judgment was that the South Viet-
namese would be able to hold out in Cambodia against the North Viet-
namese and would be stronger than the North Vietnamese. However,
the situation in Laos was different. Whenever the North Vietnamese
wanted to put more troops in they could advance. Therefore, in Laos
we had to work with the Thai SGUs and with the Lao Government
forces. We attached great value to what the Thai SGUs were doing and
strongly supported this effort.2
General Praphat remarked that he had some doubt about the South
Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, which were not too effective because
of the way that they had been put in, pulled out and put in again. Dr.
Kissinger declared that he didn’t debate military strategy with a Gen-
eral, because the General might start debating academic points with
Dr. Kissinger as an academician. We believed, though, that during the
rainy season there was not much sense in leaving the South Vietnamese
in Cambodia. They had established a line along Route 7, from which
they would push north when the dry season arrived, although they
would not go farther than the line of the Mekong. General Praphat ob-
served that this strategy might be good for the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from Vietnam, but still left the Cambodians with the requirement to
fight west of the Mekong. Dr. Kissinger said that this was true, but the
North Vietnamese had a supply problem in maintaining their forces
west of the Mekong in heavy strength and at the same time fighting

2
According to a July 3 memorandum of conversation, U.S. Ambassador to Laos
Godley told Kissinger that “the successful defense of Long Tieng” was due “to the per-
formance of the Thai troops. The Thai were very good at digging in and fighting de-
fensively. These forces were all SGU’s, there were now no regular Thai officers and NCO’s
with the SGU’s.” Godley praised the Thai battalion which had defended Ban Houei Sai
(killing 138 enemy by body count while losing only one Thai soldier) and which was
now dug in “and spoiling for a fight.” (Ibid., Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand,
Vol. VII)
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Thailand 269

the South Vietnamese east of the Mekong. So far, they hadn’t been able
to do this and probably couldn’t do it next year, either.
General Praphat said he assumed that the North Vietnamese
would be able to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply their troops in
Cambodia and South Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger observed that they indeed
could do so, and had expanded the Trail. General Praphat said that
SGUs could not defend against this, neither the Thai SGUs nor the oth-
ers (“neither ours nor yours”). Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that
the SGUs could at least do something to harass the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
General Praphat stated that the Thai would be unable to sustain
their SGUs without aid from the U.S. side, and for this needed “total
support”. In response to comments from Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador
Unger that we felt on our side we were rendering such support, Gen-
eral Praphat commented that a great deal of time had been wasted in
bargaining. Furthermore, there had been difficulties in receiving U.S.
air support and medivac. With some bitterness, he said that Thai
wounded had waited for five days for medivac, and none had arrived
until he had made a special plea to Ambassador Unger. There was a
problem also for the Thai to fight. Dr. Kissinger noted that we hadn’t
heard of these problems in Washington. We wanted the Thai to suc-
ceed and he, Dr. Kissinger, would look into the situation as soon as he
returned.
General Praphat continued by outlining a few more difficulties in
receiving air support. Requests had been put in on the ground which
had gone to Ambassador Unger, who had in turn said the requests
should have been presented to the U.S. military in Laos and to the [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] group. What had been sent was
not enough. Ambassador Unger declared that no one had asked him
to take care of the wounded, and if this issue had been raised he would
have handled it. Dr. Kissinger assured General Praphat that this mat-
ter would be looked into, and that Ambassador Unger and Washing-
ton were in full agreement on the SGU program.
General Praphat remarked that he understood the political prob-
lems which the U.S. faced, but that the Thai had a political problem in
their country, too. There was the question of economic support, and
also that of the attitude of the Thai Parliament. Some politicians had
wanted to pull all Thai out of Laos.
Returning to the subject of medivac for the Thai in Laos, Dr.
Kissinger said that he thought this had been approved and that no
problem existed. Ambassador Unger noted that all he had known of
the medical problem was that there had been a large number of Thai
wounded who had been taken care of at Udorn. There was a field hos-
pital there which had been scheduled for closure; he had stopped the
closing and had kept the facility open for a considerable time to take
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270 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

care of the wounded. He had not heard of the medivac difficulties. Gen-
eral Praphat said that this had been but one example of the difficulties
the Thai had faced. He and General Sirikit jointly explained that an-
other difficulty had been encountered over artillery support—they had
needed and asked for 155s, but had received 105s; they had wanted six
guns per battery and received four instead; they had requested an am-
munition supply, but had been told to draw ammunition from Thai
Army depots. There had been many complications. This is why they
had spoken of needing full support for the SGU program. Dr. Kissinger
once again said that he would look into the matter, and that he had
not been aware of these details. He was under the impression the Thai
had been getting everything they asked for. Who were they dealing
with? Ambassador Unger said that questions such as these were nor-
mally handled [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] not through
Thailand. He wanted to know whenever things were not going well,
however, because he wanted to give his full support. Dr. Kissinger
added that he would talk to responsible people and make sure that all
the various complaints were looked into. General Sirikit remarked here
that he hoped all this wouldn’t appear in U.S. newspapers.
On the score of press and public opinion in the U.S., General
Praphat questioned whether the U.S. people were actually supporting
their country. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that the people were
behind the Administration, it was just the intellectuals and a few Sen-
ators who were causing the trouble. He discounted an observation by
General Praphat that the morale of the U.S. people was poor. The pop-
ular morale was good.
General Praphat made what he called “a final plea” with respect
to U.S. aid to Thailand: that there be no reduction in this aid. Thailand
remained a staunch friend of the U.S., and unlike the situation in other
countries, the U.S. Embassy in Thailand had never been stoned. The
Thai Government was working very hard to improve U.S.-Thai rela-
tions. Dr. Kissinger declared that he was very conscious of the pres-
sures on Thailand. The President urgently wanted Thailand to be
helped, and was committed to maintaining close ties. In this respect,
he, Dr. Kissinger, was aware of the problems which had developed in
our program for providing close assistance to the Thai in strengthen-
ing their defenses. (General Praphat agreed that such problems did, in
fact, exist.) He would promise that when he went back to Washington
in July, a package would be developed which would please the Thai.
The President wanted this. We wanted to provide the maximum aid
possible, but had to employ many different ways to provide our aid
because of the legal restrictions imposed upon us. Nevertheless, a pro-
gram different from what we and the Thai had been discussing would
be developed.
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Thailand 271

General Praphat expressed his thanks for Dr. Kissinger’s offer on

providing maximum help. He again referred to Thai efforts to gain the
support of public opinion in Thailand for working with the U.S. This
was occasionally difficult, for when the U.S. made moves toward im-
proving relations with Red China, the people became confused. The
people were also upset about the rice situation—they worked very hard
to produce rice, and then the U.S. came along and took their markets.
Dr. Kissinger concluded by saying that we definitely understood
the Thai problems. He normally would check with the President on
matters such as had been discussed this evening, but he was so close
to the President’s thinking on aid to Thailand he knew that we could
move ahead.

127. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand
Foreign Minister Thanat
Air Marshal Dawee
Lt. General Sawaeng
Lt. General Sirikit
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Mr. Wayne Smith, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Mr. Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand
Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Chief of Political Section, American Embassy, Bangkok

SUBJECT
Prime Minister Thanom’s Comments on U.S.-Thai Relations

Prime Minister Thanom opened by discussing the situation in

Laos. Military conditions seemed to have improved with the arrival of
the rainy season. Thailand would continue to send SGUs to help out
in various places at the request of the RLG. Presently there were eight
infantry battalions in MR II and one artillery battalion; one infantry
battalion was in Sayaboury; and two infantry battalions were on the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and
approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.
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272 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Bolovens. It therefore appeared appropriate to bring the number of

SGUs up to the total number which had been requested. Dr. Kissinger
verified that this meant 36 battalions. He agreed that the situation in
Laos had improved, noting that Vang Pao’s offensive in Northern Laos
had captured a considerable amount of equipment. Possibly this was
due in part to the arrival of the rainy season. In South Laos the situa-
tion was not as good. We of course strongly supported the Thai SGU
effort. Was the process of recruiting and training proceeding at the
fastest rate? Prime Minister Thanom and Air Marshal Dawee agreed
that the process was being carried out at a rapid rate and that there
was no problem in training or recruitment. Nevertheless, units could
not be trained in a matter of weeks and advance preparations needed
to be made to take care of filling out the full 36 battalions.
Dr. Kissinger noted that we had made a firm agreement to sup-
port 24 SGUs, and wondered when the decision would need to be made
to proceed with the additional 12. Air Marshal Dawee said that the
Thai would need to know before October when the last of the 24 would
complete training. Dr. Kissinger stated that the decision would be made
this summer and certainly before September. We were very sympa-
thetic toward the Thai SGU program.
Dr. Kissinger wondered whether the Thai were planning to put
some additional SGUs into South Laos. General Sirikit replied affirm-
atively. Units would be put into the Champassak and Sithandone ar-
eas. According to Air Marshal Dawee, this area appeared to be a new
sanctuary for Communists infiltrating into Laos, Cambodia, and Thai-
land. They had even developed hospitals there. Prime Minister Thanom
described the Sayaboury area as being another dangerous spot where
SGUs were needed. The program for raising 36 SGUs would provide
units for these areas and also for North Laos. Ambassador Unger added
that units would also be sent to the Bolovens. An operation was
planned for July to retake Paksong and set up a strong protective shield
east of the Mekong.
Dr. Kissinger wondered whether the Thai would have enough time
to recruit and train if the decision on the 36 SGUs was made before
September. Foreign Minister Thanat said that the time would be ade-
quate provided there was no interference from Administration critics.
On this, Dr. Kissinger commented that Foreign Minister Thanat and
the Administration faced the same problems. Prime Minister Thanom
referred to the very heavy burden which the Thai had to bear in the
security field and hoped that the U.S. Government and people would
show understanding and not be critical. According to Dr. Kissinger,
Administration critics would be just as unhappy with 24 SGUs as with
36, and their attitude was related to the facts of the matter and not to
the number. With respect to the defense of Thailand, the President has
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Thailand 273

been personally interested in our working out a satisfactory arrange-

ment. He, Dr. Kissinger, had had a long discussion the previous day
with the Deputy Prime Minister on this matter. Mr. Smith of his staff
would stay behind in Bangkok and work out a program with the Em-
bassy which hopefully would be a satisfactory arrangement for the
Thai. He wanted very much to show his appreciation for the Thai con-
tributions in Laos.
Prime Minister Thanom expressed some apprehension that despite
certain improvements in the military situation in Indo-China, the Com-
munists might concentrate their efforts against the north and northeast
of Thailand, and even further south. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view
that Hanoi had been severely weakened by the war, and would need
several years after a settlement to recover. While there was no doubt
that the Communists would like to intensify their activities, they
wouldn’t be making peace initiatives now if they were not under some
pressure themselves. However, in the long term the Prime Minister was
right in anticipating a step-up in Communist efforts against Thailand.
Prime Minister Thanom explained that the reason the Thai felt this way
was that while the Communist resources were depleted in Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos, this was not true in Thailand. Here, the other side
could fight much better. Dr. Kissinger said in response that taking on
Thailand directly would be a formidable undertaking for them, and
they would probably try instead to encourage the insurgency in north-
ern and northeast Thailand. Our experience was that the best time to
fight an insurgency was in its early stages when the enemy hadn’t con-
solidated his bases.
According to Prime Minister Thanom, the Communist side had in-
creased its efforts and was waging a political and propaganda cam-
paign against the loyalty of the people in the north. On the govern-
ment side, it was necessary to show that the government would cater
to the people’s needs by offering direct benefits such as schools, roads,
and economic aid. Thailand’s resources were affected by the price of
its export commodities. On the one hand, exports were decreasing,
while on the other Thailand’s needs were increasing; accordingly a bet-
ter balance of resources on the economic side was required. If PL–480
assistance in the neighborhood of $30 million over a two-to-three-year
period could be obtained, this could be of some help. General Sawaeng
had already discussed a PL–480 agreement with Ambassador Unger.
Dr. Kissinger said that he would review matters such as this on his re-
turn, and would report to the President not only on his general im-
pressions but on specific issues. The President had a special interest in
Thailand and the Thai could be assured that he was most sympathetic
with respect to the Thai needs. He, Dr. Kissinger, knew that the Thai
had a special situation, and he hoped that we could respond econom-
ically. The PL–480 matter would be looked at in particular.
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274 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Prime Minister Thanom wondered if Dr. Kissinger was aware that

the Lao Government had more or less decided to negotiate with the
Pathet Lao? Dr. Kissinger replied that he was aware something was go-
ing on, but was not aware of the Lao attitude—did they really want to
settle, or were they doing this because it was expected of them? Prime
Minister Thanom remarked that Prince Souvanna had previously in-
sisted that all North Vietnamese troops had to be taken out but now
had “relented.” Dr. Kissinger said his impression was that Souvanna
didn’t really expect any results. Prime Minister Thanom thought that
the talks might lead to an agreement on a cease-fire. Dr. Kissinger asked
if this meant just the Plaine des Jarres area, or all of Laos? What about
the bombing of the Trail? Would they ask us to stop? Our Ambassador
in Laos had said “no” to all these questions. Prime Minister Thanom
agreed, saying that as long as the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
forces were attacking, he didn’t think Souvanna would ask the U.S. to
stop bombing.
Ambassador Unger explained Souvanna’s position as being that
he didn’t have authority over south and southeast Laos and couldn’t
control what was happening there. He had not advocated ending the
bombing. Dr. Kissinger agreed, adding that if Souvanna did accept a
bombing halt, a very difficult situation would be created for the U.S.
The war was divided into two parts, the North and the South. In the
North, it was conceivable that the North Vietnamese would stop at-
tacking and agree to a cease-fire. However, there was a different situ-
ation in the South. In response to a question from Prime Minister
Thanom on whether or not a stand-still cease-fire was possible in Laos,
Dr. Kissinger replied that it would be easier in the North, since the sit-
uation was subject to Souvanna’s influence. There was a different prob-
lem in South Laos, though, since this area was related to the war in
Vietnam.
Prime Minister Thanom asked whether during Dr. Kissinger’s
meeting with Vice President Ky, Ky had said anything about the North
Vietnamese proposals being acceptable to him. Dr. Kissinger explained
that Ky had not actually spoken in such terms. He had simply said he
had gone through these proposals and that those dealing with the U.S.
withdrawal were acceptable so long as U.S. military assistance could
continue. His position was that U.S. forces were not needed except for
air power. Ky’s statement was somewhat ambiguous—he didn’t say
all seven points were acceptable, just the point on the withdrawal of
the U.S. forces.
Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that what was important in these
proposals was how we should interpret the demand that we cease sup-
port for the GVN. If the Communists meant we must stop all economic
and military assistance, there would be a problem. Another problem
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Thailand 275

concerned the cease-fire. If the cease-fire would apply only to the U.S.,
then the Communists could put in all their forces against the South
Vietnamese. We couldn’t accept this. It would be dishonorable for us
if we withdrew in safety while the Communists attacked our friends.
However, it would be acceptable if all forces were included in a cease-
fire. We had proposed such a cease-fire on October 7. If the two issues
of aid and the cease-fire could be settled, the element of a fixed dead-
line would still not be acceptable to us, however.
Prime Minister Thanom asked if the Communists had made any
reference to the withdrawal of their own forces. Dr. Kissinger said that
they had simply said that this would be settled “in a spirit of national
concord.” The South Vietnamese believed they could handle the North
Vietnamese forces as long as they could get continued U.S. military as-
sistance. This was probably true. The Communists formerly had de-
nied they had any forces in South Vietnam and were now implying
they now did have forces there on the basis of settling military prob-
lems in all of Vietnam. But their forces in the South were not very strong
any more, and they hadn’t won a battle in the South for several years
because South Vietnamese firepower was so superior.
Prime Minister Thanom asked what Dr. Kissinger felt about the
prospects of the three presidential candidates. Dr. Kissinger discounted
his ability to know the right answers about Vietnamese political affairs
but observed that most people thought that in a two-man race between
Thieu and Minh, Thieu would win; in a three-man race involving Ky
as well, Ky would take votes from Thieu, but Thieu would still win.
Minh had some popularity. He, Dr. Kissinger, had spoken to all three
candidates to establish his impartiality.
Prime Minister Thanom expressed the view that if Thieu won, the
situation would be satisfactory, but if one of the others won, stability
would be affected. Dr. Kissinger said that he had met no one who
thought Ky had a chance, and the general assumption was that Ky was
preparing for the 1975 elections. If Minh won, he had already said he
wanted to prosecute the war and had said yesterday that he was ab-
solutely opposed to a coalition government and didn’t want the Com-
munists. There would be a change in the top administrator, though.
The big question was whether Minh would be a competent adminis-
trator, not that there would be any change in policies. If Minh proved
not to be a good administrator, there might be some military actions.
The Thai had had Minh in Thailand for four years—what did they
think? Foreign Minister Thanat simply observed that Minh had kept
very quiet while in Thailand.
Dr. Kissinger said that Minh had told him he was against a coali-
tion government and opposed to the PRG seven-point program, which
he felt was a trick. Therefore, his views were not radically different
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276 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

from those of Thieu. However, he wanted a broader-based government

which would, for example, bring the Buddhists in, and also wanted
a program of “social justice”. Dr. Kissinger observed that opposition
candidates were not usually distinguished by the precision of their
formulations.
Dr. Kissinger requested Prime Minister Thanom’s views on policy
toward Communist China and on the U.S. position. Prime Minister
Thanom said that if contacts between the U.S. and Chinese should re-
sult in a lessening of China’s expansionist tendencies and support for
wars of national liberation, the situation in Southeast Asia would be
improved. Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that the Chinese had reaf-
firmed their support for national liberation movements a few months
ago, and had also attacked the U.S. The GRC Ambassador had given
him their statement to this effect. He, Thanat, had told the Prime Min-
ister that there was not much difference between the Chinese and So-
viet policies.
Dr. Kissinger said that U.S. policy toward China was first, that we
had two common enemies, the USSR and Communist China, but
didn’t see why we needed to support the stronger against the weaker.
We wanted contacts with both so we could moderate the policies of
both, rather than to let Moscow act as a spokesman. Second, we also
wanted to induce the Chinese to moderate their policy with respect to
Southeast Asia, which we believed we could do if we could focus
Chinese attention on the Soviet Union. We had no illusions about
the Chinese and would expect them to affirm their support for national
liberation movements. Third, we wanted to see if the Chinese might
possibly want to withdraw their opposition to a settlement in South
Vietnam. We were very unsentimental in our approach to China and
looked at the problem from the standpoint of what we could do with
respect to Chinese relations with the surrounding countries. We had
no illusions that people who were revolutionaries all their lives would
be charmed by little gestures such as trade, travel and ping pong teams.
Prime Minister Thanom said that he felt there was a greater re-
laxation and flexibility in Chinese policy, possibly including policy to-
ward the UN. In addition, their increasing concern about the Soviet
Union could create a better balance in Peking. So far as the U.S. es-
tablishment of contacts with the Chinese were concerned, the results
were not yet in. There was a possibility that Chinese might use trade
to further their objectives. Dr. Kissinger declared that there was no
question but that the Chinese would look at everything from a politi-
cal standpoint. They could create difficulties in Southeast Asian coun-
tries having large Chinese populations. From the U.S. point of view,
we would do what we could to improve the situation. The Chinese
could use trade as a weapon, for example, against Malaysia. But the
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Thailand 277

Soviet forces along the border with China were twice the size of the
Soviet forces in Europe, which was a somewhat unsettling factor for
the Chinese. Therefore, there was some possibility that they would
moderate their pressures against some countries such as Vietnam and
Thailand. Over the long run, we had a special problem in that all of
the Chinese leaders were 70 or above, and nobody could know what
would happen when the present leadership disappeared.
Prime Minister Thanom asked if the Sino-Soviet border was very
long, and Dr. Kissinger noted that the total distance was 7,000 kilo-
meters even though the Chinese didn’t recognize all of it. It was diffi-
cult to speculate about Chinese developments, and certainly we were
going to proceed deliberately to see what the future would bring. We
did not have much expectation about U.S. trade with China. Our lift-
ing of trade restrictions had more of a symbolic purpose than anything
else.
To a remark by Foreign Minister Thanat that the Soviets and the
East Europeans appeared to have changed a bit, Dr. Kissinger won-
dered if the Thai thought they could increase their trade with East Eu-
rope. Thanat’s reply was affirmative. The Soviets, the Hungarians, the
East Germans, and the Rumanians were all interested in buying vari-
ous Thai commodities.
Dr. Kissinger said he appreciated very much the opportunity to
exchange ideas with the Thai, and wanted to assure Prime Minister
Thanom again how firmly committed the President was to Thailand.
The Thai should remember that those people who made all the noise
did not formulate U.S. policy. We would get decisions on the SGUs and
would see if we could adjust the framework of support for the Thai
defenses. Our proposals would be reasonable. There was, in addition,
one other problem which need not be discussed at this level—that of
narcotics, which was causing the U.S. great concern. This had such
emotional interest in the U.S., and was of such importance domesti-
cally, that any assistance from Thailand would be greatly welcomed.
On another point, over the long term he had heard interpretations
of the Nixon Doctrine to the effect that we would withdraw from Asia.
He had seen a great deal of the author of the Nixon Doctrine, who did
not have any such impression.
Prime Minister Thanom expressed concern over the Supreme
Court decision allowing the printing of secret papers. Dr. Kissinger
commented jokingly that at a recent press reception in the State De-
partment he had accused the Soviet Ambassador of being present to
complain over having to pay for what the U.S. newspapers were get-
ting free. The Supreme Court decision had not been that the act was
legal, only that if documents were stolen the government recourse had
to be through criminal prosecution and not through an injunction.
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278 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Therefore the U.S. would need to proceed against the criminal, and not
against the newspapers. We would also adopt new procedures to re-
strict the circulation of documents to a much greater extent and not
embarrass other governments. Prime Minister Thanom declared that
making confidential decisions public would put the Executive in a dif-
ficult position because it set a precedent for the press in other coun-
tries. Dr. Kissinger remarked that there was no question but that this
had been a very unfortunate incident. However, it was not likely to be
repeated because it had taken place in a moment of hysteria.

128. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
Dr. K. Wayne Smith, Senior Staff Member NSC
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC
Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Political Officer, American Embassy Bangkok

SUBJECT
Dr. Kissinger’s Discussions with Foreign Minister Thanat on Vietnam and Chi-
nese Representation

Dr. Kissinger referred to the just-completed discussions with Prime

Minister Thanom and other senior Thai leaders, and noted that many
important matters had been covered. We would want to continue to
discuss the questions of US defense support for Thailand and support
for the Thai SGU’s.
Dr. Kissinger went on to say that with respect to US policy toward
China and the Vietnam negotiations, we would try to keep the Thai
fully informed so that they could have complete confidence in what
direction we were going, and would not be confronted with any dras-
tic surprises. We were not planning any such surprises. Foreign Min-
ister Thanat wondered if speedy contacts with the Chinese might be

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and
approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.
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Thailand 279

included among the list of surprises, and Dr. Kissinger observed that
he was talking more about developments connected with Vietnam. The
Thai had no doubt been surprised on one or two occasions over our
troop withdrawal decisions.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked Dr. Kissinger for his thoughts about
the Paris talks. Dr. Kissinger replied that, speaking candidly, he did not
expect much to happen over the next two months. We couldn’t be sure
about the purpose of the PRG proposal and would have to see how to
interpret it. It could have been designed either to exploit US public
opinion and increase pressure on us, or to mark the beginning of real
negotiations. There was a chance that the North Vietnamese had de-
cided to engage in serious negotiations because pressures on them-
selves and developments vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Chinese made
them believe that this was a good time to settle. On the other hand,
they could be waiting for next year’s US elections. We simply didn’t
know. Their proposal contained slightly more forthcoming language.
It was consistent with what they had said before, but also consistent
with what they might say if they were opening up. We would get word
to the Foreign Minister about our reaction.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked, would the South Vietnamese make
a counterproposal? Dr. Kissinger replied that we and the South Viet-
namese had not decided how to handle the question of our response.
This would depend to some extent on the President’s judgment fol-
lowing his, Dr. Kissinger’s, return. He was going to Paris to meet Am-
bassador Bruce—he would not see Mme. Binh, though—and would re-
view the situation with Bruce, but not do any negotiating. Perhaps we
would make a counterproposal, but within the framework of the Pres-
ident’s October 7, 1970 position. We would not accept a cease-fire for
us and none for our allies, and could not stop economic and military
aid to these allies while the North Vietnamese received such assistance
from the Chinese and the Soviets. On the question of our withdrawals
and the timing, we were withdrawing anyway, but the December 31
date was unacceptable. We had not set a deadline because we wanted
to relate this issue to the negotiations.
Foreign Minister Thanat called attention to the fact that all coun-
tries having troops in South Vietnam had said that they would with-
draw, but the other side hadn’t said anything about reducing its forces.
This was a strong point for our side. Ambassador Unger agreed that
the other side was setting a double standard which could be exploited.
Dr. Kissinger stated that we would review the situation. We had a prob-
lem with public opinion in that many people didn’t care what was
fair—the radicals did not complain over the North’s invasion of the
South, but would put up great cries of indignation if the South threat-
ened to invade the North. Foreign Minister Thanat surmised that this
was because people didn’t want the US to become involved.
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280 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Dr. Kissinger cautioned Foreign Minister Thanat not to expect any-

thing much in Paris. We would move very slowly, and spend the next
two weeks pointing out the negative aspects of the PRG proposal. At
the time he had left Washington, we had no idea that this proposal was
forthcoming.
Foreign Minister Thanat asked about the US decision on the Chi-
nese representation issue in the UN, and Dr. Kissinger expressed the
view that it would be made before the end of the month. Our problem
was how to say something constructive which would not infuriate both
Chinas. We had discussed with the Thai and others various formulae,
such as a two-thirds vote for expulsion and a simple majority for ad-
mission. Foreign Minister Thanat’s idea of voting on the expulsion is-
sue first before that of admission was intriguing, and he, Dr. Kissinger,
would explore this when he returned. There were of course a number
of combinations, including sticking to our present policies.
Foreign Minister Thanat suggested that the two resolutions for re-
quiring a two-thirds majority to expel Taiwan and admit the PRC by
a simple majority might be put forward at the same time, or within a
few hours of one another. These would be two separate resolutions,
but expulsion would come first. He was not sure, though, what the
rule was if somebody wanted to alter the order. Admittedly, it might
be difficult to put one slightly ahead of the other. This matter could be
left to the “arm twisters.”
Dr. Kissinger said that he was impressed by the Foreign Minister’s
concern. Would it be possible to vote by paragraph (on the Albanian
Resolution) in such a way that the expulsion issue would never arise?
Foreign Minister Thanat thought that this could be done very easily.
Ambassador Unger thought that this procedure would need to be
agreed upon by a substantial majority. Foreign Minister Thanat
said that even if the (Albanian) expulsion resolution came first, we
could ask for a two-thirds vote, which could be approved by a simple
majority.
Dr. Kissinger reiterated that the President would make his deci-
sion before August 1, and it would probably be some variation of these
ideas. We would inform the Thai, and Mr. Newman would take this
up with the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Thanat declared that
the Thai would go along with the President’s decision.
Dr. Kissinger wondered what the Foreign Minister thought about
sticking with the present formula? Foreign Minister Thanat said he did
not believe this had any chance. Dr. Kissinger asked if it still might not
be possible to get a majority for the Important Question? Foreign Min-
ister Thanat said that he didn’t know the answer to this. Dr. Kissinger
suggested that if we could get a majority for that, we could postpone
the matter for another year even if there was a bigger majority for the
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Thailand 281

Albanian Resolution. Foreign Minister Thanat observed that this would

happen only if the people who wanted the PRC in the UN relented.
Ambassador Unger interjected to say that if the people who wanted
the PRC in felt that it would be satisfactory to the PRC, then they might
relent. Dr. Kissinger added that if these people thought that the PRC
wouldn’t come unless Taiwan were expelled, Taiwan would be expelled
anyway and then we would have paid a price. This would be the worst
possible case. Foreign Minister Thanat mentioned that the strength of
those who were willing to have the PRC in the UN without pushing
Taiwan out needed to be established.
Dr. Kissinger declared it was his instinct that the US would move
to some position such as that which they had been discussing. There
had been no final decision as yet as to making expulsion a two-thirds
vote. When this decision was reached, we would make sure that the
Thai were informed ahead of time. Foreign Minister Thanat remarked
that those who wanted the PRC in were just about the same in num-
ber as those who wanted Taiwan in. Dr. Kissinger concluded by say-
ing that was just about our own estimate.

129. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to the Chargé d’Affaires in Thailand (Newman)1

Washington, July 9, 1971.

Dear George:
I am sure you are aware of Len Unger’s letter to me of May 282
concerning Pote Sarasin’s approach to him for a repeat performance of
the 1968–69 “Project Lotus.” We will have a chance to talk to Len di-
rectly about this when he is in Washington for consultation next month,
but I thought you should be acquainted with the Washington view at
this stage.
The matter was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting recently and
Len’s position, as described in his letter, was unanimously supported.
All of us share his distaste for this kind of an operation. However, a
suggestion was made at the meeting that we have a look at the possi-

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret;
Eyes Only; Nodis.
2
See Document 120.
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282 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

bility of using this type of funding in some manner in connection with

our efforts to generate more effective RTG actions in the narcotics field.
We do not have any clear or specific ideas as to how this could be done.
We would, of course, not contemplate using such funds in lieu of as-
sistance that might more appropriately be provided for mutually
agreed narcotics measures using overt funds such as AID. More im-
portant, we would want to avoid creating an impression on the Thai
side that they could expect or demand a “payoff” for actions they ought
to be taking anyway or for which we could influence them by more
conventional and regular approaches. Finally, we must avoid setting a
precedent for periodic under-the-table contributions to Thai political
leaders for any purpose.
Notwithstanding these reservations and with full acceptance of
Len’s persuasive reasoning, we feel that the urgency and importance
of the narcotics problem in Thailand makes it incumbent upon us to
keep our minds open to any possible course of action, however un-
orthodox, that might advance our objectives. Please give the matter
some thought and let me know if you can see any possibilities.
Sincerely,
Alex3

3
Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

130. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for

National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to
Thailand (Unger)1

Washington, July 20, 1971, 10:03 p.m.

WH 10764. Subject: Thai Force Improvements: STFD Proposals.

To follow up my visit, I want to move as rapidly as possible to ob-
tain an acceptable force improvement package for consideration by the
President. I have found mission proposals transmitted to my staff in
Saigon most valuable. I would like to have Mission comments by Mon-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410,
Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1971, Southeast Asia. Top Secret.
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Thailand 283

day2 on the proposal spelled out below which represents our best syn-
thesis of the variety of proposals available to us.
While the proposal outlined below continues to provide assistance
for Thai efforts to increase RTARF readiness with respect to possible de-
ployments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], its principal fo-
cus is on accelerating the improvement of general RTARF capabilities.
The concept is that this proposal should be viewed by the RTG as
the first of two steps in gauging U.S. assistance to support RTG efforts
to improve the capabilities of its military forces. The second step would
reflect decisions in the context of NSSM 99 and the performance of the
Thai in meeting the conditions of the agreement proposed for negoti-
ation now.
The proposal includes an assistance package made up of two
elements:
a) A two year $30 million PL 480 program, $15 million per annum.
b) A $15 FY 1972 MASF add on.
For this combined assistance package of $45 million the RTG will
agree that
—the baht proceeds from the PL 480 sales will be allocated in con-
sultation with the USOM to agricultural development activities.
a) No more than $10 million of PL 480 revenues will be used to
undertake additional development activities.
b) The remaining baht proceeds from the PL 480 sales less the $10
million for agricultural development, approximately $17 million, will
be used to offset additional expenditures for improvement of Thai
forces. (An initial repayment of $3 million to the USG is assumed, thus
accounting for the $30 million PL 480 total.)
—Expenditures for pol as agreed upon in earlier negotiations and
for consumables directly related to RTAF sorties [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified], 60 sorties/month, which cannot be legally covered
under MASF will be financed by Thai foreign exchange.
—Up to 300 RTAF sorties/month [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] would be flown if required.
The principal activities which will be financed from the additional
baht expenditures for RTARF are
—1) initiation of RTA manpower augmentations above those cur-
rently budgeted for maneuver and logistics units. (Augmentation

2
In telegram 158, July 24, Unger “wholeheartedly” endorsed the Thai STFD force
improvements proposed in WH 10764. He added that “the military activities and amount
of assistance proposed will be a fair test of Thai willingness to upgrade their forces to
meet security threats they now face.” (Ibid.)
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284 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

should include filling to 90 per cent TO&E 3 RCTS and their associ-
ated logistics support units.)
—2) expansion of training programs.
—3) increases in the level of CI operations.
—4) upgrading of logistics facilities.
Our support for the expanded five division force should be made
clear, the PL 480 and $15 million MASF is initial assistance to help the
Thai move in that direction.
The principal activities for which equipment will be financed from
the $15 million MASF add on are:
—1) upgrading of maneuver and logistics units.
—2) expansion of training operations.
—3) increases in the level of CI operations.
Mission comments and specific program details consistent with
the above proposal should be sent via this channel so as to arrive open-
ing of business Monday, 26 July. Keeping in mind that basic objective
is to improve capability of Thai forces, Mission comments on signifi-
cant differences between this proposal, and Mission and Renoo’s al-
ternatives passed to Sansom would be particularly useful.
Also await Mission views, pursuant to discussions in Saigon, on
Thai para-military force development and on manpower tradeoff prob-
lems between Thai regular and SGU forces.3

3
In telegram 208, August 2, Unger discussed the SGU program in detail, and re-
ported Thai “concern over drain on RTA manpower (especially officers and NCOs).” He
noted that if the SGUs were expanded to 36 battalions as planned then there would be
a further drawdown of 126 officers and 417 NCOs from the regular Thai army, however,
he concluded “it does not appear that the BC (SGU) program per se has or will seriously
affect the RTA.” (Ibid.)
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Thailand 285

131. Memorandum for the Record1

Bangkok, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT
KMT Irregulars and Their Involvement in the Opium Traffic

1. On 5 August Chargé Newman [less than 1 line of source text not

declassified] lunched with General Kriangsak to follow up the discus-
sion which the Ambassador and the DCM held with Marshal Dawee
as reported in Bangkok Embtel 9071 of 1 July.2 Newman filled in
Kriangsak on the consultations which have taken place between the
Embassy and the Royal Thai Government on the subject of suppress-
ing drugs and narcotics, the establishment of a joint USG/RTG com-
mittee to work on the problem headed by General Nitya and Chargé
Newman, and emphasizing the mutual interests of both of our gov-
ernments in addressing this problem aggressively and expeditiously.3
Newman then recalled the conversation with Dawee and the latter’s
request that we follow up with Kriangsak to explore the possibilities
for utilizing the KMT irregulars to help suppress the trafficking of
opium from the Shan States in Thailand.
2. Kriangsak summarized the efforts in which he has been en-
gaged for the past year to re-settle KMT irregulars in Thailand in ar-
eas where they could cultivate crops and raise livestock as an income
substitute for trafficking in opium on condition that irregulars turn in
their arms and submit fully to RTG authority. Part of the agreement of
course involves first the clearance by the irregulars of areas controlled

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand,
1972–1975. Secret. [text not declassified] Forwarded to Under Secretary Johnson under an
attached August 7 cover letter from Newman.
2
Not found.
3
In a July 27 letter to Under Secretary Johnson, Newman welcomed the news that
the 40 Committee supported Unger’s position on the political money (see Document
129) and informed Johnson, in response to the “other suggestion in your letter,” that he
[text not declassified] had been “looking over the field for possibilities.” He recommended
that intelligence be provided Police Major General Chompon Lohachala so that the lat-
ter could go after the drug traffickers. He stated that the Embassy planned to do this
[text not declassified] “in the near future on a test basis.” In his August 7 cover letter to
Johnson, (see footnote 1 above) Newman stated that he [text not declassified] planned to
see General Chompon later that week “to make some information on drug traffickers in
the North available to him and to encourage him to move against these individuals.”
However, he noted, due to “jurisdictional concerns and departmental politics within the
Thai National Police Department, we are moving cautiously on this front.”
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286 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

by the Communist insurgents, and after security is established they are

supposed to turn in their arms to RTG controlled storehouses. The RTG
is to provide tea tree seedlings and farm equipment as well as some
livestock and advice and assistance in animal husbandry. KMT irreg-
ulars are also obliged to get out of the opium business. When this agree-
ment was negotiated in the latter half of 1970, Generals Li and Tuan
asked that the embargoes on KMT engagement in the opium business
be deferred until after the 1971 crop had been disposed of. Li and Tuan
pleaded that they would need this additional income during the pe-
riod of re-establishment. Though Kriangsak never flatly so stated, it is
clear that he felt obliged not to interfere with the KMT opium traf-
ficking during the past few months when this year’s harvest was be-
ing moved. Newman cited facts and figures, drawing on the attached
brief,4 indicating that Generals Li and Tuan control the movement of
a significant amount of the opium crop in the Shan States to Thailand
and also engage in refining it in Chiang Mai Province. Kriangsak
made notes on the most recent shipments in June 1971 (see page 3 of
attachment). Kriangsak was impressed with our information on the
KMT opium smuggling activities and made no effort to dispute
our information; in fact, he noted that it is difficult for him to ob-
tain reliable information of this kind and solicited our assistance. I
promised to give him a summary of our information on this subject,
if possible by next week. I cautioned him, and he agreed, that in his
use of this information there would be no reference to the fact that
he obtained it from the Americans. Kriangsak seemed to be particu-
larly interested in getting information on where the irregulars are
operating their refineries.
3. Kriangsak was quite candid in his admission that he and the
RTG cannot be certain that Generals Li and Tuan will honor fully and
sincerely their commitments to the RTG. Kriangsak suggested that if
they do not, the RTG will be forced to consider appropriate discipli-
nary action. He is trying very hard to provide enough assistance so
that the irregulars can re-settle with their families, earn an adequate
living, and exist as law-abiding Thai nationals.
4. Newman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] expressed
admiration for his program and his efforts and asked whether he
thought the next step could be taken, namely, the utilization of the bet-
ter fighting elements of the irregulars to disrupt and hopefully prevent
the movement of opium to refineries in Tatchileck, Laos and Thailand.
We noted that it is not enough to get the KMT out of the opium busi-

4
Not attached.
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Thailand 287

ness since there are plenty of others who will be happy to move in. A
force will be needed to attack caravans under the protection of Shan
insurgents and Burmese self-defense forces and hopefully destroy the
opium before it reaches the refineries. In this connection we asked Kri-
angsak whether the KMT irregulars now in Burma would be moving
to Thailand to re-settle with the others already here. Kriangsak said
that they are free to do so until the end of this rainy season. If they re-
ject the Thai offer, they will presumably join the other bands in Burma
if they can. In thinking about the problem, Kriangsak also commented
that if KMT irregulars were sent into Burma on opium-destroying mis-
sions it would be necessary to have a few Thais with them to make
certain that we are not double-crossed. He concluded by agreeing to
consider the matter further, after which he will be back in touch with
us. Newman reiterated the urgency of developing plans in the near fu-
ture in order that effective action can be taken against the next crop
which will be planted this fall. Although no specifics were mentioned
and none were requested, Newman advised Kriangsak that the Amer-
ican mission would attempt to support the RTG if a realistically feasi-
ble plan can be developed.
[name not declassified]

132. National Security Decision Memorandum 1261

Washington, August 11, 1971.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret. The memorandum was signed by
Kissinger. Copies were forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the CIA,
and to the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.
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288 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

SUBJECT
Additional Assistance to Thailand

The President has directed that a $45 million special assistance

package be negotiated with the Government of Thailand in order to
strengthen the Thai economy and the defense capabilities of Thai forces.
The purpose of this package is to accelerate the improvement of
general Thai armed forces (RTARF) capabilities and to assure that they
are capable of meeting likely contingencies.
The package will be composed of a $30 million PL 480 commod-
ity loan to be made available over the two year period FY 1972 and FY
1973 and a $15 million addition to the FY 1972 Thai MASF program.
This assistance will be provided to the Government of Thailand in ac-
cord with the following guidelines:
—The local currency proceeds from the PL 480 loan will be allo-
cated to agriculture and education development.
—At least the equivalent of $20 million in Thai expenditures, ad-
ditional to those currently budgeted, will be allocated to agreed mili-
tary activities.
—The additional $20 million in Thai military budget expenditures
and the $15 million MASF grant will finance the following principal
activities:
a) RTA manpower augmentations above those currently bud-
geted for maneuver and logistics units.
b) expansion of RTA training programs.
c) increases in the level of counterinsurgency operations.
d) upgrading of logistics facilities.
e) improving Thai Air Force capabilities to conduct sustained
operations under likely contingencies.
The U.S. Mission in Thailand should advise the Thai government
that:
—This package is an immediate measure to assist Thai military
force improvements. While the U.S. will support the formation of a
fifth division, this support is not provided for in this package.
—The U.S. government requires assurances, including access to
the Thai military budget, that actual incremental expenditures in the
identified areas have taken place.
—As a follow-on to this decision, the U.S. will give consideration
to other additional measures to assist Thai forces and the Thai econ-
omy. Implementation of such additional measures will be in part con-
tingent on Thai performance and the establishment of adequate pro-
cedures for the implementation of this package, as well as on the
availability of funds from the Congress.
In implementing the foregoing decisions, the Secretary of State in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense should insure that:
—Negotiations with the Thai government begin immediately on
the program as described herein.
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Thailand 289

—A report is provided, with a program budget by September 15,

1971,2 to the President on the final package negotiated including the
specific actions to which the Thai have agreed.
After review of the NSSM 993 options for further adjustments in
Thai assistance, the Senior Review Group should provide alternatives
to the President by October 1, 1971, on additional assistance to Thai-
land. These alternatives should encompass both economic and military
assistance.
This and the subsequent NSSM 99 decision on military and eco-
nomic assistance to Thailand should be reflected in the proposed FY
1973 assistance program. This FY 1973 program will be submitted to
the Senior Review Group and the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget by November 1, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger

2
Eliot reported in a memorandum to Kissinger, September 16, that “a number of
problems on the Thai side” had “delayed conclusion of agreements on all details and
have made it impossible to meet the September 15 deadline for reporting to the Presi-
dent.” Eliot stated that Embassy Bangkok had reported in telegram 12380, September 10
(a copy of which was attached to his memorandum), that “the major problems yet to be
overcome relate to RTG budgeting for the required $20 million increase in the Thai de-
fense budget and to certain important details in the proposed PL 480 program.” (Ibid.)
3
For discussion of NSSM 99 on Southeast Asia, see Document 82, footnote 1.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, August 25, 1971, 0904Z.

11653. Subject: Additional Assistance to Thailand. Ref: Bangkok

11605.2
At departure ceremony today for Princess Ubol, Prime Minister
asked me to express to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger his appreci-
ation for the proposal I had outlined to him yesterday. He again pointed
out that in many of the areas we wish to see increases in defense
expenditures the Thai Government had already budgeted significant

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15 THAI. Se-
cret; Priority; Exdis.
2
Dated August 25. (Ibid.)
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290 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

increases for 1972. I replied that we were aware of these increases but
believed that the additional 20 million dollars in baht that we are pro-
posing as their part of the package was fully justified in view of the
threat. As he aware from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
briefing, the insurgency threat in the northeast was increasing and
becoming more sophisticated and difficult to counter. We felt this was
equally true in other regions. Consequently, we were suggesting that
there should be significant increase in level of operations by the RTG
against the insurgency. This could be accomplished by the additional
20 million dollars in defense expenditures and the 15 million dollar
MASF add-on. The Prime Minister replied that he had asked Marshal
Dawee to see what could be done practically and that Dawee would
be in touch with our side on the details. He added that in many ways
what was happening in northeast Thailand was reminiscent of South
Viet-Nam 5–10 years ago and the Thai Government needs to move vig-
orously to prevent the insurgency from taking hold here as had been
the case in Vietnam.
Newman

134. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security

Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig)1

Washington, August 26, 1971.

SUBJECT
Relief for Thai Textile Exports to the U.S.

State (Tab A)2 has asked that HAK instruct the Interagency Textile
Advisory Committee (ITAC) to permit the entry of 52,000 dozen cot-
ton pajamas from Thailand into the United States and to permit Thai-
land to export an additional 17,000 dozen pajamas during the next nine
months. State believes this would be consistent with the President’s
wish to improve U.S.-Thai relations.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation
on the memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “OK HK.”
2
Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 291

Under the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA), tex-

tile exports to the U.S. are limited. Thailand, which has just begun to
produce cotton pajamas, was told by us on April 30, 1971 to limit ex-
ports to the U.S. to 17,000 dozen pajamas over the succeeding twelve
months and asked to consult with us. (This number was derived ac-
cording to a formula contained in the LTA.) Subsequent to that time,
however, the Thai speeded up production and exported 31,000 dozen
pajamas in the month of May alone. Because of the apparent neglect
by the Thai of our representations and the large number of pajamas
exported, Commerce, Labor and other agencies (except State) argue
that the Thai should not be permitted to import into the U.S. an amount
in addition to the 17,000 dozen prescribed by the LTA, although these
agencies would probably be willing to allow a one-time exception were
the Thai to reach a voluntary restraint agreement for subsequent ex-
ports—which the Thai do not wish to do.
State’s memorandum is, therefore, an attempt to bypass the ITAC.
Doing so not only raises bureaucratic hackles but approval would mean
our approving for Thailand imports of cotton textiles greater than the
LTA prescribed level. Other exporters could be counted on to swiftly
protest against this action on the grounds that it is discriminating
against them and request increases in their own allotments. Also be-
ing a domestically sensitive product, cotton textile imports in excess of
previously prescribed levels would incur serious domestic criticism. I
have therefore asked that this matter be considered formally by the
ITAC and that a memorandum containing the views of all concerned
agencies be submitted.
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292 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

135. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, September 15, 1971, 0745Z.

12551. Subject: High Level Discussion with Thais Regarding Vol-

unteer Program. Ref: State 166094.2
1. In order to transmit to the RTG ref decision authorizing our
support for 36 volunteer battalions3 and to review the present status
of the program, I met yesterday with Prime Minister Thanom, Deputy
Prime Minister Praphat, Marshal Dawee, and Generals Phaithun and
Boonchai (standing in for Surakij who is out of country). With me were
Minister Newman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I recalled
the Prime Minister’s discussion of a 36 volunteer battalion force level
with Dr. Kissinger during the latter’s visit to Bangkok in July4 and
noted our understanding that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had
recently reiterated his request to the RTG that it undertake such an ex-
pansion of the program. I informed the Prime Minister that we are pre-
pared to support 36 battalions subject only to the necessary legislative
authorization of funds.
a. Having carefully reviewed since my return the slippage in the
recruitment and training of the already authorized 24 battalion force
and the severe losses by resignation, etc., among deployed battalions,
I provided the Prime Minister with a rather detailed summary of the
status of the program as we understand it. I explained to him that one
of my purposes in doing so was to determine whether it is realistic and
feasible at this time to engage in military and budgetary planning
premised on the eventual availability of a 36 battalion force. My other
purpose was to see that everything possible was being done to assure

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane.
2
Attached but not printed was telegram 166094 to Bangkok, September 10, which
requested Unger to inform the Thai Government that the U.S. Government would sup-
port 36 Thai SGU battalions for Laos and to urge them to accelerate recruitment of these
forces so that they would “be of service during 1971–1972 dry season.” The telegram added
that Unger should inform them “that implementation is contingent upon our continuing
to have the necessary legislative authority,” noting that “restrictive amendments (con-
cerning Thai volunteers in Laos) have been proposed in FY 72 defense procurement bill.”
3
The decision to support 36 Thai SGU volunteer battalions for Laos was made at
the August 10 WSAG meeting, when all agreed to Kissinger’s suggestion to “go ahead
with the 12 additional Thai SGUs in the last quarter of this year.” (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082,
WSAG Meeting Laos, 8/10/71)
4
See Document 127.
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Thailand 293

that we will be in a strong position to meet the anticipated heavy en-

emy pressures in Laos in the coming dry season.
3. I recalled that our mutually agreed schedule developed early
in 1971 provided for 24 battalions to be deployed by the end of this
calendar year. The last of these units were to go into training in Octo-
ber. There are now only 17 battalions in the field (actually the 17th will
be deployed within the next several days); none are in training although
we have been advised that two more battalions may start training later
this month. If the original schedule is to be maintained, five more bat-
talions must commence training before the end of October. This sched-
ule, of course, was developed to assure the maximum possible force to
repel the enemy’s effort in the upcoming dry season campaign.
4. The situation with respect to the actual on-board strength of
units currently deployed is even more disturbing. The average on-
board strength of deployed battalions is only about 55 percent of the
authorized strength; approximately 7 percent are on authorized leave
and expected to return; an additional 6 percent have been lost to bat-
tle casualties. More than 30 percent of the volunteers have resigned
from their units or have gone AWOL. In sum, the units deployed in
Laos are short more than 4,500 men. To replace these losses and to
commence the training of five battalions before the end of October will
require a drastic effort to meet what now appears to be a shortfall num-
bering approximately 7,000 men.
5. In this connection I noted that at the beginning of the last dry
season campaign, before any of the irregular battalions were deployed,
Thai forces organized into three regular battalions plus the Thai ar-
tillery units numbered about 3,000 men. Today the 8 volunteer infantry
and two artillery SGU battalions available to General Vang Pao have
a total strength of only slightly more than 2,800 (today there are also
other Thai forces in Laos, of course). Considering the attrition that Vang
Pao’s forces have suffered and the expected all-out effort on the part
of the North Vietnamese during the coming dry season, there is deep
concern that the forces available in MR2 will be woefully undermanned
unless dramatic action is taken soon.
6. I suggested that it is not realistic for either of us to think in con-
crete terms of the formation and deployment of 36 battalions unless it
is possible before the end of October to obtain enough volunteers to
commence the training of the 24 battalions previously agreed to and
in addition to providing replacements in the deployed battalions in suf-
ficient quantities to bring these units up to at least 80 percent of their
authorized strength level.
7. At this point I took note of the Prime Minister’s interest in de-
veloping a bonus system for men who have completed their tour of
duty in Laos as an inducement to help with the recruiting program and
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294 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

to reduce the number of losses through resignation and other absen-

teeism. Discussions between [less than 1 line of source text not declassi-
fied] Bangkok and Vientiane on the one hand and the RTA staff and
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the other have resulted
in the development of a scheme for a two part bonus system—one part
to be paid to the volunteer for completing his duty and the other to be
paid after reenlistment for a second tour. Though the funding of this
proposal has not yet been completed, we are attempting to obtain ex-
peditious action.
8. It has been our understanding that the tour of duty for each
volunteer was 15 months after training. Recently we were advised that
RTA headquarters has revised the tour length to be one year after train-
ing. The effect of this is to shorten the tour of duty by about 3 months.
Since this might further exacerbate the recruitment problem and add
an additional training burden, I inquired whether this decision to ab-
breviate the tour could be reconsidered.
9. Noting General Praphat’s concern that an adequate medevac
capability be assured to handle the casualty problem during the next
dry season campaign, I advised the Prime Minister that action has been
taken to assure the availability of six helicopter gunships to escort
medevac lift operations. We are now awaiting the identification of Thai
helicopter pilots so that we can plan and institute as quickly as possi-
ble a training program. The identification of these pilots must be ac-
complished if they are to be gunship qualified by the time they are
needed.
10. Finally, I called attention to the decision taken some time ago
to man the Korat Friendship Hospital with sufficient RTA personnel to
handle the major portion of Thai volunteer casualties. According to our
information, the staffing of this hospital is going rather slowly and I
requested that the problem be examined on the Thai side to make cer-
tain that adequate preparation is being made to assure proper medical
support for the Thai volunteers.
11. In his response, the Prime Minister admitted that they had had
a number of problems with the Thai volunteer effort. Morale among
the volunteers has not been very good and one of the reasons for this
is that the the men in the program see no future for themselves. The
pay has been low and the fighting has been tough. The Prime Minis-
ter expressed his appreciation for the effort to get the bonus system ap-
proved. He feels this is essential to help keep the men in their units
and to give a boost to the recruitment effort. For example, he noted
that many of the volunteers from the Black Panthers returning from
Vietnam are interested in the volunteer program but they are not at-
tracted by the lower pay and loss of the other benefits which they had
been receiving, including their mustering out payment at the end of
their duty in Vietnam.
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Thailand 295

12. The Prime Minister praised the RTA for its efforts and said it
is doing its best to recruit, but he expressed his regret that it has been
unable to maintain the recruitment schedule and replace losses. He
went on to say, with General Praphat nodding agreement, that the RTG
would redouble its efforts and that it will have 24 battalions by the end
of this calendar year. He needs help from us in obtaining prompt ap-
proval of the bonus system, but with that assistance, he feels certain
that this target can be met. The Prime Minister, again with General
Praphat in agreement, concluded this part of his comments by asking
that we continue to plan and program for 12 additional battalions (36
battalion total) saying, “I guarantee we will do it.” I inquired whether
a further boost to recruitment and retention of the program might be
achieved by offering to those volunteers who perform successfully an
opportunity for a career in the RTA. Dawee replied that they have been
working on this and have already announced the performance, expe-
rience, and educational criteria for volunteers who wish to join the RTA.
In order to open this opportunity to more men, the educational re-
quirement has been reduced from Matayom Hok to Matayom See
(equivalent respectively to 10th and 8th grades).
13. Dawee said that the Supreme Command is issuing an order to
the various Thai services and will provide us very shortly with the
identity of the pilots for gunship training.
14. The Thais strongly resisted our request to reconsider the de-
cision already taken concerning the length of duty tours for volunteers.
They noted that the men are kept on the line with little relief or leave.
As Dawee said, “We can’t expect to keep them in the foxholes longer
than 12 months.” A move now to restore the 15 month tour of duty af-
ter training would aggravate rather than help solve the recruitment
and training program. In view of their strong feelings, I did not press
this further, but pointed out that it made it even more essential to pur-
sue recruiting with real vigor.
15. Finally, concerning the medical treatment of casualties,
Praphat assured us that orders have gone to the RTA Surgeon General
who is responsible for developing surgical and medical teams which
can move quickly to Korat or elsewhere as needed. The RTA suffers
from severe shortages in this field and it cannot man the Korat Hos-
pital beyond the level of current needs. However, steps are being taken
to identify and prepare the medical teams to move rapidly when the
situation requires.
16. Comment: The atmosphere throughout the session was con-
structive and forward looking. Though my brief was implicitly critical
of the shortcomings of Thai performance, it was received without re-
crimination and the spirit of the meeting evidenced Thai determina-
tion to solve their problems and meet the 36 volunteer battalion goal.
General Praphat did note in passing at one point that in the early stages
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296 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

of the program there had been some shortages in support on the Amer-
ican side but he had no complaints concerning the current level of sup-
port, and his comment was made in the context of the need for mu-
tual understanding of the problems that exist on both sides in an effort
to make this program succeed.
17. I do not think that we should expect any miraculous recovery
of the slippages which have already occurred. Unquestionably, how-
ever, Thai leadership is impressed and grateful for our continued sup-
port of the volunteer program and for our decision to expand it to the
36 battalion level if funds become available. Their success in the course
of the next six to eight weeks in identifying and placing into training
the remainder of the previously authorized 24 battalions should pro-
vide a pretty good index of their ability to reach the 36 battalion level
in 1972. In the meantime, it is quite essential that we authorize promptly
the bonus system as developed [less than 1 line of source text not declas-
sified]. It is my understanding that this can be accomplished within cur-
rently authorized program levels since it is quite clear that the average
number of volunteers deployed is unlikely to exceed 80 percent of their
authorized strength.
Unger

136. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division of the
Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Nelson) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Washington, September 16, 1971.

SUBJECT
Conversation with General Kriangsak on Measures to Discontinue Chinese Irreg-
ular Forces Involvement in Opium Traffic

REFERENCE
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (TDCSDB–315/05276–71)

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand,
1970–71. Secret; Sensitive.
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Thailand 297

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a message from Bangkok, dated

14 September 1971, relating to a meeting held between Deputy Chief
of Mission and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lt. General
Kriangsak Chamanan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command.
The report referred to in this message is TDCSDB–315/05276–71, a copy
of which has been disseminated to you.
2. While the account of the meeting with General Kriangsak is
very interesting, we are highly skeptical that the Chinese Irregular
Forces, which have existed for many years primarily on the revenue
obtained from opium traffic, will give up this lucrative trade. We note
that under this plan, the 1971 opium crop would not be affected. This
cycle could be repeated for the 1972 crop for one reason or another.
There is also the good possibility, because of the current public con-
cern over the drug problem, of the American interest or hand surfac-
ing. While we have not yet examined what the repercussions of such
event would have on Burmese/U.S. relations, we must assume they
would be adversely affected. Additionally, such disclosure would only
give credence to Burmese past and present claims and charges of U.S.
support and involvement with the Chinese Irregulars.
For the Deputy Director for Plans:
Thomas H. Karamessines2

Attachment

Message From Bangkok

REFERENCE
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (TDCSDB–315/05276–71)

1. The Deputy Chief of Mission [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] meeting with General Kriangsak to determine his progress
in resettling the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) of Generals Li and Tuan
and to press him to take appropriate action to discontinue CIF in-
volvement in opium traffic. In early August, General Kriangsak re-
ported that he had a commitment from both Generals Li and Tuan that
their involvement in the opium traffic would cease after the 1971 crop
had been disposed of. Last week he reported that he had reconfirmed
this commitment with General Tuan which action is supported by the
reference report. General Kriangsak stated that he was unable to see

2
Karamessines signed for Nelson above Nelson’s typed signature.
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298 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

General Li during his August trip to the north but that he intends to
follow up again with Li later in September.
2. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
3. In response to our query as to whether Kriangsak had any
thoughts on how the refineries in Tachilek could be put out of busi-
ness, Kriangsak suggested that he attempt to persuade Li and Tuan to
undertake this task. He agreed to sound them out on this possibility
at the time of his next trip. Kriangsak asked that we clear this infor-
mally with Dawee; this was accomplished on 9 September. He noted
that there must be no leak to Li or Tuan concerning American interest
or support and we assured him that we are as interested as he in main-
taining strict security. Although we did not discuss the specifics of
compensation to Li and Tuan for a successful operation, Kriangsak
noted that he would wish to relate it to other assistance he is provid-
ing for the resettlement of the CIF. In addition, it will be necessary to
promise death and disability benefits.
4. The foregoing may sound far fetched in view of the well earned
reputation of the CIF for their heavy involvement in opium trafficking
over the years. We are in no position at this point to provide a reliable
assessment of Kriangsak’s chances. [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] reporting over the past year has reflected Kriangsak’s efforts
to bring the CIF under control and to regularize their status in Thai-
land. Though Kriangsak himself remains skeptical about their long
term intentions and motivation, he feels that he has made considerable
progress in bringing these forces under greater RTG control and that
in the process of doing so, his leverage has increased. Tuan and Li have
been promised Thai citizenship and their forces will receive permanent
resident permits. In return for this and other assistance, the CIF has
performed a useful role against Communist insurgents. We believe that
Kriangsak’s interest in using CIF against the Tachilek refineries should
be encouraged and, if appropriate, assisted if this can be accomplished
without any disclosure of the hand of the United States Government.
We recognize that if successful, the effort will probably be required on
a continuing and not just a one-time basis. Kriangsak appreciates this,
too, but rightly wants to approach this cautiously, avoiding long-term
commitments pending step-by-step evaluation of the results.
5. Messrs. Gross and Minnick have been briefed on this possibil-
ity and feel we should pursue its feasibility. [1 line of source text not
declassified]
6. Please bring the foregoing to the attention of U. Alexis Johnson
and Marshall Green.
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Thailand 299

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, September 17, 1971, 0300Z.

12650. Subject: Counterinsurgency: Communist Insurgent Threat

in Thailand and the RTG Response.
1. At a meeting with Prime Minister Thanom, General Praphat,
and Marshal Dawee on 14 September, I took the occasion to comment
on the growing insurgent threat in selected areas of Thailand in order
to press for a more vigorous Thai counterinsurgency response.
2. [4 lines of source text not declassified] This briefing was translated
by them into Thai and, we have subsequently learned, read with care
by the Prime Minister who instructed that it be given broader distri-
bution to key officials of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The thrust
of the briefing was to call RTG attention to the expanding covert vil-
lage infra-structure which the CPT has built in the Phuphan Mountain
area in the northeast, particularly in the Nakae District of Nakhon
Phanom. Though our intelligence in the north is less detailed than in
the northeast, attention was also given to the growing numbers of in-
surgents and more sophisticated weaponry in the north and the ex-
panded activity on the part of the CPT cadre working out of the high-
land into lowland Thai villages.
3. After noting that since my return I had reviewed developments
in the insurgency situation during my absence, I commented on this
rather discouraging picture—discouraging to the extent that the situ-
ation in these areas has continued to deteriorate during the past year.
Recently, the CPT has been able to organize its covert village infra-
structure in the northeast to foment at least 8 demonstrations against
government officials—demonstrations clearly organized to press Com-
munist interests and not the normal needs of the villagers. At least in
this area, the Communists have the capability to manipulate public
opinion and stir up the villagers against the government’s counterin-
surgency efforts. It is a dangerous new feature of the insurgency.
4. I observed that the progress which the CPT has made serves to
highlight the need for a more intensive and aggressive RTG response.
For one thing, greater cooperation on the part of civil, military, and po-
lice forces is urgently required. A number of instances were cited where
differences among these various elements had prevented or weakened
an effective RTG response. In other cases, there have been problems of

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Secret;
Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
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300 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

inadequate support and attention from Bangkok resulting in district

and province level positions being left unfilled, delays in making bud-
geted funds for counterinsurgency operations available, etc. a more
concerted police effort is needed in some of the most critical areas.
Many military patrol, reconnaissance and hunter-capture operations
are effective while they last but are not run on a sustained basis. This
gives the insurgents an opportunity to regroup and restore their access
to the village population.
5. I emphasized that one of the reasons for the new AAT program
is to provide additional assistance to the RTG to intensify their coun-
terinsurgency operations. We realize the RTG is making every effort
within its own budget to respond to this growing threat and we hope
that additional assistance provided in the AAT proposal, by relieving
budgetary pressure in other sectors, will enable it to do more than it
would otherwise be able to do within present RTG budget limitations.
6. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the intelli-
gence exchanged and for our interest, advice, and support in the en-
tire range of counterinsurgency programs and operations. The RTG is
trying, he said, to get the various elements of the government work-
ing together more closely, and he cited as an example the recent sem-
inar of governors of the insurgency-infested provinces held in Bangkok
under CSOC sponsorship with military, police, and dola participation.
Every effort is being made to increase the budget for counterinsurgency
operations. Dawee said that in 1970, 600 million baht was allocated for
these operations; 650 million in 1971; and for 1972, despite the many
cuts made elsewhere, over 800 million baht is budgeted for counterin-
surgency. General Praphat said that the military intends to run more
operations such as Operation Phalad in the north and that these will
be prolonged, not so limited in time as was Phalad. Apparently, the
RTA is now planning such an operation in Petchabun for which funds
are being sought from lower priority requirements. Also, more inten-
sive reconnaissance and hunter-capture operations are planned for
Nakhon Phanom.
7. I expressed my satisfaction and interest in this evidence of in-
creased activity and again asked that in their review of our AAT pro-
gram, they look for other opportunities for striking hard against the
Communists in ways that are not possible within their present budget.
The Prime Minister closed with a strong statement of appreciation for
the critically important assistance provided by the U.S. Government,
noting that the Thais cannot now handle the problem without mate-
rial aid from us. Praphat echoed this with a statement reflecting his
recognition that a more powerful thrust is needed against the internal
Communist threat.
Unger
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Thailand 301

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand [text not

declassified]1

Bangkok, October 29, 1971.

24202. 1. At General Kriangsak’s initiative, we met with him 27

October 1971 on further developments outlined ref. Kriangsak stated
that he met earlier that day with CIF Generals Li and Tuan. Generals
told Kriangsak that their present raw opium stocks total 14,000 choi.
After Kriangsak determined size of stock, he informed Generals that
RTG considering purchasing total stock on one-time basis for medici-
nal purposes. Price for stocks to be determined by current market price.
Generals Li and Tuan said they would accept RTG offer, and Kriangsak
then ordered them not to move any of these stocks without his per-
sonal approval. Kriangsak emphasized to Li and Tuan that RTG pur-
chase, if approved, would be a one-time buy and no more. Further, Kri-
angsak added, he extracted commitment from Li and Tuan that they
will not engage in opium traffic in future.
2. At current market of about 1,200 per choi, preemptive buying
of total stock would be close to USD one million. Kriangsak asked that
we consult with appropriate USG authorities seeking approval for this
preemptive purchase. We reminded Kriangsak that per previous state-
ments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] this proposal had al-
ready been forwarded to Washington for consideration. We added that
as of now, however, policy decision had not been communicated to
mission in Bangkok.
3. Kriangsak commented that he starting to resettle CIF person-
nel and dependents in about December. In the meantime, he paying
cost for feeding and housing CIF families which held in five or six lo-
cations in Fang district along Thai-Burma border. It appears clear that
Kriangsak strapped for funds in his resettlement program and that pre-
emptive buying of opium stocks will alleviate partially Li and Tuan’s
needs for funds.
4. Amb. Unger briefed on above 29 Oct. Amb. requests that sub-
stance of above be passed to Assistant Secretary Green together with
statement that he endorses favorable action so that we can begin spe-
cific discussions with General Kriangsak in near future on conditions
and means of carrying out this action.

1
Source: National Security Council, Country File, Thailand, 1971. Secret; Sensitive;
Eyes Only. In an October 29 memorandum to Green, [text not declassified] stated that this
message was [text not declassified] also being provided to “General Haig at the White
House and Mr. Ingersoll in BNDD.”
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302 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 3, 1971, 0324Z.

Conto 24/14775. Subject: Connally Visit; East Asia—Secretary Con-

nally’s Calls on Minister of Finance Serm and Prime Minister Thanom.
Summary: Secretary Connally affirmed that the United States will
honor its commitments to countries of SE Asia and that U.S. military
presence as well as economic assistance will continue while a need
exists. Secretary Connally also assured the Thai that the President’s
visit to the PRC would not jeopardize the interests of Thailand or
other third countries. The major concern of Prime Minister Thanom
was China and the threat posed to Thai security. He urged the U.S.
to maintain a strong position in SE Asia while trying to improve
relations with the PRC.
1. Secretary Connally called first on Minister of Finance Serm
Vinicchayakul. After initial pleasantries, Connally asked for Serm’s
comments on the U.S. economic program. Serm said he understood
the factors which prompted the U.S. to take this action. The fact that
the dollar was not devalued, Serm felt, was important to countries
such as Thailand with substantial dollar reserves. Secretary Connally
assured Serm that the U.S. program took interests of developing
nations into account. The administration believed that objectives of
the program would be mutually beneficial to U.S. and developing
countries. The U.S. looks to Southeast Asia as vital participants
in world trade, suppliers of essential raw materials, and important
trading partners. U.S. interest in this area will continue, Secretary
Connally said.
2. At the conclusion of the meeting, Serm escorted Secretary Con-
nally and the Ambassador to a meeting with Prime Minister Thanom
Kittikachorn. Other persons present for the meeting were Deputy Prime
Minister Pote Sarasin, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, Lt. General
Sawaeng Senanarong, Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister and
Deputy Minister Econ Affairs Prasit Kanjonawatana.
3. Secretary Connally opened with a forceful declaration of U.S.
commitment to Thailand and other countries of SE Asia. President
Nixon, he said, had asked him to affirm that the U.S. will maintain
its military and economic presence in SE Asia as long as the need ex-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY.
Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 4:17 a.m. on November 4.
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Thailand 303

ists. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, Thailand can be assured

of continued U.S. assistance to help meet its economic and military
needs. Despite the recent defeat of the Foreign Assistance Bill by
the U.S. Senate, the administration is vigorously seeking interim
means of continuing assistance until the question can be favorably
resolved.
4. In response, Thanom (speaking in Thai with Thanat interpret-
ing his remarks) thanked the Secretary for the assurances which he
brought from the President. Thanom said that U.S. military forces and
assistance must play a vital role not only in Vietnamization but also
“Southeast Asianization” to assure the future security of the region. He
pointed out that Thailand had cooperated closely with the United States
in realization of mutual objectives and that Thailand was fostering SE
Asian unity by participating in regional programs.
5. Turning to the question of China, Thanom said that Thailand,
like the US, believed that the time was ripe for the People’s Republic
of China to become a member of the United Nations, and had sup-
ported the U.S. position at the UN. Secretary Connally expressed his
appreciation for Thai support. The U.S. realized that the question of
admitting the PRC to the UN was of vital importance to countries “only
a stone’s throw from mainland China.”
6. Secretary Connally said that the purpose of President Nixon’s
visit to the PRC was to seek an improved relationship with the PRC.
He emphasized that the U.S. had modest expectations for the results
of the meeting. The President, he said, feels a responsibility to try to
bring the PRC into the community of nations in a peaceful fashion.
However, the U.S. would not cultivate new friends at the expense of
old. The issues discussed at the meeting in China would be bilateral
problems between the U.S. and the PRC; third countries need not fear
that their interests would be jeopardized.
7. Thanom said that the China question was, of course, of great
concern to Thailand. He urged the U.S. to maintain its “military/
economic/political umbrella” over SE Asia at the same time that it tried
to improve relations with the PRC. Diminished U.S. interest in SE Asia
could result in a power vacuum which Peking might try to fill. He men-
tioned the Chinese road building program in Laos and Burma and ex-
pressed apprehension about the ultimate purpose of these roads. Sec-
retary Connally, in response, restated that the U.S. would continue to
maintain its strong posture in SE Asia while the need existed.
8. Comment: The major concern of the Thai was the question of
Communist China. Secretary Connally effectively outlined the objec-
tives of the President’s visit to the PRC, hopefully allaying Thai fears
that the visit might be injurious to their interests. Secretary Connally
also took the initiative in explaining that the administration is working
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304 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

hard to avoid any disruption in military and economic assistance which

might occur as a result of the defeat of the Foreign Assistance Bill by
the Senate. The Thai did not question his assessment of the problem
or his assurance that it would be resolved.
Unger

140. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, November 12, 1971.

SUBJECT
Thai Cotton Textiles

I have read carefully the State Department’s memorandum of Oc-

tober 292 recommending that we release from embargo the Thai cotton
apparel awaiting entry.3 The grounds for this recommendation after ac-
knowledgement by State that the Thai Government has handled the
matter badly, are that “a political decision (is necessary) permitting the
entry of the embargoed goods, not further consideration of the prob-
lem as a purely textile matter . . . .”
This is probably the worst possible time for the Administration to
make textile import decisions on policy grounds such as these. We have
just concluded four understandings on wool and man-made fiber tex-
tiles with our principal Asian suppliers. These understandings need to
be converted into agreements, notes exchanged, and the agreements
implemented. The President has reaffirmed to the domestic textile in-
dustry that he intends to implement these agreements effectively to

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Limited Official Use.
2
The Department of State memorandum to Kissinger, October 29, stated that the
embargo of the 50,000 dozen pair of cotton nightwear “is now damaging our overall re-
lationship with Thailand.” It stated the Department’s belief that “the political realities
of the present situation require immediate release of the nightwear in exchange for a
Thai promise to negotiate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–
COTTON 17 US–THAI)
3
See Document 134.
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Thailand 305

hold imports from these countries within the terms of the agreements.
This means that we will need to implement these agreements in purely
textile terms. If we allow policy considerations such as those suggested
by State to intervene, the Administration will lose the confidence of the
industry and call into question our intentions with regard to the im-
plementation of the new Asian agreements.
The Thai Government has indeed handled the matter badly.
1. It neglected to advise its industry that the U.S. had invoked the
provisions of the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA).
2. It permitted shipments to continue without control during the
60-day period provided for consultations so that significantly more
than the restraint level specified in our April 29 note to the Thai Gov-
ernment was shipped subsequent to the receipt of our note.
3. It did not avail itself of the opportunity to consult until the last
day of the 60-day period specified for consultations in the LTA.
4. Its official representative assured us that further shipments
would cease as of August 1, but our records show that shipments con-
tinued into September. (October data are not yet available.)
The State Department has not handled the matter well either.
1. In January 1971 Embassy Bangkok was requested in a State De-
partment message cleared by the Interagency Textile Administrative
Committee to alert the Thai Government about the possibility of ac-
tion under the LTA on the items now in dispute. The Embassy chose
not to do so.
2. In August 1971 when the Thais came to Washington to consult
on this matter, Commerce proposed that we suggest to the Thais
the negotiation of a bilateral agreement together with the outline
of arrangement and the dates for such a negotiation. State did not
concur.
3. In September 1971, Commerce proposed that one of its senior
officials could undertake such a negotiation while he was in Hong Kong
the last week of that month. State did not concur.
4. In October 1971, Commerce proposed that we ask the Thai Gov-
ernment to enter into a memorandum of understanding—just as was
done with the four major Asian suppliers of wool and man-mades—
that would contain the key points of a bilateral agreement. We offered
to release the embargoed goods immediately thereafter when the Thai
delegation came to Washington to negotiate an agreement and before
an agreement was negotiated. State did not concur.
Despite my clear negative reactions to the State Department mem-
orandum and the difficulty I have in seeing how the embargoed paja-
mas can be such ad adverse factor in our relations with the Thai Gov-
ernment, we have proposed another approach to resolve this problem
which has been accepted by State, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, and
STR. It involves releasing a portion of the embargoed goods if the Thai
Government will agree to begin the negotiation of a bilateral agree-
ment on a date certain in the near future and, if no agreement is reached,
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306 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the quantity so released will be charged against the level for the
second year the restraints are in effect. The amount of goods to be re-
leased is equal to the second year’s restraint level. State is proceeding
to communicate with the Thai Government along these lines.
Maurice H. Stans

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 16, 1971, 1207Z.

Johto 2/15421. From Ambassador. Subj: Under Secretary Johnson’s

Audience with His Majesty the King.
1. This morning Undersecretary Johnson, accompanied by myself
and John Getz, was received in audience by His Majesty the King. The
discussion ranged widely over various aspects of the current situation
in Thailand, particularly in the field of economic development, noting
forward progress particularly in the northeast since the period when
the Under Secretary was Ambassador here.
2. Under Secretary Johnson then expressed concern about the
worldwide narcotics problem and noted with satisfaction the progress
that was being made toward the development of a Thai/U.S. program
in this field. He referred specifically to my appointment with General
Prasert earlier this morning. The Under Secretary then mentioned the
problem of finding an economic alternative to opium production for
the hill tribes in northern Thailand and said that he understood His
Majesty was sponsoring some useful work in this field.
3. The King responded readily and talked at length about the ex-
perimentation going on with a number of crops (for example, peaches,
soy beans, vegetables, and coffee). He explained the need for pro-
ceeding carefully, “unofficially,” and sometimes at greater cost to be
sure that the hill tribesmen would be won over and would become
willing participants. He discussed the importance of being sure there
was a market (His Majesty advocated cooperatively organized rather
than commercial canning industries) and the need for transport to mar-
ket. Not unexpectedly, this led His Majesty to emphasize the heavy re-
quirement for aircraft, particularly helicopters and stol planes.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Secret; Limdis.
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Thailand 307

4. Discussion was very friendly and constructive throughout, and

His Majesty made none of the critical and pessimistic comments about
the RTG or the situation in Thailand which had so strongly marked
some earlier conversations with American visitors.2
5. Under Secretary has seen and approved this message.
Unger

2
One such conversation was Secretary Connally’s with the King on November 3
at Chitralada Palace in Bangkok, as reported in telegram Conto 30/9579 from Djakarta,
November 5, in which Unger reported that the King “found the government’s efforts in-
adequate and its performance in some cases deficient.” (Ibid., Conference Files 1966–72:
Lot 70 D 387, Box 526)

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, November 17, 1971, 0643Z.

15497. 1. Tonight at 2010 I met at his request with Prime Minister

Thanom. With him were Deputy Prime Ministers Praphat and Pote and
Marshal Dawee and General Kriangsak. Prime Minister informed me
that since 1900 hours there had been effected a coup d’état carried out
entirely under his control. Thanom said that this has been done for the
sake of the security of Thailand “both externally and internally” as an
alternative to letting things go to ruin in the country because of inac-
tion. The decision had been taken to move rapidly and stop an unac-
ceptable deterioration.
2. The Prime Minister, with contributions from others present,
then described the deplorable situation that has grown up because of
the actions of the members of Parliament since the inauguration of the
Parliament in 1969. They cited difficulties with Parliaments in earlier
Thai history but said the problems had never been so acute as in this
case. In particular, the Parliament has interfered in a totally unaccept-
able way in the administration of the country and obstructed essential
actions in many fields. Furthermore, collectively and individually
Parliament and its members have attacked the government for its

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis.
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308 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

performance and also made many personal attacks and have spread
among the people a growing lack of confidence in the government.
There have been serious budgetary delays this year as in previous years
so that money for the country’s development is available only six
months out of each year; members of Parliament are obstructing ap-
propriation of funds for essential government purposes including na-
tional security and want money to be diverted instead to funds which
would be spent in their districts for pork barrel purposes. The National
Economic Development Board’s five year plan is held up because of
parliamentary inaction and there was specific reference made to World
Bank President McNamara’s statement that economic development in
Thailand in the sixties was more rapid than it is today. The govern-
ment is unable to take advantage of World Bank loans because the Par-
liament refuses to enact the necessary legislation.
3. The Prime Minister and General Praphat both referred to ac-
tivities of members of Parliament with labor groups, students and oth-
ers whom they were seeking to turn against the government. For their
own purposes they were stirring up discontent and unrest and mis-
understanding in complete disregard of the stability of the government
and the country. According to Pote there was a concentrated move to
stir up students to seek to take the universities away from the gov-
ernment and run them independently and to take advantage of stu-
dent immaturity to turn them into instruments against the government.
4. Reference as then made to a certain number of members of Par-
liament who had Communist leanings, were very happy to have the
PRC in the UN and were insisting that the RTG rush into establishing
relations with the PRC immediately without giving any consideration
to the dangers that could ensue. Praphat clearly attached special im-
portance to this issue, commenting on the dangers of certain Chinese-
born who were not Thai in spite of having been born here. The Com-
munists were now trying to install in such people a feeling of the
greatness of the new China. Pote also emphasized this point, saying
that there is considerable recent evidence of Chinese in Thailand be-
coming hostile to the Thai—although the PRC admission to the UN is
certainly not the cause of the problem it has complicated it.
5. Marshal Thanom added the degenerating situation as far as
public safety was concerned and the rapid increase in crime. Actions
being taken now would make it possible to move much more effec-
tively against criminals and make it possible to restore law and order.
I said that I was aware of the conditions they were describing but was
surprised that they found them so critical as to oblige them to take this
action. After the several present again reviewed the budgetary and
other problems they had mentioned before, Marshal Thanom con-
cluded that discussion with his insistence that the action was taken out
of no motivation except for the security and well-being of the country.
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Thailand 309

6. Thanom went on to say that the principal well-established Thai

institutions and laws will continue to be observed and above all, the
institution of the monarchy. When I asked if His Majesty had been in-
formed of the action they said that Marshal Thanom had just sent him
a letter explaining their actions. They did not feel it right to seek in any
way to involve the King in their action and if they turned out to be
wrong, it was on their head. Marshal Thanom went on to state that
Thailand will uphold all its treaty obligations and that their action
should have no effect on relations with friendly countries. They said
that I was the only Ambassador they were calling in to inform per-
sonally and they hoped in particular that there would be no change in
Thailand’s relations with the US. (Reference was made to our recent
active discussions, presumably on narcotics and AAT.) They insisted
that their action was entirely an internal one and need have no effects
or repercussions outside. (They also asked me not to mention my meet-
ing with them since no other foreign representative was being called
in.) General Praphat asked me whether I thought there should be some
change in their foreign policy. I first told them that was for them to de-
cide, not for me. I then said that we were generally happy with the for-
eign policy of the Thai Govt as it has been conducted over many years,
particularly the close cooperative relations we have enjoyed. We also
realized that in times of change like the present, it made good sense
for the Thai Govt to be broadening its relations with other countries
outside the circle of its close friends and particularly concentrating on
strengthening its ties with its neighbors.
7. Since the group appeared to have completed their explanations
for the actions taken, I then told them very frankly that I was sure their
actions would be greeted around the world with considerable strong
criticism. I said that also in the US they must anticipate expressions of
disappointment at least, and in the press and probably in the Congress
some sharply adverse comment about returning to dictatorship, etc.
Marshal Thanom acknowledged this but said that their decision had
been that regardless, for the good of Thailand they must proceed.
Dawee expressed the fear that without strong direction there was dan-
ger that Thailand might go the way of Vietnam. Gen. Praphat said that
while they respected the principles of democracy and had attempted
to put them into action, it was clear that in Thailand today democracy
doesn’t work.
8. I acknowledged their comments but asked whether they did
not feel that dissolving of the Parliament and their other actions might
not in fact make more trouble for them internally with the Chinese
groups, students and insurgents. They insisted that groups like the stu-
dents, farmers and laborers would under normal circumstances be well
behaved and support the government but they were now being insti-
gated by those individuals, including members of Parliament, who
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310 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

were stirring up opposition to the government for their own benefit. Un-
der the revolutionary group it was anticipated that the government could
deal more effectively with agitation and subversive activities. They an-
ticipated that there would be a rather prompt return to an orderly situ-
ation and one that would be generally acceptable to the people. I said I
hoped that this would be the end result and that they did not find that
they had created more trouble for themselves by their action.
9. I then asked what would be their next steps. The Prime Minis-
ter said that he could not say what would follow but it was explained
that for the time being, with the Cabinet having been dissolved, there
would be a caretaker arrangement, ministries would operate under
their Under Secretaries and policy questions would be referred to the
head of the revolutionary group, Marshal Thanom. Thanom himself
said that he anticipated that in about two to three months a regular
government with a cabinet would again be formed. In reply to my
question they confirmed that various of the revolutionary party orders
which were first put into effect in 1958 would again be enforced, in-
cluding Article 17, having to do with security.
10. General Praphat returned to the public relations problem, rec-
ognizing that the revolutionary group’s purposes and reasons for its
action must be effectively explained abroad. We talked about the pos-
sibility, as a longer run matter, of the Thai securing professional advice
in this field. Somewhat later I returned to this point with Marshal
Dawee and emphasized the importance of the purposes and their rea-
sons for taking this drastic action being fully and effectively explained.
At this time I also mentioned that it would be important if they could
make clear their intention of returning to constitutional government at
some point.
11. This entire discussion was carried on in a friendly, almost re-
laxed atmosphere, the Thai present appearing calm and confident of
the rightness of their action. I, of course, committed myself to report-
ing in full everything they told me so that my government would be
aware of their reasons for action. While I made clear that I realized they
were alone in a position to make decisions about Thailand’s Govern-
ment, it was my judgment that they must anticipate encountering con-
siderable criticism abroad. As for the consequences at home in Thai-
land, I expressed my personal doubts but acknowledged they were
obviously the best judges.
12. I learned later that Marshal Thanom, Praphat, Pote, Dawee
and General Prasert (Director General TNPD) went to explain in per-
son to His Majesty the King the actions they had taken. According to
Dawee the King listened sympathetically and wished them well.
Unger
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143. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, November 17, 1971.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Unger’s Report on Coup in Thailand

Ambassador Unger has telephoned to State (Assistant Secretary

Green)2 a report of his meeting with the leaders of the coup in Thai-
land. This report provides significant details of the reasons for the coup
and on the make-up of the new leadership structures, as follows:
—The leadership group consists of Field Marshal Thanom (now
known as “Head of the Revolutionary Council” rather than Prime Min-
ister), General Praphat, Pote Sarasin, and Air Marshal Dawee. These
say that there are no differences among them. Thanom will be in charge
of the Revolutionary Council for an undetermined period, and the
country will be under martial law.
—The coup was undertaken in order to dismiss the Parliament
and suspend the Constitution. This was done in response to what was
described to Unger as a “deteriorating situation” in the country caused
by the failure of the Parliament to measure up to legislative require-
ments such as the budget and other badly-needed pieces of legislation.
Moreover, some members of the Parliament were undermining the
Government by working with groups in the country seeking to broaden
instability.
—One of the failures of the Parliament had been to impose re-
strictions on the terms offered for a World Bank loan, which made ac-
ceptance of this loan impossible.
—No foreign policy issues were involved in the coup, and there
will be no change in Thai foreign policy.3 The coup leaders are hope-
ful that cordial relations with the U.S. will continue. When Unger
pointed out that a critical reaction in the U.S. and around the world
might be expected over this lapse from democracy, the leaders said that
they had anticipated a reaction of this kind, but felt their move was
necessary on the grounds of internal security and in order to assure
decisive action with respect to internal development. (Unger suggested

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for information. Haig signed for
Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2
No record of this telephone conversation has been found.
3
The President underlined this sentence and wrote: “K—This is what matters.”
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312 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

that as a public line we should express disappointment that the Thai

effort to reestablish representative government had run into difficul-
ties, note however that these are difficult times, and then hope for an
early restoration of constitutional government.)
—There is now no Cabinet. Thanat, in meeting with a foreign cor-
respondents group, called himself “Mr. Thanat.” Unger thought that
this might be temporary, and is reserving his judgment on Thanat’s
position.
—The King has been informed, but it is too early for his attitude
to be made known. The Revolutionary group is taking full responsi-
bility for the coup, making it plain that the King is not involved.
—It is also too early to know the reaction of the public and the
press. Unger feels that there will be a mixed reaction, but that people
will be cautious in commenting. There is no evidence of public unrest.
—Unger is the only foreign ambassador who has been called in to
meet the new leadership and this fact has not been publicly made
known.
Comment
As indicated by Ambassador Unger, there should be no change in
Thai relations with the U.S. The leaders of the Revolutionary Council
are in fact essentially the same ones with whom we have been dealing
all along, and we can anticipate that our programs in Thailand will
continue without interruption. One possible leadership casualty, how-
ever, is Thanat, whose moves to make contacts with Peking have drawn
some criticism from more conservative leaders such as Praphat.
Praphat also had reservations about Thanat’s proposal to favor an en-
dorsement of neutrality for Southeast Asia at an ASEAN meeting
scheduled for November 25 at Kuala Lumpur.
Praphat may in fact turn out to be the new strong-man, since the
coup could not have been undertaken without the military forces which
he commands. Thanom was planning to step down as Prime Minister
in 1972 and Praphat was considered likely to replace him; the new sit-
uation may thus have simply moved up Praphat’s succession to power
even though Thanom may remain as titular head of the Revolutionary
Council for some time.
I believe that we should be very cautious about commenting on
the coup along the lines suggested by Ambassador Unger. There will
be criticism enough on the Hill and in the media—with resulting pres-
sure on legislation—without the Government adding to the uproar.
Press guidance so far has been to say “no comment.”
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Thailand 313

144. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bangkok, November 18, 1971, 9:30–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT
Under Secretary Johnson’s Visit with NEC Leaders

PARTICIPANTS
Thai—Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
General Praphat Charusathien
Pote Sarasin
ACM Dawee Chullasap
American—Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador Leonard Unger
John Getz, Special Asst. to Under Secretary Johnson
George F. Muller, Politico-Military Counselor
Laurence G. Pickering, Political Counselor
Harlan Y. M. Lee, Political Officer

The American contingent arrived at Government House at 9:30

a.m.
Pote Sarasin first came in alone to talk to the Under Secretary and
Ambassador Unger. Pote said that there was no coup but simply a
change. He said that doing business through the Parliament had be-
come “in fact impossible,” and they felt there was no other way but to
change the structure of the government.
He spoke of three things that he believed were most important in
bringing about the decision to change the government. First was that
the economic plan would be impossible to implement under the exist-
ing system. (Parliament obstructed international loan policy by refus-
ing to make their funds available). Second, problems within the gov-
ernment party itself could not be resolved. Third, there was the problem
of the Chinese in Thailand and the possibility of subversion of the Chi-
nese community.
In response to Ambassador Johnson’s question, Pote said there
would be no problem of political prisoners as in the Sarit days, al-
though he had earlier spoken of stern measures to be taken against any
opposition. He said, “the people were dissatisfied and something had
to be done.” He hopes that the new government will be decisive. His
greatest fear is not that Thanom will be too harsh but that he will not
be firm enough and then the change will be for naught.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret;
Nodis. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer Harlan Y.M. Lee and approved in J on De-
cember 21. The meeting was held at Government House.
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314 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The meeting then shifted to the main conference room where the
Thai side comprised Field Marshal Thanom, General Praphat, Air Mar-
shal Dawee and Pote.
Under Secretary Johnson opened the conversation by saying that
he had been to Laos yesterday and had visited Long Tieng and the
Plain of Jars and a battery of Thai volunteers. He said the Thai were
doing a good job.
Pote asked about the Cambodian situation. Under Secretary John-
son said that on the whole he felt that Cambodia in the last 18 months
had done very well. General Praphat expressed concern about the
morale of FANK and commented that the Cambodians changed
leaders or commanders too often. Under Secretary Johnson said that
at the top there had been little change and that Lon Nol’s health
continued to improve; he was impressed by their strong sense of
nationalism.
Field Marshal Thanom said that last night he had invited the
Ambassador and Under Secretary Johnson to meet with him. Regret-
tably the Under Secretary was not available but the Field Marshal
assumed that the Ambassador had briefed Mr. Johnson. He said the
Revolutionary Group had had a note sent to all Embassies explaining
the reasons for the takeover. He said there was no change in Thai for-
eign policy.
Under Secretary Johnson said it was naturally up to the Thai Gov-
ernment to decide what must be done, but they should be aware that
their action will have unfortunate effects abroad, especially in the
United States. He expressed particular concern about its effect on the
debate on economic and military assistance at this particularly critical
time.
Field Marshal Thanom said that one of the reasons they under-
took the change of government was that they felt they could then more
effectively proceed with programs the U.S. has advocated, such as pro-
viding the counterpart funds necessary to AAT. The government had
set aside this money, but the Assembly would not have agreed to its
being spent for defense. He agreed that this should not be cited in pub-
lic as a reason.
Under Secretary Johnson referred to the strong opposition in the
U.S. Senate to the foreign aid bill and to assistance to Thailand in par-
ticular. This latest move will strengthen the hand of opponents of such
assistance and the immediate question is what can be done to reduce
the damage to the Thai program. He said that realistically the Thai
must anticipate some reduction in U.S. aid in any case. He expressed
the fear that riders will now be attached to the bill aimed specifically
at the Thai program. He made clear that the Administration did not
want this but it could well happen.
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Thailand 315

Reiterating that the Thai must make their own decisions, the Un-
der Secretary ventured certain suggestions. First, he said that the phrase
coup d’état creates an extremely bad impression and brings to mind
soldiers shooting up the government and this obviously is not what
had happened. But the phrase had been used and would be picked up
by the New York Times, Washington Post, and Washington Star. He em-
phasized the press aspect in the U.S.
Field Marshal Thanom said that there were not only military but
also civilian leaders in the new government and he hoped that the for-
eign press would pick up the local press coverage. Under Secretary
Johnson noted that the local English-language Nation headlines had
been “coup d’état” and that was what would be picked up in the for-
eign press.
The Under Secretary then said that a statement as soon as possi-
ble to the effect that the intention of the group is to return to a consti-
tutional government would help. If it contained dates as to when this
would be done, that would be even better. Field Marshal Thanom said
they were considering what type of constitution would be suitable for
a permanent constitution for Thailand. Pote said that they would make
a public announcement regarding the constitution, but he did not know
when this would be done.
Under Secretary Johnson said that the change will be made that a
military dictatorship has taken over, with all the bad connotation that
has in the United States, recalling events in Greece and Brazil.
General Praphat said that the people of the United States do not
understand what “military dictatorship” means in Thailand, and that
we think of it in terms of Latin American governments. He said the
Americans in Thailand should help to make it clearer to Americans
in the U.S. that what is called “military dictatorship” here is greatly
different from the Latin American type. The Prime Minister said that
the Thai preserve the institution of the Crown, for example, and do not
attempt to set themselves up as Chiefs of State. He said the leadership
after announcing their takeover met with the King, and the King gave
his blessing to the change.
General Praphat said that perhaps the Thai should invite news-
paper men and politicians to Thailand to see for themselves what the
situation is like. Under Secretary Johnson said that would be helpful
in the longer run but the immediate problem was what statements were
to be made.
Air Marshal Dawee said that they had to terminate the power of
the MP’s, that MP’s were promoting student riots and inciting labor
and others, which led to the present situation. If nothing were done,
the situation would become so bad that even if the U.S. gave a billion
dollars in aid to Thailand there would be no country left to defend.
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316 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The Under Secretary said talking about executive-legislative rela-

tions would not help much in the U.S. Pote said that the press and Con-
gress will always interpret things the way they want to and that Ful-
bright and Mansfield will never be won over. Most important to
Thailand is what the leadership does in the months to come to bring
about stability, security, and to assure the people’s welfare. If the peo-
ple are satisfied, this will vindicate the action. He said they know the
problems caused by their action and know that they must live with
these problems.
Under Secretary Johnson agreed that what the leaders did would
be important but said again that his immediate worry is the short term.
He himself must go before Congress soon to defend the aid program
for Thailand. Pote asked the Under Secretary to help explain to Con-
gress and the people in the U.S. that the situation in Thailand is dif-
ferent from that in the U.S.
Ambassador Unger said that the immediate problem to be ad-
dressed now is that certain things must be said regarding the change
and that it is important that they be said in the right way. He suggested
that it should be emphasized that this was not a bloody coup but a
peaceful takeover by the same men who led the previous government,
and that they are looking to the day when they can return to constitu-
tional processes.
Air Marshal Dawee said the leaders will not keep power forever
and that they also want to work toward democracy. He said that the
Under Secretary could explain that he saw himself the takeover was
quiet and there was no bloodshed.
Field Marshal Thanom said that he believed actions in the next
few weeks and months were more important than statements that could
be made now. Ambassador Unger said there was no reason why the
leadership could not do both. Pote said they would do that. They would
have to consider what could be said. They were not saying “no” to the
suggestion.
Under Secretary Johnson returned to the comment concerning
those such as Fulbright who would always be opposed to assistance
to Thailand. He said he was really concerned about the middle group
that would be prepared to shift depending on how this matter was
handled in the next few days.
Thanom said that it was fortunate that Under Secretary Johnson
was here at this time and could explain what had happened and say
there was no bloodshed. Dawee observed that children went to school
as usual, and there were the usual traffic jams and most everything
was proceeding as if nothing happened. Pote also said that Under Sec-
retary Johnson could help Thailand by stating that things were normal;
he had confidence that Johnson’s words had great weight. The Under
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Thailand 317

Secretary said that because he is known as a friend of Thailand his

statements may be discounted. Ambassador Unger said all U.S. official
statements will lack in persuasiveness.
Under Secretary Johnson said that when the coup of 1958 occurred,
Thailand was not in the public focus, but because of what has hap-
pened in Southeast Asia in the intervening years Thailand was much
more in the news and that people in the U.S. were more interested in
Thai affairs.
The Under Secretary made the additional suggestion that it would
be helpful if the Thai would emphasize the civilian and non-military
aspects of the government. The press will seize on the fact that
General Prasert is to be the administrator for the civilian side. People
will not notice that Prasert is now Police Director General but only that
he is a General. Field Marshal Thanom said that civilian Under Secre-
taries are not acting in place of ministers in all except the Ministry of
Defense.
Under Secretary Johnson said that to an American having a Par-
liament is good and abolishing Parliament is bad, that nothing can re-
ally change this attitude. However, the way the press is handled can
help, and the RTG cannot afford to ignore press relations, or expect the
Americans to do the job for them. He suggested that the Thai, if they
have not already done so, should consider hiring a full-time public re-
lations man, a Thai, to handle press relations for them. Pote then said
to the Under Secretary, “You find such a public relations man for us
and we will hire him.” Ambassador Unger said that in the U.S. we usu-
ally use newsmen or those familiar with and acceptable to the work-
ing press to deal with this type of thing. Pote asked who there is in
Thailand who can do this for the group. Ambassador Unger answered
that the Americans can’t name anyone but that he should look for
someone, perhaps working in the English-language press, who has
good foreign connections as well as being effective in Thailand. Under
Secretary Johnson said that they should have a first-class press man in
the Prime Minister’s office and who would be responsible for all state-
ments issued by the Revolutionary Group.
The Under Secretary asked whether the Thai leaders ever held
press conferences. Pote said formerly the Prime Minister and he had
weekly press conferences but the reporters “never printed what they
said.” Under Secretary Johnson noted that Thanat’s speech last night
was helpful.
The conversation again turned to Cambodia, the Under Secretary’s
next destination. General Praphat said there were certainly more
headaches there than in Thailand. Part of the problem in Cambodia
was that a number of people were competing for the leadership. In
Thailand, he said, there was no competition among the leaders of the
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318 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Group, that they worked shoulder to shoulder despite the attempts to

create dissension.
Under Secretary Johnson asked the Thai if they had any advice
they wanted to give us on Cambodia. General Praphat said the best
thing the U.S. could do in Cambodia is to assist people who could bring
stability to the country. Thanom and Praphat and the others agreed
that the two who could do this were Lon Nol and Sirik Matak.
Under Secretary Johnson noted that at the time the Khmer Gov-
ernment had announced the dissolution of their Parliament, they had
announced at the same time that they were establishing a Constituent
Assembly. This had greatly dampened down reaction in the U.S. to the
dissolution of the Parliament.
Field Marshal Thanom asked Under Secretary Johnson to convey
to President Nixon his good wishes. He expressed the hope that the
President will understand that the actions taken by the Revolutionary
Group have been carefully considered and were taken to assure the se-
curity and well-being of the people. He stressed their attachment to the
Constitutional Monarchy.
Under Secretary Johnson noted that there was in fact stability in
Thailand, but it is up to the Thai Government to get this across to the
public abroad. Pote asked again that Under Secretary Johnson help to
get this point across to Congress.
The Prime Minister closed with the hope that the close relation-
ships between our two countries would be maintained. The Under Sec-
retary assured him that that was also his goal.
The meeting ended at 11:05 a.m.
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Thailand 319

145. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security

Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig)1

Washington, December 1, 1971.

SUBJECT
Progress on Thai Cotton Textiles

As you will recall, Dick Kennedy indicated several weeks ago that
we had put the pressure on the bureaucracy to resolve the Thai textile
issue without going to the President. Happily, the bureaucracy came
up with a compromise solution which was acceptable to the Thai. Ac-
cordingly, we are releasing from embargo 18,000 dozen pairs of cotton
pajamas, and the Thai are sending a representative to Washington to
negotiate a bilateral textile agreement. Once that agreement is reached,
we will release from embargo additional 50,000 dozen pairs of paja-
mas, which will be charged against Thailand’s negotiated quota next
year.
I shall continue to follow this.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Sent for action.
Drafted and initialed by Hormats, with the concurrence of Colonel Richard Kennedy. A
notation on the memorandum by Haig reads: “Great job by all around. AH” At the bot-
tom of the page another notation in Kennedy’s handwriting reads: “Al: The above added
to encouraging news on the AAT suggests we may have pulled it off. Hopefully we’ll
have the AAT wrapped up very shortly—the Thai have agreed to everything—only a
few minor technical problems remain and are being worked out now. Embassy has al-
ready drafted a proposed exchange of notes concluding the agreement. RTK”

146. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 14, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject Files,

Country File, Thailand. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not
declassified.]
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147. Editorial Note

A meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) was

held on December 23, 1971, in the White House Situation Room to ad-
dress the emergency situation created by the North Vietnamese attacks
in the Plain of Jars in Laos in the early morning of December 18. The
North attacked much earlier in the season and took advantage of bad
weather, which prevented U.S. tactical air forces from effectively sup-
porting Meo and Thai forces. The North Vietnamese also used “highly
accurate artillery fire” with the heaviest artillery pieces (Soviet-made
130 mm field guns) they had ever used on the Plain.
The main NVA thrust was made at Fire Support Bases Mustang and
Lion, which were defended by Thai SGU battalions. William Nelson of
the CIA described what happened. Nelson said that the Thais had about
2,700 men deployed on December 15 and that they had suffered an esti-
mated 400 killed and 170 wounded. According to Nelson, “The Thai 609
battalion, at Fire Support Base Lion, was the worst hit. At one time 200–300
enemy bodies were laying in the perimeter defense wire, while Sting Ray
Fire Support Base from Phou Seu provided covering 155 mm fire to within
50 meters of their outposts. During the night of the 19th, elements of the
BG 609 requested permission to withdraw. Permission was denied, and
they were told to hold their position and that reinforcements were en
route. During the night of December 19–20, radio contact was lost with
the BG 609, while hand-to-hand combat activity was underway.” Nelson
said that they fought “very well,” and that the base had held until the
“loss of the supporting Meo position allowed enemy forces to employ di-
rect fire weapons on the base, destroying ammunition supplies, pinning
gun crews and security troops down.”
Thai troops at Fire Support Bases King Kong and Panther (Thai SGU
battalions 606–608) “fought a constant battle” through December 20 and
into December 21. They were told to abandon King Kong on December
20. Nelson said that the “Thais put up a good fight. They withdrew in
good order.” He then described how three Meo and three Thai battal-
ions, about 4,780 troops, had arrived at the Ban Na/Pha Dong resistance
line. He said that the CIA didn’t know “where three other Thai battal-
ions are,” that Ban Na/Pha Dong was “a very porous line,” and that all
the friendly forces artillery had been lost on the Plain of Jars, although
some of it was being replaced. He added that three Thai irregular bat-
talions (SGUs 616, 617, and 618) of 1,403 men had been taken out of train-
ing and had been airlifted into Long Tieng on December 20 and 21.
When President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger
asked whether regular Thai troops were available as reinforcements,
Nelson supposed that they were, but said that “it’s a question of pay-
ing for them.” Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson then ex-
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Thailand 321

plained that “we are not permitted to support them. Symington’s ceil-
ing, as you know, is $350 million. One thing we have to do today is
decide how we are going to handle the ceiling.”
Nelson then described how enemy activity in South Laos had been
light. The only critical area was around Paksong, where two Thai bat-
talions had been hit very hard 10 days before and “rendered ineffec-
tive.” Still, he said, the “strength is with the Thais.” Kissinger said that
the high option for the defense of Laos was “to continue to defend the
Long Tieng area and to undertake the defense of the area at the junc-
tion of routes 7 and 13,” and asked whether “we have the forces for
the high option.” The State Department’s William Sullivan replied:
“No, not unless we get Thai regulars. And unless the Thai Government
pays for the regulars, we don’t have a Chinaman’s chance of getting
them. (to Dr. Kissinger) Excuse me for mentioning your friends.”
To Kissinger’s question as to whether the Thai military program
(meaning the AAT) had been agreed to, Johnson replied that it was
“close to agreement. The last meeting was yesterday, and there are no
outstanding issues.” Nelson then added that “I understand that the De-
fense view is that there is no way to beat the ceiling and that we should
be honest and forthright with the Congress. The feeling of the Secre-
tary is that we should be honest and ask Congress for more money.”
Kissinger eventually decided to obtain President Nixon’s guidance
on what steps, if any, to take to overcome the problem caused by the
Congressional ceiling of $350 million for expenditures in Laos in FY
1972. There was also considerable discussion of providing more U.S.
air support for the Meo and Thai forces in Laos.
In the end, the Thai volunteer SGU battalions, combined with ex-
tensive U.S. air forces support (including B–52 bombers) permitted the
U.S.-backed forces in Laos to survive this North Vietnamese assault
and to hold key positions such as Long Tieng. (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files),
Box H–115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971)
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322 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Washington, December 24, 1971, 1050Z.

230898. Ref: Bangkok 17212.2

1. Following is text of letter from the President to be delivered to
Marshal Thanom soonest. Further instructions contained in immedi-
ately following septel.
2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am pleased that you took the initiative to write me about the cur-
rent situation in North Laos. You can be assured that I fully share the
concern which you have expressed and agree that urgent action is
needed to meet this increased threat. The reports which I have received
make it clear that the Thai irregular units in the Plaine des Jarres were
courageous and effective under intense attack and that they made the
North Vietnamese pay dearly for their gains.
The three specific objectives for our air effort, which you have out-
lined, accord completely with our own estimate of the most urgent re-
quirements in that field. I have directed that all necessary steps be taken
to meet these objectives. I hope that as the weather improves we will
see positive results in the next few days.
In addition to the measures which can appropriately be taken from
the air, there remain significant problems on the ground. The losses
suffered in both manpower and equipment will require urgent correc-
tive action. In this connection, I have directed the accelerated delivery
of the equipment, especially artillery, which will be needed for effec-
tive ground defenses.
Meanwhile, the manpower and deployment needs generated by
the current situation are matters to which you, together with Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma, will wish to give urgent attention.
I am asking Ambassador Unger to discuss these matters with you
in greater detail and report promptly to me. Sincerely,”
Rogers

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to
Vientiane and Saigon. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Haig and Sullivan, and
approved by Johnson.
2
Attached but not printed is telegram 17212 from Bangkok, December 20, which
transmitted a letter to Nixon from Thanom, requesting urgent U.S. air support and ad-
ditional U.S. arms aid for the battle in Laos.
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Thailand 323

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, January 17, 1972, 0423Z.

680. Subject: Insurgency in the North.

1. During my trip last week to the North, CG Third Army (LTG
Samran Petyakul) emphasized to me the special advantages enjoyed
by the insurgents in his region. Among them, he gave greatest weight
to Communist control of contiguous areas in Laos, which affords
secure hinterland for the “liberated areas” in Thailand. To my sug-
gestion that friendly guerilla forces in Laos act as blocking forces for
Third Army initiatives, he observed that the former are heavily en-
gaged elsewhere.
2. I took the occasion to stress that dealing with the insurgency is
above all a Thai responsibility and a vital Thai national interest. The
US can help, but only as a supplement to what basically has to be a
Thai effort. I emphasized the vital necessity for Thai commanders to
use their resources effectively and energetically against the insurgents.
3. Samran accepted this, and replied by describing important op-
erations—using both Third Army elements and forces from the Cen-
tral Reserve—which are about to be undertaken in the current dry sea-
son, as well as paramilitary programs under development. Armed
operations by the RTG have proven necessary in the North (as con-
trasted with the preferred “psychological operations” approach), be-
cause insurgent operational bases are strongly held and inhabited by
non-Thais. Hill people share neither language, religion, nor loyalty to
the King with the Thai, and RTG campaigns against opium growing
are also exploited by the Communists: hill populations therefore are
particularly vulnerable to Communist propaganda and recruitment ef-
forts. Nevertheless, RTG suppression efforts are selective, and accom-
panied by efforts to win hill tribe loyalty. (The Thais have, in fact,
developed good plans and organization to deal with the problem: im-
plementation is now the issue.)
3. Although Samran emphasized the loyalty of the lowland Thai,
I was struck by his comment that about five percent of the valley
population (especially migrants from the Northeast) may be cooperat-
ing with the Communists. He also agreed with my point that effec-
tive loyalty is often a function of the government’s ability to extend

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 THAI. Secret.
Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC.
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324 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

protection, which is frequently difficult to do under conditions preva-

lent in the north.
4. This visit strengthened my impression that the insurgency in
the North is a serious and growing threat: I hope that I was able to
strengthen Samran’s resolution in dealing with it.
Unger

150. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, February 16, 1972.

SUBJECT
Communist Insurgency in Northern Thailand

The Chinese-supported Communist insurgency in Northern Thai-

land has been steadily gaining strength. The number of armed Thai
Communist insurgents (CT), estimated in 1968 to be some 250, is (ac-
cording to CIA) now over 3,100—2,300 full time and 800 village mili-
tia. Moreover, their weaponry has improved and now reportedly in-
cludes mortars, machine guns, flamethrowers, grenade launchers and
anti-personnel mines as well as numerous AK–47s and SKS carbines.
It is not known whether these weapons are coming direct from China
or are from stockpiles in Laos and North Vietnam.
In addition, the CT have made major improvements in their
politico-military organization and have formed some small battalions.
While most of their indigenous support has come from the various hill
tribes, the CT are beginning to make inroads among lowland Thai in
the North.
The number of CT-initiated incidents in the North jumped from
none in 1966 to 947 in 1969, dropped to 589 in 1970, and then rose to
well over 1,000 in 1971. A January 2 NCNA report proclaimed that “the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on
the memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “Al—Let’s get CIA assessment. HK”
Another notation in Holdridge’s handwriting reads: “done 2/20.” Haig wrote on the
memorandum: “Tom Latimer see me.”
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Thailand 325

fighting efficiency of the Thai Peoples Armed Forces markedly in-

creased in 1971.”
Ambassador Unger believes that the southward expansion of the
Chinese road (and Chinese military presence) in Laos and Communist
military advances in Laos are closing the gap between the external and
internal threat to Thailand. He believes these developments suggest
that China continues to apply indirect but growing pressure upon Thai-
land as a matter of policy, not merely “as casual encouragement of what
has been erroneously characterized as a chronic, low-level dissidence.”
Unger further believes that if these developments proceed on their cur-
rent course, they could eventually diminish Thai ability to play a sig-
nificant role in the stabilization of Laos, and undermine the internal
development and stability of Thailand.
Peking’s Role
The leading Chinese role in the Thai insurgency is ill-disguised.
The insurgency radio, the “Voice of the People of Thailand,” broad-
casts from China and has unabashedly extolled the virtues of “Mao
Tse-tung thought.” CT cadre adhere strictly to Maoist ideology. The
Thai Communist Party and its “NLF,” the Thai Patriotic Front, seem to
be led by exiles now resident in China.
The Chinese road building operation in Laos—now involving over
30,000 construction and anti-aircraft troops—seems to have little pur-
pose other than to provide direct access to Thailand from China and
North Vietnam (See map at Tab A). Significantly, these roads point to
the area where the CT are strongest (See map at Tab B). Since roads
such as these are not needed to meet present CT resupply demands, it
seems likely they are intended to support a considerably increased in-
surgency in Thailand.
Hanoi’s Role
Hanoi is also involved in supporting the Thai insurgency; but its role
is strictly secondary to that of Peking and is largely confined to North-
eastern Thailand. The North Vietnamese (and perhaps the Pathet Lao)
have trained Thai cadre and have helped supply the CT. Many of the
40–50,000 North Vietnamese living in Thailand are under Hanoi’s influ-
ence and constitute a serious potential fifth column. Recently Hanoi-
controlled media claimed that Thai insurgents are actively supporting their
comrades in Indochina and cited as evidence the January sapper attack
on our B–52 base at U Tapao. Hanoi has, of course, strongly attacked the
presence of Thai troops in Laos as well as Thai-Cambodian cooperation.
Thai Countermeasures
The Thai Government has become increasingly concerned about
the growing insurgency in the North and Northeast and plans a
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326 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

major counterinsurgency effort this year. In fact, a major military cam-

paign has just recently been launched against CT strongpoints.2
In any case, insurgency in Thailand has reached the stage where
it also deserves increased attention on our part.

2
In telegram 2039 from Bangkok, February 12, Unger reported on his conversation
with NEC Chairman Thanom, in which the former stressed the importance of “an ef-
fective RTG response to the evident insurgent decision to stand and fight regular Thai
forces in operation Phu Kwang.” Unger told Thanom that the “new situation created by
insurgent resistance and strength indicates requirement on RTG part to apply complete
campaign plans with necessary support and continuity to get the job done.” (Ibid., RG
59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7)

151. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, February 22, 1972, noon.

SUBJECT
Thai Request for Consultation on Future Vietnam Peace Proposals

PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the United States
Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director for Thailand/Burma Affairs, EA

Summary
Ambassador Sunthorn came in on instructions to deliver what he
characterized as the most important message of his tour in Washing-
ton, the request of his government that it be consulted before any fur-
ther modifications to the eight-point US peace proposal for Vietnam
are made. End summary.
Ambassador Sunthorn came in on instructions with what he de-
scribed as a very serious request.2 He realized that high US officials
were concerned with the security of Thailand as a whole and that they

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Exdis. Drafted by Bergesen on February 23, and approved by Brown and Lange Scher-
merhorn (S/S–S) on February 26. The meeting was held in Ambassador Brown’s office.
2
According to telegram 2458 from Bangkok, February 22, Unger met on February
21 with Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Charunphan (who replaced Thanat
as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under NEC Thanom after the November coup)
and received the same basic message as that delivered by Sunthorn. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 327

were interested in its problems. The President’s eight-point peace pro-

posal was acceptable in principle to the Thai Government as an attempt
at a solution to the long term problem. However, whatever the out-
come of the present difficulties in North and South Vietnam, Thailand’s
security would be affected. The Chairman of the National Executive
Council (Thanom) felt that Thailand should have been consulted in
connection with the eight-point program. The NEC now expected that
there may be a new US proposal for Vietnam which would have the
effect of involving or even endangering Thai security. As an ally and
deeply involved, Thailand should be consulted.
Ambassador Brown asked whether this meant that the Thai
wished to be consulted on any future proposal that we might make in
Paris. Ambassador Sunthorn said yes. Ambassador Brown pointed out
that we did not know what the outcome (of the eight-point proposal)
will be nor whether there will be any new proposals. We would wish
to think over what the Ambassador requested. There were many peo-
ple involved. Would a similar approach be made to Ambassador
Unger? Sunthorn said he thought so. His government felt the eight-
point program had already made substantial concessions to North Viet-
nam. Any further concession would be detrimental to the interests of
Thailand and the United States.
Ambassador Brown asked what worried the Thai especially. Sun-
thorn said his government had not specified, but they were particularly
concerned about anything affecting the security of Laos and Cambodia,
which would automatically affect Thailand’s security. They wished to
see nothing occur which would let North Vietnam control the whole of
those two countries. Ambassador Brown said that we had no interest in
seeing Thai security unfavorably affected or North Vietnam’s taking over
Laos and Cambodia. We appreciated very much what Thailand had al-
ready done. Ambassador Brown suggested that the problems of Laos
and Cambodia would be dealt with after Vietnam was settled.
Sunthorn said yes, he thought it was a package deal. A stalemate,
especially in South Vietnam, might lead to increased North Vietnamese
action in Laos and Cambodia. Ambassador Brown said we would see
what could be done to bring the Thai more into the picture. He would
consult with Ambassador Sullivan and the Secretary on the latter’s re-
turn.3 Sunthorn said this was an important request which his govern-
ment had asked him to make. They tried not to bother us—they rec-
ognize that we have many problems—but he regarded this as the most
important message that he had had to deliver to this government.

3
Telegram Tosec 76, February 23, reported the Brown–Sunthorn meeting to Green,
who was travelling with the Presidential party on a state visit to China, along with
Rogers, Kissinger, and others.
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328 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

152. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, February 29, 1972.

SUBJECT
U.S. Assistance to Thai Program for Resettling CIF Opium Traffickers

Summary
We have agreed to give the Royal Thai Government (RTG) $1 mil-
lion to support Thai efforts to resettle the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF)
of Generals Li and Tuan against the latter’s promise to cease traffick-
ing in opium, and to turn over about 28 tons of opium, now under
their control, to the RTG for destruction.2
Background
In 1949–50 KMT (Kuomingtang–Chinese Nationalist) troops un-
der General Li Mi were driven out of Yunnan into Burma, where they
settled despite the protests and military efforts of the Burmese to dis-
lodge them. In 1953–54 and again in the early 1960’s many of these
KMT’s were evacuated to Taiwan, and the Government of the Repub-
lic of China no longer has any control over those who stayed behind.
The remaining forces, now mostly in Thailand, have gradually assumed
a more local character through recruitment but have remained an ef-
fective military force, probably the best in the tri-border area. Now
known as the “Chinese Irregular Forces” (CIF’s), they are under the
leadership of Generals Li Wen-Huan and Tuan Hsi-Wen.
Over the years the CIF’s have acquired control over most of the
illegal opium traffic from eastern Burma and northern Thailand to
Bangkok. Operating in terrain they know better than the government
forces, profiting heavily from “protection” and trade in opium, and
fighting when they have to, the CIF’s became a law unto themselves.
For the past year or two the Thai Government, faced with an in-
creasing Communist insurgency in the north and recognizing the bad
effects the opium trade was having on Thailand’s reputation, has
sought to settle the CIF’s and make useful residents out of them. To
this end the Thai promised that if the CIF’s would turn their forces

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.
2
The suggested text of the agreement was transmitted to the Embassy in Bangkok
in telegram 231185, December 27, 1971. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 329

against the insurgents they would provide land, some supplies and
eventual Thai citizenship. The RTG’s relations with the CIF have been
carried out by General Kriangsak, Deputy Chief of Staff of Supreme
Command, who has been well and favorably known to us for many
years.
The Opium Trade
Recognizing the increasing problem of the illicit opium trade, the
Thai Government sought to get the CIF’s out of the business. Li and
Tuan said they were willing to give it up, but they needed 20 million
baht (equivalent to $1 million) to dispose of their obligations and opium
procurement agreements and to settle their followers. While the RTG
was able to put aside some funds for resettlement purposes, they could
not allocate this additional amount, so General Kriangsak approached
us for assistance. After careful consideration in Bangkok and Wash-
ington, agreement was reached on the form and amount of U.S. assist-
ance. An essential consideration from the Thai point of view was that
Li and Tuan were not to be aware that the USG was the eventual source
of funds. U.S. funds are to be provided from AID Development Loan
funds transferred to the BNDD.
The U.S./Thai Agreement
On February 1, General Kriangsak and the U.S. BNDD director in
Bangkok signed a letter3 which provided essentially as follows (full
text attached):
In the interest of assisting RTG efforts to resettle the CIF’s, the U.S.
would contribute 20.8 million baht in two installments on a grant ba-
sis against the CIF surrender of 16,000 choi of opium (about 28 tons).
Disposition of the opium is to be by agreement between the RTG
and the U.S. (the RTG insists on destruction of the opium).
The U.S. assistance is provided on a one-time basis.
In separate agreements between General Kriangsak and the two
CIF leaders, the latter have agreed to turn over their stocks, to get out
of the opium trade entirely, and to subject themselves and their forces
to Thai law for any future offenses.

3
The February 1 letter to Lieutenant General Kriangsak Chomanan was signed by
William T. Wanzeck, Narcotics Attaché of the Thai Embassy. In the letter Wanzeck re-
peats the language of telegram 231185 almost verbatim. He states that the U.S. Govern-
ment is “particularly pleased with the provisions in this program that would remove
these forces permanently from the illicit trade in opium which has international ramifi-
cations, and would turn them instead to agricultural pursuits or other legitimate means
of earning a livelihood.” Attached but not printed.
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330 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Conclusion
While we recognize that it is unlikely that our support of Thai ef-
forts to resettle the CIF’s will put a complete stop to opium trafficking
in northern Thailand, the U.S./RTG agreement will enable us to hold
Kriangsak and the RTG responsible for any violations by the CIF’s. The
removal of 28 tons of opium from illicit channels and its destruction
will have a major impact on the quantity available for consumption
outside the indigenous market. The resettlement scheme if successful
may make productive citizens out of a group of several thousand
freebooters. Finally, the possibility of further use of the CIF’s as a force
against the Communist insurgents in northern Thailand will be
enhanced.
James Carson4

4
Carson signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, March 10, 1972, 0540Z.

3318. Kuala Lumpur For Assistant Secretary Green. Subject: As-

sistant Secretary Green’s Call on NEC Chairman Thanom.
Summary: In cordial but deeply serious meeting with NEC Chair-
man Thanom and other top Thai leaders, Assistant Secretary Green de-
scribed background of President’s Peking trip, assuring the Thais that
there was no change in U.S. commitments to them and emphasizing
the positive benefits that will accrue to them if our diplomacy succeds.
Green stressed that continued U.S. strength and close bonds with al-
lies such as Thailand are essential to success of our diplomacy.
He also emphasized that this diplomacy, which enjoys broad sup-
port at home, will give the President enhanced ability to carry out the
Nixon Doctrine and thus put U.S. policy on a firm and steady course
on which allies can rely. The Thais were deeply appreciative of this

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Se-
cret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 6:59 a.m. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh,
Saigon, and Vientiane.
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Thailand 331

consultation and of the reassurances that Green was able to give.

Thanom expressed deep concern about the growing level of insurgency
in Thailand and Chinese support thereof, and asked if latter would
continue. Green discussed possibilities but said we must await results
to see if our diplomacy affected this. Thais obviously will be watching
this one closely. Thanom also stressed heavily the need for continuing
U.S. economic and military assistance in face of the massive aid the
other side is receiving from its backers, and his concern about Con-
gressional attitudes on this question. He also reiterated his earlier ap-
peal for consultations prior to any U.S. decisions on matters affecting
Thai security. End summary.
1. Assistant Secretary Green met with NEC Chairman Thanom to
discuss President’s Peking visit beginning at 2:00 p.m. March 8,
Thanom was accompanied by Deputy Chairman Praphat, Assistant
Chairman Pote Sarasin, Air Marshal Dawee, Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs Charunphan, and Director of Southeast Asia Divi-
sion, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asa Sarasin (Pote’s son). Green was
accompanied by Ambassador Unger, Mr. Holdridge, DCM and POL
counselor.
2. Field Marshal Thanom, with Pote interpreting, expressed great
pleasure at opportunity to received President’s special representative
and his appreciation of opportunity to hear at first hand about the
Peking talks and especially about the effects these talks would have on
Thailand and Southeast Asia. Green responded by conveying to the
Thai leadership from the President the latter’s warmest wishes and
highest regards and esteem, as well as those of Secretary Rogers. He
then outlined briefly the role that he and Mr. Holdridge had played in
the talks and the mandate the President had given him in connection
with his present mission.
3. Green went on to describe briefly the steps taken by President
Nixon leading to his Peking trip, beginning with the article in Foreign
Affairs of October 1967. He stressed that the President had succeeded
in removing barriers between the U.S. and the PRC so as to permit the
establishment of a dialouge with Peking without sacrificing our rela-
tions with the ROC or anyone else. He recalled that all our defense
commitments including that to the ROC, were specifically and publicly
reiterated in Shanghai at the time the Communiqué was released.
4. Green emphasized the responsive chord which the President’s
diplomacy had struck among the American people, who strongly de-
sired that some opening for peace be sought. Successful China diplo-
macy would greatly strengthen the President’s hand in all respects and
reinvigorate U.S. foreign policy across the board. Better relations be-
tween Washington and Peking could in turn open a real opportunity
to move the world in a better direction. However, he said this could
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332 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

come about only if the U.S. remains strong and retains its close bonds
with its allies to whom the U.S. must continue to provide adequate
support. He said the PRC was interested in a better relationship with
us because of our power and influence in the world.
5. He explored the reason why the Chinese wanted to hold these
talks, which they strongly desired. He noted however that it was very
important to avoid public speculation about these reasons, which could
interfere with the achievement of the goals of our China diplomacy
with no offsetting advantage. He cited a) Chinese fear of the USSR, re-
flected inter alia by widespread construction of air raid shelters;
b) deep-running Chinese worry about the possibility of resurgent
Japanese militarism; and c) great internal change and past turmoil in
China, in the wake of which the general move had been away from ex-
tremism. Green produced a chart dramatizing this point which the
Thais found most interesting.
6. The result, we believe, had led the PRC to realize, even though
it would not say so, that it is not in its interest to have the U.S. withdraw
rapidly from Asia. They do not want a vacuum created into which the
USSR might move. They may be coming to realize that Japanese mili-
tarism (which we feel the Japanese will reject) is less likely to reemerge
if a U.S.-Japanese relationship continues. Noting that their rhetoric may
not always reflect this change of attitude, Green stressed the importance
of encouraging them in positive acts without stopping to examine too
closely their motives or being too concerned about their rhetoric.
7. Green described the process of drafting the communiqué. The
Chinese had put up positions on certain controversial issues which we
answered point by point. There was no attempt to paper over the dif-
ferences, some of which were very fundamental. In addition to this,
however, there were areas where agreement could be expressed, in-
cluding the necessity to avoid the outbreak of war; opposition to hege-
mony or spheres of influence; and adherence to the “five principles”
which go back to the Bandung period. He noted that when these lat-
ter were first enunciated, it was in an undesirable propaganda context
which led Secretary Dulles to refuse acceptance of them. In fact, how-
ever, the points were in themselves unexceptionable. We now have a
joint PRC–U.S. commitment to them on the record and intend in the
future to hold this commitment before the PRC. He noted that we also
expressed the hope for better conditions for the Chinese people which
in our view will help further to move the PRC away from extremism.
8. Green stressed that no secret deals had been made, that there
were no negotiations except on the communiqué and no attempt to
deal with third country problems.
9. To sum up, he said the U.S. side has no illusions, but feels that
some opening for peace has been made which can successfully be ex-
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Thailand 333

ploited in close concert and consultation with our friends. He empha-

sized again that we must speak from strength, extending a friendly
hand but remaining on guard. He said he would upon his departure
from Thailand make a stronger statement of reassurance than he had
made or would make in any other country he was visiting.
10. Marshal Thanom expressed sincere thanks for this back-
ground. He noted that at a meeting with the Japanese Chief of Staff,
who is currently visiting Thailand, he had expressed the view, com-
pletely in agreement with that of Assistant Secretary Green, that Chi-
nese fear of Russia and Japan had motivated them to take part in these
talks.
11. Thanom posed the question of whether the U.S. or the PRC
initiated the talks. Green said the initiative had really come from both
sides. As he had noted, the President’s indications of desire for a dia-
logue went back to 1967, and the Chinese since then had increasingly
found reasons which made it desirable from their point of view. In the
end, after portraying Americans as devils for 20 years, the Chinese had
come to the point where pictures of Chairman Mao smiling at Presi-
dent Nixon were carred on the front pages of all their newspapers.
12. Thanom noted that there was nothing in the communiqué on
Thailand, and said he presumed therefore that there was no change in
Thai-U.S. relations and that the SEATO commitment and the
Rusk–Thanat communiqué remained in effect. Green confirmed this.
He said none of our alliances or commitments were mentioned in the
communiqué. He recalled that we took up in the communiqué only
those controversial items the PRC mentioned. The PRC did not raise
either the SEATO commitment or Thailand. However, Green said Mar-
shal Thanom was entirely correct in assuming that all UMS commit-
ments to Thailand remain in effect and unchanged.
13. Thanom asked specifically whether the Chinese had raised the
question of U.S. use of Thai bases. Green replied that they had not.
14 Thanom recalled that in 1969, President Nixon during his visit
to Thailand had described to him the Nixon Doctrine as it affected Thai-
land. He said he had found this extremely reassuring and assumed
from what had been said that there was no change in this policy. Green
confirmed that there was no change.
15. Thanon then asked whether Project Taksin also continued in
effect. Ambassador Unger noted that while it is still in existence, Proj-
ect Taksin is a military plan which takes a political decision to make it
operative, not a commitment per se. Therefore it is in a different cat-
egory from the other matters mentioned.
16. Green said he planned to stress in his departure statement that
he recognize that our own interest required maintenace of our com-
mitments to Thailand and our other allies and continuing contributions
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334 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

to the strength of our allies through economic and military assistance.

He said he would also stress our readiness to consult closely with Thai-
land and our commitment not to negotiate behind its back.
17. Thanom noted that the PRC had reiterated its policy of sup-
porting wars of liberation. To Thailand, he said, “liberation” means ter-
rorism and disruption of public administration and public safety. He
noted that the Communist terrorists in Thailand are using Chinese
equipment including modern anti-tank weapons, rockets and small
arms. He asked whether that could continue.
18. Green recalled that the President has said we can only judge
by results. He noted again that the Chinese have now expressed them-
selves publicly along with us against interference in other sovereign
countries. In the future, to involve themselves in such activities will
expose them to charges of bad faith, and we must hold this commit-
ment before them. He anticipated that the PRC will continue to use the
jargon of wars of national liberation, but he believes their real concerns
have turned in other direction. He foresaw no dramatic immediate
change but if our general diplomacy succeeds their support of such ac-
tivity may diminish. Even before the visit, we had concluded that their
policy would move in the direction of greater caution, of attempting
to “exploit external and internal contradictions” of other countries, i.e.,
a shift to “talk-talk” tactics. This trend is currently manifesting itself in
the slogan “long live Chairman Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic line.”
He said the Chinese know that Thailand is a close friend of the United
States. China wants a better relationship with us. This may give us
some additional leverage on their actions vis-à-vis Thailand.
19. Thanom asked about the current relationship between the PRC
and the DRV. Green said that two or three years ago, the PRC simply
wanted us bogged down in Vietnam until, on a wave of disillusion-
ment in the U.S., we would be swept out of Asia entirely. Now they
are coming to see a continuation of the Vietnam War as redounding to
the benefit of the Soviet Union, not to their own benefit. He said that
as the war continues, the USSR as the supplier of the more advanced
weaponry needed by Hanoi becomes more and more identified with
Hanoi’s goal of victory and will be the principal beneficiary if the goal
is achieved. The Chinese seem more interested now in seeing the war
end fairly soon.
20. Holdridge expressed agreement with this. He said the PRC
had voiced support for attainment of Communist “goals” in Southeast
Asia without defining the latter beyond expressing agreement with the
PRC’s 7-points and the two-point elaboration. They at no time became
more specific than this and they lent no additional weight to Hanoi’s
positions. The impression left was that their assistance to Hanoi would
continue in order to avoid leaving the field entirely to the Soviets but
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Thailand 335

that they would not support any expansion of the conflict. Implicit in
it all was that the U.S. role in Indochina would not stand in the way
of a developing relationship with the PRC, and that the PRC was more
interested in Northeast Asia, particularly the Soviet Union, Japan and
Taiwan, than in Southeast Asia.
21. Thanom expressed the view that the North Vietnamese were
afraid of being inundated by Chinese advisors, which was another rea-
son which led them to turn to the Russians for more assistance. But he
noted that while heavy equipment was coming from Russia, small
arms, uniforms, etc. were coming from China.
22. Returning to the Thai insurgency problem, Thanom said Chi-
nese equipment had showed up in every region of Thailand where in-
surgency existed. Since the talks in Peking were agreed to, the RTG has
carried out extensive operations in the North and Northeast destroy-
ing Communist base camps. In connection with these they had inter-
cepted communications from the enemy requesting more equipment,
weapons, medicine and food from China by land and by heliocopter.
He said the Chinese are deeply involved and so far have shown no
signs of stopping or reducing their involvement. Green recognized this
to date and repeated that we can only await results but our diplomacy
may offer a road to an easing of the problem.
23. Green said that he wanted to make it explicit, as he had done
yesterday in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, that we are not aligning with
China against the USSR, or getting involved in the Sino-Soviet split. He
recalled that the President would visit Moscow to seek a better dialogue
with the Soviets. In this connection, he noted that before the President
went to Peking, Gromyko was visiting Tokyo. At that point the Chinese
eased their hostile anti-Japanese propaganda line. Adding that he did
not believe the Japanese would move into the Soviet orbit, he said the
net result might be an escalation toward peace. He said the U.S. goal
was to further this kind of phenomenon, to establish a better relation-
ship among the great powers from which all nations can benefit.
24. Thanom said it was at one time understandable that the Viet-
namese should be “liberated” from the French, and the other former
colonies from the metropolitan states, but the Thais are puzzled as to
whom they are to be liberated from. Green said the Chinese leader-
ship, after a life-time of struggle, take struggle as the normal condition
of life. The rhetoric of “liberation” has become second nature to them.
In a case such as Thailand, which has always been independent, the
rhetoric and slogans may increasingly be exposed as empty and mean-
ingless. Our aim must be to turn the Chinese leaders around in prac-
tice without worrying too much about their rhetoric.
25. Thanom reiterated that the terrorist movement in Thailand is
an extremely serious danger to Thailand today. Thailand would help
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336 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

itself and would not need U.S. ground forces. But so long as the ag-
gressors are being given outside support, Thailand would need sup-
port, including economic aid. Yet Congress now seemed inclined to cut
aid to Thailand. This concerns them greatly. Green agreed to report this
concern2 and to support their request for continued assistance.
26. Thanom asked whether it was true that the North Vietnamese
had sent people to Peking to meet with the Americans while the Pres-
ident was there. Green said this was a pure canard.
27. Green noted that Sihanouk had gone to Hanoi during the Pres-
ident’s visit which further identified Sihanouk with the North Viet-
namese and thus further hurt himself with his own people.
28. Green referred to the open letter which appeared in the
Bangkok Nation on the day of his arrival (Bangkok U.S. info 071150Z
Mar). This was quickly and emphatically disclaimed by the NEC. Green
said that among the many errors in the letter was the assertion that the
U.S. has accepted a “One China” policy. He said both Peking and Taipei
claim that there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part and that
we have simply noted and do not challenge these positions. The Chi-
nese themselves must resolve this matter. We will not pressure Taipei
one way or the other. He expressed the view that the PRC would show
some patience and that it was now even more unlikely that it would
resort to force in seeking to take over Taiwan.
29. Thanom noted that the commitment to ultimate withdrawal
of forces from Taiwan was linked to a reduction of tension in the area;
he found this very reassuring. Green noted also that with respect to
the Indochina area the commitment to ultimate withdrawal was con-
ditional, being tied in the case to self-determination for the countries
of Indochina. With respect to the use of the term “region”, Green said
that was intended to indicate that forces providing support to coun-
tries in Indochina from outside could also be reduced.
30. Thanom recalled the approach he had recently directed to be
made concerning the RTG’s desire to be consulted before decisions are
made affecting its security (Bangkok 2458). He said this could be done
through our Ambassador here with the Foreign Office or directly with
him, or through the RTG Ambassador in Washington. The important
thing was that true consultations be held in all cases where Thailand’s
security interests are involved. It was not enough to be informed of

2
Green met with President Nixon on March 23 to report on his meetings with
Southeast Asian leaders about the President’s trip to China. In regard to Thailand, Green
said that Thanom, Dawee, Pote Sarasin, the King, and others had “all expressed their
support, although they all were concerned about PRC support for the insurgency in Thai-
land. They felt they were under pressure. The King (see Document 155) had been par-
ticularly strong on the need for continued U.S. aid to cope with the insurgency.” (Ibid.)
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Thailand 337

major U.S. moves an hour or so in advance. Green said he fully un-

derstood and would convey this point to Washington highest levels.
31. Marshal Dawee, recalling that Thailand has 3–4 million Chi-
nese residents, asked about the future of the Republic of China. Green
said that, while he of course could not predict the future, following his
talks with the leaders in Taipei, particularly Chiang Ching-Kuo, they
seemed to feel much more assured. He noted that their economy is do-
ing well and that they have strong links of trade with many countries
around the world which will continue. Noting again that our commit-
ment to withdraw is highly conditional, he said we expect to draw
down our forces in Taiwan from 8,500 to 2,000 in connection with Viet-
namization, but he expected that the latter figure would be held to for
the indefinite future pending resolution of the Taiwan issue.
32. Green recalled that, like the Thai leaders, the President has been
effectively combating Communist aggression for many years and that
he is very realistic. The President knows that strength and continued
close ties with our allies are a prerequisite to our ability to deal suc-
cessfully with Peking. But the President had also concluded that the time
had come when traditional diplomacy had to give way to inspired ac-
tion in order to make a breakthrough which would be in the interest of
all. Green said that this thirty years of diplomatic service led him to the
conviction that this was the kind of effort which would win worldwide
support, convincing people that things can improve. He felt that this was
particularly important with respect to our younger people.
33. Green said that the principal purpose of the Nixon Doctrine
was to reverse a feeling widely shared by Americans that the U.S. is
over-involved around the world, in order to avoid a reaction which
would lead to under-involvment. In other words, the President sought
to put U.S. foreign policy on a steady course which allies could bank
on and on which they could base their own planning. In terms of re-
ductions in U.S. forces, however, the President has concluded that the
point had now been reached where there must be a pause (except for
Vietnamization). He quoted from Secretary Rogers’s recent report con-
cerning this matter.
34. Following a brief exchange about press handling (see Bangkok
3298 for RTG announcement),3 Marshal Thanom thanked Assistant Sec-
retary Green warmly for the assurances he had brought from the Pres-
ident to the Government and people of Thailand. These assurances he
said would make them more confident of their security and of their re-
lationship with the United States.
Unger

3
Not printed.
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338 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Malaysia to the Department

of State1

Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 1972, 1425Z.

836. Eyes Only For The Secretary and Dr. Kissinger From Asst.
Secy Green.
1. Following NEC Chairman Thanom’s dinner for our party
March 8, I drew Chairman Thanom aside (with Pote Sarasin inter-
preting and Ambassador Unger also present) to mention a particularly
sensitive point which I wished he would not share with anyone else
in his government. I referred to his conversation of January 14 with
Ambassador Unger2 in which Thanom had asked that we take up in
our Peking talks Thailand’s concern over PRC support of insurgents
and terrorists against lawful government and innocent people of Thai-
land, and to point out that RTG had stopped its anti-Peking broadcasts
and wanted to have better relationships with PRC on basis of non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs.
2. I said Secretary Rogers specifically mentioned this point in one
of his meetings with FonMin Chi Peng Fei. Chi’s response had been
along the lines that (a) China had historically maintained good rela-
tions with the Thai people but, after Chiang’s troops had fled to Thai-
land the latter had made use of these troops, relations had deteriorated;
(b) Thailand had opposed China and the Communists including in-
terference in Indo-China and hence there were no diplomatic relations
now; (c) new Thai Government pursues the same old policies but we
(PRC) do not interfere in internal affairs of Thailand; (d) people of Thai-
land want revolution and PRC hopes that it will come to have normal
state relations on basis of five principles. Chi had added: “We hope
you will convey this to your good friends in Thailand.” Chi then said,
I continued, that as for Thai charges about Peking supported guerril-
las in Thailand, PRC admits some Thai guerrilla leaders are in Peking
but how the guerrillas carry on in Thailand is their affair; we don’t
interfere.
Chi had ended by saying that U.S. and Thailand have their prin-
ciples, and PRC has its own; nevertheless we can work for an im-
provement of state relations.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Se-
cret; Nodis.
2
A report of that conversation was transmitted in telegram 597 from Bangkok, Jan-
uary 14. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 339

3. Thanom and Pote Sarasin expressed great appreciation for Sec-

retary having taken this up and commented that Peking’s response was
pretty much as expected. Thanom felt that, to the extent the U.S.–PRC
relationship improved and China moderated its course, this could
prove in time to be of real benefit to Thailand. I agreed.
Lydman

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 0515Z.

2452. For The Secretary From Ambassador Unger. Subject: Mar-

shall Green and John Holdridge Call on King of Thailand. Ref: Bangkok
3318.2
1. On March 9 Assistant Secretary Green was received by His
Majesty the King. Also present were the Under Secretary of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs Charunpan, the King’s Aide-de-Camp, Admi-
ral Diskul, Mr. Holdridge and myself. Our conversation lasted about
one hour and forty five minutes.
2. After conveying the appropriate expressions to His Majesty
from President Nixon, Green proceeded to describe at length the Pres-
ident’s visit to China and the discussions which took place there in
terms very similar to those of the previous day before the NEC, which
meeting is recorded in reftel. Emphasis was put on those points which
I had identified to Green as being of particular interest and concern to
the King.
3. His Majesty showed immediate understanding of the impor-
tance of the trip in the light of the situation in the U.S. and particularly
the attitudes of young people there. He saw the value of the trip to the
President in establishing better understanding with some alienated
groups in the U.S. and therefore providing support for the President to
enable him to carry out his larger programs. The King understood the
value this also could have with regard to U.S. programs in Thailand.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Se-
cret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok.
2
Document 153.
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340 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Otherwise, however, the King tended to minimize the possibil-

ity of this reopening of contact between the U.S. and the PRC having
any beneficial effect on the policy or actions of the latter. He discussed
at length his view about Chinese intentions, particularly in Southeast
Asia, where he feels that the Chinese are determined to establish their
dominance. He cited maps which are a standard item in Chinese schools
which show Thailand as an integral part of China and he is persuaded
that the Chinese are not likely to be deterred from trying to make it so.
Whatever might be our good intentions, he professed to be virtually per-
suaded that Thailand will be gobbled up. The King insisted that while
the Chinese had very good understanding of Westerners, the reverse was
not the case and he implied that our reestablished contact with the PRC
may lead us to some false conclusions and unrealistic expectations.
4. In respectful terms but in firm tones Green challenged the im-
plication that the U.S. would stand idly by and let her allies be taken
over, pointing out that the U.S. has been second to none in the world
in standing by its friends, he also insisted that we are in fact looking
at the matter of reestablishing relations with the PRC entirely realisti-
cally and without false illusions. Moreover, we have a number of in-
dividuals who are exceptionally well informed about China and have
worked almost all their lives on this one subject. He cited Mr. Holdridge
as a case in point. Somewhat chastened, his Majesty made conciliatory
comments to the effect that he recognized the desirability of the Pres-
ident’s initiative on China in terms of the interests of America’s friends
as well as of the United States itself.
5. Most of the remaining discussion related to U.S. assistance to
Thai armed forces and police in the field of helicopter and Stol aircraft,
a subject which His Majesty has raised with me innumerable times in
the past. After indicating his reluctant conclusion that the U.S. would
not be providing further aircraft to the Thai National Police His Majesty
then also commented on our apparent unwillingness or inability to pro-
vide a substantial additional number of UH–1H aircraft for the RTAF.
He did not mention the large number of UH–1Hs which are in the pro-
gram for the RTA, nor did he accept the explanation that the Thai
Armed Forces themselves are not seeking additional helicopters for the
RTAF. Under the circumstances His Majesty asked whether we would
be prepared to sell to the RTG around 25 of the UH–1Hs now in sur-
plus in Vietnam and awaiting shipment elsewhere. I said we would
look into this immediately and also mentioned that we are seeking hel-
icopters from that source ourselves to accelerate considerably the de-
livery already scheduled for the RTA, as well as a few additional hel-
icopters for the RTAF.
6. In the course of this discussion the King commented that he
could understand that the Ambassador might be afraid to press for
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Thailand 341

some of these urgent needs of Thailand for fear of risking criticism in

Washington. I replied that if I ever felt that I was unable or unwilling
to report things from Thailand as I saw them, or make recommenda-
tions according to my best judgment, I would ask to be transferred the
next day. His Majesty said perhaps he had gone too far but he was
again critical of the bureaucratic complications and trials in meeting
what he saw as urgent needs for his country in a deteriorating secu-
rity situation. In the course of this discussion the King, on a number
of occasions, was also sharply critical of the present Thai government,
and armed services.
7. Comment: This was at times an uncomfortable audience, al-
though I was not greatly surprised. I have had a number of lengthy
discussions with His Majesty over recent months, particularly on the
subject of U.S. aid programs and some of his favorite projects for which
he expects prompt and full support. The King’s frustration with his
own government is understandable and may be aggravated by his dis-
satisfaction with his own status in the absence of a constitution. There
are some delays and shortfalls on our part which also can be justifi-
ably criticized. On the other hand, the strong and sometimes even in-
temperate nature of his comments probably arises in part from his lack
of experience with criticism from his own people and limited oppor-
tunities for full and frank discussion with his subjects. I believe he ap-
preciated the effort to convey to him our impressions and conclusions
growing out of the President’s visit to China and while he, and most
other Thais, are very skeptical of seeing an end to Chinese interference
in Thailand’s internal affairs, he probably accepts the usefulness of the
resumption of communication between the PRC and the U.S.
Galbraith
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342 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

156. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security

Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, March 21, 1972.

SUBJECT
Conclusion for Textile Negotiations for Thailand

After a history of frustrating negotiations and discussions marked

by misunderstanding on the part of both sides, we have concluded a
highly successful agreement with Thailand which will result in their
voluntarily restraining the amount of cotton textiles they export to the
U.S. The Thai are extremely satisfied with this agreement as is the
U.S. domestic textile industry. This may be one of the few times in his-
tory that such an unlikely and mutually satisfactory outcome has been
arrived at! For this reason alone, I believe it appropriate to send the
letter at Tab A to Pete Peterson2 complimenting his department and his
negotiator Stanley Nehmer.
There is also another reason for doing so. Commerce will play a
key role in enforcing the textile agreements worked out by David
Kennedy with Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea. Our abil-
ity to delicately and discreetly importune them to be flexible in these
negotiations could be extremely important in foreign policy terms. The
letter, by complimenting Nehmer on his outstanding job in reconciling
foreign policy and domestic interests will be helpful in any future ef-
forts we may make in importuning him to apply a similar measure of
flexibility in the future.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter to Peter Peterson at Tab A.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Sent for action. A
notation on the memorandum in Haig’s handwriting reads: “HAK—this was a result of
earlier HAK–Haig–Kennedy push. AH.”
2
A copy of the letter, signed by Kissinger and dated March 28, is attached but not
printed. In it Kissinger compliments Nehmer and states: “I understand that the Thai are
extremely pleased with the agreement, and that it was also completely acceptable to our
domestic textile industry.”
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Thailand 343

157. Editorial Note

On March 23, 1972, Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green re-

ported to President Nixon on his trip to East Asia, including his talks
with Thai Prime Minister Thanom and other Thai leaders in Bangkok
on March 8, 1972. (See Documents 153 and 154 for reports of Green’s
conversations with Thai leaders.) The meeting was held in the Oval
Office from 4:08 p.m. to 5:02 p.m. The following is an excerpt from the
tape recording of that meeting:
Nixon: “Tell me, now what, what about, did you—Thailand, you
know, give a little deal on that. We have a [unclear].”
Green: “Thailand, the big problem there, of course, is all this in-
surgency going on—”
Nixon: “Right. And they blame the Chinese.”
Green: “And they know the Chinese are involved . . .”
Nixon: “Yeah.”
Green: “How active they are. They’re unable to, perhaps, catalog
it with—”
Nixon: “Were you able to have a private talk with Thanom or . . .”?
Green: “Thanom? No, because he was a monk and that was a holy
day. I wanted to. I tried to, but I couldn’t make contact with him.”
Nixon: “I understand, but on the other hand who’d you see”?
Green: “I know it’s a big problem, though, because I talked with
Thanom. Boy, this I talked with Praphat, and Dawee—”
Haig: [unclear]
Green: “You haven’t had touch with [unclear]”?
Nixon: “Foreign Service [unclear]”
Green: “And then I [unclear exchange].”
Nixon: “I know some of them. I know those others, the old hands,
like [unclear].”
Green: “Mr. President, when I left town they made a very favor-
able statement. The Government of Thailand made a very favorable
statement. The reports we’ve had out of our Embassy have all been
favorable as a follow up. Now they would say, ‘Well, the Chinese say
they believe in these five principles but we know damn well they
don’t.’ And I said, ‘Well, we’re not saying that we think they’ve re-
formed but now we have at least mutually accepted standards to hold
them by.’ ”
Nixon: “Well look, you could—I interrupt—I know, too, you prob-
ably assured them that you know Nixon and—”
Green: “Yeah.”
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344 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Nixon: “—he’s not one that stands by.”

Green: “That’s right, I know it’s [unclear]”
Green: “Yeah, I told him what we’re dealing with and [unclear]
President Nixon. He’s been around. There’s no President that’s come
into office here who’s had more background in foreign affairs. He’s not
being difficult. He’s practical, and his approach to this problem is, as
a matter of fact, to the extent that we can make progress [unclear].”
Nixon: “Sure. The world would be a hell of a lot safer out there
for those people if we had some stroke with China rather than if we
had to have our stroke against them. That’s my opinion.”
Nixon: “Suppose that we just—suppose the Chinese thing made
a run at Thailand. And suppose the Thais said, ‘Look, we have a treaty
with you.’ Do you see an American President going down to the Con-
gress and saying, ‘We’re going to declare war on China to keep our
treaty commitments with Thailand?’ Huh? We’ve got to let them think
that. I mean we can’t say that our treaty commitments are not going
to be kept, and the Chinese better think they’re gonna be kept. But the
practical problem, that’s what we’ve got to face, is that at the present
time, except for Western Europe there are damn few places where you
would get support. You wouldn’t even get it now on Israel. Not today.”
Haig: “That’s right.”
Nixon: “And then influence them, try to ameliorate their aggres-
siveness.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White
House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Green, Haig,
and Holdridge, March 23, 1972, 4:08–5:02 p.m., Oval Office, Conversa-
tion No. 692–3) The editor transcribed the portions of this conversa-
tion specifically for this volume.
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158. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador to Thailand
(Unger)1

Washington, April 4, 1972.

Dear Len:
This letter is in reply to your telegram 45522 on the subject of Thai
interest in the US–PRC discussions.
I think that about all we can tell the Thai, even privately, is some-
thing along the following lines—which you can attribute to me if you
wish: “We expect that the Ambassadorial talks in Paris will move rather
slowly. They will be dealing with bilateral matters, centering on
US–PRC trade and on travel between the two countries. If there is any-
thing of interest to the Thai we will keep them informed.”
For your information only, we are working out with PRC Ambas-
sador Huang the ground rules for the discussions, and we hope to get
agreement or at least acquiescence that we will keep some friendly
countries informed in general terms of the progress of the talks, on a
confidential basis. Until the PRC has reacted to this suggestion, I am
reluctant to go farther than the above in promising to inform the Thai
or any other friends.
With warm regards,
Sincerely,
Marshall Green3

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Marshall Green Files: Lot 74 D 471, Box 13826,
Department Correspondence, April 1972 Folder. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.
Drafted by Hummel.
2
Telegram 4552 from Bangkok, April 1, reported Asa Sarasin’s request that the RTG
“be kept informed of developments in continuing U.S.–PRC talks, such as those being
conducted in Paris. Asa recalled that Chairman Thanom had mentioned to Marshall
Green during his recent visit Thailand’s concern about Chinese support for the in-
surgency in Thailand (see Document 153) implying that the Thai may at some point
ask that that be raised in U.S.–PRC discussions.” (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL
CHICOM–US)
3
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
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346 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Thailand1

Washington, April 6, 1972, 0003Z.

58624. For Ambassador.

1. We believe it is important for you to give Thai leadership an
authoritative impression of the President’s view of the current situa-
tion in South Viet-Nam and the United States response to that situa-
tion. We wish you to seek appointment with Thanom, Praphat, and
such others of Thai leadership whom you may consider appropriate to
give them that impression as soon as possible.2
2. You may tell them that we regard this North Vietnamese at-
tack as a clear-cut invasion across the DMZ, in which they have thrown
away any pretense of “people’s war” tactics. Because they have com-
mitted their forces so heavily, we assume this is an all-out effort to
discredit Vietnamization, to demoralize both the Vietnamese and the
U.S. public, and to create a favorable military position from which
they will hope to dictate favorable peace terms. We take this threat
seriously, but we regard it as vulnerable on both political and military
grounds.
3. From our initial assessments, we believe the South Vietnamese
forces are reacting with confidence and with an effective plan to con-
tain this initial thrust, while positioning themselves for additional at-
tacks which they expect elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. Their civilian
services are coping with the refugee flow and the other disruptions re-
sulting from this attack.
4. President Nixon is determined that the North Vietnamese plan
shall not succeed. He has already ordered a significant reinforcement
of U.S. air and naval forces in the area. He is reviewing the situation
carefully to determine what other actions may be necessary.
5. You may inform the Thai leaders that we appreciate the stead-
fast attitude they have displayed in the face of this threat to our com-
mon interests. You should express particular appreciation for their

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by Kissinger, Rush, and Robert M. Miller
(S/S), and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Saigon.
2
Telegram 4792 from Bangkok, April 6, reported that Unger met with Thanom,
Praphat, and Dawee that day to deliver the message from the President. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 347

rapid and favorable responses to our requests for deployment of ad-

ditional U.S. forces in Thailand.3
6. FYI: The President has just approved a recommendation for the
deployment of additional U.S. air units (fighter-bombers) from the con-
tinental United States to Thai bases. You should not mention this fact
to the Thai leaders but should stay in close touch with U.S. military
authorities in anticipation of such action. End FYI.
7. We would welcome any views Thai leaders wish to express and
will hope to continue consultations with them as the military action
develops.

3
In the WSAG meeting of April 10, called in response to the North Vietnamese
attack, Admiral Moorer stated that the United States had “all types of aircraft in Thai-
land—tankers, B–52s, F–104s and F–105s.” CIA Director Richard Helms then called
Thailand “the seventh carrier.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC In-
stitutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972)

160. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T.

Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, April 6, 1972.

SUBJECT
Performance of Thai Irregulars

Previously the performance of the Thai irregulars in Laos has been

spotty.2 But recent reports from [less than 1 line of source text not declas-
sified] Ambassador Godley [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
in Vientiane indicate marked improvement. A recent [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] report recounts a series of incidents in the
Sam Thong–Long Tieng area during 18–30 March in which the Thai
fought with courage and determination, often in hand-to-hand combat

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2
For a previous discussion of the performance of the Thai irregulars in Laos, see
Document 147.
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348 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

with NVA infantry. They have withstood almost constant artillery and
mortar bombardment and have destroyed four enemy tanks, one with
grenades and small arms after it penetrated their perimeter.
The recent, excellent Thai performance probably results from their
year of combat experience and a growing confidence that they can
stand up to the best NVA units. If it continues, this improvement could
prove most significant for events in both Laos and Thailand, for many
of these men will return to the Royal Thai Army.

161. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and

Burma (Bergesen) to the Staff Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Westmore)1

Washington, April 10, 1972.

SUBJECT
Developments in U.S. Relationships with Thailand (and Burma)

Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT)

On March 13 and 14 our Mission in Bangkok completed an ex-
change of letters with the Thai on the military elements of the Addi-
tional Assistance to Thailand agreement. General Evans, (COMUS-
MACTHAI), and Air Chief Marshal Dawee were the signatories. A PL
480 agreement was signed with the Thai on March 17 as part of the
AAT package. It provides for $14 million in tobacco and wheat during
CY 1972–73. Negotiations continue on a supplement to provide an ad-
ditional $16 million in cotton. The Thai asked that the agreement be
split in this fashion to give them additional time to bring their cotton
producers and textile manufacturers into the picture.
Thai Textile Agreement Concluded
On March 16 we signed a five-year cotton textile bilateral agree-
ment with Thailand permitting an aggregate annual level of exports to
the U.S. of 15 million square yards. Shortly thereafter the embargoed
Thai nightwear was released without being charged to the new Thai
quota. All involved were pleased and relieved.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Exdis.
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Thailand 349

Residual Thai Forces

On February 4, the last major Thai combat forces were withdrawn
from the RVN. By the end of April the Thai intend to pull out the re-
maining few men (some headquarters and LST personnel) of the
RTAFV. A contingent of about 35 men will be sent as members of the
Royal Thai Armed Forces Representation—Vietnam (RTAFRV). We are
arranging to provide some minimal support for this Thai representa-
tional group for one year only (FY 73).
[Omitted here is discussion of Burma.]

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, April 25, 1972, 0934Z.

5703. Subj: Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel’s Call on Field

Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
1. Deputy Asst Secy Arthur W. Hummel on April 24 paid ap-
proximately a one-hour call on Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn ac-
companied by Ambassador Unger and FSO Colebaugh. Air Chief Mar-
shal Dawee Chullasapya, who interpreted for Thanom, and Under Secy
of State for Foreign Affairs Charunphan Isarangkun were also present.
2. After initial formalities Deputy Asst Secy Hummel expressed
the USG’s great appreciation for cooperation of RTG in the deployment
to Thailand of additional US forces to meet increased threat in Viet-
nam War. Amb Unger noted that there has been an increase to about
33,300 men or 1100 over the ceiling. He described the increase as tem-
porary though of unknown duration.
3. In response to a question from Dep Asst Secy Hummel, Thanom
stated that the insurgency in Thailand is “under control.” Thanom
noted increased government activity against the CT’s and said that the
recent Phu Kwang operation was possible due to increased funds avail-
able to the RTG through expanded US assistance.2 He also confirmed

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 EA. Secret; Limdis.
2
See the March 24 memorandum of conversation for further detail concerning the
Thai insurgency. Thanom noted that the Phu Kwang 10-day operation cost approximately
4 million baht and that a number of Communist insurgent camps had been captured in
the North. Thanom mentioned that several CT camps had been captured in the South.
He also claimed that public opinion had turned against the Communists there. Finally,
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350 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

plans for increased coordination of civilians and police with military

and unified command of operations, and mentioned more and better
use of VDS–VSDU.
4. Thanom repeated a comment previously made to the press that
NVN was extremely lucky to be supported by both the USSR and Red
China who seemed to be competing with each other in their support
of the North Vietnamese. He observed that without hesitation these
two powers are “pouring” supplies into the north.
5. Dep Asst Secy Hummel raised the problem of narcotics traf-
ficking and said the USG is interested in cooperating with the RTG in
suppressing such trafficking. He particularly noted the recent well-
publicized burning of 26 tons of opium and said this act has gone a
long way in stilling criticisms of Thai efforts. Thanom said the RTG is
sincerely trying to control drug trafficking and has been cooperating
with the US and the UN. Dawee observed that harsher penalties for
drug traffickers are in the works.
6. Thanom said he has received reports suggesting the Red Chi-
nese are actively involved in drug trafficking. Dept Asst Secy Hummel
expressed US interest in receiving any evidence of such involvement,
but told Thanom that the US has never found hard evidence to sup-
port this.
7. The Amb also specifically raised with Thanom the drug prob-
lem at International School Bangkok, noting the considerable increase
in the use of heroin among students at the school. He mentioned the
great concern felt by everyone in the US community over this prob-
lem. Amb Unger said that he would act rapidly in all cases which came
to his attention and that some people have already been returned to
the US. Thanom said the drugs are being introduced not by young peo-
ple but the older persons, also citing US and European “hippies” who
travel here as tourists. He said he is considering banning such persons
from entering Thailand. The Amb again noted that the USG appreci-
ates the help that has been given so far, but said he would like to re-
quest special help from the police in cleaning up the sources of these
drugs.
8. The Amb also told Thanom he has received a copy of an anony-
mous letter addressed to General Praphat Charusathien alleging in-

“Thanom mentioned the problem of the North Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast.
He said there are some 30,000 Vietnamese who could fight against Thailand and said an
estimated 12,000 are ‘real Communist.’ When asked if there was evidence to support an
active role by the North Vietnamese refugees in the insurgency, Thanom listed several
examples of North Vietnamese fund-gathering efforts. Ambassador Unger observed that
while there is ample evidence of their fund-gathering activities he was aware of little ev-
idence the Vietnamese refugees are actively engaged in the insurgency against Thailand.”
(Ibid., POL 23 THAI)
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Thailand 351

volvement in narcotics trafficking and corruption by police. Thanom

acknowledged receipt of the letter3 and said he had already talked
about it with police DG General Prasert.
9. Dep Asst Secy Hummel asked about plans to promulgate a con-
stitution and form a cabinet. Thanom observed that the problems which
had brought about the November 17 coup have not yet been solved.
In this regard, he specifically noted the need for governmental reor-
ganization and security. Thanom said the NEC is working to solve these
problems before returning to constitutional rule “so we will not have
to have a coup again.” Thanom said the governmental reorganization
will be the subject of discussion at the NEC meeting scheduled for April
25. He noted that continuation of these problems does not mean that there
will be a wait of “20 years” before returning to constitutional govern-
ment, but he declined to predict exactly when the change may take place.
Unger

3
[text not declassified] telegram 29786 from Bangkok, dated April 4, reported the
Embassy’s suspicions of drug corruption concerning Police Colonel Pramuan
Wanikaphan and described its efforts to “neutralize” him through a fabricated accusa-
tory letter to Praphat, Thanom, the American Embassy, and others, ostensibly written
by an anonymous victim of Colonel Pramuan’s extortion. This plan evidently was put
into effect. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand 1972–1975)

163. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, May 12, 1972, 1201Z.

6616. Ref: State 0829692 and 082970.3

1. I am profoundly concerned about Jack Anderson “revelations”
reported in reftels. Earlier stories based on charges by Congressman
Wolff and others have been unfortunate but we have at least been in

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confi-
dential; Immediate; Limdis.
2
Telegram 82969 to Bangkok, May 11, reported Anderson staffer Whitten’s report
that he had documents that indicated Operation Phu Kwang was jointly planned by U.S.
and Thai Governments, failed despite commitment of “crack” first division, and that
General Evans had gone to Unger conveying Thai request for B–52 strikes to support
RTA operations but that Ambassador had “wisely” declined. (Ibid.)
3
Telegram 82970 to Bangkok, May 11, reported Anderson’s allegations that some
top Thai Government leaders were involved in drug trafficking and corruption. (Ibid.)
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352 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

a position to present our side of the story as I recently did in a public

release with regard to narcotics (Bangkok 6400). While Thai Govt was
and continues to be deeply disturbed about press and Congressional
accusations and finds it hard to make distinctions between Congress
and administration, nevertheless we have managed thus far to avoid
serious damage to our working relations.
2. New “revelations”, however, appear to be unmistakably attrib-
utable to Executive Branch documents or conversations with Executive
branch personnel privy to this and other missions’ reporting on events
and conversations in Thailand. I realize that this should come as no
surprise to me since apparently Jack Anderson has access to whatever
he wants in Washington today. I hope, however, Department appreci-
ates what impact of coming stories likely to be on our relations here
and on our capacity to influence RTG actions and programs and to se-
cure RTG acquiescence or cooperation in programs essential to us.
3. I also question whether, given Anderson’s motivations and
mode of operation, we can afford to seem to be acknowledging “rumors
implicating high Thai officials” and to be asking for substantiation. Ac-
tually, some months ago I asked all elements of this mission to give high
priority to investigating rumors that top Thai leaders were involved in
narcotics traffic. No evidence has come to light implicating any one at
the NEC level. We are continuing to collect evidence on lower level4 in-
volvement but even here we lack much firm information.
4. I hope Whitten was given facts to put Anderson “information”
on narcotics in perspective and also effort was made to persuade Whit-
ten that “revelations”, particularly if they seem to be attributable to
U.S. intelligence agencies and U.S. missions abroad, are virtually cer-
tain to jeopardize working relations laboriously developed with RTG
and which are only means we have to bring about effective control of
narcotics traffic.
5. “Revelations” about Phu Kwang, including judgments about
Thai performance, snide comments about Praphat, reference to inter-
nal Mission discussions about B–52s and CS which have been contained
for the most part in Secret or Top Secret, Nodis or Exdis messages will
persuade Thais against any possible effort on our part to dissuade them
that their conversations with us and the confidential information they
provide us about their own situation and actions are available to the
press. It will also convince them that this Mission holds views of such
a critical and unfriendly nature that frank and friendly relations char-
acteristic of our past association will be hard, if not impossible, to con-
tinue. Consequences of this when we are daily asking RTG for new fa-
vors and privileges should be clear to anyone.

4
See Document 162 and footnote 3 thereto.
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Thailand 353

6. Action requested:
A. Explain to Whitten, and if necessary to Jack Anderson, the sit-
uation regarding the narcotics traffic and that the Thai, in cooperation
with us, are taking steps to restrict that traffic; that we have no infor-
mation on the alleged atrocities in para 2 of State 082969; that the U.S.
did not help plan Phu Kwang; that CS is a normal MAP item; and that
this operation, despite its problems, has its positive side.
B. Keep out of the hands and away from the ears of the U.S. press
sensitive communications from this Mission.
Unger

164. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in

Japan1

Bangkok, May 13, 1972, 1005Z.

6634. VP Only. For The Vice President From Unger. Subject:

Thai-U.S. Relations and Your Visit to Bangkok. This message provides
background on current Thai-U.S. relations and, where needed, talking
points for use in your discussions with the Thai leadership.
1. Vietnam
Background
A. Thai leaders fully support the measures taken by the President
to meet the crisis created by the North Vietnamese invasion. They have
shown this through public and private statements as well as their readi-
ness to open their bases to our USAF buildup.
B. The Thai remain extremely concerned about the current mili-
tary situation in South Vietnam. They see the future independence of
Laos and Cambodia hanging in the balance along with that of South
Vietnam. Thus they know their own security will be deeply affected
by the outcome of the present campaign.
C. Thai leaders have readily accommodated our urgent needs for
redeployment of U.S. forces to Thailand despite their full realization of
the risks involved as public attention progressively shifts from RVN to
Thailand as the major base for U.S. combat activities in Southeast Asia.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Immediate; Exdis; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State.
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354 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

They recognize the increased danger of retaliatory attack against Thai

bases. The redeployment also has created an increased sense of the U.S.
commitment to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, includ-
ing continued air support for the defending forces in Indochina. Further,
it has heightened Thai expectations of military and economic assistance.
D. Thai realization of their increased exposure will also heighten
the bitterness of their reaction if we make concessions at the negotiat-
ing table which they regard as inconsistent with their own basic secu-
rity requirements. They have repeatedly asked to be consulted by us
before fundamental changes are made on our negotiating position.
These requests have been transmitted to the President. Since the Pres-
ident’s speech of May 8, they have sought clarification particularly on
our stance concerning a ceasefire, i.e. whether we are now prepared to
accept continued North Vietnamese presence in Laos, Cambodia and
South Vietnam.
E. Talking Point: It would be particularly useful if you could dis-
cuss with RTG our negotiating posture in light of the President’s offer
of May 8 especially clarification of the ceasefire offer. The Thai will also
deeply appreciate whatever assessment you feel able to give them of
the current military situation in SVN and of our program of severing
NVN’s supply line.
2. U.S. Military Deployments to Thailand
Background
A. In 1970–71 we reduced U.S. military forces in Thailand from a
peak of 48,000 to a U.S./RTG agreed level of 32,200. Eighty percent of
these were USAF units engaged in the air war in Indochina. Major com-
bat units operating from five Thai bases (Utapao, Korat, Udorn, Ubon
and Nakhon Phanom) included one SAC wing (B–52’s and tankers),
eleven tactical fighter squadrons, mainly F–4s, and gunships, as well
as support aircraft of many types.
B. Recent large USAF deployments associated with developments
in Vietnam increased our in-country strength to approximately 40,000
and required the reopening of a sixth base (Takhli) which we previ-
ously turned back to the Thai Air Force. In the course of these de-
ployments we added nine B–52’s (making a total of 50) and nine F–4
squadrons as well as many tankers. Additional aircraft may be moved
from Danang to Thailand. This would require a buildup at a new op-
erating location and could add as many as 4,000 additional U.S. per-
sonnel to Thailand.
C. Talking Point: Express the administration’s appreciation for all
the Thai have done and are continuing to do in furthering our mutual
interests in Indochina. Recognize the RTG’s immediate approval of the
large U.S. air buildup in Thailand required as a response to increased
enemy initiatives throughout Southeast Asia.
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Thailand 355

3. U.S. Politics and the U.S. Commitment

Talking Point: They will want your appraisal of the current polit-
ical situation in the United States, both in terms of the Congress and
the forthcoming election, and its implications for our continuing abil-
ity to carry out a foreign policy of collective security in Southeast Asia.
4. U.S. Military Assistance to Thailand
Background
A. U.S. service-funded military assistance to Thailand, including
special supplements, have averaged $72 million a year since FY–68.
The FY–72 level (provisional) is $83.5 million. This includes a $15 mil-
lion grant to enable the Thai to improve its counterinsurgency capa-
bility in the military services, and be prepared for contingencies. In
FY–73 military assistance to Thailand will shift from MASF to MAP,
funded by security assistance legislation, and thus particularly vul-
nerable to scrutiny in the Senate and by the SFRC.
B. U.S. military assistance was used in earlier years to equip a gen-
eral purpose, conventional military force. Force modernization contin-
ues to be a program goal. More attention is now being given to devel-
oping forces adapted to the carrying out of counterinsurgency
operations, including providing relevant equipment such as M–16 ri-
fles and helicopters, and converter sets for gunships.
C. Thai leaders have fully endorsed the Nixon Doctrine and have
accepted the principle that U.S. forces should not become involved in
Thailand’s security problem. They have been encouraged to expect that
the U.S. will continue MAP at or near present levels. In January 1971,
Secretary of Defense Laird stated in Bangkok that under the Nixon Doc-
trine the level of U.S. military assistance to Thailand would remain the
same or even increase.
D. Talking Point: Thai leaders are likely to seek assurances of con-
tinued military assistance and may point especially to requirements for
helicopters. In responding, you should assure Thais that we will be as
responsive as possible to their requirements, but take care not to raise
their expectations for specific dollar-levels of MAP. As to specific items,
such as helicopters, we will consider these in context of Thai needs and
capabilities to operate and support; we do in fact expect to deliver to
the RTA this calendar year 32 Hueys (UH–IM) and two to the RTAF.
5. Economic Assistance Program
Background
A. U.S. economic aid to Thailand declined steadily from a peak
of $54 million in 1967 to $23 million in FY–1971. This fiscal year obli-
gations will total approximately $17 million in aid funds plus $14 mil-
lion from PL–480. Our program emphasizes support of RTG coun-
terinsurgency activities, but includes assistance aimed at some of
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356 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Thailand’s longer term economic problems, particularly in the agri-

cultural area. The $14 million of PL–480 assistance is the first part of a
$30 million loan which is aimed at preventing the increased RTG se-
curity expenditurs from threatening development programs.
B. Talking Point: Thai leaders may ask for assurance on future aid
levels. Suggest you respond that the President places great importance
on continuing to provide needed assistance to countries which are en-
deavoring to meet their own development and security needs. We have
requested from Congress, and expect to receive, funding that will per-
mit programs in Thailand to continue at the present level.
6. Insurgency
Background
A. Communist-directed insurgency in Thailand has continued
growing in past year despite increased RTG efforts to deal with it. Num-
ber of main force insurgents rose about 20 percent last year to estimated
7,000. There has also been considerable improvement in quantity and
quality of their weapons supplied primarily by Chinese through Laos.
Most disturbing has been expansion of Communist political infrastruc-
ture in villages. Total number of incidents, including those initiated by
RTG forces, increased to 3,500 in 1971, up about 50 percent from 1970. In
1971 1,481 Thai officials were killed or seriously wounded fighting the
insurgency. This is double the figure for the previous year.
B. RTG has responded by putting more troops into counterinsur-
gency operations in field along with police and civilian paramilitary
forces. It has also increased its defense budget this fiscal year and next
by a total of about $20 million as part of a U.S.-Thai cooperative pro-
gram to improve RTG capability to counter its insurgent threat. Main
problem areas, which were highlighted in recent major CI operations,
involve coordination among different organizations engaged in CI ac-
tivity and effective implementation in field of well-conceived CI plans.
Small unit training and leadership leave much to be desired. Our as-
sistance to the police is a major element in our economic aid program.
C. Talking Points: Inquire about progress of the insurgency and
RTG countermeasures. Encourage Thais to meet insurgency threat now
before it becomes more difficult to handle. To any inquiry on assistance
levels for Thai police, suggest you respond that you understand police
presently have under consideration our proposal for a comprehensive
program which reflects our best estimate of what is needed. This pro-
vides opportunity for RTG to register desire for helicopters if these are
considered to be a priority need. Considering the dangers of a ground
attack on U.S. Air Force elements stationed on Thai bases and engaged
in the Vietnam War, you may wish to express appreciation for RTG co-
operative efforts thus far, and suggest that even greater defensive pa-
trolling and intelligence collection now by Thai civilian, police and mil-
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Thailand 357

itary components would be helpful. (Thai forces are responsible for

protection “outside the wire” of USAF assets.)
7. Narcotics
A. We have made a major effort to improve the suppression ef-
fort against the illicit narcotics traffic through Thailand over the past
year. The Thai leadership has been forthcoming in statements and ac-
tions concerning the problem. We negotiated a memorandum of un-
derstanding on the subject in September 1971 and we have under way
a number of programs aimed at increasing enforcement capability of
the RTG. Our main problem in implementing the programs lies in the
fact that the Thai view narcotics as essentially a U.S. problem and that
top-level RTG undertakings have not always been translated info firm
orders down the line.
B. Major results thus far include creating a special mobile task force
in Northern Thailand, and RTG cooperation in breaking a number of ma-
jor links in the narcotics traffic. The RTG also acquired (and destroyed)
26 tons of opium from Chinese Irregular Forces (former KMI) in return
for offering land on which the Chinese can settle permanently. The RTG
also extracted a promise by the Chinese Irregulars to end their involve-
ment in illicit narcotics traffic, an agreement which the RTG will moni-
tor. Although the fact is highly sensitive and not publicized the RTG
arrangement with the CIF was partially financed from aid funds.
C. Criticism of the Thai narcotics suppression effort such as that
voiced by Congressman Lester Wolff, and that presented in the NBC
television special “The Thai Connection,” is widely publicized here and
creates a good deal of resentment. We have explained publicly that we
do not agree with those charges and appreciate RTG cooperation.
D. Talking Point: Express appreciation for Thai cooperation and
for their increased efforts to suppress narcotics traffic. At the same time,
you should stress to them that only improved performance will really
answer the inevitable critics, just as in our handling of the problem in
the U.S.
8. Laos
Background
A. For years, Thai military units have played a key role in the de-
fense of Laos, especially Gen. Vang Pao’s stronghold at Long Tieng south-
west of the Plaine des Jarres. A total of 22 Thai volunteer battalions
(funded by the U.S.) are currently committed in Laos. Their support was
crucial during the heavy dry season offensive launched by the Com-
munists just before Christmas. Only the combination of Thai volunteer
units and U.S. Air Force support (including the B–52’s) permitted the
friendly forces to survive and hold key positions such as Long Tieng un-
der heavy enemy attacks earlier this year. The intensity of the DRV fo-
cus on the offensive in South Vietnam has eased the situation in Laos.
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358 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

165. Telegram From Vice President Agnew to the Department of

State1

Bangkok, May 18, 1972.

Vipto 31. Subj: Memorandum of Conversation: Vice President’s

Meeting with Chairman Thanom and NEC Leaders, May 17, 1972.
Participants:
US—The Vice President, Ambassador Unger, Mr. Sohmer, General
Dunn, Mr. Reynders, Mr. Masters, Maj. Gen. Evans, Mr. Pickering.
Thai—Chairman Thanom, Deputy Chairman Praphat, Assistant
Chairman Pote, Supreme Command Chief of Staff Dawee, Supreme
Command Deputy Chief of Staff Kriangsak, Army Chief of Staff
Surakit, Under Secretary Charoonphand, MFA America Division Chief
Thep Diskul, MFA Southeast Asia Division Chief Asa Sarasin.
Time: 3:00–4:30 p.m.
Place: National Security Council Headquarters.
[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, and Cambodia.]
16. Thanom referred to Moose–Lowenstein report and its refer-
ences to Thai volunteers. He asked VP what effect this report would
have on Thai/U.S. relations. VP said he was not too worried about this.
Today’s Senate vote will cool somewhat ardor of dovish elements in
Congress. President is firmly committed to a course of action in SEA
and will do whatever necessary to see it through. Thanom said he con-
cerned because RTG has consistently maintained that, while it trains
Lao forces in Thailand, only volunteers from Thailand serve in Lao
forces. RTG concerned reports such as this will give impression that
RTA forces are or will serve in Laos. VP said some elements of the press
have behaved irresponsibly but public opinion surge he had described
will discredit to some extent this kind of sniping. However, we must
not expect a cessation of anti-war activism in U.S.
17. On VP’s invitation to discuss priority matters to be conveyed
to President Nixon, Thanom said insurgency situation in North, North-
east, and South is worsening. RTG is taking measures to suppress
insurgency and frustrate enemy’s effort to win over the people, but
continued U.S. assistance is needed. Dawee said priority needs are

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Visit
of Agnew to Asia. Secret; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Printed
from a copy with no transmittal time; a handwritten notation at the top of page 1 reads
“CINCPAC # 1822212 May 72,” and later telegrams reference this number. However, no
copy of CINCPAC 1822212 has been found.
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Thailand 359

additional communications equipment, helicopters, and wheeled ar-

mored vehicles. Often Government forces know where enemy forces
are but cannot get to them before they disappear. Government forces
often encounter land-mines. More helicopters and armored vehicles
would allow RTG forces to do better job and also boost their morale.
VP said President Nixon pleased with recent RTG action to suppress
insurgency. He would convey request for equipment.
18. On narcotics question, Thanom said Thai are deeply upset that
Congressman Wolff is calling Thailand the center of opium trade and
belittling its suppression effort. Recent NBC T.V. program used picture
of Deputy Chairman Prapass to imply he involved in opium traffic.
Thais very concerned about this. Drugs destroy lives of Thai youth too,
and they wish to eradicate this menace. William A. Wanzeck and Jack
Greene of BNDD being considered for Thai decorations for their role
in suppression activities. Allegations that Thais not cooperating com-
pletely untrue as record of seizures and destruction of opium show.
Thanom asked VP to make statement reassuring U.S. public on Thai
effort. General Praphat made several interjections during presentation,
obviously intent that VP understand seriousness with which Thais
view subject. VP said President Nixon fully aware of Thai cooperation
in this field, had asked VP to convey appreciation for efforts of Thai
leaders. Some politicians use this kind of attack as personal launching
pad, and media sometimes unfortunately support such efforts, as in
case of misleading documentary on Thailand. VP assured Thais such
criticism does not square with prevalent U.S. view of Thailand, per-
sonally regretted incident and expressed willingness to state support
for Thais on this subject.
19. Thanom said Thailand is taking strong actions to eliminate
opium traffic. Some of those caught have been executed. RTG has pro-
gram to help hill tribes shift from opium to other crops. VP again gave
recognition to Thai efforts, and said he knew Wolff had tried to show
that his recent intervention had produced programs which in fact are
result of long-standing cooperative effort.
20. Thanom asked VP to convey to President Nixon hope that
President will continue vigorous and determined policies in SEA which
are so important to morale of small countries making an effort to main-
tain their independence and freedom. Thailand will continue to defend
its independence against communist attack, but needs military assist-
ance in form of equipment from U.S. Enemy is equipped with foreign
armaments, and as a developing country Thailand cannot afford equip-
ment needed to match enemy. Thailand wants to avoid being caught
short, as was GVN with NVN’s 130 mm artillery.
21. VP promised to convey this message to President, added he
will get information from Ambassador Unger to help refute false
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360 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

charges concerning narcotics. VP expressed thanks to Thais for speak-

ing frankly on all issues as friends can and should do.
22. Thanom again thanked VP for visit, and President, VP and Sec-
retary Rogers for their understanding of Thai problems. He hoped Pres-
ident will appreciate that Thailand asks for assistance only because it
truly and urgently needed. VP agreed to convey this message, said U.S.
has no more dependable friend in Asia than Thailand.
Agnew

166. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, May 24, 1972, 10:05–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Major Gen. Alexander M. Haig
State CIA
U. Alexis Johnson Richard Helms
William Sullivan George Carver
DOD [name not declassified] (only stayed for
Kenneth Rush Mr. Helms’ briefing)
Armistead Selden NSC Staff
Major Gen. David Ott Richard T. Kennedy
JCS John H. Holdridge
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer Mark Wandler
Capt. Kinnaird McKee

[Omitted here is the Summary of Conclusions and Discussion of

Vietnam.]
Gen. Haig: Let’s turn now to the problem of putting more B–52s
into Thailand. We all realize this is a big problem.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive.
The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
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Thailand 361

Mr. Johnson: Yes, it is. I would like to have a good discussion of

it here today. Tom [Moorer]2 and I spoke about it yesterday. (to Gen.
Haig) Have you seen the cables from Unger?3
Gen. Haig: Yes.
Mr. Johnson: The first thing to consider is the physical problem—
just getting space for the planes. Then we have the problem of the po-
litical approach to the Thai. We’ve been nibbling away at the Thai on
a piecemeal basis. Unger feels, and rightly so, I think, that when he
makes his next approach to them, they will ask us what our plans are.
They will want to know how much more we plan to send to Thailand.
Also, Unger feels the Thai will want to have some sort of a dis-
cussion about our strategy and our thoughts for the future concerning
Southeast Asia. As you know, we have not given anything along this
line to Unger to pass on to the Thai.
On the physical side, we have had quite a few exchanges. Another
cable came in from Len [Unger]4 this morning. The major question is
how many more B–52s—if any—have to go to U Tapao? All other ques-
tions, it seems to me, flow from that.
Concerning personnel, we are fast approaching the point where we
may have as many, if not more, people in Thailand than in Vietnam.
Adm. Moorer: And bear in mind, too, that we will have to start
moving out of Danang if we want to withdraw the 196th Brigade—
and meet the 49,000 ceiling.
Mr. Johnson: To the degree that it appears to the Thai that we are
choking their facilities in order to maintain the Vietnam ceiling, they
will not be receptive. This is a major problem which we have to face
up to.
When we go back to Unger, I would like to have a full package
for him, together with a rationale which he can present to the Thai. I’ve
done the first draft of such a message, I think we should all take a look
at it. If Unger can go to the Thai with this kind of a package and a ra-
tionale, he will be able to make an effective approach. If we keep go-
ing in piecemeal, though, the Thai will probably get their backs up.
Mr. Rush: I agree.
Mr. Johnson: The approach I outlined is what we have in mind.
Adm. Moorer: Unger says: “In my judgment, we are reaching the
point where the tactical advantages of securing additional temporary

2
Brackets in the source text.
3
Telegram 7207 from Bangkok, May 23, and previous. (Ibid., Box H–088, WSAG
Meeting, Vietnam, 7/24/72)
4
Brackets in the source text.
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362 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

aircraft accommodations in Thailand will be clearly outweighed by po-

litical liabilities of pushing the Thai too far. Accordingly, we must es-
tablish some clear limits beyond which we will not go in our deploy-
ment requests.”
When we move out of Danang, we will put even more aircraft into
Thailand. We’ve already started preparing Nam Phong for the Marines.
Mr. Johnson: I was speaking to Bangkok on the telephone earlier
today, and I was told that the Thai don’t want any public statement
about the opening of Nam Phong.
Adm. Moorer: That’s all right. Incidentally, when the F–4s go there,
we will need more tankers for them because they will have greater dis-
tances to fly. This is entirely separate from the B–52 problem, too.
While we’re speaking about problems, I might mention the bomb
problem. Quite naturally, our bomb expenditure has greatly increased
as the B–52 force has been augmented. If we send more planes, the ex-
penditure will obviously go up even more, too. In order to solve this
problem, we must surge with bomb production. With 235 B–52s and
all the Tac Air we have out there, we could very easily run out of bombs.
We are dropping the bombs faster than we make them.
Mr. Rush: What about our worldwide inventory? Can we take
some bombs from that?
Adm. Moorer: We are already drawing down the European in-
ventory. However, if we step up production, we should be able to stop
the drawdown and hold our own by January. The forthcoming rainy
season in Vietnam will have some effect in cutting down the bomb ex-
penditure because the planes won’t be able to fly as many missions as
they are flying now. Still, we have to take some drastic actions with re-
gard to bomb production. The B–52s pour out the bombs by the hun-
dreds of thousands of tons.
The first question that has to be decided is whether the President
wants to add thirty-four more B–52s—to get the one hundred he recently
ordered?5 Or, will he be satisfied with the sixty-six additional B–52s?
Gen. Haig: I wouldn’t worry about the President being wed to the
figure of one hundred additional B–52s. He wanted a dramatic step-
up in the number of B–52s, and we have done that.
Adm. Moorer: If he will be satisfied with the sixty-six B–52s, the
only problem we will have is getting the additional tankers in Thailand.6

5
According to the minutes of the May 30 WSAG meeting, Haig stated that “we
got an okay to hold to the sixty-six additional B–52s for Guam.” (Ibid., Box H–116, WSAG
Minutes, Originals, 1/3/72–7/24/72)
6
According to the minutes of the June 1 WSAG meeting, Moorer stated that every-
thing was “ready to go” with the tankers in Thailand, including 46 for U Tapao, 20 for
Takhli, and 13 for Don Muang, “most of which are already in place.” (Ibid.)
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Thailand 363

These tankers will be needed for the F–4s coming out of Danang, and
I think we can arrange it with the Thai. They have already agreed to
the transfer of the Marine F–4s from Danang.
Mr. Johnson: The Thai have also agreed to the reopening of Takhli,
but they have not agreed about Korat.
Adm. Moorer: We plan to leave one alert squadron in Danang be-
cause we feel we can accept the hazard of keeping one squadron there
after the 196th Brigade leaves. Abe, as you know, wants to pull the
brigade out in order to get down to the 49,000 ceiling.
If the President wants the one hundred additional B–52s—that
means thirty-four more than we are planning to send right now—we
will have a big problem. We will have to force the Thai into agreeing
that the tankers now at U Tapao should be moved to Don Muang.
Mr. Johnson: It will mean in effect that we have taken over Don
Muang. We would have to close the second runway on the military
side of the field and use it for parking space. And if we put forty-six
KC–135 tankers into Don Muang, that will displace the Thai Air Force
units there. As I said, we will have taken over Bangkok International
Airport.
Adm. Moorer: We probably could lay a few more mats at Takhli
and accommodate some more planes there. But that really isn’t the so-
lution. We’ve also looked at the possibility of stationing the tankers at
Clark Field. Because of the greater distances involved, though, you
have to put two and a half tankers into the Philippines for every tanker
you take out of U Tapao.
Gen. Haig: It’s clear that we should drop the option of putting
more B–52s into Thailand unless we undertake crash construction proj-
ects on facilities we hold, rather than on facilities the Thai hold.
Mr. Johnson: I agree. Can we proceed on that assumption?
Gen. Haig: That’s my feeling. But we have to give all the options
to the President and await his guidance.
Adm. Moorer: We can start some construction work at U Tapao,
but that will, of course, take some time.
Gen. Haig: Concerning the political problem of putting more B–52s
in Thailand, the President isn’t aware of the strain this move will have
on the political fabric tieing us to the Thai. And only a handful of B–52s
is involved.
Adm. Moorer: I don’t think it’s worthwhile to court political trou-
ble by asking the Thai to accept more B–52s. These planes can only
carry twenty-six bombs, anyway. We already have over 200 B–52s in
the theater—more than we’ve ever had out there before. In my judg-
ment, we have an adequate number of B–52s in action right now. But
if the President wants to send more, we will do it.
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364 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Mr. Johnson: Perhaps we can delay the redeployment of some units

from Vietnam to Thailand, thus saving some space at Takli and Korat.
Mr. Rush: If we do that, it will certainly have an effect on the 49,000
ceiling.
Mr. Johnson: I know. Remember, though, that the President has al-
ways said he will make the necessary decisions based on the circum-
stances at the moment. If he has to maintain the ceiling, he will do it.
Still, we can give him some options—such as deferring the redeploy-
ments and, thereby, saving space in Thailand.
Adm. Moorer: We have to get an answer to the basic question. Are
sixty-six additional B–52s enough to meet the President’s requirement?
In three weeks, we will have sent sixty-six more B–52s to Guam. If this
is enough to meet his requirement, then we can deal with the Thai on
the basis of arranging only the redeployments from Danang. However,
if it does not meet his requirement, and if he wants us to send another
thirty-four B–52s, then we will have a great problem with the Thai.
Gen. Haig: As I said before, I don’t think the President is wed to
the figure of one hundred more B–52s. He wanted us to take drastic
action, which we did.
[Omitted here is discussion of B–52 missions over North Vietnam.]

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, May 26, 1972, 1249Z.

7416. Joint Embassy/MACTHAI Message. Subject: Thai Military

Equipment Request: Thanom’s Comments to Vice President. Ref: A.
CINCPAC 182221Z May 72 (Vipto);2 B. Bangkok 7138.3
Summary: During recent visit of Vice President, FM Thanom asked
Vice President for increased military assistance to Thailand, specifying
helicopters, armored cars, and communications equipment. In response
to call to DOD from Vice President’s office, MACTHAI has been in-
structed through military channels to develop recommended package

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret;
Immediate. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.
2
See Document 165 and footnote 1 thereto.
3
Not found.
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Thailand 365

of defense equipment of approximately $15 million which might be

given to Thais as special military assistance add-on. We feel this is op-
portunity to present constructive package which we have structure in
four parts to be responsive to Marshal Thanom’s specific requests as
well as re-oriented high priority requirements and which we would re-
late to increased Thai performance in Thai security and counter insur-
gency programs. End summary.
1. In context of Field Marshal Thanom’s request for more military
equipment for Thailand to Vice President, during VP’s recent visit to
Thailand (see reftels), on May 24 MACTHAI received telephone re-
quest from OSD/ISA through CINCPAC to suggest items that might
be provided to Thailand under military assistance if special add-on
fund of $15 million were to become available. OSD/ISA stated request
in response to inquiry from Vice President’s office.
2. In follow-up to Vice President’s discussions with Thai leaders,
including Ambassador’s meeting with Marshal Dawee today, Mission
has attempted obtain clearer idea what Thanom had in mind when he
asked for additional helicopters, communication equipment, and
wheeled armored vehicles (para 17, ref a). We conclude from three sep-
arate conversations with RTA Chief of Staff, General Surakij, during
past week that Thanom wanted more helicopters (than Thais know are
already in pipeline) delivered more quickly than projected delivery
schedule. Thanom wants helicopters to fill out two existing RTA air-
mobile (helicopter) companies and to equip a planned third airmobile
company. Although Surakij does not think Thanom sought helicopters
for RTAF, need for more helicopters (including helicopters for RTAF
and police) has been recurring theme in conversations with Thai lead-
ers, from King on down.
While helicopter program recommended below should meet those
needs if properly managed we will keep this question under study. We
have invited Thai to explain needs as they see them but have also
pointed to large MASF helicopter program over past few years and to
management difficulties, including pilot shortage, which could arise
by overloading. Regarding request for armored cars, Surakij felt a few
such vehicles for RTA to evaluate new types would meet the require-
ments. He also addressed some RTA communication equipment needs,
which are discussed further below.
3. In course of normal MASF/MAP dialogue before Vice Presi-
dent’s visit, there have been several lower level RTG approaches re-
garding increased military assistance support to Thailand both for ad-
ditional items of equipment and for increased level of support. Mission
officers have responded to these requests by pointing out that military
assistance funds are limited (and probably will continue to be), that US
will do its best to assist Thais to meet their priority needs within these
limits, and that mission will study each request very carefully.
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366 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Additional military assistance to Thailand would offer excellent

opportunity to develop constructive supplemental program to meet
real Thai needs. Add-on package could provide further incentive to
move Thais to improve their own response to counterinsurgency. We
feel assistance beyond basic program level should be negotiated with
Thais in conjunction with actions which we feel Thais should take to
increase effectiveness of their security and counterinsurgency pro-
grams (as in recent AAT/Ramasoon exercise, but less formally, con-
sidering short time available in FY 72). Although we believe that we
should be responsive to each of Thanom’s requests, pertinence to coun-
terinsurgency including support for VDC and hill tribe volunteers
should be a prime test of priority in expenditures for equipment in
overall contemplated MASF add-on.
5. Mission has prepared a list of items which might be included
in add-on, grouped by category without any priority having been as-
signed. We consider list, which follows as most desirable make-up of
program for presentation to Vice President. This list of items recom-
mended for possible add-on is necessarily tentative pending our sub-
mission of more final mission recommendations based upon further
study and exploration of Thai desires.
[Omitted here is the list of items.]
Unger

168. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Thai Request for Additional Military Assistance

During Vice President Agnew’s recent trip, the Thai asked him
for additional helicopters, communications equipment, and armored
vehicles.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Kennedy
and Holdridge. The memorandum was attached to a June 8 covering memorandum from
Kennedy and Holdridge to Kissinger. It was signed by Haig.
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Thailand 367

At your direction Vice President Agnew asked Secretary Laird to

prepare a forthcoming reply to the Thai request.
Secretary Laird proposes that we provide the Thai with four ma-
jor items and spares2 at a cost of $4.6 million (Tab B).
—12 rebuilt UH–1H helicopters ($4 million). This would affect hel-
icopter delivery to U.S. Army reserve units, but not to the active Army.
—Fourteen M–113 armored personnel carriers ($.288 million to
complete the Thai program of 221 APCs. These fourteen vehicles would
have to be diverted from a shipment of 232 currently scheduled for de-
livery to Vietnam, but could be replaced in the Vietnam program dur-
ing the first two weeks of September by briefly delaying delivery to
FMS purchasers.
—Six armored cars ($.323 million) could be delivered within 18
months from new production. To provide them earlier, we would have
to take them from U.S. base security units in SVN and Thailand, which
Secretary Laird and I agree should not be done.
—Speed up delivery of half the 1,000 tactical radios now in the
Thai program for arrival in March 1973. They could be delivered in
August by a temporary diversion from SVN of 500 radios (from the
planned SVN delivery of 2,000) for about two weeks and brief adjust-
ments in delivery times of other programs.
Thailand will be transferred from Service funding to MAP on 1
July 1972, and MAP funds are severely limited. Therefore, if we are
to provide a special package to the RTG, the decision should be made
immediately so that Service funds may be obligated before 1 July.
Proceeding now with Secretary Laird’s package would serve two
purposes:
—It would demonstrate our responsiveness to the Thai request
and evidence a forthcoming attitude in view of all they have done for
us during our force buildup.
—It will provide a hedge against possible MAP cuts next year.
I recommend that you approve Secretary Laird’s proposal. If you
agree I will convey your approval by the memorandum at Tab A.3

2
In a June 2 memorandum for the President, Laird forwarded the proposal for the
four programs but seemed to indicate skepticism about the Thai request, stating that
there “is not a compelling requirement for military hardware additive to our regular pro-
gram for Thailand, so the primary motive for providing additional assistance would be
political.” Laird also noted that “everything that we can do for the Thai in the way of
additional military assistance at this time has a direct and adverse impact on our cur-
rent accelerated programs to satisfy combat requirements in Vietnam.” Attached but not
printed.
3
Attached at Tab A but not printed was the President’s memorandum to Laird,
signed by Kissinger and dated June 10. It noted that the President “has approved your
recommendations,” directed the provision of 12 rebuilt UH–1H helicopters, 14 M–113
armored personnel carriers, 6 armored cars, and 500 tactical radios to the Thais, and re-
quested that delivery “be accelerated to the maximum possible extent.”
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368 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Recommendation
That you approve my forwarding the memorandum at Tab A to
Secretary Laird approving his proposed additions to Thai military
assistance.4

4
Haig initialed the approve option for the President.

169. Telegram From the Consulate in Australia to the Department

of State1

Perth, June 30, 1972, 1322Z.

Secto 93. 1. June 28 Secretary Rogers met with Thai SEATO Coun-
cil Member Pote Sarasin to review several points in US-Thai relations
as well as bearing on developments in Southeast Asia of summit talks
and subsequent US contacts with USSR and PRC.
2. Secretary Rogers thanked the RTG for their prompt and gener-
ous assistance in accommodating US forces required for the increased
air activities in North and South Vietnam. Pote said Thailand regarded
this as fulfilling its obligations under SEATO. He noted that in so do-
ing Thailand encouraged considerable criticism from neutral countries
and made it more vulnerable to communist hostility, as was evident
from increase in insurgency.
3. Because of this increase the RTG had asked Vice President Ag-
new for additional assistance, a reply to which Pote said had been re-
ceived promptly and in the affirmative. With the growing threat, the
Thais were concerned about their arms and equipment being inferior
to the enemy and he asked about continuing US assistance; he ex-
pressed particular concern about the Wolff amendment on narcotics
which would cut off all aid. Secretary said he could understand the
Thai concern on these matters but explained that these were manifes-
tations of US politics particularly in an election year and he said he ex-
pected that we would be able to help with what was essential.
4. Pote then referred to the summit meetings and subsequent con-
tacts in Peking and Hanoi and said that Marshal Thanom, NEC Chair-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Sec-
retary’s Trip to SEA. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Unger on June 29, cleared by Lissy (S),
and Pedersen (C), and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Bangkok.
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Thailand 369

man, had instructed him to ask the Secretary on a very confidential ba-
sis what bearing those conversations had had on the situation in South-
east Asia including an end to the Vietnam war. Secretary Rogers ex-
plained to Pote that in spite of the lengthy conversations there was not
very much of a specific nature that could be cited although we do be-
lieve as a result of the talks that both the Russians and Chinese doubt
the wisdom of an extended continuation of the war in Vietnam. After
some further discussion on this point the Secretary made clear that we
have left neither Moscow nor Peking in any doubt about our taking
very seriously our continuing commitment to our allies and SEATO,
which of course means above all our commitment to Thailand. We have
felt that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese challenge this.
5. Pote volunteered that the Thais have been urging their neigh-
bors to accept the expanding role of the Japanese in Southeast Asia
even while carefully looking out for their own interests; he felt this was
important in order not to drive Japan back into a militaristic frame of
mind. He also volunteered that the Thai leaders will be forming a new,
constitutional government quite soon, attributing the delay to some
lack of decision on the part of Chairman Thanom and their desire to
have thoroughly worked out beforehand the framework for future ad-
ministration. Secretary Rogers said we well understood the Thai situ-
ation. He also referred to narcotics control, thanking the RTG for its
close cooperation and urging them to do anything more that they can.
Finally, he acknowledged the crucial role of the Thai volunteers in the
defense of Laos over the recent dry season.
Rogers

170. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush)1

Washington, August 18, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Deputy Director for Plans, CIA

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot
96 D 695, Box 25, August 1972. Secret.
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370 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

SUBJECT
General Praphat’s Plans to Expand the Thai Volunteer Program and to Use Thai
Volunteers to Conduct Operations Throughout Laos

Mr. Karamessines’ WSAG paper of 3 July2 was most informative

and reassuring about the Thai volunteer program and RTG intentions
for the program. I agree that recruitment should be emphasized in or-
der to bring deployed forces and replacement units up to full strength
and keep them at that level. Additionally, the deployment plans voiced
by General Praphat accord with our view, although the priorities
among the areas mentioned by General Praphat are not clear. Of great-
est interest as a potential problem area, however, were the comments
on equipping the volunteers and sustaining them outside Laos tem-
porarily should a cease-fire occur.
As you know, assistance to the Thai volunteers has been provided
under the authority which permits military department appropriations
to be utilized for military assistance to Vietnam and Laos. We have ar-
gued that the Thai volunteers are “local forces in Laos” as the words
are used in the Defense Procurement Act. With assistance to Thailand
now in the Military Assistance Program, the opportunity to mingle as-
sistance to Laos and Thailand is further reduced. The points I wish to
make are that:
—Equipment provided to the Thai volunteers is provided for the
purpose of assisting Laos. This equipment may not be transferred by
Laos to other governments or to persons not its officers or agents with-
out US consent. This consent must be reported to Congress 15 days be-
fore given under Section 502, PL 91–441.
—Authority does not now exist to assist Thailand with military
equipment other than by MAP.
—Under circumstances of cease-fire, it is doubtful that mainte-
nance of the volunteer force in Thailand could be justified as assistance
to Laos. Further, unless the forces under redeployment to Thailand
were either part of the RTA or under control of Thai MOD, they would
not be eligible for support under Thai MAP.
These constraints should be considered in our dealings with the
RTG concerning the volunteer program. In particular, a review of the
above assistance problems—especially the effect on Laos-related proj-
ects of MAP funding for assistance to Thailand—should be dispatched
to the Embassies in Bangkok and Vientiane to apprise them of the
situation.
Finally, the comments by General Praphat about the build-up to
36 volunteer battalions, together with the recent surge in recruitment,
indicate that the RTG is making a determined movement toward the

2
Not found.
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Thailand 371

36 battalion objective. I wish in this connection to draw attention to

the agreed criteria that battalions should be deployed at 100% of au-
thorized strength and maintained at a minimum of 80% of authorized
strength. These criteria have not been met. Before supporting added
units beyond the existing 25 numbered battalions, we should assure
that these manning criteria are met. In pursuit of this goal I am di-
recting CINCPAC to provide support appropriate for additional bat-
talions when new battalions are at 100% strength and all existing
deployed units are at 80% strength. I hope you will agree that this ac-
tion is appropriate to provide field activities with the leverage needed
to assure that our manning goals are met.
Kenneth Rush

171. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State

Rogers1

Washington, August 22, 1972.

SUBJECT
Determination and Authorization of the Grant to the Kingdom of Thailand of up
to $50 Million in Defense Articles and Services in FY 1973

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of

July 12,2 I hereby:
A. Determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2364), that the use of up to $50 mil-
lion of funds available in FY 1973 for the grant of defense articles and
services, including excess defense articles, to Thailand, without regard
to the requirement of Section 514 of the Act, is important to the secu-
rity of the United States; and
B. Authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, such use of up
to $50 million of funds for the grant of defense articles and services,
including excess defense articles, to Thailand, without regard to the re-
quirements of Section 514 of the Act.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special
Files, President’s Office Files, Chronological File, 1/1/72–12/21/72. Secret.
2
Not found.
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372 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

You are requested on my behalf to notify the Speaker of the House

of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of my
intention to take this action, in accordance with Section 652 of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and to specify an effective
date for this determination.
This determination shall be classified SECRET and shall not be
published in the Federal Register. Such publication would be harmful
to the security of the United States because it could jeopardize contin-
uing use by the United States of Royal Thai Air Force bases by raising
the issue of the nature of our defense relationship with Thailand.
Richard Nixon

172. Memorandum by the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)

Washington, August 23, 1972.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson

Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, August 1971. Secret; Sensitive;
Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department

of State1

Bangkok, September 1, 1972, 1244Z.

12456. Subject: Status Report on Resettlement of CIF.2 Ref: Bangkok

12010.
1. As of late August the RTG reports that 1153 CIF families have
been permanently resettled, an increase of 343 since the May 31 report.3

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 9–5 CHINAT. Se-
cret; Nodis.
2
For a discussion of the resettlement of the CIF, see Document 152.
3
Telegram 12010 from Bangkok, August 24, reported allegations of violations
by CIF Generals Li and Tuan of their resettlement/narcotics agreement with the Thai
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Thailand 373

The average family is allocated 15 rai (2.53 rai equals 1 acre) for its per-
sonal use (although ownership is not formally turned over to them). A
total of approximately 5,000 individuals are involved.
2. In many cases, the families have been living for some time as
squatters in villages in the area in which they have now been given
refugee status and allocations of land. In these cases, the allocated land
has quickly been put to use for crops and livestock. Several new areas
are also being opened up. For example, 200 families are scheduled to
be resettled in new areas of Chiang Rai Province (areas previously dom-
inated by Communist insurgents). A number of settlers at these two
sites are at work building houses and clearing land. Schools to be
staffed by Thai teachers are being erected.
3. In addition to land allocated to families, the Government also
intends to set aside large tracts as common land to be used for the eco-
nomic good of the community as a whole.
4. From the economic point of view, the project is viewed as falling
into two parts, one aimed at producing the quickest cash return and
the second aimed at putting the CIF on a permanently viable economic
basis.
5. The RTG has asked for assistance from Taipei in high elevation
horticulture to assist in the rapid development of cash crops. Experi-
mentation and research areas are being set aside to help determine
which crops are most suitable. The longer term economic base is to be
founded on production of tea, cattle, mining, fruit, and vegetable seeds.
6. Some setbacks have been encountered in tea cultivation. Only
50 percent of the 450,000 plants already set out have survived. The Gov-
ernment has hired tea propagation experts from Taiwan to advise the
settlers and has ordered new and better cuttings to replace the plants
that died. It will be five years before the plants will have matured and
start producing. The Government will provide a tea processing plant
capable of producing 2,000 kilograms of tea per day, with this level of
production to be achieved within ten years.
7. The CIF have approximately 600 head of brahman cattle from
Burma, and they plan to double the size of their herds within one year
by additional purchases. The Government is providing grass seed more
suitable for cattle raising and will train additional CIF in the technique
of artificial insemination. Eight are already qualified but more are
needed. The CIF hope to be able to export cattle by the end of this year.

Government, “sourced for the most part to persons of unknown reliability and unde-
termined access.” It concluded that “none of the reports contain sufficient substance to
lead us seriously to consider holding up the final payment,” but promised to “continue
to monitor situation most closely.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF
9–5 CHINAT)
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374 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

8. Antimony mining is scheduled to begin this year at Mae Salong

in Chiang Rai. The Department of Mines is surveying the region to de-
termine the best location for extracting the antimony. The Department
of Mines must also give final approval before actual work can get
underway.
9. General Kriangsak estimates that the CIF will be fully self-
sufficient within two years.
10. The mobile development units in the area are training CIF per-
sonnel as mechanics to repair and maintain equipment which is being
provided for use in agriculture in the common areas. Twelve mechan-
ics from each group are to be trained initially. The mobile development
units are also building roads in some of the newly opened areas.
11. At the present time, the CIF have been given refugee status
under Thai law. If this program works out as planned, the Government
plans to change their status progressively from refugees to temporary
residents, to permanent residents, and finally to Thai nationals.
12. General Kriangsak told us this week that, with the insurgency
problem somewhat quieter in Chiang Rai Province, the RTG expects to
be able to devote more time and resources to the resettlement project.
This will entail full time assignment of one or two RTG officers to each
of the settlement areas (which are now visited periodically). This will
not only speed successful resettlement, but will also enhance the RTG’s
capability to enforce the agreement to stay out of opium trafficking.
13. The RTG has expended a total of $733,000 in support of its pro-
gram to resettle the CIF.
14. I believe the RTG’s performance in resettling the CIF consti-
tutes a satisfactory execution of their commitment to us. They have car-
ried forward the types of programs upon which we and they have
agreed, they have expended more than $700,000 of their own funds,
and progress to date has been encouraging. I believe the RTG has also
investigated seriously the allegations we have passed to them that Li
and Tuan are not abiding by their commitment to get out of the opium
trade. In a discussion with Brady and Boyer from the House Foreign
Affairs Committee within the past few days, Kriangsak reaffirmed his
government’s determination to hold Li and Tuan to their promise.
While a number of allegations against them have been made, none of
these contains sufficient substance to warrant withholding our final
payment. Basic situation remains as described reftel. I, therefore, plan
to go ahead with final payment on September 6.
Unger
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Thailand 375

174. National Security Study Memorandum 1591

Washington, September 9, 1972.

TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT
U.S. Counterinsurgency Support for Thailand

The President has indicated his concern over the expanding in-
surgent threat to effective government control in a number of provinces
in rural Thailand, particularly in the two areas bordering Laos in North
and Northeast Thailand.
The President has requested a study addressing the following two
issues:
—RTG actions to increase its counterinsurgency effectiveness. The re-
peated demonstrations of insurgent capability to thwart government
efforts to counter the insurgent threat warrants an examination of al-
ternative Thai programs and modes of operation which hold out the
prospect of increased government effectiveness. The feasibility of such
alternatives should be considered in the light of their impact on the
balances within the Thai bureaucracy and their resource costs to the
Thai government.
—The U.S. role in promoting a more effective Thai counterinsurgency
effort. With limited security assistance resources and an uncertain abil-
ity to leverage even marginal changes in Thai direction, our assistance
must be carefully organized and directed to ensure support for Thai
actions which most effectively contribute to their counterinsurgency ef-
fort. Alternative adjustments in the U.S. counterinsurgency assistance
program in terms of the allocation of our resources to various Thai pro-
grams and in our own management organization at all levels should
be considered. The implications for RTG counterinsurgency efforts of
either phasing out our counterinsurgency assistance or attempting to
exert greater influence with increased levels of assistance should be
assessed.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Sub-
ject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Top Secret.
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376 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

This study should draw on work already done in connection with

the study directed by NSSM 51 but should focus on the specific issues
for decision concerning the Thai counterinsurgency program. It should
be prepared by an NSC interagency ad hoc group comprising appro-
priate senior representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and
chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State.
The study should be submitted not later than November 15, 1972,2
for consideration by the Senior Review Group. It will be reviewed in
conjunction with the study prepared in response to NSSM 51.3
Henry A. Kissinger

2
The Embassy in Thailand provided its assessments in a series of telegrams in late
November and December 1972, including Bangkok 16953, November 30 (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73. DEF 1–1 THAI–US); Bangkok 17264, December 7
(ibid., POL 23 THAI); Bangkok 17269, December 7 (ibid.); Bangkok 17354, December 9
(ibid.); Bangkok 17357, December 9 (ibid.); and Bangkok 17368, December 9 (ibid.).
3
See Documents 10 and 82 and footnotes thereto.

175. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President

Nixon1

Washington, September 16, 1972.

SUBJECT
Thai Volunteers and FY 73 Legislative Ceiling

During FY 1972, a number of US-supported Thai volunteer units

provided valuable assistance in resisting the North Vietnamese dry sea-
son offensive in Laos. By June, 22 such battalions had been deployed
in Laos. However, these units were manned at only 59 percent of their
authorized strength, in violation of the Thai agreement to maintain de-
ployed units at a minimum strength of 80 percent.
During the past three months, exceptional recruiting efforts have
taken place in Thailand. The Thai volunteer force has expanded from
9,000 to over 19,000 men during this time, and three additional battal-
ions have been formed.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.
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Thailand 377

On 28 August 1972, Ambassadors Unger and Godley jointly re-

quested that the number of Thai volunteer units be increased from 25
to 30 battalions. This would represent an increase in FY 1973 expendi-
tures of at least $16 million. Interagency plans envisage a maximum
force of 36 battalions at a cost of $134 million per year. The 30 battal-
ions requested by the Ambassadors would cost $126 million.
You will recall that your 8 August 1972 letters to Chairmen Hebert
and Stennis, as well as Department of Defense representations to the
conferees, were all aimed at eliminating any ceiling on Laos expendi-
tures. These efforts were successful only in raising the FY 1973 ceiling
level from $350 million to $375 million. This ceiling is on total US as-
sistance to Laos for FY 1973 and includes Defense, CIA and AID fund-
ing. We will incur at least a $55 million overrun if spending continues
at the planned rate.
In view of this new ceiling, we have tried repeatedly to get inter-
agency agreement to scale down the Laos program to get within the
$375 million limitation. We have not been successful.
I view this new legislative ceiling as a serious matter and will as-
sure that Defense operations are carried out at a level consistent with
the $375 million limit. As a first step, unless you direct otherwise, I am
issuing orders which will prevent expansion of the Thai volunteer force
beyond the present 25 battalions—at least until fiscal pressures abate.
Melvin R. Laird

176. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, September 19, 1972.

SUBJECT
Your Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Laird, September 202

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2
No record was found concerning the substance of the President’s breakfast meet-
ing with Laird.
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378 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Phil Odeen has already given you Talking Points. There is one ad-
ditional subject which you might wish to raise—Thai volunteers and
the Laos FY 1973 ceiling.
Secretary Laird in a memo to the President dated September 16
(Tab A)3 expressed concern that we could not live with the $375 mil-
lion ceiling for Laos unless programs were tightly controlled. To this
end he intends to limit the Thai SGU program to 25 battalions unless
the President directs otherwise.
—Mr. Laird will argue that we cannot live within the ceiling un-
less the Thai SGU program is held at 25 battalions; the Thai are not all
that good or necessary; and the threat of NVA activity is less this year
than last.
—The Thai have done a creditable job, particularly in North Laos.
The NVA are west of the PDJ and on the Bolovens this year giving them
a head start for their dry-season push. The Lao forces are weaker now
and we will probably need all the Thai forces we can get to hold this
year.
—Early estimates suggest that total expenditures with 30 Thai SGU
battalions would be about $409 million—$34 million over the ceiling
(less than 10%). The significant effects of weather alone on levels of
combat and thus on consumption of weapons, ammunition, and air
support can result in significant variation from early estimates as our
experience of the past two years has shown. Thus it is simply too early
to assume that we will be significantly over the ceiling.
The Thai have finally produced recruits for the training program
enabling us to man the existing 22 battalions at 80% strength, deploy
an additional 3 battalions at full strength, and still permit us to move
toward forming an additional 5 battalions. [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] is geared up to get the training done and the battalions
deployed. To cut back the program now could cause problems in our
relations with the Thai, and deny us needed forces in the face of an un-
certain NVA capability and intention for the coming dry season.
The Senate committee in reporting out the Defense Procurement
Authorization Bill stated: “It is possible that adjustments will be re-
quired in the ceiling, depending on future events. Nevertheless, the
committee believes a limitation should again be imposed to continue
activities in Laos at approximately their present level.”
Thus we believe we should not foreclose, now, the possibility of
going to the 30 battalion level. Meanwhile, we should caution Godley
to keep a careful watch on expenditures as the situation develops over
the next few months. We are continuing our efforts to refine our esti-
mates, identify trade-offs and determine more precisely the effects of
the ceiling on essential operations. If it appears by January that we have

3
See Document 175.
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Thailand 379

no alternative we should then be prepared to request an increase in the

ceiling. Meanwhile, we should not impose artificial restrictions which
may have the effect of giving the NVA the victory in Laos we have thus
far denied them.
You might tell Mr. Laird:
—We need to continue our efforts to refine estimates and all agen-
cies have been requested to do so.
—We should not foreclose now the possibility of moving to 30 Thai
SGU battalions when the 25 existing units are filled out and replace-
ments to keep them up to 80% strength are assured.
—We want to be sure that we make available whatever is needed
to defend Laos; if that means a request for a ceiling increase later, we
will have to consider it.

177. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 25, 1972, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT
Thai Security: Call on Under Secretary Johnson by Boonchu Rojanasathien

PARTICIPANTS
Boonchu Rojanasathien, Executive Vice President, Bangkok Bank
Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson
Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director, EA/TB

After an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Boonchu asked Under Sec-

retary Johnson about his reaction to Thailand’s sending a ping pong
team to China. Ambassador Johnson said that he agreed that commu-
nication should be established with Peking and he had no problem
with that.
Boonchu evinced considerable interest in Ambassador Johnson’s
views on the security situation in Southeast Asia. He asked about the
Viet-Nam negotiations and was told there has been no break-through.
He inquired whether Thailand could survive if its neighbors were taken
over. Ambassador Johnson said yes, if Thailand’s resistance was not
just military but also political and economic. He noted his concern that

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confi-
dential. Drafted by Bergesen and approved by U. Alexis Johnson on September 28. The
meeting was held in Johnson’s office.
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380 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

every year, since 1965, it was reported that the RTG was doing better
in its counterinsurgency efforts, yet every year there were more insur-
gents. Boonchu said that the news in the papers wasn’t necessarily the
same as the facts. He did not think the insurgency had gained stronger
support or that it was gaining recruits. To Ambassador Johnson’s in-
quiry whether Boonchu was referring to the north or northeast,
Boonchu said the problem in the north was military; it appeared that
he meant the northeast as the area where there was not much new re-
cruiting. Ambassador Johnson noted that Operation Phu Kwang
(note—in the tri-province area, Jan–April 1972) wasn’t very well done.
Boonchu attributed this to lack of experience on the part of the forces
involved.
The Thai visitor then made a pitch for continued US material as-
sistance to Thailand. Ambassador Johnson replied “you have plenty of
military supplies.” He emphasized the importance of police, that the
only RTG official that the average up-country Thai sees is a policeman.
If he has his hand out for bribes, it is easy to tell what the peasant’s
reaction to the RTG is likely to be.
Boonchu said military operations are expensive and the RTG is
now increasing its military expenditures at the expense of develop-
ment. Ambassador Johnson noted that it was not just a question of giv-
ing the Thai Government aircraft. At least as important was mainte-
nance, up-keep and operations. It was not good for Thailand to depend
too much on the US. However, Ambassador Johnson concluded, we
have been helping Thailand and we will continue to do so.
Ambassador Johnson expressed his pleasure that Anand had be-
come Thai Ambassador here. He described him as “first class”. In re-
sponse to an inquiry, Boonchu noted, laughingly, that Thanat was now
engaged primarily in playing golf.
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Thailand 381

178. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, September 25, 1972.

SUBJECT
Thai Volunteers and FY–73 Legislative Ceiling

Secretary Laird has written you (Tab B)2 expressing views about
his intention to live within the $375 million Lao ceiling and specifically
about his concern that U.S. support of the Thai volunteer battalions,
beyond the present 25, will put us over the $375 million limitation. He
mentions that the Thai volunteers provided valuable assistance in re-
sisting the North Vietnamese dry season offensive in Laos, even though
they were under their authorized strength, and that the Thai Govern-
ment is now bringing these 25 battalions up to strength. Secretary Laird
states, nevertheless, that we will incur a substantive overrun if assist-
ance to Laos for FY–1973 continues at the present rate, and as a first
step, unless you direct otherwise, he proposes preventing the expan-
sion of the Thai volunteer force beyond the present 25 battalions—at
least until fiscal pressure abates.
Although I fully agree with Secretary Laird that we must do all
possible to live within the Laos ceiling, I feel our first priority must be
to make available whatever is needed to defend Laos.
The Thai have done a creditable job, particularly in North Laos.
The NVA are west of the Plaine des Jarres and on the Bolovens Plateau
this year giving them a head start for a dry-season push if they want
to mount one. The Lao forces, particularly Vang Pao’s irregulars, are
weaker than in previous years. Thus we will probably need all the Thai
forces we can get to hold this year.
Early estimates suggest that total expenditures with 30 Thai SGU
battalions would be about $410 to 415 million—$35 to 40 million over
the ceiling (about 10%). The effects of weather alone on levels of com-
bat and thus on consumption of weapons, ammunition, and air sup-
port can result in significant variation from early estimates as our ex-
perience of the past two years has shown. Thus it is simply too early
to assume that we will be significantly over the ceiling.
The Thai have finally produced recruits for the training program
enabling us to man the existing 22 battalions already in the field at over

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Drafted by
Kennedy. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2
See Document 175.
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382 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

80% strength, fill three new full strength battalions, and still permit us
to move toward forming an additional 5 battalions. [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] is geared up to get the training done and the
battalions deployed. To cut back the program now could cause prob-
lems in our relations with the Thai, who have expected us to move
gradually to support of up to 36 SGU battalions and deny us needed
forces in the face of an uncertain NVA capabilities and intentions for
the coming dry season.
The Senate committee in reporting out the Defense Procurement
Authorization Bill stated “It is possible that adjustments will be re-
quired in the ceiling, depending on future events. Nevertheless, the
committee believes a limitation should again be imposed to continue
activities in Laos at approximately their present level.”
Thus we believe we should not foreclose, now, the possibility of
going to the 30 battalion level. Meanwhile, we should caution Ambas-
sador Godley to keep a careful watch on expenditures as the situation
develops over the next few months. We are continuing our efforts to
refine our estimates, identify trade-offs and determine more precisely
the effects of the ceiling on essential operations. If it appears by Janu-
ary that we have no alternative we should then be prepared to request
an increase in the ceiling. Meanwhile, we should not impose artificial
restrictions which may have the effect of giving the NVA the victory
in Laos we have thus far denied them.
The memo at Tab A3 requests Secretary Laird not to foreclose now
the possibility of moving to 30 Thai SGU battalions when the 25 exist-
ing units are filled out and replacements to keep them up to 80%
strength are assured.
Recommendation
That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird at Tab A.

3
See Document 179.
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Thailand 383

179. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense

Laird1

Washington, September 28, 1972.

SUBJECT
Special Operations Report of Progress

I appreciate your efforts, as expressed in your memorandum of 16

September, to find ways to conduct our programs in Laos within the
$375 million FY–1973 ceiling set by Congress. I certainly share your
view that we must treat this ceiling as a serious matter.
However, I am convinced that we cannot forego undertaking any
reasonable steps to make certain that Laos is well prepared and able
to meet the possible enemy threat against Laos in the coming months.
Therefore, I request that you do not foreclose now the possibility of
moving to support 30 Thai SGU battalions once the existing units
are filled out and replacements to keep them up to 80% strength are
assured.
In the meantime, I am sure that you will do whatever you can to
find ways to make economies that will not in any way diminish our
ability to provide the assistance which the Government will need to
successfully defend against enemy attack during the coming year.
Richard Nixon

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.
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384 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

180. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 2, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Thai Contact with the PRC

PARTICIPANTS
Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chairman, National Executive Council, Thailand
H.E. Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Wichian Watanakun, First Secretary, Thai Embassy
The Secretary of State
Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director, EA/TB

The Secretary asked Pote about the Thai contact with the PRC. Pote
said they had had to refuse the initial invitation to China which, in any
case, was non-governmental, because Thailand was not a member
(note: of the Asian Table Tennis Union). A few days later word came
that Thailand had been made a member and so it was decided to send
a team. Prasit Kanchanawat, whom Pote described as “my deputy”,
was sent with the team. When Prasit arrived the Chinese took special
care of him, e.g., separate accommodations. His midnight meeting with
Chou En-Lai was without any forewarning as to the personage in-
volved. It was a correct and formal meeting. Chou sent best regards to
His Majesty the King and Field Marshal Thanom. Pote noted as inter-
esting one item that Chou mentioned, that the Thai must be very care-
ful about Russian interest in the Kra Canal. The Chinese, Pote said, ev-
idently tried to be very nice to the Thai visitors.
Prasit told the Chinese that the Thai were worried about terror-
ists. The Thai people, he said, assumed that the Chinese were sup-
porting the insurgents. Chou said “we” had nothing to do with this
but would continue to support freedom fighters. After the tournament
there was a tour of south China for the team and its advisors and Chou
again appeared at the farewell party. Pote said that the Thai were not
yet certain of Chinese motives. The Chinese understood that Thailand
had good relations with the U.S.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret.
Drafted by Bergesen and approved in S on October 6. The meeting was held in the Sec-
retary’s office. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II notes the request of the Thais not
to be taken by surprise if a negotiated peace was in the offing, and Rogers’s various re-
iterations that he had told them as much as he could and would let him know as soon
as he could. The entire conversation is summarized in telegram 184763 to Bangkok, Oc-
tober 10. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 385

In response to the Secretary’s query about Chinese support of lib-

eration movements, Pote noted that Bangladesh was a liberation move-
ment, but the Chinese did not support it. The Secretary said that in his
conversations in Peking the Chinese told him they favored “liberation
and turmoil.” He wondered about Africa, which obviously needed
peace and stability far more. Pote said that Prasit had noted that there
was no case for liberation in Thailand and the subject was then
dropped.

181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, October 5, 1972.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Mr. Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chairman of the Thai National Execu-
tive Council (which since last November’s coup has functioned as the Thai
Cabinet)

I. Purpose
To reassure the Thai as to the constancy of U.S. support for Thai-
land and for our determination to continue to play a useful balancing
role in the Asian Pacific region.
II. Background, Participants, Press Plan
A. Background. The Vice President, when he visited Bangkok in
mid-May, emphasized the constancy of U.S. purposes in Southeast
Asia. Nevertheless, the Thai leadership remains concerned over our
long-term intentions in Asia, especially in view of our Vietnam with-
drawal, our China initiative, and the growing internal insurgency in
Thailand supported by Peking and Hanoi.
Partly in reaction to this, Bangkok in recent months began ex-
ploring in earnest the possibility of improving relations with the PRC.
In August, talks in Peking between a senior Thai official who accom-
panied the Thai ping pong team and Chou En-lai indicated that the

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the mem-
orandum indicates the President saw it.
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386 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

PRC is now sufficiently interested in getting relations with Bangkok

onto a different track to allow Bangkok to set the pace in moving the
relationship in that direction. With respect to our military presence in
Thailand and Thailand’s other support for the Indochina conflict, PRC
officials mentioned this only indirectly. Thailand, however, intends to
move slowly and prudently. The Government recently approved a
small delegation to the Canton Trade Fair this fall.
Sarasin is third in the current Thai leadership lineup and is the
ranking civilian. Although formally he is in charge of economic and fi-
nancial affairs, he also functions as Foreign Minister.
To the best of our knowledge, you last saw Sarasin during your
July 1969 visit to Bangkok, when he was Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of National Development. He was Thai Ambassador to Wash-
ington between 1952 and 1957. A biographic sketch is at Tab B.2
B. Participants: Sarasin, myself, and Thai Amb Anand Panyara-
chun*3
C. Press Plan. The White House photographer will take photos at
the beginning of the meeting. Mr. Ziegler will brief the press after the
meeting.
III. Recommended Talking Points
Your talking points are at Tab A.4

2
Attached but not printed.
3
The Thai Ambassador’s name was handwritten at the end of this sentence with
an asterisk. Next to another asterisk at the bottom of this page a handwritten notation
reads, “He presented his credentials to you on Oct. 2.”
4
Attached but not printed.
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Thailand 387

182. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, October 6, 1972, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Khun Pote Sarasin, Vice Chairman of the National Executive Council of Thailand
Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT
The President’s Remarks to Pote Sarasin on U.S.-Thai Relations and Related
Subjects

Khun Pote expressed thanks to the President for the latter’s will-
ingness to take the time from his busy schedule to see him. The Pres-
ident said that he always had time to talk to friends from Thailand,
and went on to express the firm U.S. commitment to Thailand. Khun
Pote expressed his appreciation for the President’s remarks on behalf
of the National Executive Council (NEC).
Khun Pote stated that he had been asked by Marshal Thanom,
Chairman of the NEC, to raise with the President if an opportunity to
meet him presented itself the question of the U.S. position with respect
to the negotiations with Hanoi. Specifically, were we thinking only in
terms of a ceasefire for Vietnam, or would we extend the cessation of
hostilities to include Laos and Cambodia? This was important to the
Thai because they had common borders with these countries. The Pres-
ident made it clear that our position had been from the outset that we
wanted the ceasefire to include all of the countries of Indochina.
Khun Pote raised another question on behalf of Marshal Thanom:
would it be possible for the U.S. to consult with Thailand on its posi-
tion with respect to the North Vietnamese if a settlement seemed to be
in the making? Thailand certainly did not wish to influence the U.S.
position, but due to the role which they had assumed in the war—
which they had taken willingly—the Thai hoped that they could be
kept informed.
The President said that we had this very much in mind, and that
we would certainly consult with the Thai2 if a settlement appeared to

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special
Files, President’s Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October
1, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge.
2
In an October 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted “the President’s
assurance to Pote that such consultations would be provided,” and stated that “I have
requested the Thai Ambassador to treat this conversation as a very sensitive matter and
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388 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

be in the making. However, although the North Vietnamese had indi-

cated in the Paris talks that they had an incentive to bring the war to
an end (this was due to the effectiveness of our bombing and mining,
and to the heavy North Vietnamese losses in the South) it did not now
appear that a settlement could be reached prior to the U.S. elections.
The President was confident, though, that a settlement would be
reached in the not too distant future. He was optimistic about the mil-
itary and political situation in South Vietnam.
Khun Pote mentioned that a group of Asian nations, including
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia had been
attempting to work out a formula for ending the war and would con-
tinue these efforts.
Khun Pote informed the President that he, Pote, had met PRC Vice
Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua in New York the preceding day.
Ch’iao had not made an issue out of the U.S. use of air bases in Thai-
land in connection with the war in Indochina. Although he had referred
to them, he had taken the line that the U.S. presence would inevitably
be removed from Thailand following the completion of the war. Ac-
cording to Khun Pote, he had made it very plain to Ch’iao that this
was a matter which would be worked out between the Thai and the
Americans, and concerned them alone. The President said that this po-
sition was exactly right. It was up to the U.S. and Thailand to deter-
mine what kind of U.S. presence, if any, would remain there after
the fighting ended. Thailand would make its decision on the basis of
its own interests, as it had in the case of the air bases used by the U.S.
The President referred in this connection to Senator McGovern’s po-
sition on U.S. forces in Thailand, in which only U.S. interests were
considered.
Khun Pote said that the Thai were interested in following up the
current more friendly attitude of the PRC toward Thailand, and he had
sent his own assistant along with the Thai ping pong team to China to
talk to senior PRC officials. However, while the assistant had been well
received, Thailand would be very cautious in its dealings with the PRC.
Khun Pote noted that the Chinese antipathy toward the Soviet
Union had figured in his conversation with Ch’iao Kuan-hua to a con-
siderable extent. The President described the tenor of his own talks
with the Chinese on the subject of the Soviets, and attributed the Chi-
nese willingness to deal with the U.S. in large part to fear of the USSR—
it was a matter of survival. As a consequence, the Chinese had not

to deal with the White House directly rather than going through State for any follow-
up.” He also requested that Kissinger approve the memorandum of conversation for the
President’s file “with no further distribution,” which Kissinger did. (Ibid.)
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Thailand 389

made a great issue out of Taiwan in their conversations with us, nor
of the U.S. presence in Thailand. The President then proceeded to de-
scribe the strategic factors which in his opinion influenced the Chinese
in their attitudes toward the USSR, India, and the United States. The
Chinese did not want us to pull out of Asia at his time, and we were
not going to do so.
Khun Pote stated that he was very glad to hear the President say
the U.S. was not going to pull out, because there were many people
who felt that the U.S. was going to withdraw. The President then
stressed that the Nixon Doctrine was not a means for getting us out of
Asia but rather a means for enabling us to stay on. He was confident
that with continued U.S. support, which we were going to provide (but
which Senator McGovern wants us to remove) the free nations of Asia
would be able to hold their own against Communism. The President
declared he was optimistic that the free nations would do better than
the Communist nations of Asia.

183. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT
Executive Action by RTG Forces to Eliminate the Communist Terrorist Threat

1. Our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports that [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefed Ambassador Unger in
Bangkok and the Consul in Songkhla on recurrent reports [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] officers in south Thailand have picked
up concerning instances of executive action by Thai counterinsurgency
forces to eliminate captured Communist terrorists. These reports have
not been given any other dissemination.
2. Ambassador Unger approved the [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] recommendation that the matter be brought up with the
Thais by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Consul [1 line

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand
1972–1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that
Green saw it.
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390 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

of source text not declassified] at the next appropriate occasion taking the
line that although summary activity against captured personnel might
appear to be temporarily effective in helping to eliminate the terrorist
threat, it is illegal, morally indefensible and in the long run discour-
ages terrorist defection. The Thais are to be advised that greater coun-
terinsurgency impact could be achieved by proper and detailed inter-
rogation and follow-up psychological warfare action. A final point to
be made to the Thais is that if information on their action came to the
attention of sensation-seeking journalists, the matter could be highly
embarrassing to the Thai Government internally and internationally
and could also embarrass the U.S. Government’s advisory position in
south Thailand.
3. We have advised [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
that we believe the recommended course of action is correct, adding
that the approach to the Thais should be pursued vigorously rather
than waiting for appropriate opportunities to bring it up.
4. Ambassador Unger has asked that the information in para-
graphs 1 and 2 be brought to your attention.
For the Deputy Director for Plans:
William E. Nelson2

2
Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

184. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T.

Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, December 13, 1972.

SUBJECT
Message to the President from Field Marshal Thanom

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565,
Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A no-
tation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.
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Thailand 391

Field Marshal Thanom, Chairman of the Thai National Executive

Council, has sent a message to the President dealing with the situation
in Indochina and U.S.-Thai relations (Tab A).2
The letter congratulates the President on his re-election and for the
leading role which he and his staff have played in bringing the Viet-
nam conflict to the brink of a settlement3 in keeping with “peace with
honor.” Thanom then goes on to point out, though, that the continued
presence of large North Vietnamese combat forces in Laos and Cam-
bodia does not augur well for the prospect of immediate peace in
Southeast Asia, notes the damage which the externally-supported Thai
insurgency has caused to his country’s national development, and
speaks of Thailand’s consequent “continual need of effective weapons
and budgetary resources.”
Thanom goes on to say that “with regard to the question of a gen-
eral peaceful settlement of all conflicts in Southeast Asia, it is our opin-
ion that if such a settlement were to be contingent upon the terms dic-
tated by the aggressive forces then it is neither satisfactory nor in
consonance with your noble goal of ‘peace with honour’.” He adds
that a durable peace in Vietnam also requires that the questions of in-
direct aggression and externally supported insurgency in the immedi-
ate neighboring states must be properly dealt with and included in the
terms of the eventual settlement.
Turning to the Thai role in support of U.S. actions in the Vietnam
war, Thanom calls attention to Thai base facilities which have been made
available “gratuitously” to the U.S. armed forces stationed on Thai soil—
with consequent great savings to the United States—this despite grave
risks and heavy criticism, including criticism from U.S. quarters.
In conclusion, Thanom expresses the belief that the U.S. continues
to bear a great responsibility for the preservation of the power equi-
librium in the Asian-Pacific region and for helping to bring prosperity
to the nations of the region. Citing the “vital concern” to Thailand of
the questions he has raised, Thanom declares that for some, preven-
tive measures should be taken immediately; for others, exchanges of
views are necessary. He therefore suggests that “confidential discus-
sions at a high level between our two countries would be mutually
beneficial,” and asks that this suggestion receive the President’s urgent
attention.

2
Attached at Tab A but not printed was telegram 17465 from Bangkok, December
12, which transmitted Thanom’s December 12 letter.
3
The United States and North Vietnam reached an agreement on a cease-fire in
late October, but ratification was put on hold due to South Vietnamese objections to the
North Vietnamese being allowed to remain in place within South Vietnam. The agree-
ment was not ratified until January 1973.
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392 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Comment
Clearly, the matters uppermost in Thanom’s mind are:
—The nature of the settlement which will be worked out for the
war in Indochina;
—Whether or not this settlement will safeguard Thai interests;
—The dimensions of the quid pro quo which the Thai should re-
ceive from the U.S. in return for the large contributions which they
have made to the U.S. war effort.
These matters are indeed ones which we would expect the Thai to
be concerned about, and to want to receive the President’s urgent at-
tention. Accordingly, Thanom will probably be considerably put out if
the visit to Saigon by the Vice President and General Haig is not ex-
tended to include Bangkok. We believe that it in fact would be highly
desirable for them to touch base with Thanom, even though additional
consultations with Prime Minister Souvanna and President Lon Nol
might then also be necessary.

185. Letter From President Nixon to Thai National Executive

Council Chairman Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn1

Washington, December 16, 1972.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciated very much receiving your letter of December 12,
19722 in which you quite clearly laid out your views on the coming
peace settlement in Vietnam. I have asked General Haig to deliver for
me this reply to the questions you have raised and to outline for you
the present status of negotiations.
May I first, however, thank you for your kind thoughts on my re-
election and your hopes for my second term which were contained in
your letter of December 12, as well as in your message of November
8. I was also moved by your generous compliments on our efforts to
bring about a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. We all hope that

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret;
Nodis. It was delivered by General Haig on his late December–January trip to Southeast
Asia.
2
See footnote 2, Document 184.
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Thailand 393

this will be achieved soon on terms that will provide a stable base for
peace in the region.
I appreciate your concern for the continued presence of substan-
tial North Vietnamese forces in Laos and the Khmer Republic, as well
as for the externally-inspired insurgency which you are confronting at
home. I want to assure you that we too are concerned about these prob-
lems. I know that you are also greatly interested in the terms of a pos-
sible Vietnam peace settlement. It is in view of these wholly under-
standable concerns on your part that I have asked General Haig to
discuss these matters with you at this important juncture.
As regards the question you raised concerning North Vietnamese
forces in Laos and the Khmer Republic, I would note that the draft
peace settlement contemplates the removal of these forces. May I also
reiterate my gratitude for the vital assistance which the Thai irregular
forces have given in coping with this problem in Laos.
As to the governing insurgency in Thailand, I am impressed by
the increased attention which your Government is now giving to this
substantial threat to your security and by the growing effectiveness
with which you are meeting this challenge. You may be sure we will
continue to do everything we can to provide the security and economic
assistance necessary to assist you in coping with this insurgency.
I am keenly aware of the burdens which Thailand has willingly
assumed to help defend the Republic of Vietnam against aggression
from the north. Your earlier contribution of troops and your present
provision of Thai bases have been invaluable in our combined effort
to defeat this blatant attempt to take over South Vietnam by military
force. I recognize the difficulties which your generous contributions
have posed for Thailand, and want you to know that these are deeply
appreciated. At the same time, I know that you recognize that the se-
curity of Thailand is a key to the stability of the region. Your efforts in
Vietnam—and in Indochina as a whole—are a reflection on the im-
portance of developments there to the security of Thailand. I want to
assure you that the United States intends to stand solidly behind its
longstanding security commitment to Thailand.
I hope you will share, in all candor, your concerns with General
Haig. He will report these fully to me on his return, and I assure you
that I will give them my closest attention.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
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Philippines

186. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 2, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS
President Marcos of the Philippines
Dr. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lindsey Grant, NSC Staff Member

U.S.-Philippine Relations
President Marcos introduced the question of U.S.-Philippine rela-
tions with the observation that the Philippines must be seen “not as a
puppet, but as a friend.” He said that it had caused him troubles when
President Johnson had referred to him as his “right arm in Asia.”
President Marcos said that, if the U.S. has problems in Asia, it
should “tell its friends first” as to how it planned to meet them, rather
than imposing solutions on Asia. Asked for an example, President Mar-
cos cited the recent matter of Prince Sihanouk’s overtures through the
Philippine Ambassador for better relations with the U.S. Marcos had
relayed the information through our Ambassador,2 but had received
no further response from the U.S. He had solicited U.S. views as to
how to persuade Japan to take a more responsible military role in Asia,
but had run into a blank wall.
Dr. Kissinger assured President Marcos of President Nixon’s high
regard, cited the need to be in continuing communication, and em-
phasized that if President Marcos ever has suggestions to pass to Pres-
ident Nixon, we shall look into them with care and answer them. He
promised to look into the Sihanouk question and be back in touch.
Toward the close of the meeting, President Marcos reverted to the
bilateral relation issue and reiterated that he wished to remain close to

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PHIL–US. Secret;
Exdis. Presumably drafted by Grant and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). The meeting
was held at the Shoreham Hotel. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos was in Wash-
ington for the funeral of former President Eisenhower.
2
Telegram 644 from Manila, January 20, reported Marcos’ conversation with U.S.
Ambassador G. Mennen Williams, and noted that the “President stated that he had been
invited to make a visit to Cambodia and that the Cambodians wanted him to help im-
prove relations with U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1
PHIL)
394
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Philippines 395

the U.S. but to “adopt a stance of independence.” He did not wish to

be “in opposition, or disagreeable.” Dr. Kissinger agreed that we do
not want satellites, and we want the Philippines to show themselves
independent. We do, however, judge our friends in large degree by
their actions. If the Philippines agrees with us on actions to be taken
in the area, we do not much care about the superficial factors. Presi-
dent Marcos underlined that we agree on the need to oppose Com-
munism, the common goal of security in the area, and the need to take
effective measures to attain those ends. He said that the Philippines
can help us with other Asians in pursuing those goals. He wanted U.S.
military bases to remain in the Philippines both for their economic ben-
efit and because there should be a U.S. presence in Asia.
In parting, President Marcos raised the Laurel–Langley agreement.3
He warned that the Philippines may strike very tough bargaining po-
sitions in the negotiations over the follow-on to Laurel–Langley. He
asked for understanding, and said that some Philippine industries,
such as sugar, will collapse if the preferential arrangements are not ex-
tended. The effect on the Philippine economy would be catastrophic.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that President Nixon had instructed him to look
into the matter, and he would do so.
Vietnam
President Marcos suggested that the Philippines could be more ef-
fective if it withdrew PHILCAG, which was proving very expensive,
and concentrated on helping the GVN to develop an effective con-
stabulary force. He observed that the Philippines has much relevant
experience. The training programs could perhaps be conducted in the
Philippines.
Dr. Kissinger mentioned that President Nixon has been interested
in an improved constabulary operation for weeks. It should probably
not be either incorporated in the military or run by AID. He wished to
look into President Marcos’ suggestion.
President Marcos wondered whether General Valeriano, now res-
ident in the States, might be a good person to take over the develop-
ment of a constabulary.
Dr. Kissinger asked the President’s thoughts on possibilities for a
settlement. President Marcos supported the idea that the South Viet-
namese should work out their internal arrangements, and that the U.S.
might be able to work out a satisfactory military withdrawal as the first

3
The Laurel–Langley agreement granted the Philippines preferential U.S. tariff
treatment for sugar and other key exports. It was negotiated by Senator José Laurel as
head of a Philippine economic mission sent to the United States in 1955 by President
Magsaysay.
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396 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

topic for the talks. He believed that Hanoi, which had thought that
time was on its side, was beginning to have doubts. During the sub-
sequent discussion, President Marcos asked whether the U.S. would be
willing to withdraw, to which Dr. Kissinger said that we would not
withdraw precipitately or unilaterally. The other side must also with-
draw from Laos and Cambodia; then we will withdraw.
President Marcos remarked on a recent conversation with Vice
President Ky; he said that Ky had shown himself “eager” to meet with
the NLF leaders. Asked whether this reflects mistrust of us, President
Marcos guessed that Ky may fear a U.S.–NLF deal without knowledge,
but that this fear is probably transitory.
President Marcos asked pointblank whether there are any moves
under way to promote conversations beyond the public ones in Paris.
Who is doing it, and what are the prospects? Dr. Kissinger professed
a lack of knowledge as to the initiatives of various parties, but said that
the Communists are realists; if they believe it better to settle now rather
than two years hence, they will settle now. Asked again whether there
are private negotiations presently underway with North Vietnam, he
said that there have been private meetings from time to time, but that
there is not a continuing series going on now. President Marcos then
suggested that there should be such talks, and that public talks in Paris
would be useless without them.
Dr. Kissinger asked whether President Marcos felt that we were
consulting sufficiently with him. The President said that consultation
has been adequate so far, but that the time may be approaching for
more consultations with Asian leaders. They must be private.
Japan
In answer to a question, President Marcos said that the Philip-
pines would look favorably upon a Japanese role in regional military
security, “provided the U.S. were there.” He had been interested in re-
marks which Kishi had made concerning the increase in the Japanese
military budget and amendments to the Constitution. Marcos said that
he was interested, and wondered whether there were a “new trend”
in Japanese thinking. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he doubted that
the Japanese were yet ready for a major expansion in their military
expenditures.
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Philippines 397

187. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 2, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Republic of the Philippines
James F. Rafferty, Special Assistant, AmEmbassy Manila

I had lunch with President and Mrs. Marcos on Wednesday, April

2. The President was in a jubilant mood. I hadn’t seen him this elated
in over six months. He felt his visit was a great success. Also he felt he
had outmaneuvered his opponents (Magsaysay and Osmena).
Two important results of the trip according to Marcos were:
(1) He was convinced the U.S. and in particular the CIA was not
consorting with his political enemies. I asked him point blank at lunch
how his talks with the Director went.2 He answered that he was con-
vinced that there was no effort on CIA’s part to undermine him. On
the contrary he seemed to feel that he had the support of the Nixon
administration. (Whether this present feeling that the U.S. is not work-
ing against him will continue when he returns to the political jungle
of Manila remains to be seen.)
(2) He said he had an excellent talk with President Nixon.3 He
said he advised President Nixon to use him in Asia and if he (Nixon)
ever wanted to have an “Asian opinion” President Nixon could qui-
etly check with him. At this point he indicated his severe displeasure
with President Johnson’s statement about him (Marcos) “that he (Mar-
cos) was his right arm in Asia.” Marcos said he was “still trying to live
this statement down with his fellow Asians.”
Marcos said he discussed Laurel–Langley with President Nixon.
Marcos asked the President to extend these economic privileges be-
yond the expiration of Laurel–Langley. If these privileges were not

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret;
Nodis. Drafted by Rafferty on April 4.
2
Helms met with President Marcos at the Philippine Embassy on April 1. According
to an undated memorandum from the CIA to Richard K. Stuart (INR): “The meeting was
arranged at Marcos’ request with the knowledge and assistance of the Department of
State.” Marcos had come to the United States to attend President Eisenhower’s funeral.
He told Helms “that he had wished to discuss rumors of CIA involvement in internal
Philippine affairs. The Director took the occasion to assure Marcos that the CIA was sup-
porting no candidate for President of the Philippines.” (Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, Philippines 1969, 1970, 1971)
3
According to an April 7 memorandum from Walsh to Kissinger, to which this
memorandum of conversation is attached, Marcos’ meeting with President Nixon “was
a private one and we have no U.S. version of the conversation.”
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398 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

extended Marcos believed the Philippine economy would collapse.

Marcos stated that President Nixon agreed in principle that these priv-
ileges would be extended and that “things could be worked out.”4

4
According to a May 6 memorandum from Richard M. Moose of the National Se-
curity Council Staff to the State Secretariat, the “President has agreed that we should
make sure that President Marcos understands that we have made no commitments to
extend the economic preferences of the Laurel–Langley agreement after 1974.” Attached
but not printed.

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of

the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(Hughes)1

Washington, April 4, 1969.

SUBJECT
Philippines—Request by President Marcos for Direct Channel to CIA

At the regular EA/CIA meeting today (Brown, Godley, Wright,

Duemling, and Trueheart present), Nelson reported on a meeting be-
tween Helms and Marcos which took place during the latter’s pres-
ence in Washington for the Eisenhower funeral. At this meeting Helms,
responding to concerns expressed by Marcos, gave categoric assurances
that CIA is in no way involved in the Philippine elections and would
not be. He distinguished the present situation sharply from the
Magsaysay period when CIA had helped out in the anti-Huk campaign.
Marcos appeared to be reassured.
Marcos then went on to express his concerns—as he has done be-
fore—over the alleged poor communications between his administra-
tion and the administration in Washington. To correct this deficiency,
he proposed—and subsequently repeated the request three times—that
Helms [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] establish direct con-
tact with him. To establish the link he said [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] should get in touch initially with the notorious Kokoi

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971.
Secret. Drafted by Trueheart. Hughes initialed the memorandum, as did two others, to
indicate that he had seen it.
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Philippines 399

Romualdez, his brother-in-law and campaign manager. Marcos said

that he might have need of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
advice of some unspecified sort in the coming months. Helms ulti-
mately said that he would like to help if he could but Nelson was not
sure whether he had made a firm undertaking to establish the requested
contact. The only other thing that transpired at this meeting was that
the Filipinos managed to get Helms and Marcos to pose for photo-
graphs together.
Marshall Wright, the Country Director, expressed the gravest con-
cern over the proposed contact which was patently intended by Mar-
cos to give him political advantage [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassi-
fied]. The proposed relationship would also undermine the position of
the new Ambassador and, if established before he arrived, would put
him in a particularly disadvantageous position. I supported Wright
in all of this and added that it would be much easier not to establish
the relationship than to break it off later. Godley, while recognizing the
problems, thought that it would be very difficult to refuse to permit
the President [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified]. Brown was a good
deal more negative and wanted to find out more precisely how much
of a commitment Helms had already undertaken to Marcos. It was
agreed that once we had clarification of this point the matter would be
discussed with the seventh floor and the Secretary or Johnson might
thereafter want to pursue the question further with Helms. Meanwhile,
Helms was to be informed of the concerns expressed at our level.
Brown and Godley subsequently saw Johnson who took the posi-
tion that no contact should be established at least until it can be dis-
cussed with the new Ambassador—whose identity and ETA are un-
known to Godley and me, and perhaps everyone else. Helms is being
informed of this, and unless he has objections, there the matter will
presumably rest.
Comment: I am virtually certain that CIA does not want to estab-
lish this direct contact for any private reasons of its own.
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400 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines1

Washington, April 5, 1969, 1949Z.

52387. For AsSecDes Green.

1. This is round-up of Marcos visit Washington2 based on un-
cleared memos or readouts of all the Marcos conversations except his
private talk with President Nixon.3
2. From the Philippine point of view, we believe the visit was
a smashing success. Marcos met with the President, Vice President,
Secretaries Rogers, Laird, and Finch, a group of Senators,4 Henry
Kissinger5 and Director Helms.6 We understand Marcos left convinced
that he stands well with the Nixon administration, that the U.S. Gov-
ernment is not and will not be involved in supporting his opponents
in the upcoming election, and that we appreciate reasons and have
sympathy for his recent statements about the need for a more self-
reliant Philippines and a more independent Philippine foreign policy.
3. The visit thus served our purpose in removing or allaying the
extreme suspicions and fears which have been so evident recently in
Marcos’ attitude toward us.
4. From a longer run point of view, however, the visit had about
it an unreal air for all the discussions were focused on what the Philip-
pines want from us. Meetings obviously arranged at last minute, U.S.
participants hard pressed for time and there was little or no discussion
of our specific current problems in the Philippines, such as Science tax,
Customs negotiations, validity of 1965 amendment to bases agreement,
PNG problem, territorial seas, etc.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret; Im-
mediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wright, cleared by James M. Hawley (S/S) and Richard Snei-
der (NSC), and approved by Godley.
2
Marcos had numerous meetings with U.S. officials in Washington during the first
4 days of April despite the fact that the Embassy in Manila was advised that “it would
be extremely difficult” to make arrangements for them because “U.S. officials will be
very much occupied” with the funeral of President Eisenhower. Telegram 48924 to
Manila, March 29, advised that Australian Prime Minister Gorton’s March 31 official
visit had been cancelled, and stated that although “we would not want to discourage
Marcos from attending” the funeral, “it should be made clear to him that it would be
most difficult if not impossible to combine ceremonial attendance at funeral with a work-
ing visit.” (Ibid., POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D)
3
See footnote 3, Document 187.
4
No other record of these conversations has been found.
5
See Document 187.
6
See Document 187 and footnote 2 thereto.
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Philippines 401

5. On substantive points (as distinct from atmospherics) Marcos

placed great stress on his balance of payments problem and the re-
sulting GOP desire for: (a) ensured repatriation of dollars earned by
overseas Filipino employees; (b) tight controls over dollars spent by
the U.S. Government and U.S. personnel in Philippines so that dollars
stay out of black market and end up in GOP reserves; (c) need for U.S.
sympathy and cooperation in GOP limiting non-essential imports (au-
tomobiles, textiles, tobacco, etc.)
6. We indicated that we thought we could be helpful in several
ways. We mentioned possibility of “lipsticking” U.S.G. social security
and Veterans benefits checks as one example. In subsequent rather con-
fused exchange with newsmen at press conference Marcos indicated
he thought we might “lipstick” dollar payments to U.S. military per-
sonnel stationed at Philippine bases. He also seemed to think that U.S.
was paying Philippino base employees in dollars. In short, Marcos was
pleased with what we said, but seemed quite unclear about specifics.
Should this come up, suggest you make point that “lipsticking” would
apply only to U.S. benefit checks issued to Philippine residents. You
might also make the point that it would be easier for us to be helpful
on the whole problem of dollar control if Marcos could put an end to
the GOP attempt to impose in violation of the military bases agreement
the Science tax on privately owned vehicles of our military personnel
in Philippines. That matter is arousing considerable adverse Congres-
sional reaction, and creates climate in which dollar control measures
are more difficult to establish and to enforce.
7. Marcos discussed Laurel–Langley extensively. He stressed that
withdrawal of U.S. preferential treatment for Phil products in U.S. mar-
ket would result in severe economic damage to Philippines. He said
withdrawal of sugar quota would cause collapse of sugar industry. At
Marcos’ request, Secretary Rogers agreed that U.S. would do nothing
to raise this issue this year or to publicize possible U.S.G. unwilling-
ness extend tariff preferences beyond life of Laurel–Langley. This is
based on our assumption (not made explicit by Marcos) that GOP will
defer further consultations on Laurel–Langley until 1970.
8. Conversation with Helms reported extensively in another
channel which you should see. In unlikely event question of direct con-
tact comes up, urge that you avoid any statement. (Matter still under
consideration here.)
9. Marcos raised with Kissinger the possibility of the withdrawal
of PHILCAG, and suggested that the Philippines might concentrate in-
stead on helping GVN develop an effective constabulary, possibly
through training in the Philippines. Should this be raised, suggest you
defer any comment beyond possibly mentioning importance of a
united front in Vietnam at this stage and wondering rhetorically
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402 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

whether thought had been given to whether GOP would continue as

a TCC under such a program.
10. Secretary Rogers and Marcos discussed possibility of visit
by Secretary to Manila in June or July. Should this come up, suggest
you reply that you aware of Secretary’s desire visit Manila, but that
when you left Washington his schedule was tight and plans not
worked out.
Rogers

190. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (Walsh) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between President Nixon and Philippine Presidential Candidate Os-
mena During the President’s Visit to Manila

You asked for recommendations as to whether President Nixon

should meet with Senator Osmena, and if so, how such a meeting could
be arranged.
Pros and Cons
There is no gainsaying the fact that President Nixon’s visit will
be—indeed is already being—interpreted by the Filipinos as an act hav-
ing an important bearing on their Presidential election. If President
Nixon does not see Osmena, this will be interpreted as an indication
that we expect Marcos to win, want him to win, and are content to let
Marcos harvest all the spin-off benefits of the visit.
Moreover, it is by no means certain that President Marcos will win
the November election. Osmena may well be the Philippine chief
executive during a period of critical transition in U.S.–Philippine rela-
tions. It is not prudent to ignore that possibility.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 PHIL. Secret.
Drafted by Wright, cleared by Green, and signed by Walsh.
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Philippines 403

Finally, Senator Osmena is unquestionably disappointed that Pres-

ident Nixon has refused to see him during Osmena’s current visit to
the United States.2 Osmena has declined a proferred appointment with
Under Secretary Richardson, probably because he believes that a con-
tact only at that level would be interpreted in the Philippines as a mark
of American disfavor.
The only argument against seeing Osmena is the possibility of of-
fending Marcos.3 Marcos would doubtless prefer that we ignore Os-
mena. However, the Marcos reception in Washington in April was ex-
cellent and he was extremely pleased by it. The President’s visit to
Manila will be a political boon of the first water to Marcos, even if it
includes a brief meeting with Osmena. Marcos is certainly conscious
of all this and can, we believe, be persuaded to accept without too much
ill grace a contact with Osmena.
The Modalities
1. We should inform President Marcos that Senator Osmena has
requested a meeting with President Nixon. We should point out that
it is very difficult to refuse such a request, particularly in view of the
tradition that U.S. Presidents, in dealing with our democratic friends,
customarily meet with leaders of the opposition as a normal aspect of
political intercourse between open societies.
2. We should inform Marcos that to de-personalize the meeting
somewhat we propose that President Nixon will have a brief meeting
on the evening of his arrival with the leaders of the opposition, that is
Party Chairman Roxas, Secretary General Aquino, Presidential candi-
date Osmena and Vice Presidential candidate Magsaysay.
Embassy Manila agrees that a meeting with Osmena is important,
if not in Washington, then in Manila. We favor Manila for the meeting,

2
Kissinger returned a call from Donald Kendall, CEO of Pepsico Inc., on July 1, to
explain the decision not to see Osmena in Washington. Kendall said he was dining with
Osmena that evening and was “prepared to give Osmena any message” Kissinger
thought he should have. Kissinger said that “we have nothing against him and would
not be heartbroken if he won election—odds favor the other guy. Kendall said one thing
that bothers Osmena is that Marcos will use the President’s trip” and Kissinger agreed.
Kissinger said that “he gets nothing but good reports about Osmena which makes it
tough but does not think Pres. should see him.” Kendall asked if there was any partic-
ular message which Kissinger wanted passed to Osmena. Kissinger “said only that we
are interested in close relations with him and if he wins election he will find us cooper-
ative and forthcoming—we have no favorites and are strictly neutral.” (Notes of Tele-
phone Conversation, July 1, 1969, 9:50 a.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
3
Telegram 7261 from Manila, July 11, reported that Osmena’s trip to the United
States brought charges from Marcos that the Senator was an “American boy,” which led
Osmena to declare an “independent policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 7 PHIL)
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404 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

for Osmena has already been turned down on his request for a meet-
ing here with the President. Moreover, a meeting here is more subject
to misinterpretation and distortion than one in Manila, and would not
really substitute for a Manila meeting.
CIA concurs.
John P. Walsh

191. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, July 17, 1969.

SUBJECT
Manila Visit: Your Meetings with President Marcos

1. Schedule: Your schedule is at Tab II.2 It is intended to balance

the close contact with President Marcos3 with sufficient contact with
opposition and other leaders to demonstrate that you are not taking
sides in the current Philippine election campaign, and sufficient pub-
lic exposure is programmed to establish a sense of contact with the
Philippine people.
2. Background: Note: Attached at Tab A4 is a memorandum which
covers general themes which are applicable to Thailand, the Philip-
pines and Indonesia. This memorandum covers those themes which
are peculiar to the Philippines. Your arrival comes at a time when the
Philippines are facing many urgent problems. Domestically, corruption
and inefficiency in government have reached proportions sufficient to
menace economic stability. There are virtually no foreign exchange re-
serves, and there is an unhealthy reliance upon the income derived
from US bases and military expenditures. Separatist sentiment among

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 461, Pres-
ident’s Trip Files, Presidential Correspondence File, Part II. Secret. Sent for information.
2
Attached but not printed. Nixon began a global tour on July 25 by flying to Guam.
He arrived in the Philippines July 26 and departed July 27. He subsequently visited In-
donesia, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and Romania, and returned to Washington
on August 3.
3
Presidents Nixon and Marcos held a private meeting from 3 to 5 p.m. on July 26.
No memorandum of conversation of this private meeting has been found.
4
Attached but not printed.
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Philippines 405

Muslim Filipinos in the Southern Philippines is increasing, due in large

part to a feeling that the economic and political aspirations of the Mus-
lims are being ignored.
On the foreign side, there has been widespread Filipino criticism
of the Philippine contribution to Vietnam, the PHILCAG (Philippine
Civil Assistance Group, an Army engineer contingent having its own
security forces), for diverting funds away from national development.
Filipino nationalism has been aroused over an old claim to Malyasian
Sabah (North Borneo), and last year it became public knowledge that
President Marcos was supporting a clandestine effort to infiltrate
Philippine Muslim saboteurs into Sabah. This effort has been stopped,
but Philippine-Malaysian relations remain strained. The development
of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a regional
grouping of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philip-
pines) into a going concern has been compromised as a result.
The US-Philippine relationship, seen from Manila, is an ambiva-
lent thing. There is much affection for America in the countryside, but
strident anti-Americanism has become fashionable in Manila.5 There,
the Filipinos are very sensitive to the former colonial relationship—ex-
emplified by the continued presence of US bases—and blame us for
most of their problems. Fed by this sentiment and further stirred by
hostile press articles, anti-US demonstrations have occurred—mostly
among student groups—and may take place during your visit. Yet the
Filipinos are economically and emotionally dependent on us, and not
prepared to make the sacrifices which alternatives to the present rela-
tionship would entail. Your visit provides an opportunity to reach the
Philippine people in general and convince them of continuing Ameri-
can friendship, while encouraging national self-reliance.
An election campaign is underway. President Marcos is trying to
convince the Manila sophisticates that he is not your puppet, but that
he can get more from the US than anybody else, while he tries to show
the rural electorate that he is your friend and confidant. His principal
opponent, Sergio Osmena, has also attempted to identify himself with
the US.
3. What Marcos Will Want:
a. First and foremost, Marcos will be attempting to use your visit
for his political purposes, and to prevent rival candidate Osmena from
benefiting from your visit. Arrangements have been made for you to
have some contact with Osmena and other opposition leaders to coun-
terbalance Marcos’ efforts.

5
Airgram A–182 from Manila, June 17, 1969, reported Political Counselor Francis
T. Underhill’s observations of anti-Americanism in Manila. (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL PHIL–US)
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406 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

b. Second, Marcos will try to focus the discussions on economic

matters in hopes of obtaining some economic concessions from you. He
wants these both for political reasons—to show his ability to get things
from the Americans—and to help alleviate very real and pressing eco-
nomic problems. His proposed agenda for talks with you amounts in
part to a “shopping list” which includes financial aid to support the cur-
rency; economic assistance (PL 480, AID development loan funds); trade
concessions (early negotiations on the Laurel–Langley Agreement, which
would extend until 1974 Philippine tariff preferences in the US market,
with reciprocal advantages for US businessmen in the Philippines); and
Philippine participation in post-war rehabilitation and construction in
Vietnam (a new “Marshall Plan” for Asia).
—We have informed the Filipinos that you will not wish to dis-
cuss economic issues in detail, but we expect that Marcos will never-
theless give it a try.
c. Third, Marcos may want you to agree to a review of the status
of the US bases in the Philippines. Although the three main US bases
(Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and Sangley Point Naval Sta-
tion) are recognized by the Filipinos as key contributions to Philippine
defense, they also resent the bases as vestiges of colonialism and seek
a greater degree of Philippine sovereignty and control. Particular Fil-
ipino objectives are obtaining more favorable terms on criminal juris-
diction, a return of some base lands, and a greater voice in the ad-
ministration of the bases.
d. Fourth, Marcos hopes for increased US military assistance.
There is substantial dissident movement in Central Luzon, against
which Marcos wants greater material and logistical support (helicop-
ters, M–16’s and construction of military highways). In part, this may
be a disguised way of gaining extra economic assistance. Marcos would
also like a more automatic defense commitment under the Mutual De-
fense Treaty. (In the Philippine dispute with Malaysia over Sabah, he
resented the fact that we did not regard the Treaty as covering a
Malaysian attack.)
e. Finally, Marcos will want to hear your views on Vietnam and
the Paris negotiations, the US role in Asia after the Vietnam conflict,
the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet role in Asia. Paradoxically, these
major issues weigh less in the minds of the Filipinos than do internal
issues. Marcos has also sanctioned increasing contacts with the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe and Communist China.
4. What We Want: You will want your presence to be taken as ev-
idence of your own and US’s warm and sincere friendship for the Fil-
ipino people. You recognize that there have been strains and misun-
derstandings in our relationship, and that the US bears its share of the
responsibility for the problems which have arisen. For your part you
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Philippines 407

will do whatever you can to reduce sources of friction and to restore

US-Philippine relations to the levels of mutual confidence and respect
which formerly existed. You are emphatically not looking towards a
“special relationship” which would downgrade Philippine sover-
eignty; you recognize that the Filipinos are searching for a new sense
of national identify, and you support them in their search. To this end,
you will wish to put our relations on a more equal basis, and to begin
the process of eliminating some of the sources of Manila’s present anti-
Americanism, while maintaining our friendly relations, our base rights
and other facilities in the Philippines.
You will also want to show that the US continues to support Philip-
pine economic progress and security. You are willing to explore ways
in which the US might make its aid more effective, and would en-
courage the Filipinos to participate in regional arrangements such as
ASEAN as well.
Although Philippine concerns over the Vietnam war and post-
Vietnam Asia are perhaps less than in other countries which you will
visit, you will want Marcos to know your thoughts and, if possible, en-
courage him to play a more active and constructive role in regional
affairs.
5. Points You Should Stress:
a. The US-Philippine economic relationship:
—Emphasize your interest in growing Philippine self-reliance, and
endorse Philippine efforts to establish broader relations, particularly
through regional organizations such as ASEAN.
—Point to the inherent dangers of extreme Philippine reliance
upon a single market. (We presently take 44% of Philippine exports.)
—Remain noncommittal on the Laurel–Langley negotiations, but
indicate willingness to see progress made. (Marcos has already raised
this matter with you and me.) Make clear that the ultimate objective
should be warm and friendly relations without special preferences.
—Refer specific economic problems to the advisers or to regular US-
Philippine consultations, emphasizing the need for careful staff work.
—On a “Marshall Plan” for Asia, you will want to point to the
problems both at home and in terms of the Paris negotiations of at-
tempting to describe and launch a major new aid structure for Asia at
this time. You may also wish to point out that the time is past for uni-
lateral donor programs, and that we hope to cooperate with other rich
nations in encouraging economic development in Southeast Asia.
b. The Military Bases
—Suggest that you express willingness to work toward an amica-
ble resolution of differences which would at the same time preserve
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408 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the utility of the bases in defense of Philippine and US security. You

are interested in cutting down the US presence in foreign countries. US
forces overseas have already been reduced. US base issues should be
susceptible of resolution through negotiations.
c. Military Assistance
—You would appreciate a review by Marcos of the nature of the
dissident movement, and will refer any requests he may submit for
stepped-up assistance to the proper officials of the US Government.
—Any review of the Mutual Defense Treaty would need to take
place under circumstances in which all considerations can be carefully
reviewed and both Philippine and US defense requirements (including
regional needs) taken into account.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and other issues.]

192. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, August 4, 1969, 0848Z.

8227. Subject: Meeting of Presidents with Advisers, Manila, July

26. Ref: Manila 8218.2
1. Following is telegraphic summary of memcon covering meet-
ing of Presidents Nixon and Marcos with presidential advisers (reftel)
in Manila July 26. Memcon itself approved by Green and pouched Dept
from Sun Moon Lake.
2. President Nixon said he and President Marcos had again had a
good talk, covering general exchange of views as well as certain bilat-
eral problems. In latter category were military assistance and Philip-
pine financial problems. He and President Marcos has agreed that such
problems should be worked out by the people that handle them on
a day-to-day basis. The President noted that the United States had a
few financial problems itself, and he would refer specific questions to

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON/
MOONGLOW. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Moonglow.
2
Telegram 8218 from Manila, August 4, summarized the details of the Presiden-
tial Advisers meeting in Manila on July 26. The U.S. side included Kissinger, Rogers, and
Green. The conversation centered on various aspects of U.S. financial assistance to and
dealings with the Philippines. (Ibid., POL 7 US/NIXON)
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Philippines 409

Secretaries of State and Treasury and New York bankers for further
consideration.
3. Of greater interest, the President continued, was their discus-
sion of US future role in Asia. Manner in which war in Vietnam was
settled would have considerable bearing on this question. He had de-
scribed progress of Paris Talks, and said there were some “glimmers
of change” leading to hope, but no real change. Lull in fighting, how-
ever, deserved careful watching. For its part, US has been as forth-
coming as it could be and President Thieu could not go further with-
out being brought down.
The President said that US had withdrawn forces and would with-
draw more. If Hanoi increased military activity in face of this, further
appraisal would be necessary. At same time did not want to appear too
pessimistic since there was some possibility we might be on verge of
break over.
5. Way in which war concluded, the President added, must not
prejudice future US role in Asia. American experience in Korea and
Vietnam tended to disillusion average American. But US is Pacific
power and must continue to play major role in area of vital future sig-
nificance. Therefore satisfactory long-term solution to Vietnam prob-
lem must be found which will not damage American spirit. New ap-
proaches thus were needed. The US will continue to help, he said, but
cannot continue as we have sometimes done in the past, to try to do it
all ourselves.
6. President Marcos said he had been greatly heartened at what
President Nixon had said to him. He had been deply concerned about
the prospect of an American withdrawal. He now understood US
dilemma and had received new perspective on US difficulties. Other
Asian countries as well would be happy to know US had no intention
of precipitate withdrawal.
7. Under these circumstances, President Marcos continued, he felt
the Philippines could plan to face the dangers of internal subversion
rather than external aggression. On former Philippines needed to de-
velop capabilities farther. He noted that Red China is still trying to ex-
port subversive war, and that he needed US material help but not US
forces. He and President Nixon had agreed, he said, that economic sta-
bility was an essential element in resisting internal subversion.
8. The meeting adjourned at 5:30 pm.
Wilson
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410 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 29, 1969, 1054Z.

10217. Subject: Election Interference.

1. We have had in the last three days a most worrisome develop-
ment in US-Philippine relations, but as of now I believe things are get-
ting back on the track. It had to do with charges that illegal election-
eering material and bogus money were entering the Philippines
through the Mactan air base and that senior US officers, both civilian
and military, were involved in this activity. These accusations were ac-
companied by an informal request that the accused officers be removed
from the Philippines. This message reports an interview with acting
Foreign Secretary Ingles on September 26 and President Marcos on Sep-
tember 28.
2. Acting Secretary Ingles asked me2 to call at 5:30 on September
26. Executive Secretary Maceda was in his office when I arrived and
was present during the meeting.
3. Ingles said he wanted to relay to me a message from President
Marcos. It was a very serious charge that some of our people were in-
terfering in Philippine internal affairs by taking sides in the election.
He said that the President had intelligence reports which indicated that
propaganda material and counterfeit money was coming in on our air-
craft landing at Mactan and being turned over to the opposition. In-
gles said that they wanted to inspect our incoming cargo to prevent
this from happening in the future.
4. I told him that I did not know the terms of our base agreement
affecting Mactan but would look into the matter urgently and be in
touch with him as soon as possible.
5. Ingles then said that the evidence pointed to the involvement
of two officers in the Mactan area and two senior officers in the Em-
bassy, and that Marcos had asked that these officers be removed from
the Philippines. Maceda at this point broke in to say that the President
was so concerned that he had considered sending Kokoy Romualdez
to Washington to convey the evidence.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 555,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC exclu-
sive for Admiral McCain, and to 13th Air Force exclusive for General Dempster.
2
The new U.S. Ambassador, Henry A. Byroade, presented his credentials to the
Philippine Government on August 29.
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Philippines 411

6. I told Maceda that I was making a formal request through him

to see President Marcos at the first opportunity. I said that I would like
to see the evidence, that I would investigate the matter thoroughly, but
that I was convinced that no senior officer of the Embassy could be en-
gaged in any such action. Ingles, in a somewhat sheepish manner, said
that it was of course not necessary to produce evidence. I agreed, but
said that it would be most unusual in the relations between two friendly
countries, particularly the Philippines and the US, to send home sen-
ior officers under such a cloud. This request, I continued, would come
as a great shock to Washington and I felt that it would be best for our
overall relations not to report the conversation until I had talked per-
sonally to the President. I said that if I did report it I would obviously
get instructions to see the President anyway at the earliest opportunity.
At this point Maceda said something which made it apparent that there
was uncertainty about the identity of one of the officers. I said that this
uncertainty made it all the more necessary for me to talk personally to
the President and clear up the matter. Maceda said that he would ra-
dio to the President and arrange for an appointment.
7. I saw Marcos at 8:30 last night shortly after he had returned
from a campaign trip. After delivering the Nixon family pictures (a
good time for them to arrive!), I said that Maceda and Ingles had pre-
viously given me a most serious matter which I felt necessitated a re-
quest to see him even in the midst of his demanding schedule. Marcos
said that he was truly concerned about some reports he had seen of
activities at Mactan. He doubted that the traffic concerned was of real
significance but hoped that it could be stopped before it became sig-
nificant. He said he could hardly believe our officials at Mactan were
involved, but the evidence he had was disturbing.
8. I told Marcos it was most important that he not misunderstand
what I was about to say. I wanted him to know first of all that I rec-
ognized beyond any doubt that the final decision as to what foreign-
ers remained in his country was up to him. I also wanted him to know
that at this point I was in no position to deny anything that might have
happened at Mactan because I was in no position to know. My chief
request to him was to furnish us with such evidence as he could so
that we could make a most thorough investigation. I told him that I
would lead this investigation personally and would like to go to Mac-
tan on Tuesday, probably accompanied by General Gideon’s inspector
general, if I could get the facts in time to make that schedule. I went
on to tell him that my instructions from the Secretary of State and the
President were explicit that no American should involve himself in any
way in the election process in the Philippines. I had personally passed
this out after my arrival, not only to my senior staff, but also at the
various bases that I had been able to visit so far. I had followed this
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412 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

up with a written instruction to every American to not only remain

out of the election process completely, but to avoid any act that could
through misunderstanding cause the slightest suspicion of being in-
volved. I said that in the face of all this I found it very difficult to be-
lieve that American personnel were involved, because their careers
would be at stake, and we operated a very tight system where mat-
ters such as this were involved. I said this was one reason I had not
so far reported the matter to Washington as I was afraid of severe re-
action there, caused by an unwillingness to believe that our senior
people could be involved, particularly so as we had been given no
evidence.
9. Marcos interrupted to ask if I had not been given details of their
charges, and seemed surprised when I replied in the negative. He said
he would provide them to me and attempted unsuccessfully to get the
papers from his staff as it was late Sunday evening. I told him I did
not want to take his personal time on such a matter in any event and
he agreed to supply the information to me through Rafferty today. He
said that I would find that some of the information including items,
tail numbers, etc. would be specific.
10. The President said he was most concerned about counterfeit
money, campaign propaganda, and weapons coming in from outside
the Philippines. He had specific information, that he felt had nothing
to do with us, that the first shipment of 10 million pesos supplied by
a Stephen Sy, a Chinese in Hong Kong, was to arrive in the Philippines
between the 25th and 30th September, after a couple of trial runs of
other less important amounts and items. In this connection it occurred
to him that perhaps that past shipments in question into Mactan might
have been these trial shipments.
11. I told him that by Tuesday night Mactan, at least from the
American side, would be one tight airport. I said I would talk to Gen-
eral Gideon as soon as he returns, and to his deputy in his absence
about tightening up at Clark in every conceivable way.
12. Marcos never mentioned the two senior officers here in Manila,
nor did he say anything about desiring that I have any people removed.
I believe, therefore, particularly with the steps that I told him I would
take, that a PNG request is not in the works.
13. Marcos sounds as if he has hard evidence, but considering the
heightening Malacanang tensions as election day approaches, we may
find nothing but a sinister interpretation of an innocent incident. How-
ever, since the charge comes directly from the head of state, I feel we
must make an honest effort to investigate.
14. An extreme position of subordinates followed by a calmer,
moderate attitude of the boss is, I understand, Filipino tactic to test the
water, and Marcos may have also been floating a “to-whom-it-may-
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Philippines 413

concern” warning while soliciting a reassurance3 that we are not

against him.
Byroade

3
Telegram 10314 from Manila, October 1, reported alleged Philippine sightings of
several small “bundles” of papers being taken off USAF C–141s at Mactan and deliv-
ered to the USIS office in Cebu City. The Philippine Government reported its suspicion
that these bundles were election materials supporting Osmena, Marcos’ opponent in the
upcoming presidential election, but provided no proof. (National Archives, Nixon Pres-
idential Materials, NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I)
Telegram 10354 from Manila, October 3, reported that its investigation did not develop
any information to confirm these suspicions. (Ibid.) Telegram 10484 from Manila, Octo-
ber 6, reported Byroade’s letter to Marcos, detailing the results of the investigation. (Ibid.)
The matter thereafter was dropped by both sides.

194. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental

Coordinating Group (McClintock) to the Under Secretary of
State (Richardson)1

Washington, October 3, 1969.

SUBJECT
Principal Themes Developed by Symington Subcommittee

On the basis of the first week of the Symington hearings on the

Philippines (which apparently will terminate today with the closed in-
terrogation of the NSA witness), the main thrust of the Committee’s
inquiry2 seems fairly evident.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Sub-
ject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Robert
McClintock (PM), who was designated by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
U. Alexis Johnson to represent the Department of State at meetings of a White House
Working Group. President Nixon appointed this group to coordinate the testimony of
all agencies of the Executive Branch before the Symington subcommittee. Copies were
sent to Kissinger, BeLieu, French, U. Alexis Johnson, Torbert, Spiers, Green, Sullivan, and
Moore.
2
On September 22 the White House Working Group set up an Interdepartmental
Coordinating Group, chaired by McClintock, to supervise testimony before the Sub-
committee. In a November memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, John D. Erlich-
man stated that McClintock “was given clear instructions at this meeting, as to the cat-
egories of materials that should not be given to the Subcommittee.” Erlichman added
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414 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

A major theme will be to try to make a case that past Adminis-

trations, and by inference the present Administration, have undertaken
commitments to foreign governments far in excess of the basic defense
agreements which were ratified with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate. A case in point is the communiqué issued by the White House on
October 6, 1964, following talks between President Johnson and the
then Philippine President Macapagal, which stated:
“They reviewed, in this connection, the importance of the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in main-
taining the security of both countries, and reaffirmed their commitment
to meet any threat that might arise against their security. President
Johnson made it clear that, in accordance with these existing alliances
and the deployment and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack
against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against the
United States forces stationed there and against the United States and
would instantly be repelled.”
A similar case occurred with Korea. In reply to a press conference
question in Korea on February 23, 1966, Vice President Humphrey
made the following statement:
“The United States Government and the people of the United
States have a firm commitment to the defense of Korea. As long as there
is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line,
the whole and the entire power of the United States of America is com-
mitted to the security and defense of Korea.”
It seems to me that when eventually the Secretary or you are asked
to testify before the Subcommittee on overall policy with regard to over-
seas commitments, the line to be taken is that we frankly recognize that
the statements made by the last Administration were in fact in excess

that it was explained to McClintock that “the President had directed that guidelines for
these hearings be set by the White House rather than by each department.” McClintock
was also advised that no witness was to give any indication “that the White House was
supervising or issuing instructions.” (Ibid.) In a September 24 memorandum to Kenneth
BeLieu at the White House (who was also a member of the Working Group), McClin-
tock delineated eight types of material or information “which under no circumstances
should be divulged to the Subcommittee,” including information on nuclear storage, mil-
itary contingency plans, and privileged communications between Chiefs of State or gov-
ernment. McClintock continued that the “Working Group defined materials or informa-
tion which can be provided the Committee in sanitized version in the following four
categories: 1) Corruption and crimes against US personnel and property in the Philip-
pines; 2) Programs directed toward counter-insurgency matters; 3) Air defense arrange-
ments between US and P.I.; 4) Negotiations for PHILCAGV.” Finally, McClintock noted
that “a large amount of data” had already been provided to the Subcommittee, includ-
ing international commitments, U.S. military facilities, forces, and missions in the Philip-
pines, the Military Assistance Program and DOD and AID programs for counter-
insurgency for the Philippines, joint military planning, and the Philippine contribution
to the war effort in Vietnam, particularly PHILCAGV. (Ibid.)
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Philippines 415

of our explicit treaty obligations. What the present Administration

seeks to do is to go back to the letter of those agreements ratified with
the advice and consent of the Senate. This has already been suggested
by the Secretary’s speech in Canberra on August 8, and by you in your
speech in New York on September 5.
Senator Symington is obsessed with the fear of imminent bank-
ruptcy of the US. He is convinced that a major measure for cutting
down government spending lies in the broad field of our overseas com-
mitments, which would include the MAP program and bases. At this
point, Senator Symington removes his fiscal hat and puts on his Gen-
eral’s cap. Another of his obsessions is the idea that overseas bases are
no longer necessary because ICBM missiles and Polaris submarine
rockets make the stationing of US conventional forces abroad no longer
necessary. Senator Symington apparently has not thought through the
implications of resorting to strategic nuclear war as the only alterna-
tive to the limited deployment of conventional forces in given circum-
stances. Without saying so, he comes close to the Dulles doctrine of
massive retaliation.
All the Senators, but particularly Senator Fulbright, bore down
heavily in the Philippine hearings on the theme: “Why do we pay so
much and get so little?” They were indignant that the Philippine gov-
ernment refused to send even a civic action group to Viet Nam until
the US had engaged itself to supply the equipment for three engineer
battalions and to pay per diem for the officers and men who actually
went to the Philippines. Senator Fulbright dealt at great length yester-
day on what he regards as the exorbitant mercenary pay we agreed to
give the Koreans for the two divisions now fighting Viet Nam. He re-
ferred a number of times to the “Brown letter,” which purportedly en-
gages this government to pay for the Korean expeditionary force, and
said its contents had been published in a Japanese newspaper.
The main theme of protest that our client states receive so much
from the US and contribute practically nothing in return was made re-
peatedly in the case of the Philippines where “millions of dollars” had
been poured into the country but even in a situation involving the
SEATO Alliance, the government at Manila would not send even a to-
ken detachment unless backsheesh was paid in advance.
A kindred theme is corruption. To read the testimony of the Philip-
pine hearings, one would think that a principal function of Clark Air
Force Base is to subsidize illegally or otherwise the iniquitous City of
Angeles, which is adjacent to the Base and whose inhabitants are any-
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416 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

thing but angels. Evidences of corruption of high officials going right

up to the top of the Philippine government were freely disclosed by
the Air Force OSI colonel who heads up a sort of export FBI operation
at Clark Field. Senator Fulbright made the point that the presence of
Clark Air Force Base was in fact an active incentive to theft and cor-
ruption. About the only amusing aspect of this part of the testimony
was that DOD, which was late in getting in its written statement 24
hours in advance of the hearings, excused its tardiness on the plea that
to provide the statement earlier might have endangered the Air Force
colonel’s life. Senator Symington, tongue in cheeck, said he would write
the Secretary of Defense, praising the colonel’s forthright testimony,
but suggesting that in view of the danger to his life, he not return to
the Philippines. We might keep this ploy in mind for certain other
witnesses. . . .
I suggested to our military witnesses yesterday that, if they could
find an opportunity, they should make a closely reasoned military ra-
tionale as to why certain of our bases in the Philippines are still to be
regarded as assets and not as liabilities, as the testimony in the hear-
ings might make them seem. However, neither General Gideon nor Ad-
miral Kauffman had such an opportunity. I have, therefore, recom-
mended to DOD that for future hearings in the prepared written
testimony Defense include such rationale as to specific bases and mil-
itary programs which may become subject to the Committee’s scrutiny.
Senator Fulbright indicated a clear intention to build up a case
against the Department by piece-meal interrogation of subordinate wit-
nesses before he took on the Secretary of State. For example, he tried
repeatedly yesterday to pin down Mr. Wilson, our witness on the
Philippines, as to what reappraisals of East Asian policy the Depart-
ment would undertake and what in fact our new policy toward com-
munist China might be. I think we can expect in future hearings that
Senator Fulbright will continue to press the same tactic. The answer by
the witness in all cases should be that questions of broad policy must
be deferred until the Subcommittee meets with the Secretary of State.
This might, however, not be easy for Ambassador Sullivan in the hear-
ings on Laos, as he is a Deputy Assistant Secretary.
Senator Symington’s philosophy toward the Subcommittee’s
hearings was summed up succinctly in his own words yesterday
afternoon—“You give the Committee all the facts; we’ll draw the
conclusions.”
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Philippines 417

195. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State
(Richardson)1

Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT
Revisions in US Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines

The President has expressed the belief that the United States
should be prepared to bring the terms of the US Military Bases Agree-
ment in the Philippines into line with the terms under which we oc-
cupy bases in other countries,2 in order to eliminate any aspects which
may give the Philippines legitimate cause to feel that the US enjoys le-
gal or other advantages which it does not possess elsewhere. It is the
President’s understanding that opinion in the Philippines, both official
and non-official, is highly sensitive to what are considered to be in-
equities, and that US-Philippine relations are rendered more difficult
as a result.
The President accordingly has directed that the Under Secretaries’
Committee undertake a review of our treaty and other relationships
with the Philippines, and that a negotiating position be drawn up, set-
ting forth the changes needed in our Military Bases Agreement to bring
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United States concern-
ing base rights in the Philippines down to a level comparable with the
rights which we possess in other independent countries where there
are US bases. Particular attention should be paid to the questions of
length of tenure of bases and procedures for establishing criminal ju-
risdiction. It is recognized that there are variations in our rights in var-
ious countries, but the objective should be to put the Philippines on a
most-favored-nation basis.
The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries’ Com-
mittee examine the total physical area included within the US bases,
and the number of such bases, compared with the facilities available
in other countries, note being taken of the different missions of the US

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US.
Secret.
2
According to an October 29 memorandum from Cargo to Green and Spiers, this
memorandum superseded NSSM 73, Revision of US Military Bases Agreement with the
Philippines, “which has been cancelled.” (Ibid.) A copy of NSSM 73 is in the National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Se-
curity Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103.
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418 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

bases in different countries. Consideration should be given to the re-

lease of land in the Philippines which may be surplus to military needs.
It is intended that when the foregoing studies have been com-
pleted, the Department of State will prepare to invite the Government
of the Philippines to renegotiate the Military Bases Agreement so as to
bring it into line with other US overseas base agreements. This ap-
proach to the Philippines should be made within a reasonable time af-
ter the forthcoming Philippine elections, but not before them. It is en-
visaged that the question of the release of land may be dealt with at a
later stage of the negotiations in order to permit sufficient time for this
particular study to be analyzed in detail. The target date for comple-
tion of the land study should be January 1, 1970.
Henry A. Kissinger

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, October 30, 1969, 0920Z.

11375. For the President and the Secretary of State.

1. With the receipt of the second and third volumes of the Syming-
ton subcommittee hearings on the Philippines I now for the first time
have had a chance to judge personally the full impact here of the pend-
ing publication of the present “sanitized” version of those hearings.2
In my opinion the result of such publication, even two weeks from now
after Philippine elections, will be an unmitigated disaster in terms
of basic US interests in this country and the future of US/Philippine
relations.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 555,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2
According to an undated memorandum from Erlichman to Rogers detailing White
House complaints about McClintock’s performance as Chairman of the Interdepart-
mental Group and his ultimate removal on November 14, the White House did not learn
the basis of the deal that had been struck between McClintock and Symington until Oc-
tober 23, after having been kept in the dark by the Ambassador for “a long period.” Ac-
cording to the memorandum, “In return for deleting certain non-policy passages of some
witnesses, and for deferring publication of the transcript until after the Philippine elec-
tions, Ambassador McClintock had agreed to make no substantial cuts in the transcript,
in clear violation of White House guidelines.” (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 398, Symington
Subcommittee, Vol. I)
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Philippines 419

2. Beyond this I am deeply disturbed by the broader issue of prin-

ciple involved in the implications of these proceedings as they seem to
question, and publicly so, the control of the conduct of our foreign re-
lations. Staff members of the committee prior to the hearings visited
the Philippines and other countries of Southeast Asia and on the in-
structions of the Departments of State and Defense were provided with
the most sensitive and highly classified information on virtually every
aspect of our political-military relationships. Senior military and civil-
ian officers summoned home from the field were the principal wit-
nesses before the Subcommittee. These witnesses testified in good faith
and spoke frankly in executive session on a series of highly delicate
matters. They were continually pressed for personal opinions and judg-
ments on policy decisions reached on the highest level of the United
States Government and on conditions in the Republic of the Philip-
pines and actions of its senior officials. They provided without reser-
vation details of classified agreements with the Government of the
Philippines.
3. The subcommittee is now apparently about to publish this tes-
timony and, as I understand it, is setting itself as the final judge on
what will be released. With an unfriendly committee controlling the
proceedings it is inevitable that a distorted and unbalanced picture will
emerge.
4. This applies not just to the Philippines but also to the other
countries covered by the Committee’s inquiries. It becomes particularly
important at this time when you are engaged in the difficult task of
shaping future US policy toward Southeast Asia.
5. I am also concerned about what this will be taken to imply with
respect to the sanctity of confidential agreements between governments
and our ability to enter into them in the future. Also, other Asian na-
tions will be looking at this to see how we treat our former ward. They
will reason that if we treat Filipinos this way they can expect worse
when their turn comes.
6. There are other matters of considerable importance involved
here. The most senior military and civilian staff members in several
missions abroad are going to be faced with critical quotations attrib-
utable to them specifically by name in the press of their host countries.
It is not at all inconceivable that public png cases may result. In other
cases the effectiveness of these officers may be so impaired that termi-
nation of assignments would seem in order. To a lesser extent it is pos-
sible that the effectiveness of your Ambassadors in these various coun-
tries may be impaired in a guilt by association sort of way in that senior
staffs would be expected to reflect the views of their bosses.
7. As you know, the Filipino is hyper-sensitive to foreign criticism,
particularly when it comes from the former colonial power. This goes
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420 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

not just for the super nationalists but for our friends as well. We are
already under heavy fire for the acquittal of a US sailor for shooting a
Filipino at one of our bases. The violent reaction here to the relatively
calm criticism of Eugene Black provides ample evidence of the explo-
sion which will occur if the committee’s hearings are published in their
present form.
8. We are faced with a trying and difficult series of negotiations
regarding our bases, our mutual defense arrangements, and our trade
agreements, which we had hoped would normalize, and actually im-
prove, our relationship for some time to come. Publication of the
Symington hearings as they now stand will be taken as a clumsy at-
tempt to signal future US policy and tactics in these discussions. It will
play into the hands of those who are working against us and cost us
most of our friends. It could eventually cost us the bases themselves.
9. At this critical stage in our economic relations there is also likely
to be a destructive fallout in terms of our business interests. I am cer-
tain that the New York business community, with nearly a billion dol-
lar of private investment here, would be extremely active in Washing-
ton just now if they realized what this may do to our coming efforts
to negotiate away uncertainties here that are already plaguing them.
Unfortunately they will not fully realize this until after publication
when it is already too late.
10. Some of what is contained in these hearings needs to be said
to the Philippine Government. But how we say it and when is the busi-
ness of the Executive Branch. This is not the way to do it. It will make
it that much harder, if not impossible, to say it properly later on.
11. I realize it may be most difficult to try to walk the cat back at
this stage. At the same time I do not think the Committee’s hired staff
has played fair with the information thus far given it in confidence. In-
deed I am informed that the local representative of the Reader’s Digest
claims to have already received a copy of the proceedings.
12. In short I am asking that this whole matter be reviewed once
more3 in view of its very serious implications. One would hope that
the Senate leadership itself could be convinced to take action on their

3
Telegram 11375 elicited concern in Washington and Moore (EA) drafted a telegram
stating that the Embassy had been kept advised of developments with the Symington
subcommittee and that, with the exception of minor adjustments, it was too late to make
substantial changes in the report. (Ibid.) Haig, in an October 31 memorandum to Er-
lichman, noted “that efforts to reverse agreed-upon policy with the Subcommittee would
poison our whole relationship with the Subcommittee and would not preclude the tes-
timony getting into public print in a distorted and possibly far more harmful manner.”
Haig also asked for Erlichman’s “written judgment as to the suitability of the course of
action laid out in the proposed State reply.” (Ibid.)
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Philippines 421

own to suppress publication completely if they could fully understand

its almost certain damaging consequences of serious proportions. If this
is impossible a lesser alternative, undoubtedly still damaging, but far
less so, would be for the subcommittee to release its findings on the
hearings in its own report and in its own words, with the volumes of
actual testimony remaining classified and non-releaseable to the press.
13. I realize this is a difficult one for you to judge as neither of
you can possibly read these voluminous reports and be able to weigh
for yourselves the possible effects of publication of such sideswiping
material. If nothing else can be done, please consider finding some
manner of disassociating the Executive Branch, to the extent it can now
be done, from the whole affair.4
Byroade

4
According to the agenda for the November 11 meeting of the White House Work-
ing Group, the transcripts were returned to the Subcommittee for publication, with the
“more embarrassing sections dealing with corruption” deleted in return for Department
of State agreement “to supply the exact figures for U.S. support for PHILCAG—in di-
rect contravention of explicit White House instructions.” (Ibid.) A summary of Marcos’
corruption [text not declassified] which states that “Marcos and his wife have gone to con-
siderable lengths to enrich their personal base. [text not declassified] estimate that they
have accumulated approximately $100 million during his term in the presidential palace.”
(Ibid., Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I.)

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines1

Washington, November 11, 1969, 2326Z.

190471. Subj: Release of Symington Subcommittee Testimony. Ref:

State 189980.2 For Ambassador from Asst Secy Green.
1. Long struggle over transcript of Symington Subcommittee hear-
ings on Philippines—in which State and Defense representatives were
in almost daily contact with Sub-committee staff—culminated last
night (November 10) in hour and half meeting I had with Senator

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Usher and approved
by Green and Curtis H. Taylor (S/S).
2
Dated November 11. (Ibid.)
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422 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Symington. The Senator accepted the exclusion of considerable addi-

tional material from his proposed public edition of the transcript. At
the conclusion of our meeting I told him that, with these further ex-
clusions I could say that we had no further objection on national se-
curity grounds to the publication of this material. FYI—in making this
latter statement we have not indicated that we welcome or approve
publication of the remaining material, nor have we even indicated that
we do not still regret its publication. If reaction to the publication
should require it, we will be in a position to say in fact that we did not
approve and that we regret. End FYI.
2. The additional material to be excluded from publication was:
(a) All references to B–52 flights from Okinawa—of great importance
to our relations with Japan. (b) The entire [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] testimony except for one paragraph in which [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] explains that certain information he
has provided consists largely of unsupported and unsubstantiated al-
legations and one paragraph in which [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] gives his description of “an atmosphere of general law-
lessness . . . throughout the area surrounding Clark Air Base.” A total
of some 20 pages of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mate-
rial will be removed from the published transcript and replaced sim-
ply by the notation “20 pages (deleted).” (c) Virtually all of the pas-
sages in the testimony of the witnesses which could be embarrasing to
them or imperil their effectiveness in performing their official functions
in the Philippines. (d) Some remaining passages which were too pre-
maturely revealing of our tentative internal planning for anticipated
future developments or contingencies.
3. During my meeting with Senator Symington I also pointed out
certain statements by the Sub-committee members which would have
an adverse impact because they would be deeply resented by Filipinos.
I asked that serious consideration be given to deleting these passages.
I understand that some of these will be edited at least, but we don’t
know what the Sub-committee will finally do about the others.
4. Dick Usher will be communicating to you the revised portions
and passages of the transcript which now will additionally be excluded.
As we have already cabled you, the Senator will delay his release of
the transcript for another week, and presumably also his press confer-
ence, since his concept of his press conference has been that he would
hold it only after the press had had a few days to read the embargoed
transcript.
Rogers
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Philippines 423

198. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, November 14, 1969.

SUBJECT
Ambassador Byroade’s Conversation with President Marcos on PHILCAG
Withdrawal

In the middle of the Sullivan meeting, November 14, Marshall

Green asked me to leave the group in order to read a telegram which
had just come in via back channels from Ambassador Byroade in
Manila.2 This telegram (Tab A) concerned Byroade’s approach to Mar-
cos to inform him of an impending move on State’s part to preempt
the Symington Subcommittee by announcing in advance of Symington
that we had paid allowances to the PHILCAG during its stay in Viet-
nam. (Byroade’s instructions had also been sent by back channel.)3
Byroade reported that Marcos was already planning to issue a
statement on November 15 which would cover the points State wished
to be made; namely, that these allowances had been paid by the US in
order to prevent diversion of Philippine resources from badly needed
internal development programs. However, it emerged from the con-
versation that Marcos had not felt under any obligation to use the funds
we gave him for the PHILCAG directly, but had actually used it for
purposes such as “security matters.” Marcos mentioned in this con-
nection the expenses involved in Philippine peacemaking efforts,
travels of emissaries (he mentioned Paris and Hanoi), and efforts in
South Vietnam to make contact with the Viet Cong, etc. Marcos left
Byroade with the impression that Marcos would try to portray himself
as an Asian leader who, like President Nixon, had always been striv-
ing for peace in Vietnam and who also had engaged in activities such
as those revealed by the President in his November 3 speech.4
Byroade was not sure just what of all this would emerge in the
light of day in Marcos’ November 15 statement. It seems highly pos-
sible, though, that some of Marcos’ machinations may indeed be

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote
on the first page: “What finally happened?” with an arrow back to Holdridge’s initials.
2
Backchannel message 851 from Manila, November 14, attached but not printed.
3
Not found.
4
For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909.
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424 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

revealed. If so, this would be embarrassing to the President, since Mar-

cos might try to make it appear that his efforts to contact the North
Vietnamese were done with the President’s consent, and also would
be embarrassing to State if it appeared that the money which we gave
to Marcos in support of the PHILCAG was used for other purposes.
On this latter issue, Marshall Green called in Philippine Ambassador
Lagdameo and in my presence explained the problems which use of
our funds for purposes not connected with Philippine economic de-
velopment or allied projects would cause for us with respect to the
Symington Subcommittee. What nobody appeared to notice, or at least
wanted to mention, was the possibility that Marcos used the funds
given him for his own personal political activities. As you know, one
reason he gave for recalling the PHILCAG was that the Philippine Con-
gress did not vote any funds for its support. This could turn out to be
a real mess for everybody.
Ambassador Lagdameo left the session with Marshall Green5 as-
suring us that he would try to touch base with Marcos in advance of
the release of the November 15 statement to make sure that everything
was properly squared away. We now can only wait and hope.6

5
Details of the meeting between Green and Ambassador Lagdameo were trans-
mitted in telegram 192677 to Manila, November 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central
Files 1967–69, DEF 6 PHIL)
6
Following up on Kissinger’s question as noted in footnote 1 above, Holdridge in-
formed Kissinger in a November 25 memorandum, that “Marcos has now denied that
our funds had been granted as a quid pro quo for PHILCAG. He said that he had re-
ceived some special funds from us, beginning in early 1965, which had been used for
national security and intelligence operations too classified to discuss. He did not sug-
gest that they were used to defray his expenses as a go-between.” Holdridge also re-
ported that there had not been a lot of Philippine congressional and press interest in the
story. A stamped notation on this memorandum reads “HAK has seen, Dec 20, 1969.”
(Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philip-
pines, Vol. II)
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Philippines 425

199. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, November 15, 1969, 0418Z.

11818. 1. I had opportunity yesterday with Marcos alone to dis-

cuss in general terms our approaches to forthcoming negotiations. My
remarks followed very closely the previous discussion with Romulo
reported in detail Manila 111492 and in interest of brevity I will not re-
peat herein my opening remarks. They were perhaps more sharply fo-
cused this time on the dangers involved in negotiating through the
press with large and high-ranking negotiating panels.
2. Marcos in general, like Romulo, said most of the things that I
wanted him to say but seemed to have more apparent conviction than
had Romulo. He said he had already taken some steps in this direction
by telling the main members of the panel that he personally was
going to make the decisions and that he did not want each of them
playing the press in his own behalf. He went so far at one point as to
speculate that perhaps we should not start out negotiations with pub-
licly known meetings at all, but have the members of the technical
panels meet quietly to see how far they could get before higher levels
become involved.
3. I found general approach of Marcos quite encouraging. He said
they were not really prepared as yet to handle matters of such impor-
tance and he wanted to put a damper on any idea of “immediate” talks.
He said he felt that February was really too soon and at one time men-
tioned mid-summer. He also said that he thought we should allow time
for passions to cool down and hoped for a better atmosphere under
which to conduct the talks. He said he had told the policy council that
he wanted no more statements about Americans being evicted either
from the bases or from their economic interests in the Philippines. He
also said he did not want to push us on matters on which we on our
side might not be ready. He made reference in this regard to trade pol-
icy and evidenced some concern over President’s recent speech re Latin
America.
4. Marcos said he was making Defense Secretary Mata head of the
technical panel on military matters, assisted by Alex Melchor. It was in-
teresting that he remarked that if Mata did not remain in the cabinet he

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US. Se-
cret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVBASE Subic, and to
the Commander of 13th Air Force.
2
Dated October 24. (Ibid.)
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426 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

would be replaced on the panel by General Yan. I told him I thought this
was very good, as, while we might not necessarily agree, it would be very
easy for us to quickly understand each other with such personalities.
5. Marcos at one point mentioned Washington in connection with
Laurel–Langley discussions. He also at one time referred to the desir-
ability to wait a while before getting into such touchy subjects as
“vested rights” on the part of American business here. His remarks on
this subject could have implied that he preferred a negotiated settle-
ment on this issue as he once referred to what proportion of present
American holdings (presumably land) would be a fair and equitable
settlement. I am not sure just what he meant on this and there was not
time to explore further.
6. I mentioned the problem of negotiating on some of these mat-
ters with the prospects of constitutional changes hanging over our
heads due to the coming convention in 1971. Marcos said this was in-
deed a matter that concerned him. He said he sometimes thought it
might be better to delay completion of some of our negotiations until
we could see what the composition of the convention delegates would
be. He said that once he could look at the slate of delegates he felt he
could almost know in advance what they would come up with. I jok-
ingly remarked that he would have me at a disadvantage there as he
could make such a judgment while I could not.
7. While all of Marcos’ remarks indicated that he wanted delayed,
quiet, and sober approaches to be made on all items of negotiation be-
tween us for the sake of eventually arriving at a sound and durable
basis for our future relationships, I have a feeling that something un-
said was also on his mind. The Philippines are in a desperate financial
situation and he, of course, is fully aware and conscious of their
predicament. I think, repeat think, he will hope that we can go into a
quiet period without new issues between us for a while in the hopes
of our financial assistance. On my part I hope he may try to tamper
down reaction here to the forthcoming release of the Symington testi-
mony with this in mind.
8. It probably will appear that his super-active moves of this week
(PHILCAG, today’s coming statement on Symington, etc.) give a
contrary impression to my above analysis. Please bear in mind, how-
ever, that Marcos’ motives as of today is to do almost anything he can
think of in order to dominate press coverage and get Osmena and LP
charges and accusations re the elections off page one of the press. Please
bear this in mind over the next few days as you judge his moves and
statements.
Byroade
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Philippines 427

200. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the

Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, November 16, 1969, 1231Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Top Secret;
Immediate; Literally Eyes Only. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

201. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, December 1, 1969, 0440Z.

12150. Subj: PHILCAG Overseas Allowances. Ref: State 1985992

and 199807.3
1. Regret delay in replying to State 198599. It arrived during my
absence at Baguio, and senior staff here so unanimous in feeling sug-
gested second démarche to Marcos on subject would be so counter-
productive that they decided to await my return. I share view and hope
you can satisfy your requirements at home on this subject through Lag-
dameo and Melchor. If you feel strongly otherwise, I will of course see
Marcos.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.
2
In telegram 198599 to Manila, November 26, the Department expressed bewil-
derment at Philippine Presidential Press Secretary Tatad’s November 20 press statement
that “Philippines has received no ‘payments of any kind in support of the PHILCAG or
its personnel.’” It advised Byroade to “let Marcos know that we foresee trouble with
this” and that “it is most important that Marcos not reiterate these statements in face of
contrary testimony from Hearings. If pressed, he must continue to support official tes-
timony as it appears in the transcript.” The Department then proposed a scenario in
which U.S. payments would be described as offset-type funds: “The funds which the
United States did provide to cover the costs of overseas allowances for PHILCAG went
directly to the Philippine Government. These offset funds made it possible for the Philip-
pine Government to provide for this contingent without curbing important domestic
programs.” (Ibid.)
3
Telegram 199807 to Manila, November 29, reported Usher and Moore’s Novem-
ber 26 conversation with Philippine official Alex Melchor about the PHILCAG overseas
allowances payments, with the latter stating that he did not think that U.S. accounting
of the amount of the funds provided was correct. (Ibid.)
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428 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

2. A peripheral reason for my reluctance is that almost without

exception I have tried to handle some aspect of Symington Report in
each visit I have had with him. It is by now a sore and dreary subject.
3. A far more important reason is that I think he would feel that
I was returning to suggest a formula to him which I had previously
given him. When I saw him on November 14 I suggested that he might
want to handle the subject matter involved in a statement before ac-
tual release of the testimony based on the various reported leaks out
of the Committee. I suggested that he might note that expenses of the
operation were overburdening as far as the Philippine Government was
concerned, and that he had felt it necessary to mitigate these extraor-
dinary costs in same manner as some other troop contributing coun-
tries by accepting US offer to pick up expenses for equipment and sup-
plies for PHILCAG in Vietnam and to offset costs of necessary special
overseas allowances by other arrangements. I suggested that he could
also say that he and we had felt it in our mutual interests to acceler-
ate normal deliveries of US military assistance for badly needed do-
mestic Philippine programs. I told him that the testimony would show
that these latter were unconnected so far as he was concerned with
PHILCAG itself but were needed on their own merits for mutually
agreed objectives in promoting meritorious Philippine domestic pro-
grams. After suggesting the above, I left it in written form with him
for his consideration. Your new formula is somewhat better now that
the text is public but it does not seem sufficiently so to make any great
difference.
4. I am equally concerned about dangers in the formula you sug-
gest if we press it upon him too hard. I feel sure that Marcos at this
point would not be willing to make such a statement and let it go at
that because it will raise anew the unsettled question as to “where the
money went.” I feel he would almost certainly add a long and detailed
(and exaggerated) account of expenditures involved in heretofore se-
cret attempts to serve as peace maker on Vietnam. This would be un-
fortunate in my opinion and would leave things no better off than they
were.
5. We here find it difficult to understand why you place so much
importance on this particular point. The public record is quite specific
on the question of funds and the word of US Executive Branch officials
will be generally accepted here, even though GAO has the problem
now in Washington. To that extent it seems to us that Marcos has
a problem far greater than we do. But Filipinos are not noted for
and do not expect perfect consistency. Marcos plainly prefers to see
things remain as fuzzy as they are at present and to ride it out. To that
extent, if we are searching for precision, we are definitely at cross
purposes.
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Philippines 429

6. Even if he made suggested statement, we feel it would do very

little to help us here. The bitterness over PHILCAG is not the exact
amount of money nor how it was used. It was rather the biting and
sarcastic approach to the Philippines and PHILCAG itself by the two
Senators involved and particularly Fulbright’s implication that “the
PHILCAG was nothing but hired mercenaries.” He might be reminded
that his approach was a classic example indeed of “The Arrogance of
Power.”4
7. We will be sending you in a few days our attempted assessment
of the damage done here by this whole exercise. We may be somewhat
over the hump on the first issue which was PHILCAG. It drew the first
attacks because it was the first item reaching here through press re-
porting in the States. The fact that that reporting was distorted and su-
perficial only served to make it worse. We are now starting up the sec-
ond hump as the local press has finally had actual texts long enough
to start dealing with the remainder of the report.
Byroade

4
Reference is to J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random
House, 1967).

202. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the

Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Manila, December 17, 1969.

4161. For Assistant Secretary Green From Ambassador.

1. The DAO message2 you refer to may be a little loosely drawn
in terms of its comments. While there is considerable uneasiness in

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. The telegram shows no time of trans-
mission.
2
Telegram SNF–497 from the USDAO Manila to the DIA, December 15, reported
the Defense Attaché’s conversation with Liberal Party stalwart Eleuterio Adevoso. Ade-
voso stated that the Liberals had not expected Marcos to employ armed force in the elec-
tion “so effectively or so broadly,” and that the Philippines “was ready for revolution.”
Adevoso stated that he was going to the United States and “wanted to talk to the right
people.” (Ibid.)
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430 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Manila as a result of election reverberations and the rise in prices, we

foresee no immediate increase in the likelihood of revolution, an aw-
fully strong word. Most of the talk about revolution and even assassi-
nation has been coming from the defeated opposition, of which Ade-
voso is a leading activist, and must be weighed in that light.
2. Where information coming to us on assassination plans has
been relatively hard or well-sourced, we have made sure that it reached
Marcos. We know that Marcos has been aware for some time of Ade-
voso’s involvement in such plotting. The word has been passed to him
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We also know from a sen-
sitive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] source that Marcos
sent an emissary to Adevoso whom seemingly extracted a promise that
Adevoso would at least lay off Marcos personally [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified], (TDCS–DB 31505154/69).3
3. I fully agree that we should protect the U.S. in all ways possi-
ble from accusations of collusion with any and all plotters, and I am
sure, but will reiterate it to them, that all country team members and
the military are aware of this danger. I will also see to it that Adevoso’s
normal American contacts are especially alert. At the same time, I feel
it would be wrong to cut ourselves off completely from the waning op-
position in this country, [garble] the initiative for contact comes from
them. Sometimes, as I think I did with Osmena, we can even dampen
their emotions a bit.4

3
Not found.
4
In a December 16 backchannel message Green requested Byroade’s comment on
the DAO message, and advised that the Embassy must do everything it could “to avoid
giving plotters any ‘evidence’ of American involvement in their activities.” (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East,
Philippines, Vol. II)
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Philippines 431

203. Backchannel Message From the Assistant Secretary of State

for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador
to the Philippines (Byroade)1

Washington, December 31, 1969.

35889. For Ambassador from Green.

1. Department has recently received from the White House for
appropriate action a hand-written notation by the President indicating
his interest in cutting U.S. personnel on Clark AFB by 50% and over-
all in the Philippines by 25%. The notation was made on a copy of a
study2 which had been submitted to the President showing the distri-
bution of contract employees of the U.S. military bases. It is likely the
percentages refer to overall personnel; they might refer only to mili-
tary personnel. In any event they suggest the order of magnitude of
his present thinking.
2. This raises a point covered in your talk with the President in
San Clemente. In reviewing your letter to me of August 21, 1969,3 I
note that the President spoke to you among other things of the neces-
sity to cut down the American presence in the Philippines, and that he
asked if you could give him a report by January containing your broad
recommendations on policy and personnel. I have informed the White
House that we would prefer to handle the matter within the overall
context of the President’s request to you, of course taking into consid-
eration this indication his current views. It would be particularly use-
ful if you could let us have in regular channels Nodis on a priority ba-
sis at least your preliminary views about the desirability of reducing
our presence and how this might best be done.4 Of course, you should
take into account the feasibility of bringing about these reductions on
a phased basis.
3. We have made some rough calculations here as to the numbers
of people involved. Figures available here show a total U.S. American
military presence in the Philippines of 50,863 made up of 27,423 mili-
tary personnel, 1,443 civilians and 21,997 dependents. Of this Clark

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Usher on December 31
and cleared in draft by Moore. The telegram bears no time of transmission. According
to a note Byroade wrote at the end of Document 204, “for accountability purposes only”
this telegram was assigned the number 35889.
2
Not found.
3
Not found.
4
See Document 204 for Byroade’s response.
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432 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

alone accounts for a total of 32,916 comprising 16,968 military person-

nel, 737 civilian employees, and 15,211 dependents. From these figures
it emerges a 50% cut at Clark would in itself constitute a cut of more
than 25% of the total American military presence in the Philippines.
We do not have figures available which would show changes either up
or down in American military presence since December 31, 1967 which
was the eve of the BALPA in Embassy personnel. However, our figures
on the Embassy and its component missions show a cut in American
personnel from 700 as of December 31, 1967 to an authorized strength
of 494 as of December 31, 1969 representing a 29.4% cut.
4. Your early response to this cable will be invaluable to us in the
context of memoranda which we would be preparing here for the White
House on this matter.

204. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the

Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Manila, January 2, 1970, 0451Z.

41. Eyes Only Asst Secretary Green, Dept of State. Ref: [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] 35889.2
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
My primary point, even considering the level of the handwritten
notation you refer to, is that I just do not think the problem should be
approached in this manner by either me or the Department. If such
drastic cuts are to be made out here, it seems to me that the message
would have to go to the Pentagon, and they would have to decide how
they would have to reorganize their forces in order to meet the re-
quirement. The final decision would then have to be made taking into
account the effects of this on our strategic posture, as well as the views
of the Department on what the effect of cuts of this magnitude would
have in the Philippines. The latter could properly include from us the
effect of such cuts on our overall relations with the Phils, their eco-
nomic impact, etc.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; Exdis. A notation
on the message indicates that Green saw it.
2
Document 203.
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Philippines 433

I see no way for me to even approach the initial problem of the

proposed 50 percent cut at Clark. It is true that the base is on Philip-
pine soil, but what we are really talking about is a drastic cut in the
13th Air Force with headquarters and support staff and many of its op-
erating units at Clark but which, in actuality, extends from Taiwan to
Thailand. One needs to get into what units, activities, and capabilities
of the 13th Air Force would have to be reduced, or abandoned, and
how this would fit into the picture with the present situation in Viet-
nam and our future national posture in the Far East. Exactly the same
type of problem would be involved in a similar, even if reduced, re-
duction at Subic, substituting only the Seventh Fleet for the 13th Air
Force and such matters as to where its future center of gravity and
maintenance facilities should be. And we should not forget in the
process that we are talking about very expensive facilities indeed,
which if transferred elsewhere would be very costly. I realize that I am
probably over-simplifying the matter because I do not know in just
what context this all occurred, but it looks to be like initial action on
this, at least, would have to be transferred to the Pentagon. State should
of course have its voice, but I really think not an initial one as its role,
or at least it seems to me, should be after the initial military appraisal.
We could, I suppose, volunteer through normal channels what the
economic and political effect of cuts of this magnitude would mean in
the Philippines, but I would feel much easier about it if we had a nor-
mal channel request to do so. The reason I feel this way is that I can
not believe that cuts of this magnitude are consistent with our best in-
terests, and I therefore have no reason to raise the prospects of such an
eventuality.3 I do not mean to say that a well thought out strategic plan
of our posture in the Pacific of some years hence might not indicate re-
ductions of this magnitude, and I would personally be glad if they
could. But I really do think that it must be approached from that di-
rection and not from the direction of cutting bases by name by specific
percentages. The latter type of approach is merely the question of
swinging the pendulum back, and when done for that reason alone, all
past experience shows that it tends to swing too far and too fast, and
that it has been costly to get it back to where it belongs.
I would as well in such a volunteered message have to say that I
believed that both the political and economic effects in the Philippines

3
After receiving such a “normal channel request,” telegram 3094 to Manila, Janu-
ary 12, Byroade emphasized in telegram 419 from Manila, January 15, that the projected
plan would effect a “drastic cut in the 13th Air Force.” At the same time, Byroade stated
that “my own view is that considerable reductions could be made in the number of per-
sonnel that the military says is necessary to perform the roles assigned to it.” (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East,
Philippines, Vol. II)
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434 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

would be adverse,4 so I would in effect be giving the appearance of

raising a straw man and then shooting him down. On the political level
I think it would hurt our position here. The Nixon Doctrine is very
sound policy but unfortunately its press treatment and, more impor-
tantly, actions in the Senate have local leaders concerned that in effect
it is a policy of cutting and running beyond what the nations out here
believe to be in their best interests. I would guess the Vice President
will have a most important report on this aspect of the situation when
he finishes his tour. And on the economic front only a brief but im-
portant point. I know we can’t let this be a big factor in any decision
to retain bases abroad. But it is a very important factor here at present.
If the Phils should keep on the recent path of better policies, they would
still need help. What better way to do it than by utilizing facilities of
theirs which are useful to us.5 At least this way we get something in
return.
I have re-read my letter to you of last August regarding San
Clemente.6 I well see that as constructed that letter could have been
misunderstood. As it actually happened, when the President asked if
I could give him a good feel of the situation here by January, it was
clear to me at the time that he had in mind a report on the general sit-
uation here containing broad policy recommendations. We were not at
that moment focusing on the reduction-in-presence theme as the letter
implies.
I have been wondering of late just how to best comply with my
affirmative answer to this query of his, particularly as it is too early as
yet to know in which direction Marcos will go in his new administra-
tion, or whether it will be more of the same. My doubts are affected
somewhat by my indecision at the moment as to whether I shouldn’t
come home briefly on consultations some time in the next few weeks
in order to be better equipped to handle the forthcoming talks with
Marcos. I do not herein, however, raise this question for decision but
may be in touch with you separately on this one.

4
Telegram 420 from Manila, January 15, stated that the extent of the adverse im-
pact “would depend primarily on timing, phasing, and the rationale offered to the GOP
and to public opinion.” (Ibid.)
5
A Department of State report, February 19, noted that U.S. spending in the Philip-
pines “would drop from the current annual figure of about $140 million to a reduced
level of about $83 million,” and concluded that the Philippine economy would be hurt
by the loss of foreign exchange income, reduced economic activity, and a presumed re-
duction of Philippine employment at the bases. It added that the $57 million reduction
“would theoretically cut back Philippine economic activity by $171 million,” using the
standard multiplier of three effect, and that this “would be equivalent to about 2 per
cent of the 1969 Philippine GNP of $8.5 billion.” (Ibid.)
6
Not found.
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Philippines 435

205. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the

Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)1

Manila, February 2, 1970, 1103Z.

132. We here are, as I am sure you can guess, in the midst of one
of our occasionally delicate times. In the past few days I guess I have
been spending more time trying to steer us through the present situa-
tion rather than reporting it.
When I saw Marcos the morning after the January 26 riots, he
opened the conversation by saying how much he had looked forward
that morning to seeing me. (We had arranged to meet on the 27th for
a general talk when neither of us knew, of course, of the coming riots
at Congress.) He said he had not slept much the night before, admit-
ting that the demonstrations and riots had come as a jolt to him. He
said he had been jolted further when some of his intelligence types late
the night before had attempted to convince him that the U.S. had been
implicated in the riots. He said he had seen pieces of paper which im-
plicated Colonel Patterson, Dave Sternberg and Al Ravenholt.
He told me that we personally doubted these reports implicating
Americans, but it was a factor nevertheless if people were talking about
it around town. I told him that I had heard rumors about Patterson be-
fore and had thoroughly investigated his activities and had instructed
him personally as to how to avoid future misunderstandings. I said I
was thoroughly convinced that, if Patterson was guilty of anything, it
was no more than having a sympathetic face.
I reminded Marcos that just after elections I had heard reports that
Osmena was talking about rash things. I told him that I thought it best
to go try and calm Osmena down and felt that I had at least accom-
plished something in my two hour talk with him. I told him at the time
that I had asked that word reach him indirectly as to what I was try-
ing to do. He said he remembered that and was grateful.
I told him that the policy of the U.S. was absolutely firm in the
matter under discussion, and that was that the U.S. would in no way
attempt any interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines, and
that this was fully understood by my staff. We did, however, face a
practical problem. It was an old game in the Philippines for politicians
and others to claim American support and backing. I was sure he knew
that people did occasionally approach us. It seemed also obvious that

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret.
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436 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

they were doing a lot of loose talking around town. Under these con-
ditions if I released specific personnel without cause, nothing really
would be accomplished because a new set of names would crop up in
the future.
I told him I would do two things: 1) talk to sensible opposition
leaders and let them know in passing, and of course with no mention
of our talk, what the policy of the U.S. was, and 2) insure that no offi-
cer of mine let any such conversation end in the future without a clear
statement that the U.S. policy was firmly against becoming involved
in any way.
The conversation ended on good notes and I think Marcos was,
temporarily at least, reasonably reassured.
In the wake of the serious demonstrations Saturday2 night Kokoy
Romualdez called Rafferty on Sunday asking if the Embassy had any
thought about what had happened. Rafferty merely pointed out the
obvious that the real damage had been caused by the infiltration of real
pros into the study body. Rafferty suggested to Kokoy that it might be
a good idea if he talked to me. Kokoy checked with Marcos and showed
up at my house one hour later. We had a good talk and I think Kokoy’s
later report to Marcos was probably helpful. Kokoy was very frank and
gave every evidence he felt himself in a friendly and helpful atmos-
phere. (As you know he is tense and somewhat tongue-tied when he
feels himself in the opposite.) He said we had enemies surrounding
Marcos who were deliberately feeding this stuff to the President.
Yesterday afternoon Osmena called me (on what are probably
tapped wires) saying he had just returned from useful talks, particu-
larly with Don Kendall in the U.S., and asked if he could come see me.
I said of course he could (even though I did not particularly like the
timing). Osmena stayed for 21⁄2 rather uncomfortable hours. He was ob-
viously happy to see the recent trouble and considered it a vindication
of his protest positions over the elections. He furthermore said that this
was just the beginning and that further trouble will follow. In the long
conversation I let him know that some LP Party members would find
us more cautious around them in the future as they were talking freely
around town about contacts and conversations with Americans. I also
let him know that the previous policy I had given him after elections
about the U.S. position stood firm. I also said I could not see how it
would benefit the Liberal Party in the future for them to even think of
working side by side with leftist elements causing the trouble.
His proposition in general was that all he had tried to convince us
of in the past was beginning to become true, and that the great dan-

2
January 31.
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Philippines 437

ger was that things were being set up for a Communist takeover. My
position was that he exaggerated that part of the problem.
I asked Osmena if he thought new worries of Marcos might make
him a better President after the current troubles were over. In essence
Osmena said no, because 1) in six months Marcos wouldn’t be alive
and 2) Marcos didn’t have the courage to see it through, as he would
not stand up under pressure from his political cronies.
Against all of the above I have a very sensitive report of a meet-
ing which took place about 2 a.m. last night at the Palace. This would
indicate that the President and Mrs. Marcos advised several close con-
fidants that they believe the U.S. had in some way had a role in insti-
gating demonstrations against Malacanang. President Marcos’ reason-
ing was that the U.S. desires to keep him off balance in view of the
forthcoming U.S./Phil negotiations on Laurel–Langley, bases, etc. Pres-
ident Marcos also discussed contingency plans in the event an insur-
rection in the Manila area was successful. The President apparently
said his plans in this event were to move himself and some loyal fol-
lowers to the Ilocos region where he can regroup his forces.
I believe we will be able to weave ourselves through this without
something stupid happening, but wanted you to have the background
of these three conversations just in case. The real danger, of course, is
of Marcos becoming panicky in his surprise and concern. Hopeful de-
velopments as of today is that they have asked us for renewed riot
training. We are equipped to do this locally and it is now underway.
Also, very trusted security chief in Malacanang has just asked us for
advice and possible assistance on getting the type of dye that Germans
use effectively for identification purposes in connection with the fire
hoses technique of riot control.
You must remember in judging all this that we here live in a situ-
ation where it is almost inconceivable to the average Filipino that any-
thing ever happens in the Philippines without an American hand be-
ing involved somewhere.
I will provide you with this type background through this chan-
nel to supplement our regular reporting as long as this seems neces-
sary.3 Our principle problem at the moment seems to be one of help-
ing Marcos to keep his cool. For this he needs reassurance from us
among other things, and for this reason if for no other, I will try to see
him soon and will continue to make plain that we are not and will not
be involved in these internal matters.

3
In an attached note to Haig, February 2, Green passed on this message and stated
that “I think Ambassador Byroade is proceeding just about right.” He noted that “I also
sought to discourage him from using this ‘back channel’ too much, preferring regular
channels with highest restricted indicators where necessary.”
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438 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, February 3, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Riots in Manila

The Causes: The proximate cause of the student riots was a student
demand that the political parties (i.e. specifically President Marcos) not
influence the elections next November for a Constitutional Convention
to frame a new Constitution. With Marcos’ recent overwhelming vic-
tory, fears are growing among the students and others that he may per-
petuate his power, and that a last chance may be lost to reform Philip-
pine politics.2
The Liberals, disgruntled by their recent defeat, may have thought
it useful to egg on the students to “get even” with Marcos. Some of his
political competitors in his own party may be trying to generate pres-
sures against a third term. Beyond this is a widespread sense of post-
election letdown in the Philippines. The balance-of-payments crisis is
tightening, and some people are being hurt by the Government’s new
austerity measures. In every previous Philippine election, frustrations
could be blamed on the President who had just been defeated; Mar-
cos’ unprecedented re-election means that the natural scapegoat is still
in office. Frustrations over the venality and lack of direction of Philip-
pine political life have been growing, and some observers believe that
church and parental authority was probably sympathetic to the strik-
ers rather than being a restraining influence.
What Happened: The demonstration was originally organized by a
moderate student grouping anxious to keep it peaceful. To avoid vio-
lence, they were in the process of dispersing, and their leaders were
actually in the Malacanang talking with Marcos, when an extremist
student group arrived with their supporters, looking for trouble.
During the period that followed, four or five students were killed,
of some 15,000–40,000 involved. It was by all odds the largest and most
violent demonstration in Philippine history.
The violence may have been fanned by professional Communist
agitators, but this is still very moot.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 962, Alexan-
der M. Haig Chronological File, Haig Chron—Feb. 1–7, 1970. Secret. Sent for information.
2
The President underlined the last two lines of the first paragraph and wrote:
“(They need the reform!)”
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Philippines 439

The Reaction: The principal current reaction is shock and intro-

spection. President Marcos has gone on the air and, in an effort to
divert attention from the fact that he personally was the target of
the students, has blamed the violence upon leaders “influenced by . . .
the ideology of Mao Tse-tung,” and upon Communist and non-
Communist conspiracies. He has further magnified the importance of
the riot by closing schools for a week.
The Implications: Marcos has been put very much on the defensive
in a remarkably short time following his election landslide. Popular
discontent and political jealousies have focussed on him. It is much too
early, however, to say whether he will be seriously weakened, or
whether he will be deflected from an effort—which we surmise he has
been making—to insure that the Constitutional Convention is mal-
leable to his interests.
At its most serious (and fed by current economic troubles), an at-
tack on Marcos could expand to an attack on the present political struc-
ture, but we have no evidence that the forces with the will and power
to press for fundamental changes have coalesced.
We may hope that the riots will encourage Marcos to put a prior-
ity on social and economic reform, but this is by no means certain.
At the least, it is reasonably certain that Philippine politics will be
inward-turned in coming months. Some journalists have, as usual,
blamed the US, but the US will probably not become a major target,
unless the power balance moves sharply to the left. Marcos has hereto-
fore tended to monopolize the “nationalist” line, but his decision to
blame Communists for his present troubles limits his flexibility to seek
better relations with them. Because of the economic importance of good
relations with us (and to avoid adding problems with the US to his
other problems), Marcos will probably move very slowly on opening
Military Base Agreement negotiations with us, and will probably seek
to continue to defer negotiations on the Laurel–Langley renegotiation.3

3
The President underlined the phrase “negotiations on the Laurel–Langley rene-
gotiation” and wrote: “1) K—I want every possible step taken to reduce U.S. presence
in Philippines—Let’s not press for extended base operations. 2) Did we cut down on our
military personnel in the base areas?”
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440 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

207. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, February 7, 1970.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

—Ambassador Byroade’s Conversation with Marcos: Ambassador By-
roade reported a rambling conversation with a very distraught and un-
nerved President Marcos,2 who made the following remarks:
—He wanted Byroade’s “active help”; Marcos said he might have
to impose martial law, and wanted to know if Byroade would “stand
behind him.”
—He asked advice whether to postpone the Constitutional Con-
vention scheduled for 1971, and about speeded-up deliveries of heli-
copters and ammunition under MAP.
—He complained about the hostility of the Manila press.
—He asked why we cannot be more forthcoming with help, and
at one point mentioned the figure of $100 million. (We have already
turned aside requests for $450 million in stabilization loans over three
years, and have pushed the GOP to deal with the IMF. We are pro-
viding a small PL 480 program, and U.S. banks and oil interests are
giving some balance of payments relief.)
Byroade reacted cautiously to keep us from being drawn into this
situation. He tried discreetly to suggest the need for social programs
and land reform, and to head off drastic actions such as martial law.3
Byroade comments that the Philippines are used to our moving in
to bail them out, and that Marcos probably thinks our present re-
strained position is punitive. He observes that Marcos is really afraid
of a revolution, and that he is further unnerved by Chinese soothsay-
ers’ predictions that he will die before June. Byroade himself thinks
that the situation may get worse (the next student demonstration is
scheduled for February 12, and there is a chance that labor may join
it). Byroade thinks that Marcos’ best course would be to make a sweep
of the Cabinet and to embark upon such reforms as he can afford. He

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 17, Pres-
ident’s Daily Briefs, February 2–10, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The memo-
randum is unsigned.
2
Transmitted in telegram 1071 from Manila, February 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files
1970–73, POL 15–1 PHIL)
3
A marginal note in Nixon’s handwriting next to this underlined section begin-
ning with “social” reads: “K—I doubt this line’s effectiveness.”
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Philippines 441

points out, however, that a Philippine President who moved too fast
might well be murdered by his own establishment.
Separately, Byroade makes a plea for the return to the Philippines
of an American soldier who was allowed to slip out of the Philippines
while in U.S. custody awaiting a Philippine trial. He thinks this issue
(coming on top of another similar incident) could become explosive to
our relations if the GOP should endeavor to exploit it to divert atten-
tion from its own problem. At the least, he says, this incident could
wipe out all hopes of negotiating a satisfactory criminal jurisdiction
understanding with the GOP. (Tab A)4
[Omitted here is discussion of items on the Republic of China, Is-
rael, and Honduras.]

4
The President highlighted this paragraph and wrote: “K—What are the facts?”
Tab A was attached but not printed.

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines1

Washington, February 7, 1970, 0050Z.

19158. Subject: US Posture with Marcos Relative to Student Crisis.

Ref: Manila 1071.2
1. We commend way you handled delicate conversation with Mar-
cos, avoiding being drawn into position of giving him advice as to spe-
cific decisions he faces, while at same time being willing to discuss with
him nature of problems with which he is now confronted. We agree
that it is desirable for you to continue to maintain Marcos’ confidence.
Your conversations with him will provide an opportunity for you, with-
out making any specific recommendations, to review events and show
the pros and cons of various possible courses of action. Such talking
out of the issues should also help Marcos maintain the necessary de-
gree of composure and balance.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 PHIL. Secret;
Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Usher on February 6; cleared by Moore, Green, and Eliot; and
approved by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson.
2
Dated February 6. (Ibid., POL 15–1 PHIL)
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442 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

2. Believe you should continue to try to maintain this posture dur-

ing this volatile period of uncertainty as to how the various forces at
work are motivated and will operate in the immediate future. We be-
lieve we must try to keep the United States as much as possible from
being drawn into involvement or appearance of involvement in this
crisis. Thus, if you were to give Marcos specific advice, he might then
let it be known that in his future actions he was acting on American
advice, thereby involving us directly. On the other hand, by keeping
in touch with him and helping him to analyze his situation as objec-
tively as possible, you may be able at the same time to play a role in
restraining him from ill-considered actions.
3. The situation requires, more than ever before, that we take every
precaution to avoid incidents of any kind which might direct the fo-
cus of Philippine unrest and anger against the United States or any el-
ements of its presence in the Philippines. No doubt you will be cau-
tioning U.S. military and civilian components that they must exert
extreme care and restraint to prevent incidents involving Americans.
4. We here will be doing everything we can to support you and
your highly capable team in your best judgments as to how we should
proceed.3
Rogers

3
Telegram 21459 to Manila, February 11, informed Byroade that the Philippine
Government and the IMF had reportedly reached agreement on a $27.5 million third
credit tranche. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files,
Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

209. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, February 11, 1970, 1027Z.

1213. Subj: Call on Romulo.

1. I called on Romulo at his request this afternoon. He held in his
hand two notes to present to me. As I suspected they were on the sub-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to
CINCPAC and CINCPACREPPHIL.
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Philippines 443

ject of U.S. military leaving the Philippines to evade criminal jurisdic-

tion by the Philippines.
2. I opened by saying that in view of our past conversations
(nearly daily) I had hoped he would feel that he need not have to give
me these notes today. He replied that he felt he had no alternative be-
cause he was “sick and tired” of evasion on these issues. He then went
into a bit of speech-making which ended up with him asking me point
blank what I was going to do about Moomey.2 I told him that I was
not ever going to even try to do anything about Moomey, inasmuch as
I was sure he knew, there was nothing I could do about bringing him
back. I also told him that I had every hope that Williams would be
brought back. I did not see why, when he knew we were in the process
of working very hard on this case, which had its complexities in Amer-
ican (as it would in the Philippine) system, that he would feel com-
pelled to make a strong case publicly until the matter could be resolved.
3. I did not bother to read his notes, but proceeded to talk to
Romulo in the strongest language I believe I have ever used with a for-
eign minister. I said I recognized the element of sovereignty in these
cases which concerned him, but wanted him to know that as far as the
real issues were concerned, which included matters of life and death,
the exercise he was trying to put me through paled into semantics. I
also told him that I could not believe he was fully aware of the things
going on around town and feared that he was unwittingly joining into
a pattern which seemed to me both serious and sinister.
4. I told him I thought there was an obvious effort going on in
Manila to divert attention from the government onto the Americans,
and this included efforts to divert the rioters and troublemakers as well.
I suggested he think long and hard before he engaged in public
polemics about us today in view of the anticipated troubles here in
Manila tomorrow. There were rumors around town that there would
be an indiscriminate attempt to kill some Americans in connection with
the demonstrations scheduled for tomorrow. I felt these were serious
enough that as a precaution I was making considerable effort to keep
Americans in their homes tomorrow, even though I regretted taking
this step as it might in a way contribute to the feeling of unease of
everyone here. It was for this reason that I have made all my moves in
this regard as low-keyed as possible.
5. I also told him that the charges that he was leveling against us
for infraction of rules around the bases paled even more into insignif-
icance when one considered the security situation around these bases.

2
Moomey and Williams were U.S. servicemen stationed in the Philippines who
were accused of serious crimes, and whom Philippine authorities wished to try in Philip-
pine courts rather than the customary U.S. military courts.
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444 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I told him I thought I would be ready soon to present him with facts
that I was sure neither he nor the President knew about. In addition
to the normal graft and corruption and straight malfeasance of justice
situations which had long existed, things were now taking a more se-
rious turn. It appeared to me that a pattern might be developing of pe-
riodic, indiscriminate killing of Americans. I said he could not accept
forever that publicity would come only from him or his side, and that
I might have to start speaking out publicly on these matters. I gave
him four or five lurid cases which I must admit had even Romulo
speechless.
6. I said he might likewise not know that he was planning this
public attack on us at the very time that I was working closely with
President Marcos in an effort to be helpful to him and the government
in their current crisis.
7. Romulo interrupted and said that he wished he had talked to
me earlier as he had already given the notes and comments to one af-
ternoon newspaper. I said in that case I guess it was even too late to
see the President, and my only recourse was to consider what I might
myself do publicly.
8. Romulo jumped up and went into his adjoining office and came
back with the material he had planned to use in the press conference
after my departure. He threw it on his desk and said, “There it all is.
I won’t give out any more to the press and I will see what I can do to
tone down what I have already done.”3 He said that he had not known
many of the things I had told him and wanted me to know personally
that his intended action had been at his own initiative and he did not
want me to think that he was joining others to turn Filipinos against
us at this time.
9. Comment: I think that the latter is probably true and that Ro-
mulo, for purposes of his own shaky position and prestige, had de-
cided that this was a good time for him to weigh in. There will be an-
other staff cable enroute on these cases. I see now that his note
complains about a case involving a Sgt. Moore back in August who ap-
parently left on August 15 without a subpoena being issued to him
which was received by base authorities on August 11. I also under-
stand the Embassy was not informed of either this case or Williams for
a long period of time. In any event, if I am going to get tough with the

3
Telegram 1243 from Manila, February 12, reported that the “scathing tone re-
flected in February 11” newspapers was “nowhere to be found February 12,” and that
the morning dailies had “temperate stories.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)
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Philippines 445

GOP on our side of the line, which I am in the mood to do,4 I would
certainly like no more dallying about getting Williams back here as the
Filipinos have a fool-proof case on this one. An international agree-
ment has clearly been violated and I must say I cannot understand the
reluctance of Defense to make amends.
Byroade

4
In a memorandum to Kissinger, February 17, Holdridge characterized this
telegram as “some effective bare-knuckle diplomacy by Byroade.” Holdridge surmised
that Romulo had intended to present the protest notes and then report the whole affair
to the press, which would have stirred up anti-American sentiment and diverted atten-
tion from Marcos’ problems with the students. He reported that “Byroade made a very
strong presentation as to the danger of using us as a whipping boy in the situation.”
Holdridge drafted a note from Kissinger congratulating Byroade, but the note appar-
ently was not sent. (Ibid.)

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, February 17, 1970, 1052Z.

1393. Subj: Conversation with Marcos on Central Luzon.

1. I took departing AID Director Haraldson to say goodbye to Mar-
cos yesterday and the latter asked me to remain afterwards for a pri-
vate talk.
2. Marcos said he was going to clean up Central Luzon once and
for all. He wanted to start the process within the next thirty days, but
he wanted to know first whether he would have our support. I asked
what he had in mind, and he quickly pointed out that all he had in
mind was for us to supply military items. He said he was worried about
the level of ammunition for his armed forces, the need for more M–16’s
and helicopters. I reminded him that we were momentarily in the
process of bringing side arm ammunition up to date. He said he ap-
preciated our quick action in this particular matter.
3. Marcos said that all eyes were focused on Manila whereas the
real impetus for many of the troubles in Manila, and the real danger
for the future, lies in Central Luzon. He said training camps were

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 PHIL. Secret.
Repeated to CINCPAC, CHJUSMAG, and CINCPACREPPHIL.
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446 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

being set up in extremely inaccessible spots. He mentioned one that

appeared being set up for about 100 men and another for 300 and that
if he tried to drop 50 troopers in these areas using his present 5 heli-
copters they would be wiped out. He said any support that these camps
were getting at this point from outside sources was negligible, but it
looked like subversive forces were being formed which, when in be-
ing, might expect outside support.
4. He then dwelled at some length over the perennial disagree-
ment here between his people and our JUSMAG over the level of sup-
ply of ammunition that should be in Philippine hands. (This has in-
deed been a problem over the years and it has often appeared to our
people that it is more emotional than logical. We hope this problem
will eventually be solved when their own ammunition factory comes
into operation in late 1971. In the meantime, I think in judging them
on this score we must be conscious of the psychological factors in-
volved in having one’s source of ammunition in foreign hands.)
5. What Marcos is asking for in effect is quick action on our part
on some initial supply items so that he could plan his operations well
prior to the beginning of the rains, and in addition to that some proof
that we would continue to stand behind them for replenishment of
used items. All this, of course, gives us quite a problem. In its broad-
est aspects I suppose he is trying to prove once again to himself that
we will support him, but even more broader still may be putting us to
the test on the Nixon Doctrine,2 i.e., the Phils will do the job themselves
but will need logistic support.
6. It is, of course, very much in our interests that Central Luzon
be cleaned up and Communist oriented armed groupings there not be
allowed to expand and organize under the umbrella of the current gen-
eral situation here. We also have to think of the importance of opera-
tions at Clark Field and of our people in that area. To take the extreme,
the terrain is such that a few hostile mortars in the hills could make
for a very difficult situation at Clark.
7. One trouble in the past in this situation is that no President since
Magsaysay has been willing to tackle the political aspects of changing
the situation in Central Luzon. If Marcos really means it this time he
is going to have to ride rough shod over local politicians of some
stature. He is also going to have to move on civic action aspects of the
problem and he has, of course, made one move by sending PHILCAG

2
For further documentation concerning the Nixon Doctrine, see Foreign Relations,
1969–1976, vol. I, Documents 5, 46, and 52. The Nixon Doctrine generally stated that,
while the United States would honor its commitments and help its allies, Asian coun-
tries would bear the main burden of defending themselves.
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Philippines 447

to that area, and another by starting air mobile operations in the area
using available lift.
8. I would like to find some way to satisfy any legitimate concern
Marcos may have as to our physical support for meaningful items and
yet protect us from those that would not really be meaningful. We have
already been able to move on some items and this has been very use-
ful to us here. I do believe a few more helicopters makes sense and
have recommended we try to find somewhere five more at an early
date. I have just sent a message suggesting how we might be able to
handle another roughly 1,200 M–16’s.
9. This leaves the question of the level of supply of ammunition
which we will support here. I would like to find some means of meet-
ing this problem, which I would assess as being about half real and
half psychological, and do it in a way that would not cost us much
money (which we do not have in our program), and also in a way that
would give us freedom of action to judge how the Phils perform in this
task. It seems to me that there should be some middle course to sat-
isfy these rather somewhat conflicting criteria.
10. I have not as yet had time to thoroughly explore this with
JUSMAG, but am wondering whether we could not move into Subic
for storage from depots in Japan or Okinawa an additional increment
of supply above the 30 day base for their main line weapons. We would
then be in a position to tell Marcos that the stuff was close by and could
be drawn on as necessary to keep their levels at a satisfactory rate as
ammunition was expended. It might be a bit hard to do this without
giving the impression that we want to wait to see how he performs.
Off hand I would think it could be presented to him primarily as a
budgetary device because there was no immediate money in the pro-
gram available and we would not need any as long as the ammunition
was still in our hands/with him, however, knowing that it was close
at hand. I am fully aware that any such apparently simple plan would
be full of logistical and statistical nightmares but suppose it could be
done nonetheless if our overall interests would so dictate.
11. We will be exploring these matters further and this message is
to give a feeling of things here and to lay the setting for possible fu-
ture message through both State and Defense channels.
Byroade
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448 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

211. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, February 20, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Williams Case

You will recall the Williams case in the Philippines, in which an

Air Force sergeant at Clark Field was accused of complicity in an at-
tempted rape case in the nearby town of Angeles, and was inadver-
tently allowed by his military supervisors to depart on reassignment
while Philippine judicial procedures were pending against him.
The Williams case has now become a major issue in US-Philippine
relations. As Ambassador Byroade had feared, hostile elements in the
Philippines have picked it up as an affront to Philippine sovereignty
and used it as a rallying point to inspire a mob assault against our Em-
bassy in Manila—see the memorandum from State at Tab A, which re-
ports a telephone conversation between Ambassador Byroade and
DCM Wilson and the Philippine Country Director.2 According to Am-
bassador Byroade, two-thirds of the anti-foreign speeches at a mass
demonstration prior to the attack on the Embassy referred to the
Williams case, and were used as one means of getting part of the crowd
to move to the Embassy.
In the period since the confrontations developed between Marcos
and discontented student groups, Byroade has been concerned over
the possibility that the US might get caught in the middle and catch
part of the blame for the situation. He feared, in fact, that the Philip-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files,
Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970–March 1970. Secret. Sent for action.
The President wrote on the first page: “I hereby order an immediate 1/3 cut in military
personnel in Philippines (Clark Field).” A notation in Butterfield’s handwriting reads:
“Henry—the President approved this action recommendation on this condition:” with
an arrow drawn to Nixon’s aforementioned note.
2
At Tab A was a February 18 covering memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger that
transmitted a memorandum of a February 18 telephone call between Byroade and Wil-
son; attached but not printed. According to the memorandum of telephone conversa-
tion, a group of demonstrators broke away from a larger demonstration on the night of
February 18 and marched to the U.S. Embassy, broke through the outer gates of the com-
plex, and threw rocks and firebombs at the windows. Because there was no police pro-
tection at the Embassy, Ambassador Byroade telephoned President Marcos directly, em-
phasizing that “the Embassy had no protection. President Marcos said he would take
care of it right away. Riot police arrived within half an hour and very quickly brought
the situation under control.” Several situation reports describe the demonstration in
greater detail. (Ibid., Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)
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Philippines 449

pine Government might deliberately attempt to draw in the US in or-

der to deflect attention from the pressing economic and social issues
behind the confrontation with the students. The Williams case im-
pressed him as a perfect vehicle for this purpose, and indeed Foreign
Secretary Romulo actually intended to use this ploy but was deterred
by some extremely effective bare-knuckle diplomacy by Byroade. I at-
tach (Tab B) a telegram reporting Byroade’s conversation with Romulo
to this effect.3
While Byroade was able to influence Romulo’s behavior to some ex-
tent (though the absence of any police protection prior to the attack on
the Embassy indicates a degree of Philippine Government duplicity), he
was of course in no position to influence the leftists. There are many ex-
tremists who would like nothing better than to drag the US through the
mud, and the Williams case has provided a perfect starting point.
Filipinos of all descriptions are susceptible to propaganda charging the
US handling of the Williams case as having violated Philippine sover-
eignty, especially since this is not the first case of this nature.
Meanwhile, the question of issuing orders to Williams to return,
as urgently requested by Ambassador Byroade, has become stuck in
Defense. State has asked the Air Force to issue the orders on foreign
policy grounds, and the Air Force is willing to go along. However,
higher authority in Defense is not, and is balking, due both to appre-
hensions over the prospect of adverse reaction on the Hill, and to the
very good chance that Williams, if returned, would not receive a fair
trial. Defense also believes that Williams might be able to resist return
by seeking a legal writ. I understand that Justice is perfectly willing to
take the case through the US courts if orders are issued to Williams
and he employs legal procedures to resist; Justice also believes that it
could win the case. It is not willing to take an official position on the
matter at this time, though.
I believe that you will wish to consider the implications of the
Williams case very carefully. Our position in the Philippines appears
to be vulnerable, and if Williams is not returned, our whole relation-
ship with the Philippines could be greatly complicated, including the
tenure of our bases. According to our Military Bases Agreement with
the Philippines, we have no grounds to keep Williams out of Philip-
pine judicial process, even though some of these processes have typi-
cally been bent and stretched by the Filipinos in their handling of this
and other cases. On the other hand, the possible US domestic reper-
cussions, particularly those on the Hill, could be troublesome.

3
Document 209.
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450 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Even returning Williams at this time will not solve our problems,
since we will appear to be operating under Philippine pressures rather
than honoring our treaty relationship, but we can at least ease the
criticisms on this score by claiming that the matter was under review
by the appropriate authorities and action has been taken in accordance
with standard procedures. Sending Williams back might also help to
get us more into the background when Filipino tempers are running
high. We could use any breathing-space gained to press the Filipinos
for improvements in their judicial handling of criminal cases involv-
ing Americans, particularly at Clark Field.
Recommendations
That you inform Secretary Laird that orders should be issued to
Williams sending him back to the Philippines.4
Alternatively, that you agree with Defense in not ordering Williams
to return.

4
Nixon initialed the approve option. However, in an attached February 21 note to
Kissinger, Haig wrote: “I’ve done nothing on this. It will require direct discussions with
Laird in my view.” Kissinger returned the note to Haig with the following handwritten
notation: “Make sure I take up with President.”

212. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) to

the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, March 4, 1970.

SUBJECT
Reduction of U.S. Presence in the Philippines

I must say this action borders on the ridiculous. This is an in-

credible reduction in U.S. presence in the Philippines no matter how
unnecessary our presence may be. The degree to which our facilities
in the Philippines are directly linked to operations in South Vietnam is
substantial and no one with any knowledge of this fact has even been
asked to comment.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.
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Philippines 451

If we were to send out a memorandum of this type2 calling for a

reduction of this magnitude over the time frame cited, I think we will
ultimately provide either the biggest laugh in the bureaucracy or shake
whatever confidence they may have in our ability to run foreign affairs
on a sound and systematic basis. Our job is to prevent the President
from making the kinds of mistakes which we know only too well he
can make in times of emotional peak. This action fits into that category
despite the fact that the President has reiterated his intention of re-
ducing our presence in the Philippines on countless occasions.
The Philippine cut, the near 50% reduction in Korea, the precipi-
tous draw down in South Vietnam and Thailand, the All-Volunteer
Army ploy, the posturing for an assault on NATO next year, and the
10% across-the-board reduction of our overseas strength already ac-
complished this year cannot but convince the most amateur observer
that despite all of our rhetoric we are adopting a fortress America con-
cept which is not only inward looking but emotionally orchestrated. I
think the Korean studies, even though triggered by a capricious direc-
tive, at least went through the motions of a clear and systematic inter-
departmental review. In that instance the wisdom of reduction was con-
firmed by that review. We should certainly as a minimum follow a
similar procedure on the Philippine issue.
I would suggest that you talk to the President about this before
signing this memorandum and underline your concern that such a
drastic reduction could not but be interpreted as a wholesale bug-out,
which will have an incalculable impact on our efforts in Southeast Asia
to say nothing of inflicting untold hardships on the economy and peo-
ple of the Philippines. I also strongly recommend that we accomplish
the Philippine reduction as a result of an objective NSDM which would
initiate the kind of interdepartmental review of the type which we will
all have confidence in with the kind of time we need to do it and with
careful consideration given to the impact of this reduction on the Viet-
nam war, Pacific Fleet and air operations and the economic stability of
an irritating but nevertheless long-time ally and ward.

2
Haig evidently was referring to a draft memorandum outlining severe cuts in
U.S. personnel in the Philippines, as insisted upon by Nixon; see Document 203. A March
11 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, attached but not printed, advised the Presi-
dent that Kissinger had informed Laird of the President’s decision to cut personnel at
Clark Air Base by one-third and that Laird had reported that he would have a “detailed”
plan for the reductions completed by about April 20. In a March 10 memorandum Laird
stated that the plan would call for the personnel reductions to be fully implemented by
September 1. Kissinger asked if “this target date is acceptable to you,” and Nixon ini-
tialed his approval. (Both ibid.)
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452 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, March 6, 1970, 0521Z.

1912. For Asst Secretary Green from Ambassador Byroade. Sub-

ject: U.S.–Phil Economic Bilaterals. Ref: State 25196.2
1. Your Feb 20 cable causes very grave concern on my part. It
comes as quite a shock to learn six months after my arrival (and three
months after we reaffirmed our willingness to renegotiate the
Laurel–Langley Agreement first expressed in September 1966) that we
are prepared to do nothing about our economic arrangements here ex-
cept let nature take its course. It may be nice theory but it hardly fits
the practical world of things, in which the Philippines is presently pass-
ing through several long-term crises at the same time (foreign policy,
constitution, balance of payments, and economic relations with the
U.S.). I also think it is a callous view as regards the degree of protec-
tion we should accord to U.S. business abroad, which I feel is a legiti-
mate part of our national interest.
2. I don’t think I can accept this without a considerable effort on
my part to try to change our position. I realize, however, one doesn’t
win any cases with Washington when things still seem to be on a the-
oretical basis. Unfortunately, although it may not seem so on the sur-
face, we are in a very real sense even now at the time of decision. The
continued uncertainty is exacting an ever-rising toll in the economic
realm. If we let things slide, this will mean that sooner or later we will
confront the Phils across the table with the news that we really don’t
have anything to talk about. Their natural reaction will presumably be to
take strong punitive measures against U.S.-owned businesses to force
us off this position, where upon the latter will descend on the Wash-
ington scene in force. I know that there is a feeling in the Department
that there is considerable difference in the thinking of local business
leaders here and their home offices. Now that I am getting to know
both, I think this has been greatly over-exaggerated. Not a week goes
by here that I don’t see several visiting bigwigs from home offices. I

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.
2
Telegram 25196 to Manila, February 19, clarified Green’s position to Byroade.
Green stated that he was aware that any duty reductions granted to the Philippines
“could be made available to other countries.” However, Green stated: “we do not be-
lieve this is a desirable course to pursue” for a number of reasons, the first of which was
that the “Filipinos, in their own interest, must come to realize that the development of
a sound economic base for their economy is essentially up to them.” (Ibid.)
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Philippines 453

believe when the issues become defined that New York will at least
try to push us to attempt to defend what seems to them to be fair and
reasonable.
3. I predict that we would then develop a more flexible and imag-
inative position. The problem will then be, however, that, because of
the nature of these issues, the need for legislation, etc., many months
will thereafter be required for firm positions to be developed.
4. This would I believe be the wrong approach. It would of course
exacerbate our military as well as our investment problems. I still hope
we can to avoid adhering to such an approach which, I might add, ap-
pears to be widely at variance with the approach we are contemplat-
ing taking with the Latinos.
5. I wish to make clear that I do not recommend anything that
might properly be termed a prolonged extension of “special relations.”
I do believe however that there is need for general recognition through-
out the U.S. Government of the importance and delicacy of the issues
involved and of the essentiality of our managing this creeping crisis in
the Philippines as painstakingly as we know how. Some flexibility on
timing of the phase-out, and ad hoc problems, may be required. In any
case, I am convinced that the approach in your message will only in-
crease the perils already inherent in the situation.
6. If the position outlined in your message eventually remains firm
in spite of these considerations, then I think the Department will have
an obligation to inform U.S. industry. It would not be fair in my opin-
ion to withhold this position from them and let many of them, who
are still hopeful we will get a fair deal for them in negotiations, end
up in a fire-sale atmosphere too late to make better arrangements.
Byroade
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454 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

214. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National
Security Council’s Under Secretaries Committee
(Richardson)1

Washington, March 25, 1970.

SUBJECT
Personnel Reductions in the Philippines

The President has directed an immediate one-third reduction in

the civilian and military personnel stationed at Clark Field in the Philip-
pines. Secretary Laird has been informed of this directive and has
agreed to submit a detailed plan for the reductions by April 20. They
are to be completed by September 1, 1970. The Defense Department
has been asked to coordinate with the State Department prior to sub-
mitting the plan.
In addition, the President has asked that other civilian and mili-
tary personnel of all agencies in the Philippines be reduced 25 percent.
These reductions should be completed as soon as possible and in no
case later than June 30, 1971. The Under Secretaries Committee should
consider how they are to be effected and report to the President on the
schedule for carrying them out.2 The report should consider their im-
plications for U.S.-Philippine relations and for the U.S. strategic posi-
tion in the Pacific. It should also reach the President by April 20.3
Henry A. Kissinger

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.
2
Richardson sent an April 10 memorandum to the members of the committee, re-
questing them to carry out the President’s instructions and noting that an ad hoc group
had already been established by his memorandum of March 31. Both memoranda are
attached but not printed. The Embassy was advised of the President’s decision in
telegram 48653 to Manila, April 3. (Ibid.)
3
A marginal notation in unidentified handwriting reads: “Now slipped a week.”
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Philippines 455

215. Report by the National Security Council’s Under Secretaries

Committee Review of U.S. Bases and Facilities in the
Philippines1

Washington, April 6, 1970.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

SUMMARY
This study was undertaken as a result of the memorandum from
Dr. Kissinger to the Under Secretary of State dated October 30 [20]2,
1969, on the subject of “Revisions of the US Military Bases Agreement
with the Philippines.” The memorandum indicated that the President
had directed a review of our treaty and other relationships with the
Philippines with the objective of:
—putting the Philippines on a most-favored-nation basis,
—examining the total physical area in the Philippines controlled
by the US Forces and the number of bases for comparison with the US
Forces holdings in other countries. Consideration should be given to
the release of land in the Philippines which may be surplus to military
needs.
The study sets forth objectives and outlines policy assumptions
and guidance on which the effort is based. In addition, the Philippine
pressures in the last five years, as related to the number and size of US
bases, are discussed in detail. A section of the study is devoted to the
size of the US bases in the Philippines and in several other countries.
Country population, land areas and civilian population densities are
compared to the same statistics of the US Forces in the various coun-
tries. Pertinent information of all the US bases and properties in the
Philippines is provided and the need for the properties is discussed.
The JOBAR study conclusions relating to the closure of Sangley Point,
the JCS position concerning the study results and the present status of
JOBAR recommendations are discussed briefly.
The Study conclusions are as follows:
a. Although the total land area of US bases in the Philippines is
large in comparison to that in other foreign countries, a comparison of

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. This 36-page study (plus four
map drawings) was designated NSC–U/N 18, Annex C, and was forwarded to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under
an April 6 cover letter, by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director of the Under Secretaries
Committee.
2
Document 195.
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456 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the various population densities does not indicate that the US controls
a disproportionate share of land in the Philippines.
b. The two Navy VP squadrons, based on Sangley Point, are in-
volved primarily in Vietnam-related missions. It is envisioned that this
ASW force will be reduced to one squadron in the post-Vietnam era.
As US combat forces are reduced in SEA, it may be desirable to relo-
cate those naval aviation units and support activities now located at
Sangley. The JOBAR Study addresses the issue of closure of Sangley in
the present time frame. In late January 1970, however, DepSecDef
elected against a unilateral decision to close Sangley Point now. This
was due, in part, to the utility of the station as a bargaining point in
our MBA negotiations.
c. From a review of Clark Air Base holdings, it is considered that
the Air Force could relinquish a portion of Zone D acreage without ad-
versely impacting on base expansion requirements, security, or in-
tegrity. However, it is believed that this acreage should be released only
if the GOP presses for a reduction in the size of the Clark holdings.
d. Due to its topography, approximately one-half the land in the
Subic Bay area is unimproved and is retained primarily for security
reasons and to protect the watershed of the area. A portion of this land
could be relinquished without adversely affecting the mission of the
base provided there is an adequate land use survey.
e. John Hay Air Base serves as an important low-cost recreational
area for all US armed forces personnel in the Philippines. The annual
savings that would accrue from closing the base is small in compari-
son to its value in increased morale and productivity of the personnel.
It should be retained unless GOP insists upon its return.
f. Land holdings in the minor US facilities are not considered in
excess of requirements and are not identified for release.
g. The GOP has failed to live up to guarantees for watershed
preservation in some cases involving release of US-controlled land in
the past. Any actions involving future release of base lands should be
completed only after adequate measures are taken by GOP to ensure
protection of watershed areas essential to the bases.
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Philippines 457

216. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, April 7, 1970, 0651Z.

3028. For Under Secretary Richardson from Byroade. Subj: Re-

duction in US Personnel in the Philippines. Ref: Manila 2946.2
1. My guess is that we are just “whistling Dixie” if we think we
will have any options left when the time comes to tell the GOP about
our scheduled cuts in the Philippines. Yesterday I found that all of the
bases here were informed through military channels of current plans
for across the board cuts, with percentages provided. No rationale
whatsoever was given.
2. Throughout all of this I have felt that when the chips were down
and the effects, both here and in our support for the area as a whole,
were coldly analyzed, that things would begin to fall into place in a
more logical manner. I still think this will be the case, but now I won-
der how much damage may be created before we reach that point.
3. At the very least I suggest you ask the military to follow up
their JCS message to CINCPAC and its subsequent distribution here
with the follow up order that they clam up on this particular subject
pending further instructions. This would give your committees and
planners time to weigh the consequences prior to any further word to
the field.3
4. In a more philosophical vein I want to pass on along to you,
and for the perusal of your sub-committees, a part of a draft policy re-
port from here, not yet finished, that deals with “the American pres-
ence.” It is still in draft form, but because of the urgency of the situa-
tion, I will send it along as it now is.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.
2
Telegram 2946 from Manila, April 4, reported Byroade’s “shock” at the extent of
the personnel cuts to be made in the Philippines and stated that “the implications” of
this decision “could not be more profound.” In regard to the 25 percent across the board
personnel reduction, Byroade stated that he felt “strongly that we have passed the point
where this is possible. Whole operations and probably some agencies must be taken out
to achieve reductions of this magnitude, not crippling cutbacks that will leave me with
nothing operating properly.” (Ibid.)
3
In telegram 52752 to Manila, April 10, Green informed Byroade that all agencies
in the Philippines were required to submit lists of their positions “in ascending order of
essentiality,” and that a “subcommittee established in State” would submit recommen-
dations to the Under Secretaries Committee, which would “make final approval on pro-
gramming of reductions and submit to President.” (Ibid.)
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458 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

5. Begin draft:
1. In considering the term “American presence” as it applies to
the Philippines, it is useful first to review the current status of this
presence:
(A) The number of American residents in the Philippines is de-
clining and has been for some time, even though estimates of non USG
connected persons claiming US citizenship still run as high at 24,000.
(B) The American business community is half the size it was a
decade or two ago. With trained and competent Filipinos available it
is unnecessary and expensive to maintain a large American staff.
(C) The American religious community increased sharply after
World War II, but is now declining as Filipino priests and ministers are
replacing Americans and other foreigners.
(D) Our civilian official strength has been cut back by almost thirty
percent in the last eighteen months, and if the reduction in the num-
ber of Peace Corps volunteers is included, there has been a fifty per-
cent reduction.
(E) Lower levels of military activity in Vietnam, and budgetary
limitations have reduced our military strength. We have moved out of
Mactan Air Base, and by June of this year military personnel reduc-
tions will be slightly over two-thousand.
2. The impact of this presence is difficult to measure. For the press
critic and student radical in Manila, hostility to the United States is
rooted in psychological and historical factors little affected by the num-
ber of Americans in the Philippines. In the countryside the respect and
admiration for the United States is still so great that the American Am-
bassador runs the awkward risk of outdrawing the Philippine Presi-
dent. There are well publicized problems around the bases, but with
one exception our military is concentrated in two relatively isolated ar-
eas in the Philippines, and the social and economic impact in even these
areas is by no means all bad. There has certainly been no suggestion
from the Philippine Government that there are too many Americans
here. On the contrary, the Government is doing all it can to encourage
the presence of many more American tourists.
3. It is important to recognize that seventy years of close associa-
tion with the Philippines has bound us together, and that for good or
ill, an American presence (in the broadest sense of this term) would re-
main even if every official American went home. We have established
institutions here that took deep root and are now a part of Philippine
society, representative government, private enterprise, and freedom of
the press. Filipino newspapers would still continue to carry American
columnists, American comic strips, and American ball scores. Ameri-
can books, movies, and products would still be favored. Over 4,500 Fil-
ipinos went to the United States for education and training last year.
Over 16,000 went as visitors. Approximately 20,000 a year are now go-
ing as immigrants, and many later travel back to the Philippines for
an extended stay. The cumulative impact of these tens of thousands of
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Philippines 459

exposures to our country would have a continuing and pervasive in-

fluence on the course of internal Philippine affairs, and on our bilat-
eral relations, even if there were no U.S. Government employees in the
country.
4. Considered in this broader context, the number of official Amer-
icans in the Philippines is not in itself a critical factor in our relations.
Our intentions and attitudes in all the complex issues in our contrac-
tual relationships, and our policy in the area as a whole, are still much
more important.
End of Draft.
Byroade

217. Paper Prepared For the Under Secretaries Committee1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Revisions in U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement and Other Relationships

I. Statement of Requirement
A. Revision of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement, As
Amended, of 1947
The President by Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of October 20, 1969
directed the Under Secretaries Committee to make two studies:
(1) A comparison of the 1947 U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
Agreement with similar U.S. arrangements elsewhere, in which the ob-
jective would be to bring U.S. privileges and immunities in the Philip-
pines down to a level comparable with rights we enjoy elsewhere.

1
Source: Department of State, NSC Under Secretaries Committee: Lot 83 D 276,
Box 7813, NSC–U/SM 51B—4/7/70—US Philippine Bases Agreement Revisions. Secret.
This study was prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group, which was charged
with studying the Military Bases Agreement revisions. According to an April 7 memo-
randum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other principals of the
Under Secretaries Committee, this issue paper was prepared to “facilitate discussion on
this topic” at the Committee’s April 9 meeting. Circular Airgram 2879 to Manila and
CINCPAC, May 23, reported that the Under Secretaries Committee endorsed the East
Asia Interdepartmental Group’s proposed revisions at the April 9 meeting. (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US) No memorandum of con-
versation of the Under Secretaries Committee has been found.
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460 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Particular attention was to be given to the questions of length of tenure

and criminal jurisdiction procedures.
(2) A comparison of the extent of U.S. base holdings in the Philip-
pines with those we hold elsewhere, with a view to the releasing of
Philippine baselands surplus to our needs.
These studies were to be preliminary to an early invitation to the
Philippines to renegotiate the Military Bases Agreement.
B. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952 and the Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Agreement of 1953
The Philippines has advised us that in any discussion of the 1947
MBA they will wish also to discuss certain aspects of the 1952 Mutual
Defense Treaty and the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.
Therefore, in addition to answering the specific questions raised in Mr.
Kissinger’s memorandum, the IG has formulated recommendations on
issues involved in these agreements.
II. Issues and Positions
There follows a statement of the steps which this study discloses
are desirable, together with a statement of areas where views are di-
vided. The USC is requested to approve recommendations that are
unanimous and make decisions where differences exist.
The IG, concentrating on the areas of tenure, criminal jurisdiction
and base operating rights, has concluded that with a few exceptions
the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement is broadly comparable
with our arrangements elsewhere.
A. Tenure
The Philippine bases agreement runs to 1991; most of our other
agreements are on a one-year terminable basis, and run concurrently
with mutual defense treaties.
Divided Position
State recommends that the MBA be put on a one-year terminable
basis to bring it into conformity with those we have elsewhere.
DOD does not concur with the State recommendation because
DOD does not believe such a change is necessary or desirable.
A decision is required.
B. Criminal Jurisdiction
In this area, the provisions of the Philippine agreement are about
comparable with those we have elsewhere.
Unanimous Position
Both State and DOD agree that the principal features of the
existing arrangement should be retained and that anticipated GOP
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Philippines 461

demands for exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses either off-base

or both off-base and on-base and pre-trial custody should be
opposed.
However, this conclusion may well be unacceptable to the
Philippines unless changes in the manner the SOFA actually op-
erates could make our position more palatable and the IG will be
studying existing SOFA procedures to see if any modifications can
be devised to make this decision more acceptable.
C. Base Rights and Operating Rights
Some of our agreements give slightly greater rights to host coun-
tries in such matters as the posting of host officials on the bases than
the Philippine Agreement does.
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree that the U.S. should consider permitting
the posting of appropriate Philippine officials on the bases to per-
form or oversee normal immigration, health, customs and other
administrative functions.
Divided Position
State recommends that the U.S. also consider establishment of
some form of nominal joint command of the bases.
DOD does not concur.
A decision is required.
D. Selective Joint-Use of the Bases
Short of full joint-basing, there appear to be possibilities for offer-
ing the Philippine Government a broader role in utilization of the bases
through selective joint-use in specific circumstances in which U.S. op-
erational control of the bases would not be compromised.
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree on the utility of a study of joint-use pro-
posals prior to the initiation of negotiations; and that the IG
will forward any recommendations developed by such a study to
the USC.
E. Baselands
The study shows that the extent of Air Force baselands in the
Philippines far exceeds such holdings in any other country. The study
indicates Navy baselands can also be reduced.
1. Clark
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree on relinquishment of a part of Zone D
acreage (47,250 acres in all).
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462 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

State and DOD also agree in principle that relinquishment

be considered of portions of Zone A (28,350 acres) and Zone B
(10,650 acres), following a land use survey to determine watershed
requirements.
2. Sangley
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree on reversion of Sangley when the re-
quirement for its Vietnam-related support efforts ceases.
3. Subic Bay
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree on reversion of a portion of the 36,124
acres at Subic following a watershed survey.
4. John Hay
Unanimous Position
State and DOD recommend retention of John Hay unless the
GOP insists on its return.
F. The 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty
The Philippines may raise the issue of the 1952 mutual security
treaty in the course of the base negotiations. Presumably the Filipinos
will seek, as they have in the past, to obtain a more explicit commit-
ment from the United States to come to their defense than that con-
tained in the treaty.
Unanimous Position
State and DOD agree on the need to tell the Philippine Govern-
ment when they raise this question that any effort to renegotiate the
treaty would be completely counterproductive, especially, given the
mood of the U.S. Senate.
G. 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
The Philippines may raise the issue of MAP administration pro-
cedures and JUSMAG organization and privileges. These are nagging
irritants which the Philippines have long wished to solve. In 1966 the
Philippine Government drafted (and the U.S. rejected) a new draft Mu-
tual Defense Assistance Agreement in which a drastic reduction in JUS-
MAG prerogatives was proposed along with a countervailing increase
in Philippine authority and independence of action, particularly with
regard to freeing the Philippine Government from obtaining JUSMAG
concurrence on each MAP procurement. The Philippine draft agree-
ment also sought removal of the present injunction in paragraph 15 of
the 1953 agreement that arms and other military supplies can only be
obtained from third country sources with explicit U.S. approval.
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Philippines 463

These may be important considerations for the Filipinos. It is pos-

sible that U.S. concessions in this area may relieve Philippine pressures
for concessions in other areas, particularly in criminal jurisdiction
where there is little give in the U.S. position. Accordingly, the IG has
assigned itself the task of determining specific revisions in the Military
Assistance Agreement that might be responsive to Philippine needs.
Unanimous Position
State and DOD are agreed that specific ideas for revision of
the Military Assistance Agreement should be forwarded to the Un-
der Secretaries Committee.
H. Laurel–Langley
The Filipinos would like to have simultaneous negotiations on the
MBA and the 1955 Laurel–Langley Trade and Investment Agreement,
under which the U.S. and the Philippines enjoy mutual advantages.
(The Laurel–Langley Agreement is due to expire in 1974.) The Philip-
pines wishes to retain tariff preferences in the U.S. market and a sugar
quota in a successor agreement to Laurel–Langley. They may seek
to tie extension of U.S. base rights to obtaining equivalent Laurel–
Langley concessions.
Unanimous Position
We would prefer not to have combined negotiations on the
MBA and Laurel–Langley. However, if it should occur that we were
otherwise making trade concessions in the Laurel–Langley con-
text, we might try to use these to get concessions from the Filipinos
on base matters, as well as in the context of favorable investment
provisions for American capital.
I. Likely Impact on the Negotiations of Presidential Directives to Reduce
U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel in the Philippines
By Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of March 25, 1970, the President
has directed a one-third reduction of U.S. military and civilian per-
sonnel stationed at Clark Air Base. A one-quarter reduction of U.S. per-
sonnel of all U.S. military and civilian agencies elsewhere in the Philip-
pines was also directed.
The likely impact on the military bases negotiations of personnel
reductions of this magnitude will be to increase Philippine demands
for more financial offset to counter the negative effects these cuts will
have on their balance of payments. Since U.S. base spending totals
about $150 million annually, it seems evident the reductions will en-
tail a loss to the Philippines of the order of $50 million annually.
Unanimous Position
State and Defense are now analyzing the impact of the Pres-
ident’s directive, particularly its effect on the Philippine balance
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464 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

of payments. We anticipate the reductions will have an adverse

impact on the negotiating atmosphere for the talks on the MBA
and related matters.
J. Timing
The Philippines is not presently ready to enter into MBA or, in-
deed, other negotiations. It would be advantageous, nevertheless, for
the U.S. to take and keep the initiative with regard to demonstrating
our readiness for negotiations.
Unanimous Position
State and DOD are agreed that the U.S. should take the ini-
tiative with the GOP by offering to negotiate an MBA that would
be comparable to modern Asian SOFAs; however, it is agreed that
in making such an offer no mention be made of our willingness
to relinquish baselands.

218. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT
Implications of the Proposed Reduction of U.S. Government Personnel in the
Philippines

You asked whether Ambassador Byroade has some legitimate ar-

guments against the proposed personnel reduction in the Philippines,
or whether he is simply placating Marcos.2
These are Byroade’s feelings, not Marcos’. So far as we are aware,
Marcos does not know of the planned reductions, though rumors are
already said to be floating around Clark.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A nota-
tion on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2
Byroade had requested in telegram 2946 from Manila (see footnote 2, Document
216) that his telegrams concerning the “profound implications” of the planned person-
nel reductions be shown to President Nixon, and Kissinger had reassured Green in an
April 7 telephone conversation that this would be done. (National Archives, Nixon Pres-
idential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)
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Philippines 465

Informal consultation with the State Department and the Embassy

in Manila indicates that the following questions will arise in imple-
menting your instructions:
—The impact upon our strategic position in the Pacific.
—When and how to tell the Philippine Government about the
reductions.
—The effect that the reductions will have on the political position
of President Marcos.
—The relationship between the reductions and upcoming negoti-
ations on our base rights in the Philippines.
—The impact of cuts on the Philippine economy, particularly its
foreign exchange position.
—The labor problems caused by laying off Philippine employees.
—The effect of the phasing of the reductions on all the above.
I have asked Elliot Richardson, as Chairman of the Under Secre-
taries Committee, to draw up a reduction plan for submission to you.
He has been specifically authorized to include in his report an evalu-
ation of the implications of the planned reductions for U.S./Philippine
relations and for U.S. strategic capabilities in Asia. I have suggested
that the plan envisage a completion date in 1971 for the planned
reductions. Defense has asked for more time to make its submission
for this report and a separate memorandum is coming to you on this
subject.

219. Letter From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to

President Nixon1

Manila, May 13, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

I feel that you will wish a more personal appraisal of some of the
characteristics of President Marcos than it is wise for me to put into my
general report to you, which of course will be read by several others. I
wish I could do this part orally, but as this is impossible at present,

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Top Secret.
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466 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I have asked Dr. Kissinger to prevent distribution and filing of this por-
tion of my report.2
As I see it, Marcos is a product of the political system here, and
not the cause of that system. His training in that system here has been
in fact nearly all of his adult life—through the Congress, the Senate
and now the Presidency. The whole atmosphere has been one of pub-
lic expectancy that anyone able to move through these ranks would
capitalize financially on their positions—and anyone who did not
would be considered naive indeed—if not down-right incapable. This
is one of the things that I predict will change—but we are only in the
initial phases of this now.
Politics is still the single biggest industry in the Philippines. Can-
didates for public office spend huge amounts of their personal wealth
in campaigns. If elected, they usually recoup these amounts while in
office. Marcos is no exception to this. Marcos, like other Filipino politi-
cians, has always been corrupt by American standards, but by Filipino
standards he is no better or no worse than other Filipino politicians.
Some several persons close to the President say that during his first
term in office he amassed a multimillion dollar fortune, although there
is no absolute proof of this. Yet when you compare his performance
with that of past Filipino Presidents, such as Garcia and Magapagal,
Marcos has done more for the Filipino people than many of the Pres-
idents combined. He built more roads, pushed through miracle rice,
built school houses, etc. While the opponents dismiss this with the
phrase “the more projects, the more kickbacks,” nevertheless there is
material evidence to show that Marcos did carry through with his in-
frastructure program better than anyone before him had done.
Not long after I got here a Chinese businessman of prominence
said to me “You Americans are far too critical of Marcos because he is
the best we ever had. Before Marcos, not even 20% of appropriated
funds were put to good usage. Marcos has more than doubled that fig-
ure—and that’s progress.” I guess it’s all in the point of view!
Marcos is a typical Filipino. While money normally is power any-
where in the world, in the Philippines it would seem, many times, that
money is the only thing that counts. Marcos believes that to keep the
feudal-like political barons from his throat he must amass sufficient
wealth to keep them in check. When you ask a Filipino who may have
$20,000,000 why he continues to amass greater amounts of money, he
will give you a simple but honest reply: “That’s the way the game is

2
Kissinger forwarded the letter to the President under a June 8 covering memo-
randum which summarized Byroade’s “revealing and sensitive letter” “on President
Marcos and his place in Philippine politics and history.” A notation on the memoran-
dum indicates that the President saw it. Attached but not printed.
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Philippines 467

played in the Philippines.” Marcos also believes that anything can be

bought in the Philippines and he may be right, at least for the time be-
ing—but as I say in my main report I believe a beginning at least is be-
ing made in a change in the system.
I have no doubt that Marcos will endeavor to recoup the private
monies that he spent in getting re-elected. Whether he will have the
good sense to at least stop there, I just don’t know. He is not engaged
in petty or small things such as the corruption around our bases. He
is a very sophisticated operator and anything he does will be well con-
cealed through others in such things as private investment, stock mar-
ket manipulations, etc.
Whatever his shortcomings, the Philippines, barring accident, has
him for almost four more years, and so do we. Someday there will be
a Jerry Roxas, but Jerry for all of his fine qualities, lacks one all-
important one—the leadership capacity to get himself elected Presi-
dent of the Philippines. Marcos has been described as the greatest
Filipino politician since Quezon. Politicians do not achieve greatness
by insensitivity to changing demands, and I think it would be a mis-
take to underestimate Marcos’ capacity to adjust to a new situation
and work towards goals that are both in his own and his country’s
interests.
The personal relationship we have been able to develop with both
the President and Mrs. Marcos are highly satisfactory—and have
reached the point where I can say in all candor I do not want them to
be any closer than they are now. He is easy and pleasant to work with,
is extremely able and is quick in his actions and decisions. He is also,
underneath, obviously quite pro-American.
I hope very much, Mr. President, that we can get at least a part of
what you want here during your own tenure of office.
Respectfully yours,
Henry A. Byroade

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State

Manila, May 15, 1970, 0301Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Top Secret;
Nodis. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]
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468 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

221. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, May 23, 1970.

SUBJECT
Renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines

In response to your request of last autumn, the Under Secretaries

Committee has come up with the outlines of a negotiating stance with
regard to base rights in the Philippines, and has approved some pre-
liminary conclusions concerning the base land issues.
In short, the Committee came to the following conclusions:
—Base Lands. USAF holdings in the Philippines alone exceed all
other USAF holdings in foreign countries. It was agreed to relinquish
36% of the holdings at Clark and to consider further relinquishments
there. The naval base at Sangley will be given up as soon as the need
for its Vietnam support effort ceases. Part of the Navy’s 36,000 acres at
Subic Bay should be relinquished, following a watershed survey. Camp
John Hay (Baguio) will be retained unless the GOP insists on its return.
These relinquishments will be offered during the course of negotiations
to gain Philippine acceptance of points vital to us on other issues, and
thus will not be offered at the beginning of the negotiation.
—Tenure. The Bases Agreement runs until 1991. Such agreements
with other countries usually have a one-year termination clause, com-
parable to the mutual defense treaties. The Committee agreed that the
unstable political situation in the Philippines argues against offering
such a one-year clause. However, if the Philippines press us on the
Agreement, consideration will be given to reducing the length of its
validity and/or agreeing to a termination clause.
—Criminal Jurisdiction. The Agreement itself is similar to other
agreements, but the GOP seldom waives its jurisdiction, whereas other
countries regularly do so. Problems concerning fair trial, the conditions
of imprisonment, etc., generate unique problems in the Philippines. It
was agreed to study ways to improve procedures and relations with
the Philippines on this sensitive issue, but to place a high priority on
retaining our present rights in this delicate area.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on
the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
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Philippines 469

—“Filipinization” of the Bases. Detailed proposals will be developed

to permit the Philippines a role in immigration, health and customs
procedures on the bases, to provide for selective joint use and possi-
bly to effect a symbolic joint command of the bases. In these respects,
our present Agreement is less liberal than with most other countries.
It was agreed some of the most persistent Philippine complaints
relate not to the Base Agreement itself, but to other aspects of our mil-
itary relationship. On the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the
Filipinos have a point. We have controls not duplicated elsewhere—
for instance, the GOP can purchase military equipment from third
countries only with our approval. A specific proposal for renegotiation
of that agreement, to bring treatment in line with our other allies, will
be developed and cleared by the Under Secretaries Committee. Nego-
tiations on this agreement could be dovetailed into the Bases Agree-
ment negotiation at a later stage.
The GOP periodically suggests that it wishes to renegotiate the
1952 Mutual Defense Treaty to get a more explicit commitment from us.
The Committee agreed that we would suggest to the GOP, if the issue
arises, that renegotiation would be impractical and might be counter-
productive.
The Philippines have hinted that they would like to renegotiate
our economic agreements concurrently with the military ones. Their en-
thusiasm for this course of action may be diminishing, however, as they
begin to realize that they cannot demand economic concessions for con-
tinued military agreements, as they have done in the past. The Com-
mittee agreed to keep these negotiations separate if possible.
The attached memorandum suggests that we will hold up negoti-
ation of the Military Bases Agreement while we analyze the impact of
proposed personnel reductions on our relationship.2 This is inaccurate.
There will of course be a connection, but no proposal to defer the Base
negotiations was actually agreed among the Under Secretaries, and in
fact State is proceeding to develop specific negotiating instructions and
to authorize our Embassy in Manila to begin negotiations.
The GOP will probably wish to defer formal negotiation for Philip-
pine domestic reasons. This is not a matter of great concern, since our
willingness to negotiate will be documented by our offer, and this alone
takes much of the sting out of the aspects of our military relationship
which are unfavorable to the Philippines.

2
See Document 218.
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470 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

There is no need for any decisions on your part at this time. I will
continue to keep you informed as the negotiating scenario develops.3

3
Circular airgram CA–2879 to Manila and CINCPAC, May 23, informed the ad-
dressees that the U.S. Government would be “ready shortly” to inform the Philippine
Government that it was prepared to begin negotiations and requested their comments
and recommendations. More specifically it asked the Country Team to make detailed
studies “of concessions we could offer the Philippines to Filipinize the bases,” of “joint-
use proposals we offer the Philippines in the course of negotiations,” and of “nominal
joint command proposals” that could be offered. Finally, the Country Team was requested
to “make a detailed study of base and watershed requirements to determine what spe-
cific proposals for relinquishment of acreage” at Clark AFB and Subic Bay Naval Base
“could be tabled in the course of negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1970–73, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US)

222. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, June 16, 1970.

SUBJECT
Letter from Ambassador Byroade

Ambassador Byroade has sent you a personal assessment of the

situation in the Philippines and of the proper role for U.S. policy (Tab
B).2 This was the assessment he promised when he saw you in San
Clemente last August. (I recently sent you his separate, highly sensi-
tive, letter assessing President Marcos in personal terms.)3
Byroade refers to the convulsion of anti-Marcos feeling which
swept Manila in January and he observes that it is still impossible to
say with confidence what caused that movement and what it may por-
tend for the direction of Philippine development. He nevertheless ven-
tures some estimates as to what happened then, what courses are open
to Marcos now, and what the U.S. role should be now and in the
future.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information and action.
2
Attached but not printed.
3
Document 219.
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Philippines 471

The riots against President Marcos. Byroade sees these as arising from
the economic/financial crisis, from the psychological letdown follow-
ing the election, from the revulsion against Marcos’ manipulation of
the elections, and from the long overdue outbreak of student political
activism. At least as important, factions of the local Establishment
turned against Marcos out of personal animosity and from fear of his
growing power reflected in his election victory. Through their control
of information media, these factions did an incredible hatchet job on
Marcos’ reputation within a matter of weeks.
(Byroade touches only lightly on another cause which was promi-
nent in the Embassy’s reporting at the time: in many normally con-
servative quarters including the Church, there has developed a deep
and widespread frustration and disillusionment against the Philippine
political system and its venality.)
The choices before Marcos. Marcos could embark on one of three
broad courses:
—Assume leadership of the forces calling for fundamental but
non-violent change, and challenge the Establishment.
—Continue the present lines of Philippine politics, playing off one
group against the other, using the carrot and the stick, and avoiding
any fundamental challenge to the system.
—Retreat to a defensive position relying upon the military and
upon the more conservative elements in society.
Marcos does not seem to have decided which course he will take,
and he may attempt to temporize throughout his second term. With the
best will in the world, he might well find it impossible to pursue the first
course above. The Establishment is very powerful, and resistances to
change would be powerful. Marcos might be murdered if he attempted
to challenge the system, and in any case he would not carry Congress.
The U.S. role. Byroade continues to think that we should take the
course that you have sketched out: to modernize our relationship and
put it on a “most favored nation” basis. He notes that we are moving
ahead to begin negotiations on the major areas of our relationship.
He predicts, however, that we should not expect a dramatic im-
provement from our efforts, and he observes that our problems are
most acute in renegotiating the Bases Agreement and Laurel–Langley
Economic Agreements. He notes the following problems:
—Filipinos really do not realize that they are getting most-
favored-nation or better treatment in many areas. As an example
he points out that our military criminal jurisdiction agreement is
in fact as favorable as our NATO or Japan formulas, but that most
other countries almost invariably grant us waivers of jurisdiction in
criminal cases, whereas the Philippines almost never do. Marcos him-
self was astonished when Byroade cited the comparative statistics on
waiver requests to him.
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472 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—The Philippines will pose exaggerated demands which we will

not be able to meet.
—Negotiations will proceed in a “Chautauqua” atmosphere which
makes it doubly difficult to come to terms.
Byroade recommends nevertheless that we go ahead with due cau-
tion on the negotiations, and he recommends that we push ahead with
economic negotiations without waiting for generalized preferences to
LDCs under GATT. He believes that we should be prepared to give the
Filipinos something in the way of continued preferences, while we pro-
tect the legitimate interests of American business in the Philippines. He
suggests that we consider simultaneously negotiating a Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty. (We have already urged State to de-
velop a negotiating scenario for the economic negotiations.)
For the longer term, Byroade sees some hope. He says that all the
Philippines needs is “good government and birth control.” He notes
that there are powerful forces beginning to work toward an improve-
ment in political morality, and that the Establishment is jittery and less
inclined than heretofore to play “politics as usual.”
Ambassador Byroade urges that we provide quiet advice to move
the Philippines towards correcting its own problems, but he also rec-
ommends more use of international advice through the IMF, the World
Bank, etc. He urges also that we bring the Japanese into the exercise.
He sees this as the way to move steadily away from our strictly bilat-
eral “special relationships.”
I have sent an acknowledgement to Ambassador Byroade on his
other letter on President Marcos. I have attached (Tab A) a note from
you to Byroade, in case you wish to acknowledge this one.4 Byroade
has done an outstanding job in Manila. He has gotten across to the
Philippine leadership that we are moving toward a new relationship,
that we plan to treat the Philippines as an equal, but that we will no
longer tolerate the Filipinos treating us as a whipping boy yet at the
same time expect us to be particularly understanding and responsible
toward them. (On at least two occasions, Byroade has stopped cold
schemes by Romulo to blame us publicly in disputes over military base
and consular matters, by making it clear that such behavior is simply
not acceptable.) He has gotten the same message across to our military
and civilian personnel in the Philippines, and has stopped certain high-
handed practices which annoyed the Filipinos. At the same time, he
has established close personal relations with Philippine leaders. (He
was Marcos’ personal guest on a recent Presidential boat tour of the

4
Attached but not printed.
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Philippines 473

outer islands.) I think that he would appreciate a message from you,

and that he deserves one.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter to Ambassador Byroade at Tab A. The let-
ter has been cleared with James Keogh.

223. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 30, 1970.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Philippines,

1969, 1970, 1971 File. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not
declassified.]

224. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, July 2, 1970, 0928Z.

6187. Subj: Secretary’s Talks with Marcos

1. In the brief interval after arrival of Secretary Rogers here and
his call on Marcos, we had opportunity with Pedersen and Green pres-
ent to run through the bilateral subjects that might come up, with par-
ticular attention to the subject of a possible state visit. The Secretary
had had the opportunity of reading report of my last conversation with
Marcos on this subject transmitted to Department as Manila 6085.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rogers was in Manila
to attend the 15th Annual Council Meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO).
2
Telegram 6085 from Manila, June 30, reported Rogers’ discussion with Marcos,
including the postponement of the latter’s August visit to Washington and the reduc-
tion of U.S. forces in the Pacific. (Ibid.)
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474 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

2. The Secretary decided that he and I would go alone to Mala-

canang and I got this word to Marcos prior to our arrival. When we
arrived only Romulo was with Marcos. After the photographers had
left Marcos indicated that he would appreciate a short time with the
Secretary alone and the two of them went into the inner library. They
stayed alone for the full hour that Marcos allotted to us. (Other heads
of delegations were scheduled every 15 minutes thereafter.) In the
meantime, Romulo and I occupied ourselves with current business and
enjoyed the company of Mrs. Marcos for a portion of that time.
3. What follows herein is my own summary of the debriefing the
Secretary had the time to give me, and which he had indicated con-
veys the substance on the main substantive points. It lacks obviously
finer points and nuances which it may be possible for me to obtain
from the Secretary later on as his schedule permits.
4. The most important point to emerge was that the proposed state
visit for Marcos in August is indefinitely postponed. Marcos took the
initiative on this subject, raising some of his own doubts about the wis-
dom of his absence here in August, and wondering frankly what prac-
tical results could come out of the visit at this time, despite the fact that
he would personally very much like another opportunity for discus-
sions with our President. The Secretary indicated that, while he knew
from President Nixon personally how much he would welcome such
a visit, that the timing did indeed raise some problems on our side.
The Secretary mentioned upcoming election period in the United
States, the sensitivity of matters affecting the Far East now in our re-
lations with the Hill, etc. This led Marcos to suggest that maybe it was
not very good timing for either of us. In the discussion that followed
as to exactly how to leave the matter, the Secretary suggested that re-
ally nothing need be done in any public sort of way, as it had never
become public knowledge that such a trip had been tentatively
planned. Marcos said this was quite agreeable with him.
5. They both agreed that it would be extremely important that
there be no leaks that a visit had been planned but postponed. In the
event of unfortunate leaks it could, of course, be quite truthfully said
that it was certainly the desire of our President to see President Mar-
cos on a state visit and the matter had been discussed from time to
time with no decision as to possible timing (I would like to add my
own recommendation that all concerned quietly cross off the possibil-
ity of a Marcos visit on August 19 and ensure that there be no leak or
comment about it). It was the Secretary’s own impression that Marcos
was not personally disappointed at the thought of an indefinite post-
ponement, and in fact may have been somewhat relieved.
6. There was general discussion on the reduction of forces in the
Pacific area to somewhere near pre-Tonkin levels as the situation would
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Philippines 475

permit. It appears to me that the Secretary did a very good job on this
and that Marcos accepted the philosophy that this was really a part of
a process that America should go through in order to be certain that
the administration could keep the support of the Congress and the
country for maintaining those forces abroad that would be actually nec-
essary for vital security interests. The Secretary talked about reductions
to be made elsewhere in the Pacific. I feel that this subject went well.
He did not, of course, get into actual figures for the Philippines, which
I will handle later on with Marcos as they become known.
7. The Secretary expressed our appreciation to Marcos for the
many instances of late in which he personally had lent the support of
his office to making conditions around our bases better for our own
forces. The Secretary took note of the fact that, as I had told him ear-
lier, we were nearing the point of being ready to undertake base ne-
gotiations at his convenience. Marcos made a rather interesting com-
ment that he thought our troops would be happier in the Philippines
if they used their leave opportunities to travel more in the Philippines
away from the base areas, where conditions were bound to be some-
what abnormal. He said the average Filipino liked Americans, and it
was a pity that most of the troops never saw anything of the Philip-
pines except the bar-infested areas outside the base gates. (The Presi-
dent may be thinking of the benefits of tourism, but there is no doubt
in my mind that he made a very good point on this one.) Marcos gave
the impression he was really in no hurry on base negotiations, and
would just as soon see them postponed for a while.
8. There was some general discussion of Laurel–Langley problems
with both sides apparently agreeing that there seemed no need to at-
tempt any early negotiations on that matter as well. Marcos did men-
tion his concern again over the sugar quota and the Secretary said that
there would be every desire on the part of his department to be help-
ful to the Philippines as this problem came up, but that as Marcos knew
other departments and the Congress itself were in the last analysis
probably most important in the decision making process. Marcos said
he appreciated the statement of support from the Secretary on the part
of the Department.
9. Marcos indicated that he hoped the Philippines could get more
military assistance from the United States in the future so that they
could handle to the greatest possible extent their own security prob-
lems. He said he thought that the army could handle the limited type
of internal security problems that now face the Philippines, but that
their capability at present was really very little greater than that, and
their navy and air force was practically non-existent. He said he fully
shared, what he understood to be President Nixon’s view, that nations
should be more self-reliant on such matters, but that the Philippine
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476 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

financial situation would prevent them from moving forward much

further without assistance. The Secretary said that, within the increas-
ingly tight budgetary restrictions upon the administration, Philip-
pine requirements would of course continue to receive sympathetic
consideration.
10. There was no specific discussion on any future amount or type
of possible U.S. assistance to the Philippines.
11. The Secretary tells me that the talks were extremely friendly
and frank throughout and it appeared to me that the talks went well.
Marcos certainly seemed to be in a good mood as they emerged and
rejoined Mrs. Marcos, Romulo and me.
12. The Secretary has asked me to add to this message his per-
sonal desire that all elements of State involved in a possible Marcos
visit ensure that the matter die as of now without leak or comment.
He also asked that this particular matter be explained to the White
House staff so that they will realize the desirability of no leak or no
further mention of such a possible visit.
Byroade

225. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, July 13, 1970.

SUBJECT
Personnel Reductions in the Philippines

Description of Reduction Plan Recommended by Under Secretaries Committee.

U. Alexis Johnson has transmitted the Under Secretaries Commit-
tee plan for personnel reductions in the Philippines.2 A summary of

1
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 65,
Memoranda to the President 1970, July, Part II. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for action.
Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the original.
2
On June 20 in a memorandum to the President from the Under Secretaries Com-
mittee. (Department of State, NSC Under Secretaries Committee File: Lot 83 D 276,
NSC–U/DM 42, 6/22/70)
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Philippines 477

the plan, which appears fully responsive to your instructions, is con-

tained in the table at Tab B.3 In general its principal features are:
—a 33 percent reduction at Clark Field and a 25 percent reduction
of other military personnel. This cuts back our military presence in the
Philippines to pre-Vietnam war levels.
—a minimum of military redeployments to other locations in the
Western Pacific. All but 400 of the military reductions involve the elim-
ination of positions not now filled or the return of personnel to the U.S.
—a 32 percent reduction in the total official U.S. presence in the
Philippines (including personnel of civilian agencies and dependents)
to be fully accomplished by June, 1971.
Implications of the Plan for our Strategic Position in the Pacific and our
Relations with the Philippines.
The recommended reductions will reduce our capacity and flexi-
bility to deal with military contingencies in Southeast Asia and the
Western Pacific but should not prove unmanageable as long as they
are tied to Vietnam withdrawals. They should not affect our continued
tenure at bases in the Philippines which will become increasingly im-
portant in the years to come because of their unique geographical lo-
cation, their capacity to handle “surge requirements” and the likeli-
hood that it will be more difficult to maintain present base structures
at a number of other pacific locations.
In the long-run, the impact of a substantial reduction in our in-
volvement in the Philippines, which will contribute to greater Philip-
pine self-reliance, should be favorable to U.S.–Philippines relations. In
the short-run, however, there will be the following problems:
—As a result of the reductions, 3,000–5,000 directly hired Philip-
pine employees of our bases will be laid off and up to 11,000 Philip-
pine contract employees will be put out of work. This could result in
strikes and protests organized by Philippine labor unions.
—The Philippines will loose $30–40 million a year in foreign ex-
change during a time of balance of payments crisis.
—The people of the Philippines, the majority of whom regard the
retention of U.S. bases as beneficial, could interpret the reductions as
a U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. This could intensify the cli-
mate of uncertainty which now characterizes the Philippine political
situation.
—The reductions could also be interpreted as a sign of our disap-
proval of President Marcos and a lack of confidence in his leadership,
making his political position more difficult.
We can, however, minimize these short-run problems by:
—making it clear that the reductions are related to Vietnam with-
drawals and to world-wide budgetary and manpower constraints.

3
Attached but not printed.
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478 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—emphasizing our continued commitment to Philippine security

in the context of bi-lateral military agreements.
—undertaking new programs, where possible in the context of
multilateral approaches, to mitigate the economic effects.
Issues for Decision and Recommendations
1. Cuts in the Diplomatic Mission
Ambassador Byroade recommends only a minimum of reductions
(roughly 3%) in U.S. personnel under his direct control. Under his rec-
ommendation, one American position from the diplomatic mission
would be eliminated; 5 would be converted to staffing by Philippine
nationals and 17 involving regional activities would be relocated else-
where in the Pacific area. The Under Secretaries Committee has also
described two alternate plans for Embassy cuts, but has made no
recommendation.
—The first involves a reduction of 50, which amounts to a 12 per-
cent cut. Although a few programs would have to be curtailed, Wash-
ington agencies involved, including the Bureau of the Budget, feel that
a reduction of this magnitude would be manageable.
—The second envisages a 25% reduction in Embassy personnel. In
the opinion of the Under Secretaries Committee, it would require ter-
mination or severe curtailment of a number of programs considered
essential to achieving our current national objectives in the Philippines.
Recommendation
I recommend that you approve the first alternate plan proposed
by the committee which calls for a 12 percent cut in the diplomatic mis-
sion. In my opinion, the 3 percent reduction recommended by Am-
bassador Byroade would not be consistent with the deep cuts proposed
in other programs.4
2. The Timing of Reductions at Clark Field
The plan for reductions at Clark Field, which was drawn up by
the Air Force, calls for 75% of the reductions to be implemented by
September, 1970 (100 percent implementation by that time would in-
volve an undesirable increase in the number of personnel who had to
be redeployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific).
On the basis of your instructions, the Defense Department has al-
ready incorporated this immediate drawdown at Clark into its budget
plan for FY 71 and is now reluctant to stretch out the reductions any
further. Ambassador Byroade feels, however, that problems with the
Philippine Government would be reduced if the immediate reductions

4
The President checked the approve option.
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Philippines 479

at Clark were delayed a few months. The Department of State requests

that you instruct the DOD that at least 50% of the scheduled reduc-
tions for Clark Air Base be completed by September 30, 1970 and that,
to the extent possible, the balance of that reduction be spread out more
evenly over the period ending June 30, 1971.
Recommendation
I believe that Ambassador Byroade is in the best position to judge
the effects of the timing of the cuts. I recommend, therefore, that we
leave some leeway for the Clark reductions to be slowed down. This
could be done by directing that at least 50 percent of the Clark cuts be
made by September 30 and that the level of any immediate reductions
beyond that level be worked out between the State and Defense De-
partments and the Ambassador.5
A memorandum from me to the Under Secretaries Committee ap-
proving the plan recommended by the committee and incorporating
the two recommendations above is attached at Tab A.6

5
The President checked the approve option.
6
The memorandum, July 17, advised the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Com-
mittee that the personnel reductions in the Philippines should incorporate “a 12 percent
reduction in our diplomatic mission” (with JUSMAG and DAO to be excepted from the
cuts) and ordered that 50 percent of the reductions at Clark Field be accomplished by
September 30, with the remainder to be done by June 30, 1971. Attached but not printed.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, July 22, 1970, 0945Z.

6794. Deliver Upon Opening of Business. Subj: U.S. Personnel Re-

ductions in the Philippines. Ref: State 115651; State 115652.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to
CINCPAC.
2
Telegrams 115651, 115652, and 115650, to Manila, all July 20, informed Byroade
of the decisions made by the President on reductions of U.S. personnel in the Philip-
pines (see Document 225), asked him to inform Marcos, and asked him to comment on
a statement for the press describing the decisions. (All ibid.)
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480 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

1. I called on President Marcos this morning to discuss forthcom-

ing U.S. personnel reductions in accordance with above messages. In
our continuing conversations in the past several weeks I have at-
tempted to gradually prepare him for this type of specific information
so that it would not come as a surprise. The Secretary also did a good
job for us with Marcos on this subject when he was here early this
month. In spite of this I think he got a bit of a jolt over the magnitude
of the cuts and the fact that they would start right away.
2. The first question from Marcos was whether these cuts affected
in any way our Mutual Defense Treaty. I said that they did not, that
our commitments still stood, and after some discussion on this point I
believe he accepted the fact that the air and naval defense of the Philip-
pines was not basically affected.
3. Marcos then quickly focused into the three points which caused
him the most concern. The first was the effect of the loss of foreign ex-
change earnings from the bases on their precarious economic situation
and their current economic plans. The second was the loss of jobs for
Filipinos that would inevitably follow such a large cut of Americans.
A third point of concern was how the matter could be handled pub-
licly in a manner which does not cause considerable damage here. Our
discussion focused particularly on this latter point and prompted my
preliminary warning cable requesting that no public statement be made
until we could think about this matter further and I could discuss it
with the military commanders.
4. With regard to the first two points above, Marcos asked if I
could give him statistics as to what we thought would actually be in-
volved in the way of loss of foreign exchange and loss of jobs. I told
him I was not in a position at the moment to do that but would give
him as quickly as I could our best estimate on these matters. He un-
derstands that they will be very preliminary “estimates” but said they
would be useful to him in planning within his own government with
the thought he should initiate immediately.
5. Marcos asked what our plans were for handling the matter pub-
licly. I showed him a possible opening statement being considered in
Washington as contained in State 115652. When he read it his first com-
ment was “but this will serve to undo everything you and I have been
trying to do.” What he was referring to was handling doubts that are
widespread here about future U.S. intentions. He said he is continu-
ally being asked if the U.S. intends to withdraw completely from the
Philippines. This had reached the point where he recently had been
asked if the U.S. and the UK had not reached some kind of a private
understanding where the British would remain in the area, thus al-
lowing U.S. withdrawal. I said this was of course utter nonsense and
he agreed, but pointed out the fact that such questions do come from
responsible people.
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Philippines 481

6. Marcos asked what I could tell him alone and privately about
the future of U.S. intentions. Specifically, was this merely the first of
several cuts, and how far down did we plan to go? I told him that I
felt relatively sure that there was no planning within our Executive
Branch at this time for further cuts in the Philippines. I told him I was
sure that our President plans a continued military presence in the Pa-
cific area for the foreseeable future. I said that I could not of course be
categorical with him on actual figures for the future, but left him with
no doubt that we were not considering anything like a withdrawal from
the Philippines.
7. Marcos asked at one point if we need make any statement at
all. He said he was afraid that the draft I had shown him would really
raise fundamental questions that could not be answered. He then went
into a rather lengthy thinking out loud process as to whether we should
not try to answer some of these fundamental questions positively and
publicly. Could we for instance say that this was the only reduction
planned for the Philippines under the MDT; that there was no ques-
tion of U.S. withdrawal from the bases, etc., etc. I told him I did not
think it was in the cards that we could publicly commit ourselves to
maintain the new reduced force levels for forever-and-a-day. I did un-
dertake to think further as to whether we might in some manner han-
dle publicly the question of whether our commitments under the MDT
were effected and also how the matter of doubts about “withdrawals”
might be handled.
8. I never felt more the real need of long ranged strategic plan-
ning for the Pacific Area which I plugged for so hard at the Tokyo Con-
ference than I did during this conversation. I was somewhat taken
aback to have him express thoughts which resembled very closely some
of my own argumentations on this subject as contained in past cables.
9. I am convinced that we are dealing with a subject here on which
we should attempt to find the best possible answer for our own inter-
ests, as well as those of Marcos, and in some instances at least I believe
we have common cause for concern. It is definitely not in our own in-
terest to have our image here as one of possible “withdrawal.” Our
problem certainly is not with Marcos, whom I can talk to directly and
who has the benefit of occasional talks such as the recent one with the
Secretary. Our problem is one of public understanding, and this in-
cludes not only the masses but up through the Government and leg-
islative branches as well.
10. By septel I am sending a revised press statement which I think
goes as far as we can towards meeting Marcos’ needs, as well as our
own. I will be seeing him again on July 23 at 10:00 a.m., and same night
at dinner, and if draft is acceptable, I could show it to him then.
Byroade
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482 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

227. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SUBJECT
Conversation Between the Director of Central Intelligence and Madam Imelda
Marcos, Wife of the Philippines President

PARTICIPANTS
Madam Marcos, The Director of Central Intelligence, and a CIA Staff Officer

The Director met with Madam Marcos for thirty-five minutes in

the evening on 22 September 1970 at her suite in the Hotel Madison.
Mr. James Rafferty, Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador
in the Philippines, The Honorable Henry A. Byroade, made the intro-
ductions and then withdrew.
Madam Marcos began her presentation by drawing attention to
the forthcoming 10 November 1970 elections for delegates to a consti-
tutional convention in the Philippines, planned for June–July 1971. She
said socialist movements sponsored by certain lay and clerical elements
in the Catholic Church, particularly the Jesuits, and some Communist
fronts are planning to contest administration candidates in the election.
She believes that the Marcos Administration could lose the election by
default unless a crash program is organized to help it win. She noted
that the Church has already picked candidates, either priests or lay per-
sons, for each election district. Should these groups succeed in achiev-
ing their objectives, it would change the form of government in the
Philippines to Socialism or Communism, with only a few people real-
izing what the real consequences would be. She underscored her view
that Philippine democracy is viable but will not survive unless the
United States helps the Marcos Administration through this difficult
period.
She said the Philippines is a child of the U.S. and illustrated this
point by describing Vietnam as a French baby, Malaysia as an English
baby, and Thailand as everybody’s baby. She observed that in Asia one’s
creditability is not measured by how one treats a friend, but how one

1
Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File,
Philippines. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mrs. Marcos’ suite in the Hotel
Madison. According to a September 23 attached covering memorandum from Helms to
Kissinger, Helms met with Mrs. Marcos on the evening of September 22 at “the Presi-
dent’s instruction.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met
with Mrs. Marcos on September 22 from 12:42 p.m. to 1:14 p.m. No other record of the
meeting has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House
Central Files)
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Philippines 483

treats his children. She is of the opinion that the United States needs a
victory in Asia to maintain its stature there. A victory in Vietnam would
be negative, she said, because a U.S. victory in Vietnam is expected,
but a victory for those who have and continue to advocate democracy
in the Philippines would be a positive one. She pointed out the rich-
ness of Philippines national resources, the high literacy rate (85%), and
the cosmopolitan make-up of the population, reiterating that some-
thing must be done between now and November 1971 to help Presi-
dent Marcos.
She revealed that her husband is personally directing the current
campaign against pro-Communist guerrilla bands in Central Luzon,
commonly referred to as HUKS, and reminded her listeners of his re-
cent successes. Madam Marcos also noted the President’s efforts to meet
his foreign financial obligation in order to maintain a creditable inter-
national image, but observed that when high interest and principal
payments are made, little is left for internal improvement. She called
attention to the political and financial pressures on President Marcos
and described him as being squeezed and pushed into a corner by his
detractors. She described candidates of the socialist fronts led by the
Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) headed by ex-Senator Manglapus
and the Communists as articulate and clever. She believes these anti-
Marcos forces might succeed in their plan to control the constitutional
convention. In this event, she said, the President would become a
“strong man” because he has no intention of being pushed out by the
CSM or the Communists. She has been told that the CSM is being sup-
ported by the Adenauer Foundation in West Germany and has sources
of succor in England. She also directed attention to Father Ortega who
recently resigned as head of Ateneo University in Manila to stand as a
candidate for the constitutional convention under the CSM banner. Fa-
ther Ortega is now in New York soliciting support for the CSM. She
disclosed that her visit with Pope Paul VI, while en route to Washing-
ton, was not for the purpose of piety but to persuade him to make his
visit to the Philippines in the third week of November, which would
be after the election, to prevent the Catholic Church in the Philippines
from using his visit to further its political ambitions. She said the Pope
suggested prayer as a possible answer but he also agreed to delay his
visit.
After listening to Madam Marcos suggest that the U.S. sometimes
helps enemies but forgets friends, i.e., help Germany and Japan but
forget the Philippines, Mr. Helms asked what was meant by a crash
program. She replied:
a. A rural electrification program for the Philippines costing be-
tween 300 and 500 million dollars over a ten to twenty year period, an-
nounced by President Nixon as soon as possible in order to achieve
high political impact. She said it would be understood that the full
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484 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

amount would be stretched out over a long period of time but she also
emphasized that the announcement would have to include the full
amount in order to assure maximum political gain.
b. A side sum of money for support of some of Marcos’ candi-
dates at the barrio level.
c. Support for a better exchange rate between the peso and the
dollar.
d. Birth control and family planning programs.
Madam Marcos said Dr. Hannah of AID, who is now in the Philip-
pines, promised 30 million dollars in aid, presumably for the rural
electrification program. She thinks the Asian Development Bank might
provide 30 to 50 million dollars and the World Bank another 50 mil-
lion dollars; some of this latter money would be for birth control and
family planning. In response to Mr. Helms’ request for other possi-
bilities, she suggested short-term bank loans and other short-term in-
ternational credit be extended to long-term loans to ease the pressure
of large interest payments. Presumably the money saved would be
used for political purposes. She also suggested some consideration be
given to manipulating the sugar industry, noting that the sugar barons
are giving money to Communists to win their support. Mr. Helms said
that he would see President Nixon in the morning on 23 September
and would at that time discuss Madam Marcos’ helpful and eloquent
conversation.
Madam Marcos then said funding the election at the barrio level
would mean 4,000 pesos for 35,000 barrios and also asked for more
arms and helicopters to enable President Marcos to capture a fourth
HUK leader, Commander Dante. She praised the Rockefeller and Ford
foundations who, she said, maintained the U.S. image in the Philip-
pines by developing the IR–8 miracle rice.
Mr. Helms again said he would discuss the matter with President
Nixon.2 Madam Marcos noted that she might leave Washington on
Thursday but was prepared to stay for as long a time as it was neces-
sary to acquire support for her husband. Mr. Helms suggested that it
would be proper for the response to her request to come from the White
House. Madam Marcos ended the conversation by yet another appeal
to “back her and support President Marcos and democracy in the
Philippines.”
In the morning of 23 September, Mr. Rafferty called the Agency
and said that Madam Marcos talked with President Marcos after Mr.
Helms departed. President Marcos reportedly said to her that what is

2
No record of this meeting was found.
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Philippines 485

needed is a 300 million dollar stabilizing fund for the peso.3 President
Marcos also said that the 300 million dollars need never leave the
United States but would be used to backstop the peso free exchange
rate, which, said Rafferty, is in a precarious position. Rafferty had no
other commentary to offer as an explanation or clarification, but said
that he was merely noting this conversation between Madam Marcos
and her husband.

3
The Department of State position on the $300 million stabilization loan, as ex-
pressed in telegram 159948 and in a memorandum to Kissinger, September 25, was that
such a loan would be contrary to U.S. policy of moving from the bilateral to the multi-
lateral arena in assistance to the Philippines and that it “would torpedo the whole
IMF–IBRD arrangement which has so successfully established financial discipline in the
Philippines.” (Both in the National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Sub-
ject File, Philippines)

228. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, September 25, 1970.

SUBJECT
40 Committee Consideration of Philippine Constitutional Convention Issue

At the 40 Committee meeting on September 242 the issue was dis-

cussed of the Philippine Constitutional Convention and its possible im-
plications for the U.S. national interest. It was decided that it would be
undesirable to have radical or left-wing elements take over the Con-
stitutional Convention and draft a constitution which, as Mrs. Marcos
suggested to you, might turn the Philippines into a social democratic
welfare state or a Marxist state.
It was also recognized, though, that we do not now possess enough
information to make judgments on how to proceed in this matter, and

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Ac-
cording to a September 25 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, the
memorandum was prepared at Kissinger’s direction. A notation on an attached cover-
ing memorandum reads: “Sent to Pres. 10/2/70.” A notation on the covering memo-
randum indicates the President saw it.
2
The minutes are in the National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files,
Minutes of 40 Committee Files, September 24, 1970.
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486 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

that a number of questions would need to be answered on the basis of

information furnished by informed sources in Washington and in
Manila. These questions are:
—What do we want to achieve?
—What elements should we back? (In this respect, it was agreed
that backing supporters of President Marcos in the November 10 elec-
tions for delegates to the Convention would be preferable to seeing a
leftist victory. Alternatively, however, we might wish to back a mod-
erate group if one is identifiable because of the public criticism directed
at Marcos over his rigging of the election which gave him his second
term.)
—How do we provide our assistance?
—What should be the magnitude of our assistance?
At your direction State was tasked with preparing a study of the
implications of the Constitutional Convention and the elections of del-
egates.3 These specific questions, however, were not addressed. The 40
Committee will meet again on October 6 to review the answers and to
submit the findings to you for a decision.
On the subject of assistance to the Philippines in rural electrifica-
tion, it was determined that some help might be provided prior to the
November 10 elections. A statement on U.S. assistance might be made
or financing of some type provided through the World Bank. Under
Secretary Johnson will speak to Mr. McNamara on this last point.
Follow-up steps will also be discussed at the October 6 40 Committee
meeting.

3
The Department of State study, October 2, stated that “Mrs. Marcos is the only
person who professes to believe that the Philippine Constitutional Convention will be
controlled by leftist elements. In fact, there are few observers who believe it will not be
controlled by President and Mrs. Marcos.” (Ibid.) The study was prepared in response
to a September 22 memorandum from Davis to Eliot. This attached covering memoran-
dum stated that “the President has asked that State prepare an analysis of the Philip-
pine Constitutional Convention and its possible outcomes, particularly the possibility
that it will be controlled by leftist elements. This analysis should include Ambassador
Byroade’s appreciation of the situation.” (Ibid.) Assistant Secretary Green also sent a let-
ter to Kissinger, September 24, stating that he had heard that Mrs. Marcos had told the
President that “we in Washington didn’t seem to know about the Constitutional Con-
vention” and “that I had not known anything about it when she talked to me last Sun-
day” and seeking to correct this matter “for the record.” (Ibid.) Kissinger replied to Green
on October 13, stating in a postscript that he had mentioned Green’s letter to the Presi-
dent who “has no illusions about the lady and a great deal of confidence in you.” (Ibid.)
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Philippines 487

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, October 3, 1970, 1044Z.

9074. 1. Mrs. Marcos called Rafferty at 6:30 a.m. this morning ask-
ing that an appointment be arranged with me sometime today. I saw
her for about an hour and a half beginning at 2:00 p.m.
2. After small talk about her trip, I received, in general, the same
presentation she had made so often in Washington as reported in State
159948,2 and I will not therefore repeat it here. It was I think a some-
what altered presentation in that at times she was extremely frank
about some of the aspects of the convention that worried her, particu-
larly on personalities involved, including those in their own camp.
3. I attempted to use the occasion to accomplish three specific
things. One was that I thought she had gone a little too far in exciting
Washington that the Philippines was on the doorstep of becoming an-
other Chile. She took this well, but in the discussion I began to realize
that she was personally more convinced that the dangers were real than
I had thought would be the case. She is obviously extremely tense, has
lost considerable weight, and is in a generally emotional state. She car-
ried on at great length about the weaknesses of the Nacionalista can-
didates in the upcoming election. At one time she referred to some of
them as “unattractive tribal leaders” who would be incapable of match-
ing the eloquence of the opposition in the convention itself, and that
many of them that she would consider reliable would be very bad vote
getters indeed, and put on quite sorry campaigns. I believe that this is
a belated recognition that she and Marcos did not work hard enough
to convince the right people to run, and on this point, at least, I think
she was being quite open and honest.
4. Another thing I sought to do was to try to make her understand
why huge amounts of cash from America at this time were not only
impossible due to severe budgetary limitations, but out of step with
policy in Washington as well. I told her that Washington was taking
very seriously the Nixon Doctrine, and that “multilateralism” was a
strongly held view in Washington from the President on down. As a
practical matter, I said that even had we been able to pull the devel-
opment funds out of the safe that she had asked for, most would feel

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 PHIL. Secret;
Priority; Exdis.
2
Telegram 159948 to Manila, September 29, summarized Mrs. Marcos’ meetings in
Washington. (Ibid., POL 7 PHIL)
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488 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

that this would have been an unkind act for the Philippines itself. It
would have dislodged and ruined the whole IMF exercise, the forma-
tion of the consultative group, and even upset their current workable
relations with U.S. private banks. I told her of the very encouraging
meeting in Paris (of which she was uninformed) and said that Wash-
ington was sure that this route was better, not only under our own con-
ditions at home, but in the long-term interest of the Philippines itself.
She was encouraged by the news from Paris but stressed over and over
again that in the next few weeks, in particular, they needed signs of
direct American support. I told her we would do what we could do
(Can we for instance speed up action on PL–480 program?).
5. A third thing I had in mind was to try to prevent her from mak-
ing any more statements to the press that would imply huge Ameri-
can assistance. She gave me a skillful reply on what was needed at the
moment in the Philippines. She does understand her people very well,
but unfortunately has a rather dismal ignorance on how things work
for us at home. I told her I was already extremely worried about her
exclusive interview of Sept 29 with UPI, in which she had come very
close indeed to directly quoting our President, with approval and sup-
port, and had in the same interview ticked off a number of items which
totalled approximately $900 million. She read the account and gave her
explanation that it was somewhat distorted and she had not meant this
to be the case. I cautioned her against further encounters with the press
in which she could be represented as saying such commitments had
been made. I said that it was not improbable that our President might
be publicly asked by hostile members of our Congress if these com-
mitments had in act been made. This could, of course, lead to a highly
embarrassing situation. There is no doubt that she got the point and
realizes that there is indeed a direct conflict between the postures she
feels are important for her to assume here at the moment and our
own method of doing business. I hope this will tone down her future
statements.
6. When I returned to the office we had received the press release
of the consultative group in Paris and its accompanying reftel. This has
received no publicity in Manila, I suppose because of no Philippine news
presence in Paris, and inadequate diplomatic reporting. I am taking this
to the President within the hour in the hopes that he will see desirabil-
ity of playing this in a constructive light here. More will follow.
Postscript: I have just returned from seeing Marcos. He was most
appreciative of CG press release and was taking action as I left to give
it full play in the Philippines. As time was running out on him, if it
was to get heavy coverage in the influential Sunday press, I did not
take up other items.
Byroade
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Philippines 489

230. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, October 6, 1970.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970

PRESENT
Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Lt. Gen. Richard T.
Knowles, and Mr. Helms
Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Mr. Viron P. Vaky, and Mr. William Broe were present for
Item 1.
Mr. John Holdridge and Mr. William Nelson were present for Items 2 and 3.
Colonel Richard T. Kennedy and Mr. Thomas Karamessines were present for all
items.

[Omitted here is discussion of Chile.]

2. Philippines
a. The Chairman reviewed the recent visit of First Lady of the
Philippines Imelda Marcos and the web she tried to weave around
Washington while here. She had expressed herself to higher authority2
and Mr. Helms as well as others, throwing curve balls around a leftist
threat to the Constitutional Convention, the need for a huge balance
of payments loan, high impact projects, i.e. rural electrification and
support for her husband’s political campaign. As a result, four ques-
tions had been passed to Ambassador Byroade in Manila. He had
replied with a 10-page cable on 30 September 1970.3
b. The Ambassador’s assessment did not support the First Lady’s
scare talk. The Byroade analysis was that Marcos was in full control at
this time.
c. It was also noted that Marcos was allegedly angered by his
wife’s freewheeling; none of this had come directly from him and she
might be launching personal political ambitions.

1
Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee
Minutes, October 6, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.
2
Imelda Marcos had met with President Nixon on September 22 from 12:42 p.m.
to 1:14 p.m. No record of this meeting has been found.
3
Byroade’s backchannel message to Green, September 30, was forwarded to the 40
Committee and the NSC under an October 1 covering memorandum [text not declassi-
fied]. (National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines)
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490 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

d. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Packard gener-
ally agreed with the Byroade assessment. Mr. Kissinger pointed out
that higher authority was sensitive on matters like this and did not
want to be told everything was all right only to awaken months later
to find the bottom dropping out. Mr. Helms said the basic question
was: Do we want at this time to earmark funds for covert support of
Marcos candidates at a time when President Marcos—no neophyte at
feeding at our trough—had not yet asked for a peso.
e. Mr. Nelson pointed out that there were 2400 candidates for
about 130 seats and that current information was that the party in
power had more than a 50% leverage, the opposition no more than
25%.
f. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Manila was directed
to make an independent assessment (considering the worst that could
occur) in as much detail as possible and have it ready for next week’s
meetings. [1 line of source text not declassified]
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Philippines.]
Peter Jessup

231. Paper Prepared in the Embassy in the Philippines1

Manila, October 13, 1970.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Manila Reply to Questions
Concerning Philippine Constitutional Convention
1. It might be useful for a better understanding of the atmosphere
in which the Constitutional Convention will take place to note current
issues in Philippine political life which affect U.S. interests. These is-
sues, which have been developing over a number of years, are:
a. A desire to eliminate special privileges currently allowed to U.S.
investors and to regulate U.S. investments in the Philippines by new
legislation based upon laws similar to those governing foreign invest-
ments in other Southeast Asian countries. In 1946 the Philippine Con-
stitution was amended to give U.S. citizens equal rights with Filipinos
in the development of natural resources and in the operation of pub-

1
Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Philippines, 1969,
1970, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The assessment was in response to an October
6 directive of the 40 Committee (Document 230).
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Philippines 491

lic utilities. The Laurel–Langley Agreement also granted reciprocal na-

tional treatment to U.S. or Philippine citizens engaged in commercial
activities within the other country. In addition, it provided for tariff
preferences which favor the U.S. This agreement has been modified but
its basic provisions remain intact.
b. A policy for U.S. military bases which would limit the free hand
which we have thus far enjoyed in their operation and which would,
at the same time, raise the price we must pay. The Philippine Consti-
tution, for example, authorizes the U.S. to acquire bases in the Philip-
pines for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the U.S., rent
free.
c. A foreign policy which would establish diplomatic and trade
relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations.
2. What interest does the U.S. have in the Philippine Constitu-
tional Convention?
In the long run we believe U.S. interests would be served ade-
quately by a constitution which would encourage the viability of a self-
sustaining, friendly Philippines, wherein our investments would not
be discriminated against and whose soil we could use for military pur-
poses under certain conditions. In the short term, 3–5 years, we would
not want the use of the two military bases, Clark and Subic, signifi-
cantly curtailed. In addition, we would not want to be confronted
with constitutional provisions that would adversely affect U.S. in-
vestments in the Philippines without adequate provisions for retain-
ing, or receiving compensation for, assets acquired under the current
arrangement.
3. Whom should we back, President Marcos, the moderates, or no
one?
At this point in time there is no need to commit U.S. support to
any particular group. Marcos-backed delegates probably will consti-
tute the single largest voting bloc in the Convention. The other dele-
gates will be made up of smaller groups representing business, reli-
gious, provincial and other special interests. These smaller groups will
form alliances with one another and trade off support depending upon
the particular interests they wish to advance at a given moment. In-
formation available to us now on approximately 1,800 out of the more
than 2,500 candidates leads to the conclusion that the majority are mod-
erate in their outlook on issues which affect the U.S. Of the 1,800 can-
didates examined, there are less than 20 who can be classified as rad-
ical left or communist.
4. If we are to become involved, how should we do it and what
should be the size of our activity?
We should remain alert to the workings of the Convention. Should
trends develop which would adversely affect our interests we should
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492 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

act [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to back the work of in-
dividual delegates or group leaders and deflate the more extreme pro-
posals. We cannot control the majority of the Convention delegates. We
can, however, directly or indirectly control small blocs of delegates
which could, in turn, be joined to larger forces to protect our interests
if the need arises. We believe the total number of delegates required to
influence the Convention would not exceed twenty.
5. “Worst Case” assessment2
There is a remote possibility that a solid minority of the delegates
might acquire a supra-nationalist attitude or spirit and press for a con-
stitutional revision which would jeopardize our interests. They might
call for an immediate nationalization of foreign investments with only
nominal compensation or they might seek to deny us the unrestricted
use of our military bases. In such an event, we believe we could [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] fragment the minority bloc, and
encourage delegates to join the Marcos bloc. This would be costly [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified], and might promote charges of
political interference, but probably could be effective. In the long run
such American interference in Philippine elections, however, would be
politically counterproductive.
6. Possible outcome of the election
The intelligence available to us at this juncture indicates that Mar-
cos, without making any further effort, can be expected to emerge from
the elections with a minimum of 100 delegates3 responsive to his dic-
tates. This is so because of the procedures which govern the campaign.
Marcos has the best political machine in the country and access to pub-
lic funds which no other organization can match. There are several
other factors which give Marcos an advantage. The Liberal Party has
not recovered from its defeat in the 1969 Presidential elections and lacks
adequate funds. The Catholic Church lacks the experience, the funds
and the organization necessary to contest political elections success-
fully on a nationwide basis. With the possible exception of Manila, and
Rizal Province, the field is open to the pressures and tactics that the
Marcos machine has demonstrated it is capable of applying. If he does

2
In an October 13 covering memorandum to Johnson, Green noted that should the
“Worst Case” eventuate, i.e. “that a solid minority of the Convention might call for re-
visions which could jeopardize U.S. interests,” [text not declassified] “believes that this
minority could be fragmented [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].” However,
such an action would be costly [text not declassified]. Green said that “I agree in general
with these assessments, and see no reason to initiate any [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] action directed supporting President Marcos in the Convention at this time.”
3
There will be a total of 320 delegates to the Convention. [Footnote in the source
text.]
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Philippines 493

not have a clear majority of the delegates in hand after the election of
delegates, he will, as a result of his machine’s effort between now and
the opening of the Convention, acquire what he needs for a majority
when the Convention begins. He controls the Government machinery
and will be the President for three more years. The problems that Mar-
cos might have during the election and Convention will stem to a cer-
tain extent from his tendency to over-kill and the resentment that such
an approach generates.
7. Possible outcome of the Convention
The Convention most likely will produce a moderate document
containing modest changes in the structure and functioning of the Gov-
ernment. The proposed Constitution probably will affect directly or in-
directly foreign investments in the Philippines, although it is doubtful
that these new provisions would be so extreme in nature as to exclude
or seriously damage our business interests. This will probably also ap-
ply to the U.S. military bases.
8. The unknown factors which complicate our analysis are the pre-
cise objectives and plans of President Marcos. We know he wishes to
prevent any significant reduction of the powers of the Philippine Pres-
ident. He also does not wish to decentralize a highly centralized gov-
ernment. Some say he would like to perpetuate himself in the Presi-
dency. It is on these issues that delegates not in the Marcos camp might
unite into an anti-Marcos bloc. Should Marcos seek to change the term
of the President from two four-year terms to one six-year term and
have this new provision apply to his administration, he probably will
provoke the delegates to take extreme positions, although they would
not be against a six-year term per se. If Marcos does decide that his
tenure as President is to be his primary objective, he would be willing
to make all compromises necessary to achieve this end. This could in-
clude a decision by him to adopt a supranationalist position, and, in
the unlikely event Marcos finds himself unable to control the Conven-
tion, it is possible that he would move to dissolve it.
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494 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, October 20, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Philippine Constitutional Convention

At your direction the 40 Committee has three times2 met to dis-

cuss Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos’ urgent request to you for covert financial
support to President Marcos in connection with the November 10, 1970,
elections of delegates to the Philippine Constitutional Convention to
be held in June–July 1971.
Independent assessments of the prospects of the Convention be-
ing dominated by communists and radical leftists, as feared by Mrs.
Marcos, were requested and received from Ambassador Byroade [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] Manila.3 Neither believes that
anything is likely to happen during the forthcoming elections which
confirm Mrs. Marcos’ foreboding. In addition, in a recent conversation
with Ambassador Byroade, President Marcos himself stated that he
does not share Mrs. Marcos’ concerns.
The consensus is that President Marcos will want to and can quite
adequately dominate the Convention through pro-Marcos delegates
and is already moving to assure the election of delegates who will sup-
port him. He will probably be successful in this endeavor without any
U.S. help. Marcos-backed delegates are likely to constitute the single
largest voting bloc in the Convention.
As of now there are some 2600 candidates for 320 delegates posi-
tions to the Convention. Information presently available on approxi-
mately 1800 of these candidates leads to the conclusion that the ma-
jority are moderate in their outlook on issues which affect U.S. interests.
Of the 1800 candidates studied, there are less than 20 who can be clas-
sified as radical left or communist. Intelligence available at this junc-
ture indicates that Marcos, without any further effort, can be expected
to emerge from the November elections with a minimum of 100 Con-
vention delegates responsive to his dictates.

1
Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File,
Philippines. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation indicates the
President saw it.
2
The 40 Committee meetings were held on September 24, October 6, and October
14. (Memoranda for the record; ibid., Minutes of 303 Committee, September 24, October
6, and October 14, 1970)
3
Document 231.
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Philippines 495

The principal knowledgeable concerns expressed over problems

that Marcos might face during the election and ensuing Convention
generally stem from his tendency to over-kill and the resentment that
such an approach generates.
Based on the above, the 40 Committee concluded that involvement
in the forthcoming elections of delegates to the Philippine Constitu-
tional Convention is inadvisable. The Committee also agreed that fol-
lowing the election there should be a careful assessment of those
through whom we might work effectively in furtherance of U.S. inter-
ests during the Convention should circumstances then so dictate.
I will follow up on this and see that appropriate proposals for
any action at the Convention are submitted to the 40 Committee
for consideration.

233. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 15, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Henry A. Byroade, American Ambassador to the Philippines
John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT
The President’s Discussions with Ambassador Byroade on Developments in the
Philippines

Ambassador Byroade began by explaining to the President2 that

there was very little he could tell the President which was good, in fact,
he anticipated the President would be more concerned than ever be-
fore with what Ambassador Byroade had to tell him. (The President
observed that the Philippines was indeed a “disaster area.”) However,
just to show that things weren’t entirely bad, he wanted to tell the Pres-
ident of progress which had taken place in three areas: foodstuffs, pop-
ulation control, and increased influence on the part of technically-
trained personnel. On food products, the Philippines now produced

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special
Files, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President Files, 1/10/71. Top Secret;
Sensitive. Sent for information.
2
Ambassador Byroade was in Washington for consultations.
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496 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

all the rice needed to support the population and then some. As to pop-
ulation control, a very effective program had been implemented by
President Marcos which enjoyed the support of large segments of so-
ciety including the Catholic Church, which had resulted in the estab-
lishment of birth control clinics throughout the Philippines and a down-
ward trend in population increase. It was estimated that by 1980 the
rate of increase would drop from the present 3.3 percent per annum to
1.1 percent. Ambassador Byroade described this as a revolution which
was even more important than the “green revolution,” and noted that
the Philippines would probably lead the rest of Asia in the field of pop-
ulation control.
Turning to the influence of the “technocrats,” Ambassador Byroade
said that as a result of prodding by the IMF Marcos had been induced
to put fiscal controls into effect and to put trained personnel in charge
of these reforms. In fact, about all the trained people the Philippines
possessed were now in positions of responsibility, and these young men
were becoming increasingly influential in determining Philippine poli-
cies. They were capable of understanding, for example, that discrimi-
nation against American business interests might cost the Philippines
a disinvestment of close to $600 million, which would be a disaster for
the Philippine economy. Thanks to the technocrats, Marcos was now
considering measures to ease the pressures on American business in-
terests. The President said that he was glad to have this information.
Turning to the political situation in the Philippines, Ambassador
Byroade stated that he was obliged to report that nothing good would
come out of the Philippines in the next six months. Just before leaving
for Washington, he had had a long conversation with Marcos, in which
Marcos had warned him of the possibility of serious disturbances in
the next six-month period. Political forces hostile to Marcos were stir-
ring up tensions and were actually preparing for an attempt to take
over the key installations in the city of Manila in an effort to discredit
Marcos and unseat him. Marcos had information to the effect that ex-
plosives and guns were being brought into the city, so that points such
as the power station and the telephone exchange could be taken over
or destroyed. Marcos had received one intelligence report that $8 mil-
lion worth of guns had been purchased by opposition elements in Hong
Kong—perhaps this was $8 million Hong Kong rather than $8 million
U.S. since the figure seemed high.
Ambassador Byroade explained that the anti-Marcos forces were
led by a man named Argenio Lopez, one of the richest men in the
Philippines and the worst enemy of the United States there. The Pres-
ident interjected to wonder if Lopez was any relation to the Philippine
Vice President, and was told by Ambassador Byroade that Lopez was
the brother of the Philippine Vice President. Vice President Lopez was
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Philippines 497

a fairly good man although rather stupid, but Argenio was a sour, vi-
cious, and bitter person who wanted to drive the U.S. out of the Philip-
pines completely. The danger was that if he succeeded in unseating
Marcos, he would be able to control the Philippines via his brother.
Ambassador Byroade remarked at this point that there was a 60 per-
cent chance Marcos would not survive his last three years in office.
He explained to the President that by this he meant Marcos might be
assassinated.
Continuing, Ambassador Byroade said that the current crisis in the
Philippines was undoubtedly of Lopez’s making. The jeepney (taxi cab)
drivers had gone on strike, and this strike had now gone on for nine
days; unless somebody like Lopez had been supporting the drivers it
would have collapsed within four days because the drivers couldn’t nor-
mally stay out of work any longer. In addition, there was unprecedented
campaign of vilification against Marcos also against the U.S., in the news-
papers owned by the Lopez interests, which comprised the majority of
the Philippine press. All of this added up to a very nasty situation.
Ambassador Byroade then declared that he had a very sensitive
matter to lay before the President at Marcos’ request. At the end of his
predeparture conversation with Marcos, Marcos had warned him that
he might find it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
establish martial law in the city of Manila—unprecedented steps which
had not been taken by any Philippine President since the late 40’s dur-
ing the hukbalahap movement. What Marcos wanted to know was: in
the event that he found it necessary to declare martial law in Manila,
would the United States back him up, or would it work against him?
Ambassador Byroade noted that he had promised Marcos he would
bring back the President’s personal reply.
The President declared that we would “absolutely” back Marcos
up, and “to the hilt” so long as what he was doing was to preserve the
system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty. The
President indicated that he had telephoned Trudeau of Canada to ex-
press this same position. We would not support anyone who was try-
ing to set himself up as a military dictator, but we would do every-
thing we could to back a man who was trying to make the system work
and to preserve order. Of course, we understood that Marcos would
not be entirely motivated by national interests, but this was something
which we had come to expect from Asian leaders. The important thing
was to keep the Philippines from going down the tube, since we
had a major interest in the success or the failure of the Philippine sys-
tem. Whatever happens, the Philippines was our baby. He, the Presi-
dent, was an activist and felt very strongly that it was far better to do
something to try to save the situation than just to let it slip away from
us. Ambassador Byroade said that he was very happy to hear the
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498 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

President say this. He acknowledged that if Marcos did act he would

undoubtedly pick up some of his political enemies among those he ar-
rested, but in general he would be attempting to do the right thing.
Ambassador Byroade went on to remark that in the event the worst
happened, and Marcos was in some way displaced by the Lopez fac-
tion, the U.S. would need to face up to two options: whether to stay
out of Philippine affairs entirely, or to intervene in some way. (The Pres-
ident again remarked that he believed in taking action rather than
standing idly by.) If we did intervene, the question would be how? One
situation which he foresaw was that in which Mrs. Marcos would come
to us and ask us to back her up in calling for a special Philippine Pres-
idential election in which she herself would run as a candidate. This
would not be desirable. The President expressed surprise that Mrs.
Marcos would have presidential aspirations of her own, and was in-
terested in hearing that Mrs. Marcos very definitely had such aspira-
tions. The other possibility which Ambassador Byroade envisaged
would be for us to keep hands off until the situation got so bad that
the Philippine military decided to take action and would request our
support. Ambassador Byroade believed that in this event we should
respond favorably. The Philippine military leaders were reliable—he
pointed out they were all West Point and Annapolis graduates—and
despite their tradition of not getting involved in politics could be re-
lied upon to do their best for their country if compelled to act. The
President asked if they actually had the political skill to run the coun-
try, and Ambassador Byroade replied that they didn’t but that they
would find someone to do the job for them. Ambassador Byroade ob-
served that things now were nowhere near as bad as the circumstances
which he had described, and that the crisis point, if it came, was still
quite a bit of time away. We would need to keep watching the course
of events, though. The President agreed.
The President wanted to know how Marcos was getting along with
respect to the Dovey Beams case. Ambassador Byroade said that the
case hadn’t really caused Marcos all that much difficulty, since Philip-
pine mores were quite different from our own. The only criticism of
Marcos appeared to be over the fact that he got caught out. Whatever
he did, he shouldn’t have let Miss Beams make tapes of his liaison. Ac-
cording to Ambassador Byroade, Miss Beams was still trying to keep
something of a hold over Marcos.3

3
Telegram 10183 from Manila, November 12, 1970, and subsequent telegrams from
Manila and Hong Kong, transmitted reports on this affair. (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 US–HK/BEAMS, DOVIE)
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Philippines 499

Ambassador Byroade brought up as a final point the question of

the President’s reaction to possible Philippine moves to establish diplo-
matic relations with Eastern European countries. He had assured Mar-
cos that he would ask the President for comments on this issue. Am-
bassador Byroade handed the President the text of a cable covering the
position which he, Byroade, had outlined to Marcos,4 and asked if the
President agreed or disagreed. (The line taken by Byroade had been
that the Filipinos had to decide the matter of recognition for them-
selves, but should weigh the benefits which they expected to receive
against the security problems which would inevitably accompany the
establishment of Eastern European or Soviet missions.) The President
declared that he thought the line by Ambassador Byroade was the cor-
rect one. Of course, we would not be happy if the Philippines recog-
nized the USSR, and this would also be harmful to the Philippines.
However, Ambassador Byroade was correct in saying that the Filipinos
had to decide things such as these themselves. He had long ago adopted
the maxim of not trying to argue against something which somebody
else had already decided to do. The only thing was, that if the Filipinos
decided to go ahead they should give us some advance warning so we
could use this matter in our relations with the USSR. We might want
to go to the Soviets and tell them that the Filipinos had asked our ad-
vice on recognition and we had told them to go ahead. In this way, we
might get some credit for the Philippine action.
Ambassador Byroade stated that he was not sure the Filipinos ac-
tually intended to go ahead. A while ago it had seemed almost certain
that they would, but there had been some drawing back from estab-
lishing relations with the Communist world in recent weeks. Eight
Philippine Senators were now against this policy, and if Marcos were
to move today he would not be able to gain approval from the Philip-
pine Senate.
During the conversation Ambassador Byroade expressed the opin-
ion that we were taking the Philippines too much for granted. We had
taken over eight months on PL–480 negotiations without reaching
agreement, and the MAP for the Philippines had been cut from $20
million to $17 million and then to $13 million. Even though these cuts
had been restored, the Filipinos weren’t happy, and they would be less
so when they found that the MAP for Indonesia was larger than theirs.
They had no particular use for the Indonesians, and American inter-
ests in Indonesia were less than in the Philippines. Actions of ours of
this nature were regarded as a “slap in the face from Father.”

4
Telegram 158 from Manila, January 6, reported this conversation. (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East,
Philippines, Vol. III)
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500 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

234. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the

Administrator of the Agency for International Development
(Hannah)1

Washington, January 27, 1971.

SUBJECT
Rural Electrification for the Philippines

Recent proposals from the GOP and USAID/Manila have outlined

a rural electrification program for the Philippines to be funded in part
by AID development loans. I understand that the initial reaction at
working levels in the Department and in AID is basically favorable,
while adding the ingredients of a greater emphasis on a multilateral
forum, in conjunction with the IBRD and ADB, and greater emphasis
on sector-wide planning. Assuming this to be the case, I should like to
express to you certain political considerations which I believe support
a decision to implement this program as soon as possible.
It has been characteristic of the Philippines that the pace of infra-
structure development and modernization has been too slow to meet
the expectations of a rapidly growing Philippine population.
In order to overcome a critical balance of payments crisis, Marcos
has conscientiously enforced the fiscal and foreign exchange disciplines
imposed a year ago by the IMF. This has led, however, to a slow-down
in the rate of economic growth and a 22 percent rise in consumer prices
in 1970. Discontent and an anti-administration mood prevails among
the populace. Revolutionary extremists, operating provocatively
through emergent student activists and with the unwitting coopera-
tion of Marcos’ conventional political opponents, are creating serious
political instability and fanning the danger of explosive violence.
While this situation is partly of Marcos’ own making—his over-
kill tactics in the last Presidential elections, the popular belief that he
is amassing a large personal fortune from his Presidential office—the
fact is that explosive popular discontent stems to an important extent
from economic problems. For example, recent riots in which five were
killed stemmed from a strike of jeepney drivers supported by activist
students. Discontent could be reduced and popular confidence in the
Philippines’ democratic structure of government strengthened by in-
dications that the country is moving forward with national economic

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) PHIL. Secret.
Drafted by Usher (EA/PHL) and Shepard C. Lowman, Country Officer (EA/PHL), and
cleared by Wilson and Barger (EA). This memorandum responds to a January 21 mem-
orandum from Green to Rogers. (Ibid.)
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Philippines 501

development. It is in our interest, as well as in that of the Philippines,

that this be achieved; and it is important that indications of forward
progress come now, before the internal political situation of the Philip-
pines further deteriorates.
Initiation of the long planned and impatiently awaited national
electrification program at this critical juncture could have a significant
favorable economic and political impact. Thus, I would urge that seri-
ous consideration be given to the allotment of sufficient development
loan funds from FY 71 to initiate this program with the remainder to
be programmed in FY 72.
William P. Rogers

235. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, March 31, 1971.

SUBJECT
Some Positive Insights on Filipino Characteristics

Secretary Rogers has sent you a brief but remarkably perceptive

report (Tab A)2 on the political and social character of the Filipinos,
prepared by the Political Counselor of our Embassy in Manila. It illu-
minates those positive and stabilizing aspects of Philippine society
which we have been groping to understand, but which are so often lost
from view amid the welter of daily events.
I agree with Secretary Rogers that this paper displays real insights.
Its main points are as follows:
—There is no argument about the lack of visible progress in deal-
ing with the Philippines’ major problems; graft and corruption,3 peace

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. The mem-
orandum indicates the President saw it. A notation in Nixon’s handwriting to Kissinger
reads “K—Do letter as I wrote.” Regarding this letter, see footnote 5 below.
2
Tab A, Political Counselor Underhill’s report, sent as valedictory observations
upon leaving the Philippines, was sent from Manila as airgram A–36, January 27. (Ibid.,
RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PHIL) Rogers forwarded it under cover of a memo-
randum to the President on February 25. Attached but not printed.
3
For a different view of corruption and the abuse of power in the Philippines, see
airgram A–4 from Cebu, February 8. (Ibid., POL 15–4 PHIL)
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502 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

and order, the widening gap between rich and poor, government inef-
ficiency, and the inadequacies of top leadership.
—If there is general agreement that Philippine society is seriously
ill, there is also equally firm agreement that a revolutionary situation
does not exist. The reasons for the “perverse stability of this noisy,
poorly governed, disorderly, under-achieving society” are:
—There is a political system in the Philippines. The Constitution
has been in effect for 35 years without suspension or having been
rewritten by a “strong man.” Peaceful transfer of power repeatedly
takes place. There is general agreement that the system needs revision,
but there is equal agreement that the mechanism to bring about changes
should be the Constitutional Convention.
—In other developing countries of Asia we are concerned because
the provinces do not identify with the capital. This is definitely not the
case in the Philippines. A good internal civil air network, a nationwide
radio network, and an excellent newspaper distribution system pro-
vide good communication within this society.
—The Filipino is addicted to elections and if much energy is ab-
sorbed in the political game it fulfills the special purpose in the Philip-
pines of serving to deal with the oriental problem of face. The Filipinos
are unusual in Asia for knowing how to find a respected place for de-
feated ex-Presidents.4
—The Philippine press helps drain off revolutionary pressure. This
is a compulsively open society, where the life span of a secret is meas-
ured in hours. Scandals are hyper-ventilated. After a while this pro-
duces not indignation but boredom. A comparable phenomenon is
indifference to student martyrs. The normal level of casual violence
is so high in the Philippines that there is no general sense of outrage
when a few students are shot.
—The private sector of the economy works well. The road to
wealth is open to the ordinary dishonest man. In most of developing
Asia this road is controlled by the military.
—The Filipino is less interested in good government than in gov-
ernment that is good to him. Like a gambler in Las Vegas, the system
may wipe him out, but he is no more interested than the gambler in
changing it. Tomorrow he may strike it lucky.
—Sheltered in his extended family system, linked by dual tires of
loyalty and obligation upward and downward in the social structure,
the Filipino is almost never alone, either actually or figuratively. The

4
Nixon underlined the last sentence (beginning with the word “how”) and wrote
in the margin: “Like Mexico.”
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Philippines 503

individual loneliness and alienation that is deeply troubling the soci-

ety of the West is almost unknown in the Philippines. This is perhaps
the essential reason why the average Filipino is optimistic about the
future. To the despair of the revolutionaries, he has not lost his sense
of humor, he is not bitter.
—What are the limits? How much more can the long-suffering Fil-
ipino take before he accepts the arguments of those favoring violent
change? Consensus for change develops slowly in a democracy, and if
the needed change is basic as it is in the Philippines, it often takes a
severe crisis to generate and sustain the consensus.
—The alternative to peaceful reform in the Philippines is proba-
bly not revolution but anarchy. Those who try to end the anarchy may
come from either the Right or Left but they will have to accept the fact
that the Filipino will not tolerate too much government. He will be in-
tractable and rebellious if his individualistic way of life is denied him.
—The democratic values which the U.S. planted in the Philippines
have now assumed their own indigenous forms. The roots are deep
and if we have faith in the capacity of our own society to change and
survive, we cannot give up hope for the Philippines.5

5
At the end of the memorandum Nixon wrote: “Dear Mr. Underhill: The Secretary
of State has called to my attention your Airgram of __. This is one of the most percep-
tive, incisive and thoughtful analyses I have ever seen in reading hundreds of such re-
ports over the past 20 years. The Nation is fortunate to have a man of your analytical
ability in our foreign service. Cc to Rogers.” Attached but not printed is an undated let-
ter to Underhill signed by President Nixon incorporating the notation almost verbatim.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, July 8, 1971, 0851Z.

6405. 1. I do not want to clutter up the wires with the obvious, but
I do think I would be remiss if I did not report that the recent events
started by the New York Times disclosures, the Supreme Court decision,
et al, have had a great and injurious impact here. I have had long talks
on these matters with both Marcos and Romulo, in each case at their

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PHIL–US. Secret;
Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.
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504 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

initiative. Their immediate primary concern or course (in this contin-

uing process, which for here, started with the Symington Committee
disclosures long ago) is what may yet come out to cause further em-
barrassment to the GOP, and of course to Marcos personally.
2. As an example, Romulo told me yesterday he was appalled by
the publication of the Lansdale Memo in 1961 indicating CIA support
of, and implication with, three Philippine organizations, i.e., the East-
ern Construction Company, Operation Brotherhood, and Security
Training Center. I told him I had not seen that report and had only a
hazy recollection as to what two of these outfits were like in 1961. I
added, however, that there was certainly nothing sinister in our help-
ing, if we did in fact help, in any of these efforts, as all three in fact
were in a good cause. He said he agreed, but it was now being played
in the light that it was sinister, and that, especially as two of these en-
deavors still existed, it could have serious and immediate local reper-
cussions. (Unfortunately friendly and helpful Congressman San Juan
is in charge of the Eastern Construction Company.) He said that it
was so serious that he had asked for a full study and the Philippine
Embassy to send in the complete text of the Lansdale Memo. Fortu-
nately this particular disclosure has not as yet been played in the local
press, but I assume that it will be and most probably in a sensational
manner.
3. Marcos, in personal conversations, has never come directly to
the point, but occasionally phrases he uses could hardly have any other
meaning but to reflect concern on his part as to whether my own re-
porting might be distributed widely and be leaked in Washington. Ro-
mulo, more in sorrow than in anger, has gone much further and asked
how any nation can have the confidence to converse freely with our
ambassadors in the future. He hastened to add that this would be a
tragedy, as he did not think American motives bad, but that there would
naturally be great mistrust in doing sensitive things with us in the
future. He thought Newsweek’s graphic description of Lodge’s last as-
surances to Diem in Vietnam in the face of what actually happened,
would hamper us with every Asian leader for a long time to come.
4. For my part I go through the obvious: that these are only Pen-
tagon Papers, which to the exclusion of all other relevant papers and
records of discussions and decisions, leave a very distorted picture, that
this has been further exaggerated by the manner of presentation, head-
line selection, etc. But, of course, there is really no effective answer, and
it would be impractical to attempt to portray by cable all the local re-
actions, very many to me personally, on this subject.
5. But in summary I can say that we have suffered a very great
loss indeed as a nation in these events. In my opinion it goes beyond
a fear by local and high officials as to how it might affect them per-
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Philippines 505

sonally. The deeper loss of confidence reflects a worry about the U.S.
itself, which is considered important by every segment of this country.
I am not competent to know what steps we can take that would be ef-
fective, but additional search, on the one hand, for ways of assuring
others that we have adequate laws to protect the security of our own
confidences of state in the field of foreign affairs (and hence those of
others), and on the other for ways of proving that we have the national
will to tighten our own security, and prosecute under the laws if nec-
essary, seems very definitely in order.
Even more difficult would be the search for forms of reassurance,
in the case of Asian nations particularly, that we are on an honest and
open course with them, in the interest of their own aspirations as well
as our own.
Byroade

237. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, July 19, 1971.

SUBJECT
Philippine Special Fund for Education: Proposed Project for Land Reform
Education

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Secretary Rogers2 rec-

ommending that we agree to the Land Reform Education project pro-
posed by the Philippine Government to close out the funds remaining
in the Special Fund for Education. (The Special Fund for Education, es-
tablished by a 1963 amendment to the Philippine War Damage Legis-
lation of 1962 and fully constituted at $28,133,000, is to be used as jointly
determined by the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines.)
The Philippine Government has proposed that the remaining
$1,281,935 in the Fund be used to establish a trust fund for land reform
education. Earnings from the trust fund would support education for

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Limited official use. Sent for action. Haig
signed for Kissinger.
2
Rogers’ memorandum is dated July 2; attached but not printed.
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506 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

farm families, training of land reform personnel, research, and com-

plementary programs in community development and cooperative
farming. The trustee funding concept has proved successful in three
previous projects carried out under the Special Fund for Education.
Recommendation
That you authorize the conclusion of an agreement with the Philip-
pines for the expenditure of $1,281,935 from the Philippine Special
Fund for Education (PL 88–94) to establish a Land Reform Education
Fund.3

3
Haig checked the approve option and wrote: “Haig for HAK for Pres.”

238. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

A–291 Manila, August 20, 1971.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Filipino Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., LP Secretary General.

SUMMARY

Senator Aquino, the hyperactive Liberal Senator with a “maver-

ick” reputation, reported that he will visit the People’s Republic of
China for ten days in September with a group of Filipino journalists.
He was pessimistic about the prospects for the Liberal Party in the No-
vember senatorial, provincial and local elections and about the future
of the Liberal Party and the two-party system in general in the Philip-
pines. Aquino does not exclude the possibility of some sort of revolu-
tionary upheaval in the Philippines during the next four years and
sought to leave the impression that he might “go to the hills” as one
of its leaders.
During a long merienda and introductory meeting at the Army-
Navy Club on August 11 for Political Counselor Maestrone, Sena-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–6 PHIL. Confi-
dential. Drafted by Forbes, cleared by Hulen (POL) and Kalaris (POL/R), and approved
by Maestrone (POL). Repeated to Hong Kong.
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Philippines 507

tor Aquino made a number of interesting comments that are worth

recording.
Trip to Peking. Senator Aquino said that he would be leaving on
September 2 for a ten-day trip to Peking, Canton, Shanghai and, pos-
sibly, other cities in Communist China. Accompanying him will be six
Filipino journalists and two TV cameramen who will stay in China for
a total of thirty-five days and will try to make a side trip to Pyongyang.
The trip, which Aquino said is being sponsored by a Chinese journal-
istic association, is for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with
current developments on the Mainland. (Although Aquino said that he
had gone to Canton with the Philippine Chamber of Commerce group
that traveled to China in May, we have no information that he actually
went further than Hong Kong with the group or received a visa to en-
ter the Mainland. If Aquino does, in fact, make the trip he says he will,
he will be the most senior Philippine official to visit Peking.)
The 1971 Elections. Senator Aquino was pessimistic about the Lib-
eral Party’s prospects for this November’s elections. Only two Liberal
candidates (Salonga and either Magsaysay or Osmena) would be
elected to the Senate, and the Liberals would fare badly in gubernato-
rial and mayoralty contests. President Marcos, Aquino complained, is
buying off Liberal candidates with money or political appointments
and has already persuaded eleven potential Liberal gubernatorial can-
didates not to run; four of these were confirmed on the day of our con-
versation as new Court of First Instance judges.
Senator Aquino showed us the results of a recent poll conducted
nationwide by the Liberal Party. The poll, which had 2,800 respondents,
confirmed his conclusions that the Liberals would not do well in the
senatorial election. Of the issues that respondents were asked to iden-
tify as the most urgent problems presently facing the Philippines, high
prices and the need for public works ran far ahead of graft and cor-
ruption and criticism of the Marcos Administration. The Nacionalistas,
according to Aquino, had conducted a separate poll with similar re-
sults, with Senator Almendras emerging as the most popular candidate
from either party. When we pointed out that high prices and the need
for public works were issues that the Liberals could readily use in their
campaign, Aquino replied that this was not the case; instead, what
counted was how the voters, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas,
would respond to these issues at the time of election. Their memory is
short and their impressionability high, and between now and election
day Marcos would dispense considerable amounts of “pork barrel”
funds for local high-impact public works projects and would import
enough rice to keep the price of this essential commodity down. Aquino
appeared to place great stock in the value of his polls. He went over
them column by column and figure by figure and gave no sign of ques-
tioning the validity of the statistics he quoted. As a practical politician,
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508 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

he said, he has his office conduct a nationwide poll of issues every 45

days, paying particular attention to identifying issues connected in the
popular mind with certain Senators. Little nationwide impact resulted,
according to his poll, from his Congressional budget and fund trans-
fer campaign; Senator Magsaysay, however, drew high marks on land
reform even though, according to Aquino, Magsaysay “never opens
his mouth on this issue.”
The Liberal Party is in danger of extinction, Aquino continued.
President Marcos has changed the traditional rules of the political game
in the Philippines by spending unprecedented sums of money to en-
sure the election of himself and other Nacionalista candidates. The Lib-
erals can no longer compete on this basis; they need 500,000 pesos per
province per year (68 provinces) just to operate their party organiza-
tion, let alone to pay for the costs of an election, and raising the nec-
essary funds is becoming increasingly difficult. President Marcos will
spend freely on the 1971 elections, Aquino claimed, and has already
started doing so by passing out two thousand pesos to each of the
twenty-seven thousand barrio captains in the country. In addition,
Aquino states that Marcos now owns directly or controls through var-
ious means, 220 of the approximately 290 radio stations in the Philip-
pines and has managed to prevent criticism in all of the major news-
papers except the Chronicle and the Times-Mirror-Taliba group. Mandy
Elizalde (described by Aquino as a political nobody whose inclusion
on the Nacionalista slate was intended to prove that Marcos can get
anyone elected) puts the Elizalde Tri-Media behind the Nacionalistas.
(Aquino’s claim of the extent of Marcos’ control over radio broadcast-
ing is open to doubt since the Lopez-owned ABS–CBN system owns a
sizeable percentage of the broadcasting industry. As for newspapers,
his remark is misleading since the circulation of the Times, Taliba and
the Chronicle is considerably greater than that of all the other major pa-
pers combined.)
Revolutionary Change. Aquino’s comments on the future of the Lib-
eral Party led him into a discussion of his own future political role
and revolutionary political change in general in the Philippines. Since
Marcos had, by his overspending on elections, blocked the traditional
avenues of access to political power for the Liberals, Aquino said he
was left with three choices for his own future: 1) allow himself to be
bought off by the Nacionalistas (Nacionalista Senator Jose Roy, Aquino
related, had recently orally invited Aquino on Marcos’ behalf to be the
Senate’s representative on the GOP delegation to the UN General As-
sembly and, upon his return, become the head of the Philippine Na-
tional Bank. Aquino said he asked for the offer in writing from Mar-
cos, thus effectively declining the probe); 2) “hang up my shingle” and
retire from politics; or 3) “go to the hills” and join the revolution.
Aquino implied that he was considering the third choice. Polls con-
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Philippines 509

ducted by his office had shown that in response to the question “How
would you react if a senator went to the hills?” 34% of the respon-
dents said they would approve; two years ago the response was only
19%. A question on whether or not the respondent would approve of
a revolutionary change of government in the Philippines produced a
similar response. Aquino stated that his fellow Liberal Senator Jose
Diokno has decided against the idea of “going to the hills” for the mo-
ment; Aquino, however, left the impression that this course was not
excluded for himself. He thought a revolutionary leader of sufficient
prominence would have little difficulty in gaining support from the
peasants and that financial support would come from the urban mid-
dle class and some of the wealthy who were disenchanted with the
Marcos Administration.
Aquino said that he believed that there could be a revolution in
the Philippines sometime between now and 1974 or 1975. Underlying
his comments on this subject was a fairly clear indication that Aquino
is in active contact with KM leaders both in and outside Manila. For
example, he reported that radical leaders had decided to change the
tactics of their guerrilla activities. Starting in September they planned
to place their emphasis on increased urban terrorism rather than on
terroristic activities in the provinces which they felt were not having
the desired impact. (This tends to support similar reports heard from
other sources.) He noted that the number of students who have re-
ceived two or three months of guerrilla training in the hills and who
have returned to the cities is growing, and their tactics have become
more sophisticated. In the future, Aquino thought that there will be
fewer direct confrontations with the police and Philippine Constabu-
lary and more use of sniping, arson, bombing and other forms of se-
lective terrorism.
Aquino said that Marcos was becoming more and more of a dic-
tator and was gaining control of the government and the country in
line with his alleged intentions of continuing to stay in power beyond
the end of his second term in 1973. Thus Marcos’ present actions and
future ambitions, Aquino argued, were creating a revolutionary situa-
tion for the Philippines. While Aquino said he could not predict with
precision when a revolution would occur, he said that one of the key
factors that any revolutionary must consider and which at present was
unclear was the position the United States would take in a revolu-
tionary situation in the Philippines.
Comment: Senator Aquino can be prone to exaggeration, and his
remarks on the possibility of revolution and the role that he might play
as one of its leaders seemed quite farfetched. Aquino, who is a long-
time and prominent critic of Marcos, has no political ideology beyond
his own personal ambitions. In this respect, his discussion of revolu-
tion can be interpreted as meaning that, if the Philippine political
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510 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

system has been changed to the extent that his political clique cannot
alternate in power with the Marcoses by democratic means, then it will
become necessary to resort to violent revolution as the means of gain-
ing power. Although Aquino is believed to maintain regular contact with
the Huks and the NPA, the jump from being a potential Liberal Party
candidate for the 1973 Presidential election to leading a revolution in the
hills may be a bit too much for the “boy wonder of Tarlac” to make.
Byroade

239. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 3, 1971, 0937Z.

8351. 1. I literally do not have time prior to my departure from here

for detailed reporting on a long talk with Marcos alone today, and later
on with Mrs. Marcos alone, and finally with the two of them together.
2. As it turned out it was a bad day indeed to see Marcos as there
were two or three hundred people in Malacanang on a whole series of
important meetings and he actually had about 100 waiting for him
when I left. In the turmoil I ran into Mrs. Marcos by accident and
walked over to say goodbye. She took me in the music room for about
an hour’s conversation. Her main concern seemed to be some doubt
as to our support of the President in present circumstances, or as she
put it, in his struggle to rid the country of Communist subversive op-
erations. I told her she need have no worry on the latter, but went on
to explain my concern that the President’s actions to suspend the writ
coming as it did in an election period, might well be misunderstood
abroad. I tried to draw her out as to what had to happen, as she saw
things, before he could raise the suspension, but did not get anything
very specific. She went into long stories as to the nature of their evi-
dence, as of now, implicating Aquino and possibly others.
3. I told her I would face many questions at home, and some in
which I had no answers. I said the first question that everyone would
ask me is “Who did it at Plaza Miranda?”2 My answer would have to

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PHIL. Secret;
Exdis.
2
The Plaza Miranda incident refers to an indiscriminate terrorist attack by un-
known assailants who tossed two grenades there into a rally of the opposition Liberal
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Philippines 511

be the “I do not know.” The next question would be “Who do you think
did it?” I told her my answer to that one would also have to be “I don’t
know.” I said this would put me somewhat on the defensive in Wash-
ington which was unfortunate as there were positive things that I
wanted to work on there.
4. Later on as I was sitting down with the President, Imelda asked
to see him before his talk with me. When I later joined the President in
his private library, he said that I had left the First Lady quite agitated
and worried, with her worry centering on my remarks in the quotes
above. Marcos said I must know that he had not suspended the writ
solely on the Plaza Miranda incident, as he had stated publicly, that this
was only the last straw. He said he was determined, during the period
of the suspension of the writ, to break the back of Communist-led in-
surgency in the Philippines, even though this might take some time. He
assured me that he would not misuse the suspension for political pur-
poses, or against personal enemies. Interestingly, he said that it would
not be difficult to have the constitutional convention extend his tenure
of office, but that he was not going to do that. He said he would retire
in 1973 unless at the time the country seemed in such a condition that
he could not conscientiously leave the office of the President.
5. I said that from all evidence we had it appeared that his peo-
ple were operating under the suspension in quite a proper and legiti-
mate manner. I said unfortunately, however, as long as the suspension
was in effect he would be accused by his enemies of misusing it no
matter what he did. He said he knew that was true, but there came a
time in the life of many presidents where they had to become immune
to criticism and he had personally passed that stage. He repeated that
the affairs of the nation under the suspension would be handled prop-
erly, and said further that in the two years he had left he was going to
institute significant reforms.
6. Our conversation then turned to the long list of specifics that I had
prepared to take up with him prior to my departure. These need not be
reported now except for matters connected with Clark Field. Marcos told
me that he would sign the transfer orders of Judge Gaddi from the
Angeles area today. He said it made him wince to have to “promote”
Gaddi to get him out of our hair, but he would do it, and do it right away.
He also phoned the Solicitor General in my presence and directed him to
take any steps necessary to get Airman Whipkey out of jail in Angeles.

Party on August 21. President Marcos responded by suspending the writ of habeas cor-
pus for suspected subversives. Marcos also caused the detention of a number of persons
without formal charges and immediately came under suspicion of exploiting the situa-
tion to stifle opposition elements, according to INR Intelligence Note REAN–47, Sep-
tember 1. (Ibid., POL 23–8 PHIL)
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512 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

7. Imelda joined us and the three of us had a re-hash of her con-

cern as to what I would say in Washington. It all ended amicably
enough, but it is clear that she is somewhat worried. While this at times
makes life a bit complicated for me here, I think I left her with just
about the right amount of concern. I am not worried about the Presi-
dent as he is less emotionally inclined and I think respects and un-
derstands the position of the American Ambassador here far better than
she. In any event, we will know in due course. I am leaving here by
Pan American tomorrow. My itinerary will be sent separately.
Byroade

240. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, September 13, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration In-

telligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Records, Philippines.
Secret; Eyes Only; Outside the System. 2 pages of source text not
declassified.]

241. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

New York, October 14, 1971, 2059Z.

Secto 161/3504. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Romulo

(Philippines) Part II of III: Military Situation in Philippines and Viet-
Nam; October 13, 1971, 5:00 pm: 35 A Waldorf.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. Secret. Re-
ceived at 2210Z. Repeated to Manila and Saigon. Part II of III. Part I on the issue of Chi-
nese representation in the United States and Part II on Nixon’s proposed trips to Beijing
and Moscow are ibid.
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Philippines 513

1. Participants: Philippines—FM Romulo, PermRep Reyes; US—

The Secretary, Mr. Murphy (reporting officer).
2. Summary: Romulo said there were some subversive demon-
strations in the Philippines and the Philippine Army needs US support
on training and equipment. The Secretary said the military situation in
Viet-Nam is good and even the other side must acknowledge it. End
summary.
3. Asked about the situation in the Philippines, Romulo said there
had been several subversive demonstrations including a recent bomb-
ing of an electric plant, and that those responsible are Maoists. Conse-
quently, he said, it is against President Marcos’ inner convictions to
vote for the entry of PRC into the UN. The Secretary observed that US-
Philippine relations were excellent, and Romulo said much credit
should be given to Ambassador Byroade, who was the best US Am-
bassador the Philippines had had, and enjoys the respect and confi-
dence of both the President and himself. The Secretary stated that
things looked good in Viet-Nam at the moment and that although we
were disappointed by the Presidential election, because Thieu could
have won even with opposition, South Viet-Namese forces were fight-
ing well and US casualties were very low. Romulo asked if South Viet-
Nam could handle the military situation by itself if US forces with-
drew, including US air forces. The Secretary said that the South
Viet-Namese could make it without US ground forces, but the Presi-
dent had not yet decided how long US air power would be used. He
said the other side also thinks the South Viet-Namese can do it on their
own and that in recent conversations with the Russians they had ac-
knowledged this. Romulo said his country would like to know what
plans the US had to train the Philippine Army and what equipment
they could get from the US. He remarked that the Philippines was not
getting sufficient training or equipment at present. The Secretary asked
how many insurgents were active in the Philippines, and Romulo said
about 3,000, who were getting their equipment from Viet-Nam. He said
President Marcos strongly desires to see his army properly trained and
equipped. The Secretary inquired if the Philippine Government was in
touch with the US military on this, and Romulo replied that they were,
through the Mutual Defense Board. The Secretary promised to look
into the matter and discuss it again with Romulo, and Romulo sug-
gested that the Secretary could pass the message through Ambassador
Byroade. He commented that the problem of the US surcharge on
Philippine sugar seems to be solved now, and said much of the credit
for that belongs to Ambassador Byroade.
Rogers
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514 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

242. Editorial Note

First Lady Imelda Marcos made a trip to the United States in Oc-
tober 1971 and requested meetings with President Nixon and other
high-level U.S. officials. The following excerpt is from the tape of a con-
versation between Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman and President Nixon
concerning that request and other matters. The conversation took place
on October 19, 1971, from 10:55 a.m. to 12:14 p.m. in the Oval Office.
Haldeman: “Marcos, do you have to see her when she comes?
Nixon: “Oh, hell, I don’t know. I don’t really think so.
Haldeman: “What they’re [Department of State] suggesting is an
option if you don’t see her.
Nixon: “Yeah. She’s here for what good?
Haldeman: “She’s here to try to assess the extent of U.S. Govern-
ment support for she and her husband’s—her and her husband’s fight
against communism in the Philippines is—
Nixon: “Oh, is she?
Haldeman: —“the way she puts it.
Nixon: “Well—
Haldeman: “He intends to retain control until communism is de-
feated, either by extending his term of office or having her replace him
as President—
Nixon: [unclear]
Haldeman: —“’til the end of his term.
Nixon: “I think I should stay out of it.
Haldeman: “He’ll have to revise the Constitution to do that.
Nixon: “What do they [Department of State] suggest?
Haldeman: “They say we should treat her with reserve. At the
same time, we don’t want to give her cause to feel rebuffed. And I—
Nixon: “I think she’s got to be seen some way but I don’t—”
Nixon and Haldeman then agreed that the President would meet
briefly with Mrs. Marcos. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terial, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon
and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation No. 596–4)
A record of President Nixon’s subsequent meeting with Mrs. Mar-
cos on the morning of October 22 is in Document 243.
Almost directly after his meeting with Mrs. Marcos, President Nixon
met with Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., from 12:16 p.m. to 12:45
p.m. in the Oval Office. The following excerpt is from that conversation:
Nixon: “Democracy isn’t easy. I was just talking to Mrs. Marcos in
the Philippines. You know what they’re talking about now? Oh, they
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Philippines 515

think that the Communist danger is so great that maybe, maybe—they

may not—it may be in their interest to write their Constitution in a
way that democracy could succeed itself without an election. And the
Philippines, we [unclear] that’s American style democracy trying to
make it work in Asia—
Frelinghuysen: “As I understand it—
Nixon: “It’s a hell of a problem, right?
Frelinghuysen: “It’s not easy.
Nixon: “And our people who take this high and mighty attitude
about democracy and all [unclear] our thing, particularly that is. The
Latins aren’t any good at it. In fact, the Anglos are the only people who
are any good at democracy, the British and the Americans.” (Ibid., Con-
versation between Nixon and Frelinghuysen, Oval Office, Conversa-
tion No. 599–12) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversa-
tions printed here specifically for this volume.

243. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, October 22, 1971, 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between the President; Mrs. Imelda Marcos, Wife of the President of the
Philippines; and Brig. Gen. A.M. Haig, Jr.—Friday, October 22, 1971 (11:45 a.m.–
12:15 p.m.)

The President welcomed Mrs. Marcos and asked for her appraisal
of the Iranian 2500th Birthday Celebration. Mrs. Marcos said that it had
been a remarkable assembly of world leaders. While she could not
judge its economic costs, she did believe that the exposure of the lead-
ers of so many different political ideologies could not but have had a
constructive influence on world peace. She had again had an oppor-
tunity to talk with Vice President Agnew, she noted, and jokingly com-
mented that many in the press had assumed that their identical con-
servative attitudes made them natural allies. Mrs. Marcos described

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special
Files, President’s Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Secret. Drafted
by Haig. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
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516 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the atmosphere in Tehran as almost fairy-tale-like in its simplicity, with

world leaders of different viewpoints all seated at the same dinner
table, indulging in frivolous games and a kind of light and good-
humored banter which was almost childlike in nature. The days were
extremely hot and the nights chilly, and the Iranians had gone all-out
to provide adequate and colorful facilities for the celebration. Many
tents had been erected to house the various activities and each was
decorated in a unique color scheme of its own.
The President commented that the Shah of Iran was a strong and
selfless leader who was a great favorite of his and who had generously
and progressively exploited and distributed Iran’s great oil revenues
to the benefit of his people. He noted that while perhaps Iran’s formal
government did not meet the idealistic criteria of many critics, it was
perhaps the best system for Iran at this point in history since it pro-
vided for strong leadership at the center.
President Nixon then asked Mrs. Marcos to comment on the in-
ternal situation in the Philippines, recalling his discussions with Mrs.
Marcos in September 1970. Mrs. Marcos stated that all of the things
that she had predicted with the President at their earlier meeting had
come to pass. Internal disorders and efforts by extremists to discredit
the Marcos Government had increased in intensity and culminated in
the detonation of a grenade at a meeting of the liberal party leader-
ship. She stated that this, of course, was contrived to make it appear
as though President Marcos had been behind the incident. She stated
that Communist activity was also increasing and that the Communist
insurgents in the Philippines had achieved a degree of greater self-
confidence as a result of recent events, to include perhaps even
announcement of the President’s visit to Peking. She noted, however,
that President Marcos understood the purposes of the President’s visit,
even though many Asian leaders were concerned and worried by its
implications.
President Nixon emphasized that his visit to Peking should not be
misinterpreted. He was traveling there with his eyes open and would
not under any circumstances sacrifice the interests of America’s tradi-
tional friends. The 300 million people of Asia who formed an arc around
the periphery of Communist China—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea—produced far more than
all of Mainland China and constituted the bedrock base of freedom in
the area. No American President could sacrifice the interests of any
member of this essential arc in favor of progress in our relationships
with Peking. On the other hand, the President pointed out, certainly
the time had come to at least start talking to Peking’s leadership in the
interest of stability in the area and world peace in general. Mrs. Mar-
cos assured the President that she understood this, as did her husband.
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Philippines 517

Nevertheless, she said, a certain nervousness had resulted. President

Nixon assured Mrs. Marcos that he would keep President Marcos fully
apprised on a consultative basis with respect to both the meeting in
Peking and his meeting in Moscow which was equally significant in
terms of world peace.
The President then asked what the Philippines needed at present.
Mrs. Marcos replied that her husband had been most grateful for the
United States action on the Philippine sugar quota. The President com-
mented that he had taken this action because of his special feeling for
the Philippines and at some expense to our relationships with friends
in Latin America.
Mrs. Marcos then stated that the Philippines need additional mil-
itary assistance and felt that it would be most helpful if some of the
equipment which the United States used in South Vietnam could be
made available to her government as the U.S. presence was reduced.
Her husband had asked her to mention this to the President and was
particularly interested in helicopters, ammunition, and small arms, all
of which could be used for internal security purposes. The President
instructed General Haig to look into the Philippines’ requirements and
to view them with sympathy in light of our overall plans.
Mrs. Marcos then stated that there were many, some of whom were
in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, who expected the Philippines to react
as an American puppet. She stated that this could not be, for both sub-
stantive and political reasons, and many times she and her husband
were forced to take positions which did not necessarily meet U.S. con-
ceptions. On the other hand, this in no way should be interpreted by
U.S. officials as a departure by the Philippine leadership from its long-
standing and traditional pro-U.S. stance. Quite the contrary, President
Marcos had recently taken a poll of Filipino attitudes with respect
to the United States. The remarkable outcome of this poll indicated
that in the rural areas in the Philippines a majority of the citizenry ex-
pressed a desire to become a state of the United States of America.
She cautioned the President to keep this in mind when he received re-
ports from the Embassy in Manila or when he was exposed to Manila
press interpretations suggesting a growing anti-U.S. climate. The Pres-
ident expressed sympathy with President Marcos’ problem. He stated
that obviously no leader of the Philippines could assume a puppet
stance and we would not want or expect this. He said even a tradi-
tional friend like Great Britain was forced to demonstrate its inde-
pendence from the United States from time to time. Mrs. Marcos stated
that she had spoken recently to Prime Minister Heath and that he
had mentioned to her his desire to explain U.S. policies to the other
powers in a constructive way, thus confirming his friendship for the
United States.
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518 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

As the meeting adjourned, Mrs. Marcos gave the President a let-

ter from President Marcos (attached)2 and commented that the inter-
nal situation in the Philippines continued to deteriorate as a result of
some subversive activity by the Communists. For this reason, she said,
it might be important to modify the Philippines Constitution to permit
a strong and consistent leadership by President Marcos after the ter-
mination of his Presidential term in office. President Nixon did not
comment on this remark.
The President then escorted Mrs. Marcos to Rose Mary Woods’ of-
fice and from there to the White House Mess, where he introduced her
to the Cost of Living Council. Mrs. Marcos made a brief speech to the
group reiterating the warm friendship of the people of the Philippines
for the people of the United States and informing them of the results
of President Marcos’ poll.
The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

2
Attached but not printed. The text of Marcos’ October 8 letter was forwarded to
the Embassy in telegram 201847 to Manila, November 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files
1970–73, POL 7 PHIL)

244. Letter From President Nixon to Philippine President Marcos1

Washington, November 18, 1971.

Dear Mr. President:

It was a great pleasure for me to see Mrs. Marcos once again dur-
ing her recent visit to Washington and to receive from her your letter
of October 8, 1971. Her account of the Persepolis celebrations was most
interesting, and I also appreciated the chance to talk with her about the
situation in the Philippines. I hope she enjoyed her short visit to the
United States as much as we enjoyed having her here.
Your kind words of support for my coming trip to Peking are
greatly appreciated. As you are aware, our efforts to establish a new
relationship with the People’s Republic of China are based on my con-
viction that all nations will benefit if relations between the United States

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. No classi-
fication marking. Drafted by Frank C. Bennett and Lowman on November 4 (ibid.);
substantially revised in the White House. Transmitted in telegram 210645 to Manila,
November 19, the original signed letter subsequently sent by pouch. (Ibid.)
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Philippines 519

and the People’s Republic are improved. It is good to know that you
feel tensions in Asia have already lessened as a result of our initiatives.
I was deeply gratified for your Government’s decision to support
our efforts to secure continued representation for the Republic of China
in the United Nations—at the same time that we supported represen-
tation for the People’s Republic of China in that body. I am sure that
you share our disappointment that the General Assembly rejected the
resolutions we both cosponsored. Throughout this difficult test I was
heartened by the unstinting cooperation of the Philippines and others
among our allies and friends. Please convey my compliments to For-
eign Secretary Romulo, Ambassador Jimenez, Ambassador Yango,
and other members of your Foreign Department for their excellent
performance.
Now that the majority has spoken we will, of course, accept its de-
cision. You can be sure that the United States will perservere in the ef-
fort to make the United Nations a more effective institution, and that
we look forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Philip-
pines in working toward that goal.
I was pleased that you were able to receive Secretary Connally
during his recent visit2 to your capital. I am looking forward to hear-
ing his report concerning his discussions with you. Upon receiving his
comments, I shall be writing you further to respond to the several ques-
tions you raised in your letter concerning our economic relations.
Again, Mrs. Nixon and I were very happy for the opportunity to
receive Mrs. Marcos in Washington. To her and to you we extend our
most sincere best wishes and warmest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon

2
Connally’s trip to the Philippines and meeting with Marcos is reported in telegram
10479 from Manila, November 12. (Ibid., POL 7 US/CONNALLY)
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520 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines1

Washington, January 4, 1972, 2337Z.

1189. For Ambassador.

1. Please convey orally following message to President Mar-
cos. Explain that the President has asked you personally to make this
presentation.
Begin message: Before visiting Peking and Moscow the President is
consulting with several heads of friendly and allied governments. He
would have liked to have had an opportunity to get together with Pres-
ident Marcos in the course of these consultations. Unfortunately it is
now clear that that will not be possible.
While the President very much regrets this, he is mindful that he
and President Marcos have kept in close touch with one another’s
thinking on key issues. The President was pleased that Mrs. Marcos
was able to visit the US in October and meet with him. He was grate-
ful that President Marcos received Secretary Connally last month and
engaged in a frank exchange of views with him. Finally, the exchange
of letters between President Marcos and himself has, he feels, very use-
fully clarified our two countries’ mutual understanding on important
problems of common interest.
The President now wants to let President Marcos know what he
is discussing during the Summit consultations.
Moscow Visit
The President during his current consultations is reviewing the
general state of relations with the USSR, preparatory to his visit to
Moscow in May 1972. He is making it clear that the US had no inten-
tion of “dealing over the heads” of its friends and allies in any matter
where their security interests might be affected. For example, there have
been no, and there will be no, bilateral US-Soviet negotiations on mu-
tual withdrawal of forces from Europe.
The President is indicating during the consultations that some con-
crete progress might be made either before or during the Moscow visit
in such bilateral areas as arms control and economic relations.
Peking Visit
The principle purpose of the President’s visit is that the PRC and
ourselves achieve a better understanding of each others’ positions, and

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority, Exdis. Text received from
the White House.
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Philippines 521

that we establish a continuing means of remaining informed about

these positions. In addition, he hopes that the two sides will be able to
agree on at least the beginning of exchanges in nonpolitical fields so
that our two peoples will begin to understand each other better.
The President is emphasizing that neither side is under any illu-
sions as to the depth and complexity of the differences that separate
us. Having been two decades in developing, these differences will not
be easily resolved. Nevertheless, we hope to make a beginning toward
clarifying our positions and toward working out the real differences
that stand between us. To the extent we are successful, we believe we
will have helped reduce tensions in Asia and the world, which should
be of benefit to all nations.
The President is stressing that he has the interests of the Philip-
pines and our other friends and allies very much in mind. He has no
intention of concluding agreements at the expense of other countries;
the talks will, in fact, focus on US–PRC bilateral issues. Given our dif-
ferences, the question of formal diplomatic relations will not arise. Nor
will US treaty commitments with other countries be affected.
Economic Issues
The President is extremely pleased that agreement has been
reached on the realignment of exchange rates. This agreement—which
is the basis for a restoration of international monetary and financial
stability—is a manifestation of cooperation among the major trading
nations to the mutual advantage of all. It is, further, evidence that eco-
nomic differences which we may have with our trading partners can
and will be solved amicably in a spirit of international cooperation. It
would be incorrect for China, the Soviet Union, or any other nation to
see such economic differences as representing an opportunity to divide
free world nations. End message.
2. USG does not intend to make delivery of message public. Would
appreciate host government also maintaining confidential nature of
both fact and content of message. (FYI—similar messages are also be-
ing sent to selected other leaders. End FYI)
Rogers
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522 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

246. Talking Points Prepared by the Director of the Office of

Philippine Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Department of State (Usher)1

Washington, undated.

PHILIPPINE PARA
EA/PHL TALKING POINTS
1. Re. Assessment that U.S. interests in the Philippines are not seriously
imperiled by anticipated political and economic evolution in the Philip-
pines over the next five or six years.
a.) It should be heavily stressed that this assessment is based on
an assumption that the U.S. will allocate resources required for the
courses of action called for in Section II of this paper as needful to
achieve objectives numbers 3, 4, and 5 under part D of Section I.
b.) It is also based on an assessment that needed social reform will
proceed by evolutionary processes. If this process is frustrated by dis-
ruption of the Philippines open democratic institutions, then the coun-
try could be plunged into a deepening chaos in which all constructive
interests would suffer. The danger of such a disruption is more likely
to arise from right wing (oligarchs) attempts to arrest the evolutionary
process or from a Philippine President’s attempt to perpetuate himself
in power by illegal means than from left wing attempts to accelerate
or preempt the evolutionary process through violent revolution.
c.) A major problem for the U.S. will be to avoid being identified,
because of our military and business interests in the Philippines, as the
bulwark of the oligarchy.
There are two special factors which may help us to avoid such
identification. These are the fact that the oligarchs are the chief advo-
cates of anti-American nationalism—a pseudo nationalism which they
use as a device to harass American business competition. Thus, the oli-
garchs themselves tend to have an image as tormentors of American
interests rather than as the protected favorites of American power. The
U.S. need not be regarded by the discontented masses of people as al-
lied with their oppressors.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/PAB 1972–73 Letters and Memos File: Lot
74 D 471. Secret. Drafted by Usher and attached to a February 8 covering memorandum
to Green, in which Usher noted that the talking points “are related to the issues paper
which S/PC has prepared in coordination with me,” and that both had been done in
preparation for the East Asian Interdepartmental Group meeting on the Philippine Pol-
icy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) scheduled for February 23.
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Philippines 523

The second of the two factors is that there exists still among the
people of the Philippines a great affection for the United States and an
image of Americans as friends who would like to help them improve
their prospects in life. In the Philippines there is no need for the United
States to wind up on the wrong side of social evolution or even of rev-
olution, should that, however defined, ultimately occur.
2. Status of Base Talks
Except for some technical matters relating to exemption from the
Philippine taxes and exit and entry procedures for American person-
nel on the bases, the principal issues remaining for negotiation are the
tenure of the agreement and criminal jurisdiction arrangements (par-
ticularly the extent of Philippine participation in duty determination).
Another possible issue is the relinquishment of additional areas of base
land. However, Ambassador Byroade’s instructions already authorize
substantial land relinquishment, and we do not anticipate any signifi-
cant difficulty with this issue.
3. Military Assistance Program
Dangerously low politically, particularly now when we are trying
to complete base negotiations. Ambassador Byroade has been warning
us for a year that we would need “some blue chips” to wind up the
MBA revision negotiations on the hard issues. Filipinos will think we
are walking away from unspoken understanding that MAP is in return
for bases. Marcos will think that we are walking away from what he,
at least, had thought to be the Nixon Doctrine concept that we would
provide increased MAP to help the Philippines prepare for increased
self-reliance.
MAP is dangerously low too in terms of AFP need for improved
capability to deal with internal security problems. As a practical mat-
ter, the cuts which we have already received in FY 1972 will eliminate
all of the capital improvement element of MAP.
The problems inherent in this situation will be almost inconceiv-
able compounded by the new requirement that the Philippines reim-
burse us in local currency for 10% of the MAP. We have no idea where
the Philippine Government would get the money. Some 80% of the
Philippine military already goes just for payment of salary and al-
lowances. The prospect of Marcos asking the Philippine Congress for
an appropriation to pay this 10% at a time when MAP has already de-
clined to the lowest when he may also find himself faced with the ne-
cessity of seeking Philippine Senate approval of revisions in the base
agreement is bewildering to say the least.
Such a combination of events coupled with the exemption in the
U.S. legislation for countries whose MAP is explicit base rent, makes
it almost inevitable that the Philippines will demand explicit rent for
our bases there. Perhaps anticipating that the MBA revisions may be
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524 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

hard to sell in the Philippines in any event, Marcos has been publicly
emphasizing the “continued need for an American military umbrella
over the Philippines for some time to come.” But the unveiling of the
10% peso payment provision in our declining MAP will probably be
more than Philippine public opinion can take.
In fact this 10% reimbursement requirement (which is contrary to
the courses of action prescribed in Section II of PARA) could be of such
serious dimensions as to undermine the first premise set out in the is-
sues paper.
4. Trade and Investment Relationship
The latest statement of our strategy is contained in the joint
State/Commerce message of last January 1972.
5. Are the Philippine Military Bases Essential?
Judging from NISM 69 and the circular telegram now in clearance
process, one deduces that our bases in the Philippines are essential to
the U.S. posture in the Western Pacific and that they will become more
valuable to us in the future.
Not only is this eventuality being taken into consideration in our
current MBA negotiations, it is the principal reason why the current
negotiations are being undertaken. If we foresaw the diminishing need
for the bases we could probably have lived with the existing MBA, en-
during for a few years longer the increasing harassment and friction
we had been experiencing before the MBA talks were undertaken.
The objective of the current talks is to put the MBA on an up-to-
date basis which takes cognizance of new Philippine sensitivities about
their sovereignty and which will make for improved U.S.-Philippine
relations on base issues, thereby making it easier and pleasanter to op-
erate our bases in the Philippines over the long pull.
The fact is that since we began the base talks last February, base
relations have been much improved. The only and glowing exception
is the trouble we are having with Judge Gaddi’s challenge of the va-
lidity of the custody receipt. Gaddi has not been supported by the
Philippine Government in this. In fact, the Philippine Executive Branch
has supported us against Gaddi. The Philippine Government itself is
being harassed by Gaddi’s almost fanatical preoccupation with the au-
gust dignity of his court. He has harassed us by citing our base com-
manders and unit commanders for contempt and ordering their arrest
whenever an American serviceman subpoenaed or charged in his court
was late to or missed a scheduled court appearance. Early in February
Gaddi cited the Philippine Secretary of Justice for contempt and or-
dered his arrest and imprisonment because no one from the Justice De-
partment appeared in Gaddi’s Angeles City court in response to a sub-
poena of the Justice Secretary.
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Philippines 525

However, if the MBA talks fail, we can expect a recrudescence of

the kind of general harassment and press and public hypersensitivity
on base incidents involving Filipinos which had plagued us in the past;
and by a practical matter rendered our use of the bases increasingly
difficult and our tenure increasingly insecure.
6. Various Proposals for Consolidated Use of U.S. Inputs as Leverage to
Obtain Protection of U.S. Interests
There are two basic dangers in this concept. The first of these is
that each U.S. input already has a specific purpose which is being ac-
complished. If we try to make an existing input into a bargaining lever
to achieve some secondary or tertiary objective unrelated to the basic
purpose, we run the risk of undermining or sacrificing the basic pur-
pose. Therefore, the concept would be valid only if the secondary or
tertiary objective was so closely intertwined with the basic objective
that all could be accomplished with the same leverage.
The second and perhaps far greater danger in the concept is that
where the proposal is to combine all U.S. inputs into a single lever to
compel the Philippine oligarchy to extend benefits of concessions to di-
rect U.S. interests such as bases or business interests, we may:
a) Make our interests and inputs hostage to the Philippine oli-
garchy (if we can lever the oligarchy, they can by the same device put
the squeeze on U.S. interests in order to get more U.S. input—and, as
a matter of fact, the oligarchy has for a long time been smarter at this
than we have);
b) Use up resources which we could otherwise use to improve
the chances for a peaceful social evolution in the Philippines and
diminish the danger of chaos and explosive revolution—objectives 3,
4 and 5;
c) Lock ourselves in with the oligarchy (which is protecting our
interests in response to our leverage) as the enemies of the people.
One example of a type of leverage which we might use on the oli-
garchy would be a requirement for social and economic benefits to
sugar estate workers as a condition for the Philippine sugar quota.
An example of a type of leverage we should not use would be eco-
nomic aid as a lever to obtain protection of vested rights after the ex-
piration of Laurel–Langley.
Note that the implication of such a leverage approach would be
that if the vested rights were not protected the economic aid would be
reduced or eliminated, thus reducing or eliminating many of our
courses of action designed to achieve objectives 3, 4, and 5 in the PARA.
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526 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

247. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, March 5, 1972, 0345Z.

1997. Subj Green–Holdridge Meeting with President Marcos.

Summary: Assistant Secretary Green’s2 meeting with top GOP
leadership was well-nigh indispensable if we are to halt snowballing
erosion of Philippine confidence in U.S. Asia policy and reliability U.S.-
Philippine relationships. Exchange of views was brisk and penetrating,
with questions to Green reflecting deep anxieties of Philippine offi-
cialdom and public. Visit greatly appreciated by Marcos and extremely
helpful here whether or not it proves to have been an enduring cor-
rective.
1. Green met with President Marcos for over two hours morning
March 4, accompanied by John Holdridge, Consul General Osborn, and
Ambassador. Marcos had present General Romulo, Finance Secretary
Virata, Executive Secretary Melchor, and two DFA officials.
2. After brief exchange of warm and friendly greetings during
photography, Marcos launched immediately (before Green was even
able to convey President Nixon’s and Secretary Rogers’ greetings,
which he did later) into series of pointed questions related to implica-
tions of President’s Peking visit and the communiqué for future U.S.
policy and behavior toward East Asia and most specifically Taiwan and
the Philippines. It was more than an hour before any curiosity was ex-
pressed as to Chinese side of the coin or Chinese views on particular
issues and problems. Main themes are summarized:
A. Marcos asked first about an apparent contradiction between
U.S. acceptance that Taiwan is an internal Chinese problem and Dr.
Kissinger’s reaffirmation of U.S. defense commitment to GRC. In the
ensuing discussion both Marcos and Romulo had considerable diffi-
culty distinguishing between Marcos’ formulation and the commu-
niqué language of “acknowledging” and “not challenging” the view of
Chinese on both sides of the Strait. Green carefully explained deliber-
ate U.S. decision to leave undetermined position on “One China”, “Two
Chinas”, “One China—One Taiwan”, etc. It became apparent Romulo
had not really understood, through period of UNGA debate on ad-
mission of PRC, the deliberate care in wording of U.S. position on dual

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Se-
cret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon for Green.
2
Green traveled to Southeast Asia in March 1972 to explain the Nixon adminis-
tration’s China policy in light of the President’s trip to China and the joint U.S.-Chinese
communiqué on Taiwan and East Asia.
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Philippines 527

representation. This lack of understanding accounts for his recent feel-

ings that he had been betrayed by what he saw as U.S. switch from
“Two Chinas”—a position he had supported vigorously in UN—to
what he has considered new “One China” stance.
B. Marcos then asked whether U.S. would challenge actions taken
by PRC in accordance with its stated policy on Taiwan—”Tell us your
intentions; Taiwan is only 92 miles north of Bosco” (northermost point
in Philippines). Green reviewed President’s interest and efforts since
1967 through series of careful steps to find a way to deal with the re-
ality of China, to remove barriers to trade and travel, to avoid Cold
War rhetoric, to remove tensions in area and show PRC we are not try-
ing to threaten or isolate them. He said it has been made clear through-
out that U.S. would stand by its commitments to GRC, and this had
been stated again while on the Mainland. He noted his belief that
Peking does not, in any event, want the U.S. withdrawal from Asia its
propaganda has demanded while Peking’s problems with USSR and
Japan are viewed so seriously. Green stressed the importance of some
means for dealing with day-to-day problems, which sterile Warsaw
talks had failed to provide, and argued that communiqué reflects ma-
jor gain of taking pressure off U.S. on recognition issue. Achievements
of visit, he concluded, are what we need at this time and have been
obtained without undercutting U.S. or free Asian interests in this area.
C. Pursuing his effort to pin down the U.S. intentions, Marcos
asked what will happen to Taiwan in the long run. He asked Green to
convey to USG his government’s belief that Philippines must prepare
for the worst, that within ten years Taiwan will be part of Communist
China. He said this would threaten Philippine survival and conditions
may deteriorate to the point GOP will have to adopt options it would
not like. Green said he considered this line of reasoning unnecessary.
The GRC is in a strong position, with outlook for trade and investment
and economic progress good in comparison with PRC. Green referred
to his talks in Taiwan, saying GRC leaders naturally not happy but that
they understand our reasons and their situation and prospects are not
bad. He made comparison with PRC which faces internal difficulties
and severe external problems. Green sought to reassure Marcos with re-
spect to continuity of U.S. concern for Philippines and other Asian
friends, evoking special heritage U.S.-Philippine relations, quoting from
President’s foreign policy report on pillars of U.S. Asian policy and not-
ing these have been reaffirmed since visit, and declaring U.S. prepared
to stand on its record compared with all nations in history in living up
to its undertakings. Marcos pursued his contention that communiqué
says U.S. will let time solve the problem of Taiwan without interfering
and referred to evidence he has that investors on Taiwan are offering
to move holdings to Philippines, Singapore and elsewhere. Green re-
ferred to conversations in Japan and Korea, where similar concerns
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528 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

have been expressed, and said he felt, and our embassies have subse-
quently reported, that leaders there now understand and are satisfied
with our policy. Green stated that our willingness to accept some fu-
ture settlement between PRC and GRC did not mean that we are apa-
thetic, noting military aid and diplomatic relations would continue.
Ambassador noted tendency of public opinion to ignore military real-
ity that GRC forces are large and strong and 7th fleet “remains out in
front.”
D. Question from Romulo about communiqué statement on re-
duction of forces on Taiwan led Green to reaffirm the statement, not-
ing it is consistent with Nixon Doctrine and that ultimate withdrawal
is expressly contingent on peaceful resolution of problem. He referred
to information previously conveyed by Ambassador on force deploy-
ments, assured Marcos this position still stands and said USG would
try to repeat this kind of consultation from time to time. He said core
elements will remain on Taiwan until settlement, which may well take
many years. Green confirmed, in response to President’s question, that
U.S. will sustain its defense commitment if PRC and GRC cannot set-
tle differences peacefully, but expressed some confidence its contin-
gency not real in light of Peking record since costly Korean conflict of
avoiding adventuristic actions. He noted evidence including fact of
President’s visit that Peking wants some form of relations with U.S.,
making them less likely to prejudice own interests by resort to violence
against Taiwan. Green expressed confidence we are on right track pur-
suing President’s effort to escalate toward peace rather than war.
E. Regarding prospects for U.S.–PRC formal relations, Green sug-
gested this not likely soon because Peking won’t agree while U.S.–PRC
relations are preserved. Green reiterated U.S. has obtained its short
term objective, that visits by representatives may in actuality be better
than a resident mission unable to operate in traditional fashion, in re-
sponse to question whether he would not soon establish a Chargé in
Peking and “commercial” representation in Taipei in British fashion.
F. When Green stated SEATO not affected by China developments,
Romulo asked skeptically whether U.S. would still apply Article IV
which is limited to “Communist aggression”, “now that you are
friends.” Green said there has been no change and U.S. has record to
prove we mean what we say. This exchange led on to discussion of the
incorporation of the “five principles.” Green noted principles had al-
ways been unexceptionable, though propaganda environment at Ban-
dung had precluded U.S. acceptance in 1950s, and suggested we gain
in capacity to hold Peking to performance if we and Peking have stated
our agreed support for five principles. This caused Romulo to refer to
“U.S. interference” in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and Green to re-
spond with specific reference to U.S. action in response to legitimate
Cambodian call for help, including citation of even Sihanouk’s Octo-
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Philippines 529

ber 1969 complaint of North Vietnamese aggression. When ousted, Si-

hanouk was in fact enroute to Moscow and Peking for very purpose
of seeking their restraint on Hanoi’s agression.
G. Discussion of U.S. bases in Philippines in this full meeting was
brief, with Green stating in response to question there has been no short
or long range change in our assessment of their importance. Marcos
said he had asked Adm. McCain to obtain position on future of bases
from Washington. Green affirmed that U.S.-Philippine relationship is
unimpaired and he would so state to press on departure. Marcos ex-
pressed appreciation, noting irresponsible opposition effort in his Con-
gress and consititutional convention on this issue.
H. To request for U.S. position of ASEAN neutralization proposal,
Green said it is question for Southeast Asians to decide, U.S. consid-
ering it a worthy objective but noting many problems including es-
tablishment of adequate strength and stability to make it work.
I. Marcos expressed concern about Communist subversion.2
Green acknowledged this is still a competitive world, said U.S. does
not believe everything Peking says and will remain on its mettle and
alert. Consul General Osborn noted that Peking frequently opts for
diplomatic rather than military means of pressure when choice exists,
and Green suggested they likely will increasingly conclude that spon-
sorship of national liberation movements is not useful. Marcos repeated
his misgivings, looking ahead 10–20 years, and Green agreed it is im-
portant we all maintain adequate strength. He noted that overwhelm-
ing popular support in United States for President’s China policy
should strengthen his hand in Congress for totality of Pres. Nixon’s
policies and programs including adequate military aid.
3. Even after the foregoing and more, Marcos returned to theme
that he had to find out exactly where we stand. Southeast Asian lead-
ers expect him to be in the know about U.S. policy, “but I am not.” He
said, “If your policy is to withdraw from Asia, just inform us.” Green
responded that the President had personally charged him at end of
China visit to convey to Asian friends and allies that U.S. is not going
to leave western Pacific but rather find right way to remain. He said
we should be and act confident, that Peking might be hypocritical but
we stand to gain to extent Peking follows norms of international be-
havior. Urgent problems of environment, population, seabeds, and
outer space cannot be dealt with on global basis without including
China.

3
Telegram 1990 from Manila, March 4, reported Green’s conversation with Mar-
cos about Governor Romualdez’s trip to China, in which the latter queried Chou En-lai
about Chinese support of Maoist forces in the Philippines. (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POL PHIL–US)
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530 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Romulo initiated discussion on related economic questions, ask-

ing whether U.S. will shoot for retention of GRC in World Bank; Green
said U.S. will do what it can to support China in international finan-
cial institutions. Virata expressed concern about Phil problem in IMF
should GRC be dropped and Green said he believed U.S. should give
strong support. Virata requested U.S. decision as soon as possible. Sim-
ilar concern expressed about ADB, particularly as it is located in Manila.
Concerning trade, GOP leaders were informed PRC will henceforth be
subject to same restrictions as USSR and that we judge trade will be
limited and develop only slowly.
5. Toward end of discussion, Phils inquired about:
A. Peking view of Japan (we said Peking very worried about re-
vival of militarism, though in fact internal restraints in Japan against
militarism remain very strong);
B. Whether China still thinks in terms of encirclement (yes, but
Soviets have replaced U.S. as number one threat and China may begin
to perceive advantages in our overall posture of involvement);
C. PRC naval development (not yet a blue water navy). Phils
asked about following subjects which were identified as not having
been discussed during Peking visit: the ASEAN neutralization concept;
Quemoy and Matsu; seabeds; and the ADB.
6. Marcos took Green away for half hour’s private chat (septels).
Interval provided opportunity for remaining group to elaborate a num-
ber of points previously raised (e.g., dual representation). Romulo came
around to agree that U.S. and GOP position on Taiwan are the same,
when it was stated we favor peaceful solution to be worked out by
Chinese but will not yield to a forcible settlement.
7. As Marcos walked back with Green from private talk, he said
the meeting had been useful, that it is obvious we are on same wave
length, and that he was grateful to the President for sending Green to
visit.
8. Comment: Embassy will forward fuller assessment after reac-
tions to entire visit are registered. In brief, however, it is clear to us that
the deep doubts and suspicions Marcos aired are real, shared within
GOP as well as in increasingly noisy public discussion here. The re-
ported misunderstandings and disbelief were undoubtedly somewhat
exaggerated for test purposes and in an effort by Marcos to gather am-
munition for use with critics and doubters. Secretary Green gave him
plenty.
9. Dept repeat as appropriate.
Byroade
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248. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to

the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (Green)1

Washington, March 18, 1972.

SUBJECT
PARA Review—Philippines2

Pursuant to the review of February 10, 1972, following is a sum-

mary of our conclusions with respect to US policy toward the Philip-
pines for the FY 72 review period.
I. Action Items
1. There was agreement that to require the Philippines to deposit
10 percent of the value of US military assistance could endanger the
successful conclusion of our military base negotiations. The Depart-
ment, therefore, will seek to exempt the Philippines from this require-
ment. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs will be the action bureau.
2. EA will amend the background statement on the situation in
the Philippines (Annex I of country PARA document)3 to highlight fac-
tors which work for and against peaceful evolutionary change and re-
form of Philippine society.
On the assumption that the next five years may be a transition pe-
riod which will determine the future direction of change in the Philip-
pines, this revised statement, updated annually as part of EA’s PARA
procedures, will be given further consideration in future PARA reviews.
II. Policy Program Guidance
A. Overall Policy Posture (Issue 1)
The challenge for the US over the next five years—and so long as
the bases remain of fundamental importance to us—will be:
—to retain a satisfactory relationship with the Philippine Govern-
ment that will ensure continued availability of the bases; but
—to avoid giving the appearance in the Philippines that we are
wedded to a particular administration or are unsympathetic to the re-
quired basic reforms.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL–US. Secret.
2
The Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) study for the Philippines was
prepared in the Office of Philippine Affairs of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs in coordination with the American Embassy in Manila for consideration by and at
the request of the East Asian Interdepartmental Group (NSC: IG–EA).
3
See Document 246 and footnote 1 thereto.
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532 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

We have had some success in recent years in reducing Philippine

dependence on the United States. These efforts should be continued.
Accordingly, we should:
—Seek to reduce and eliminate the remaining elements of the “spe-
cial relationship” we have with the Philippines, emphasizing that ex-
cessive dependence on the United States is neither in the US nor Philip-
pine interest and that a policy based on mutuality of interest will
contribute to a healthier relationship.
—Continue to move as far as practicable from a bilateral to a mul-
tilateral framework in our dealings with the GOP.
—Keep our official presence to the minimum, consistent with our
basing requirements, eliminating operations that are not essential or
serve only marginal purposes.
B. Relations with Marcos (Issue 2)
Our relationship with Marcos should take into account his in-
creasingly controversial role in Philippine politics.
While continuing to work closely with Marcos as the elected Pres-
ident, we will have to avoid identification as partisans of Marcos, par-
ticularly with respect to a possible move by Marcos to extend his in-
cumbency beyond the present constitutional limit. (See III B below.)
C. Military Bases (Issue 3)
We should continue to avoid specific and public quid pro quo
arrangements because these would be more costly and difficult than
the present relatively modest military assistance program.
A tacit understanding has, in fact, long existed between the United
States and the Philippines that US military assistance is a quid pro quo
for otherwise rent free use of our bases. Neither country has wished,
however, to formalize this relationship into a specific agreement that
would formally tie MAP levels to US base rights.
To put the US-Philippine military relationship on a quid pro quo
basis would undermine the concept of mutual US-Philippine defense
interests in the area. Moreover, the Philippines would presumably seek
a substantial increase in military aid if they were to regard the defense
relationship in such stark terms, shorn of the long standing perception
of the bases as serving mutual security interests.
D. Military Assistance (Issue 4)
The United States should continue to concentrate its security as-
sistance on improving Philippine internal security capabilities.
The demands on the Philippine security forces are likely to in-
crease over the next several years, reflecting mounting unrest both in
the cities and countryside. There is no evidence at this time that we in-
cur any serious political liabilities from our rule in support of this
Philippine program.
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Philippines 533

This issue should be kept under review in the annual PARA

cycle.
E. Development Assistance (Issue 5)
The US should continue to coordinate its development assistance
through the IBRD-led Consultative Group and look to the IMF as
Philippines’ principal financial advisor.
Concentration of US aid efforts on rural development and popu-
lation problems seems appropriate to our desired posture in the Philip-
pines and to available resources. Short-term balance of payments sup-
port is also warranted.
F. Trade and Investment (Issue 6)
The review reaffirmed the position adopted in 1965 that we should
not seek an extension of the Laurel–Langley Agreement.
Accordingly, beyond 1974, the US should neither extend special
bilateral tariff preferences nor request parity (or equivalent) rights for
US business. At the same time, the US should try to persuade the GOP
that it is in the Philippines’ own interest to maintain a favorable cli-
mate for foreign investment.
In this connection, the review noted that those American firms that
will clearly be affected by the termination of the Laurel–Langley Agree-
ment have by and large accepted this fact and have made or are mak-
ing appropriate adjustments in the arrangements under which they op-
erate. Most US firms will probably be affected to some degree by the
termination, but the full impact on individual firms will not be known
until the courts have ruled on a number of legal questions. Estimates
of how much disinvestment may be required of US firms therefore vary.
According to a 1970 Embassy assessment, disinvestment (outright sale,
moving to minority equity position, sale of land in return for long-term
leases, etc.) might be somewhere around $160 million (out of a total
US direct investment of about $1 billion). Most American firms believe
that they will be able to make sufficiently satisfactory adjustments and
will probably continue to do business in the Philippines.
III. Policy Assumptions and Background (Issues 1 and 2)
A. The Policy Problem
Two assumptions set the framework for US policy in the Philippines:
—First, our military bases are of fundamental importance to the
United States, at least for the foreseeable future. In fact, the bases are
likely to become more valuable if US base rights are curtailed or re-
stricted elsewhere in the Western Pacific.
—Second, if basic political, economic and social reforms are not
soon forthcoming, internal unrest is likely to mount. While it is gen-
erally agreed that reasonable stability will probably be maintained over
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534 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the next four or five years, there is considerable doubt whether the
Marcos administration and its successor (most likely again controlled
by the oligarchy) will institute the extensive reforms that are necessary
to forestall rising internal unrest over the longer term.
At present the situation in the Philippines is mixed: forces of re-
form are gaining strength but are blocked by strong vested interests.
On balance, there is probably little the US can do directly to induce the
GOP to institute the required reforms.
B. The Problem of Marcos
Marcos is the first Philippine President ever elected to a second
term. Although it is charged that the Marcos machine committed ex-
tensive fraud and applied considerable pressure tactics, particularly in
the second term election, it is clear that in completely fraud-free elec-
tions Marcos would have been elected both times. Furthermore, Mar-
cos’ opponents are not entirely innocent of such practices.
Marcos has been one of the best Presidents the Philippines has had
in terms of constructive accomplishments; and he has been friendly to
the United States. Now, however, he has become a highly controver-
sial figure, partly because of his presumed (but publicly denied) desire
to continue as President despite the constitutional prohibition against
a third term.
Appropriate portions of this memorandum are intended as policy
guidance for the Bureau of EA.
Should the views of other agencies represented in the IG/EA re-
sult in conclusions by the Interdepartmental Group that depart sub-
stantially from this guidance, your Bureau is requested to bring these
to the attention of S/PC for a possible review by the NSC Under Sec-
retaries Committee.4
John N. Irwin II

4
Annex A, Indicator Resource Guidance, is attached but not printed.
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Philippines 535

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines1

Washington, May 13, 1972, 0058Z.

84423. For Ambassador from Assistant Secretary Green. Ref:

Manila 4379.2
1. While I can sympathize with your desire to challenge Aquino on
these matters,3 my own judgment would be strongly negative. His 44
points apparently lay out the foreign policy framework for his campaign
for a presidential nomination. As such, they are so drafted as to seem
more pro-Filipino than anti-American and leave plenty of room for ma-
neuver. While you are the better judge, I would imagine the points would
receive a good local press. Thus, I doubt we can gain much by attack-
ing him on these points, and we would run serious risk of appearing to
attempt to inject ourselves into domestic political conflicts.
2. His follow-up remarks on the relationship of the bases to the
Vietnam conflict is, of course, a different matter and distinctly un-
helpful. Nevertheless, I feel we must avoid public discussion of these
matters as much as possible. We have sent you our standard press guid-
ance in State 082955 and I believe we must adhere to that line, partic-
ularly at this time, and “no comment” any further detailed questions
or speculation on the role of the bases other than to refer to the
Bohlen–Serrano Agreement. We are sending a septel for your use with
Romulo, though I fear it is not much more forthcoming.
3. Finally, I am concerned about the nature of the attack you would
launch on Aquino. It seems to me he would almost have to categori-
cally deny its truth. The consequences of such a public confrontation
are hard to foresee but I cannot see how they would serve our inter-
ests. In this connection, we also have in mind the consequences that
followed from Bill Blair’s remarks directed towards Speaker Laurel.
4. All in all, I hope you will decide not to use the material.
Rogers

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by
Lowman, and approved by Green, Wilson, and Hummel.
2
Telegram 4379 from Manila, May 12, reported Byroade’s desire to reply to Philip-
pine Senator Aquino’s criticism of the U.S. military base in the Philippines. (Ibid.)
3
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Secretary-General of the opposition Liberal Party
and a leading contender for the Presidency in 1973, strongly criticized Philippine na-
tional security dependence on the United States, the status of U.S. bases in the Philip-
pines in general, and their use to support the war in Vietnam in particular. Airgram
A–170 from Manila, May 30, among other messages, describes Aquino’s policy initiative
and criticism. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL)
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536 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

250. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State

Manila, May 19, 1972, 0955Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret;
Immediate; Niact; Nodis. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State

Manila, May 25, 1972, 0803Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret;
Priority; Nodis. 8 pages of source text not declassified.]

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, June 2, 1970, 0900Z.

5107. Summary: Ambassador and EmbOff separately have had se-

rious talk with Senator Aquino about his current anti-American stance
and efforts to publicize and have investigated our usage of military
bases in the Philippines. While our previous analysis that Aquino’s ac-
tions are primarily for domestic political reasons still stand, it may be
that some of his actions have been based, at least in part, upon a mis-
understanding of facts or even miscalculation as to future U.S. policy
and posture in the Pacific area.
1. Department should probably know that I recently used fairly
strong words with Senator Aquino at a social affair. As I saw Aquino
coming through the receiving line for Army Secretary Froehlke at Lag-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PHIL–US. Confi-
dential. Repeated to CINCPAC.
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Philippines 537

dameo’s house, I began maneuvering to the opposite side of his group

of 120 guests as I had no desire to talk to him. Aquino, however, came
directly to me with a query as to whether I had seen his most recent
article. (I still do not know what he was referring to.)
2. Making certain that we were not overheard, I told Aquino I had
seen several of his other articles and letters which concerned me deeply.
I said I could only conclude that he had made some basic miscalcula-
tions based upon mis-information. I said I thought I detected in some
of his moves and words a feeling that we might lose in Vietnam. I told
him most emphatically that that was not the case. He said “But what
are you going to do?” I finally got his shifty eye and made it very plain
that we would do anything we had to do not to lose. He began to ap-
pear a bit uneasy and said, “But it is proven that the South Vietnamese
will not fight.” I told him there again he is quite wrong, saying that he
must be relying too heavily on press reports of sometime ago which
were in general quite distorted.
3. Being careful to remain courteous and polite, I told him that as
a distinguished Filipino citizen he was, of course, fully entitled to his
views, and of course to make them public. I said he must remember,
however, that we of course are entitled to our own feelings, and that
we could hardly help but be concerned that he would mount an ap-
parent attack on the use of our military bases at the very height of the
current intensified Vietnam conflict.
4. We then got more into details and at times it appeared that
Aquino was honestly surprised by some of the things I told him. For
instance, when he referred to GI’s loading bombs underneath airplane
wings at Clark I told him such reports were undoubtedly true. I said
he must know that Clark is utilized for gunnery training by air force
pilots both from the Philippines and other areas in the Pacific. The
bombs closely resembled real ones but were most often filled with
smoke marking material, concrete, etc. I said there had never been any
secret about such things, reminding him that Marcos and I over a year
ago had gone to Clark and handed the trophies to the Philippine air
force, who in that gunnery competition had won over our own air force.
I told him that he did not have to get conscientious objectors from Clark
before a foreign senate body to find out such things. I asked why he
did not ask Philippine pilots whose F–5–E’s are standing right next to
ours on the alert ramp at Clark. I had assumed he would know this, as
Clark is in his area, but he seemed flabbergasted. The conversation was
broken at this point as we were seated at different tables for dinner.
PolOff Ron Palmer was at Aquino’s table and he reported that Aquino
told him that he was quite shaken up over his conversation with me,
remarking that I had told him many things which he did not know and
seemed contrary to what he had heard. The conversation was quite ex-
tensive, with Palmer answering his questions frankly and openly.
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538 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

5. Aquino told Palmer that his experience at the Fuji Seminar on

Japan’s role in world affairs in the 1970’s in late March had had quite
an effect upon him. He said that Thanat Khoman and several other im-
portant people from the general area were there. He said it seemed to
be the majority feeling of the delegates that the U.S. was in fact headed
towards a “pull out” from the Asia area. He had thereupon begun to
think what the Philippines should do to get prepared for this type of
situation. Palmer reminded him that that conference was before Pres-
ident Nixon had shown the whole world, by a series of bold moves,
that the U.S. was not going to lose in Vietnam. Aquino admitted that
this was the case, but said that when he read the President’s conditions
for getting out of Vietnam (i.e., cease fire and return of prisoners only),
he had taken it as a clear signal that we were going to bug out. Palmer
replied that if he were more up-to-date on our massive actions re Viet-
nam, he probably would feel differently about it.
6. The evening ended with Aquino asking Palmer if he would be
willing to meet and talk about things some more. Palmer replied at the
time that he had enjoyed the conversation and would like to talk again.
I told Palmer the next morning he was free to do so. Now I find that
Aquino that same morning called long-time American resident, Dave
Sternberg, saying (falsely) that apparently doors in the Embassy were
closed to him and asking to see Sternberg.
7. There is no doubt in the minds of either Palmer or me that
Aquino took our conversation seriously. While our assessment of
Aquino’s motives previously reported remains unchanged, I am in-
clined to think that maybe he has not been as well informed as we gen-
erally assumed. The pace of his daily activities is so great that he may
not have spent the time on “facts” that we would have assumed.
8. In all of this, however, I find his remarks about the seminar in
Japan most interesting. I have not been so concerned of late about the
deleterious effect of the “American withdrawal” bugaboo that has con-
cerned me so much in the past. In looking back I guess I had assumed
that our present actions in Vietnam, beginning with the mine laying,
had laid this one to rest for the time being. I do not, of course, assume
for one minute that Aquino was necessarily telling the truth, while tac-
itly acknowledging his own ignorance, but on the other hand it would
probably be unwise to be too sure that he was not. We will be watch-
ing for his next public utterances with interest.
Byroade
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Philippines 539

253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

the Philippines

Washington, June 7, 1972, 1616Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC

Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

254. National Security Study Memorandum No. 1551

Washington, June 28, 1972.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines

The President has directed that a review of U.S. policies toward

the Republic of the Philippines be made. The study should identify ba-
sic U.S. interests in the Philippines. It should examine the implications
of the present situation in the Philippines for basic U.S. interests, and
the consequent U.S. objectives in furthering those interests over the
next five years. Lastly, it should delineate and examine the policy op-
tions open to the U.S. over this period.
The study should analyze factors and trends affecting U.S. inter-
ests and include consideration of:
—The political ambitions and intentions of President Marcos and
opposition groups.
—The growth of Philippine nationalism, its manifestations in the
Constitutional Convention, and its likely effects on U.S. military base
agreements, investment and trade.
—The political role of the Philippine Armed Forces.
—Philippine perception of and reaction to the Nixon Doctrine and
to U.S. policy toward the PRC, Japan and other nations of East and
South East Asia.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Sub-
ject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret.
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540 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—The economic situation in the Philippines.

The study should include consideration of the following policy
issues and their interrelationship as they affect U.S. interests and
objectives:
—Continued access to U.S. military bases in the Philippines. (In
this connection, what should be the relationship to continued base ac-
cess of (a) U.S. military assistance, and (b) the continuation of the pref-
erential provisions of the Laurel–Langley Agreement?)
—Continued liberal access to the Philippine market for U.S. traders
and investors, and reasonable protection for existing U.S. private in-
vestment in the Philippines.
—Particularly in relation to the foregoing two issues, (a) to what
extent should we preserve our “special relationship” to the Philippines;
and (b) should the U.S. take a position as regards the Constitutional
Convention and the development of a new Constitution?
—U.S. role as regards:
—Philippine efforts to maintain internal stability and a satis-
factory level of economic development. (As regards internal sta-
bility, what should be the U.S. role vis-à-vis Philippine internal se-
curity policy and operations? As regards economic development,
what should be the U.S. role vis-à-vis external aid and economic
development, what should be the scale and direction of our aid
programs, and what should be the areas reserved for multilateral
programs?)
—Philippine efforts to play a constructive regional role in
Asia.
—As it relates in particular to the foregoing issues, how far should
we go in limiting our identification with the present administration
and its policies?
The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental
Group for East Asia, and should be submitted not later than July 31,
1972 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.2
Henry A. Kissinger

2
The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs completed its first draft of working
papers in response to NSSM 155 on July 28, and the Embassy provided its input in
telegram 7578 from Manila, August 15. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1
PHIL–US) The Senior Review Group met on December 1 to discuss NSSM 155. (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box
H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, Philippines, Dec. 1, 1972) NSSM 155 resulted in NSDM
209, “U.S. Policy Towards the Philippines,” March 27, 1973, and will be covered in For-
eign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–12.
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Philippines 541

255. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, July 6, 1972, 0425Z.

6169. Subj Ambassador Has Frank Discussion with President Mar-

cos on Recent Trends in US-Phil Relations. Ref Manila 5211.2
1. Summary: I saw Pres. Marcos July 5 to inquire about signifi-
cance of GOP foreign policy developments of past month for future
US-Phil relations. Marcos said no fundamental shifts have taken place,
but acknowledged things have gotten out of hand and need cooling
off. Marcos accordingly suggests putting off final stage of negotiations
on US-Phil security and economic matters until early 1973.
2. I told Marcos during call July 5 that I was beginning to get ques-
tions from Washington regarding the foreign policy of the Philippines
that I could not answer and hence felt it necessary to seek his own
views. I told him that in the past three or four weeks it would be ap-
parent to any observer that the Philippines is in the process of rather
drastically changing their policies. Marcos said he would welcome my
questions.
3. I said that in looking back to the period immediately following
our meeting recorded on television (reftel) on the subject of our mili-
tary bases, this subject had become highly publicized and somewhat
emotional. Furthermore, the start of the campaign had seemed to be
officially inspired. I reminded him that the very next day there were
many items in the press quoting “official sources” or “sources close to
Malacanang.” I reminded him also that the Daily Express (his own pa-
per) had headlines the next morning “FM–U.S. Bases Must Go!” since
that time there had been much pro and con debate about the Philip-
pines leaving SEATO, etc. I paused for his reaction and he asked that
I continue.
4. I said these things concerned us primarily because the things
that seemed to be under debate were very fundamental indeed, as they
all dealt in one way or the other with the military strength of the United
States and its deployment overseas. I said that I thought when Romulo
talked about the new “realities” in world affairs, that he left out many
very important things. I said one reality, as an example, was that Pres-
ident Nixon in an election year was asking for a considerably expanded
defense budget. I said that our administration was determined that U.S.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2
Dated June 2. (Ibid.)
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542 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

strength would not fall below that of the Soviet Union, although we
would, of course, do this in ways that would not violate our new SALT
agreements, providing they were also lived up to by the Soviets. We
hoped that further agreements could be reached with the Soviet Union,
but this probably would be unattainable if we dealt from a position of
weakness. It is in this context, I said, that we could hardly fail to be
concerned at talk from one of our friends and allies of changes that
might well significantly affect our force posture, which we consider not
only important for ourselves, but for our friends and allies as well.
5. Marcos said he wanted me to know that there had been no such
fundamental shift in his own thinking. He agreed, however, that things
had gone a bit far and thought it was time that he moved to “take some
steam” out of these issues. He said he was sure that I knew the Fil-
ipinos well enough to realize, however, that negotiations are usually
approached with outlandish first positions. I said I realized this, and
was sure that some of his advisers would urge such a stance to make
the price go up. Marcos quickly interjected that he didn’t subscribe to
that tactic(!). I said the trouble with such an approach was that by the
time a sensible compromise had been reached, it could produce a sit-
uation where the new agreement would be criticized as being no good
because the Philippines did not gain their maximum position. He said
he realized such dangers and would exert such control as he could.
6. I told him I had been wondering also about timing and tactics.
I said I had been concerned of late that he might publicly nominate
high-powered panels, including members of the Senate and the House,
which I did not see how we could match in our current election process.
He said he realized that. Suddenly he said, “I think this whole thing
is getting out of hand. Why don’t we just delay everything until early
next year.” He said he had thought about trying to bring things to a
head with a state visit before our elections, but he realized it was get-
ing too late for that, and besides his government was not prepared on
its part for such rapid action. I told him that there were some matters
on our side that I doubted we could get in shape as well before No-
vember. There seemed to be agreement between us that a good time
to bring things to a head would be somewhere around February or
March. To delay much longer than that would be getting too close to
elections here. He said maybe panels should be appointed in Decem-
ber. I told him that this seemed a good idea because there was a great
deal of work involved and it might take two or four months to get
everything in shape.
7. Marcos then asked about our “new” disclosure that we were
just going to let Laurel–Langley die without being willing to talk about
it. I told him that that revelation, sometimes labeled as a leak on our
side, had appeared in so much of the press the same day that I can
only conclude that it had been inspired by someone, as there had been
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Philippines 543

no recent decisions or release of information on that subject from our

side. It was apparent in his remarks that he would be considerably dis-
turbed if the United States position were that we would refuse to talk
about any follow-on to Laurel–Langley.
8. Marcos asked if he had dispelled some of my concerns. I replied
that he had. He said, “Well, then let me go all the way.” He said to tell
the truth he hadn’t been thinking at all about such things as military
bases, alliances, etc. He said that he was so deeply involved in so many
internal matters that he had perhaps relied too much on others were
distorting on the Philippine image (he explicitly named Romulo as be-
ing in favor of removal of our bases). He then went on to list at least
20 things he was working on and began to show some signs of frus-
tration that he couldn’t seem to get things done. (We have noticed our-
selves a slackening in Malacanang efficiency and morale.) He listed the
oil price problem here affecting our companies as one of the problems,
and I took a fairly strong line as this problem is, in fact, becoming in-
tolerable to our oil companies. He threw up his hands at one point say-
ing that the Philippines had loans, but was largely without well worked
out projects to take advantage of them. He began to show a somewhat
agitated state of mind over the magnitude of the problems facing him
personally. He did not mention, except once indirectly, domestic polit-
ical problems.3
9. Our talk, which is much longer that can be put in a message,
would seem to indicate that we are not about to be hit with some new
demand that would surprise us. (There will be a follow-up message,
however, recommending that with the short time we have to Decem-
ber or, even to March, we not relax with this new development, but
keep our own preparations going.) While this is a welcome develop-
ment, on the other hand, it is disconcerting to see Marcos personally
so perplexed about his problems.
Byroade

3
Telegram 5074 from Manila, June 2, reported Byroade’s conversation the previ-
ous week with Marcos about domestic and political problems in the Philippines, in which
the latter talked of the “great upsurge of communist insurgency threat in the country,”
adding that “he might have to reinstate martial law. He asked again if we would sup-
port him or at least not oppose him.” To this, Byroade said that he “mumbled that our
position on that had not changed, but added the hope that he would not find such a
move necessary as I thought it would clearly at this time tear the nation apart into op-
posing factions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 PHIL)
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544 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

256. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 15, 1972, 0942Z.

8734. Ref: Manila 8424.2

1. In order to deal with the obvious complexities of the develop-
ing situation in Philippines which we have been analyzing in our re-
cent series of cables,3 I should like to try to dissect the problem into
more digestible proportions. We might first of all separate things into
two categories: (1) The extension of Marcos in power by political means
which are permissible under the Constitution, and (2) Extension in
power by such means as martial law. There was no hint of the latter in
his talk with Johnson, although he did list it as a possibility, in event
the situation so warranted, with Senator Inouye.4
2. Barring unforeseen circumstances, I believe that Marcos can ex-
tend himself by constitutional means without our support, which, of
course, he would not ask for unless he needed it. I believe he has the
capability, for instance, of getting the Constitutional Convention to ap-
prove the concept of a transitional government with him as head for
two years in preparation for a shift of parliamentary rule in 1975. He
could do this by securing support from all those in the present Legis-
lature who would be automatically extended, and bringing the Con-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2
Dated September 7. (Ibid.)
3
In addition to telegram 8424 from Manila, these included telegram 164964 to
Manila, September 9; telegram 8619 from Manila, September 13 (both ibid.); and telegram
8652 from Manila, September 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US)
The main issue of these telegrams was Marcos’ maneuvering to continue in power and
to gain the support of the United States for such a development. The telegrams also dealt
with economic issues, especially the ownership of property in the Philippines by Amer-
icans, including America-owned oil industry property and rights. Marcos intimated that
U.S. economic concerns would be best met by U.S. support of his political moves. U.S.
concern over the property rights of Americans in the Philippines was occasioned by a
court case called the Quasha decision which, according to telegram 164964, “would ap-
pear not only to deprive U.S. citizens of their right to continue after 1974 to own land
which they have acquired in good faith under Philippine law, but would also appear to
put into doubt the current validity of their titles to such land, including the ability to
convey good title to a would-be purchaser.” During the first week in September, how-
ever, the Marcos-dominated Supreme Court overturned the Quasha decision, a move
which Byroade theorized in telegram 8424 may have been one of Marcos’ “first big moves
to get our blessing, or at the minimum our acquiescence, to his extension in power.”
4
According to telegram 8424, Senator Inouye gave Byroade an oral report of his
“considerable time alone with Marcos.” Inouye said that Marcos had given him a long
statement as to why it would be good for the Philippines if he remained in power. No
other record of Inouye’s meeting with Marcos was found.
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Philippines 545

stitutional Convention (ConCon) body into the transition government

to satisfy the appetities of its members there who are eager to run for
public office. He could also bring drafting of the Constitution to an
early enought conclusion, I think, so that (if approved by plebiscite)
the parliamentary system would go into effect with national elections
set for November 1973.
3. Having the ability to accomplish some combination of the
above, I think Marcos will not ask for our help. He would only be in-
terested in whether we would oppose him or try to thwart his plans.
This may seem rather far fetched to non-students of the Philippines.
But notwithstanding proponents of low profile, the position of the Pres-
ident of the United States and his representative here is still absolutely
unique here as compared to other countries. A majority of Filipinos
would even at this point in time list my position (not me) as the sec-
ond most important position in the Philippines. A minority, although
sizeable, would still list it as the most important. With these consider-
ations in mind, and Marcos knows them well, our attitude on any given
question is still a very important factor.
4. If Marcos wants to extend by constitutional means, and we in-
tervene, (which I think we would not at this point, all things consid-
ered) we might be in a position to buy considerable benefit to ourselves
by simply letting him know that we would not oppose in any way his
continuation in power by constitutional means. These matters, we
could say, are internal to the Philippines on which we would naturally
take no position or action. However, we would want to make clear at
the same time the importance we attach to the constitutional legality
of these means. All of this, of course, would be quite private, and Mar-
cos would want it that way.
5. At the same time we should have no hesitation at all to ask him
to take specific steps in the interest of our mutual business relation-
ships, which after all are basically good for the Philippines. Nor do I
think it outside the realm of possibility that we might get a good share
of them. Montelibano (principal spokesman for the sugar industry), for
instance, and I think with the President’s blessing or at least knowl-
edge, is openly advocating an extension period of 10 to 15 years for
the transition of American interests (Laurel is saying this very pri-
vately). I believe that this goes byeond his own interests in the sugar
quota. I think Montelibano is convinced along with many others that
any quick transition will end up in drastic deterioration of the Philip-
pine economy.
6. I am in favor of the proposition of getting what we want now,
while Marcos is legitimately in power, in the nature of constitutional
provisions and laws which could be expected to extend beyond his
tenure. In my first two years here Marcos played quite above board
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546 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

with me, but this situation had deteriorated somewhat due to his
doubts that we can go along with his extension in power. My own at-
titude is that, if Marcos can keep his fingers crossed behind his back
while making agreements with us, so can we—and we can also judge
the future and our position completely in our own interests as time
passes.
7. If we are going to go down this route with Marcos, we will want
to broaden our support here as much as possible at the same time, and
not narrow it down to him personally. There are many in and out of
government who are vitally interested in the issues of trade prefer-
ences, sugar quotas, etc. I would say we should go ahead with the
above, we should find some way of getting trade preferences for the
Philippines, we should find some way of assuring them on sugar, and
we should go ahead with the new approach I have recommended in
the security field on military assistance. Incidentally, our recommen-
dations in the latter field do not in any way greatly enhance a military
capability that can be used against the Filipino people.
8. The second category mentioned above leads us into the ques-
tion of extension of power by extra-constitutional means. It should be
pointed out at the outset that a declaration of martial law, if carried
out for the purposes specified in the Constitution, is not in itself, of
course, an extra-constitutional step. It could become so if its purpose
is extension in power, which obviously is outside the spirit of the
Constitution.
9. I asked Marcos yesterday if he were about to surprise us with
a declaration of martial law. He said no, not under present circum-
stances. He said he would not hesitate at all in doing so if the terror-
ists stepped up their activities further, and to a new stage. He said that
if a part of Manila were burned, a top official of his Government, or
foreign ambassador, assassinated or kidnapped, then he would act very
promptly. He said that he questioned Communist capability to move
things to such a stage just now and asked my views. I said I thought
it a bit premature in their plans, but the present atmosphere undoubt-
edly increased their recruiting capability. He said 3,000 students were
no longer in greater Manila universities (implying they have allied
themselves with the dissidents—a figure we cannot sustain), and that
if it were inevitable he would just as soon see them go for big things
now in order to get this period of indecision over with!
10. Marcos could be encouraged in this course by a growing pop-
ular concern over the deteriorating law and order situation, particu-
larly on the part of the influential Philippine business leaders, as well
as government technocrats. The latter have felt for some months now
that a firmer hand at the tiller is necessary to control this situation and
the spreading corruption, as well as to remove political and legal ob-
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Philippines 547

stacles to greater social reform. A rather surprising number of people

seem to be in the mood of letting Marcos go ahead and take over with
the hope he can straighten things out. This does not mean any great
shift of popularity, although his position is somewhat better as reported
elsewhere than say three months ago. Rather it is more a philosophi-
cal resignation to “who else is there?” There is without doubt a grow-
ing feeling that social reform under the present system just may not be
possible. A legislature that represents the “status quo” will never agree
to meaningful reforms. Also, nearly every action, even including clear-
ance of obstacles from drainage canals which helped cause greater dam-
age in the recent floods, can be stopped by hundreds of court injunc-
tions. Among the articulate there is a growing feeling that revolution,
“from the bottom” is inevitable unless “revolution from the top” is
prompt and effective.
11. Romulo, in an amazing toast to the Korean Foreign Minister
recently compared progress in Korea with that in the Philippines in a
very unfavorable light for the latter. He concluded that under the pres-
ent system of “complete democracy” the Philippines would never be
able to keep pace with their Asian neighbors. On that same occasion
he put his hand on my shoulder and said that “your brand of democ-
racy clearly cannot get the Philippines out of its dilemmas and start
her on the road to real progress.” He said that our system was for de-
veloped countries and developing countries could not afford this lux-
ury. Later on I told him that in my opinion our brand of democracy re-
ally worked best while we were still in the process of development. He
said that his people were different and the Filipino would never get
out of their deterioration without a very strong hand to take them out.
12. Imposition of martial law, or an abandonment of the demo-
cratic constitution, would present us in America with a problem. Thai-
land, for instance, can change its governmental system with hardly a
ripple felt in the United States. I do not believe this would be the case
with regard to the Philippines, where we introduced our own brand
of democracy.
13. This message brings you up to date both on reporting and
analysis as we see things from here. We are working now trying to for-
mulate as specifically as we can what seems to be reasonable positive
action that might possibly be handled by the Supreme Court, the Leg-
islature, and the ConCon. When we get this to you, you may have an
easier task in providing Washington comments than has been the case
with our reporting so far.
Byroade
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548 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

257. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

A–244 Manila, September 21, 1972.

SUBJECT
Senator Aquino’s Views on Martial Law and the Political Future of President
Marcos

REF
Manila 87382

Summary
In a private conversation on September 12 with the Political Coun-
selor and another Embassy political officer Liberal Party (LP) Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. stated that he believed President Marcos would
declare martial law in order to stay in power. Aquino said Marcos is
faced with serious economic problems as a result of the floods and the
Quasha decision, which Aquino thinks will have a severe dampening
effect on foreign investment. With rapidly worsening law and order
and Communist dissident problems added to these economic woes,
Aquino believes that Marcos must take strong actions in the near fu-
ture and that these will include martial law. If the President follows
this course, Aquino said that, “for the good of the country,” he will
support Marcos. However, Aquino pointed out, martial law could back-
fire on the President, and Aquino expressed doubts that the GOP has
sufficient resources to carry out martial law successfully. As for his own
political ambitions, Aquino believes that the possibilities of his be-
coming head of government by legitimate means are quickly dimin-
ishing, and he is accordingly keeping open an option to lead an anti-
Marcos revolution in alliance with the Communists.3
During a protracted luncheon conversation with two Embassy of-
ficers on September 12, LP Secretary General Senator Benigno S.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 PHIL. Confi-
dential. Drafted by Political Counselor John D. Forbes on September 20, cleared by Po-
litical Officer George T. Kalaris, and approved by Maestrone. Also sent to Djakarta, Taipei,
Tokyo, Hong Kong, CINCPAC for POLAD, and CINCPACREPPHIL.
2
Dated September 16.
3
Aquino’s revelations about his meeting with Jose Maria Sison, Chairman of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist–Leninist
(CPP/ML), in which they discussed the possibility of forming a broad united front in
opposition to the Marcos administration, are reported in airgram A–245, September 21.
(Ibid.)
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Philippines 549

Aquino, Jr., a leading presidential aspirant and principal critic of Pres-

ident Marcos, expounded on his views of Marcos’ political future.
(Aquino’s comments on his connections with the Communists are re-
ported in a separate airgram.)
Aquino stated that he has no doubt that President Marcos intends
to remain in power. He was less certain of how the President would
do this. Presidential elections in 1973 seemed to Aquino to be low on
the scale of priority for Marcos; however, Imelda Marcos would almost
certainly win if she ran since the President could fill the ballot boxes
with fake votes and employ other illegitimate means of insuring her
success. As Aquino believes that the Liberals would be powerless to
prevent this from happening and could do little more than protest, Sen-
ator Aquino showed very little interest in his own ambitions for the
Liberal Party nomination next year. A second Marcos alternative is to
stay in office for two more years through the adoption of the synchro-
nization of elections in 1975 proposal that pro-Marcos delegates are
presently floating around Con-Con. But Aquino is unsure of Marcos’
ability to completely control Con-Con. He said that Marcos had spent
ten million pesos so far in his successful effort to control the Con-Con,
but, nevertheless, must be very disappointed with the relatively nar-
row margin in his favor in the recent vote defeating a draft provision
to ban him and his spouse from holding the positions of President or
Prime Minister (see Manila 8452).
Aquino believes that martial law is the most likely means Marcos
will use in order to stay in power. Aquino said that he would support
Marcos if this is the course he adopts. Since the law and order and eco-
nomic situation is deteriorating so rapidly, in Aquino’s view, the good
of the country requires strong measures on the part of the Central Gov-
ernment. The growing threat from the dissidents, the worsening law
and order problem, the serious economic setback that has resulted from
the floods in central Luzon and the probable ill effects of the Quasha
decision of the Supreme Court on the country’s foreign investment cli-
mate were cited by Aquino as reasons why stronger central govern-
ment action is needed. Such action means martial law. Were he Presi-
dent, Aquino indicated that he would not hesitate to take such strong
action and would, for example, execute several corrupt officials at
the Luneta Park in Manila as a lesson to other officials that he meant
business.
[Omitted here is discussion of Philippine politics.]
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550 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

258. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 21, 1972, 1011Z.

8936. Ref A. Manila 8424,2 B. Manila 8619,3 C. Manila 8734,4 D.

State 171335.5
1. Yesterday local [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] re-
ports began to be quite specific about the imminent imposition of mar-
tial law. On top of this Bob Wales of Mobile gave me in written form
his memo of conversation with Marcos the day before which generally
paralleled matters that Marcos had told Johnson of Caltex previously
reported. We are classifying these two documents and will send them
by pouch. For purposes of brevity, I will not herein summarize the
memorandum of Wales, except to report its last sentence which is as
follows: “Marcos ended up the discussion by saying that it would be
a tragedy if he had to declare martial law if he was not supported by
his ally, the United States”.
2. I decided I had no alternative but to undertake quickly the po-
tentially dangerous task of a real heart to heart with Marcos on issues
as delicate as his own plans and ambitions. Last night proved impos-
sible but I had a very long session with him this morning.
3. I told Marcos that to save time he should assume that I knew
in detail the important matters he had discussed with Johnson and
Wales, except possibly for company matters which were not my con-
cern. I said I did not believe he should place any blame on these two
individuals, as they were conscientious Americans who realized that
they were getting into matters of proper concern to me and to their
government. He said he understood this very well (I think it obvious
all along that he assumed they would talk to me).
4. I told Marcos that I was not seeing him for the purpose of
preparing a report for Washington. I said I had a message asking me
if I thought martial law was about to be declared, and whether we
thought it necessary. I said I did not come even specifically to talk abut
that, but on matters perhaps even more fundamental.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at
7:14 a.m.
2
Dated September 7. (Ibid.)
3
Dated September 13. (Ibid.)
4
Document 256.
5
Not found.
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Philippines 551

5. I said I was not under instructions and anything I might say

would at this point be just personal from me. My motive was to try to
achieve better understanding so that neither one of us might make a
major miscalculation. I said that if I did so, nothing more would hap-
pen other than I would get fired and go look for a new job, and his-
tory would in no way be changed. On the other hand, if he, as head
of state, were to make a miscalculation based upon some failure of mine
to communicate, this could turn out to be of real importance.
6. He asked what I had in mind. I replied, a great many things,
but I supposed we might just as well start with the question of mar-
tial law. He said he thought maybe we had better not discuss it directly,
because he had to remain in a position where he could say that he had
not accepted my advice. I told him that I was not in his presence to ad-
vise him on such a decision that only he can make, but I thought we
did have to discuss the matter and quite frankly. I told him that he
himself had told me that he might have to move if there were some
new and significant event. This could mean at any given time that we
might be only one day away. Also that one of his last remarks to Wales
had brought up the question of our support. Moreover, the question
had arisen as to whether New York could not urge more Washington
support for him and his government.
7. I said I thought it was necessary to reflect a bit on the obvious.
We did not have a dictatorship, but a big sprawling bureaucratic work-
ing democracy. I said that his brother-in-law’s idea of trying to sneak
into Washington under an assumed name and making a secret deal or
understanding with somebody after midnight went out of vogue about
the time of Teddy Roosevelt. I said that efforts on the part of New York,
even with our President, could turn out utterly fruitless provided
things happened where even our President could not get what he
wanted in the way of legislative support, etc.
8. I reminded him again that it was terribly important that he un-
derstands that it was only I, a friend, talking to him personally and
privately. In that context, I said I wanted to talk to him about the type
of things that cause me to pace the floor. He said he understood com-
pletely and I should go ahead without hesitation. I then reminded him
that we are in the wind-up phase of an extremely important election
campaign in our own country. I said I thought McGovern would seize
on anything like a military takeover in the Philippines in an effort to
use it as the final proof of his charge that the foreign policies of Nixon,
particularly in the Asian area, were a total failure. I said I thought he
would scream that “even the Philippines” had been so badly messed
up that the very form of government which we instituted here was
now in the hands of military dictatorship, supplied by our equipment.
He would probably try to make a major thing of it, proving that this
was the beginning of another Vietnam “even in the Philippines.” I said
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552 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I know Nixon pretty well, and I thought he would be greatly upset if

the Philippines gave the appearance of blowing up in his face at a time
like this. I returned to the idea that our hands could become so tied up
that as a practical fact we couldn’t do any of the things we really wanted
to do for the Philippines.
9. Marcos said he had made no decision to move towards martial
law, and he had never considered anything beyond that, such as mil-
itary rule. He did admit, however, that planning for martial law was
at an advanced state. He said that under any conditions he could fore-
see he would not consider any extra-constitutional moves in the Philip-
pines. We then got into a discussion as to what type of events had to
happen under the Philippine Constitution wherein it would be consti-
tutional to declare martial law. He concluded that words might have
a different meaning for us and the Philippine Constitution was per-
haps broader in this respect than our own.
10. At one point I said maybe we needed his help and the help of
his intelligence people, as it was obvious that he and they must know
many things in this country that we could not know. I said it was diffi-
cult for us to start off with a band of armed men numbering somewhere
around a thousand, mostly in the Hills and, with assumed figures as to
the extent of their base and mass support, to conclude that the Philip-
pine Government was in danger of being toppled. He said that, of
course, was true, and he did not consider the government to be under
that threat at the present time, but he said the very effectiveness of gov-
ernment was threatened and that was enough for him to move legally.
11. Marcos told me at one point that guns were not the answer.
He said he did not mean that over the long haul that the Philippines
did not need adequate military forces. He then went into quite a bril-
liant description of the state of things in the Philippines and the ab-
solute necessity for social reform. He said after all of his years in gov-
ernment, including seven in the Presidency, that he did indeed question
the ability of the Philippines to achieve adequate reforms in time un-
der the present system. His descriptions of its evils, and graft and cor-
ruption, of the impossibility of getting adequate legislation, and ade-
quate resources for desperately needed reforms could hardly have been
equalled by any harsh critic of this country. It is hard to escape [gar-
ble] that he thinks that his place in history might be made if he had
the power of drastic reform. He might even see at this point this is his
only route to regain his popularity even to the point where he could
win handily in a future election, although he made no reference to ei-
ther of these thoughts.
12. We then went on in an unusually relaxed and friendly session,
even for us, to discuss many other things which will be reported sep-
arately, and with different classification.
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Philippines 553

13. As I was about to leave he suddenly changed the subject and

said “how long is it to your elections?” I said, “about six weeks.”
14. Whether or not I have succeeded in at least postponing new
developments here until after our elections, I do not know. I ask White
House tolerance in tossing around the name of our President so freely,
but it was my judgment that I should pull out all stops on this one.
Byroade

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 22, 1972, 0945Z.

8989. Ref: Manila 8875.2 Subj: Talk with Marcos on Economic

Issues.
1. Marcos told me Sept 20 that he wanted me to know that, in
spite of all his other problems,3 he was still devoting considerable time
and study to our own problems. He then talked with great knowledge
about the problems created by the recent Supreme Court decisions, etc.
He made a number of very interesting statements.
2. He said he was not calling Congress back immediately for an-
other much needed session, even though an extremely important bill
had not been passed, as he did not want to risk any legislation just
now on questions such as parity, or even efforts aimed toward getting
legislation which would keep the waters muddy.
3. He said he was slowly coming to the conclusion that the
Supreme Court itself should correct some of its decisions, and that this
might be the best route to try to proceed. He asked what I thought of
SC action which would clear the titles of American-owned land as far
as individuals are concerned, but not insofar as the state was concerned.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret;
Priority; Exdis.
2
Not printed.
3
In telegram 8990 from Manila, September 22, Byroade reported that there were
“several indications” that Marcos was “seriously considering martial law” as a possible
option “because of increasing violence such as continuation of current rash of bombings,
which would render effective operation of government either difficult or impossible.”
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far
East, Philippines, Vol. IV)
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554 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I said I didn’t understand him. He replied that owners of property

would be free to make any sale that they wanted to and the govt would
then be free, through legislation, to spell out the ground rules for the
future. He said this would get the matter back to being the subject of
negotiations between two govts, where it belonged in the first place
and not in the courts. We could then agree on such matters as a rea-
sonable transition period, etc. I think he has in mind here something
like a conveyance to the state or possibly escheat at the end of an agreed
transition period, if private sales have not been made by that time. He
may need something like this to get the Court or the Congress to go
along with a stretched out transition. I said on first thought his sug-
gestion seemed to hold promise. I felt, however, his choice of words
wasn’t very good as the average person would conclude from the man-
ner in which he had used the word “state” that perhaps confiscation
would be the end result. He said he had nothing like that in mind what-
soever. I said that I thought wording was important as under his pro-
posal some time would elapse when people wouldn’t know what was
going to happen. He said this deserved thought.
4. I asked if he would consider separating out the Luzon Ste-
vedoring case and consider quick legislation for its correction. He said
this was a bad case, indeed, and had to be corrected without too much
delay. He said he thought it best, however, that the SC itself correct it,
as the court had made a great error in extending its decision way be-
yond what the case before it called for. He said he thought the SC
should reverse itself and allow foreign participation in boards of di-
rectors. If that was not corrected the Philippines would never get any
foreign investment. I agreed. I asked if he could broaden this to include
executive management. After some discussion he said he didn’t really
know, but it was worth studying as he agreed that in some cases, such
as advanced technological enterprises, it would be an asset to have for-
eign executive management.
5. Marcos said he thought some parts of the retail trade problem
could be handled by legislation. His tentative thought was that the term
“retail trade” should be redefined by Congress (perhaps by amending
the Retail Trade Act which reserves retail trade to Filipinos but is vague
about defining “retail”) and at least make exception for bulk transfers
to commercial outlets, which would take care of our oil companies and
a number of others who sell (wholesale in our practice) directly to re-
tailers (rubbers, drugs, etc.).
6. I told him that we had some thoughts of what might seem rea-
sonable and fair on all these matters and I wondered if he would mind
receiving them from me. He said he would welcome that. I asked if
there was anyone else in his government that it would be useful for us
to have sessions with. He said he thought that he and I had better do
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Philippines 555

it. He said the only two working with him on these matters were the
Secretary of Justice and the Solicitor General (a good team). He said
things were very delicate, and he even had to work indirectly through
friends with the Court.
7. I told Marcos I remained extremely concerned about draft eco-
nomic provisions in the steering committee at the ConCon. I said if
these provisions were ever calendared we would all be in a real mess,
as the parliamentary procedures in that body would mean that all these
provisions would have to be changed line-by-line or even word-by-
word through lengthy floor debates that would be emotional and could
go on for a long time as well as come out in the wrong place.
8. Marcos then launched into quite an exposé on the ConCon. He
said if they could move promptly, which he thought they couldn’t, this
could be a way they could handle some of the needed reforms in the
country. He said it was such an unruly mess, however, that he had just
about concluded that they would not finish their job in time for the ‘73
elections (quite a significant statement). When we finally got back to
the provisions that I said worried me, he said he would do what he
could to get the various provisions referred back to organic commit-
tees and out of the steering committee.
9. I said we were all in a box on these issues. On the one hand it
was extremely important that our business interests see some sign of
movement, and I dreaded the thought of a long period of no apparent
motion. I said at least I could let the word get out that we were talk-
ing, but there wasn’t much I could pass along of our private talks.
10. It is encouraging that Marcos was this forthcoming on our in-
vestment issues. He was obviously prepared, as he asked me Septem-
ber 19 on the phone if I wanted Abad-Santos or Mendoza at our meet-
ing. I said “no” because I wanted to discuss quite delicate matters
(reported separately).
11. I want to keep working with him on these matters in confi-
dence, and things have now reached the point where, as suggested in
Manila 8875, I need to get as many as possible of our needs in front of
him. An early answer to this reftel would therefore be greatly appre-
ciated.
Byroade
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556 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

260. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, September 23, 1972.

SUBJECT
Philippine President Imposes Martial Law

President Marcos imposed martial law throughout the Philippines

at midnight September 22. He proclaimed it officially at mid-day Sep-
tember 23, according to press reports, saying that it did not involve
military rule and that civilian government would continue. We do not
yet have the text of the proclamation, and thus do not at this point
know its specifics, particularly as to whether Marcos suspended the
Congress.
The situation at present is as follows:
—Numerous arrests of Marcos’ critics have reportedly been made,
according to Embassy Manila, including opposition Liberal Party Sec-
retary General Aquino (whom Marcos recently accused of conspiring
with the Communists), several other opposition politicians, and Manila
Times editor Roces and several other journalists and commentators.
—All television stations and most radio stations have been closed,
and no major newspapers appeared the morning of September 23. Ra-
dio stations are broadcasting no news.
—Domestic commercial flights have been cancelled, and Filipinos
are allowed to board international flights only upon government
permission.
—International cable and telephone traffic has been suspended.
—No U.S. citizens are known to be involved or endangered.
Background
Marcos’ action followed an assassination attempt the evening of
September 23 against his Defense Secretary in which no one was in-
jured and the attackers were not apprehended. This attempt climaxed
a two-week rash of urban bombings of government buildings, which
have been somewhat unusual in that all occurred at night and very
few have been injured. (Embassy Manila reports that public opinion
remains about evenly divided as to whether these have been perpe-
trated by left extremists or staged by the government.)2 These acts have
occurred against a backdrop of a steady growth over the past three

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Coun-
try Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig signed
for Kissinger. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2
In telegram 9087 from Manila, September 25. (Ibid.)
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Philippines 557

years of rural insurgency—and more recently urban terrorism. Our Em-

bassy believes that this increasing violence could render continued ef-
fective government difficult or impossible, but could not threaten its
existence.
President Marcos’ ambition to hold onto the Presidency after his
constitutional limit of two terms runs out at the end of next year is
well known. In this context, and as his first-term lustre as a reform
president has dulled, he has constantly underlined the deteriorating
security situation as posing a need for a strong leader and improved
discipline. He is assisted in this by a growing public concern, especially
among influential Filipino businessmen and government technocrats,
over the declining civil order. Particularly the latter believe that badly-
needed reforms are now possible only under strengthened govern-
mental controls.
Likely Filipino Reaction
Embassy Manila estimates that the country will react with resigned
acceptance, after the initial shock and uproar.3 Criticism of Marcos’ ac-
tion would diminish particularly if there is early evidence of move-
ment toward meaningful reform. The Embassy believes that martial
law could not be maintained over a long period without either a grad-
ual return to normal constitutional rule or a drift toward more au-
thoritarian forms. We believe that continued tight prohibition of dis-
sent normally vented through the political opposition and media,
important safety valves for the volatile Filipinos, would generate po-
tentially dangerous political and social pressures.
Implications for U.S. Interests and Our Position
At least in the short term, martial law should pose no direct seri-
ous problems for U.S. security and economic relations with the Philip-
pines. In fact, the climate for individual business operations might even
be improved.
As to our position, I believe we should refrain from comment on
Marcos’ action, regarding it as a Philippine matter.4 This stance may
well be interpreted as tacit U.S. support for Marcos’ move, and result
in criticism of us, particularly if Marcos does not make good use of his
increased authority and the situation deteriorates. On the other hand,
Marcos probably will appreciate such a stance on our part, and this
should result in his continued cooperation in our maintaining effective
access to our bases in the Philippines and his assistance in resolving
U.S. private investment problems resulting from last month’s Quasha

3
In telegram 9087 from Manila, September 25. (Ibid.)
4
A notation in Nixon’s handwriting next to this sentence reads: “K—Low key it.”
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558 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

decision. As you will recall, we are reviewing our Philippine policy in

NSSM 155,5 and expect to forward policy options to you in the near
future.

5
The NSSM 155 study was completed in early 1973 and resulted in NSDM 209,
“U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines,” March 27, 1973. See footnote 2, Document 254.

261. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, September 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
President Marcos and the Philippine Investment Climate

PARTICIPANTS
Tristan Beplat, Vice President Manufacturers Trust and President Philippine
American Chamber, New York
Harold Smith, Hanover Manufacturers Trust
Max Ansbach, Colgate
Harding Williams, Del Monte
Herman Barger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Shepard C. Lowman, EA/PHL

At their request, a delegation from the Philippine American Cham-

ber of Commerce in New York called on Mr. Barger to express their
concern and views with reference to recent events in the Philippines.
Mr. Beplat was the primary spokesman for the group.
Beplat first sketched briefly the recent events affecting the busi-
ness climate in Manila. These included the Quasha case, the Lusteveco
case, and the threat to declare the oil companies a public utility. He
sees all of these actions as essentially political in nature, designed to
bring pressure on the US to be responsive to President Marcos’ re-
quirements. Beplat does not, however, believe that the Philippines de-
sires to drive away American business. To the contrary, he and others
have been talking with senior Philippine officials recently, including
Executive Secretary Melchor, Secretary of Finance Virata and Governor

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret.
Drafted by Lowman and approved by Barger. The meeting was held in Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary Barger’s office.
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Philippines 559

of the Central Bank Licaros, who are presently in the US. As a result
of these conversations, he believes the GOP continues to desire Amer-
ican investment. Chamber members will be meeting with these tech-
nocrats in New York next week to discuss current problems. Governor
Licaros specifically requested that Beplat invite representatives of 30
banks, with loans to the Philippines totalling $225 million, in order that
he might have an opportunity to reassure them as to the future course
of the Philippines.
Nevertheless, Beplat feels we have problems, arising from President
Marcos’ problems which include 1) how to continue in office after 1973,
2) growing levels of communist terrorist activities, and 3) a recalcitrant
Congress which frustrates Marcos’ efforts to obtain reform legislation.
Beplat believes that Marcos has now made the decision to carry
out a program against communist subversion; that this decision will
be a major fact of life in the Philippines, regardless of our assessment
of the necessity for such a decision; that Marcos will be expecting and
demanding various forms of US assistance in carrying out such a pro-
gram to include additional military assistance, perhaps in the form of
helicopters and other aircraft, as well as increased economic assistance
to underpin the social reforms which Marcos plans to undertake as a
part of his overall program to deal with the insurgency. Given the
Philippine balance-of-payments problems, Beplat suggests that US aid
might be necessary for the success of such reforms.
During this meeting, Beplat repeatedly reverted to the theme that
Marcos expects to get additional assistance from the US because his
need is great and because he believes that we are paying much larger
sums for base rights to countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ethiopia.
Regardless of whether the US feels it may be supplying adequate as-
sistance to the Philippines at this time, the fact is that Marcos feels that
the Philippines is being treated badly. It is given a separate aid cate-
gory from base rights countries. It is shortchanged with respect to avail-
abilities of excess defense articles and, generally, the Philippines in-
surgency is not taken seriously. Marcos had noted that when he sent
his brother-in-law, Governor Ben “Kokoy” Romualdez, to the US to
discuss such matters that Kokoy had returned with the report he had
been given a run around; that nobody believes him.
Beplat said he presumed discussions were under way in Manila
on these subjects. He alluded to the fact that Marcos had spoken very
frankly and bluntly to some US business representatives in Manila.
Marcos is deadly serious in his intent to stay and play his hand out in
the Philippines and the economic aspects of US-Philippine relation-
ship will not be settled unless the political aspects are. If Marcos goes
down or things get rough in the Philippines, US business will suffer
and other US interests will suffer as well. If we want to stay in the
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560 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Philippines, we must pay the price and quickly. While Marcos under-
stands politics and would not press for a final resolution of these ques-
tions before the US elections, we should be prepared to be forthcom-
ing within a short time thereafter.
Beplat closed his presentation by stating that US business wishes
to express its strong concern about the drift of events in the Philippines
and to express its belief that the USG has to take action on these mat-
ters; something must be done and the USG would make a very seri-
ous error if it tried to handle these problems in a passive manner. If
something is not done soon, the Chamber is going to form a delega-
tion of their senior officials from senior companies and come back to
Washington to see President Nixon.
Mr. Barger asked Mr. Beplat if what he was making was a specific
policy recommendation to which Mr. Beplat replied in the negative.
Mr. Barger pointed out that an expression of strong concern was one
thing but a specific recommendation that we must accede to the de-
mands of President Marcos would be something else again. In response
to this, Mr. Beplat reiterated that he was not making such a policy rec-
ommendation; that it was up to the State Department how to best han-
dle this matter, but that something must be done soon.
Mr. Barger pointed out that a major concern of ours was that the
Philippines not reach a point of no return through acts which might
cause US companies to bring pressure on the Congress to cut off aid
or the Philippine sugar quota or through actions by the GOP which
would trigger such automatic legal sanctions as those in the Hicken-
looper and Gonzales amendments and sugar legislation with respect
to expropriatory situations. He felt that this was a message which US
business might usefully convey to the technocrats. Mr. Barger added
that it seemed to him that we would not wish to get into a stance where
the expectation in the Philippines is that the way to do business with
the US is to squeeze the US investors in the country to obtain ever new
US Government concessions. In the long run, such a situation would
be in no one’s best interest.
In closing, there was a brief discussion of why Marcos would jeop-
ardize the major interests that the Philippines has in its close economic
relationships with the US for the sake of gaining necessarily limited mar-
ginal increments to US assistance. In this connection it was pointed out
that the United States already provides very substantial levels of aid, both
for regular programs and in response to emergencies such as the flood.
In response to the query, Beplat seemed to be saying that Marcos
understood the value of the economic relationship with the US, but
that he would have to go all out on the difficult course on which he
was embarked and that, if he failed, chaos would follow which would
be bad for all.
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Philippines 561

262. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, September 27, 1972, 0420Z.

2
9155. Ref: Manila 9147.
1. This man Marcos is a chess player, par excellence. It is usually
possible to predict that he will choose as his next move one of two or
three options that seem open to him—yet we cannot be certain just
which one of these the next sealed envelope will contain.
2. You should read above reftel which describes Marcos’ interview
with Durdin of New York Times that he has decided to settle our in-
vestment problems in the Philippines by Presidential decree. We have
speculated here in my staff that Marcos might in fact make this move.
It would tend to prove to the opposition party and all else concerned
that he had our backing in his declaration of martial law. Any dis-
claimer by us, other than out-right public denunciation of him (ab-
solutely out of the question at this time in our own best interests) would
be entirely futile. We have almost come full-circle in the scenario dis-
cussed with my staff immediately following the Supreme Court deci-
sion re Quasha as reported in Manila 8424 of Sept 7.3 There have been
deviations along the way, including some alteration of time tables, but
the basic theme therein remains.
3. While it would be a great relief to see our investment problems
solved, or greatly eased, I cannot help but have mixed feelings over
the fact that Marcos would proceed on these fundamental matters by
Presidential decree. If he could have maneuvered the Supreme Court
into handling at least two of these problems in our behalf, it would
have been much better for us. Had he done so, of course, only a very
few of my staff and the readers of these restricted series of messages
would have known that he was our benefactor. For the viewpoint of
Marcos, with his desire for our continued acquiescence to his recent
moves, and with the hope that we could move quickly to full support,
this probably was not good enough. He would conclude that he should
move now, without any other quid pro quo, to obtain this type of sup-
port in New York and head off opposition from our Executive Branch
and perhaps our Congress.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2
Telegram 9147 from Manila, September 27, reported Marcos’ decision to settle
some of the economic issues with the United States by Presidential decree. (Ibid., RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US)
3
Not printed. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country
Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV)
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562 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. The decrees that he will make will predictably be sensible and

good in themselves even for the Filipinos, as they will clear the air of
very real recent obstacles to the future of foreign investment, not only
our own, in the Philippines. But in doing it in this way, if Marcos fails
in his efforts over, say, the next year, conditions might be such that any
successor government might well reverse with vengeance every decree
that he had made. Thus he has made one more very effective move in
keeping our fortunes tied together.
Byroade

263. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the

Department of State1

Manila, October 2, 1972, 1042Z.

9362. 1. I am fully aware that this highly restricted channel should

not be overdone, and hope things will develop so that perhaps this can
be the last in this series for a while.
2. This message is to state that, both in my own opinion and that
of my entire senior staff, we believe that we should now consider very
seriously whether we have any sensible options left other than to ac-
cept and—in so doing—to assist as we can the effort by Marcos to build
a “new society” in the Philippines. Our general reporting had indicated
widespread local acceptance of his announced intentions and first firm
steps in the direction of achieving reforms, registered in almost all lev-
els of society here. What has been missing so far is any specific indi-
cation of the position we felt the USG should take in this matter. This
is quite proper up to a point, but we are arriving at the stage where it
will be desirable, we think, for private indicators to begin to be given.
Also more and more—on a daily basis now—we are being faced with
decisions that will in one way or another give some clue to our view,
or, at least, be interpreted as such. As you will see later on in this mes-
sage I do not visualize the need for, or recommend, any U.S. public
statement of support.
3. The Liberal Party is in obvious disarray, with a sizeable group-
ing apparently ready to give public support to the measures Marcos is

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557,
Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.
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Philippines 563

taking. But lest anyone think we should be too concerned over the
plight of the opposition party, let me say the following: with the ex-
ception of a very few very solid people, patriots without doubt, the
rank and file of the Liberal Party are nothing one could pin any great
hopes on for the future of the Philippines. Were they in a position to
come into power—the chances of which are now remote (but weren‘t
good anyway)—this would not have represented a real hope of mov-
ing the Philippines toward meaningful reform. Dedicated as some very
few of its leaders are, they do not seem to have the strength and guts
to really control their followers. In general, a Liberal Party victory,
which I think very unlikely in the near future anyway, would in time
simply have renewed the old process of putting new hands in the till,
with disappointment again for real change in the Philippines.
4. I conclude now that we should quietly continue business as
usual with the GOP, including Marcos, watching all the while for any
abuse of his new powers. For the short term, at least, I feel almost cer-
tain he will not do so. He knows now, in my opinion, that he is liter-
ally on a “life or death” course. He also knows that our support for
meaningful social reform programs will be critical in the year ahead.
There is real question in our minds as to whether the GOP can muster
the minimum pesos for a sufficient effort without support from our
own planned expanded programs. They can, I think, get off to a good
start alone, but thereafter much will depend on us. At that time our
ability to perform would depend on active program planning now on
present programs and prompt consideration of such changes as we
may want to recommend.
5. For our part, I do not believe we should be impervious to the
apparent fact that a majority in this society have spoken out more
quickly than we anticipated along the lines of giving Marcos a chance
for meaningful social reform. Certainly we would not want doubts and
hesitations on our part to build up any belief that we do not want the
same thing for the Philippines. If reform can happen at least to the de-
gree that would preclude the label “failure” from resulting, it cannot
help but be beneficial to our own interests and future relations. And,
alternatively, if the current efforts of Marcos come to be labeled “fail-
ure” there would be the prospect of very serious troubles, indeed, in
the Philippines which could affect not only our business interests, but
also our security interests as well. It is worth noting in this connection,
that at least so far there has been no hint, in the trends that govern-
ment pronouncements are taking, to blame the past and present ills of
the Philippines on the foreigner, which has so often been the case in
underdeveloped countries around the world in efforts to move to re-
form their societies. Our own interest would seem to dictate that we
try to keep it this way.
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564 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

6. As I say, I don’t see the desirability of the USG taking any pub-
lic role in explicit support of Marcos, or even of publicly expressing
mild hopes that much needed reforms can come to the Philippines.
This could be useful to offset some quite unbalanced reporting by tem-
porary press visitors (in contrast to that of the wire services which has
been much better informed and balanced) but even so I don’t see such
a need to commit us. On the other hand, I think we are already in a
period where nothing positive in our programs should be held up in
a “wait and see” attitude. For instance, if it becomes possible to an-
nounce the grand aid reconstruction funds now being discussed with
our Congress—then I think we should go right ahead without delay.
This of course would be an indirect indicator, but even so it is for a
good and popular cause, and there can be no conceivable gain from
delay. Monies such as this are not actually spent in the very short term
anyway, and we will have opportunities along the way to delay or
withhold actual dispersement if things later on seem to be going sour.
7. I have had a fear that staff action in Washington on all matters
re the Philippines may be suspended due to uncertainty following the
declaration of martial law. I hope this is not the case, and at this point
we would like the record to show that we want this Mission’s recom-
mendations over the last few months to stand, and we hope staff work
can continue on them. I know some of these recommendations cause
you difficulty, but I want to repeat that as of now they still remain the
recommendations of this Mission concerning what we believe is best
for US interests. (We have the tape of Marcos’s talk with Till Durdin.
He still is planning an across-the-board broad scale talk early next year
with us on economic and security matters, as he told me some time
ago.)
8. In making your assessment of this situation, I suggest you keep
in mind that a long drawn out posture of “hesitation” on the part of
the United States would indeed be, or at least should be, considered
as an important and definite decision on our part. We may very well
soon want to adopt the posture, here at least, of pursuing every rea-
sonable avenue that may be available to us in trying to ensure that this
situation comes out right.
Byroade
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Philippines 565

264. Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note1

REAN–67 Washington, November 1, 1972.

The Philippines Tries One-Man Democracy

While there is nearly universal acclaim in the Philippines for the
abatement of crime and violence during the first five weeks of martial
law, Filipinos are waiting to see whether President Marcos really in-
tends to eliminate Communist dissidence and to fundamentally reform
Philippine life. Marcos’ security measures so far appear aimed more at
his own political opponents than at Communists, and his “reforms”
have been little more than conventional bids for popular support which
could have been initiated without martial law. The more radical part
of Marcos’ reform program has so far been largely hortatory, and noth-
ing he has yet done directly threatens the entrenched economic inter-
ests of the country’s oligarchy. What he clearly is doing is erecting a
one-man constitutional regime which permits him to stay in office in-
definitely, with almost unlimited powers, under a veneer of parlia-
mentary democracy. Marcos wants to have a new constitution com-
pleted and approved by the country within about three months, which
will enable him to control the government for several years without
having to call elections if he finds it inexpedient to do so.
[Omitted here is discussion section of Marcos’ one-man rule.]

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 PHIL. Secret; No
Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Analyst Edwin L. Barber and Director Paul M. Popple of
INR’s Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific on October 27.

265. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division,

Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
(Nelson) to the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee
(Ratliff)

Washington, November 3, 1972.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration In-

telligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Files, Philippines. Se-
cret; Sensitive. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
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Indonesia

266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, March 26, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

—Tour d’Horizon with President Soeharto: During Ambassador
Green’s farewell call, President Soeharto made a number of remarks
indicative of his present thinking:2
a. He thought that the USSR provided the principal pressure point
on Hanoi for a settlement of the war, but Indonesia has no present
leverage with the USSR.
b. A resumption of bombing of North Vietnam might increase
Hanoi’s interest in a negotiated settlement. (Ambassador Green com-
mented that he has never heard him come out so openly for bombing.)3
c. He was very much aware of the relationship of Vietnam to In-
donesia’s own security.
d. He is concerned at a resurgence of Communist activity in In-
donesia, and blames the Chinese Communists.
e. He underlined the importance of Indonesian cooperation with
its neighbors and stated flatly that Indonesian forces would if neces-
sary take a forward defense posture. If there were aggression against
Malaysia, and Malaysia requested help, Indonesia would send forces.
(Ambassador Green observes that Soeharto and the military take a
more relaxed view as to the requirements of “non-alignment” than do
Malik and the Foreign Office.)
f. President Soeharto reiterated his interest in visiting the US, and
Ambassador Green said that he was confident that a visit would be
welcome, and that the Indonesian Ambassador was in touch with our
Government on the question.4

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, Pres-
ident’s Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.
2
Green’s farewell call on President Suharto was reported in telegram 1724 from
Djakarta, March 23. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL INDON–US)
3
Nixon wrote the following comment next to this paragraph: “K. Note! He may be
right (on psychology).”
4
A marginal note in Nixon’s handwriting next to this sentence reads, “K as soon
as possible. Summer or Fall.”
566
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Indonesia 567

Despite the shibboleths of non-alignment, President Soeharto’s

views seem to be running very close to ours on most of the key ques-
tions of Southeast Asia security. (Tab B)5
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

5
Attached at Tab B but not printed is telegram 1724 from Djakarta, March 23.

267. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President

Nixon1

Washington, April 1, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S. Position at April 14 Inter-Governmental Group (IGGI) Meeting on Indonesia

Last year, the Government of Indonesia, with the support of the

World Bank and International Monetary Fund, requested $500 million
of aid for calendar 1969. This request was addressed to the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), composed of the Bank,
the Fund, the United States, Japan, Netherlands, France, Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
At the October 21, 1968 meeting of the IGGI, the United States
pledged to meet one-third of the non-food aid portion ($365 million)
of this request, plus an undefined “fair share” of the food aid needs
then estimated at $135 million.
This memorandum requests your authority to reaffirm that pledge
at the April 14 IGGI meeting and approval of the program to carry it
out.
Progress of the Soeharto Government
President Soeharto gained effective control of the Government of
Indonesia almost two years ago, following the bloody aftermath of the
Communist coup attempt of October, 1965. His performance during
this period has exceeded what most observers thought possible.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FN 1–1 INDON. Confi-
dential. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Approved. Mr. Sneider
to D Gleysteen 4/11/69.” A handwritten notation underneath the date reads: “Called
AID (Menlinberg) 4/14. M. says he saw a 4/13 State cable notifying our delegation of
Pres. decision.”
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568 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

In the economic field, Soeharto and his American-trained advisers

have, with the help of foreign aid and the advice of the Bank and Fund,
sharply reduced the inflation rate from 635% in 1966 to about 26% for
the twelve months ending March 1, 1969. Budgetary stringency and
expanded tax collection have led to a balanced 1968 budget. Foreign
private investment has been welcomed, although bureaucratic barriers
continue to hinder the flow. Free market forces are now the prime de-
terminants of import priorities; government corporations are no longer
heavily subsidized; the private trade sector has been revitalized by end-
ing a corrupt system of licenses and controls, and by enabling private
enterprise to obtain needed spare parts, new equipment, and raw ma-
terials. Exports for 1968 reached the highest level for seven years; they
were about 10% above 1967. But stabilization austerity has under-
standably restricted growth and Indonesia is only beginning the long
climb back to pre-1941 levels of productivity.
In the political field, the Soeharto Government ended Sukarno’s
career and confrontation with Malaysia, re-instituted freedom of the
press, brought the legislature into the political process for the first time
in many years, and suppressed a communist attempt in mid-1968 to
establish a guerrilla base in eastern Java. Very serious problems, going
to the heart of Indonesia’s future, remain: the vitality of political par-
ties is limited and Soeharto has not yet attempted to mobilize effec-
tively the goodwill toward him that exists throughout the country, thus
leaving him excessively dependent on the armed forces for political
support and administrative action; corruption and smuggling are
still widespread and may become a serious political issue; and the na-
tion’s archaic administrative apparatus is burdened by an inflated civil
service.
Despite these and other problems, Soeharto has succeeded in tak-
ing many of the politically tough decisions needed to stop economic de-
cline and to move towards stability. The Government is now preparing
to give highest priority to economic reconstruction and development.
The aid extended by the IGGI has been critical to economic progress
thus far, and Soeharto’s ability to persist in sensible economic and po-
litical reforms depends heavily on continued international support.
The Multilateral Approach
In 1966 the United States decided that our interests called for a
wholly new approach to our aid strategy in Indonesia which would
maximize aid from other nations, deeply involve international agen-
cies, and minimize direct U.S. Government involvement in Indonesian
initiative and decision-making.
The United States took the lead in calling together in 1966 a group
of Indonesia’s western creditors (the communist states, though invited,
refused to participate), to consider Indonesia’s unmanageable debt
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Indonesia 569

problem, a $2.2 billion burden inherited from the Sukarno era. The main
western creditors reached agreement in 1966, and again in 1967 and
1968, to reschedule current or overdue principal and interest payments
on this debt. Communist countries have separately made comparable
debt rescheduling arrangements with Indonesia. But, as Indonesia’s
servicing of “Sukarno” and new aid indebtedness for the next decade
far exceeds its capacity to repay without great harm to its development,
western creditors are now sponsoring a study to find a long-term so-
lution to this problem.
The IGGI, formed subsequent to the first creditors’ meeting, has
met about every six months since early 1967 to consider Indonesia’s
economic performance and its need for foreign assistance.
The International Monetary Fund has taken the lead in advising
the Indonesians on their stabilization program and in evaluating their
economic performance for the benefit of aid donors. The Fund has
taken the unusual step of establishing a resident mission in Djakarta,
including a group providing much needed technical assistance in fis-
cal affairs. In addition, the Fund entered into a $51 million standby
arrangement with Indonesia in 1968 and the Fund staff has just demon-
strated further support for the Soeharto Government’s economic pro-
gram by recommending a $70 million standby for 1969.
The World Bank has also assumed a major and unprecedented role
in Indonesia’s development. In October, 1968 the Bank opened an of-
fice in Djakarta with a ten-man professional staff to assist Indonesia in
planning development programs, preparing capital projects, and coor-
dinating foreign assistance. Thus far, the International Development
Association has authorized $7 million in credits to Indonesia, with
$20–$40 million more expected in 1969.
The Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Pro-
gram, Harvard Development Advisory Service, and other agencies are
also providing skilled personnel and financial resources.
United States Aid
In 1967, the IGGI countries provided $210 million in general sta-
bilization support to Indonesia. Of this, the United States provided
about a third, or $65.2 million ($37.5 million in A.I.D. commodity loans
and $27.7 million in P.L. 480 rice and cotton). Japan also contributed
about a third, with other donors providing the remainder.
For 1968, the United States again provided about one-third ($110
million) of a $325 million Indonesian requirement ($25 million of this
was an A.I.D. commodity loan and the remainder P.L. 480 rice and cot-
ton). We responded to an unexpected emergency by offering an addi-
tional $50 million in P.L. 480 wheat products to help prevent a recur-
rence of the serious food shortages which had caused a quadrupling of
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570 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the basic rice price at the end of 1967. About $30 million of this has
been shipped. Japan agreed to commit $110 million, and about $85 mil-
lion came from others.
In October, 1968, the Fund and Bank endorsed Indonesia’s $500
million foreign aid request for calendar 1969 ($365 million for projects
and basic imports, including cotton, and $135 million for food). The in-
crease over 1968 is largely accounted for by including total costs of
multi-year projects, instead of only actual disbursements as was done
in 1968; 1969 disbursements are estimated to be only slightly higher
than in 1968.
The U.S. had pledged to meet one third (about $123 million) of
this non-food aid requirement plus a “fair share” of the food aid re-
quirement. Separating food aid from non-food aid took account of the
facts that food aid requirements are highly uncertain from year to year,
and that the U.S. is in a special position to respond quickly and flexi-
bly to such needs. While we do not want to define “fair share” pre-
cisely, in order to keep some pressure on Indonesia to obtain food from
other donors, we must realistically expect to provide the great bulk of
wheat and rice needed. This formula also left an amount for non-food
aid that represented a practical target for burden sharing.
The U.S. pledge was subject to several conditions:
1. That other donors make commitments satisfactory both as to amounts
and terms.
The budgetary cycle of most donor nations usually does not per-
mit pledges to be made before the mid-April IGGI meeting and often
not before mid-year. The Dutch and several small donors have made
known their pledges but a decision from the Japanese is not expected
for several months.
We propose to offer Indonesia about two-thirds ($81 million) of
our non-food aid and $50 million of food aid prior to the April IGGI
meeting, leaving a decision as to the balance for later in the year when
we know other countries’ plans.
2. Continued satisfactory reports from the Fund and Bank on Indone-
sian performance in its stabilization program and in using aid effectively.
Due to slack demand for more expensive American goods and high
freight costs from the U.S., use of A.I.D. loans has been slow in the past.
However, with Fund approval, the Indonesian Government recently
made special arrangements for A.I.D. loans which have speeded use.
3. The availability of sufficient quantities of rice after the priority needs
of Viet-Nam are considered.
This is no longer a problem; Viet-Nam’s rice requirements are far
lower than projected last October.
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Indonesia 571

4. Availability of Congressional appropriations.

A.I.D. is giving Indonesia very high priority on limited funds, at
the expense of development programs in other important countries of
Asia and Africa.
We are presently planning to meet our calendar 1969 non-food aid
pledge as follows:
($ million)
Total Source of Financing
CY 1969 FY 1969 FY 1970
A.I.D. Development Loans $70 $50 $20

P.L. 480
a) Cotton (raw and yarn) 50 30 20
b) Tobacco 3 1 2
$123 $81 $42
The $50 million for FY 1969 A.I.D. loans is already available from
current appropriations, as is the P.L. 480. The A.I.D. loans would fi-
nance a Stabilization and Food Production Loan of $44 million and a
$6 million expansion of Indonesia’s major cement plant. The remain-
ing $20 million of A.I.D. loans in this calendar year’s pledge would
come from FY ‘70 loan funds still to be appropriated. The funds pro-
vided will finance U.S. exports only and commodities will be selected
to minimize impact on our balance of payments.
It is now uncertain whether Indonesia will require delivery dur-
ing 1969 of the full $135 million in food aid (principally rice and wheat)
requested in October 1968. Extraordinary rice harvests due to favor-
able weather, combined with our rice and wheat commitments (in-
cluding 100,000 metric tons (MT) of rice already shipped and charged
to our 1969 pledge) of last year, produced for the first time in memory
a stable rice price during the normal December–March scarcity season.
In addition, approximately $20 million of wheat is still available from
our $50 million commitment of last year. However, in order to assure
price stability during the 1969–1970 scarcity season, the Indonesians
will have to line up sufficient rice and wheat imports within the next
few months. With this in mind, they have recently requested under P.L.
480, for delivery by early 1970, 350,000 MT of rice (about $70 million),
and 300,000 MT of wheat flour (about $30 million).
We would instead propose to offer now only 250,000 MT of rice
($50 million) in addition to the wheat still available under last year’s
commitment. The balance of the rice and wheat request could be pro-
vided in a subsequent PL 480 agreement later in the year when food
needs are better known and the contributions of other countries an-
nounced. The rice agreement would be a convertible local currency
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572 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

credit; the wheat may be on the same terms, or be a grant under the
Kennedy Round Food Aid Convention, depending on the outcome of
negotiations with the Indonesian Government now underway.
Recommendation: That you authorize us to reaffirm our October
1968 pledge to Indonesia and approve the CY 1969 A.I.D./P.L. 480 pro-
gram as set forth above.2
The Secretaries of Treasury and Agriculture concur.3
WPR

2
A copy of Rogers’ memorandum was attached to an April 10 memorandum from
Kissinger to Nixon in which the President approved the Indonesian aid program. (Ibid.,
Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I)
3
Memoranda from the Secretaries of Agriculture and Treasury are also attached to
the Kissinger memorandum of April 10 but not printed.

268. National Security Study Memorandum 611

Washington, June 23, 1969.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia

The President has directed a review of our policy toward Indonesia.

This study should assess U.S. interests, objectives and policy al-
ternatives, and should include a discussion of the following issues:
—our general political approach toward Indonesia and her un-
aligned status
—possible internal political conflicts or insurgencies
—our economic and military assistance programs
—economic problems, including foreign investment
—Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia and Singapore and the in-
teraction of our policies toward all three countries

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–154, NSSMs, NSSM 61. Confidential. A copy was sent to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Indonesia 573

—Indonesia’s relations with major countries such as Japan, Aus-

tralia, the USSR and China
—the West Irian situation
—Indonesia’s role in Asian regional organizations.
The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group
for East Asia undertake this study. The Chairman of the group may in-
vite other agency representatives to participate as appropriate. The
study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by September
12, 1969.
Henry A. Kissinger

269. Editorial Note

In late July 1969 President Nixon made a globe-circling diplomatic

trip visiting Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, South
Asia, and Romania. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State
Rogers, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, and
a number of other foreign affairs specialists. Guam was the site of Nixon’s
press backgrounder on July 25 in which he stated that the United States
would encourage Asian countries to solve their own internal problems,
and at the same time the United States would keep its treaty commit-
ments to them. This policy became known as the Nixon Doctrine. After
meeting with President Marcos in the Philippines on July 26, Nixon had
private talks with Indonesian President Suharto at Merdeka Palace on
July 27 and 28. No record of these meetings has been found, but a few
briefing documents hint at some of the points Nixon and Suharto dis-
cussed. For Suharto’s account, see Document 273.
Talking points prepared for the meetings indicate the policy high-
lights that Nixon was to stress to Suharto. Nixon underlined what he
felt were the key points in the talking points for July 27; the talking
points for July 28 indicate the President saw them. On the former, Nixon
underlined “regional cooperative” efforts as being important to polit-
ical and economic stability in Southeast Asia. He also underscored the
idea that, while the United States would provide its share, economic
assistance to Indonesia was best “handled on a multi-lateral basis.”
Nixon also underlined the fact that “Indonesia’s special circumstance”
deserved sympathetic consideration, but that military “requirements
should be weighed carefully with economic ones.” (Both in the
National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 452,
President’s Trip Files, President’s July 69 Trip to Far East)
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574 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

270. Memorandum for the Record1

Jakarta, July 27, 1969.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Indonesian Generals

Mr. Kissinger met on July 27 with General Sumitro, the Defense

Chief of Staff, General Tjakradipura, the Minister for Interior, and Gen-
eral Sutopo Juwono, the Army Staff Intelligence Chief. The generals
had asked for the meeting at President Suharto’s request. Mr. Kissinger
was accompanied by Messrs. Holdridge and Lake of his staff.
The generals made the following points:
1. The U.S. should stay in Vietnam long enough to provide In-
donesia—and other Southeast Asian nations—with time to strengthen
themselves against Communism. The generals were concerned by press
reports that the U.S. intends to withdraw by the end of 1970, and
showed great relief when Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. has no in-
tention of withdrawing without regard for the circumstances. The key
is a reasonable, tolerable outcome.2 The generals stated that the U.S.
should concentrate on strengthening the GVN; in five years, but no
less,3 a South Vietnam capable of defending itself could emerge.
2. The Indonesian military are developing plans for one half a
Corps of troops which could be contributed to an international peace-
keeping force.
3. Although the primary Indonesian emphasis is on economic de-
velopment, the Indonesian Armed Forces need assistance to build for
the future.4 The only specific request the generals mentioned was for
more training. General Sumitro will give Mr. Kissinger this request in
writing on July 28. Mr. Kissinger said that we would consider this re-
quest very sympathetically.5

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff
Files, Lake Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Tony
Lake. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2
The President underlined this sentence.
3
The President underlined the words “in five years, but no less.”
4
The President underlined from the word “Indonesian” to the end of the sentence.
5
In a backchannel message to Jakarta, August 11, Kissinger, who had accompanied
Nixon on this Southeast Asia trip, informed General Sumitro that he had discussed their
conversation with President Nixon and that the latter had “indicated that he would look
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Indonesia 575

4. The generals said that they had intelligence reports that Hanoi
is interested in a temporary ceasefire to gain a breathing spell.6 The
North Vietnamese economy was devastated by U.S. bombing, and
Hanoi’s manpower pool is depleted. The VC are harder and more pro-
Peking than Hanoi.
5. The generals clearly disagreed with Foreign Minister Malik’s
statement about the desirability of taking VC into the GVN. This, they
said, was “political.”
6. The generals expressed concern that a secret Soviet deal ex-
isted.7 Mr. Kissinger assured them that the U.S. has no secret agree-
ments with Russia.
7. The generals suggested that Russian proposals for Asian Col-
lective Security arrangements are designed to stimulate Chinese attacks
on Southeast Asia before a pact could be arranged; these attacks would
relieve pressures on Siberia and involve the Chinese in confrontation
with the U.S.
—Mr. Kissinger noted our desire to work with the Indonesians on
a basis of equality. We can work with all nations when our interests co-
incide. We do not seek client states; we prefer healthy independence.
—Mr. Kissinger also stressed the point that we do not intend to
“withdraw from Asia” or fail to live up to our commitments. With re-
gard to Indonesia, an attack on so important a nation would clearly
threaten the peace of Asia, and we would take it very seriously.
The generals asked that the meeting be closely held to the White
House, and specifically indicated a desire that the State Department
not be informed. They said that if they had further information or views
which they wished to convey to Mr. Kissinger, they would do so
through a military attaché (an intelligence man) at the Embassy in
Washington.

with favor on your proposal for initiating expanding military training. Along these lines,
would you please provide me through this channel with the specific proposals that you
would like the U.S. Government to entertain. The President would be grateful for early
advance notice on this project.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I)
6
The President underlined the words “Hanoi is interested in a temporary”.
7
The President underlined from the word “secret” to the end of the sentence.
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576 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

271. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Jakarta, July 29, 1969, 1045Z.

5129. Dept Pass Action AmEmbassy Tokyo for Secretary’s Party.

SecState for S/S. Subj: Secretary’s Meeting with Adam Malik and Coun-
terparts July 27.
1. Present on Indonesian side in addition to Malik, Brig Gen Sud-
harmono (Secretary to Cabinet), Prof Widjojo (Chairman National Plan-
ning Bureau), MajGen Alamsjah (State Secretary), LtGen Sumitro
(Chairman Ministry of Defense and Security), Anwar Sani (DirGen
PolAff FonDept), Amb Sudjatmoko, Madame Artati Marzuki (SecGen
FonDept), BriGen Her Tasning (FonDept), J. Ronodipuro (SecGen In-
foDept), BriGen Supardjo (Head Asian Pacific Bureau FonDept), Ismael
Thajeb (Dir EconAff FonDept).
2. In addition to Secretary on US side were Ambassador [sic,
Counselor] Pedersen, AsstSec Green, Dr. Kissinger, DepAsstSec Bar-
nett, Mr. Holdridge, and Mr. Lydman.
3. Following is uncleared running summary of meeting:
4. After usual amenities, Secretary noted he was pleased there were
no bilateral problems between US and Indonesia. At present time, he said,
there was a very favorable attitude towards Indonesia in the adminis-
tration and in Congress and there was less opposition to extending aid
to Indonesia than to some other countries. He was particularly grateful
therefore for opportunity to learn more about Indonesia and its problems
and, if possible, to be better able to understand Indonesia’s needs.
5. Mr. Malik said it was indeed gratifying there were no problems
between two countries; he hoped the US would, however, not be too
surprised in years to come if there might have to be some increases in
external aid to meet Indonesia’s requirements; such aid, of course,
would be in accordance with IGGI estimates of Indonesia’s real needs.
6. Malik said he would like to address problems outside of bilat-
eral area and among these were Vietnam; the general effects of British
withdrawal east of Suez; China and the Soviet Union; and Japan.
7. Vietnam: If asked if GOI were happy with prospect of US with-
drawal from Vietnam, Malik said this would be an extremely difficult
question to answer. In principle Indonesia believes Vietnam problem
ultimately must be settled by Vietnamese themselves and thus GOI

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Prior-
ity; Exdis. Rogers visited a number of East Asian countries, including Indonesia and
Japan, for conferrals following President Nixon’s July 25th Guam statement; see Docu-
ment 269.
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Indonesia 577

would be pleased if US were to withdraw its presence. There are prac-

tical difficulties, however, with this course of action. If a US withdrawal
were precipitate there would be great danger of an equally precipitate
Communist takeover not only in Vietnam but also in neighboring coun-
tries and this would have a direct impact on Indonesia’s security in-
terests. Malik therefore hoped that US in considering staging of with-
drawal of forces from Vietnam would bear in mind need to maintain
general security of Southeast Asia and would see that Saigon Govt, in
first instance, as well as other vulnerable govts on periphery of Viet-
nam, would be effectively strengthened in order to protect themselves
from the expected Communist infiltration and subversion.
8. Malik said he would like to see a democratic govt established
in South Vietnam. In view of realities of the situation, he assumed that
such a GOG would have to include Viet Cong elements.
9. British withdrawal: Malik said that Indonesia has no objection
to continuing presence of Australian and New Zealand forces in
Malaysia and Singapore. This does not mean, however, that GOI would
welcome any other foreign forces there to substitute for the British.
10. Communist China: Malik said Indonesia’s view towards China
is that despite the low state of relations between GOI and Peking (re-
lations are suspended) Communist China as representing the Chinese
people should be allowed to enter the community of nations. In this
way, said Malik, one could at least hope that over time Communist
China might become a responsible member of world community.
11. Soviet Union: Malik said it was obvious that the Soviet Union
was increasing its interest in Southeast Asia. The GOI was intrigued
by Brezhnev’s statement about collective security in South and South-
east Asia but has been unable to gain any clarification of what Brezh-
nev has in mind. Mrs. Gandhi, who was a recent visitor in Djakarta,
also has no idea what Brezhnev means.
12. Japan and regional cooperation: The GOI is a sincere supporter
of regional cooperation, active in ADB, ECAFE, SEAMEC and ASEAN.
The GOI is proud that it has been able to achieve some progress in this
area. It is hoped that Japan will play a more prominent role in regional
affairs as time goes on. Southeast Asian countries, however, fear Japan-
ese economic strength and Indonesia particularly would like a clearer
idea of Japan’s motives in regional cooperation.
13. In addition to these main points Malik said that he would also
want to comment on:
14. Middle East: The GOI believes that the UN resolutions on
the Middle East problem are not effective and there appears to be a
dangerous confrontation of military forces in that region. Malik ex-
pressed the hope that the big powers will be able to contain conflict in
the Middle East.
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578 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

15. Five-year Plan: Malik said that Indonesia’s five-year plan is a

modest one in the sense that it is based on a realistic appreciation of
prospects for development in Indonesia. The country will require about
$600 million a year in external aid for this program. The principal ob-
jective is to achieve agricultural development and thus lay a solid base
for a second five-year plan in which hopefully Indonesia may approach
a takeoff stage. In the three years of the new govt, the GOI has broken
the hold of the PKI on the country and the five-year plan is success-
fully achieved, this will lessen substantially the capability of the PKI
to return to power. The aim in this five year period is to demonstrate
to the people that the govt is able to supply their basic needs of food,
clothing and other essentials. In the second five-year plan the govt must
demonstrate that there will be opportunity for gainful employment for
all the people and also govt must launch industrial development. Ma-
jor objective of second plan will be to develop national capacity to re-
sist subversion and aggression.
16. Malik said he was happy that there was a sympathetic re-
sponse to Indonesia’s debt problem on part of Western creditors. He
wondered what US thinks of Dr. Abs’ recommendations. Malik said he
recognized that Dr. Abs’ recommendation for waiving interest pay-
ments would probably raise a problem for US Congress. He hoped that
this procedural problem would be overcome, however, since a favor-
able US attitude toward this issue would certainly influence other coun-
tries in favor of Abs’ recommendations.
17. To revert to economic plan, Malik said that Indonesia hopes
for considerable help from private sector. Indonesia will need steel pro-
duction, it will need to develop the Asahan power complex in Suma-
tra and additional cement and petrochemical facilities in Java. Roughly
$200 million will be required for these projects and it is hoped that they
can be financed by private investment.
18. Secretary Rogers responded as follows:
19. On debts, the Secretary said we are sympathetic to Indonesia’s
debt problem, and we have had discussions with Dr. Abs concerning
his recommendations. There are two helpful factors in regard to this
issue, (1) Indonesia is generally held in high regard for the caliber of
its govt and its policies and (2) the important fact that Indonesia has
checked a virtually runaway inflation.
20. On private investment the Secretary noted that we are doing
all we can to encourage American investors and will continue in this
direction.
21. On British withdrawal, the Secretary said the US has no in-
tention of supplanting the UK although we would be concerned if any
other super power has such an intention.
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Indonesia 579

22. Commenting on the Brezhnev statement on collective security,

the Secretary noted that we had been unable to clarify Brezhnev pro-
posal. The Soviet Ambassador in Washington had been unable to en-
lighten US and the Indian Foreign Minister was similarly unclear as to
Brezhnev’s intention. It would be interesting, said the Secretary, if the
Soviets were thinking of some kind of security arrangement of non-
Communist countries which would be directed against Communist
China. He thought this had a ring of unreality.
23. Reverting to British withdrawal, President Nixon, said the Sec-
retary, thinks it important that we make clear that we are a Pacific
power and we will continue to honor our treaty obligations and to do
our part in helping in the economic, educational and cultural devel-
opment of other countries. We have no intention of withdrawing from
Asia. However, we will not get involved with our troops except in con-
nection with treaty obligations. We regard insurgency as a problem for
the Asian countries themselves. We will, however, be prepared to help
in other ways to strengthen the capabilities of Asian countries to man-
age their own insurgency problems. Basic to our position is that we
will not interfere in the sovereignty of other nations.
24. Our interest in regional cooperation derives from the convic-
tion that if the Asian countries themselves fail to appreciate the im-
portance and necessity for such cooperation, they will surely be taken
over. We therefore intend to encourage regional cooperation to the best
of our ability and we wish to congratulate Indonesia on its successful
efforts thus far in strengthening regional arrangements.
[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union,
and the People’s Republic of China.]

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, July 29, 1969, 1110Z.

5130. Department Pass Action Tokyo (priority). For Secretary’s

Party. SecState for S/S. Subj: Secretary’s Meeting with Adam Malik and
Counterparts July 28.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Prior-
ity; Exdis.
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580 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

1. Present on Indonesian side: Malik, LtGen Sumitro, MajGen

Alamsjah, Prof Widjojo, BrigGen Sudharmono, Mrs. Marzuki, Anwar
Sani, Ismael Thajeb, Amb Sudjatmoko, BrigGen Her Tasning, BrigGen
Supardjo, Suryo Di-Puro (Chief American Bureau FonDep).
2. Present on US side: Secretary, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Green, Amb
Galbraith, Mr. Ron Ziegler, Mr. Barnett, Amb Pedersen, Mr. Holdridge,
and Mr. Lydman.
3. Following is uncleared running summary of meeting:
4. Mr. Malik began the session by requesting clarification of US
views on Dr. Abs’ recommendations on the debt question.
5. Mr. Barnett noted that as an agent chosen by the creditors, Dr.
Abs had been given a mandate to report his views but not to negoti-
ate a debt rescheduling. Abs has advanced the view that while the GOI
needs relief from its debt problem the purpose of his exercise is to es-
tablish a permanent credit position for the GOI. He is recommending
that interest on all categories of debt be cancelled; this would lower
the Sukarno debt from $2.2 billion to $1.7 billion. The principal would
be amortized over 30 years with payments to begin immediately. Dr.
Abs believes there must be one formula for debt rescheduling for all
creditors, East Bloc as well as Western. His problem now is how to
make his recommendations acceptable. In this regard it is hoped there
will be agreement among major creditors such as the Japanese and US
with regard to procedures for settling the new debt in order that the
GOI can establish a strong position for negotiations with the USSR. Abs
will be submitting his recommendations the first week in August to
the French chairman of the creditors group. Abs will not become a bro-
ker in negotiating with the creditors unless he is requested to do so.
The US has not influenced Dr. Abs in any way but is giving him a free
hand to develop his creative thoughts. Our hope is he may become the
negotiator with the creditors. It is not certain that he will be able to sell
his formula of a settlement with zero percent interest and he may have
to modify his proposals in this regard. The US intends to talk to the
Japanese, however, about the post-Sukarno debts in order to give the
GOI leverage to influence the attitude of the USSR. Mr. Barnett said
that we see some problem ahead in that US aid may be used indirectly
to service the Communist debts. In facing up to this problem we would
attempt to establish the creation of Indonesian creditworthiness as the
major point of the whole debt resettlement exercise, recognizing that a
fair settlement of the debt problem is vital for the GOI.
6. Mr. Malik turned to West Irian and reviewed the GOI’s imple-
mentation of the act of free choice. He said that the last stage of this
procedure would be initiated on August 2. There is no doubt about the
result; the West Irian people will of course register their desire to re-
main in Indonesia. Malik, however, asked that the US recognize that
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Indonesia 581

the people in West Irian feel somewhat of an historic relationship with

the American people due to their experiences in World War II. After
the act of free choice the GOI will be carrying a major responsibility in
West Irian. Only a small part of external aid to Indonesia now goes to
West Irian and Malik said the GOI wishes to establish a substantial de-
velopment fund for West Irian after the act of choice is finished. The
GOI has dismissed this matter with the Dutch who have been the prin-
cipal contributors to the UN fund in West Irian and the Dutch have
agreed that the GOI should seek additional funds from the ADB and
also hopefully from the US. Malik said he would welcome special US
assistance for West Irian.
7. Malik said that after the act some African countries will be heard
from in the UN when the West Irian problem comes to their attention.
He would appreciate US help in explaining the facts of the West Irian
situation to these Africans, particularly to the Liberian lady2 who is
likely to be the next president of the GA.
8. Malik turned to the question of US–GOI military relationships,
noting that General Sumitro and Dr. Kissinger had discussed this yes-
terday. The GOI does not need material assistance for its armed forces;
most of all it requires understanding of the role the armed forces must
play. In this connection Malik hoped that the US might lend assistance
to the Indonesian armed forces in the training area, including training
in the tactical use of modern weapons. So far as equipment was con-
cerned, Malik said if any surpluses are available the GOI could cer-
tainly use them. He said he would not go into this matter in any greater
detail.
9. Malik asked that the US seek to enlarge US quotas, or markets,
for Indonesian primary products such as sugar, rubber, palm oil, etc.
10. The Secretary said he would give careful consideration to the
matters raised by Mr. Malik.
11. Mr. Green, referring to the West Irian problem, inquired what
actually is expected to happen after the act of choice takes place. Mr.
Malik said that Ortiz Sanz and the GOI, separately, will report to the
Secretary General. The Secreatary General will then report to the Gen-
eral Assembly. His report does not require a GA vote but comment and
debate on the subject cannot be excluded. Mr. Malik said that the GOI
wants the least possible debate on this issue because it could become
a football for certain Communist countries, such as Albania, to casti-
gate Indonesia; also the problem has racialist overtones in certain
African countries, and the GOI fears that the methods used by the GOI

2
Reference is to Angie E. Brooks, President of the UN General Assembly during
the 24th session in 1969.
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582 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

in implementing the act of free choice might be exploited by colonial-

ist powers.
12. Responding to the Secretary’s question on Vietnam, Malik said
that while Indonesia would welcome a US withdrawal from Vietnam,
leaving the Vietnamese free to decide their own destiny, at the same
time GOI realizes that the US has commitments in the ARDL and in-
deed does not wish the US to pull out quickly. Malik said he cannot
make this latter position a matter of public record but it nevertheless
represents the view of the govt. If the US withdraws rapidly, North
Vietnam will certainly take over and neighboring countries will be wide
open for Communist subversion. The GOI would hope for a fair solu-
tion from the Paris discussions but also wishes a strengthening of South
Vietnam. Realizing that this is not easy in a war-time situation, the GOI
hopes that the South Vietnamese people will come to accept the regime
as their own. The social-political base of govt must be strengthened in
South Vietnam and it is necessary that every hamlet have the will to
resist. An important element in this resistance, said Malik, is to give
the people a sense of proprietorship by making it possible for them to
own the land. Both the Northern and Southern regimes in Vietnam
have slogans that they are giving land to the farmers. This must be
credibly implemented in the South.
13. Mr. Malik thought that there were other political forces in
South Vietnam that should be included in govt in order to broaden
popular support. If South Vietnam can broaden its political base it must
then find an ideological base like Pantja Sila. If this can be done then
US forces could perhaps safely withdraw. Finally, said Malik, there is
also the possibility that the Paris Talks will fail, that North Vietnam is
not sincere. If so, as he had already told Ambassador Green, the US
must be prepared to exert greater pressure on North Vietnam. Again,
said Malik, this position could not be made public but he wished the
Secretary to know his feelings.
14. The Secretary commented that in effect Malik’s views repre-
sent both the policy of the United States and that of the Government
of South Vietnam. The Secretary said that through the process of local
elections and other base-broadening activities, such as President
Thieu’s land reform program, which is now before the Assembly for
final approval, and through a broadening of cabinet participation—all
the major actions that Malik had underlined are being pursued. The
ideological objective is more difficult, said the Secretary, because there
has been no base developed for nationalist leadership. The only rally-
ing point at present is anti-Communism. However, if the army and civil
defense and civil service could be unified in common purpose in sup-
port of the govt this would represent a very substantial base of sup-
port for the govt’s actions.
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15. Mr. Malik continued on Vietnam, said that he thought it was

important that the behavior of US troops and South Vietnamese troops
be carefully considered in order that they might acquire the image of
protectors of the people and comrades-in-arms of Vietnamese forces.
He thought it vital for the future of South Vietnam that as US troops
pull out, the process should be managed in such a way as to support
the image of the South Vietnamese troops that are taking their place
and who must remain.
16. The Secretary agreed that this was a highly desirable and im-
portant objective and noted that we had withdrawn one of our best di-
visions which had been replaced by one of South Vietnam’s best divi-
sions specifically for the purpose of improving the image of the South
Vietnamese troops in the eyes of their own people.
17. In response to the Secretary’s question on China, Malik said
Indonesian-Chinese relations are frozen. He said that obviously China
cannot be ignored or isolated indefinitely. He feels China must be
brought into the community of nations and that we must face up to
this problem in the UN. On the other hand, said Malik, the GOI can-
not sponsor China in the UN in view of the present state of relations
between the two countries. There is hope, however, for change in China
where Communism has developed in stages. In the first stage, the iron
hand was needed to secure sufficient food and clothing for the popu-
lation. Now China is in the second stage, industrial development is un-
derway and the govt can now force people to work because they have
secured sufficient food and clothing for them. This is the meaning of
the cultural revolution. At some future time, the Chinese will proceed
to the third stage of their development when they will expose their in-
dustrial production to the outside world. At that time they will require
better relations with outside countries. If China decides to join the UN
it will be a reflection of its development into its third stage as a Com-
munist country. We may have to wait a long time for this, said Malik.
Perhaps the Rumanians will have a better idea what stage the Chinese
actually are in.
18. Also in judging the Soviet-Chinese conflict, said Malik, we must
recognize their different stages of development. In their first stage of de-
velopment, the Soviets tried to include China as well as Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Rumania and others in their internal development plan. This
created serious difficulties for the Soviets when each of these countries
developed to the point where they could no longer be so dependent on
the USSR. If the Chinese should achieve more economic development,
said Malik, we can expect their aggressiveness to lessen in the same way
that the USSR became less aggressive as it advanced economically.
19. In response to the Secretary’s question on Taiwan, Malik said
that in a sense the GOI’s attitude toward Taiwan is a procedural
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584 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

matter. If one asks who is the legimate head of the Chinese Govt, the
answer must be Peking, but the existence of the Taiwan Govt cannot
be ignored. One might hope that there would be such changes in the
Mainland that it would be possible for Taiwan to return to its control.
If this is not possible, Taiwan should be reconciled to a status as an is-
land country, not one representing 800,000,000 Chinese. Taiwan, rep-
resenting Taiwan only, should certainly be a member of the UN.
20. In responding to the Secretary’s question about Cambodia,
Malik said that Sihanouk faced an urgent struggle for survival under
extremely difficult conditions. Sihanouk wants to be a saviour and this
is only possible in the framework of his Socialist program; this he pur-
sues also to draw support and sympathy from the USSR, China and
North Vietnam. A question here is what these countries think of Cam-
bodia. North Vietnam has an historic position of desiring all of the for-
mer French Indo-China to be under one system. The efforts of the US
and Indonesia should be directed towards trying to keep Cambodia
and Laos neutral. This may be decided by the outcome of the Paris
negotiations.
21. Turning to the Secretary’s question on Malaysia, Malik said he
did not think we need worry too much about the situation in Malaysia.
The clashes now underway cannot be avoided. The British wished to
establish a multiracial society and believed this had been achieved in
the 12 years of independence. But when independent Malaysia was
created the British left the leadership in the hands of feudal Malays
and rich Chinese. Difficulties should really have broken out much ear-
lier and might have been more easily contained but now after one
whole generation substantial numbers of Malays and Chinese have
been isolated from their leadership—this has created not only a racial
problem but a social problem. It is now necessary for the govt to adapt
to the real situation. The govt must conciliate the dissident Chinese (in
Penang and other areas), and the Malays must face up to the fact that
their survival depends on multiracial cooperation. For the Malays it is
too easy to see their country as a Malay country and some of them are
looking to Indonesia to help them in this regard. Maybe they hope that
Sumatra will help them in their struggle against the Chinese, but this
is not possible!
22. Responding to Mr. Green’s question what could be done now
for example, by the National Operations Council (NOC), Malik said
that he had told his friends in KL that the NOC will be a danger if it
is protracted because it excludes Chinese and the longer it continues
the more disaffected the Chinese will become. It is logical for the Malays
to unite and to seek to strengthen themselves as a community but they
must open the dialog with the Chinese and with the poor Malays
to bring them into a sense of participation in their country. And they
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Indonesia 585

must deal with the Malay extremists, to convince them that their atti-
tude is destructive to the whole Malay community. The govt in KL
must seek rapidly to correct the past errors; there must be more
and better jobs for the Malays, more and better schools for Malays,
and the rural Malays must be given a sense of involvement in their
government.
23. Malik said that the Tunku and Tun Razak are inhibited from
dealing constructively with the Chinese because of the influence of ex-
tremists in the Malay community. But this is the problem they must
solve and perhaps the national unity effort of Ghazali can serve some
useful purpose in this regard.
24. In response to the Secretary’s question on the PRG, Malik said
the GOI had told the PRG representative the GOI was not in position
to recognize them. A representative of the NLF is resident in Djakarta
but has no diplomatic rank. Malik said there are indirect contacts with
the South Vietnamese Govt.
25. Turning to the subject of ASPAC, the responding to Mr. Green’s
comment that the US is not pushing ASPAC as an organization that
other countries should join, Malik said that the GOI considers ASPAC
[garble—redundant?], an organization which duplicates efforts of
ECAFE, SEAMEC, ADB and ASEAN. Malik said the GOI is getting con-
fused about organizations like ASPAC and others. He asked what or-
ganization the USG prefers as a channel for US assistance in SEA.
26. Mr. Barnett commented that the US regards the GOI as kind
of a model of a developing country for the reason that its economic
prospects, requirements and indeed the supervision, of its economic
program have been carefully developed on a multilateral basis in-
cluding excellent assistance from the IMF, IBRD and ADB. (Discussion
was halted at this point.)
27. President Nixon and President Suharto joined the meeting at
11 am. President Nixon noted that the Presidents had had an excellent
discussion. President Suharto had accepted his invitation to visit the
United States at a time to be worked out by their respective ambassa-
dors. President Nixon thought early January might be a convenient
time and he hoped that President Suharto would be able to spend long
enough in the United States to travel not only to Washington and New
York but also to Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles and possibly
Houston, to view the Space Center. President Nixon said he was keenly
aware of the immense importance of private investment in Indonesia
and he was encouraged by the interest that had been shown by Amer-
ican businessmen. In this regard he hoped President Suharto might be
able to arrange a meeting with some of our top business executives in
New York. President Nixon said he thought the five-year plan needed
maximum support from private investors.
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586 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

28. Viewing Asia as a whole, President Nixon said it was quite ob-
vious that the key to at least South and Southeast Asia was Indonesia
and certainly if there was a serious reversal in Indonesia it would
seriously affect other countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia and
Singapore. It is thus necessary that Indonesia remain strong and it is
the goal of its policy to support this strength.
29. It is important, said President Nixon, that our relationship
must not give any appearance of neo-colonialism or exploitation. [gar-
ble—We?] must “go together, not one behind the other” whether in the
context of multilateral or bilateral relationships, the US respects In-
donesian independence and wants to be a part of its era of progress.
[garble—Prospects?] for a “big leap” in Indonesia are as exciting as in
any country in the world.
30. President Suharto expressed his gratitude for the very good
exchange of views that he had had with President Nixon which he be-
lieved had established a solid foundation for future US-Indonesian re-
lations. He expressed thanks for President Nixon’s invitation to visit
the US which he would certainly do at a convenient time.
Galbraith

273. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

Bali, August 5, 1969, 1530Z.

10. From Ambassador Galbraith. Dept pass Djakarta. Subject: In-

donesian Reaction to Presidential Visit.
1. I saw Suharto prior to leaving for Bali yesterday. I told him it
would be some time before the content of his talks with the President
on the second occasion would become known to me.2 I did not wish
him to disclose to me anything I should not know, but it would be a
help if he told me anything he thought I should know. He looked

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL INDON–US. Secret;
Nodis.
2
President Nixon had private talks with President Suharto from 4 to 5:55 p.m. on
July 27 and from 9 to 11:25 a.m. on July 28 at Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Di-
ary) No memoranda of conversation of these private talks were found.
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Indonesia 587

at me thoughtfully for a moment and then gave me the following, in

summary:
2. Viet-Nam. Suharto had said that while Indonesia favored a Viet-
Nam free of foreign troops it fully realized that the United States should
not pull its troops out of Viet-Nam precipitately; also that the United
States could not do this in a month or even within a year but over a
period of some time, depending on South Viet-Nam’s (SVN) ability to
consolidate its strength. In Indonesia’s view this meant finding and in-
culcating a common ideology and a broadened base for the govern-
ment so as to increase and strengthen popular support and the national
will and capability to resist.
Answering President Nixon’s question about how Indonesia
would be prepared to participate in a peacekeeping force in SVN,
Suharto said that Indonesia was prepared to send its troops to SVN to
monitor the implementation of a settlement on condition that (a) it
would be part of a UN sponsored force, (b) its participation would re-
ceive the approval of both the U.S. and North Viet-Nam (NVN), and
(c) Indonesia would not have to bear the cost. Although Indonesia
would be present as a nonaligned power it would have an anti-
Communist orientation and, on the basis of Indonesia’s experience,
would try to help SVN develop the ability to resist a Communist take-
over.
3. Threat to Indonesia. The President asked Suharto what he saw
as the greatest danger to Indonesia, whether it was Communist sub-
version in the area, a re-emergent Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
or the threat of Red China. Suharto said it was actually none of these
things that he feared. The danger lay in possible failure of the five-year
development plan. Such failure would provide fertile soil for the come-
back of communism in Indonesia by weakening the national will and
ability to resist.
4. Assistance for Indonesian Development. The President asked
Suharto whether Indonesia preferred its economic assistance from the
U.S. to be on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. Suharto replied that it
didn’t matter to Indonesia. But where projects could provide long-term
monuments to U.S.-Indonesian friendship and cooperation, Suharto
would prefer to see them provided on a bilateral basis. Suharto stressed
the importance of continued foreign assistance for the five-year devel-
opment plan at a level of $600 million a year. Some relief for Indone-
sia’s indebtedness was also required, possibly along the lines of the
Abs Plan.
As a sound basis for the second five-year plan certain key projects
should be accomplished as soon as possible. These included (a) the
Asahan power complex, (b) the steel plant at Tjiligon, (c) the cement
plant at Tjibinong, and (d) the fertilizer plant at Tjirebon. The cost of
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588 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

these projects would be only about $200 million. These are the kind of
monumental projects that would enhance U.S.-Indonesian relations
over the long haul. By implication, Suharto hopes the U.S. will find it
possible to support these projects.
5. Military Assistance. President Nixon asked Suharto whether he
felt assured that he had the loyalty and support of the Indonesian
armed forces. Suharto said certain elements earlier had succeeded in
infiltrating into and subverting some units of the armed forces, turn-
ing them against Suharto. But cleansing operations had been carried
out. Most importantly, Suharto, as Minister of Defense and Security
and Commander in Chief, maintains control over the military, includ-
ing the police. He plans to keep this control to help ensure against dis-
ruption whether from the left or the right.
Suharto said training in modern weaponry and tactics is also
needed. Suharto repeated the desire to obtain conventional aircraft for
close support roles (B–25s, B–26s, A–1s, etc.) and for transport aircraft
(C–130s). He said these planes are obsolete in the U.S. but still in sup-
ply and very useful to Indonesia.
6. West Irian. Suharto told President Nixon that the act of choice
would be completed between August 2–4. The follow-up would be all
important. It will be a burden for Indonesia to bring the 700,000 West
Irianese, the most primitive of the Indonesian people, to an acceptable
level of development. In humanistic terms this effort deserved the sup-
port of all, particularly the developed countries. President Nixon said
he had not studied the background of the West Irian problem. He would
do so when he returned to Washington. Suharto said he hoped Presi-
dent Nixon would publicly note that the act of choice had resulted in
a decision to stay with Indonesia and pledge U.S. support for the de-
velopment of these stone age people who had served the U.S. indi-
rectly during World War II. Such public notice by the President would
interest other countries in the task of developing West Irian. Suharto
hoped the President’s announcement could come as close as possible
after August 4 and before the General Assembly meets.
7. East-West Relations. Suharto felt it would be unwise for the U.S.
to strengthen either Red China or the USSR in relation to the other.
He thought Red China should be brought out of its isolation, if possi-
ble, and into the UN. He implied that the continuation of the Soviet-
Communist Chinese conflict might weaken both and that this would
not be unwelcome to him.
8. Other Subjects. Suharto indicated briefly that they had dis-
cussed Japan, and the importance of stable prices and markets for In-
donesia’s agricultural and mining products. Indonesia is making stren-
uous efforts to increase its oil production and continued access to U.S.
markets for Indonesia oil is crucial, Suharto said.
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Indonesia 589

9. Suharto said he would charge his Ambassador in Washington

to get in touch with the Department of State upon his return and work
for implementation of the Presidential talks. Suharto hoped I too would
be of assistance and that the talks beginning in Bali on August 5 would
also contribute to the implementation of the general principles he and
also President Nixon had agreed upon.
10. At the conclusion of the review of his talks with the President,
I asked Suharto to clarify for me how he saw Indonesia interacting in
the future with its neighbors, not only in the economic and cultural
fields but in the field of security. Suharto said internal subversion could
only be met by the consolidation of the national will and ability to re-
sist, based on the individual nation’s own national ideology and eco-
nomic strength. Indonesia could serve as a model and source of inspi-
ration and provide advice on how it had accomplished this. Indonesia
would consult its own interests in the event of any aggression any-
where in the area and he would expect every country to do the same.
Any country under a threat which [garble] not feel it could itself meet
could ask Indonesia for help and Indonesia would be prepared to re-
spond. Indonesia had already provided military advisors and training
assistance to the Government of Malaysia.
11. Comment: Suharto carefully asserts Indonesia’s independent
policies, foreign and domestic, as well as its primary responsibility for
its own development, but he clearly looks to the U.S. as the primary
source of foreign assistance. His reference to “monuments” in the form
of U.S. financed projects suggests his desire to gradually induce among
the Indonesian people recognition of this primary reliance on the U.S.
Clearly Suharto would raise the ante on economic aid to include sup-
port for $100 million worth of what he regards as key projects, to be
begun as soon as possible; also by unspecified amounts of MAP assist-
ance in the form of line items for the military excess to U.S. require-
ments. This may run in the opposite direction from our own desire to
avoid challenging public sensitivity here on any suggestion of a de-
veloping neo-colonial relationship and our attempts to continue a low
posture.
12. Both Lydman and I have found Ambassador Sudjatmoko con-
cerned about the inflation of Indonesian expectation, developed since
President Nixon’s departure, for additional U.S. Assistance.3 We will
need careful guidance on the President’s intentions with respect to

3
In telegram 5596 from Djakarta, August 16, the Embassy cited “heightened ex-
pectations and insistent Indonesian requests for increased military assistance” as well as
the “excellent rapport established with President Suharto” as some of the results of the
“highly successful presidential visit.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 8
INDON)
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590 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

fulfilling these inflated expectations and we will need to deal with them
urgently, if they require deflating, before they set in concrete.4
Rogers

4
Rogers met with Foreign Minister Malik and other Indonesian officials in Bali Au-
gust 5–7. Their discussions are reported in telegram 5427 from Jakarta, August 8. (Ibid.,
POL INDON–US)

274. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

New York, September 26, 1969, 2336Z.

Secto 62/3255. Subj: Secretary’s Bilateral with Indonesian Foreign

Minister Malik, September 26.
1. Malik began conversation by discussing West Irian. In UN con-
text he said he hoped to have matter handled as expeditiously as pos-
sible, but it now appeared it would not come up until end October or
early November. He would have to make another trip to New York at
that time. He saw no problems in getting report through UN.2 Amb.
Abdulgani said they were discussing with the Netherlands a joint res-
olution to take note of report.
2. Malik then gave a long report on Indonesia’s debt problems.
He said he met Abs before going to Africa and discussed his proposal.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL INDON–US. Secret;
Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta. Rogers was in New York to attend the 24th Session of the
UN General Assembly.
2
On April 1, 1968, UN Secretary-General U Thant had appointed Fernando Ortiz
Sanz as his Representative for the “act of free choice” under which the inhabitants of
West Irian would decide whether they wished to remain with or sever their ties with In-
donesia, under the terms of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands of
August 15, 1962. The representative made a number of reports on the progress Indone-
sia had made on this issue. On November 6, 1969, the Secretary-General reported to the
General Assembly concerning the act of self-determination. In his report the Secretary-
General annexed the final reports submitted to him by his Representative and by the In-
donesian Government, which described in detail the arrangements, conduct, and results
of the act of free choice. Malik is evidently referring to one of these reports. (United Na-
tions Yearbook, 1969, pp. 175–177). The act of free choice, the Secretary-General said, had
been held between July 14 and August 2, when the enlarged West Irian councils, which
had included a total of 1,026 members, pronounced themselves, without dissent and on
behalf of the people of West Irian, in favor of remaining with Indonesia.
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Indonesia 591

He understands there will be a meeting in Paris in Oct. He knew there

were problems with the proposal on the American side and there are
also problems for the Japanese. Aichi told him problems in three areas
(a) the long repayment period, (b) interest, and (c) debts on which
agreed term of repayment exists. Malik suggested to Aichi that per-
haps they could arrange exchange of views at World Bank meeting.
3. Before leaving Djakarta he met USSR mission which had come
at Indonesian invitation to discuss debts. Soviets wanted hold discus-
sion on basis 1966 Protocol which called for $7–8 million short term
payment 1967–68–69 and $22 million long term repayment beginning
1970. Under present circumstances Indonesia could not meet payments.
Negotiations almost ended at this point. Malik suggested negotiation
turn to discussion new Indonesian proposal. This was close to the Abs’
terms except had asked Soviets for 35 years repayment and had
avoided linking proposal to Abs plan. Soviets said workers country
could not be philanthropic and reduce interest to zero. However, it
might put off interest payments and accumulate same until Indonesia
in position to pay. Malik felt door still open for future negotiations.
4. His impression was that there is change in Soviet tactics re-
garding Indonesia and, if debt problem worked out, Soviets will fin-
ish aid projects Indonesians wish completed. Soviets might even in-
crease amounts available. The Soviet del also offered possibility assist
Indonesian government projects with experts and material. On navy
and air force spares, Soviet said they would supply on cash and carry
basis.
5. Malik turned to special development fund for West Irian. Dutch
and Australians have already agreed to supply some funds and he
hoped US would come in. Amb. Sujatmoko said this already discussed
with Green. He noted President Nixon’s indication personal interest
this matter and his request he be reminded. He said Dutch were press-
ing for establishment of fund for “internal political purposes.” Dutch
have agreed to 5 million dollar contribution but Australia not yet com-
mitted on amount. Dutch hope for fund establishment in November,
but need not have prior US agreement. Secretary suggested further
talks with Green and pointed out time problems facing US in obtain-
ing Congressional approval. Sujatmoko said he was in touch with
Green and Barnett. Secretary recommended he also talk to Samuels.
6. Secretary raised possibility Malik undertake activities here stim-
ulate private investment. Sujatmoko said 20 man group now in New
York on this project. Perhaps October/November Malik trip might pro-
vide better time. Secretary suggested talks with James Lennon and Su-
jatmoko said they were in touch.
7. Secretary suggested Malik also undertake improve relations
with key Congressional leaders. Malik agreed this useful and suggested
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592 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

October/November time frame. Secretary asked to be reminded and

suggested either lunch at Dept or visit to Hill. Sujatmoko requested
Mansfield be included in order refute concern expressed his report that
US exceeding self-imposed 1/3 formula in Indonesia. Secretary em-
phasized benefits close personal contact 3 or 4 Congressional leaders
citing South Korean success this field. He urged this be undertaken at
present time when Indonesian image with US public very good. Su-
jatmoko said he would discuss this with Green.
8. Malik asked for Secretary’s views on Vietnam and the Middle
East. Secretary indicated no great change in situation since their last
conversation. He said he saw no willingness yet on the part of the
North Vietnamese to enter useful talks. However, he noted change in
tactics, quoting President’s press conference statement that infiltration
rate down by 2/3 and also noting decrease enemy activity. He viewed
this as good sign and said if other side wished reinstitute offensive op-
erations it would require build up time. He also noted casualty ratio
remains unfavorable North Vietnam. He expressed pleasure over
smooth progress redeployment program. He hoped opposition would
conclude negotiations would offer best result. He indicated US will-
ingness discuss difficult problem setting up mutually agreeable system
supervise free elections, regardless what required. Other side had not
indicated willingness discuss. If they continue obdurate we will con-
tinue Vietnamization.
9. On ME Secretary said we have hopes of movement but have
word problems. Malik asked if these on both sides. Secretary suggested
possible success Rhodes Formula, but noted difficulties Riad experi-
enced with press when he raised this. He noted Israeli difficulties due
October election and said hoped resume four power talks about Oct
20. Malik asked if the USSR was willing and the Secretary said yes but
they held different views. Malik said in his discussion Soviets, Malik
(USSR) had said four powers willing but contestants not agreeable. Sec-
retary agreed contestants must be party to any solution. Malik said he
would have opportunity further soundings at non-aligned meeting
scheduled tomorrow in New York.
Rogers
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275. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT
Indonesian Request for Arms Aid

I attach (Tab A) Djakarta’s 7460,2 which describes an approach

made by General Sumitro to the Ambassador’s Special Assistant for
arms aid. Sumitro said that President Suharto had authorized him to
approach the Embassy, to explain the situation as they see it, and to re-
quest that we study the possibility of equipping the Indonesian armed
forces over the next 5–7 years.
Sumitro said he recognized that Congressional approval of new
major MAP programs is probably two or three years away. He hopes,
however, that a program can be sketched out and that personnel can
be trained to use the equipment which they might plan on receiving
some years hence. Consequently, he hoped for “some modest increase”
in professional training in the current MAP budget, plus transport air-
craft and naval spares to meet specific requirements.
Sumitro said that the Indonesians have completed their list of re-
quirements. The list does not constitute an immediate request, but they
are looking for an indication that the US will in the future assist them
in replacing Soviet equipment. Sumitro said that this will be a major
topic when Suharto meets the President next spring.
Sumitro said that he planned to raise the same points with Ad-
miral McCain during his forthcoming visit.
You will recall that General Sumitro some weeks ago passed you
a similar request for arms aid through the Indonesian Military Attaché,
General Suhud. It would appear that President Suharto has now de-
cided that he had better begin to hit the US Government at different
levels with his request.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation
on the memorandum in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “John, See me HK.”
2
Dated October 28, attached but not printed.
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594 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

276. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, November 17, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia
Ambassador Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko
Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

Following a very brief discussion of the purpose of Mr. Malik’s

visit to the UN in connection with the West Irian debate,2 the President
remarked that he had good memories of his visit to Djakarta last sum-
mer, and certainly hoped that our relations were going well. He jok-
ingly said that he hoped, too, the Indonesians were receiving good co-
operation from Ambassador Green. As he had said when in Indonesia,
if one looks at this area of the world Indonesia’s 120 million people
and great geographic area give it a key relationship in the future of the
region. Without Indonesia, there would be no real possibility for re-
gional solutions. Knowing that the Indonesians wish to retain their in-
dependence, we in this Administration were looking forward to main-
taining a close relationship with them. Mr. Malik stated that he indeed
hoped that our relationships could be strengthened.
Changing the subject, Mr. Malik declared that the Indonesians had
read the President’s recent speech3 with great interest and sympathy,
and looked on it as a very objective statement of the US situation in

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Holdridge and for-
warded to Kissinger under cover of a separate attached memorandum, November 25.
Kissinger initialed his approval on the covering memorandum on November 28 and
wrote: “Send to State. Incidentally this goes to S/S only as all other Presidential mem-
cons. Don’t let into the working level.” The meeting was held in the President’s office.
Another copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 7 INDON.
2
Foreign Minister Malik visited Washington November 15–18 in between visits to
the United Nations in New York. In addition to his meeting with the President, Malik
also met with Rogers and key members of Congress. Details of these discussions are re-
ported in telegram 195740 to Jakarta, November 21. (Ibid.)
3
President Nixon, in his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam on Novem-
ber 3, made the point that the United States would not engage in “an immediate, pre-
cipitate withdrawal” from Vietnam, but would, instead, “persist in our search for a just
peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible,” or would “withdraw all of our forces
from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese
become strong enough to defend their own freedom.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp.
901–909)
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Indonesia 595

Vietnam. Mr. Malik added that he thought the speech also indicated
the time now was right for political movement in South Vietnam so
that the thrust of US policy would not only be of a military character.
As he looked at US domestic developments, he had the impression that
many people thought the US was pressing solely for a military solu-
tion. Political development in South Vietnam might therefore deflect
domestic opinion away from controversy in the US to events in Viet-
nam. Although the position of Thieu and Ky was not so good, their sit-
uation might be strengthened if they were to rely more on the leader-
ship in the countryside. If the relationship between the national leaders
and the natural leaders in the countryside could be developed, to the
point where the latter were willing to participate in the physical de-
velopment of the country, the influence of the Viet Cong would be
neutralized.
The President declared that one of the most encouraging devel-
opments in his ten months in office was the strengthening of the Viet-
namese territorial forces, as distinct from the regular armed forces. Gen-
eral Abrams had said that this was the most significant development
which had occurred. The territorial forces had always existed, but be-
fore had not possessed much of a will to fight; now they were better
equipped, increasingly active, and could provide security to outlying
areas which the regular forces could not reach.
Referring to Mr. Malik’s comments on political development in
South Vietnam, the President said that this in fact was our objective,
but that the process took time—years and even generations. What we
were trying to do was to compress political evolution in the country
into a time span of five minutes. Nevertheless, it was important to make
the effort, for if there were no local elements assuming responsibility,
once the regular military went away, the old problems would appear
again. The President likened this type of war to playing a violin—there
had to be at least four strings: economic, military, political and social
progress.
Mr. Malik noted that one of the side effects of the President’s
speech could be found in his area, namely, the speech would definitely
increase the desire of the nations of the area to increase their coopera-
tion regionally. In this respect, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers were to
meet in Kuala Lumpur in December. The President’s speech had had
a reassuring effect on the ASEAN countries and would encourage them
to work out a greater degree of regional cooperation.
The President said that in this country we had to rule out the easy
way of ending our involvement in Vietnam. We could of course get out
easily, but this would in turn get us out of Southeast Asia, and there-
fore we had to find a way to bring the war to an end and yet achieve
our limited objective of preventing a government from being imposed
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596 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

on the Vietnamese people from the outside. Noting that this objec-
tive had been accomplished in Indonesia, the President hoped that the
same outcome would be reached in Vietnam. He thought that he could
keep US opinion in support of this goal, and certainly would resist ef-
forts to wash out the war as a bad deal, which would bring very bad
consequences.
Mr. Malik indicated that, on the other hand, there was a danger
that the ending of the US involvement in Vietnam would lead to iso-
lationism. The President agreed, saying that Vietnam must not be in-
terpreted domestically as a failure, especially after the loss of 40,000
lives. If we were to leave under humiliating circumstances or with
the war a failure, the American people would say in the event that a
threat were directed against Indonesia, Thailand or India, “Why do
anything?”
Continuing, the President mentioned that one point had been very
encouraging to him: Mr. Malik and his colleagues had been able to
avoid a Communist takeover in Indonesia. They had displayed courage
and leadership and by resisting had showed that the people and lead-
ers of their country possessed the will to retain their independence. In-
donesia was the brightest spot: having had the greatest problems, it
had now turned completely around.
The President touched on the problems in other areas, referring to
Thailand and Malaysia, and noting Malaysia’s interracial conflict. He
commended Singapore under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, ob-
serving that Lee understood the problems of Vietnam. The difficulties
of all these countries, including Laos and Cambodia, were related and
were but a part of the total picture.
In response to a statement by the President that Ambassador Green
had been in Indonesia when the change had happened, Mr. Green re-
called the President’s visit to Indonesia as a private citizen, recalling
that the President had been the best visitor the Embassy had ever
known. Mr. Green then spoke of the long-standing friendship which
Mr. Malik had displayed toward the US, which had existed even dur-
ing the bad days under Sukarno.
The President remarked that Mr. Malik understood the real nature
of the problems facing his country, and recognized that there were civil-
ian as well as military components. Moreover, Mr. Malik had a view
which was not limited to Indonesia, but saw things in terms of the
whole area. Too many people, the President said, thought only of their
own country. On his trip to Europe, European friends had said to get
out of Vietnam in any way. Their reasoning was that because the US
was in Vietnam it was not doing enough to support Europe. The same
situation was true in the Middle East. The Israelis, for example, as-
sumed that if we were not in Vietnam we would do more for Israel.
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Indonesia 597

He had told them that if Vietnam ended as a failure, “forget it”. Amer-
icans would simply withdraw from Vietnam, Asia and the Middle East
and stay home. He stressed that we were not going to fail; however,
we needed to appreciate the fact that there was a domino effect—in-
deed, just to talk in these terms was to touch on too small a part of the
picture. In terms of the effect on the US and its world relations, if we
were unable to succeed in supporting one small country for limited
goals, great internal frustrations would result. The US had to play a
world role, but a proper, not a dominating one. The key was to find a
way to end the Vietnam war so that this world role could be played
successfully. Most of our friends in Asia understood this. Our efforts
were directed not so much at changing North Vietnam, but rather to-
wards trying to find solutions which would enable South Vietnam to
stand on its own feet.
Turning again to the subject of regional cooperation, the President
stated that this was very important and he was encouraged to hear
about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Regional cooperation was the re-
sponsibility of the countries concerned but was also very helpful to our
policy here. Too many people here had never visited the region and
did not know the great national pride and desire on the part of the
peoples of the region to stand on their own feet. Assistance was not
wanted if it meant control, and this was a very healthy attitude. How-
ever, the US could play a good partnership role.
Mr. Malik mentioned on the score of foreign assistance that early
after the 1965 coup he had told Ambassador Green not to offer aid be-
fore Indonesia had settled its own house. Ambassador Green added he
had been told by the Foreign Minister at that time that when the time
had come for US aid he would let us know.
The President asked about Indonesia’s present situation—were we
doing about what we should be doing? Mr. Malik replied that he hoped
the US would continue and possibly increase its present level of aid,
which was crucial in maintaining Indonesia’s stability and accom-
plishing its five-year plan. The President referred to the difficult situ-
ation in the US, with the Congress having cut the aid appropriation
below what we had asked for. The Foreign Minister should understand
that what we were doing now was not a reflection of what we would
like to do. However, over a period of five years he anticipated that
the situation would be different and Congress would provide more
support.
Mr. Malik said that he was fully aware of these difficulties, but
that the Indonesians were still not giving up hope. The President ob-
served in response that we would do as well as we could.
Mr. Malik again brought up the possibility of new isolationism in
the US, particularly among the youth. The President said in reply that
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598 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the isolationists were not a majority. Some elements in the population

said we should not do anything abroad, but most would support a re-
sponsible foreign policy. Over 300 members of the House and 59 Sen-
ators had joined in resolutions supporting his policy on Vietnam. This
was the kind of support which counted. Policy was made in this way,
not otherwise.
Mr. Malik referred to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund,
and wondered about the US contribution. Ambassador Green noted
we had pointed out that we could not yet go forward with our contri-
butions since we had no special legislation. The President said that he
had a long talk with World Bank President McNamara prior to the Sato
visit and had talked in general on this subject. Mr. McNamara felt that
we need to give more emphasis to the whole Asian problem. He him-
self could only say that as a result of his own personal intervention we
would give this matter more attention. Frankly, we had a problem with
Congress, but over a period of five years there would be a change.
Mr. Malik mentioned the question of the Indonesian oil quota in
the US, to which the President remarked that he was very familiar with
this whole issue, and knew that the Indonesian quota was quite mod-
est. Mr. Malik expressed the hope that the Indonesian quota would be
kept open and that Indonesia would have increasing access to the US
market. The President assured him that Indonesia would have a per-
centage of any increase and would keep this in mind.
In conclusion, the President urged Ambassador Green to encour-
age members of the Cabinet and Congressional leaders to visit In-
donesia in order to see the country and to get a feel for Indonesia’s
problems. He told the Foreign Minister that the Indonesians were for-
tunate to have as Assistant Secretary of State a man such as Ambas-
sador Green who was so thoroughly familiar with Indonesia and its
conditions. He asked Mr. Malik to transmit his best wishes to Presi-
dent Suharto.
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Indonesia 599

277. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF NSSM–61 ON INDONESIA

I. Indonesia’s Importance to the U.S.
The Indonesian leadership during the first half of this decade com-
bined hyper-nationalism and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine
in a formula for “nation-building” which in fact sought to destroy West-
ern influence and deny the concept of peaceful change in Southeast
Asia. In contrast, the current Indonesian government seeks to obtain
economic and social development through the pursuit of pragmatic,
non-doctrinaire policies in close cooperation with its neighbors and
with multilateral assistance from international agencies and Free World
governments.
Success for the new Indonesian approach would dramatically im-
prove the economic and security environment in Southeast Asia, of
which roughly half the population and area is Indonesian. It could also
set a constructive example for other less developed nations. Conversely,
an unhealthy Indonesia would pose serious problems for Asia and Aus-
tralia and endanger U.S. policy objectives in the Pacific.
II. The Indonesian Setting for U.S. Policy
Indonesia has many of the key ingredients for successful devel-
opment. Separation from mainland conflicts and an ability to handle
all foreseeable internal threats permit concentration on economic sta-
bilization and development. Only partially explored but apparently ex-
tensive mineral wealth promises future increase in income, and new
rice technology may bring self-sufficiency in the nation’s basic food
crop. Moreover, the performance of the Indonesian government to date
has earned the increasing support from international agencies and Free

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H–041, SRG Meeting, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 12/22/69.
Secret. Attached to a December 16 memorandum from Holdridge and Lord to Kissinger
that explained that the summary was prepared for the Senior Review Group. A copy of
the 29-page response to NSSM–61 is also attached but not printed. Holdridge and Lord
stated in their memorandum that, “the President need only address the issues of mili-
tary assistance and the U.S. role in maintenance of a Singapore base.” They added, “We don’t
think that our policy towards these countries [the memorandum concerned Malaysia
and Singapore, as well as Indonesia] requires an NSC meeting. However, a package
should be forwarded to the President because of his personal interest in Indonesia.” The
Department of State paper was included in that package.
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600 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

World governments which is essential for the success of that nation’s

development program.
Indonesia’s weaknesses, however, match its assets. Two decades
of neglect have left Indonesia’s basic economic infrastructure in disre-
pair. Roads, railroads, ports, communications and power will require
substantial investments to provide an adequate base for economic
development.
Problems concerned with human resources loom even larger. A se-
vere shortage of technical skills and managerial expertise limits ab-
sorption of economic assistance, and the educational system must be
completely reoriented to meet this need. Even more basic impediments
to progress are the traditional attitudes and values of Indonesian soci-
ety, which can deflect foreign efforts to help. These include an emphasis
on adaptation to rather than manipulation of the environment, a ten-
dency to avoid rather than solve conflicts and problems, and a pater-
nalistic social organization which places personal relationships above
impersonal codes of conduct.
Indonesia aspires to a role in Southeast Asia commensurate with
its size and population. With this goal in mind, it hopes to see a grad-
ual lessening of the area’s dependence on major powers. It has fostered
good relations with its immediate neighbors and has attempted to build
up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into the pri-
mary vehicle for subregional cooperation. It has scrupulously followed
a policy of non-alignment on international issues while pursuing
rigidly anti-communist policies at home.
III. Current U.S. Policy Objectives
The absence of immediate security threats or of pressing bilateral
issues has permitted United States policy to focus on the long-range
goal of assisting in Indonesia’s modernization.
The United States has sought to strengthen Indonesia’s commitment
to a pragmatic approach to development. Economic progress attained
by such policies will in turn help prevent successful challenges to the
regime from internal forces hostile to U.S. interests, promote Indonesian
cooperation with the U.S. and other Free World powers, and contribute
to the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. U.S. policy ob-
jectives have respected Indonesia’s desire to maintain a balance in bi-
lateral relationships which will preserve its non-aligned status.
IV. Current U.S. Posture
Past experience cautions against certain dangers attending Amer-
ican participation in Indonesian development: (1) too prominent a role
can stimulate a fear common to Indonesia’s traditionalist masses that
modernization is in fact “Americanization” which threatens Indone-
sia’s cultural identity and political independence; (2) assistance in cer-
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Indonesia 601

tain sectors can associate the U.S. too closely with painful economic
and social changes which must accompany development; (3) Ameri-
can initiative can preempt tasks which other governments or interna-
tional agencies are willing to assume; and (4) providing American so-
lutions to Indonesian problems can inhibit the growth of indigenous
problem solvers.
To avert these dangers the United States has: (1) adopted a
multilateral approach in which the IMF, the IBRD and the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia assist in determining and meeting
Indonesian aid requirements; (2) emphasized economic assistance, lim-
iting military aid to non-combat materials tied to the development pro-
gram and avoiding direct efforts to promote social or political changes;
(3) encouraged private foreign investment; (4) maintained a “low pro-
file”, restricting the number of American personnel in Indonesia to a
bare minimum; and (5) quietly encouraged a regional approach to de-
velopment through ASEAN, ECAFE and similar organizations.
V. Alternatives in Overall U.S. Approach
The options open to the United States in defining its overall ap-
proach to Indonesia tend towards two poles:
1. Maintaining (or accentuating) the multilateral, “low profile” ap-
proach with the short-term goal of keeping Indonesia on a friendly but
non-aligned course and with a possible long-term goal of promoting
Indonesia as the nucleus for a healthy, independent Southeast Asia.
2. Leading Indonesia into a close bilateral relationship in which
the United States would take a much more direct and immediate role
in helping meet economic and social problems endangering present In-
donesian stability and in helping prepare Indonesia for a greater se-
curity role in the region; this relationship would, of course, involve
greater obligations on our part.
The United States approach can be established at many points be-
tween these two poles. Movement towards a close bilateral relation-
ship, however, cannot be easily reversed and can build up a momen-
tum of its own.
VI. Policy Alternatives
There is no single issue of such importance that it alone will set
the tone for U.S.-Indonesian relations. The United States is instead
faced with alternative approaches in several broad sectors which will
in combination define our overall posture.
The multilateral, “low profile” approach, for example, would be
reinforced by decisions to: (1) restrict our Military Assistance Program
to civic action, related transportation needs and professional training;
(2) adhere strictly to a multilateral formula in which the level of our
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602 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

economic assistance is not allowed to exceed roughly one-third of that

contributed by other nations; and (3) restrict technical assistance to cur-
rent low levels.
Some of the advantages accruing from such decisions are: (1) In-
donesia would be encouraged to focus its efforts on economic devel-
opment; (2) pressure would be kept on other foreign donors to con-
tribute; and (3) the United States would not incur the many risks arising
from a conspicuous role and a large American in-country presence.
Among the disadvantages of this approach are: (1) failure to meet
certain military requests could harm our relations with the Armed
Forces, which provide the leadership and the political base of the cur-
rent regime; (2) the multilateral framework gives less leverage for ex-
acting quid pro quos, including self-help measures, and creates delays
and uncertainties in meeting Indonesian needs; and (3) a low ceiling
on technical assistance would tend to limit efforts to improve Indone-
sia’s absorptive capacity for foreign assistance.
At the other extreme, a close bilateral association would be pro-
moted by decisions to: (1) assist in the modernization of Indonesia’s
Armed Forces; (2) disregard the multilateral approach and match avail-
able American resources to Indonesian needs; and (3) provide techni-
cal skills wherever needed.
Typical advantages deriving from these decisions are: (1) Indonesia
might be willing to share the current defense burden on the Southeast
Asian mainland; (2) a greater assurance that its foreign assistance needs
would be met would strengthen Indonesian confidence in the economic
course we advocate; and (3) Indonesia would be directed more towards
American markets for eventual military and civil purchases.
Disadvantages associated with such decisions include: (1) a sig-
nificant increase in U.S. expenditures; (2) apprehension on the part of
Indonesia’s neighbors over its increased military capabilities; (3) the
danger that we might replace contributions from other countries or in-
hibit the growth of Indonesian initiative; and (4) a hostile reaction from
Indonesia’s powerful traditionalist forces who could accuse the regime
of abandoning Indonesia’s independent course in foreign affairs and
permitting “Americanization” of the Indonesian society.
There are, of course, intermediary positions on most of these is-
sues which would provide generally less negative and less positive re-
sults than the courses outlined above. Among these are: (1) increasing
military assistance in non-combat equipment and training; (2) adjust-
ing U.S. aid levels to meet the gap in Indonesian requirements while
adhering to a multilateral framework; and (3) modestly increasing tech-
nical assistance.
(In the text of this study policy alternatives are discussed by indi-
vidual problem areas, which have been grouped together in the dis-
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Indonesia 603

cussion above for the purpose of brevity. There are other issues which
cannot be grouped with those directly affecting our overall posture to-
wards Indonesia but which will nevertheless require important policy
decisions. Among these are: (1) whether to attempt directly to foster
political and social progress or to avoid such sensitive and difficult ac-
tivities; (2) the problem of finding a suitable mix between “program”
aid and “project” aid; and (3) finding a means of settling the huge for-
eign debt inherited from the Sukarno regime which will ensure a con-
tinued flow of resources into Indonesian development and protect the
interests of donor nations.)

278. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, December 22, 1969.

SUBJECT
U.S. Aid to Indonesia in 1970

The Inter-Governmental Group of donors to Indonesia (IGGI) last

week accepted Indonesia’s request for $600 million of aid in 1970. At
Tab A are recommendations from Secretaries Richardson, Kennedy and
Hardin, concurred in by Director Mayo (Tab B),2 on the U.S. share in
that total.
The Indonesian economy has achieved stabilization and must now
move on to development. The Suharto Government has held inflation
to 7 percent in 1969 compared with 85 percent in 1968 through a pol-
icy of strict budget balancing and liberal foreign assistance in financ-
ing food and commodity imports. Both foreign and domestic invest-
ment are increasing, with emphasis on the manufacturing sector. Free
market forces have been given the major role in economic decisions.
Indonesia’s greatest problems are its slowness in developing capi-
tal projects and in making credits available for needed local investment,

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the
memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2
Tab A, a December 5 memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, and Tab B, a De-
cember 6 memorandum from Budget Director Robert Mayo to Nixon, are attached but
not printed.
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604 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

inadequate price incentives for farmers to grow more rice, an inefficient

administrative apparatus, and a shortage of private sector entrepre-
neurs and managers. U.S. assistance has focused on these points. The
World Bank is expanding its advisory and project coordinating efforts
to help as well.
Donors in the IGGI currently supply all of Indonesia’s foreign as-
sistance. Indonesia’s present request of $600 million includes $140 mil-
lion for food aid and $460 million for non-food aid. The request would
actually cover a 15-month period from January 1970 to March 1971.
AID, the IBRD, and the IMF agree that this is an appropriate aid level.
In addition, Indonesia is benefiting from a major rescheduling of debts
by most of the IGGI countries.
In the IGGI, the U.S. has adhered to a “one-third” formula. We
have agreed to pledge one-third of total non-food aid with the hope of
pressuring Japan to do the same and the other donors—the Europeans
and Australians—to supply the remaining third.
This year, the agencies propose that the U.S. pledge one-third ($125
million) of bilateral non-food aid ($375 million) and a “fair share” (ap-
proximately $105 million) of non-[sic] food aid ($140 million). Includ-
ing our share of the money which will be provided to Indonesia by the
Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, this would be slightly
more than we contributed last year.
We would pressure Japan to match our $125 million and the Eu-
ropeans and Australians together to provide the same. This proposal
ensures proper burden-sharing and represents a level which is consis-
tent with our budgetary constraints. It risks a small shortfall in meet-
ing Indonesia’s request if Japan and other donors prove niggardly, al-
though we could probably make it up late in the year if necessary.
Recommendations
1. That you authorize the U.S. to provide $105 million of Indone-
sia’s food aid requirements which total $140 million.3
2. That you authorize the U.S. to provide one-third ($125 million)
of Indonesia’s bilateral non-food aid requirements.4
Additional Point
Program loans are extended to Indonesia to finance general com-
modity imports important to her development effort. The U.S. is not
competitive in most of these, however. Indonesia therefore must sub-
sidize imports from the U.S. to use our money. The loans thus cause
an inefficient allocation of aid money and a waste of Indonesia’s local

3
Nixon initialed his approval.
4
Nixon initialed his approval.
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Indonesia 605

currency. Budget recommends that we carefully study the possibility

of liberalizing the procurement restrictions attached to our program
loans to Indonesia.5
Recommendation
That you authorize me to direct AID to study methods of liberal-
izing the procurement restrictions attached to our program loans to
Indonesia.6

5
A memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and to
the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, January 16, is attached
but not printed. Kissinger stated in the memorandum that the President had directed
that they “undertake a study of the difficulties involved in the use of U.S. program loans
to Indonesia, particularly as these difficulties relate to our present tying practices.” They
were asked for recommendations “on any measures needed to deal with the problem,
such as the possibility of partially untying such loans to permit Indonesian procurement
from other less developed countries in the region.”
6
Nixon initialed his approval.

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department

of State1

Canberra, January 14, 1970, 1610Z.

Vipto 020/285. Subj: Vice President’s Meeting with Indonesian For-

eign Minister Malik. Dept Pass AmEmbassy Djakarta.
1. The Vice President met with Foreign Minister Malik for one
hour and twenty minutes on January 11 in Bali.2 Malik was accompa-
nied by Anwar Sani and Abu Bakar Lubis. Ambassador Galbraith, Mr.
Crane and Mrs. Duemling were also present.
2. After an exchange of pleasantries, the Vice President expressed
interest in Indonesia’s economic development plans. He indicated
awareness of Indonesia’s great resources, its geographic expanse, and
asked how long the Foreign Minister thought it would take to achieve
their objectives.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Se-
cret; Immediate.
2
Kissinger prepared talking points for Agnew’s meeting with Malik in a Decem-
ber 17 memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office
Files, Box 82, V.P., Agnew Trip Dec. 1969–Jan. 1970)
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606 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

3. Malik responded that at least five years would be required just

to re-establish the economy which had been ravaged during the
Sukarno years. In this time he hoped Indonesia could become self-
sufficient in food production. The distribution infrastructure was key
because some areas produce a surplus while others are in deficit.
Indonesia’s problem was to increase its productivity for current con-
sumption at the same time it is investing in infrastructure. Foreign
investment is most welcome but it takes time for results since at least
two years are required for research and preparation. However, Malik
hoped that Indonesia would reach the “take-off point” by the end of
the first five-year plan.
4. Demographic Problems
Java presents the greatest problem because of population density
and high annual population increase. Malik reviewed Indonesia’s ex-
perience with transmigration. During the colonial period, entire fami-
lies with all their goods were evacuated, but this technique simply
transplanted the same static condition to the new location.
5. During the occupation, the Japanese engaged in forced migra-
tion. Both techniques yielded poor results. After independence, several
schemes were tried leading to general confusion. Attempts to clear vir-
gin jungle suffered from inadequate preparation, with the result that
the people’s spirits were broken before they became established. Now
the government is considering using the armed forces in jungle clear-
ance as part of their civic action program.
6. Current thinking on transmigration includes provision of jobs
and housing as well as a subsidy until migrants can earn their own liv-
ings, though this will be costly. Also, younger people will be encour-
aged to migrate (rather than entire families) since they are more ener-
getic and carry a new spirit. In addition to jungle clearing, new
industries will be created and new foreign enterprises encouraged. The
government hopes for a chain reaction relationship between foreign in-
vestment and migration.
7. The Vice President complimented Malik on the sagacity of In-
donesia’s planning for migration and its intention to balance agricul-
ture and industry. He hoped foreign investment would ameliorate the
Indonesian plans. He thought another stimulating factor could be eco-
nomic cooperation within the region. Population control remains a
problem because most people are happiest in large groups. However,
congested areas are time bombs whose potential for disruption and
civil disorder offer an easy mark to extremists. Therefore, the problem
is political as well as economic. The Vice President concluded by press-
ing his admiration for Indonesian realism on this matter and his hope
that the IGGI nations could be helpful.
8. Outcome of ASEAN Meeting
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Indonesia 607

In response to a question from the Vice President about current re-

gional cooperation on security matters, Malik reviewed in some detail
the results of the ASEAN meeting held in Malaysia in December 1969.
Malik suggested that progress so far had only resulted in agreement
on the need for cooperation. Prior to the ASEAN meeting there had
been some apprehension among the membership about one disruptive
influence of the Sabah issue, but President Marcos had the courage to
relax tensions by recognizing that a political approach as well as a ju-
ridicial one was possible. Therefore, the Philippines had been willing
to put its claim aside for the time being without actually renouncing
it. Marcos told Malik that he hopes to visit the Tunku in March or April
1970.
9. At the ASEAN meeting the five member nations recognized the
limitations of their own funds and therefore agreed on a token $1 mil-
lion contribution from each. Since they have also approved 98 projects,
it is clear that the available funds are woefully inadequate. However,
this symbolic beginning was a good one.
10. Malik expects short-term results in tourism and communica-
tions and perhaps long-term cooperation in such projects as steel pro-
duction. On the latter point he said the participants hoped to agree on
a site close to the source of raw materials.
11. Malik also mentioned several possibilities for bilateral operation
(in addition to multi-lateral): between Indonesia and the Philippines on
copra production, Indonesia and Malaysia on rubber and tin, etc.
12. Progress had also been made in reducing tensions. For exam-
ple, Malaysia in recent years had been fearful that Indonesia might be
dominated by communism, religious extremists or a military regime;
Malik thought Indonesia had helped alleviate these fears by bringing
Malaysian students over to study in the Indonesian Armed Services
Staff College. In the same spirit, Indonesia has not objected to Australia
becoming a substitute for the United Kingdom in Malaysian defense
matters. Indonesia has also attempted to calm Singapore’s apprehen-
sions about the fate of Chinese in Indonesia by easing the citizenship
requirements.
13. A common fear expressed at the ASEAN meeting, Malik said,
related to the post-Vietnam period. Since the ASEAN charter has no mil-
itary aspects, the question of defense was discussed informally, outside
the regular meetings. In the case of major war or invasion, the coun-
tries are planning to send troops to one another; in this respect the
others look primarily to Indonesia. This is compatible with Indonesia’s
forward defense doctrine which favors fighting outside Indonesian ter-
ritory in the event of a clear threat. Malik said Indonesia is not plan-
ning on this at the present time but it wishes to consider the means of
avoiding open attack. Malik said he had stressed the necessity of these
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608 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

nations demonstrating their unity and strength to help avoid attack.

They had achieved understanding on the exchange of information
among their top military intelligence officers, though this will take
place outside the ASEAN framework.
14. In considering the post-Vietnam situation, the ministers had
asked the Vietnamese and Lao observers at the meeting to explain the
situation in their countries. The Ministers then held bi-lateral talks with
the Vietnamese Foreign Minister since each country has slightly differ-
ent relations with and policies toward Vietnam. Indonesia, for exam-
ple, agreed with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister to exchange infor-
mation on subversion. Vietnam wanted to insist on the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Indonesia. But, Malik said, Indonesia is
“in different position from Thailand and the Philippines.” So for the
time being, this will not be possible. However, they have agreed to op-
erate a chamber of commerce in each others’ capitals. In response to
questions from Ambassador Galbraith, Malik and Sani said that the
chamber of commerce mechanism was chosen (rather than a trade of-
fice) to provide a private facade so as to avoid undue reation from
Communist countries. Malik pointed out, however, that each govern-
ment would be free to appoint anyone to this position and it could be
an official, even a high-ranking diplomat.
15. Additions to ASEAN
On the subject of other nations joining ASEAN, Malik provided
the following summary. Thailand thought Burma would not join be-
cause of the possible reaction from Communist China. Similarly, Cey-
lon’s trade with China is too important to jeopardize. Australia and
New Zealand are already associated with two ASEAN countries
through the Commonwealth. Malik mentioned that Australia had
asked Indonesia for its thoughts about Australian relationship to
ASEAN, as well as about the Indonesian role in in Southeast Asian se-
curity. Malik said that Indonesian cooperation with Australia and New
Zealand is improving and expanding especially through the navy and
air force. He said border problems between Australia and Indonesia in
New Guinea (Irian) had all been settled.
16. The Vice President expressed complete agreement with the
ASEAN emphasis on economic cooperation and the organizations’ ten-
tative interest in regional security. He suggested that the current dan-
ger is not so much all-out invasion as it is insurrection and infiltration.
If people have confidence in their government they will willingly com-
bat insurrection and countries which have a stake in foreign trade will
be interested in assisting their neighbors.
17. Communist China
The Vice President also mentioned steps which the US is taking to
reduce tensions with Communist China. These are small steps and we
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Indonesia 609

do not plan to relax our vigilance, but Communist China already ap-
pears to have responded with a desire to resume the Warsaw talks.
18. The Vice President then commented about US policy in Viet-
nam which was in accordance with the feelings of the American peo-
ple, though not necessarily with the views of the press. We hope to
conclude the Vietnam War as quickly as possible. However, the war is
not over and we will face a difficult problem with American public
opinion unless the nations of Southeast Asia indicate their concern and
support for our position. The Vice President pointed out that immedi-
ate disengagement, as some people urge, is not compatible with the se-
curity of Vietnam. The American public is somewhat bewildered be-
cause, although our government receives private assurances from
Southeast Asian nations, some Asian leaders often leave the impres-
sion in public that the US is not welcome.
19. As for what might be done in these circumstances, the Vice
President suggested that small nations could help if they would frankly
tell us when we are doing something wrong or abrasive. Similarly, they
should be equally frank with the Soviet Union. They could also shore
up American public opinion and counter isolationist sentiment by be-
ing equally frank when they agree with US policy. These approaches
might also help diminish tensions with the USSR and Communist
China.
20. The Vice President said that the Thieu Government is enjoy-
ing continued success. Enemy activities have decreased but major at-
tack is still possible, and its effect would not be military so much as
psychological because it would once again arouse anti-war activities
in the US. Whether or not our withdrawal is precipitate depends in
part on whether Asian nations are able to impress their concern on
American public opinion. The American people will believe one side
or the other. At the moment, President Nixon’s head-on approach has
turned public opinion in his favor but this situation would be seriously
impaired by a preemptive Communist attack. The Vice President ex-
pressed complete agreement with a toast made in Singapore by Prime
Minister Lee in which he cited the folly of notifying the Communists
about the time and level of our withdrawals. The Vice President un-
derstood the delicacy of Indonesia’s domestic politics but he hoped In-
donesia would find an opportunity to indicate that the Americans are
wanted in Asia.
21. Foreign Minister Malik replied that the subject of the Ameri-
can presence now and in the future had often been discussed among
the Southeast Asian nations. They do not favor a precipitate withdrawal
because they are not yet prepared to assume the defense burden, al-
though they cannot admit this publicly. (Malik said that even after the
Vietnam War is over America should not become isolationist because
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610 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

its assistance will be needed. When he last saw President Nixon in

Washington he had expressed this need and also mentioned the need
to determine how Southeast Asian nations can help Vietnam.) The Vice
President mentioned how impressed he had been while visiting Viet-
nam with the cooperation between US and Vietnamese troops. If the
US adheres to reasonable levels of withdrawal, we can successfully
transfer responsibility to the Vietnamese. He also drew an analogy with
our experience in Korea where, today, very few US troops are involved.
Korea is also an example of how a country’s ability to defend itself de-
pends on economic stability.
22. Bilateral Relations
Malik said he would not wish to conclude the meeting without
mentioning US-Indonesian relations, which he thought were going
well. He particularly commended our understanding of Indonesia’s
needs, as demonstrated at the recent IGGI meeting, and hoped In-
donesia would also have our support in convincing other nations that
they should help. The Vice President said that our ability to respond
depends on our own budgetary situation. We look upon assistance as
an investment in world society. However, many Americans think our
efforts are not appreciated. The Vice President recognized the problem
of incurring reactions from Communist states, but he thought coun-
tries like Indonesia should take a calculated risk in this matter. The Vice
President thought it was important for nations to make clear which
economic system they favored and which promised them the greatest
gains.
23. Malik said that the Indonesian people recognize what the US
has done and this recognition will be made clearer in the future.
24. The Vice President asked Malik to convey his best wishes to
President Suharto, expressed his regrets at not being able to visit
Djakarta but stated that he looks forward to seeing President Suharto
when he visits Washington. Malik indicated he would transmit this
message.
Rice
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280. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and
Secretary of Defense Laird1

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT
MAP Alternatives for Indonesia

At the Review Group Meeting on December 22, 1969,2 it was

agreed that the Departments of State and Defense would prepare a
memorandum for the President spelling out in broad terms the equip-
ment which would be supplied under the military aid program for In-
donesia, under Options 3 and 4 of Section VI B of NSSM 61.3
The consensus in the Review Group was that the program should
be somewhat larger than at present and that there should be a judi-
cious addition of combat equipment to the present program, which is
limited to civil action equipment.
The President believes that his conversations with President
Suharto oblige him to proceed with a combat/civil action mix, between
Options 3 and 4. For planning purposes a program level of about $15
million should be assumed. (If supplies are available from surplus
stocks, they could of course be utilized, reducing somewhat the need
for additional MAP appropriations.)
The report to the President should be submitted by February 2.4
Henry A. Kissinger

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia. Vol. I. Secret.
2
Minutes of the meeting were not found.
3
See Document 277 and footnote 1 thereto.
4
See Document 283 and footnote 2 thereto.
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612 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

281. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT
U.S. Provision of 10 C–47 Aircraft to Indonesian Armed Forces

On January 21 I asked Brig. General Suhud, Indonesian Military

Attaché, to stop by my office. Upon his arrival, I informed him that the
U.S. had decided to provide the Indonesian Armed Forces with 10 C–47
aircraft, and that these aircraft would be arriving in Djakarta shortly. I
stressed to him that these aircraft were being made available as a di-
rect consequence of President Nixon’s conversation with President
Suharto in Djakarta last July, and that I would appreciate his passing
this information to President Suharto and General Sumitro. I added
that in the meantime appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government were
giving further consideration to the question of providing military as-
sistance to Indonesia, and that he should not necessarily take the 10
C–47s as the end of the story.
General Suhud, who had not heard of the provision of the C–47s,
appeared very pleased. He asked if he might now discuss with Defense
the arrangements which had been made for sending the aircraft to In-
donesia. Since our Embassy in Djakarta had told the Indonesians there
about this matter, I informed General Suhud that I could see no objec-
tion to his getting in touch with Defense, but that I would appreciate
his not informing Defense that he had heard of the matter from me.
General Suhud informed me inter alia that he is returning to
Djakarta early next month to assume a new post. He believes that this
position will be Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Indone-
sian Army. His replacement will not be informed as to the contact which
he, Suhud, had been maintaining with the White House, and hence any
further communications would need to be via the special channel
which had been set up last summer in Djakarta.
John H. Holdridge

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a January 22
covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger that indicates Kissinger saw the
memorandum.
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Indonesia 613

282. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Washington, February 2, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration In-

telligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Files, Indonesia. Secret;
Sensitive. Extract—1 page of source text not declassified.]

283. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers
and Secretary of Defense Laird1

Washington, March 11, 1970.

SUBJECT
Additional MAP for Indonesia

The President has directed the following actions, in response to

the memorandum of February 4 from the Secretary of State.2
1. An expanded MAP program for Indonesia is approved on an
annual basis totaling approximately $15 million per year (including the
imputed valuation of items supplied from excess stocks), with the five
year projection strictly for planning purposes. No commitments for a
five year program should be implied, nor should the program be de-
signed so as to provide more gradual deliveries in the early years with
a speed-up toward the close of the period.
2. Because of his conversations with President Suharto the Presi-
dent has directed that there should be more combat matériel than is en-
visaged in the illustrative program enclosed with the memorandum of
February 4. There should be informal consultations with the Indonesian
Armed Forces as to their combat equipment priorities, in order to de-
termine what combat matériel should be considered for the program.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret. Also sent to Bureau of the Budget director Mayo.
2
See Document 280; Rogers’ February 4 memorandum has not been not found.
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614 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

3. A supplemental MAP appropriation bill should not be required

in order to finance the $10 million increase over the original budget for
MAP for Indonesia in FY 1971. This increase should be met from de-
ductions from other programs and insofar as possible from maximum
use of excess stocks.
4. You are authorized to proceed immediately with discussions
with the Indonesians.
5. The nature of the proposed program should be definitively
spelled out prior to President Suharto’s visit in late May.
Henry A. Kissinger

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Indonesia1

Washington, March 31, 1970, 0155Z.

046476. For Ambassador from Asst. Secretary Green.

1. Public statements by Adam Malik clearly show his awareness
of importance of Cambodia to security Southeast Asia, including In-
donesia. As reported by FBIS, Malik told press March 25 that “what is
happening in Cambodia at present is a change of government and that
Indonesia recognizes the government currently in power in that coun-
try.” Malik added that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from
Cambodia since their presence only “endangers situation in SEA.”
2. Request you see Malik at earliest convenient moment to discuss
developments in Cambodia as they relate to security of Southeast Asia.
After commending him for his above statement, you might point out
to him that we too fully support the neutrality and territorial integrity
of Cambodia. Communist allegations of US involvement in Cambo-
dian affairs are absolutely without foundation. These charges are an

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CAMB–INDON.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Green and Masters on March 30, cleared by Haig
in the White House and Wingate Lloyd (S/S), and approved by Green.
2
In telegram 46727 to Djakarta, March 31, Green advised Galbraith in part that if
ASEAN countries were “to play [a] useful role with regard to Cambodia, it [is] impor-
tant that they publicly announce their support for Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial
integrity at earliest possible moment. I therefore do not believe you should await Ma-
lik’s return April 4 or 5 [from Bonn] but should try to see Suharto soonest and encour-
age Indonesian initiative through him.” (Ibid.)
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Indonesia 615

obvious effort to divert attention from the undeniable fact that there
are perhaps 40,000 North Vietnamese encamped on Cambodian soil
plus some 5,000 Viet Cong. It was in order to gain international sup-
port, including that of Moscow and Peking, for the removal of these
NV/VC forces that Sihanouk set out on his trip. Meanwhile, Lon Nol
is continuing efforts to talk with Hanoi and PRG to get them to remove
these forces and there are now unconfirmed reports and rumors that
Communists may be seeking to attack and overthrow Government of
Cambodia or to extend control over various parts of country.
3. Under these circumstances, would be most useful if Asian coun-
tries were to register their concern over developments in Cambodia
and their support for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity,
much the way Malik has already done (see para 1). If this could be
done by ASEAN countries speaking with common voice, this would
be particularly impressive, but if ASEAN as an organization shrinks
from being involved in this kind of an issue, then it would be second
best if ASEAN member countries could speak up on their own. In any
event, it is better for Asians to take the lead than it is for US or Euro-
pean countries. Moreover, any indication that US was putting Asian
countries up to making such statement would be unfortunate.
4. I leave it to your best judgment and finesse as to how to han-
dle this issue with Malik in a way likely to result in ASEAN (or fail-
ing that, ASEAN member countries) making their position clear along
above lines. It is not our intention to approach other ASEAN countries
on this issue since this should be a purely Asian initiative. Indeed I
would hope you could handle conversation in such a way that Malik
would make suggestion himself about ASEAN or ASEAN member
countries making statement and that he would follow through with
them.
Rogers
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616 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, April 2, 1970, 0930Z.

2311. For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador. Ref: State

46727.2
1. In meeting with Suharto evening April 1, I told him I had a mat-
ter of some urgency that I had wanted to discuss with FonMin Malik
but he was abroad. It was matter which I thought had to be consid-
ered at top level.
2. I said situation in Cambodia and question of preserving Cam-
bodia’s neutrality were most worrisome. I said Malik’s statement a few
days earlier stressing the importance of Cambodia’s neutrality had
been helpful. I spoke of the importance of underlining and doing all
possible to preserve Cambodian neutrality, and of the difficulty for U.S.
to do much because we were already accused of having been some-
how involved in change of governments in Phnom Penh. I emphasized,
of course, this not true and Suharto appeared accept this. I asked
whether Suharto had thoughts about what might be done, whether
there had been any consultation with Indonesia’s neighbors, whether
he thought it might help if group of Asian nations such as ASEAN were
to evidence interest and support for Cambodia’s neutrality.
3. Suharto said current events in Cambodia were difficult to in-
terpret, because of paucity of information and conflicting reports. It
was necessary to study the Cambodian situation carefully in order de-
termine whether support to Lon Nol was indeed the way to preserve
Cambodian neutrality and the best chance for Cambodia’s continued
independence. He reflected considerable caution that Indonesia not be
caught in support, verbally or otherwise, of an unsuccessful Cambo-
dian regime, or in a posture which would both weaken Cambodia and
be seen as collusion between GOI and USG.
4. Suharto thought best thing currently to be done was to try to
strengthen support among Asian nations for UN consideration of
threats to Cambodian neutrality and he implied that GOI was prepared
to support such an effort.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2
See footnote 2, Document 284.
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Indonesia 617

5. Suharto said that if it developed that Lon Nol was able con-
solidate FARK and people behind him and he needed outside help,
GOI would be prepared try to help him. But, Suharto said, Indonesia
had no physical possibility of helping Cambodia.
6. Suharto added that it might be vital to U.S. position in SVN that
Lon Nol receive help and perhaps GOI could serve as channel for U.S.
assistance which would, if given directly, otherwise compromise Cam-
bodian neutrality. I said it would be next to impossible in American
system to channel our assistance in any way that would not become
known and further complicate problem.
7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]3 reports GOI has
sent message to Indon delegation UN to quietly but urgently push for
some move by U Thant. GOI is thinking of UN peacekeeping force for
Cambodia and, if requested by UN, GOI would be prepared to partic-
ipate in such a force, along with such other truly non-aligned nations
as Burma and Sweden. But only if UN requested GOI participation.
GOI believes there need for prompt UN action and is worried that U
Thant will drag feet and do nothing. GOI has not discussed this plan
with RKG, nor has GOI offered any assistance to RKG.
8. Comment: As we have noted previously, Suharto, while ap-
pearing to realize importance of maintaining Indonesia’s non-aligned
position, does not appear always to realize nuances of protecting that
position. Malik and FonDept generally take care of this aspect. Suharto
appeared stimulated by our discussion of this problem but I have feel-
ing he needs Malik’s guidance. In any case, my discussions on Cam-
bodian problem here last few days reveal that Indonesians are think-
ing mainly of UN not ASEAN as vehicle for group action and they
obviously want to be part of larger and non-aligned supported effort.
Galbraith

3
Not found.
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618 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Indonesia1

Washington, April 15, 1970, 0023Z.

055342. For Ambassador Galbraith from Asst. Secretary Green.

1. You may have noted today’s Phnom Penh broadcast declaring
Cambodia’s adherence to neutrality and spirit of Bandung, and in-
forming international community of necessity “to accept all uncondi-
tional foreign aid from all sources for national safety.” In your estima-
tion, would GOI be willing to assist Cambodia, even in small token
way? What would be GOI’s attitude towards US-financed Indonesian
assistance to Cambodia on a covert basis? What are the chances of keep-
ing such a transaction covert?
2. Since Cambodian Army (FARK) utilizes AK–47 rifles, we would
be particularly interested in knowing whether Indonesians might have
any AK–47’s and ammunition which could be made available for Cam-
bodia. (We understand Indonesia manufactures AK–47 ammunition.)2
In addition, is there any other military equipment which Indonesians
might have that might be of immediate usefulness to FARK?
3. Would appreciate your information and opinions on above
queries soonest. Foregoing should not be discussed with GOI.
Rogers

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Green on April 14, and cleared by Under
Secretary Johnson, Director Dirk Gleysteen (S/S-S), and Kissinger at the White House.
2
The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) considered possible types and
quantities of assistance to Cambodia in a meeting on April 14. According to the minutes
of the meeting, Johnson raised the question of possible “Indonesian sources” for AK–47
rifles and ammunition. Green stated that the Indonesians had “a small factory in Ban-
dung” that produced AK–47s and some ammunition, but he did not know “whether the
production is in excess of their own needs.” William Nelson of the CIA added that In-
donesia was “the only possible sizable source within reach of Cambodia” and that they
had “about 15,000 AK–47s issued to their own troops.” Kissinger stated that if the In-
donesians were to give AK–47s to Cambodia, “we would have to replace them with
American rifles.” He then asked how long it would take “to get delivery from Indone-
sia” and how “the rifles would be routed to Cambodia.” Nelson replied, “If the ship-
ment were to be completely covert, we could make arrangements with the Indonesians
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. They could arrange commercial air shipment
to Cambodia.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Insti-
tutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)
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Indonesia 619

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, April 15, 1970, 1030Z.

2645. For Asst Secretary Green from Ambassador. Ref: A. State

55342;2 B. Djakarta 2631.3
1. Within few hours after dispatch ref B, Sudjatmoko on instruc-
tions from Pres. Suharto reiterated to me Indonesia’s willingness to as-
sist Lon Nol Government with small arms if U.S. willing replenish and
said Suharto awaiting US reaction. Sudjatmoko obviously not in com-
plete agreement with his President’s position but dutifully carried out
instructions.
2. According to Sudjatmoko President told him this morning that
Cambodia must be helped and that Indonesia should do its best to be
of assistance since, because of historical background, Thailand would
have difficulty and, to preserve Cambodia’s neutrality, US should not
become directly involved. Indonesia only logical country available and
Suharto willing to provide training within Indonesia, and small arms.
Lon Nol has asked GOI specifically for small arms for two to three di-
visions. Indonesia might be able to help with small arms for brigade
but could not supply quantities required without replenishment by the
United States. Arms for Cambodia would not be of US manufacture
and Sudjatmoko said to Suharto that Indonesia could handle transport
by air, ferry and sea. In response to my query Sudjatmoko said that,
while President did not specifically say so, he had implied GOI sup-
ply of arms to Lon Nol government would be open although replen-
ishment by US would be kept confidential.
3. Sudjatmoko raised with Suharto the implications for Indone-
sian non-alignment if such collusion between US and Indonesia be-
came known. He also said he had explained to Suharto the cautious
hedging of both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists in their
support for Sihanouk and effect on entire Indo-China conflict if In-
donesia were to become so openly involved. Suharto apparently un-
deterred by Sudjatmoko cautions but told Sudjatmoko that he had in-
formed Lon Nol to go slowly in shift from monarchy to republic and

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis.
2
Document 286.
3
Telegram 2631 from Djakarta, April 15, reported Suharto’s indications of his will-
ingness for Indonesia to support Cambodia. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Ma-
terials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II)
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620 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

that he had urged Lon Nol to try to use Sihanouk or Queen Mother to
neutralize their supporters, somewhat in the fashion he had used
Sukarno’s supporters after 1965 coup.
4. Sudjatmoko intends to discuss this whole matter with Malik ei-
ther in Djakarta or Bangkok Friday or Saturday. It’s our impression that
neither Malik nor others in FonDept had, before Suharto talked to Sud-
jatmoko, been cut in on Suharto’s plans to assist RKG.
5. In light of what appears to be specific request from Lon Nol to
Suharto and Suharto’s willingness to be forthcoming, it appears GOI
would be amenable to move ahead along lines ref A with some assur-
ance US approved of such action and would be willing to provide re-
plenishment for arms given to RKG. However, when Malik returns, he
may try to slow down Suharto.
6. Sudjatmoko’s task was to be sure I got message and reported
it to you which I assured him was case.
Galbraith

288. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 17, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member
William R. Smyser, Staff Member
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State,
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

SUBJECT
Dr. Kissinger’s Conversation with Ambassadors Green and Sullivan

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559,
Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was
held in the White House Situation Room. On April 21 Holdridge sent this memorandum
to Kissinger who approved it on June 1, with the proviso “Just for our files and my per-
sonal ones.” (Attached memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, April 21; ibid.)
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Indonesia 621

Following are the highlights of Dr. Kissinger’s luncheon con-

versation with Ambassadors Green and Sullivan in the White House
situation room on April 17, 1970.
[Omitted here is discussion of Cambodia.]
Military Assistance to Indonesia
Mr. Green raised the subject of US military assistance to Indone-
sia. The Indonesians had asked us for 40 T–37 jet trainers, and he and
Ambassador Galbraith both felt that this was not advisable. For one
thing, the cost of the T–37s would virtually take up the whole aid pro-
gram, and in addition he doubted that jets would be a good idea. The
Australians, for example, were opposed to them. He proposed instead
that our aid be confined to transport-type aircraft such as C–47s and
C–130s which could be converted as gunships and thus might meet the
Indonesians’ desire for combat equipment. He appreciated the desire
of the Indonesian Air Force to get jets and the morale factors involved,
but thought that giving the T–37s was going too far.
Dr. Kissinger responded with the observation that the President
would probably ask, if confronted with State’s position, why it would not
be possible to give the Indonesians at least some of what they wanted,
say perhaps 5 or 10 T–37s. Mr. Green agreed that this could be done.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, April 19, 1970, 1130Z.

2738. Subj: Indonesian Help to Cambodia. For Asst Sec Green from
Ambassador.
1. At informal Sunday luncheon meeting at residence, General
Alamsjah, who as you know is one of President Suharto’s closest ad-
visers, raised Cambodian issue with me. He indicated awareness of my
talk with Suharto and of at least my first talk with Sumuatmoko and
he asked whether I’d had any response from Washington on proposi-
tion that if Indonesia gave arms assistance U.S. would replenish. After
my negative reply Alamsjah urged I try again.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Coun-
try Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:12 a.m.
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622 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

2. Alamsjah said it was Indonesia’s assessment that unless Lon

Nol Government received arms and other help within next two weeks
it might fail. Result of that would be increased Communist threat in
Southeast Asia.
3. Alamsjah said Indonesia felt it urgent to get small arms for
from five to ten battalions into Cambodia within next two weeks. He
indicated Indonesia was prepared to do this (I asked him if Indone-
sia was thinking of supplying AK–47s and he indicated vaguely that
this was possible) but that unless these arms were replenished In-
donesia itself might be facing increased internal threat. Alamsjah said
Indonesia was prepared to supply small arms, training assistance both
within Cambodia and in Indonesia, and close air support. Latter
would depend entirely, however, on willingness U.S. to supply T–37s
and OV–10s.
4. I told Alamsjah that I thought it best that Indonesia work out
with Cambodian Government whatever assistance it thought it should
and could give without reference to any arrangement with U.S. I said
I thought questions of U.S. supply of small arms and aircraft to In-
donesia should be quite separate matter. I said otherwise some leak
linking two was almost inevitable and would be devastating. Alams-
jah indicated agreement in principle but said some reassurance from
U.S. that replenishment would follow was essential.
5. Alamsjah said Suharto thinking in terms of flying small arms
into Cambodia from and basing any air support for Cambodia on
Natuna Island which about two hours flying time from Phnom Penh.
6. I asked Alamsjah whether Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who
I knew had some ideas on trying to shore up Cambodian neutrality on
diplomatic front, was aware and approved of Indonsia military assist-
ance to Cambodia. Alamsjah answered affirmatively. He said he had
discussed it with Malik before latter left for Manila a little over a week
ago and Malik had commented that it was important that whatever
was done be done expeditiously.
7. Alamsjah said Suharto regarded Indonesian efforts to help
Cambodia to be implementation of the Nixon Doctrine.
8. Comment: You and I know that Alamsjah unlikely to be most
coordinated chanel in Indonesian Government. But he is close to
Suharto and I have hunch that he accurately reflects Suharto’s think-
ing. He may not be au courant with Sutopo Juwono [1 line of source text
not declassified]2, indeed Sutopo may not yet have made pitch to

2
Not found.
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Indonesia 623

Suharto. Sutopo in turn probable awaiting Malik’s return and perhaps

return Indonesian team from Cambodia.
9. Although there is serious doubt in my mind that Indonesians
would be very effective in this, their first, exercise in providing military
assistance to beleagured neighbors, I tend to think it would be salutary
for them to get their feet a little wet in their attempt to give content to
the Nixon Doctrine on Asians taking intitative. I suggest therefore that
I be authorized to suggest to Suharto that they work out whatever they
think they can and should do to block expansion of Communist threat
in Cambodia and that they will find U.S. sympathetic to problems of re-
placement and replenishment which, however, must be handled quite
separately and unrelated to what they do for Cambodia.
Galbraith

290. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for

National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, April 21, 1970.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Indonesia.]

On Indonesia, Suharto wants training rather than weapons as I
understand it. This should be a very easy request to fill. In any event,
I hereby direct that we go forward on the Indonesian military request
in the event that Suharto wants it, particularly since it is minimal and
completely consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. McCain tells me that
Djakarta has ordered the Soviet technicians out. They have no spare
parts for their Soviet equipment and, consequently, may have to come
to us eventually for equipment.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559,
Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Confidential.
2
According to an April 20 memorandum from the President’s Military Aide Gen-
eral John Hughes to Kissinger, the President met with Admiral John S. McCain, CINC-
PAC, on April 19. Admiral McCain said that his recent visit to Indonesia was “the first
CINCPAC visit there and he had received a good reception.” McCain said that “Suharto
felt strongly that the Fort Leavenworth training for his Army officers helped greatly in
defeating the communists.” McCain then told the President that the Indonesians were
in the process of expelling Soviet technicians, and that the Soviets had not provided spare
parts for the equipment that they had furnished. (Ibid.)
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624 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, April 23, 1970, 0430Z.

2859. For Asst Sec Green from Ambassador. Subj: Indonesian Ini-
tiative on Cambodia. Ref: Djakarta 2763.2
1. Malik told me this morning (I met him with dawn patrol on
golf course) that he is shooting for conference of 12 or 14 Asian nations
at either Kuala Lumpur or Djakarta in early May.
2. I asked Malik whether he was trying to convene preparatory
meeting before main conference in early May. He replied in negative.
I asked him which countries would be sponsoring conference. He said
Thailand, Japan, New Zealand, and Indonesia. I asked him whether
Australia would also sponsor. He said there hadn’t been time to get
Australian Foreign Minister’s approval when he talked to him but that
Australian Foreign Minister had announced approval publicly in last
day or two.
3. Malik said he had met with North Vietnamese Chargé yester-
day and asked latter to convey to his Government Malik’s ideas about
conference and invitation to attend. Malik said Chargé’s response re-
flected irritation. Chargé called Cambodian Government illegal, said
coup had been arranged by American CIA and that American troops
were in Cambodia. Malik responded that GOI information indicated
Government of Cambodia legal with approval of legislature. Malik said
perhaps North Vietnamese had information on CIA involvement which
Indonesia did not have but Indonesia’s information indicated there
were no American troops in Cambodia.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2
Telegram 2763 from Djakarta, April 20, reported Ambassador Galbraith’s meet-
ing on April 19 with Foreign Minister Malik. Malik had met shortly before that with
Suharto to discuss Indonesian ideas on assisting Cambodia. Galbraith reported that “Ma-
lik suggested we continue to drag our feet on responding to Suharto on proposal that
U.S. replenish Indonesian arms supply to Cambodia. I said I thought it was highly im-
practical to link U.S. military assistance to Indonesia to Indonesian assistance to Cam-
bodia. Malik indicated agreement and said he had made this point to Suharto. I said I
was somewhat concerned however that Suharto felt he should receive response from me
to questions he had put to me. Malik said I didn’t need to worry, he had told Suharto
he would be talking to me on Cambodia.” Galbraith concluded “there is obvious lack
of consensus among various advisers to Suharto on how to help Cambodia. I suggest
we go along with Malik for a few days.” (Ibid.)
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Indonesia 625

4. Malik said with obvious relish that North Vietnamese are now
on defensive and that “we had seized the initiative.”
5. I told Malik that we were most interested in his efforts and were
rooting for him.
Galbraith

292. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 5, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS
Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko
Dr. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT
Comments by Indonesian Ambassador on Cambodian Developments

Ambassador Soedjatmoko thanked Dr. Kissinger for receiving him

in what must be a very busy period. However, he was very pressed by
two problems: the conference Indonesia was planning to hold on Cam-
bodia, and the Suharto visit here; and the connection between these
developments and what was happening in Washington. He would ap-
preciate clarification on the decisions taken to move into Cambodia,
and on the resumption of the bombing. Dr. Kissinger interjected that
we had not resumed the bombing and our activities over North Viet-
nam had been stopped after we had achieved what we wanted.
In reply to a question from the Ambassador on whether this was
a one-shot affair, Dr. Kissinger said that it depended on the other side,
but that our intention was not to go on day after day.
Returning to the subject of Cambodia, the Ambassador asked
whether the conclusion could be drawn that the US had given up on
establishing buffer states? Dr. Kissinger stated that it had not been the
US which had moved into Cambodia, established bases, and expelled
the Cambodian authorities. We were not going to occupy Cambodia,

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge on
May 5 and approved by Kissinger on May 7.
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626 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

but would destroy supplies and then withdraw. We were not going to
march on Phnom Penh, and would be delighted if all foreign forces
could be withdrawn from Cambodia and Indo-China. Our purpose was
to protect our own forces and to protect Cambodia.
As to buffer states, Dr. Kissinger noted that we had no interest in
staying on in that region, and would expect, welcome, and support
anything which other states encouraged. We had had nothing to do in
instigating the Cambodian situation, and had accepted the situation
under Sihanouk. The Communists had then moved out of their bases
and had shown that they themselves did not accept a buffer state.
Continuing, Dr. Kissinger stressed to Ambassador Soedjatmoko
that he could assure his President and the highest levels of authority
in Indonesia that we wanted buffer states, and that if the Asian nations
desire a security system we would be glad to withdraw. We believed
that what we were doing was in the interest of the neutral nations in
Asia.
The Ambassador declared that he was relieved to hear what Dr.
Kissinger had said—he had been starting to be less sure on these points.
Dr. Kissinger said that the situation reminded him of a joke, in which
somebody was hitting a mule over the head with a sledge hammer,
and when asked why, had said that he had to do something to get the
mule’s attention.
Ambassador Soedjatmoko recalled that in the President’s April 30
speech,2 there had been a heavy reference to the credibility of the US.
Was this credibility with respect to Hanoi, or to the the Soviet and Chi-
nese Communists? Dr. Kissinger expressed the opinion that the issues
were closely related, to which the Ambassador remarked that he would
have expected a slightly lighter tone if we had been focusing only on
Hanoi. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that it was hard to distinguish. This was
the most dangerous situation in the world, and Hanoi knew both pub-
licly and privately that if it moved on Phnom Penh we would do some-
thing. It knew, too, that if it stepped up US casualties, we would do
something. The situation affected not only Hanoi but other countries.
We were not looking for a confrontation, though.
Ambassador Soedjatmoko said that there was some pressure in In-
donesia to call off the conference on Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger observed
that this would be a mistake, to which the Ambassador responded with
the reassurance that his Foreign Minister still believed the conference

2
In his address to the nation on the situation in Southeast Asia of April 30, Presi-
dent Nixon explained that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would launch attacks “to
clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border,” where “North
Vietnam in the last 2 weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty
or the neutrality of Cambodia.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410)
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Indonesia 627

should be held. Dr. Kissinger agreed, but emphasized that it should be

an Asian initiative and that we would make no public endorsement.3
Ambassador Soedjatmoko mentioned that when President Suharto
arrives, it may be at a time when issues were heightened in the US.
President Suharto was scheduled to have a meeting with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Was there a danger that the visit might
become politically utilized or embarrassing? Dr. Kissinger thought that
the visit would not be embarrassing for the Administration, although
almost certainly an effort would be made to embarrass Suharto and to
show that Asians disapprove of our policy. Nevertheless, having seen
President Suharto in action, Dr. Kissinger had great confidence in his
ability to be enigmatic. Ambassador Soedjatmoko laughingly referred
to inscrutable Asians, and Dr. Kissinger said that occidentals could be
inscrutable too.
Dr. Kissinger expressed confidence that the Suharto visit could be
handled tactfully. His estimate, based on what he knew, was that Pres-
ident Suharto was not excessively pained by our policy and if he ex-
pressed his views carefully would be understood and not embarrassed.
We were looking forward to his visit, and would do everything we
could for its success.
Ambassador Soedjatmoko raised a minor point: if the two Presi-
dents met alone, he hoped it would be possible to have the Foreign
Minister meet with Under Secretary Richardson and Dr. Kissinger at
the same time. (Secretary Rogers would be in Rome.) Dr. Kissinger ex-
plained that a decision would be needed as to whether he would sit in
with the President; if not, he would certainly sit in with the Foreign
Minister.
Dr. Kissinger asked if there were any special wishes from Presi-
dent Suharto which the Ambassador wanted to convey. He wanted to
reassure the Indonesians that we understood their position. We wanted
a neutral Indonesia, and didn’t expect a blanket endorsement of our
policies. We thought that what we were doing in Cambodia was in
their own interest, and undertake not to hurt their neutrality but to
protect it. Our operations were limited, as would become apparent

3
In a memorandum to Kissinger, May 4, Holdridge stressed some of these very
points, noting that the United States Government would be “glad to see Indonesians and
other Asians taking the lead in trying to do something for Cambodia,” and that a “pub-
lic U.S. endorsement would harm rather than help the conference.” Holdridge noted also
the U.S. hope “that any resolution on withdrawal of foreign forces does not seem to be
pointed at us, whose presence is admitted and can be documented, rather than equally
at the Vietnamese Communists, whose presence there long antedates ours, but who re-
fuse to admit it.”
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628 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

when they were completed. Our main purpose was to strike at enemy
logistics.
In conclusion, Ambassador Soedjatmoko referred again to the
point of a neutral buffer zone and said that Dr. Kissinger’s remarks
had clarified the US position in this respect.

293. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT
Determination to Permit Continuation of the Grant Military Assistance Program
to Indonesia

Under Secretary Richardson (Tab B)2 requests that you sign a de-
termination authorizing the use of FY 1970 military assistance funds in
excess of $3 million to provide defense articles to Indonesia. Similar
determinations were made in 1968 and 1969.
Section 505(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act limits the provision
of grant defense articles to any country to $3 million per fiscal year if
the articles are not to be utilized for the maintenance of the defensive
strength of the free world. Military assistance to Indonesia is not con-
sidered to do so.
However, Section 614(a) of the Act permits a waiver of Section
505(6)(2) when the President determines that such assistance is im-
portant to the security of the U.S. State feels that it is, and Budget con-
curs (Tab C).3
The proposed $5.8 million program for Indonesia for FY 1970 is a
continuation of our prior civic action-type programs in substance,
amount, and purpose. It helps the Indonesian military focus on con-
structive economic rehabilitation work, thereby bringing it closer to the
people, and improves our working relationship with the Government.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 370, Sub-
ject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71–10. Secret. Sent for action.
2
Attached at Tab B, but not printed, was Richardson’s April 3 memorandum re-
questing $5.8 million in grant military assistance to Indonesia.
3
Attached but not printed.
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Indonesia 629

Congress has been informed of the justifications for the proposed

grant assistance.
Recommendation
That you sign the determination at Tab A.4

4
Attached at Tab A, but not printed, was Presidential Determination No. 70–8, May
18, authorizing the grant assistance Richardson had requested.

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, May 21, 1970, 0430Z.

3709. For Asst Sec Green from Amb.

1. I had an hour’s pre-departure discussion alone with President
Suharto last night providing me with insight into what he will want
to discuss with President Nixon.
2. I began conversation by congratulating Suharto on outcome of
Asian conference and way it had been handled. He said he hoped that
conference and follow-up, if successful, might serve as pattern which
could be used further to deal with situations in Laos and South Viet-
nam. He indicated that achieving consensus between divergent views
of South Koreans and South Vietnamese, who wanted to condemn
Communists, and, for example, Singapore, which was anxious to avoid
damaging its trading and financial interests with both USSR and Red
China, was difficult.
3. This led Suharto into further derogatory comment on Singa-
pore. He said that although leadership of Singapore was perhaps free
of any dominating influence by Peking, there were many Chinese in
Singapore who looked toward Communist China. For this reason he
thought great care should be taken in providing Singapore with
weapons which might be transferred to Communists. He made spe-
cific reference to M–16 factory, production of which might some day
fall into hands of Communists. [11⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] I
explained to Suharto genesis of Singapore’s acquisition of factory and
limitations on and control of M–16 production.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDON. Se-
cret; Priority; Exdis.
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630 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

4. Suharto discussed briefly talks he had had with both Cambo-

dian and South Vietnamese Foreign Ministers about possible Indone-
sian material assistance to Cambodia. He indicated that arms and am-
munition caches in Cambodian sanctuaries should provide source arms
and ammunition which Indonesia was in no position, in any case, to
supply. Cambodian army lacked training, however, in guerrilla war-
fare and there was inadequate understanding of how army and peo-
ple in Cambodia should work together to defend Cambodia against
NVN/VC. Suharto indicated that Indonesia was prepared to provide
training in this general field.
5. I outlined to Suharto results of study in Washington of MAP
program we had worked out with Hankam for FY 71. I mentioned pos-
sibilities of substituting T–28s for T–37s, situation with respect to C–47s,
substitutions we were considering in naval patrol craft, possible avail-
ability of two lsts and possibility of requirement for communications
system for Hankam. I said it had become clear in going over our rec-
ommendations that list we had submitted and substitutions which
would probably be required would come to great deal more than $10
million addition to MAP. Some selectivity on basis of priorities would
be required. I said we would welcome Suharto’s views on priorities.
6. In commenting on foregoing, Suharto began by describing ad-
ditional difficulties which Indonesia was undergoing in trying to get
spare parts for Soviet equipment, implying that Soviet-Indonesian re-
lations had further deteriorated. He said it had originally been planned
to try to maintain this equipment and make it do through five-year
plan but that this, in the face of difficulties, indeed impossibilities, of
securing Soviet spare parts made this plan impractical. It would be nec-
essary to scrap Soviet cruiser, “West Irian”, destroyers and some 16
other vessels which were completely useless. Likewise with antonovs,
of which three had been flying, it would be impossible to keep these
going beyond next overhaul requirements. Suharto said it was neces-
sary, therefore, in terms of Indonesia’s internal defense and minimum
deterrent to outside aggression to find, by end of 1971, source of equip-
ment for armed forces. Clearly he hopes this will be the U.S.
7. Suharto said he hopes to speak to President Nixon in terms of
possible commitment for four years beginning FY 1972 which would
permit some rational planning and relieve him from trying set priori-
ties now. This would make it possible to plan equipment to be acquired
for armed forces by end of four years and to adjust in the meantime
to availabilities and financial and other problems on U.S. side.
8. Suharto said acquisition of military equipment Indonesia will
need to insure its internal security, minimum of deterrent to outside
agression and some potential for cooperating in strategic terms with
U.S. in area could be provided on either grant or credit basis or both.
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Indonesia 631

9. I told Suharto that I couldn’t comment on possibilities beyond

FY 71 commitment which President Nixon had already decided. I
thought it would be difficult for President, in face of Congressional
questioning of expanded military involvement in Southeast Asia, to
make forward commitment of this kind and I knew he would not want
to make commitment unless he was certain he could fulfill it. I assured
Suharto President Nixon would listen sympathetically.
10. Replying to my question what other subjects he might want
to discuss, Suharto mentioned need for capital investment needed to
effect increased timber exports and income therefrom and to stimulate
tourism and investment in facilities therefore. Suharto indicated desire
to explore EX–IM Bank loans for purposes of expanding airports in
Djakarta and Bali to accommodate jumbo jets, which he felt would in
turn bring private investment in hotels and lead to quick increase in
Indonesia’s earnings from tourism. In the case of timber, he said In-
donesia is presently exporting at the rate of about $10 million annu-
ally. This could easily be doubled and one-tenth or more of cost of ex-
porting this timber could be saved with acquisition of Indonesian
shipping (Indonesia now dependent on Japanese shipping for export-
ing its timber which costing it large amount foreign exchange, Suharto
said). Implied Suharto wants to discuss Export-Import loan for ac-
quiring ships for timber trade.
11. Suharto said he will want to express his appreciation to Pres-
ident for U.S. participation in and leadership of IGGI and donor effort.
He said additional and accelerated momentum to development process
could be achieved through increased attention to exploitation of tim-
ber and tourism in Indonesia. He would want to discuss importance
of this with President; it was not unrelated to acquiring equipment
needed for Indonesia’s defense. I told Suharto it was hard for me to
guess what magnitudes he might be talking about in terms of Export-
Import loans but I sparked no response from him on this.
12. Comment: It appeared implicit in way Suharto related events
in Cambodia and threat to South Vietnam and U.S. armed forces there,
his suspicion of Chinese Communists and Soviet influence in Singa-
pore, difficulties Soviets are giving Indonesia in supply of spare parts
for Soviet military equipment and possibly accelerating threat of Com-
munist aggression in neighboring countries, that Suharto will want to
talk mainly about enlarged and accelerated flow of military equipment
from U.S., beginning, as he put it, after elections in 1971.
Purnell
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632 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

295. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:33 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
President Suharto of Indonesia
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

President Nixon expressed his pleasure at having the opportu-

nity of meeting President Suharto and told President Suharto how
much he had enjoyed his visit to Indonesia. President Nixon then in-
quired about the state of Indonesia’s economy. President Suharto
replied that his economy was progressing in accordance with his ap-
proved program. The five-year plan was working well and Indone-
sia is taking steps to abolish the dual exchange rate and is working
to adjust the oil rate. However, progress in the economic field, while
encouraging, is not enough for the population which wants a speed-
up. Indonesia also must speed it up to destroy the remnants of the
Communist Party.
President Nixon asked what the strength of the Communist Party
was and whether there is a real danger or is it under control. President
Suharto replied that strategically the Communist Party had been nul-
lified. Ten percent of the old body of the hard-core members still exist
even though thousands are in jail. President Nixon then inquired about
the Indonesian students’ attitude on the Communists. President
Suharto said that he thought the student movement was under con-
trol, pointing out that Indonesia is making students participate in de-
velopment projects with good results. Students go into the villages to
carry out government work and this way they do not have so much
time to become ideological.
President Nixon then asked what President Suharto thought of
United States problems in Indonesia. President Suharto replied that the
progress in the Indonesian economy is, of course, in the first instance
the result of Indonesian efforts, but foreign governments certainly have
helped. Indonesia is aware that the United States has difficulties with

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024,
Pres./HAK Memcons, President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger, May 26, 1970. Top Secret; Sen-
sitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in
the Oval Office. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White
House Central Files) In telegram 87970 to Djakarta, June 6, the Department sent a sum-
mary of the President’s two conversations with Suharto on May 26 and May 28. (Ibid.,
RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER)
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Indonesia 633

Congress in getting appropriations and it appreciates that despite this

the United States has increased its aid to Indonesia. In addition, for-
eign capital and the World Bank have been very helpful and Indone-
sia has appreciated U.S. assistance in rescheduling its debt.
President Nixon said we want to be of every assistance consistent
with respect for Indonesia’s non-aligned status. Indonesia will continue
to have U.S. support. President Nixon added, “The principle I wish to
emphasize is this: we do not want to interfere in Indonesian affairs,
but we want Indonesia to be strong enough so that no one else can
interfere.”
President Suharto thanked the President for his expression of re-
spect for Indonesia’s non-aligned status, which will be used to preserve
peace in Asia and especially Southeast Asia. President Suharto said he
was convinced that a sound economic situation produces a commit-
ment to peace but improving economic conditions is, by itself, not
enough. “Military strength is also essential. We cannot neglect military
strength. In the first few years of office, I have put top priority on eco-
nomic strength, but now Indonesia must give attention to military
strength as well. Assistance is especially needed for the navy and air
force. Given Communist strength we cannot neglect defense, especially
air force and navy patrol craft.”
President Suharto stated further that the Chinese IRBM threat was
now beginning to give the Chinese the capability of reaching countries
even as remote as Indonesia. The military leaders in Indonesia recognize
that Indonesia must move step by step and not get over-ambitious. How-
ever, Soviet infiltration in Asia and in the Indian Ocean makes it neces-
sary to strengthen the ASW capability around Indonesia. President
Nixon agreed that Indonesia’s military strength was necessary for both
external and internal reasons. He added that President Suharto was cor-
rect in putting first priority on economic matters, but neutrality is mean-
ingless unless the neutral can defend its neutrality.
President Suharto said he had already talked to Ambassador Gal-
braith and that the Ambassador wanted to move step by step.
It was very important from now on to know what kind of assist-
ance the U.S. can give Indonesia. President Nixon confirmed that the
U.S. would give Indonesia’s requests very sympathetic consideration,
recognizing its desires are defensive. President Suharto replied it is an
important part of Indonesia’s responsibility to make sure other states
in the area are convinced of the seriousness of the situation in Cam-
bodia. Indonesia received a Cambodian request for help. The limita-
tions in Indonesia’s capabilities make it impossible to do much in the
military field, but they are giving all political and moral support
and attempting to line up others. Political activities have included
the Djakarta Conference whose main aim is the territorial integrity
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634 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

of Cambodia, elimination of foreign troops, and reactivating of the

Geneva 1954 Accords. A commission of three has been appointed to
look into it, but there also exists a military difficulty. Lon Nol’s
Government has only 35,000 soldiers facing larger and more expe-
rienced forces. The involvement of the U.S. and South Vietnamese
forces was essential strategically to give Cambodians a chance to help
themselves.
The crucial role of sanctuary operations cannot be overempha-
sized, President Suharto added. They will help Vietnamization. Presi-
dent Suharto urged President Nixon to give the equipment captured
in Cambodia to the Cambodian Government, stressing that the rela-
tions between the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese was not es-
pecially good. Also, the Lon Nol Government realizes the continuing
need to deal with VC and the NVA on Cambodian territory after the
United States withdrawal.
Summing up, President Suharto stated, “we hope that sanctuary
operations will smash the military strength of the VC and the NVA.
The U.S. should keep up the operation as long as possible and thus re-
duce the pressure of the VC and NVA. At this time, the Indonesians
can give only training support, especially in anti-guerrilla warfare. In-
donesia is limited in its ability to give military support because of lim-
ited resources and because of economic priorities. However, they
would certainly be prepared to do so if resources would be freed.” Pres-
ident Nixon asked whether President Suharto considered the survival
of Cambodia important for Indonesia and other countries in the area.
President Suharto replied affirmatively, stressing the need for the ac-
tual neutrality of Cambodia.
President Nixon suggested that some people say the U.S. should
have let Cambodia go since it would have made no difference. Presi-
dent Suharto replied that this attitude is reflected only by those who
do not live in the area, adding, “if Cambodia falls into Communist
hands, it will be an expanded base for guerrilla and infiltration activ-
ities; Vietnamization could not succeed.” President Nixon stated that
the U.S. has no designs on Cambodia and will leave as soon as the
sanctuaries have been destroyed. The GVN will react, however, if NVA
sanctuaries are restored. The war in Vietnam, President Nixon contin-
ued, has been a very difficult war for the United States. Many want us
to pull out. We have not and will not do so, not because we have de-
signs, but because to do so would demoralize all of Southeast Asia in-
cluding the Indonesian people. Therefore, it is also important that the
local people speak up. President Suharto said Indonesia had this idea
from the beginning, but when Indonesia proposed to Ambassador Gal-
braith that it send equipment for the battalions of the Cambodian army,
Ambassador Galbraith doubted that the U.S. could replace this equip-
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Indonesia 635

ment.2 President Suharto had in mind that Indonesia’s proposal could

maintain the neutral position of Indonesia and yet help Cambodia.
President Nixon said that the U.S. wanted to provide whatever
help it can that will not, in turn, hurt Indonesia. Indonesia is indis-
pensable for the future of Southeast Asia.

2
In a telephone call to President Nixon later that same day, Kissinger said that “the
Ambassador’s attitude when we give military assistance was troubling.” The President
responded: “They should provide assistance and we will replace it.” He added: “Let’s
get going on that subject. I assume they are following up on getting some captured
equipment over here.” Kissinger answered: “That is being done.” (Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronologi-
cal File)

296. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT

WHITE HOUSE TALKS
SUBJECT
U.S. Role in Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign:
Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Soedjatmoko, Ambassador to the United States
H. Alamsjah, State Secretary
Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, National Planning Board
Vice Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy
Soedharmono, Secretary of the Cabinet
Dr. Ch. Anwar Sani, Director General for Political Affairs
Suryono Darusman, Chief of Protocol
United States:
Elliot L. Richardson, Acting Secretary of State
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret.
Drafted by Masters and Paul Gardner (EA/MS) and approved by John D. Stempel (D)
on June 11. The memorandum is part I of IV; part III is ibid., parts II and IV are Docu-
ments 297 and 298. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
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636 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Francis J. Galbraith, Ambassador to Indonesia

Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
John Holdridge, White House Staff
Edward E. Masters, Country Director for Indonesian Affairs

After welcoming Foreign Minister Malik and his colleagues

to Washington and conveying Secretary Rogers’ regret that a long
standing commitment to attend a NATO conference had prevented his
being present, Mr. Richardson asked Mr. Green to provide a brief sur-
vey of the situation in East Asia.
Mr. Green outlined the principles which underlie the Nixon Doc-
trine and noted that, while the Cambodian situation has injected a new
element into Southeast Asia, our policy there is completely consistent
with these principles. The President’s action in sending troops into Cam-
bodia, Mr. Green pointed out, is designed to protect and advance the
policy of Vietnamization and increase prospects for Cambodia’s stabil-
ity and friendly cooperation with its neighbors. Referring to a Harris poll
the previous day which showed that a majority of the American people
support the President on this issue, Mr. Green stated that the success of
our action in Cambodia would increase this popular support.
Mr. Richardson noted that the Nixon Doctrine does not mean that
we are in the process of disengaging or running out on our commit-
ments but represents an adjustment of U.S. policy to actual conditions.
It reflects increased Asian capability for and interest in regional coop-
eration, the declining influence of ideology and the fact neither super
power is in a position to push others around. For these and other rea-
sons, Mr. Richardson explained, the President has decided that we
should adjust, but not abandon, our role in Asia.
Mr. Richardson emphasized that the U.S. does not seek a military
victory in Southeast Asia and noted that we have placed definite re-
straints on our actions regarding North Vietnam. The U.S. believes that
it will have discharged its obligation to the people of South Vietnam if
they are given freedom to choose their own course.
The United States recognizes the importance of Indonesia as a non-
aligned country, Mr. Richardson said, and can envisage as a possible
solution of the conflict a situation in which all of Indochina might be
non-aligned, if this is what these nations want. The U.S. commitment
to the people of South Vietnam is to help them attain a position in
which they can reach their own solutions rather than be forced to ac-
cept those dictated by others.
Malik said he wished to make clear that Indonesia has no misap-
prehensions regarding the Nixon Doctrine but, in fact, believes that it
is time for some rethinking along these lines by the U.S. Indonesia
hopes, however, that under this new doctrine the U.S., as a super power,
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Indonesia 637

will not equate all problems of Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Gov-
ernment understands the domestic problems which the U.S. faces but
nonetheless believes it important that the U.S. stress and even increase
its commitments as far as certain problems are concerned.
Malik perceived two distinct facets of communists’ strategic ap-
proach, the more moderate public line of the Soviet Union and the mil-
itant position of Communist China. This divergence in the communist
camp has an impact on world opinion and on domestic opinion. In-
donesia would like to expose the communists’ views so that they are
not able to play both sides of the street.
Until now, Malik continued, the impression has been created
through communist propaganda that the communists are all right and
the U.S. is all wrong. Demonstrators aiming at ending U.S. support for
Vietnam’s struggle forget that the communists have been attempting
to subvert South Vietnam for a long time. The Djakarta Conference was
designed, among other things, to open the eyes of the world to the true
state of affairs, Malik explained.

297. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT

WHITE HOUSE TALKS
SUBJECT
Diplomatic Initiatives on Cambodia

[Omitted here is the list of participants, which is identical to that

in Document 296.]
Mr. Richardson explained that the U.S. crossed the Cambodian bor-
der to insure our ability to carry forward with Vietnamization and not
to insure the survival of the Cambodian Government. This latter objec-
tive can best be served by the diplomatic initiatives. In this connection,

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret;
Exdis. Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved in U by Stempel on June 11. The
memorandum is part II of IV; part III is ibid., parts I and IV are Documents 296 and 298.
The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
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638 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the United States is interested in proposals for an international confer-

ence to discuss Cambodia and related matters, Mr. Richardson contin-
ued. French suggestions in this regard were promising. At one point
Malik of the Soviet Union seemed to be saying much the same thing,
but unfortunately nothing materialized from his remarks. The U.S. has
also watched with quiet interest Indonesia’s initiatives in calling the
May 16–17 Foreign Ministers Conference in Cambodia.
Malik explained that, although Indonesia should logically concen-
trate first on economic development and its internal problems, it sees a
connection between Cambodian events and Indonesia’s own security.
India opposed the idea of the Djakarta Conference, preferring to wait
and discuss Indochina in the forum of the Non-aligned Conference. In-
donesia did not accept this view, first because of the need to act quickly
(the Non-aligned Conference will be held in September) and secondly
because, if past performance is any indication, that Conference would
give the communists an additional opportunity to spread their propa-
ganda unless thorough preparations were made in advance.
Indonesia consequently decided to invite 21 nations to a meeting
in Djakarta, Malik continued. Invitations were sent to Communist
China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia to see if these na-
tions really wanted to solve the problem through negotiations. In-
donesia concluded that it was better to continue with the Conference
even though the communists refused to attend.
Noting the importance of Moscow’s reaction to the Djakarta Con-
ference, Malik said Indonesia advised the Soviet Union twice regard-
ing the Conference. Although Pravda and Izvestia opposed the Con-
ference, officially there has been no reaction from Moscow except a
question as to why Peking was invited. Indonesia perceives some hes-
itation in the Soviet Union’s policy towards Cambodia. The Soviets
have not closed their Embassy in Phnom Penh and, just before he left
Phnom Penh for the Djakarta Conference, Cambodian Foreign Minis-
ter Yem Sambaur received assurances from the Soviet Ambassador that
the U.S.S.R. was not in a hurry to break off relations with Cambodia.
Malik noted that the Djakarta Conference had encountered diffi-
culties because of the different approaches recommended by various
participants. South Vietnam and Thailand wanted to condemn North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Cambodia, for its part, wished to use the
Conference as a forum to mount a major push for military assistance.
Indonesia managed to convince the Cambodians the day before the
Conference opened that they should not do so or they would jeopard-
ize Indonesian efforts. Mr. Malik said he had explained to Yem Sam-
baur that the aim of the Conference was not to assist Cambodia in wag-
ing war and that it would be disadvantageous to give the impression
that the Conference was beating war drums for the Cambodians.
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Indonesia 639

Malik noted that the participants did not wish the Djakarta
Conference to be a one-shot affair. They consequently empowered
Indonesia as Chairman to take all necessary steps to carry out the
agreed decisions and appointed Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia as their
representatives to carry their views to the Geneva Conference Co-
Chairmen, the three members of the ICC and the UN. Those nations
which declined to attend the Conference will also be informed of the
results of the meeting, Malik noted.
Malik believed that the flexible decisions of the Djakarta Confer-
ence may reinforce U Thant’s view that there should be an interna-
tional conference on Indochina. The major key to such a Conference is
Moscow, Malik said, adding that in his opinion the Russians have not
yet made up their minds on this question. France, Germany and the
United Kingdom seem agreeable to convening a Geneva-type confer-
ence, Malik added, but this cannot be hurried. Malik said that the U.S.
could play an important role in bringing about such a conference, but
this role cannot be too open. If the U.S. enters too directly into the pic-
ture, Malik said, there is danger that the other side will use this fact in
its propaganda to defeat the possibility of a conference. Appropriate
ways should be found to press the Soviet Union to agree to a Geneva-
type conference on Indochina, Malik added.
Referring to North Vietnamese claims that they are willing to fight
for another 100 years, Malik said there are actually indications that
North Vietnam is tired of the war. If the Soviet Union can be drawn into
a conference, Malik continued, this could have a constructive influence
on Hanoi. It is also necessary to exert pressure on North Vietnamese
troops in Laos and in the Thai–Laotian–Cambodian border area similar
to the pressure exerted in the fishhook area of Cambodia, Malik said,
while acknowledging the possibility that this could cause North Viet-
nam in turn to step up its pressure on Cambodia. In addition to In-
donesia’s diplomatic efforts, Malik envisaged two means of aiding Cam-
bodia: exerting military pressures to convince Hanoi to go along with
an international conference and helping the Cambodian Government
form village defenses against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.
Malik expressed doubt that Communist China will intervene in
Indochina, suggesting that its strategy is rather to arouse opposition to
U.S. policy and put the Soviet Union in an increasingly difficult spot.
A Geneva-type conference would force Peking into the open and pre-
vent it from continuing this strategy, Malik explained.
Mr. Richardson agreed that diplomatic initiatives clearly offer the
best prospects for preserving Cambodia’s neutrality and stabilizing the
situation. In this and other respects the role of the Soviet Union is cru-
cial. The extent to which it can influence or is influenced by Hanoi is
an open question.
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640 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

The United States fully supports the efforts of the Three Nation
Committee appointed by the Djakarta Conference, Mr. Richardson
continued, but will be careful to avoid giving them the “kiss of death.”
The United States will keep in close touch with the Indonesians re-
garding means of helping without compromising the efforts of the
Three Nation group, Mr. Richardson added.

298. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT

WHITE HOUSE TALKS
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for Cambodia

[Omitted here is the list of participants, which is identical to that

in Document 296.]
Mr. Malik noted that participants in the Djakarta Conference
agreed that they should concentrate on finding a peaceful solution to
the Cambodian problem, leaving the matter of military aid for bilat-
eral negotiations. The Cambodians nonetheless informally asked all of
the participants for weapons and even troops. The Indonesians un-
derstood that Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and some others have
promised aid.
Cambodian Foreign Minister Yem Sambaur had high hopes of ob-
taining military aid from Indonesia, Malik continued, but the Indone-
sians explained that the maximum they could give was training assist-
ance. Providing the Cambodians with an adequate supply of weapons
would not seem too difficult, Malik said, if arms captured by South
Vietnamese and U.S. troops could be given to Cambodia. Malik ex-
plained that, according to Indonesian information there was, however,
another problem over and above the shortage of arms: the Cambodian
Armed Forces are not yet able to handle any significant volume of arms.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret;
Nodis. Drafted by Masters and approved by Stempel (U) on June 11. The memorandum
is part IV of IV; part III, U.S. Troops in Cambodia is ibid.; parts I and II are Documents
296 and 297. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
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Indonesia 641

They need training first, Malik said, and Indonesia can perhaps help
in this field.
Mr. Green remarked that Malik seemed to envisage two concur-
rent courses of action regarding Cambodia: diplomatic efforts, which
depended in good part on the Soviet Union and the outcome of which
is not yet clear, and action to keep the Cambodian Government afloat
while these diplomatic efforts are proceeding. Mr. Green noted that the
U.S. is giving limited support to Cambodia, primarily in the form of
small arms. The U.S. hopes that others will provide support also, not
only because it is needed militarily, but also because this support would
provide a psychological boost to the Cambodian Government and sig-
nal to Moscow and others that the countries of the area are willing to
work together to preserve peace.
In response to Mr. Green’s question on how Indonesia would help
Cambodia in the field of training, Malik explained that Indonesia had
in mind bringing Cambodians quietly to Indonesia for training in guer-
rilla warfare. They could be blanketed with other nationalities training
there, he added, without attracting undue attention. Indonesia is also
considering sending Indonesian instructors to Cambodia, which Ma-
lik felt would reveal Indonesia’s hand too openly. Another possibility,
Malik said, is the attaching of some officers to the Indonesian Embassy
in Phnom Penh to help advise the Cambodian Government on mili-
tary matters in a liaison capacity. This matter is still under discussion
by Indonesian defense officials, Malik said, and a decision has not yet
been made.
Malik said Indonesia was caught between two difficult problems:
it does not want to do anything which would compromise its non-
aligned position and reduce its influence within the Afro-Asian group
on the one hand and it does not wish to see the Lon Nol Government
fail on the other.
Malik said there was one related matter he wanted to mention. Ac-
cording to Indonesia’s information, Cambodia does not have direct,
open contacts with the U.S. on matters such as military aid; as a result,
Cambodia is trying to channel its requests through third countries. Per-
haps, Malik said, the U.S. could calm Cambodia by giving more direct
proof of its support. The Cambodians, for example, have mentioned to
the Indonesians the possibility of dealing with the U.S. on military mat-
ters through the former U.S. military attaché in Phnom Penh who is
well known to the Cambodian military.
Mr. Richardson assured Malik that we are in direct touch with the
Government of Cambodia through our Chargé in Phnom Penh on aid
and all other matters and that additional channels are not needed.
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642 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

299. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 27, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency H. Alamsjah, Indonesian State Secretary
Henry A. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT
U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Mr. Alamsjah said that his President had ordered him to see Dr.
Kissinger as a continuation of the previous day’s discussion. President
Suharto had felt that it would be better to give more explanation con-
cerning Indonesia’s request for military assistance. This position had
also been explained to Admiral Moorer, who at that moment was still
busy with Admiral Sudomo.
Since 1965, Indonesia has been concentrating on peaceful devel-
opment of its economic and political stability. However, following the
Cambodian affair, when things were moving very fast, President
Suharto had decided—while still adhering to Indonesia’s basic princi-
ples of non-alignment—that it must take a greater interest in Southeast
Asia developments. The Djakarta conference was an outgrowth of this
decision. (Mr. Alamsjah went on to describe the nature of the confer-
ence, and the agreements which have been reached for ongoing diplo-
matic initiatives to end the war in Indo-China.) At the conference, all
of the countries except Singapore had been very worried at the situa-
tion in Cambodia and surrounding countries, and also about the spread
of Communism. Their representatives had brought this out in conver-
sations with Foreign Minister Malik. They had also expressed their full
confidence in Indonesia. Hence Indonesia, which since 1965 had never
stressed military affairs, now felt that it had a special role with respect
not only to Cambodia but to the surrounding countries. Lon Nol had
twice approached Indonesia on the possibility of obtaining Indonesian
weapons. This request had been made known to the U.S. at President
Suharto’s suggestion through Ambassador Galbraith, but no reply had
been received.
Dr. Kissinger wondered whether there might be a problem here in
that the Indonesian Foreign Minister didn’t want to give arms. Never-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024,
Pres/HAK Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive.
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Indonesia 643

theless, if President Suharto wanted to send arms, our President would

be sympathetic.
Mr. Alamsjah expressed the opinion that his Foreign Minister
would not say anything other than what his President suggested, since
he knew he could be replaced if he acted otherwise. In any event, as
President Suharto had suggested through Ambassador Galbraith, the
Indonesians were prepared to send sufficient weapons to Cambodia to
equip 10 battalions. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that we had never re-
ceived a formal proposal to this effect, to which Mr. Alamsjah replied
that it was correct to say that there had been no formal proposal, but
that the proposition had been passed along and only three people had
known about it in Indonesia: President Suharto, Alamsjah himself, and
Galbraith.2 Mr. Alamsjah noted that the Indonesia proposal had been
made three weeks to a month ago, and involved sending small arms,
including mortars, but no artillery. The Indonesians had also brought
up a related problem—if they sent arms they would need replacement
stocks, and would expect these from the U.S.
Dr. Kissinger asked if the quantity of replacement stocks had been
made known to Admiral Moorer. Mr. Alamsjah explained that he had
touched on this matter with Admiral Moorer the preceding evening,
and that Suharto had afterwards decided that he, Alamsjah, had to see
Dr. Kissinger.
Turning to Cambodia’s military requirements, Mr. Alamsjah said
that there were two urgent matters for Indonesia to consider. First, there
was the matter of weapons, and there was also training. On training,
if possible the Indonesians would like to send Cambodians to Indone-
sia for guerrilla training. Many foreign students had received such
training, since Indonesia’s experience in dealing with guerrilla warfare
was the greatest among all Southeast Asia armed forces. In addition,

2
This exchange between Alamsjah and Kissinger went a long way towards an-
swering Nixon’s question “What did you find out on this thing?” that he posed to
Kissinger in their telephone conversation of May 26. Following the question, Nixon or-
dered that Kissinger “check this out with the Ambassador. We want the Indonesians’
help. I want it done. That is a policy decision. It is vitally important to have other coun-
tries help them in some way. Now here is a country that is willing to help. We tried to
get the Thais. But now this country wants to help. What in the hell happened here.”
Kissinger responded: “It is part of the problem we talked about before. We have to make
these departments more responsive.” Nixon continued, “If Indonesia wants to send this
ammunition, they should do it. The Soviets of course are taking on Lon Nol. As long as
he appears to be a puppet of the US it is one thing but when I ordered this three weeks
ago that is the way it is to be. We have got to get the military to shape up and get it
done. I want the Indonesians to send some stuff. We will replace their stuff. Of course
we will get a military request from Indonesia anyway. So let’s see what we can accom-
plish.” Kissinger then promised that “I will have it done by tomorrow evening.” (Li-
brary of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conver-
sations, Chronological File)
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644 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

if the Cambodian situation became urgent, Indonesia could send offi-

cers to Cambodia who would be carried as personnel of the Indone-
sian Embassy but who would train the Cambodian forces.
Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had been told the preceding evening
that Foreign Minister Malik had been most unhappy about what our
President had said to President Suharto. Mr. Alamsjah doubted that Mr.
Malik had been unhappy, and referred again to the fact that the Foreign
Minister was subject to the orders of the President.
To recapitulate the Indonesian proposal for aid to Cambodia, Dr.
Kissinger asked if it was correct that they were willing to send mili-
tary equipment to Cambodia immediately, that the amount would be
sufficient for ten battalions, and that they would want us to replace
these stocks. Mr. Alamsjah agreed. On replacement, Dr. Kissinger asked
over what period? Mr. Alamsjah replied as soon as possible, since re-
moving these arms from their supplies would leave an empty hole. Dr.
Kissinger then asked how this should be handled as a practical mat-
ter. Mr. Alamsjah referred again to the military mission which his Pres-
ident wanted to send. In addition to the point of aid to Cambodia, how-
ever, there was a second point concerning the general state of the
Indonesian armed forces. For ten years the Navy and Air Force equip-
ment had all come from the USSR, and now spare parts were unavail-
able. As he had mentioned to Admiral Moorer, a Navy without gun-
boats was useless, and pilots without aircraft were useless. He indicated
that he was thinking not only in terms of Indonesia, but in terms of
the other countries of the region except Singapore. Indonesia was be-
ing counted on by these others, but they did not know the real power
of the Indonesian military sector. The U.S. had a military advisory and
assistance system, but Indonesia was not a member. Admiral Moorer
had suggested to Admiral Sudomo that it would be impossible for the
U.S. to re-equip the Indonesian Navy and Air Force, even though these
forces possessed tactical skills.
Dr. Kissinger explained that our problem was with Congress. Nev-
ertheless, we would like to help, and would do our best. The President
was sympathetic. We had more than tripled our MAP for Indonesia,
although we recognized that this was still not enough. We would like
to look into the problem of surplus equipment from Vietnam at lower
costs, but the problem of Congress remained. How could we get an
idea of the Indonesian needs? Mr. Alamsjah again referred to their mil-
itary mission.
Dr. Kissinger declared that the President had reiterated the same
morning that he was anxious to cooperate fully with President Suharto
on the matters which he had discussed with President Suharto the pre-
vious day on aid to Cambodia. He had found President Suharto’s at-
titude very encouraging.
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Indonesia 645

Dr. Kissinger noted briefly that the Indonesians also had a prob-
lem in connection with the Bandung munitions factory. We would take
this matter up and let them know. The amount was not great, being
only somewhat more than $3 million, and we would be sympathetic
in reviewing the Indonesia aid request. Dr. Kissinger stated that their
military mission should bring a complete proposal with it.
Turning to the equipment for the 10 battalions, Dr. Kissinger said
that we would look at this matter with the intention of being helpful
and knowing that this was in the spirit of what the President wanted.
Mr. Alamsjah asked about the possibility of taking care of some of
the Indonesian needs prior to the elections, particularly those of the
Air Force. In sending weapons to Cambodia they planned to use air
transportation from Indonesian to Cambodian airports. Dr. Kissinger
replied that we would do the best that we could, and asked how soon
the military mission would come. Mr. Alamsjah said it would arrive
not more than three weeks from now. Mr. Alamsjah observed that the
mission would be led by the top Indonesian Army man, General Umar.
General Sumitro, whom Dr. Kissinger had met in Djakarta last year,
was now concentrating on internal Indonesian affairs and General
Umar was responsible for broader matters.
Mr. Alamsjah reverted to the question of Foreign Minister Malik’s
attitude on aid to Cambodia, and recalled at yesterday’s advisers’ meet-
ing he had made a very strong pitch for military assistance. Dr.
Kissinger mentioned, however, that he had expressed some doubts
about this matter. Mr. Alamsjah thought that these doubts referred to
sending arms only if there was no replacement.
The meeting closed with Mr. Alamsjah expressing confidence that
the press problem could be handled, and with Dr. Kissinger empha-
sizing once more the President’s pleasure over his conversation with
President Suharto. The President understood President Suharto’s view,
and saw eye-to-eye with President Suharto on maintaining Indonesia’s
formal policy of non-alignment.
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646 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

300. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, May 27, 1970.

Dear Henry:
In response to your suggestion this morning, I list below a phased
program through which Indonesia might help Cambodia without un-
duly interfering with its diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Cambo-
dia or seriously complicating its internal or external position. We can-
not at this time fix a time phase for this program but would have to
remain flexible, keying later steps to the progress of Indonesia’s diplo-
matic efforts. As I see it, there are four major areas in which we might
expect the Indonesians to be helpful:
1. First, as top priority, the Indonesians should be encouraged to
continue their present diplomatic efforts. The Three Nation committee
appointed during the recent Djakarta Conference will be contacting the
Co-Chairmen and members of the ICC as well as key U.N. officials
during the next few weeks to consider ways in which Cambodia’s in-
dependence can be preserved. The Indonesians are realistic enough not
to expect dramatic results. Concurrently, they will push Cambodia’s
case within the non-aligned forum. A preparatory meeting for the Sep-
tember Non-aligned Conference will be held in New Delhi on June 8.
The Indonesians expect the Sihanouk government in exile to make a
major bid to be seated during this meeting. Indonesia will support the
Lon Nol government, and Adam Malik believes it important that In-
donesia take no action before that time which might compromise its
credentials with the Afro-Asian group.
2. Indonesia has apparently already decided to provide some mil-
itary training to the Cambodian armed forces. While details have not
yet been worked out, they are considering the possibility of bringing
Cambodians to Indonesia for training in Indonesia’s service schools,
particularly those concerned with counter-guerrilla activities. This will
not be publicized. They are reluctant thus far to send advisers to Cam-
bodia since this would be even more difficult to conceal but have men-
tioned the possibility of assigning several military experts to their Em-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret. An attached covering note from Colonel
Kennedy to Kissinger, May 28, stated that Green’s paper “seems to add nothing to our
store of knowledge or action program.” Kennedy added that he would give a copy to
Holdridge, who would do “a more complete brief.”
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Indonesia 647

bassy at Phnom Penh to provide informal liaison with the Cambodian

military. They are also stepping up coordination with Cambodia and
other countries in the area in the field of intelligence.
3. We should now begin exploring quietly with the Indonesians
the possibility of Indonesia converting its ammunition plant near Ban-
dung to produce ammunition for the AK–47. We do not know how big
a job this would be, but we believe it would be manageable and ac-
ceptable to Indonesia provided that, through some indirect offsetting
arrangement, we helped them meet the costs involved. Indonesia has
on-going need for some AK–47 ammunition and would be in a posi-
tion to sell much of the plant’s output to Cambodia, which has urgent
requirements for such ammunition.
4. A final step, which I believe should be delayed until the above
steps are further advanced, is the provision of military equipment by
Indonesia to Cambodia. Indirect offsetting arrangements with the U.S.
(within agreed limits) are necessarily involved.
Malik and others are concerned that providing weapons to Cam-
bodia at this time would complicate Indonesia’s current diplomatic ef-
forts and also trigger opposition among domestic left wing as well as
traditional groups which fear a basic shift in Indonesia’s foreign pol-
icy of non-alignment.
As I mentioned this morning, the Indonesians seem to be placing
top priority during this visit in getting a commitment from us to re-
place their Soviet military equipment. This equipment had an original
price tag of nearly $1 billion. Some Indonesians hope, by giving arms
to Cambodia, to put us in their debt and improve chances for such a
commitment.
There is also the danger of exaggerated expectations on the part
of the Indonesian military. I have been through this once. In 1966 some
of the Indonesian Generals received the impression following a visit to
Washington that we were going to give them arms to the tune of $500
million. This, of course, was impossible, but it took nearly a year to
convince them of this fact. Meanwhile, our relations with the Indone-
sians were strained and I was cut off from effective contact with
Suharto.
We should also bear in mind the fact that the Indonesians are al-
ready having difficulty absorbing what they are receiving. Skilled per-
sonnel are in short supply, and maintenance procedures are poor. At
present, they could not effectively use more than they are getting
through our expanded $15 million annual program.
The problem, as I see it, is essentially one of timing. I believe we
can successfully avoid the problems of exaggerated expectations as well
as internal or external damage to Indonesia’s position if we follow the
phased program outlined above and keep flexible. Steps one and two
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648 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

are already underway in any event and should prove helpful to Cam-
bodia while we assess further steps.
Marshall

301. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10:08–11:03 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Suharto of Indonesia
The President
Dr. Kissinger

The President: I consider this an historical opportunity because we

are the two largest democratic countries of the world, with the excep-
tion of India. You and Henry both know that I would like to travel to
Indonesia again before the end of my present term. I always empha-
size to my American colleagues the economic and strategic importance
of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Most people know about Thailand,
Cambodia or Vietnam but not many people know very much about In-
donesia. This is because there are not many opportunities to travel
there.
President Suharto: I am very happy with your evaluation con-
cerning the important role of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The fact that
you would like to return again is a sign of our close friendship. The
Indonesian people will always welcome you with an open heart.
President Suharto: Concerning military matters, I have appointed
Lt. Gen. Sumitro to take charge of these affairs and I have in mind to
appoint a reserve officer also. In the future I will also appoint an ad-
ditional limited number of officers to work in this field.
The President: What is the rank of your military attaché here in
Washington?
President Suharto: There are three—Air Force, Army and Navy.
The Air Force Attaché is a Colonel, the Navy Attaché is a Colonel and

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024,
Pres/HAK Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is from the Presi-
dent’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The meeting was held at the White
House.
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Indonesia 649

the Army Attaché is a Brigadier General. The Army Attaché was trained
in Russia but he is also a member of the revolutionary generation of
1945.
The President: I would like to have one military attaché in Djakarta
to have my complete confidence. The rank is not important but it
shouldn’t be out of line with the rank of the Indonesian attaché in Wash-
ington. To Kissinger—I wanted more than that. I would like to upgrade
this position in Djakarta.
The President: Quite frankly we must recognize that there is re-
sistance both in Indonesia and in the United States to a large military
assistance program for Indonesia. We do not want to compromise your
non-aligned position. There is also a fear in the United States that in-
creased military assistance will be a financial burden. But you and I as
politicians must recognize these political realities. We would like to
work out an arrangement to fulfill the needs of Indonesia without any
embarrassment to your political situation. These needs should be met
so that Indonesia may play a larger role in Southeast Asia. For exam-
ple, when the Cambodian problem began, they turned to Indonesia for
assistance but your capabilities were limited. Your equipment was all
old. We may be helpful there. Looking at the broader picture in South-
east Asia and Asia, the larger countries such as Japan and Indonesia
should play an effective role. The role of Japan can only be in the eco-
nomic field. In Southeast Asia itself, Indonesia is the largest country
and can perhaps lead the way in collective security arrangements but
always within the framework of the necessity to maintain your non-
aligned position. Indonesia as a neutral country must be strong enough
to defend itself against minor assaults. But it is not enough only to in-
sure ones own neutrality. If a nation believes that its neutrality is only
for its own self interest and has no role when a smaller nation goes
down, that nation itself will become the next target.
President Suharto: Thank you very much. My view is not much dif-
ferent from yours. Indonesia must be strong economically, socially, and
militarily in order to develop the will and capacity to resist ideological,
political and military attacks. We will continue to carry out our active
and independent foreign policy, but we place great importance on work-
ing together with the other Asian neighbors. I recognize also that there
is fear within the area that Indonesia will become too strong. But this
fear is completely unjustified. Our philosophy, Pantjasila, does not per-
mit us to expand in relation to other countries and peoples or to attack
other countries. This is absolutely contrary to Pantjasila. I have made
it clear to you and to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that our first priority is economic development, but this also
must be related to security measures. We must not neglect military
development but this must not be so rapid that it hampers economic
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650 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

development. Concerning the possibility of a strategic capability for

Indonesia in the long-range future, I feel that training can be carried
out in the U.S. and this training can be put to use later if needed.
The President: I hope that we can work out the appropriate coop-
eration in an agreeable way. We welcome your military mission.
I would like to emphasize our appreciation for the initiative of In-
donesia in sponsoring the recent conference concerning Cambodia. The
initiative of Asian nations is very important. Who knows where the
next problem will occur? It may be in Burma or it may be in Laos again.
But when something happens it is heart-warming to see a country such
as Indonesia speaking up and gathering together other Asian nations
to discuss the problem. When a country is under attack it seems as if
it always ends up with the question of what the U.S. is going to do.
The U.S. becomes the issue but the issue should be the small country
which is under attack. We do not intend to withdraw from Asia. Our
intention is to help you to do what you decide is best. There is no Amer-
ican imperialism. We seek no colonies. We do not want any bases.
President Suharto: We understand completely the role of the
United States and we are convinced that the United States is waging a
just struggle for independence and freedom in Southeast Asia. Con-
cerning our role in Southeast Asia, we must keep in mind our limited
capabilities for activity outside of the borders of our own country. A
larger role for Indonesia in Southeast Asia depends upon the rate of
acceleration of our economic development program. If we were to un-
dertake actions which were beyond our capabilities, this would cer-
tainly endanger our domestic situation. There are four conclusions
which I would like to present to you. First, we are pleased that the
United States understands our efforts in the field of economic devel-
opment and we appreciate the aid of the United States in these efforts.
Secondly, we appreciate the manner in which the United States respects
our non-aligned position. Thirdly, we hope that the United States fully
supports the recent 11-nation Asian conference on Cambodia which
was held at Djakarta. Fourthly, we fully support the Nixon Doctrine or
the Guam Doctrine and hope that it will continue to be carried out.
The President: Very good. Very good.
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302. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON VISIT—SECOND

CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALK
SUBJECT
Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign:
Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Soedjatmoko, Ambassador to the United States
H. Alamsjah, State Secretary
Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, National Planning Board
Vice Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy
Soedharmono, Secretary of the Cabinet
Dr. Ch. Anwar Sani, Director General for Political Affairs
Suryono Darusman, Chief of Protocol
United States:
Elliot L. Richardson, Acting Secretary of State
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Francis J. Galbraith, Ambassador to Indonesia
Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
John Holdridge, White House Staff
Edward E. Masters, Country Director for Indonesian Affairs

Mr. Richardson opened the discussion by returning to the topic of

U.S. economic and military assistance to Indonesia, which was intro-
duced by Foreign Minister Adam Malik just before the May 26 con-
current meeting was interrupted.
At the earlier meeting, Malik expressed deep appreciation for the
U.S. role, and in particular that of Mr. Barnett, in assuring Indonesia
sympathetic treatment at the April meetings of the Inter-Governmen-
tal Group on Indonesia (IGGI) on economic aid and of the “Paris Club”
on the Sukarno debt problem. Malik added, however, that Indonesia
required additional help at this particular state of economic develop-
ment. He noted that Indonesian efforts to procure aid from “socialist”
countries have not been productive but will continue. In the meantime,

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret.
Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved by Stempel (U) on June 10. The memo-
randum is part I of III; part III is ibid., part II is Document 303. The meeting was held
in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
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652 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

he wondered if there were additional sources of U.S. assistance which

might be tapped, mentioning in particular the Export-Import Bank.
Mr. Barnett noted that the multilateral IGGI mechanism had en-
abled Indonesia to obtain greater aggregate assistance than if it had
dealt bilaterally with individual donors. He added that, again, one of
our reasons for supporting a Paris Group solution of the Sukarno debt
was to provide Indonesia with essential multilateral leverage in deal-
ing with Eastern European creditors. Mr. Barnett noted that we had not
encouraged Indonesia to repudiate its debt to the Soviet Union in light
of the latter’s importance as a source of military spare parts, as a po-
tential aid donor, and as an important future market for rubber and
other natural resources. Repudiation of the Soviet debt might also dam-
age Indonesia’s credit worthiness, he added. Mr. Malik later expressed
appreciation for the U.S. Aide Mémoire in which the U.S. accepted the
debt settlement worked out at Paris in April, which he said would help
Indonesia to move forward in negotiations with other countries.
Regarding additional sources of U.S. assistance, Mr. Barnett said
that progress made in resolving the debt problem would permit the
Export-Import Bank to talk with the Indonesians about a possible re-
sumption of the Bank’s financing activities in Indonesia. Mr. Barnett
pointed out that the Bank is already offering insurance for suppliers’
credits and is a participant in Freeport Sulphur’s program. Mr. Barnett
noted, however, that the Export-Import Bank is not a foreign aid agency
and its function is to facilitate U.S. exports. He emphasized the need
to consult fully with the Resident Mission of the IBRD in Djakarta on
the priority of projects for which Ex–Im financing might be sought. In-
donesia should be aware of the risk that aid donors might reduce their
aid should Indonesia indicate through Ex–Im transactions that it was
entering a phase where it could borrow on normal commercial terms.
Mr. Malik inquired whether the Export-Import Bank could lend to
the Indonesian private sector in order to further contacts between pri-
vate business in the two countries. Mr. Barnett expressed the opinion
that the Bank would wish to know about particular projects being con-
sidered and the extent to which the Indonesian Government is in-
volved, through guarantees, for example. When queried whether there
is not a means to get around a requirement for government guaran-
tees, Mr. Barnett suggested that representatives of the Indonesian Gov-
ernment discuss the matter with the Export-Import Bank.
Mr. Malik referred also to the possibility of doing more in the field
of scientific cooperation but did not specify what he had in mind.
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303. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO’S WASHINGTON VISIT—SECOND

CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS
SUBJECT
U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

[Omitted here is the list of participants which is identical to that

in Document 302.]
The May 28 meeting returned to the subject of U.S. military assist-
ance raised by Foreign Minister Adam Malik during the May 26 meet-
ing but not discussed because of lack of time.
At the earlier meeting, Malik said that Indonesian hopes for a
peaceful solution of Southeast Asian problems should not lead it to
neglect its own internal defense. Economic development remains In-
donesia’s top priority, he added, but Indonesia must also prepare for
the worst possible eventuality. Recent developments affecting Cambo-
dia have created concern in neighboring countries and have given rise
to the expectation in some quarters that Indonesia might help defend
neighboring states if a more serious situation developed. At present,
Indonesia could not do so, Malik said.
Referring to President Nixon’s July 1969 conversation with Presi-
dent Suharto in Djakarta on military assistance, Malik said the In-
donesian Navy and Air Force remain in a most difficult position. Most
of their equipment originated in the Soviet Union which continues to
take a hard-nosed attitude regarding spare parts. Malik said there was
not time to go into details but the Indonesian Armed Forces could dis-
cuss the problem with their counterparts. In this respect, Malik men-
tioned the possibility of the United States sending a delegation to In-
donesia to determine its needs. In conclusion, Malik pointed to the
presence of Admiral Sudomo in President Suharto’s official party as an
indication of the importance Indonesia places on the defense aspect of
national development.
At Malik’s request, Mr. Masters summarized the current status of
the Military Assistance Program for Indonesia. He noted that the In-
donesian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret.
Drafted by Masters and Gardner, and approved in U on June 10. The memorandum is
part II of III; part III is ibid., part I is Document 301. The meeting was held in the Cab-
inet Room at the White House.
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654 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Djakarta seem to have reached a general understanding on the items

to be included in the FY 1971 program, which is to be increased almost
threefold over the current annual level. Mr. Masters mentioned in par-
ticular that the U.S. hopes to help within budgetary limitations to meet
the Air Force’s requirement for trainer and close support aircraft, the
Navy’s need for patrol craft, and all of the Services’ needs for com-
munication and electronic equipment. As for the latter requirement,
Mr. Masters noted that a U.S. technical team has just completed an in-
country survey and is now drawing up its recommendations.
Mr. Malik asked if support for the police is to be included in the
expanded program. Mr. Masters said that the U.S. was tentatively
thinking of allocating approximately $300,000 of the FY 1971 program
to meet police requests for communications equipment, subject to the
findings of the technical team which had also explored police needs in
this field.

304. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 4, 1970.

Dear Henry:
I have long believed that it is important for us to do whatever we
possibly could to encourage Asians to become more involved in their
own affairs. I deeply share the President’s views—and your views—
on this vital issue. Our own problems will be much simpler when
Asians speak with a common voice on maters of mutual concern, when
their present rudimentary efforts toward regional cooperation and mu-
tual security really take hold. In this connection, I believe also that it

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Strictly Personal. In an attached
covering memorandum sent to Kissinger for action on June 5, Haig summarized Green’s
letter and added: “Underlying all of this, of course, is Green’s basic view that we should
be very cautious about changing Indonesia’s non-alignment image and about providing
her with greatly increased military assistance.” Haig then asked for Kissinger’s decision
on the proposed message to Suharto. Kissinger initialed the approve option on June 8
and noted: “(already approved by telephone. Deal with Jonathan Moore in absence of
Marshall Green.)”
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Indonesia 655

is important that Indonesia and the other nations of Southeast Asia as-
sist Cambodia. Their own security is clearly at stake.
At the same time, there are dangers involved in forcing the hand
of Indonesia and others too quickly. In the case of Indonesia, for ex-
ample, too sudden or too deep an involvement in Cambodia could up-
set fragile internal balances. Nationalist political groups are already
concerned that Indonesia is moving too close to the West. Cambodia,
if not properly handled, could give them additional ammunition
against the Suharto Government.
In addition, the handling of this problem could upset civil-military
relationships. Suharto’s instincts on this matter are sound, but this is not
true of some of his close advisers. A number of these, including General
Alamsjah, are out to get Malik. If we induce Indonesia to move in a way
or in a time frame which discredits Malik we will not only be damag-
ing the effectiveness of a man who has been of great assistance to us,
but we may well be contributing to a disturbance of the present delicate
balance between military and civil leaders in Indonesia.
We can already see in the case of Indonesia that some of the Gen-
erals are using the Cambodian issue as a lever to get from us a broad
commitment to re-equip their armed forces. It would not only be po-
litically undesirable for us to take on this role but it would also be
far beyond our present capabilities. There is also the problem of
Indonesia’s limited absorptive capability which we have discussed
before.
I am, of course, not averse to a bit of judicious pressure, but if the
Nixon Doctrine is to be effective, these countries must themselves rec-
ognize the danger and be prepared to act on their own. If they do so
largely at our behest, they will expect us to pay the bill.
Your conversation with General Alamsjah, unlike that between the
President and Suharto, causes me concern. Given the curious workings
of the Indonesian scene, the three references which you made to Ma-
lik’s doubts about Indonesia providing military aid to Cambodia could
jeopardize his position, although I know this was not your intent. I am
concerned in particular by the fact that you signalled to Alamsjah that
Malik had on May 26 expressed his misgivings directly to us.
As I mentioned earlier, Alamsjah is [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a man who has been the target of intense criticism in In-
donesia for years. We learned reliably [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] several years ago that he hoped to become Foreign Minis-
ter. For this and other reasons he is out to get Malik, and I feel he will
use your remarks to further this objective. Frank Galbraith tells me that
Malik was very subdued during the trip outside Washington. It may
well be that Alamsjah has already scored some points with Suharto
against Malik.
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656 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

I am also aware that the military team which Suharto plans to send
will expect more than we could and should give them. Your remarks
that they should bring a “complete proposal with them” may well be
taken by the Indonesians as an invitation for another unrealistic In-
donesian shopping list. We have had a number of these over the years
and have only recently succeeded in getting the Indonesians to sit down
with our people and plan realistically regarding their military re-
quirements. As I told you last Wednesday morning, I was in coventry
for several months in 1967 (denied access to Suharto by Alamsjah and
others) due to frustrations by the Indonesian military who for some
reason had been led to expect during Pentagon visits that we would
give far more civic action aid than we delivered.
One way out of this difficulty, particularly that affecting Malik’s
position, would be for the President to send a message to Suharto. This
could be in response to the message of thanks we will likely receive
from him or we could use the fact that June 8 is Suharto’s birthday as
the peg for a message. In this message, the President might express his
appreciation for his useful talks with Suharto and confirm the fine im-
pression which Suharto left here with the Congress, the press, and oth-
ers. He could also extend warm regards from himself and Mrs. Nixon
to Mrs. Suharto, who made so many friends in the U.S. He might then
ask that his best regards be conveyed also to Foreign Minister Malik
whose astute handling of Indonesian foreign policy has won admira-
tion throughout the world, including the U.S., and who played a par-
ticularly helpful role as catalyst in bringing together the eleven nations
which recently met in Djakarta to discuss Cambodia.
If this were done, I think Suharto would clearly get the signal that
we support the diplomatic efforts initiated by the Djakarta Conference
and also Malik’s continued role as Foreign Minister.
If you agree, I should be glad to try my hand at such a message.2
Sincerely yours,
Marshall

2
Green’s proposed message was drafted and approved by Masters and sent as
telegram 88649 to Djakarta, June 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON)
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Indonesia 657

305. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 18, 1970.

Dear Henry:
As you know, a recent Djakarta message indicates that General
Sumitro may arrive here as early as next Monday (June 22) to follow
up on the discussions with President Suharto and General Alamsjah
last month. We do not yet have detailed knowledge of just what the
Indonesians have in mind, but it appears that Sumitro will carry with
him two lists. One will include military items they would expect from
us to replace any equipment they might give Cambodia, and the other
would deal with Indonesia’s own long range military requirements.
Sumitro plans to see you first and follow your guidance on others he
should talk with in Washington.
The Indonesians apparently then plan to send a second military
mission in July to be led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Umar,
and including logistical experts from all of the armed services. Ac-
cording to word from Djakarta, the Umar mission will seek a “fixed
commitment” from us to re-equip Indonesia’s Armed Forces over the
next five to seven years.
President Suharto’s visit here gave new impetus and direction to
the Indonesians’ as yet only partially formulated plans to assume a
greater role in matters affecting Southeast Asian security. Sumitro’s visit
will give us another good opportunity to nudge the Indonesians in the
right direction. The Sumitro group will also bring along a few bear
traps, however, which we should keep well in view. Principally among
these is the Indonesian tendency to read more into what we tell them
than we actually intend—to translate our general comments into what
they consider broad and binding commitments. For this reason I would
like to suggest the following general precepts by which the visit might
be handled:
1. Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts are at a particularly sensitive
stage with the Three Nation Committee now engaged in discussions
with the Soviet Union. For this and other reasons it is important that
the Sumitro visit be treated low key and that every effort be made to
avoid publicity.2

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Khmer.
2
A notation apparently in Holdridge’s handwritting next to this sentence reads:
“yes.”
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658 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

2. Since Sumitro is coming here primarily to talk with you, I be-

lieve it important that he get from you a full and realistic assessment
of what we can and cannot do to help Indonesia.3 Otherwise, he will
not take to heart comments about budgetary limitations and other prob-
lems which he may receive at DOD.
3. In addition to his talks with you, I would welcome an oppor-
tunity to talk with Sumitro and suggest we also arrange a courtesy call
on General Westmoreland and a “working level” meeting with officers
in DOD who have detailed knowledge of MAP matters and possible
availability of excess equipment.4
4. I suggest we tell Sumitro that we welcome the opportunity to
get his firsthand views and those of other key Indonesian officials, but
we believe that both our interests would be best served by continuing
to handle detailed planning in Djakarta.5 For this reason, while we
would be delighted to see General Umar, we would suggest that he
not bring any large number of experts with him but that we continue
to handle details of our MAP in Djakarta through the very effective co-
ordination already developed between HANKAM and our Defense Li-
aison Group.
If you agree, a copy of this letter might be passed on to Dave
Packard and Tom Moorer.6
Sincerely yours,

Marshall

3
A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “guidelines of
Pres.—encourage be helpful in Cambodia.”
4
A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes.”
5
A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes.”
6
A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes. They can
send but we direct.”
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Indonesia 659

306. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 20, 1970.

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with General Sumitro

Indonesian General Sumitro, whom you met in Djakarta last year,

is arriving in Washington June 22 for the expressed purpose of seeing
you and following up on your conversation with General Alamsjah
about U.S. arms aid to Indonesia and Indonesian military assistance to
Cambodia. (We will not be able to set the specific time of your meet-
ing until after he arrives.) Although State is very much aware of Sum-
itro’s visit, the arrangements have been made through the special chan-
nel and not by State. Sumitro will, in fact, probably want to short-circuit
State (although a protocol call on Ambassador Green is in order) on
the grounds that he will expect to get more by dealing directly with
you and Defense.
Sumitro’s Anticipated Position
—He will hope to obtain a firm U.S. program for Indonesia which
will re-equip a substantial part of the Indonesian armed forces with
U.S. military hardware. (He will not wish to get into specifics, since a
military mission under General Umar will be arriving soon to discuss
details.)
—He may justify the need for a MAP program on the grounds that
the Indo-China situation poses a grave threat to the entire Southeast
Asian region, and that Indonesia has an important regional defense
role. He will probably explain that Indonesia’s previous Communist
sources of arms are now excluded.
—He may also argue that Indonesia’s needs for economic devel-
opment preclude picking up this burden through Indonesian resources.
—He will probably raise the matter of Indonesia’s plan to send
15,000 Communist-pattern weapons to Cambodia. He will want im-
mediate U.S. replacement of these stocks, as a special program and not
part of the regular MAP.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that
Kissinger saw it.
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660 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—He will solicit your help in getting favorable action out of De-
fense and State.
Your Recommended Position
—You recall with pleasure your talk with Sumitro and his as-
sociates last summer in Djakarta. You are glad to welcome Sumitro to
Washington.
—As the President told President Suharto, we want to be as help-
ful as possible in responding to Indonesia’s arms needs. There are of
course Congressional and budgetary constraints on what we can do,
but within these parameters we will try to work out an appropriate
program. (You might wish to mention that we have already more than
trebled Indonesian MAP.)
—As discussed by the President and President Suharto, the mat-
ter of arms aid to Cambodia is urgent. You hope that Indonesia can
move soon on this, not only to meet the military needs in Cambodia,
but to give the Cambodian Government a needed psychological boost.
You appreciate, though, the desirability of maintaining Indonesia’s
non-aligned image, especially while Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia are
following up the Djakarta Conference.
—You might wish to ask Sumitro how these arms would be de-
livered, and whether he thinks secrecy could be maintained. (Possibly
the U.S. could render some assistance in delivery, either directly or
through third parties.)
—You hope that Sumitro will have useful discussions with people
in the Pentagon. Your staff members have been in touch with respon-
sible people there in setting up meetings. The question of our replac-
ing stocks of Indonesian arms sent to Cambodia can be discussed in
them.
—You believe it would be useful, too, for Sumitro to talk with Am-
bassador Green. All of us—those in the White House, Defense, and
State—want to be helpful.
—You understand that General Umar will be coming soon with a
mission to go into details of U.S. military aid. He and his group will
be welcome. You anticipate that further details will be worked out af-
terwards at Djakarta between our respective military representatives.
—(If Sumitro raises. You are glad to hear that our technicians have
arrived to inspect the Bandung ammunition plant, and hope that con-
version to handle AK–47 ammunition can proceed rapidly.)
Points to Avoid
—Implying any substantive role for Alamsjah in our arrangements.
Since he was here with Suharto we have learned [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] that senior officers among the Indonesian military
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Indonesia 661

have become sensitive over the way that Alamsjah functioned within
the Suharto party. (Alamsjah is only a Brigadier General.) This smacks
of Indonesian palace politics, of which we want no part. If the matter
arises, you might note that you dealt with Alamsjah merely as Suharto’s
emissary, and as a transmission-belt for carrying the President’s views
to Suharto.

307. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 25, 1970.

SUBJECT
Further Points for Your Meeting with General Sumitro

General Sumitro arrived in Washington late yesterday, and his

aides, General Latief and Colonel Soekeng, got in touch with me to-
day. General Sumitro hopes for an early meeting with you, and does
not want to talk with anyone at State or Defense beforehand. I have
not given any assurances of when the meeting will be arranged, but
assume that you will want to talk to him as soon as it is convenient. I
assume also that the party can be flown out and back by Jetstar.
Meanwhile, a number of additional points have developed in my
conversations with State and Defense which you might wish to bear
in mind in your discussions with Sumitro:
—Defense hopes that the Indonesian offer of rifles to Cambodia
can be held to 15,000, at least for the time being. The rationale in part
is that making up stocks will be difficult (M–16’s would need to come
from new production at $150 each; M–14’s are in short supply as stocks
are being used to re-equip the National Guard). In addition, if the In-
donesians turn over all 33,000 AK–47’s in their possession there will
be no requirement in Indonesia for the AK–47 ammunition produced
by the Bandung ammunition factory.
—A way can be found to replace quickly the rifles Indonesia sends
to Cambodia, however. Defense is thinking in terms of a loan of 15,000

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.
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662 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

M–14’s with a promise to replace them later with M–16’s out of the In-
donesian MAP.
—Military assistance funds are extremely tight due to the extra
burden which Cambodia has imposed. Defense is already cutting into
MAP for other countries to take care of Cambodia, and the need to pick
up Indonesia imposes yet an additional burden. This is over and above
the replacement of rifles, which is being treated as a separate item. De-
fense believes it can locate funds to maintain Indonesian MAP at a level
of $15 million as already agreed, but will find it very difficult to add
more. Defense hopes that you can firmly but gently get this point across
to Sumitro. ($15 million should be enough, especially if Defense is not
held to $70 million annually on what it can provide from U.S. excess.)
—For their part, the Indonesians probably have high hopes for
much more than $15 million. Suharto wants to standardize the arms
of the entire Indonesian Army—which means U.S. help, since he can’t
get anything from the Communists. There is talk in Indonesia of set-
ting up an Armalite or M–16 plant. The other services will want their
share, too. The Indonesians desire a firm U.S. commitment.
—There is no enthusiasm whatsoever in State and Defense for the
Indonesian technical mission to be headed by General Umar. They feel
that this mission will tend to reinforce Indonesian hopes, in that it
might go home with inflated ideas of what we can do if technical talks
actually take place. State tried to turn the mission into just a protocol
visit limited to Umar, his wife, and two aides. I told them that this sim-
ply wouldn’t wash—your talks with Alamsjah and the President’s talks
with Suharto endorsed the technical mission concept, and that it sim-
ply cannot be turned off. (You may be hearing more on this, though,
from Marshall Green.)
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Indonesia 663

308. Memorandum of Conversation1

Los Angeles, California, July 1, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS
General Sumitro, Indonesian Army
Brigadier General Latif, Indonesian Army
Colonel Soekeng, Indonesian Army
Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Holdridge

SUBJECT
U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Dr. Kissinger expressed his regrets in his delay in seeing General

Sumitro; the problem was that he had to be with the President so as to
help prepare the President for the meet-the-press session that evening.
He was pleased to see General Sumitro whom he remembered from
the Djakarta visit last year. He also recalled the conversation which he
had had with General Sumitro. Had General Sumitro engaged in talks
with anyone else in Washington? General Sumitro replied that he had
wanted to see Dr. Kissinger first. He would, though, want to call on
Admiral Moorer. He also wanted to convey President Suharto’s greet-
ings to the President.
Continuing, General Sumitro explained that President Suharto had
called a meeting of senior Indonesian Armed Forces officers just after
returning from the U.S., and had gone over his conversation with the
President. He had then ordered General Sumitro to come to the U.S. to
follow up his, Suharto’s, talks with the President. General Sumitro
added that this visit, which was something of a surprise to him, was
made on the basis of his having become, in effect, Dr. Kissinger’s coun-
terpart in Indonesia. Dr. Kissinger asked if General Sumitro had any
special representative in Washington, and upon hearing that none
presently existed, ascertained that any communications by the Presi-
dent and Suharto would be through Sumitro in Djakarta. The special
channel would be used.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger under a July 6
covering memorandum. The meeting was held at the Century Palace Hotel.
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664 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

General Sumitro then brought up Indonesia’s strategic thinking,

noting that before Suharto had left for the U.S. he had directed that an
analysis be prepared of the current situation in Southeast Asia and the
Indonesian role. (There had been some changes since Dr. Kissinger had
been in Djakarta.) This study took into consideration the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from the Far East over a period of time, which the In-
donesians hoped would not be earlier than 1973. They also hoped that
this would be a scheduled process. Looking at the situation very real-
istically, they had come to the conclusion that there should be no vac-
uum. At the same time, Indonesia was not yet a real power, and not
yet able to take over the responsibility for security in Southeast Asia.
They had then addressed the problem of the future role of Japan,
on the assumption that there were no other major powers with which
they could undertake cooperation. (They had noted that the U.S. was
moving in this direction also.) India could not be relied upon, although
its industry was growing, because of its internal political unstability.
While Japan had its troubles, too, its people seemed to be generally of
the same opinion, namely, that the major threat to Japan would come
first from Red China and secondly from the USSR. In 1968, when there
first had been regional discussions, the fact of Japanese development
had been recognized but also the dangers which came from that di-
rection. The Indonesians maintained the hope that the U.S. would play
a role in making Japan strong, and causing it to be a power able to give
a sense of security to Asia.
On Japan, the Indonesian position was that they did not object to
seeing Japan come into the region, but still had some doubts about the
part which Japan would play as a political and military power. Japan
was unpredictable, and while it had industry, logistical support, and
manpower, and could develop strong armed forces, there might be yet
some tendencies in Japan to accommodate. Two years ago, Sumitro had
been told by the South Koreans that the Japanese might reach an un-
derstanding with the Chinese to divide up the responsibilities in the
Far East between the two of them, with the Chinese dominating the
Asian mainland, and the offshore centers coming under Japanese con-
trol. General Sumitro felt that this might be true, and that there were
forces in Japan which wanted to work with the Chinese.
General Sumitro said that the Indonesian Government, President
Suharto, and the principal officers of the Armed Forces had originally
not intended to build up the Armed Forces before 1973 because they
had decided in 1965 that the first need was to upgrade the Indonesian
standard of living, and thus had sacrificed security for the sake of the
national reconstruction effort. However, this situation had changed.
There was the fact of the U.S. withdrawal from the Far East, and the
knowledge that Japan was still a questionable friend even though it
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Indonesia 665

might become a political and military power. The Indonesians were

also afraid that Asian centers such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philip-
pines, and Malaysia, because of the lack of military power in the re-
gion would be pressed by domestic forces to make policy shifts. In this
connection, General Sumitro referred to the intensity of Soviet diplo-
macy, and expressed apprehension that the Asian governments he had
mentioned might lean to the Soviet side. Although the Soviets were
committed in the Middle East, they had influence in the region, and
the Asian nations might turn to the USSR to counter the danger of Chi-
nese infiltration. Speaking frankly, Indonesia had to consider then be-
coming active in this situation.
General Sumitro noted that between 1960 and 1965 Indonesia had
possessed strong Armed Forces, although the policies of the old regime
in this period had been bad. He added that Sukarno, who had just died,
could now be forgiven, but his policies would not be followed. In-
donesia again needed to develop strong armed forces. He and his col-
leagues were not worried about internal disturbances, since they had
been able to roll up the strong Communist organization. The problem
was external, and what Indonesia could do if asked by others for as-
sistance. Indonesia could send its men, but the means available to them
were so poor that they could not do too much. Indonesia’s “strategic
material” was originally from the Soviets, but would be all used up by
1971. What was on hand was in bad condition and could not be used
in a war against the Communists. Indonesia was willing to dispose of
these materials. Dr. Kissinger mentioned, and General Sumitro con-
firmed, that the Indonesians have problems with spare parts for their
Communist matériel.
According to General Sumitro, the Indonesians were now hoping
to obtain military supplies from Western Europe and from the U.S. in
order to rebuild their Armed Forces. They had been encouraged by the
talks between the President and President Suharto, but when Admiral
Sudumo had talked with Admiral Moorer on the Indonesian propos-
als, Moorer had said that everything had depended on Dr. Kissinger’s
views. This was the reason why Suharto had asked him to give the
background of the Indonesian thinking. In speeding up the rebuilding
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Indonesia needed time to develop
since its training facilities were limited and its management very bad.
There was an additional principle: military development should not
interfere with the Indonesian five-year plan. Not one penny could be
expected from this plan, or it would fail.
General Sumitro remarked that the Indonesians had been ex-
tremely pleased at the boldness of the President’s decision on Cambo-
dia, and over the fact that he had not allowed public opinion to deter
him. On the basis of the President’s appreciation of the facts and the
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666 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

support which he enjoys with the silent majority, President Suharto had
wanted him, Sumitro, to present a full conception of the Indonesian
military requirements. These he had with him, which would be gone
into in detail later by General Umar and the special group which would
accompany him. Another factor which the Indonesians had taken into
consideration was the possibility that if the U.S. demobilized or re-
duced its military strength, there would be surplus material which
could be used by the Indonesians. Indonesia wouldn’t ask for what
was still required, but only for what would no longer be needed after
demobilization. He would make the list of Indonesian requirements
available to Dr. Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger asked if General Sumitro had the list with him, and
was told that such was the case.2 Dr. Kissinger said that he had no idea
as to how this matter could be implemented, but wanted to say a num-
ber of things. We had a tough legislative problem, and there were also
some divisions in the Government on the issue of military aid to In-
donesia along the same departmental lines as existed in Indonesia. We
had learned of Indonesian divisions from various sources. All these
things posed a difficult problem, although he felt that we both under-
stood the problems which existed in our respective Capitals.
Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to make one point plain—the
strategic picture which we had in mind was not of withdrawal, but of
a reduction. The President agreed with the Indonesian position, and
had expressed this to President Suharto, whose visit he had very much
welcomed. Anything which required legislation or money needed to
wait until after the November elections. If these went badly there might
be difficulties. General Sumitro expressed the hope that the elections
would go very well. He observed, too, that he had convinced the In-
donesian Ambassador in Washington on the need for what Indonesia
was doing.
Dr. Kissinger asked how long General Sumitro had been in Wash-
ington. He was worried about the time factor. If this was no problem,
he would suggest that the best procedure would be for him to study
the Indonesian paper, and for General Sumitro to see Admiral Moorer,
in whom he had full confidence. He would speak to Admiral Moorer
beforehand. Because the President was so preoccupied with Cambo-
dia, not much could be done that day, but he would be back in Wash-
ington on Monday. He would study the plan, would talk about it with
the President, and meet again with General Sumitro on Monday or
Tuesday. No one but Admiral Moorer and Mr. Holdridge would know
of this matter. Possibly something could be worked out in principle,

2
Not attached and not found.
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Indonesia 667

and he was sympathetic to the idea of providing surplus matériel. There

was a problem, though, that if our help became too obvious, then Con-
gressional restrictions might be imposed. The Congress would zero in
if the program were too obvious. As for the elections, we didn’t need
to defeat all the Senators, but if three or four were defeated the others
would get the message. Meanwhile, we could use the time between
now and the Fall to do what could be done in developing a program.
The Indonesian theory was fully consistent with the Nixon Doctrine.
We would need to study the paper and transfer it into specifics. He
would want to talk with General Sumitro again, and with the Presi-
dent in some detail so that proper guidance could be provided. An im-
mediate way to be helpful might be on the matter of the Indonesian
offer to send rifles to Cambodia. If these were replaced with some U.S.
rifles, the program of re-equipping the Indonesian Armed Forces would
already be beginning.
On the matter of the rifles for Cambodia, General Sumitro felt that
it would be better to wait for the visit of General Umar to work out
the technical details. President Suharto had told him not to get into de-
tails. Dr. Kissinger assured him that we would think the whole thing
over. He could only say that the President had been very pleased over
his conversation with President Suharto, and believed he had reached
an understanding with him. He wanted to do what he could to help
Indonesia develop. The problem was one of finding measures to do so
which would be within our political capability. As to the visit by Gen-
eral Umar, it might be a good idea to hold this matter in abeyance and
to talk about it further next week. General Sumitro indicated that Gen-
eral Umar would not leave until after his own return to Djakarta, so
that holding off for a while would be no problem.
General Sumitro asked if Dr. Kissinger had any questions con-
cerning Indonesian strategic thinking. Dr. Kissinger wondered about
the magnitude of the development program, the size of the Indonesian
Armed Forces, and the scale of re-equipment. He would get a better
feel of this from the paper. On the Indonesian strategic appreciation,
he recapitulated this as: first, accepting the importance of having the
Asian centers play a larger role if the U.S. presence was reduced (we
didn’t like to talk about “withdrawals”); second, having Japan play a
larger role but with its forces coming in only if a threat developed and
not before; third, regarding Indonesia as another component in the
strategic situation in which Malaysia, the Philippines, etc., tended to
look to the largest country for security; fourth, seeing India as not be-
ing in a position to fulfill this responsibility; and finally, reasoning that
the Indonesian Armed Forces needed to be re-equipped to some extent
to fit into our reduction, using equipment of common origin. This
meant replacement of matériel from Western Europe and U.S. sources.
The Indonesians also were aware of the U.S. legislative restrictions,
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668 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

and were thinking of surplus equipment after U.S. forces were drawn
down.
Dr. Kissinger stated that he would ask Admiral Moorer to trans-
late the Indonesian request into dollars, and would try to keep this
matter as restricted as possible. We would need some idea as to what
was really involved. At the same time, the President had the warmest
attitude toward Indonesia, appreciated its constructive attitude, and
regarded the Indonesians as friends. Could he assume that General
Sumitro spoke for President Suharto? General Sumitro replied that his
position had been mentioned during the meeting of the two Presidents
and reiterated before the Indonesian military leaders. General Latif,
who had been in both meetings, could verify this. Dr. Kissinger ob-
served that we would communicate with General Sumitro via our man
in Djakarta. If we received confusing reports, we would check with
him, and it would be helpful to receive information as to what Presi-
dent Suharto thought. Similarly, if they received confusing reports from
our Ambassador, they should check with us. He would provide exact
information. Was there any other matter which General Sumitro
wanted to discuss? He did not object to the Indonesian list, but did not
want it to become an official proposal. It was agreed that one copy
would be provided to the NSC staff and one to Admiral Moorer. The
NSC copy would be examined by Dr. Lynn.

309. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, July 7, 1970.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Sumitro

Attached is the MemCon of your meeting with Sumitro in Los An-

geles on July 2.2 Admiral Moorer was asked yesterday to meet again
with Sumitro and did so at 5:00 p.m. last night. Sumitro was told by

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Top Secret; Sensitive.
2
Document 308. The meeting took place on July 1.
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Indonesia 669

Holdridge to provide Admiral Moorer with a list of Indonesia’s re-

quirements; however, he refused to do so and when he was pressed by
Admiral Moorer he stated that his instructions provided that he had
to give the list to you alone. All of the instructions which you gave to
David were carried out, and Holdridge spoke to Sumitro yesterday
morning on the subject but apparently to no avail.
During the conversation with Admiral Moorer, Sumitro made the
following points:
—Indonesia is prepared to furnish up to 25,000 AK–47’s to
Cambodia.
—Indonesia is also prepared to train Cambodian forces either in
Indonesia or in Cambodia. Sumitro estimates it would take three
months to develop an effective soldier and six months to train highly
qualified troops.
—Sumitro is very anxious to actively participate in Cambodia’s
anti-Communist efforts. He suggested to Admiral Moorer that the U.S.
should completely replace all Soviet equipment in Indonesia and
should also provide the amphibious or airlift for at least a brigade of
Indonesian troops so that their power could be projected into trouble-
spots.
—Sumitro estimated that the major threat comes from Communist
China which could move through Burma or Thailand.
Admiral Moorer got the impression that there would be no diffi-
culty in getting the Indonesians to help provided their quid pro quo
was met. The quid pro quo, in Admiral Moorer’s estimation, un-
doubtedly will be extremely large, however.
John Holdridge is completing detailed talking points for your use
at tomorrow night’s meeting with Sumitro and will have them to you
before the close of business today.
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670 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

310. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, July 8, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
General Sumitro, Indonesian Army
Brigadier General Latif, Indonesian Army
Colonel Soegeng, Indonesian Army
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. Laurence E. Lynn
Mr. John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT
U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Dr. Kissinger said that he had read the memos covering General
Sumitro’s conversations with Admiral Moorer,2 and had studied the
Indonesian proposal for U.S. military assistance. In addition, he had
just had a long talk with the President about the situation.3 He had
given the President a full account of the discussions in Los Angeles,
and had told the President about the Indonesian defense philosophy
if U.S. forces were reduced, i.e. others would need to step in, and In-
donesia as the largest country in Southeast Asia would want to play a
bigger role as its forces were modernized. The President had agreed.
The problem now was one of how to put the Indonesian philosophy
into effect. The full Indonesian list was very substantial; for example,
B–52s did not appear to be the most immediate necessity. General Sum-
itro remarked that as he had explained to Admiral Moorer, the plan for
modernizing the Indonesian forces was divided into phases.
Dr. Kissinger stated that the problem with the total list was that it
was so comprehensive we found it hard to make a reasonable propo-
sition. We would like, first, to build upon the $15 million Indonesian
MAP. Although there were some here who said that the emphasis in

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
Drafted by Holdridge and sent to Kissinger for approval under a July 13 covering mem-
orandum. Kissinger initialed the approve option and also approved sending an attached
sanitized summary of the conversation to the Department of State, which had “been
pressing for word of what was said.” Attached but not printed. The summary is also
ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER. The meeting was held in
Kissinger’s office.
2
Summarized in Document 309.
3
According to the President’s Daily Diary for July 8, Kissinger met with President
Nixon from 4:17 to 5:10 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White
House Central Files)
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Indonesia 671

the MAP should be put on civil construction, we recognized that this

did not serve the purpose of modernization, and so would undertake
a review. Second, we would look over our surplus equipment in Asia
to see how much we could give. Third, we had established good suc-
cess in our Government in making studies of problems such as this in
terms of program analysis of requirements, and with their approval
would like to do this for them to see how we could develop a reason-
able program within our capabilities. We couldn’t reach agreement on
the full list right away, and needed a program; we also wanted to look
at what we could get from surpluses. Dr. Kissinger assumed that the
Indonesians could get such civil assistance items as road building
equipment elsewhere, and that there would be no objection to a re-
ordering of the Indonesian MAP.
General Sumitro said that he had discussed this with President
Suharto, who had indicated that if the U.S. was in basic agreement, the
MAP program would be dropped and included in the new require-
ment list. They hoped that MAP could be transferred into their over-
all requirements. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that MAP should be
continued; in fact, he had asked Dr. Lynn to see what could be obtained
from MAP alone if it were concentrated on weapons. There was no
need to go into details now, but a good deal might be obtained. (He
read from an illustrative list.) We wanted, too, to look at surpluses.
He had talked with Secretary Laird on the possibility of increasing the
Indonesian MAP, and would attempt to do so, but we needed to get
some idea of their needs in terms of realistic possibilities. We would
look at their plan through Dr. Lynn,4 and we would look at surpluses.
Dr. Kissinger indicated that until all of these requirements had
been completed, it might be better for General Umar not to come. We
did not want this matter to become too bureaucratized. If it were kept
low, the Indonesians could be sure of the President’s personal atten-
tion. General Sumitro agreed, observing that it would be much better
if General Umar could wait. In the meantime, a study could be made
in Indonesia, which he felt might require about two months. Dr.
Kissinger thought that the time required might not be more than two
weeks, since Dr. Lynn had done superior work before in this sort of

4
Lynn had already looked at the Indonesian plan that Sumitro had given Kissinger,
and had reported his conclusions in a July 7 memorandum to Kissinger. Lynn reported
that the Indonesian plan requested “a complete force modernization plan,” including
such new big-ticket items as B–52s and IRBMs, and that it would cost “billions of dol-
lars.” Lynn proposed instead “to give them assistance which contributes to the priority
mission of maintaining internal security,” including 18 T–37 aircraft, 20 C–47 aircraft, 10
patrol craft, 12 light landing craft, and initial equipment for 9 infantry battalions, which
he estimated would cost $75 million over 5 years. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 531, Country
Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II)
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672 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

analysis and could organize a study team quickly. This would be a

good survey, which would provide us with a basis for joint action.
General Sumitro noted in response to a question from Dr. Kissinger
that he was planning on returning to Djakarta on July 9. Upon his re-
turn, consideration would be given to what the Indonesia Five-Year
Military Plan should be. There was as yet no idea as to magnitudes.
Dr. Kissinger suggested that Dr. Lynn might be able to help in this re-
spect. General Sumitro speculated that it might be possible to talk in
terms of percentages of their total requirements list, perhaps 10–15 per-
cent for a start. The officer in charge of laying out these requirements
was just finishing up a seminar in the U.S. and was on his way to
Djakarta.
Dr. Kissinger asked how we might maintain communications, to
which General Sumitro replied he favored using the same special chan-
nel which now existed. In a month or two, he would have a military
man in Washington who could act as a contact. Dr. Kissinger also raised
the problem of maintaining security on Dr. Lynn’s presence in In-
donesia. On this, General Sumitro proposed that the study be made in
Bali, which could be reached by direct flight to Bangkok. Dr. Kissinger
observed that he would give further thought to this question, and
would be in touch. Would they mind if our Ambassador knew of the
study? General Sumitro replied that President Suharto felt Ambassador
Galbraith could be relied upon. He was, however, subordinate to the
State Department. Dr. Kissinger assured General Sumitro that we
would keep this whole thing under tight control, and would look into
the bureaucratic aspects.
On the question of obtaining a visa for Dr. Lynn, General Sumitro
felt that this was no problem. The Indonesian Military Attaché could
set it up, or it could be obtained somewhere else such as the Indone-
sian Embassy in Bangkok (their Ambassador there was a General) or
in Tokyo. General Latif observed that in the President’s conversation
with President Suharto the President had given assurances that Am-
bassador Galbraith would be kept fully informed. Dr. Kissinger agreed,
but pointed out that the communications channel posed a problem. It
would be difficult if we had to go through the regular channel. How-
ever, what we told our Ambassador would be our worry. Did Ambas-
sador Galbraith know that General Sumitro was here? General Sum-
itro noted in reply that Ambassador Galbraith had been kept informed
of his, Sumitro’s, visit by the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Dr. Kissinger
declared that we would keep Ambassador Galbraith informed on es-
sential matters.
Dr. Kissinger stated that we would start now to work out the com-
position of the study, and the communications channels. Our require-
ment would be to get some sense of the magnitude of the quantities,
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Indonesia 673

and to know what we could realistically do. He emphasized that the

President was in favor of helping. What the Indonesians had presented
was a maximum program, but we needed to be realistic. Had the In-
donesian plan been given to Admiral Moorer? General Sumitro said
that it had not yet been given to Admiral Moorer, since they didn’t re-
gard it as a formal document. However, they would be glad to pass
the plan on to Admiral Moorer if Dr. Kissinger thought that this would
be desirable. It was agreed that Colonel Soegeng would give it to Mr.
Holdridge for transmittal to Admiral Moorer.
Dr. Kissinger raised the issue of the Indonesian offer to provide
AK–47s to Cambodia. General Sumitro said that Indonesia had 25,000
on hand which they were willing to offer as soon as they heard from
Phnom Penh and as soon as U.S. replacement rifles arrived in Djakarta.
They understood that the total Cambodian requirements were for
30,000 small arms. Dr. Kissinger informed General Sumitro that we
would be willing to send 15,000 M–14s immediately, on loan, and re-
place these with M–16s under the Indonesian MAP. General Sumitro
remarked that of the types of weapons available—the M–14, the AR–15,
and the modified M–16—the modified M–16 was much the best. Dr.
Kissinger reiterated that our proposal was to give M–14s now and re-
place them with M–16s as production became available.
General Sumitro raised another question: the re-equipping of the
Indonesian State Police, for which they had also forwarded require-
ments. He pointed out that the Police were a part of the Indonesian
defense establishment. Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Lynn indicated that this
question, too, would be considered in the study.
Dr. Kissinger then telephoned Admiral Moorer to ask about the
time which would be required to provide M–16s under the Indonesian
MAP. He quoted Admiral Moorer as saying that the M–16s would be
provided within a year or even less, and that the M–14s would thus
be on hand for a relatively short period. These M–14s would be in good
condition, since they were being held in reserve for the U.S. forces.
General Sumitro referred to the fact that the Indonesians had an
arms factory capable of producing a machine gun known as the BM–59.
This was a stop-gap weapon, which did not compare with the M–16.
Was it correct that the U.S. had given an arms factory to Singapore for
manufacturing M–16s? Mr. Holdridge said that he thought this was
still under discussion, and had not yet been decided. Dr. Lynn asked
if their existing factory could be converted to manufacture modern
weapons, to which General Sumitro expressed uncertainties as to the
technical nature of the problem. Again, the M–16 was better than any-
thing else. Dr. Kissinger explained that we were in principle prepared
to provide M–16s and would do so as soon as production caught up.
We were in fact cutting back on production for our forces.
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674 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Dr. Kissinger wondered how AK–47 deliveries to Cambodia could

be worked out. General Sumitro responded by saying that President
Suharto wanted the Cambodians to take over this responsibility and
transfer the weapons to Phnom Penh themselves. Dr. Kissinger stated
that this was satisfactory, and that the Indonesians should let us know
when the transfer had been completed so we could provide replace-
ment weapons. General Sumitro then said that the Indonesians wanted
the U.S. rifles first, to which Dr. Kissinger observed that we should
start doing this and would take it up in the next WSAG meeting.
Dr. Kissinger touched on the question of Bandung ammunition fac-
tory, asking about its status. General Sumitro noted that the money was
available in Indonesia to start building a new plant for AK–47 ammuni-
tion, and that nine months would be required for the first production.
They still had ammunition reserves, but had pulled it all back to Djakarta
and had re-equipped their commando and parachute brigades.
General Sumitro again brought up the question of the National
Police, explaining that the Police would need to take over internal se-
curity responsibilities from the other services so that these services
could concentrate on the national defense effort. Dr. Kissinger thought
that our program would take care of most essentials.
General Sumitro went over Indonesian strategic concepts in the
same terms which he had outlined in Los Angeles. Once again he ex-
pressed reservations about the role of Japan in Southeast Asia, pointing
out that the Japanese military leaders properly understood the threat
Communist China posed for Japan but that the Japanese politicians in
contrast wanted to avoid a conflict with China and might accommodate.
In fact, Japan’s approach to the other Asian countries might even con-
stitute an economic and political threat if things were to go wrong. When
Dr. Kissinger asked what could go wrong, General Sumitro pointed once
more to the possibility of a Japanese accommodation with Communist
China. He hoped that the U.S. would be successful in influencing the
Japanese to follow the proper line, but he was not so sure about this—
he had the impression that the Japanese politicians were stubborn. Dr.
Kissinger recalled that when he had been in Indonesia last year he had
encountered disquiet over the future role of Japan.
The conversation concluded with a reaffirmation from Dr.
Kissinger that the President had wanted very positively to respond to
the Indonesian proposals and had asked that his warmest feelings be
conveyed to President Suharto. He considered his relationship with
President Suharto as one of the warmest he possessed. We had certain
restraints on what we can do, but within these limitations we would
act. We recognized the Indonesian role, which was precisely what the
Nixon Doctrine required. General Sumitro should feel free to write on
any subject and to keep in close contact.
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Indonesia 675

311. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, August 10, 1970.

Dear Henry:
I have received a personal letter from Frank Galbraith covering a
range of sensitive subjects regarding our relations with Indonesia. I
thought you would be particularly interested in the following excerpts
on Indonesian MAP. Frank presented these points as the views of the
small circle in the Embassy who work on highly sensitive politi-
cal/military matters (the DCM, Political Counselor, Defense Attaché
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).
“What we are most anxious to see amplified is the timetable which
the President and Dr. Kissinger have in mind for the Indonesian pro-
gram. We are all agreed, as I believe you are in Washington, that In-
donesia’s present capability for assuming a meaningful security role in
Southeast Asia is virtually nonexistent. A great deal of basic spadework
needs to be done, both in stabilizing and developing the country as
well as preparing the military establishment for modernization. The re-
view of emphasis in our MAP which Dr. Kissinger mentioned to Sum-
itro has to a large degree already taken place. Although civic action
continues to play an important role in the program, the planning un-
der the new $15 million ceiling places primary emphasis on improv-
ing the maintenance capability, logistics, and communications of the
military, along with the introduction of some combat equipment. All
of these elements are, of course, a necessary preamble to a modern-
ization program.
“President Suharto’s reaction, as reported by General Sumitro to
George Benson (Djakarta 5655)2 fortunately seems to recognize the
need for a measured approach. He seems to be sufficiently concerned
with the budget and Indonesia’s economic development to want to
postpone any further burgeoning MAP for this year at least.
“There are a number of pitfalls which both we and the Indone-
sians will have to avoid if we want a realistic chance for a stable
Indonesia capable of playing the role we envisage for it in the area.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret. In an August 11 routing slip, at-
tached but not printed, Holdridge noted that “HAK has seen, no further action neces-
sary. JHH 8/12.”
2
Dated August 4. (Ibid.)
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676 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Shifting too quickly into a full-fledged modernization program, either

because of our interest in forcing the pace of Indonesia’s military
progress, or because of the inability of the Indonesians to resist the
temptations, would present us with one of two choices. Either one of
these, I believe, would be undesirable at this stage. The first would be
to turn over a lot of modern equipment too soon and watch it become
quickly unserviceable; the other would be to provide hundreds of
American trainers and advisers so that we could insist and insure that
they take care of the equipment. If we were to adopt the second choice
I am afraid that we would be adding significantly to the domestic po-
litical problems which are likely to mount for the Suharto Government
anyway. Many of those in the Indonesian Armed Forces are all too in-
clined to ignore the political repercussions of actions which they con-
sider desirable from a purely military point of view. If we compound
their lack of political sophistication by ourselves ignoring such proba-
ble political repercussions, we are likely to increase their political trou-
bles and eventually weaken the Suharto Government.
“Another area where a premature military modernization effort
would weaken hopes for a stable base from which Indonesia could
mount its heightened SEA role is on the economic side. It would be a
tragedy should the Indonesians divert too soon their scarce resources
from development into the military sector, a diversion which would be
required if they were to seek to absorb more MAP, given the huge ru-
piah outlay required to receive, use and maintain the equipment we
might give them. Progress on the economic side has been promising,
but the situation remains critical. Such a diversion at this stage of the
first five-year program could seriously set back the good start that has
been made in economic rehabilitation.”
My personal experiences in Indonesia would support Frank’s
assessment.
Sincerely yours,
Marshall
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312. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, October 13, 1970.

SUBJECT
Indonesian Request for U.S. Assistance in Furthering Southeast Asian Regional
Military Cooperation

At Tab B2 is a message to you from General Sumitro requesting

U.S. assistance to Indonesia in furthering Southeast Asian regional mil-
itary cooperation. He proposes that Indonesia take the initiative in ar-
ranging for: (1) exchanges of personnel for training; (2) strategic intel-
ligence operations; (3) holding seminars of senior commanders on
defense, intelligence and territorial warfare operations; and (4) ulti-
mately, participation in joint military operations in border areas.
General Sumitro’s thesis is that the British “East of Suez” policy
and the Nixon Doctrine create a military vacuum into which the Com-
munists (particularly Communist China) will try to move via pro-
tracted wars of national liberation, and that the free nations of the re-
gion thus have enough in common to be able to coordinate on foreign
policy and defense matters if someone shows the way. This could lead
to a military “gentleman’s agreement,” and not necessarily to a formal
military pact.
The initial costs to the U.S., as laid out by General Sumitro, would
amount to a rounded-off figure of $1 million spent between 1970 and
1972 on conducting an educational program in joint strategic intelli-
gence, a senior seminar, an Indonesian advisory and military training
program in Cambodia, and a language training program. To provide
for transportation of the personnel involved, Indonesia would like the
loan of six C–130s, or if this is not possible, the use of U.S. aircraft as
needed on an “on-call” basis. Typically, General Sumitro insists that
there be no impairment of Indonesia’s five-year plan by diverting funds
from it.
As a final pitch, General Sumitro strongly urges that the U.S. set
up an M–16 factory in Indonesia to bring about the standardization of
weapons among all the free Southeast Asian nations. He suggests that

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2
The September 25 message is attached but not printed.
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678 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

the ammunition which Indonesia has sent to Cambodia be applied as

a partial payment for the M–16 plant.
Comment
General Sumitro’s proposal contains some intriguing aspects. We
are interested in the development of regional security undertakings,
and the Indonesians might well be the best ones to take the lead in this.
The rather modest nature of their initial program would probably as-
sure a good response, since there would be no implications of a formal
security organization. The proposal might also be a means for getting
Indonesia to move toward a security role of its own in troubled areas
of Southeast Asia. The costs involved are also relatively modest.
On the other hand, we should recognize that Indonesia is not act-
ing out of sheer altruism. A bid for six C–130s has been made to us ear-
lier in connection with the shipment of ammunition to Cambodia,
which we deflected by using U.S. aircraft, while a request for an M–16
factory has been made on several occasions, most recently during Gen-
eral Sumitro’s conversation with you in July. It has been reiterated
through regular State channels, also as part of a deal on the ammuni-
tion which they sent to Cambodia, and will probably come up again
when Suharto sees the President. It is clear that they want the airplanes
and the plant very badly, and may have used their regional coopera-
tion proposal in part as the means to this particular end (or ends). They
are also working their aid to Cambodia into the regional security frame-
work, of course at our expense.
Nevertheless, as Mao Tse-tung put it, a single spark can start a
prairie fire. As of now there is no movement at all toward a regional
security arrangement in Southeast Asia, and the Indonesians might just
be able to get things going. At Tab A is a draft reply from you to Gen-
eral Sumitro, which while not assuming any commitment expresses in-
terest in his proposal and suggests that he should submit it through
Ambassador Galbraith so as to assure that it will receive full staffing.3
The draft reply dodges the C–130 and M–16 factory questions, which
you may wish to consider separately. An interim reply has already been
sent to General Sumitro in your name, since you were in Europe when
the message arrived, which promises fuller study (Tab C).4
Recommendation
That you approve the message at Tab A to General Sumitro.5

3
The draft was attached but not printed.
4
Tab C was not attached.
5
Kissinger initialed the approve option.
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313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Packard)1

Washington, November 2, 1970.

SUBJECT
Military or Related Assistance to Indonesia in Exchange for AK–47 Ammunition

Your memorandum to me of October 27, 1970 on the above sub-

ject2 was very useful, and I appreciate the effort that went into it. Your
preferred option for repaying the Indonesians for the AK–47s and am-
munition which they sent to Cambodia is acceptable, i.e. providing
them with $262,000 in cash and with 2,640 M–16s, each with 1000
rounds of ammunition.
I would also appreciate, however, a somewhat fuller study by De-
fense and State on the pros and cons of the M–16 factory which the In-
donesians have requested. In this respect, I believe that it would be
useful to weigh into the balance any political factors which might af-
fect our judgment one way or the other. I would in addition like more
details on the aid which we might offer in connection with the Ban-
dung ammunition factory or the Husien Air Base Depot, specifically
whether our assistance would be of an order of magnitude which
would make these projects acceptable alternatives to an M–16 factory.
Pending completion of this further study, I recommend that the
draft State/Defense message to Djakarta which you attached to your
memorandum to me be sent without the final paragraph.3
Henry A. Kissinger

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Green.
2
Attached but not printed.
3
The attached draft was sent as telegram 180287 to Djakarta, November 2; attached
but not printed.
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680 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

314. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T.

Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT
Survey Group on Military Assistance to Indonesia

You have approved a draft message to General Sumitro informing

him you will send a survey group to Indonesia to go into the question
of U.S. military assistance in relation to Indonesian needs as soon as
General Sumitro informs us of a suitable date. As finally sent, this mes-
sage contains a new sentence to the effect that we will inform General
Sumitro of the composition of the group once a date is established;2
the extra wording was included in response to an additional message
from General Sumitro in which he indicates he is expecting Dr. Lynn
to come (Tab A).3 We will of course want to inform him at an appro-
priate time that Dr. Lynn is no longer with the NSC and that the com-
position of the group will therefore be different than originally antici-
pated. However, any group which goes to Indonesia will be regarded
as doing so under your direction and hence will be acceptable to the
Indonesians.
A problem which now must be addressed is getting a suitable
group organized. We believe that it would be desirable to send a small
party so as to keep the visibility down, and to include one representa-
tive each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, a logistics specialist and
a representative of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State. A

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A notation in Kissinger’s handwriting in the upper right-
hand margin of the first page reads: “Discuss soonest. Why not small NSC working
group on model of VSSG (Vietnam Special Study Group) task force.” A note attached to
the first page reads: “Xeroxed comeback copy sent to Holdridge/Kennedy 11/27 for ac-
tion.” In a memorandum to Kissinger, November 30, Holdridge stated that he, Kennedy,
and Dr. Wayne Smith had agreed that the NSC should not become involved directly in
the group sent to Indonesia, “but rather leave this to the bureaucrats to determine and
staff through the NSC process.” (Ibid.) Kissinger initialed his approval of this idea on a
November 10 memorandum from Herbert Levin. (Ibid.)
2
The attached message, sent as backchannel message WHO2234 to Djakarta, from
Kissinger to Sumitro, December 24, advised that the group was in the process of being
organized, would depart shortly after the start of the new year, and “I will be commu-
nicating with you further as details are worked out.”
3
Quoted in a November 14 memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger, at-
tached but not printed.
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Indonesia 681

representative of CINCPAC also should join the team for its Indone-
sian visit (he would pave the way for problem solving both with
PACOM and MACV). The team chief preferably should be designated
by the Joint Staff or DOD/ISA.
There is also a problem on how to initiate this project. No one other
than Admiral Moorer is aware of the five-year improvement plan given
you by the Indonesians. We suggest a game-plan which would involve
your engaging in discussions with Under Secretary Irwin, Mr. Packard,
and Admiral Moorer. Your luncheon on November 20 with Under Sec-
retary Irwin and Mr. Packard would provide the opportunity to raise
this with both of them, leaving only Admiral Moorer to be brought in.
You could point out that:
—The Indonesians have been pressing to send a high-level mis-
sion to Washington under General Umar, their Army Chief of Staff, to
determine possible levels of U.S. military assistance.
—Indonesian expectations are very high, and we, Defense, and
State (the East Asian Bureau) agree that it would be inadvisable for
General Umar’s mission to come until we have a better feel for what
they really need and what we can do. Otherwise, the Indonesians ei-
ther would see our willingness to receive them as a sign that they can
expect a great deal from us, or we would be placed in the position of
turning them down.
—We do not want to leave the impression with the Indonesian mil-
itary that we will not be helpful. The President, in fact, wants us to do
what we can within the limits of available resources and has author-
ized an increase in the Indonesian MAP from around $4.5 million to
$18 million for FY 71 (including $3 million to reimburse the Indone-
sians for their aid to Cambodia). The intention is to use surplus stocks
as much as possible. The Indonesian military are a very important fac-
tor in the country’s stability, and President Suharto wants to be able to
meet their desires for new equipment to the greatest extent possible.
A negative attitude on our part could seriously impair what is now a
cordial U.S.-Indonesia relationship.
—At the same time, we do not wish to lend any substance to the
high Indonesian expectations. We want to keep the whole question of
military assistance to Indonesia under control and not let the Indone-
sians set the pace.
—Accordingly, you suggest that a special survey group on U.S.
military assistance to Indonesia be sent out to go into Indonesian re-
quirements and to see what we might be able to provide, particularly
from surplus stocks in Vietnam. This group would plan on spending
several weeks in Indonesia, and would also go to Vietnam to inquire
into the surplus situation there. In this way we could hold off General
Umar’s mission, and keep the initiative in our hands.
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682 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

—You suggest that the survey group be composed of representa-

tives of the three Armed Services, a logistician, a CINCPAC represen-
tative, and a representative of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in
State. It would be headed by a military officer to be designated by the
Joint Staff, or by someone of appropriate rank from OASD/ISA.
—We would want to keep the existence of the survey group very
closely held. Its members would be picked very carefully and briefed
thoroughly on the political sensitivities involved and on the need to
stay out of the public eye while in Indonesia.
Wayne Smith (John Court for) concurs.
Recommendations
1. That you discuss with Under Secretary Irwin4 and Mr. Packard
the question of sending a survey group to Indonesia along the lines
outlined above.
2. That you ask Mr. Packard to bring up this matter with Admi-
ral Moorer.

4
According to an attached but not printed December 1 memorandum from
Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, Kissinger met with Irwin on November 30 and ob-
tained his agreement “on the desirability of sending a survey group to Indonesia to con-
sider military assistance which might be provided by the U.S.” The memorandum also
suggested that Kissinger meet with Packard “following the next SRG meeting.”

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, November 21, 1970, 0430Z.

8770. For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador.

1. We have had some pretty good indications last few days that
contrary some previous reports debate is still going on within In-
donesian Government over question of seeking Soviet assistance for
rehabilitation of Soviet military equipment (or has been reopened as a
result of a new and presumably more attractive Soviet offer). My hunch
is that foreign office plus certain elements in military concerned both
with Indonesian nonaligned image and with importance of Soviet

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
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Indonesia 683

equipment in air and navy (and this does not include apparently chiefs
of staff of these two services) are pressing Suharto to seek Soviet as-
sistance in military field. We have also received indication from mem-
ber of staff of Chief of Air Force Suwoto that Soviet Ambassador has
in last few days given President Suharto rosy picture of possible fu-
ture Soviet military assistance. I have agreed to meet informally and
privately with Chief of Staff of Air Suwoto this coming Monday
evening at his request to discuss this matter, his purpose apparently
being to seek my reaction and to enlist my efforts to emphasize to
Suharto U.S. intentions in military assistance field in way which would
counter Soviet approach.
2. I talked with new Director General for Political Affairs, Foreign
Ministry, Djajadiningrat, yesterday I was asked whether I didn’t agree
that Indonesia should seek support from Soviets for rehabilitation So-
viet military equipment. I said this was decision for GOI but that from
my point of view if price was right and Indonesia could preserve its
independence of action I saw no objection.
3. I would appreciate reassurance2 that line I took with Djajadin-
ingrat is correct one, particularly if, as we suspect, Soviets are raising
the ante.
Galbraith

2
Green reassured Galbraith in telegram 191309 to Djakarta, November 22. (Ibid.)

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, November 24, 1970, 1000Z.

8853. For Asst. Sec. Green from Ambassador. Ref: A. Djakarta 87702
B. State 191309.3

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to CINCPAC for Ad-
miral McCain. A notation on the first page in Kissinger’s handwriting reads: “We can’t
rest till they [or they will] buy Soviet arms. HK” An arrow was drawn from this nota-
tion to Haig’s name, which is followed by Haig’s initials.
2
Document 315.
3
See footnote 2, Document 315.
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684 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

1. Before meeting mentioned para 1 ref A took place last night we

learned that Chief of Staff of Air Suwoto was having cold feet about
discussing alleged Soviet offers of military assistance with me. Never-
theless Suwoto and his chief of operations (Air Vice Marshal Slamat,
who had served as intermediary) showed up at house of one of DLG
staff and after some awkwardness about opening up subject (I even-
tually took initiative) Suwoto talked briefly and in very general terms
about “probability” that Soviets will make attractive offer of military
assistance to Indonesia. Suwoto said it is apparent to him that Soviets
want to establish themselves in Southeast Asia in order to out-flank
Communist China and that strenuous efforts they are making in this
regard elsewhere in area is indication they will make attractive offer
of military assistance to Indonesia. Suwoto said he does not want his
air force split into two sections, one supplied by Soviet and one by U.S.
(implying he is not in favor of accepting Soviet assistance) but he also
implied that unless U.S. moves faster with its assistance for close air
and other support for Indonesian air force he may be forced to take
Soviet assistance.
2. I questioned Suwoto as closely as I could on whether Soviets
had already made an offer or indicated in any concrete way that they
are prepared to discuss the matter further. He maintained that this was
all still in the conditional and the realm of possibility.
3. Air Marshal Slamat had also indicated previously that Suwoto
would press me on possible procurement of excess B–25 aircraft. Su-
woto did not do so although he queried me in general terms about
availability of excess material in Vietnam. He also questioned me in
general terms about future of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia. I
replied in equally general terms that it was possible that there would
be some excess equipment in Vietnam available that would be useful
to Indonesia although we had not thus far been able to locate much
within context our MAP. With respect to future U.S. military assistance
I only said that Congress was watching this very carefully but that I
felt sure we would do our fair share to help countries which showed
that they could help themselves.
4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contact has repeat-
edly assured [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Indone-
sians would not accept offer on spare parts from Soviets for Soviet mil-
itary equipment. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contact
told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on November 23 that
Soviet military attaché had recently approached Suwoto with offer of
spare parts for Indonesian air force. [less than 1 line of source text not de-
classified] contact said they now “investigating” report of Soviet approach
to Suwoto to ascertain exactly what offer to Suwoto contained. [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] contact said he would advise [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] results their investigation.
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Indonesia 685

5. Comment: It is hard to sort truth from fiction among the spongy

and sometimes contradictory discussions referred to above. Our best
guess is that although GOI, particularly army, has decided against ac-
cepting Soviet assistance and number of Soviet personnel which go
with it, there are those among the armed services and, of course, in for-
eign office who believe that offer of credit terms which Malik brought
back from Moscow for purchase of spare parts for military equipment
should be taken up. The Soviets may be seeking to reopen the debate
within the military over accepting Soviet spare parts (and incidentally
embarrass the U.S. since they undoubtedly aware of our tardiness in
delivering promised air force items) by a specific and presumably more
attractive offer. Whatever Suwoto’s motives in approaching me, he ob-
viously backed away at last moment possibly at insistence of Hankam.
Galbraith

317. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Aid to Indonesia

State (Tab A)2 requests your approval for a U.S. endorsement of

(a) a World Bank recommendation that Indonesia receive $640 million
in aid from all sources in 1971/72 and (b) a pledge of $215 million as
the U.S. share of the total.
The proposed package would support your general aid strategy of
shifting U.S. assistance increasingly into a multilateral framework, and
the high priority you place on Indonesia. The FY 71 allocation necessary
to support this U.S. pledge would be within expected appropriations

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. An attached De-
cember 15 memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council staff to
Kissinger indicates that the memorandum was drafted by the former and sent to the lat-
ter on that date. An attached routing slip indicates it was approved by Kissinger on De-
cember 16.
2
A December 5 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President
Nixon is attached but not printed.
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686 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

and the approved budgetary outlay ceilings. Treasury, Agriculture, and

OMB (Tab B) concur.3
The $640 million Indonesian aid requirement was calculated by
the World Bank, which coordinates the major non-Communist aid
donors through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI).
The total is an increase over the 1970/71 level of $600 million. It is com-
posed of $160 million in food aid, $375 million in bilateral non-food
aid, and $105 million of multilateral aid provided through the World
Bank and Asian Development Bank.
The U.S. pledge of $215 million will consist of $90 million in food
aid and $125 million of non-food aid. Both pledges are consistent with
the formula used last year, that the United States provide a “fair share”
of food and one-third of bilateral non-food aid. It would, however, rep-
resent a slight decline from our $230 million contribution this year.
Foreign aid has played a key role in stabilizing the Indonesian
economy following the disastrous policies of Sukarno. The rate of in-
flation in 1970 has been less than 7 percent, compared with 600 per-
cent in 1966. An increase in food availability, particularly rice, is the
key to the success of the stabilization program. A sound rice policy has
been instituted under which domestic procurement of rice by the Gov-
ernment has more than doubled over last year, helping assure an in-
centive price for farmers while eliminating seasonal fluctuations in ur-
ban rice prices.
In April 1970, basic reforms were introduced to simplify the for-
eign exchange system; exports thereby increased in the first ten months
of 1970 by about 15 percent, despite falling prices for rubber and tin.
Imports are being focused on high priority sectors. Indonesia’s net for-
eign exchange position has improved, and foreign investment contin-
ues to be attracted to priority sectors. An international formula for
rescheduling Indonesian debt has been worked out, and we expect to
sign a bilateral agreement which will allow Indonesia to reschedule its
debts to the U.S.
The problems facing Indonesia are still severe: generating long-
term economic growth is difficult in view of the weak economic base;
corruption continues to be a major problem; and the country’s lack of
a strong administrative capacity impairs even the most carefully con-
ceived development plans.
However, President Suharto, with the assistance of the World Bank
and the U.S., is sincerely trying to correct these problems and is show-
ing encouraging success.

3
A December 14 memorandum from the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, George P. Shultz, to President Nixon is attached but not printed.
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Indonesia 687

Recommendation
That you approve State’s recommendation that the U.S. endorse
(a) the $640 million 1971/72 aid requirement for Indonesia from all
sources and (b) pledge $215 million as the U.S. contribution to meet-
ing that total.4

4
Kissinger initialed the approve option for the President on December 16.

318. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, December 23, 1970.

SUBJECT
U.S. Response to Indonesia’s “Five Year Military Plan”

This memorandum follows up on a recent conversation on the

above subject you had with Under Secretary Irwin and has his
approval.2
Indonesian military leaders appear determined to draw from us
within the very near future a reaction to their proposal to assume re-
gional security responsibilities as well as a more precise indication of
the military support we will be giving them over the next five years.
They have not provided us and perhaps have not yet formulated
a clear picture of Indonesia’s prospective security role in the region.
They seem to envisage as a first step, however, an in-country training
program for other Southeast Asian troops as well as the stationing of
Indonesian advisors in Cambodia and perhaps other forward areas. By
the end of the “Five Year Plan,” they might well hope to equip a mod-
ern, mobile strike force to stand by for possible deployment on the
mainland.

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret.
2
See footnote 4, Document 314.
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688 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

We believe that we must at this point provide as unequivocal a re-

sponse as possible to this Indonesian démarche if we are to place our
future relations on a sound basis and avoid leading the Indonesians
into potentially harmful miscalculations. In formulating our response,
we should bear in mind that it is in the Indonesian nature to expect
more than is usually possible and to request more than is really
expected.
The enclosed paper discusses the current Indonesian probe and
evaluates alternative U.S. responses. Following are our views on the
approach we should take with the Indonesians:
We should discourage the Indonesians from thinking that we will
underwrite a regional security role for them over the next five years:
—Even should funds for such a program be available, we cannot
promote Indonesia into a role to which it must be elected by its neigh-
bors. Indeed, efforts to do so would probably be counterproductive as
other nations would resent Indonesia’s serving as a middleman for U.S.
military assistance.
—More compelling, some of Indonesia’s neighbors might well
view an Indonesian external defense capability as a threat rather than
a contribution to their own security.
—Finally and most important, Indonesia’s assumption of regional
security responsibilities before it has developed necessary manage-
ment, logistical and operational capabilities will only delay efforts to
lay an indigenous base for a more effective defense establishment.
On the other hand, we should be as positive and forthcoming as
possible in helping Indonesia over the next five years to build an in-
digenous logistical base which would permit it to play a role in the
area commensurate with its size, population and economic potential.
This approach is discussed under Section V B of the attached paper. It
would involve supplying light combat items wanted and required by
Indonesia for helping to meet its internal security needs as well as con-
tinued concentration on improving Indonesia’s maintenance, transport
and communications capabilities. In addition we might afford assis-
tance in building up defense-related industries. If a suitable program
can be worked out, we should consider increasing the currently
planned FY 1972–76 annual MAP levels of $15 million ($13 million
funded and $2 million excess) over the next few years to permit sup-
port for a defense-related industry (estimated at approximately $2 to
$3 million per year).
We strongly recommend informing the Indonesians of the ap-
proximate levels of both funded and long supply/excess support they
can expect to receive under MAP for the next year or two, subject to
Congressional appropriations. Failure to do so could well lead to ex-
aggerated expectations and thus future misunderstandings. In this re-
spect we support Alternative D under Section VI of the attached pa-
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Indonesia 689

per.3 Using the current $15 million planning figure, our Defense Liai-
son Group in Djakarta is now working up a general prospectus of the
types and amounts of MAP-supplied equipment we believe Indonesia
will require next year and beyond.
We share your view that it is preferable to send a group of quali-
fied DOD and State Officials to Djakarta to discuss this matter there
with the Indonesians before General Umar’s proposed visit to the U.S.
This group could also look quietly into the question of increasing LS/E
for Indonesia and helping to set up a vehicle and equipment repair fa-
cility. We believe, however, that we should define our response to this
Indonesian initiative before entering into these discussions in Djakarta,
which might best be timed for late January or early February.
R.C. Brewster4

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

U.S. RESPONSE TO INDONESIAN REQUEST FOR MAP SUPPORT

OF A FIVE YEAR MILITARY PLAN
I. The Problem
The Indonesian military leaders have reportedly approved a “Five
Year Military Plan” which projects a regional security role for the In-
donesian Armed Forces. They have urgently pressed for high level, bi-
lateral meetings to sound out U.S. reaction to this plan, which would
apparently rely on MAP support.
We have as yet obtained only a very sketchy outline of the In-
donesian plan and it is possible that the Indonesians wish to probe the
degree of U.S. support for this general concept before developing fur-
ther their ideas. As a first step, they apparently envisage a large in-
country training program for Malaysian, Thai, Laotian, Cambodian and
perhaps other Southeast Asian troops and the establishment of regu-
lar channels for the exchange of military intelligence. (This would in
fact be expansion of arrangements Indonesia has already established
on a bilateral basis with certain countries.) The Indonesians also have
spoken of stationing Indonesian territorial warfare advisors in Cam-
bodia and may envisage a regional advisory effort.

3
Alternative D of Section VI of the attached 10-page paper, “U.S. Response to In-
donesian Request for MAP Support of a Five Year Military Plan,” specified that the U.S.
Government “could inform the Indonesians of an approximate ceiling both on funded
and long supply/excess equipment.”
4
Deputy Executive Secretary Brewster signed above Eliot’s typed signature.
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690 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Towards the end of the Five Year Plan, the Indonesians probably
wish to establish and equip a modern, mobile land force for possible
deployment to the mainland, a navy strike force consisting of de-
stroyers, submarines and attack transports and an enlarged Air Force
transport arm. In addition, the Indonesians have clearly indicated their
willingness to provide troops for a peacekeeping role in Viet-Nam un-
der certain political conditions.
Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Umar Wirahadikusumah
has been invited to visit the U.S. in late March and early April, 1971.
The Indonesian military leadership has clearly indicated that his pri-
mary mission will be to obtain a high level reaction to the Indonesian
Five Year Military Plan.
The U.S. will consequently be faced in the near future with the
problem of (1) commenting on Indonesia’s plan to assume a regional
role and (2) responding in some manner to an Indonesian request for
MAP support for this plan. This paper discusses first the principal fac-
tors influencing the Indonesians to make this request, secondly the as-
sets and liabilities which Indonesia would bring to a regional security
role, and finally possible U.S. responses to this Indonesian démarche.
[Omitted here is discussion of further factors underlying the In-
donesian request and possible U.S. responses.]

319. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (Brewster) to the President’s Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, December 24, 1970.

SUBJECT
Current Status of the Multilateral Development Effort for Indonesia

The December 15–16 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group for

Indonesia (IGGI) in Rotterdam illustrates how a multilateral assistance
effort can in time assume an inner dynamism of its own. Because this
aid consortium so clearly demonstrates the basic principles of the
Nixon Doctrine, it is worth noting some of the IGGI’s accomplishments

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret.
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Indonesia 691

beyond those mirrored in the encouraging statistics of Indonesia’s per-

formance and donor nations’ response.
The IGGI has grown not only in terms of donors and donations
but, perhaps more important, in its ability to promote healthy change
in Indonesia’s institutions. The unanimous approval given to Indone-
sia’s $640 million foreign assistance projection for 1971, the decision of
four countries to join the US in announcing their assistance in advance
of the April pledging session, and Canada’s entry into full IGGI mem-
bership may be attributed in part to Indonesia’s sound economic per-
formance over the past year. Also a major contributing factor, however,
was the member nations’ increased confidence in the IGGI as an ef-
fective vehicle for stimulating modernization in all sectors of Indone-
sian society.
After commending Indonesian performance in economic stabi-
lization, the Rotterdam meeting discussed candidly the many institu-
tional deficiencies which continue to hamper development efforts. Crit-
icism on the part of donors, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, however, was most carefully phrased so that it might
be used as a lever by Indonesia’s problem solvers to lift burdens im-
posed on their economy by special interest groups.
Steps taken to ensure a more rational use of Indonesia’s now sub-
stantial and rapidly expanding oil revenues is one example of how
moves by the IGGI, the World Bank and the Indonesian Planning Bu-
reau have been carefully and unobtrusively synchronized to help solve
sensitive internal problems. Because the national oil company Pertam-
ina has long served as a source of support for influential segments of
Indonesian society, including the Armed Forces, it was politically im-
possible two years ago for Indonesia’s economic planners to demand
an accurate accounting of its receipts and expenditures. Brief mention
of this problem by donors prior to and during last year’s IGGI meet-
ing, however, set in motion joint discussions between Indonesia’s Plan-
ning Bureau and World Bank representatives which resulted in writ-
ten recommendations to President Suharto. At the Rotterdam meeting
this month the Indonesians were able to announce that legislation is
now before Parliament which will place a significant portion of In-
donesia’s oil revenues into the national treasury for the benefit of the
society as a whole. The IGGI’s Dutch Chairman responded with a tact-
ful request for further information on oil revenues during the next IGGI
session, a peg which will undoubtedly be used in coming months to
initiate further reforms.
In much the same manner, improvements are being initiated in the
tax and tariff structure, investment policies, fertilizer distribution, floor
prices for the rice farmer, and several other pressing areas. These are
all politically volatile sectors in which the intervention of individual
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692 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

foreign governments would be neither welcome nor helpful. The IGGI

framework, however, has permitted donor nations, the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund to give discreet, highly effective sup-
port to the efforts of President Suharto and his economic planners to
modernize their society’s institutions. Although these particular ac-
complishments of the IGGI must remain unheralded, they are as es-
sential to Indonesia’s growth as the transfer of resources and technical
skills, which is the IGGI’s stated goal.
RC Brewster

320. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, July 27, 1971, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
The President’s Meeting with Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko

Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko saw the President on July

27 for the purpose of paying a farewell call. Dr. Kissinger sat in.
The White House photographer took pictures at the beginning of the
meeting.
The President and the Ambassador began by discussing the Pres-
ident’s July 15 China announcement,2 which the Ambassador said
marks a change in world history. The President agreed that it repre-
sents a massive change in world history—a visit by the leader of the
most powerful country in the world to the most populous country.
The President assured the Ambassador that our action relates
solely to our relations with Mainland China, and is not in derogation
of any of our friends. Indonesia, he continued, is a tremendous force
in Asia and in the Pacific. We have told the Indonesians we will assist
them in their military programs. Under no circumstances will this Gov-

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special
Files, President’s Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Confidential.
No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the
Oval Office.
2
President Nixon announced to the nation on July 15 that he had accepted an in-
vitation to visit the People’s Republic of China and that Kissinger had already held talks
in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai July 9–11. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 819–820)
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Indonesia 693

ernment move in any way against the interests of Indonesia. Dr.

Kissinger noted that we have ordered an increase in U.S. military as-
sistance to Indonesia. The President added that we have internal prob-
lems to contend with here.
The Ambassador said that it is of principal importance to his coun-
try to know what kind of US presence there will be in Asia in the fu-
ture, in terms of economic and military aid. The President replied that
we will continue our economic aid and we will even keep our military
presence. Indonesia need have no fear of a US withdrawal.
The Ambassador then commented that what is important is how
to place our withdrawal from Vietnam into some future kind of sys-
tem. It is not enough to give personal assurance—one must make spe-
cific proposals. The Ambassador wanted to relieve himself of some anx-
iety, particularly on Japan. Everything should be done to keep Japan
from going nuclear. There must be a concert of world powers, of which
one is not assured. But it must be done.
The President emphasized his agreement on the importance of
maintaining our world presence. But some, like Fulbright and Mans-
field, are a problem. Actually, Mansfield is a great fellow, the President
added. But if we get out of Asia, Japan will go nuclear or make a deal
with somebody.
The Ambassador emphasized that his country is not worried over
the terms of a Vietnam settlement or about the American President. We
are worried, he said, about the credibility of the American people’s per-
formance. The Ambassador also commented that Japan is basically a
tribal society, with no world view.
The Ambassador then referred to the rubber issue, with which In-
donesia was very concerned. [This involved the GSA’s resumption of
U.S. rubber stockpile sales, announced July 7.]3 Dr. Kissinger replied
that we would look seriously at the counterproposals which had just
been submitted by the rubber-producing countries.
The meeting then ended.

3
Brackets in the source text.
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694 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

321. Memorandum for the President’s File1

Washington, September 14, 1971, 10:45–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between the President, Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith and Brigadier
General A. M. Haig, Jr., September 14, 1971 (10:45–11:45 a.m.)

The President opened the meeting by welcoming Ambassador Gal-

braith and expressing his personal appreciation for the Ambassador’s
effective efforts over the past two years. The President recalled his
meeting with Ambassador Galbraith at the time of the President’s Asian
trip, just after the Ambassador’s arrival in Djakarta.
The President then asked the Ambassador for his view on the ef-
fectiveness of President Suharto and the Ambassador’s estimate of the
influence that the military had on Suharto’s government. Ambassador
Galbraith replied that President Suharto’s demeanor was one of great
reserve. Although his accession to power was based on the actions of
the professional military in Indonesia he had been careful to insure a
proper balance of civilian and military influence. His recent appoint-
ments were primarily civilian.
The President inquired about how President Suharto was getting
along with Foreign Minister Malik, noting that in the past there had
been some friction between the two men. The Ambassador answered
that their relationship appeared to have warmed in recent months, es-
pecially after Malik played an active role in support of the President
in the recent elections.
Ambassador Galbraith stated that the situation in Indonesia was
very promising at the present time. In response to a Presidential ques-
tion on the progress made with respect to U.S. investment in the coun-
try, the Ambassador reported that this year foreign investments would
amount to $1.1 billion U.S. dollars, of which one-third represented U.S.
investment. He noted that Indonesian oil exploitation had increased
substantially and that their hardwood production would amount this
year to over $100 million, with the possibility of reaching $500 million
in the future.
The President asked Ambassador Galbraith whether the atmos-
phere was favorable for U.S. investment in Indonesia. The Ambassador
answered that considerable improvement had been made, although

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 532,
Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted and initialed by
Haig.
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there were still many frustrations which a prospective investor had to

overcome. He stated that it would take a considerable period of time
to reach an optimum situation but that patience on the part of U.S. in-
vestors would generally meet with success.
The President next asked for the Ambassador’s assessment of the
Indonesians’ attitude toward his China initiative. Ambassador Gal-
braith replied that without question the Indonesians were experienc-
ing an underlying nervousness with respect to the U.S. initiative. The
President stated that he wished the Ambassador to actively attempt to
put U.S. logic in its proper perspective. He noted that many incorrectly
had assumed that our initiative was based on a U.S. assessment that
the Chinese had changed or, in fact, the Chinese Communists had never
been a source of tension. This was patently incorrect. The U.S. had care-
fully assessed the need to review our posture with respect to China
and had concluded that the dangers of the continued isolation of 800
million Chinese were no longer acceptable. We had concluded, there-
fore, that a very careful deliberate and pragmatic opening towards nor-
malization represented in the long run a strengthening of the security
of the countries in the area and reduced the risks that an atmosphere
of isolation and confrontation would entail. He emphasized the im-
portance of Ambassador Galbraith’s making clear to the Indonesians
that our approaches to the Chinese were deliberate and calculated.
They were not based on the naive assumption that fundamental
changes in Chinese performance could be expected.
The President then asked Ambassador Galbraith for his assess-
ment of the Indonesian attitude toward the U.S. military presence in
Asia. The Ambassador answered that the Indonesians were extremely
nervous at the prospect of U.S. withdrawal. He noted that in fact Gen-
eral Habib, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, was visiting Wash-
ington now with the view towards ascertaining long range U.S. plans
with respect to a military presence in Asia. The President stated that
the Indonesian view appeared consistent with the view of other Asians
and that he had no intention of eliminating our military presence in
Asia. At the same time it was obvious that the aftermath of the Viet-
nam conflict would require some reductions.
The President then asked the Ambassador how the Indonesians
view U.S. Vietnam policies. The Ambassador replied that the main con-
cern of the Indonesians was that we would withdraw too quickly from
Vietnam. The Ambassador added that the present political turmoil in
Saigon did not represent a problem to the Indonesians except to the
degree that it might affect our withdrawal rates.
In concluding the meeting, the President noted that there were
those high level policy makers in the U.S. Government who felt quite
strongly that U.S. assistance to Indonesia and, in fact, other developing
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696 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

nations such as those in Latin America should be channeled primarily

through economic assistance and that military assistance tended to re-
tard progress. The President stated that he did not accept this view. He
asserted that it was essential that all understand that a developing coun-
try such as Indonesia, with thousands of miles of coastline, a strong mil-
itary influence and an essentially military leadership had to have a sub-
stantial military capability if political stability was to be assured.2 He
noted that this was true in many Latin American states as well. He cau-
tioned the Ambassador to keep this reality in mind as U.S. assistance ef-
forts are developed. The Ambassador responded that the $25 million mil-
itary assistance package for Indonesia appeared to be a sound one which
maintained the proper balance between military and economic aid.

2
Nixon signed Presidential Determination No. 72–3, September 7, to provide a pro-
gram of $25 million in military assistance to Indonesia during FY 1972. An attached Au-
gust 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon contains the former’s recommendations
of the program. (Ibid., Box 370, Subject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71–11–
72–09/71) Further recommendation of increased military assistance to Indonesia had
been provided by Ambassador David Kennedy in his meeting with President Nixon on
April 9. Kennedy noted, according to a memorandum of conversation of that date, that
Assistant Secretary Green was against this military assistance, “dominated our policies
in Indonesia from his Washington desk,” and had “hand-picked” the top officers at the
Embassy in Jakarta. Kennedy added that “he had been very unimpressed with both their
attitudes and their ability.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files,
Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President)

322. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1971, President Nixon met with Secretary of De-

fense Laird and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Henry Kissinger to discuss foreign policy matters, including Indone-
sia. They met from 3:16 to 4:20 p.m. in the Executive Office Building.
At the time, Secretary of the Treasury Connally was traveling to vari-
ous East Asian countries; see Document 323 for a report of Connally’s
trip to Indonesia. The following is an excerpt of the conversation among
Nixon, Laird, and Kissinger:
President: “Let’s get a hardnosed judgment, and when Connally
gets back I think it will be very useful for him to sit down and give us
his feel of Suharto, of Indonesia, don’t you agree?”
Laird: “Oh, yeah. Well, I’m all for the Indonesian thing. I—”
President: “Mel—Well, let me ask you—”
Laird: [unclear]
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Indonesia 697

President: “Let me say, Mel, I want you within the administration

to push quite hard on the Suharto thing.”
Laird: “I’ve been pushing hard.”
President: “You will. And in public meetings—I mean in our meet-
ings with the NSC. Because this is one thing I, we, have a constant bat-
tle with Marshall Green. Marshall Green is wrong about this. You can’t
have a thousand miles of islands with no damn equipment to defend
those damn islands.”
Laird: “No, I don’t think we don’t. We won’t prod them” [unclear]
President: “With Suharto in power . . .”
Laird: [unclear]
President: “We have to keep Suharto in power, too. Let’s face it.
Otherwise, you get another goddamn Sukarno in there.”
Laird: “Well, I’m going to let Westy go in there. Now Westy [un-
clear]. Apparently he wants to travel around the” [unclear]—
President: “Let him take a look.”
Laird: “I think so—”
President: “Don’t you think so, Henry?”
Kissinger: “Absolutely.”
President: “That’s excellent. When’s he going?”
Laird: “He’s going in there the first week in January.”
President: “Well, have him drop over and have a talk with me. I
mean I should give him a little blessing anyway. He’ll appreciate it.
Let’s do that. Let’s get—you bring him over with [unclear]. He’s a fine
man. He deserves a little—and tell him to give us a real report on that.
Not a silly report. Indonesia is the big prize. It’s a big prize. We don’t
think of it very often.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materi-
als, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon,
Laird, and Kissinger, Executive Office Building, Conversation No.
299–19)
General William Westmoreland traveled to Southeast Asia in late
January and early February 1972. He delivered a letter from Nixon to
Suharto (Document 327) and met with Suharto on February 3 (Docu-
ment 329).
On November 14, 1971, Nixon and Connally met in the Executive
Office Building from 5:02 p.m. to 6:41 p.m. about the latter’s trip to
Southeast Asia. In this wide-ranging discussion, Connally included a
report of a conversation with President and Imelda Marcos in Manila
and a substantive conversation with the King of Thailand in Bangkok.
The following is an excerpt of Connally’s conversation with Nixon
about his meetings with Suharto and some of the leading ministers in
Indonesia:
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698 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

Connally: “So I gave them—I said: ‘The President asked me to see

you and [unclear] too great to withdraw. The Nixon Doctrine is de-
signed to draw on these [unclear] and so forth.’ And I talked about the
foreign aid thing and I told him that I’d talk to him on the foreign aid
picture and said that you had recognized that [unclear] of protection-
ism of the United States largely because of what had been happening
to it, and that you took the steps on August 15th both to correct the
imbalance in our trade situation, and secondly, Congress still wants
protectionism before they became too vocal in the United States. As
part of that, you felt just that you could cut foreign aid ten percent and
you did that. Well, but the Congress said, because they were in control
of an opposite Party, thought that they had to get in some of the po-
litical popularity of protectionism—ok, so—growing in this country, so
they just cut it all out. Now I’m sure the President can get it restored,
and I said, ‘I don’t know in exactly what forms or in what amount but
the administration is going to do everything within our power—’”
President: “Um-hmm.”
Connally: “‘to restore foreign aid.’ And I said, ‘We’re not going to
leave Indonesia. We’re going to stay in Southeast Asia militarily, fi-
nancially, economically, [unclear], for as long as we can now see.’ And—
so this is quite reassuring to all of them. And I think it particularly was
to Suharto. His wife entertained at a luncheon for us, took us all to her
home. One night with about ten of his Cabinet, he had dinner for us
and all of our group and we had—we had a real good meeting with
them on three different occasions. We met with all of his top economic
people. And I’m very impressed with them.”
President: “Are you? In Indonesia?”
Connally: “Yes, sir.”
President: “Good. Good.”
Connally: “Oh, they are over there.”
President: “That’s an important country.”
Connally: “They’re all articulate. They’re all highly educated.
They’re all fluent in English. They’re all graduates, most of them,
from United States schools. The Finance Minister spent 4 years at
Berkeley. One of them is a graduate of Pennsylvania. One of them
is from Purdue. They’re all, as I’ve said, they’re all damn smart, all of
importance—”
President: “Good.”
Connally: “—[and] very aggressive. I found all of them extremely
honest, extremely busy people, and he’s listening to them. Suharto lis-
tens to them. As I’ve said, he’s got a couple of old military buddies, a
couple generals that are still around, that at least our people don’t like;
they think they’re bad men, real [unclear], but—”
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Indonesia 699

President: “Suharto raised the military aid thing with the U.S.? Did
you reassure him that we are [unclear]—”
Connally: “Yes. And primarily he’s—”
President: “At least that’s one place where there’s no damn dif-
ference with the State Department there.”
Connally: “He very much wants military and other aid for the sim-
ple reason that he wants to help Cambodia, and he’s willing to do it.”
President: “Um-hmm.”
Connally: “He’s willing to do it himself.”
President: “Um-hmm.”
Connally: “Or he’s willing to serve as a conduit, but he is extremely
interested in the military agreement” [unclear]. (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of con-
versation between Nixon and Connally, Executive Office Building,
Conversation No. 296–16) The editor transcribed the portions of the
conversations printed here specifically for this volume.

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of

State1

Tokyo, November 12, 1971, 0735Z.

Conto 48/11325. Pass Treasury. Subj: Connally Visit:2 East Asia:

Meeting with Indonesian President Suharto.
1. Participants: H.E. General Suharto, President of the Republic of
Indonesia; H.E. Ali Wardhana, Minister of Finance; Lt. General Alam-
sjah, State Secretary; General Sutikno, Presidential Secretary; General
Sudarmono, Secretary to the Cabinet; Mr. Widodo, Interpreter; Secre-
tary of the Treasury, John B. Connally; Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith,
Nov 5, 1971, Istana Negara, Djakarta, Indonesia.
2. Following is the text of the memorandum of conversation of the
meeting between Secretary Connally and President Suharto drafted by
Ambassador Galbraith and approved by the Secretary’s party.

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY.
Confidential. Repeated to Djakarta.
2
Connally traveled to East Asia in November on behalf of President Nixon.
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700 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

3. The Secretary conveyed President Nixon’s warm regards to Su-

harto and expressed his own pleasure at being able to visit Indonesia.
4. Suharto began by describing, in familiar terms, Indonesia’s eco-
nomic development plans. He said these were modest in the first five
years, covering merely the provision of the basic necessities of food,
clothing and housing (the latter in the form of materials only). In the
second five year plan some processing of the raw materials which con-
stitute Indonesia’s main exports would hopefully begin, establishing
an industrial capacity. In the third five year plan Indonesia would start
to produce its basic industrial requirements. Suharto mentioned the de-
velopment of oil, minerals and timber which would provide additional
foreign exchange.
5. Suharto said that Indonesia manufactured about 80 percent of
its requirements in textiles but produced very little of the raw materi-
als required. Indonesia did not seem to be particularly favorable for
cotton production and most of its cotton therefore, thus far, had to be
supplied from abroad.
6. Suharto emphasized that Indonesia’s economic development
depended mainly on its own efforts but, particularly in the present
transition period, it also depended importantly on foreign aid. And in
the provision of foreign aid, the position of the U.S. was key to the pro-
vision of foreign aid by others. He expressed some concern about the
recent Senate actions;3 about the upcoming IGGI meeting where the
U.S. pledge was of great importance;4 about the announced 10 percent
cut in foreign aid; about the replenishment of IDA funds; and about
Cambodian aid. Suharto stressed the importance of aid to Cambodia,
a country which was not only threatened by subversion along with its
neighbors, but by the presence of foreign troops. The defense of Cam-
bodia was of major importance to the defense of Cambodia’s neigh-
bors. Indonesia was weak and could do little to help Cambodia but it

3
The Senate rejected the House-passed foreign aid bill (HR 9910) on October 29,
thus failing to authorize appropriations for both military and economic aid in fiscal years
1972 and 1973. The defeat of the bill constituted the first outright rejection of foreign aid
legislation in the 24-year history of the program. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. III,
1969–1972, pp. 876–877) Telegram 202840 to Djakarta, November 5, reported Green’s ef-
forts to reassure Indonesian Ambassador Sjarif Thajeb that “there would be a continu-
ing aid program though likely at somewhat reduced levels.” (National Archives, RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDON)
4
In telegram 180503 to USUN, October 1, the Department reported Indonesian For-
eign Minister Malik’s concern, expressed to Rogers at the UN General Assembly, that
the United States might not follow its “recent practice by leading off with its pledge at
December IGGI meeting. This would have an inhibiting effect on other potential donors.”
Rogers responded that “he could not comment on the matter now since those aspects of
the economic policy were still under study.” (Ibid., POL 7 INDON)
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Indonesia 701

was trying to do what it could to increase Cambodia’s sense and ca-

pacity for national resistance.
7. Suharto suggested that the Secretary might wish to comment
on both the short and long term outlook for U.S. economic and mili-
tary assistance in the region.
8. The Secretary began by describing the basic reasons for the re-
cent Senate action on the aid bill. He said this was not a case of sud-
den pique because of the vote in the UN on Taiwan, although that may
have been the immediate cause for the particular timing. The under-
lying cause was the mood of the country and the conviction of the
American people that the U.S. had too long been bearing all the bur-
dens of foreign assistance and common defense to the neglect of its
own national interests, while other countries, able to help, were not do-
ing so to the extent of their capacities and were, moreover, taking un-
fair advantage of the U.S. in trade.
9. The Secretary said that President Nixon’s announcement of a
10 percent cut in foreign aid had been the most popular thing this ad-
ministration had done. 83 percent of the people had expressed approval
and only 6 percent had disapproved. The economic measures an-
nounced on August 15 had also met with strong public approval. This
did not mean that the American people were returning to isolationism
or would fail to share their wealth or to show compassion for the needs
of others. But the administration had won public approval for its meas-
ures demonstrating that it was doing something about the U.S. balance
of payments situation and about the lack of fairness which had grown
into the currency and other financial and trade relationships between
the U.S. and, especially, the industrialized countries. The Secretary said
that in his view the Senate action was, as is often true, 60–75 days be-
hind the mood of public opinion in the United States. That public opin-
ion had already shifted, as a result of the administration’s action, in fa-
vor of the continuation of foreign aid, in the Secretary’s opinion. The
Senate would be realizing this and acting accordingly.
10. The Secretary said he did not know what form the legislation
would take but he was personally confident the Senate would act to
continue aid—both military and economic. It was in the U.S. interest
that it do so.
11. The Secretary stressed the common interests of Indonesia and
the U.S. in Indonesia’s development. Indonesia produced raw and
semi-processed materials for which the U.S. had an insatiable appetite.
On the other hand, Indonesia’s population of 120 million provided a
potential market of great interest to the U.S. We wanted a greater not
a lesser relationship with Indonesia. It would make no sense for the
U.S. to abandon Indonesia at this point; on the contrary it made good
sense for the U.S. to expand Indonesia’s economic development and
help assure its stability.
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702 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

12. The Secretary also stressed the intentions of the Nixon ad-
ministration, and in his opinion of the U.S., to remain in Southeast Asia
in a military, economic, financial and cultural sense. The U.S. was with-
drawing its troops from Vietnam and it was the U.S. policy to avoid
involvement in further military action in Southeast Asia. But the U.S.
would continue to exert an influence and to do its part in further
strengthening the ability of the countries in Southeast Asia to defend
themselves and to maintain their independence and develop them-
selves economically. Indeed it was the success of the efforts thus far of
the counties of Southeast Asia in strengthening their own capacities
and the success of U.S. programs in helping them do this that had made
it possible for President Nixon to go to Peking and Moscow with the
objective of reducing world tensions and misunderstandings that might
lead to confrontation. This was also in the common interest of the free
world.
13. The Secretary affirmed his strong personal belief that the U.S.
would continue to help Indonesia and that it would make the pledge,
as it had in the past, in the meeting of the IGGI December next. The
Secretary stressed that he could not, of course, guarantee this but he
was personally confident that it would take place.
14. With regard to the ten percent cut, which as he had already
mentioned had served to strengthen the hand of the administration in
continuing foreign aid as a principal policy tool, the Secretary said there
was no requirement that it be leveled across the board and no certainty
that it would affect the Indonesian program at all. He expressed the
opinion that whatever aid monies the U.S. had would go first to those
that supported the U.S. In this connection, the Secretary called atten-
tion to the recent vote in the UN on Taiwan, noting that Indonesia had
supported the U.S. The Secretary told Suharto that he wanted to con-
vey the special thanks of President Nixon for the support Indonesia
had given the U.S. on the Taiwan issue. The Secretary said, “We lost,
but our position was right.”
15. The Secretary also noted the fact that the replenishment bill
for IDA funds had passed in the Senate and was now under consider-
ation in the House. He thought that the outlook for this legislation was
good.
16. With regard to Cambodia, the Secretary said the administra-
tion had every intention of continuing its assistance to Cambodia.
17. Comment: There was visible evidence in the faces of President
Suharto and of those who sat in the meeting with him (Minister of Fi-
nance Wardhana, General Alamsjah, General Sudarmono, General Su-
tikno and others of the President’s staff) of their pleasure at the forth-
right way the Secretary had spoken on Indonesia’s favorable position
in the eyes of the U.S. (the Secretary said that Indonesia’s accomplish-
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Indonesia 703

ments in stabilization and economic development had been little short

of phenomenal.) Following the foregoing, President Suharto and Sec-
retary Connally withdrew for a separate and private conversation of
about twenty minutes duration.5
Connally

5
No record of this private meeting was found. Records of Connally’s meetings
with the Indonesian economic advisory team, telegram 11329 from Tokyo, November 12,
and with Sir Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Indonesian Minister of State for Economic,
Financial, and Industrial Affairs, telegram 11330 from Tokyo, November 12, as well as
other reports concerning the Treasury Secretary’s visit, are ibid., POL 7 US/CONNALLY.

324. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro1

Washington, December 11, 1971.

Your messages of December 52 and December 93 on the question

of the U. S. pledge to be made at the IGGI meeting December 13 were
much appreciated. President Suharto’s letter to President Nixon on this
subject4 has also been delivered by Ambassador Thajeb. I hope that
President Suharto by now will have received President Nixon’s reply5

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2
Sumitro’s December 5 message to Kissinger stated that Indonesia had learned
from the Department of State that the U.S. Government “would pledge approximately
$100 million in support of Indonesia’s Development Program at the I.G.G.I. meeting be-
ginning on 13 December. This amount is a decrease of previous years and will have an
adverse effect on our economic development plan.” Sumitro continued: “I am bringing
this problem to your attention through this private channel because our people feel they
have had difficulty getting attention focused on this matter through other channels and
because we, including President Suharto, should very much like to have President Nixon
be made personally aware of our concern.” (Ibid.)
3
Sumitro’s message to Kissinger of December 9 reiterated the concerns of the De-
cember 5 message and added among other arguments that the Indonesian Government
was convinced that any U.S. Government reduction in its pledge “will have an adverse
and negative impact on other donor nations who will probably follow your lead and de-
crease their pledges as well.” (Ibid.)
4
Not found.
5
Not found.
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704 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

explaining his thinking on this matter, which is unquestionably of great

importance to both of our countries.
As President Nixon stated in his reply, we fully share your con-
cern that the momentum of Indonesia’s economic development,
achieved under President Suharto’s leadership and with arduous ef-
fort, not be lost. For our part we are pledging, consistent with our for-
mula last year, to meet one-third of your non-food aid requirements
and a fair share of your food aid requirements, for a total pledge of ap-
proximately $203 million.
We are also aware that serious consideration is being given by
other IGGI donors to increasing their pledges for the coming year. I am
sure that with the same representations with the other members which
you have made in the past, Indonesia will again be successful this year
in inducing them to increase their contributions. You may count on the
fullest cooperation from the U. S. representatives in this effort.
Let me reassure you concerning the great value we place on the
cooperation your Government has shown toward ours, and once again
affirm our admiration of and support for the inspired progress that
your country has made under the leadership of President Suharto.
Warm regards

325. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, January 12, 1972.

SUBJECT
Information Items

[Omitted here is discussion of Indochina.]

Indonesian President Suharto’s Reaction to Your Assurances on Peking
and Moscow Trips: The principal points of President Suharto’s reaction
to your assurances on your Peking and Moscow visits, delivered by
Ambassador Galbraith January 10,2 were:

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 38, Pres-
ident’s Daily Briefs, January 3–17, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Haig signed
for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
2
Telegram 298 from Djarkarta, January 11, reported Galbraith’s conversation with
Suharto. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON)
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Indonesia 705

—He deeply appreciated your message and understands your

purpose.3
—Countries lying close to the PRC such as Laos, Cambodia, and
possibly Thailand should be reassured and kept as fully informed as
possible about your trip. (Similar verbal assurances have been con-
veyed by our ambassadors in these three countries.)
—Indonesia will do its best to help strengthen the will and capa-
bility of Southeast Asian nations to resist Communism, and toward this
end hopes the U.S. will support his efforts to improve Indonesia’s co-
operation with Japan and Australia.
—Communism, whether from Peking or Moscow, remains a threat
to Indonesia, and the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict has resulted in a
further extension of both Peking and Moscow into South Asia.4
—This threat underscores the importance of Indonesian political
and economic stability, and Suharto is deeply grateful for your sup-
port through economic assistance for his country’s development.
[Omitted here is discussion of Turkey and the Middle East.]

3
Nixon wrote next to this sentence: “K Set up a procedure where I bring in their
Ambassador for a special briefing (after the trip).”
4
Nixon wrote next to this sentence: “K—of top priority—Keep close to Indonesia.”

326. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security

Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro1

Washington, January 15, 1972, 1731Z.

WH20098. Please Pass Following Message to General Sumitro

From Henry A. Kissinger:
In reply to your message2 concerning support for the proposals
discussed with Generals Hasnan Habib and Sudardjo Niklani, please
be assured that these proposals remain under active consideration on
a close-hold basis in appropriate areas of the Department of Defense.
In view of the uncertainties which have developed from Congressional
handling of this year’s military assistance appropriation, it has not been
possible to establish a clear basis for funding levels or sources. How-
ever, I will see to it that this matter will continue to be addressed. The

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].
Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2
Not found.
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706 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

entire military assistance picture should become much clearer in early

1972, and your proposals will be given every consideration. I antici-
pate that any assistance we provide can be handled covertly, as you
prefer.
In the meantime, I have asked the Department of Defense to con-
sider means for assisting Indonesia in this matter via existing programs.
[5 lines of source text not declassified] I will keep in touch with you as
further information becomes available.3
Warm regards

3
Sumitro replied in a message, January 22, that he understood from Kissinger’s
message that “the financial support we expected has been more or less agreed upon and
will be implemented thru covert channels, when approved.” Sumitro stated that he and
President Suharto appreciated Kissinger’s “personal attention and efforts on our behalf”
in “the favorable results” from “President Nixon’s decision on the U.S. I.G.G.I. pledge
for 1972.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office
Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2])

327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in

Indonesia1

Washington, January 25, 1972.

14367. Subj: Letter to Suharto from President Nixon.

General Westmoreland is carrying letter from President Nixon to
President Suharto. Text follows.
“General Westmoreland’s visit with you presents an excellent op-
portunity to set forth to you my views on the importance of your coun-
try’s security and continuing economic development and my determi-
nation to maintain our support for your outstanding efforts in these
vital areas.
In my letter to you of December 11,2 I outlined the extent to which
I share your concern for strengthening the foundations of Indonesia’s
security and economic well being. In this regard, I recognize the strains
placed on Indonesia’s resources by the problems of strengthening its

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis.
Text received from the White House, cleared by Theodore J. Heavner (EA/IMS) and by
Robert T. Curran (S/S), and approved by Charles S. Whitehouse (EA).
2
See Document 324 and the footnotes thereto.
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Indonesia 707

security while also maintaining the momentum of economic develop-

ment which your country has attained under your dedicated leader-
ship. We in the United States want to do everything we can to assist
you in meeting this formidable challenge.
I also understand the concern which you expressed to Ambassador
Galbraith recently over the threat which Communist expansionism—
whether originating in Moscow, Peking, or Hanoi—poses for Indone-
sia and Southeast Asia. I welcome your interest in helping to strengthen
the other Southeast Asian nations so that they may cope with this
threat, as well as your plans to improve Indonesia’s cooperation
through ASEAN and particularly with Japan and Australia.
In the light of these considerations, I want to tell you that, despite
the severe limitation which our Congress has placed upon funds for
military assistance, we will continue our military assistance for In-
donesia this fiscal year at a level at least equal to that of last fiscal year.
Further, I am asking the Congress for funds to increase our military as-
sistance to you in Fiscal Year 1973. I believe this assistance on our part,
together with our contributions through the Inter-Governmental Group
for Indonesia, constitutes one of the most important means by which
the United States can help to insure that the tremendous progress re-
alized during the past six years under your leadership is not lost, but
will indeed continue.
I also want to reassure you, as I have on earlier occasions, that the
United States intends to remain in Asia to play a balancing role in the
stability of the region, and that we will stand firmly behind all of our
treaty commitments. Toward these ends, we will retain sufficient air,
naval, and ground forces in Asia in order to accomplish these purposes.
Indonesia has a vital role to play in the future peace, prosperity,
and stability of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole. As I recently con-
veyed to you through Ambassador Galbraith, I shall have your coun-
try’s interests very much in mind as I go to Peking and then to Moscow
in the coming months. Knowing your keen interest in my trips, I will
plan to be in touch with you when I return as to their results, and I
would appreciate your reaction to these missions. I will hope, too, that
you will feel free to pass any thoughts on these and other matters to
General Westmoreland which he may report to me upon his return.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
(signed) Richard Nixon.”
Rogers
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708 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination,

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee) to the Under
Secretary of State (Irwin)1

Washington, February 1, 1972.

SUBJECT
Procurement of Soviet Matériel from Indonesia

Currently negotiations are going on (in a somewhat desultory fash-

ion, as suits the Indonesians) for the clandestine procurement of a
MIG–17, MIG–19, and MIG–21, all in operating condition from the In-
donesian Air Force. The U.S. Air Force’s offering price is $250,000, a
small sum which reflects the fact that the USAF has had previous ac-
cess to these machines in Korea, Cambodia, and Israel. Additional units
are desired, however, for testing.
Indonesia, which obtained a large stock of Soviet armaments dur-
ing the Sukarno era, has become a prime source of Soviet matériel. So-
viet replacements are no longer available to, nor desired by, a pro-West-
ern Indonesian Government. The risks involved in obtaining Soviet
matériel covertly, while undeniably present, are minimized by sloppy
Indonesian inventory control in the past and consequent Soviet in-
ability to maintain effective surveillance of the matériel. The Soviets
are further hampered by travel restrictions, much reduced staff, and a
generally hostile attitude on the part of the Indonesian Government
and armed forces.
During the past two years the U.S. services have spent some two
million dollars for Soviet matériel in Indonesia. The Soviet P–15 sur-
face-to-surface missile, various fire control systems, anti-submarine
warfare gear, and the Fan Song radar used in the Soviet SAM system
are the major items obtained. All of these items (some still in the orig-
inal crates) were air-lifted out of Indonesia without incident. In the case
of the Fan Song radar three large vans were involved. The Air Force
proposed using the huge and conspicuous C–5A which INR refused to
agree to. Eventually USAF planes delivering civic action type supplies
to the Indonesian services brought back the Fan Song vans on return
flights. In all cases extreme care has been taken to do loading in hang-
ars wherever possible and at night by specially vetted Indonesian mil-
itary teams.

1
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia File. Secret.
Drafted by Richard K. Stuart (INR/DDC) and sent through INR Director Ray S. Cline.
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Indonesia 709

An outgrowth of the procurement of the P–15 missile was the op-

portunity to monitor the firing of several P–15 missiles by the Indone-
sian Navy. When the Indonesians proposed test firings at a target is-
land in the Java Sea, the Naval Attaché, knowing that the Indonesians
were scrapping SKORY class destroyers, suggested that one be sold—
covertly—to the U.S. Navy and that it be used as a target ship. The In-
donesians agreed and with U.S. guidance welded impact gages to the
hull and installed a transponder on the mast. They also agreed to film,
in color, and “rooster-tail” of the missile when fired and turn the films
over to the U.S. The telemetry of the firings (the ship was hit and sank)
was monitored from specially configured U.S. aircraft which remained
out of sight of the firings and did not land in Indonesia. The gages are
now being removed from the destroyer by Indonesian divers. No
Americans were involved in the firings, either as observers or techni-
cians.
INR’s role in the procurement of Soviet matériel is to make cer-
tain that the operation has the approval of the Ambassador, the De-
fense Attaché, [2 lines of source text not declassified]; that the Indonesian
Government and the head of the Indonesian service involved approve;
and that coordination is complete at the Washington level among State,
including the policy bureau, Defense, and CIA.

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, February 4, 1972, 0650Z.

1163. Eyes Only For General Westmoreland From Ambassador

Galbraith. Subject: Letter to Suharto From President Nixon. Ref: State
014367.2
1. I accompanied General Westmoreland in his call on President
Suharto afternoon February 3. Chief of Staff Umar and President’s in-
terpreter, Widodo, also present. General Westmoreland told Suharto
President Nixon had taken keen interest in General’s visit to Indone-
sia at invitation General Umar and had called Westmoreland to White
House few days before he left Washington and had asked Westmore-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis.
Repeated to Canberra.
2
Document 327.
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710 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

land to pass to Suharto President’s personal esteem for accomplish-

ments Suharto Government and President’s continuing interest in In-
donesia. Suharto thanked Westmoreland and spoke briefly of the value
he placed on his relations with President and on assurances he has re-
ceived from Nixon on continued support for economic and military
programs.
2. Suharto spoke of the priority given economic development in
the Indonesian budget and of the austerity imposed on the armed forces
which receive only a small part of total budget resources, barely enough
for upkeep. Suharto said it was hoped and expected that in another
few years and with economic development promising to gain some
momentum, additional budget resources could be made available for
the development of the Indonesian armed forces. He said Indonesia’s
armed forces understood and agreed to this approach.
3. Westmoreland gave Suharto letter reftel which Suharto read.
Westmoreland then explained that although President had asked Con-
gress for appropriations which would have supported $25 million MAP
for Indonesia, Congress had cut overall appropriations for military as-
sistance by 40 percent, that President hoped to provide Indonesia with
at least $18 million for MAP which, together with $2.3 million provided
in excess supplies and other excess items which might be found use-
ful to Indonesia, should raise total for MAP above $18 million for
FY–72. Westmoreland also mentioned no-cost lease arrangement on
ships for Indonesian navy. Westmoreland said utilization all these
sources might produce figure approaching $25 million and President
Nixon hoped to be able to do better for Indonesia in following fiscal
year.
4. Suharto said he understood President’s problems with Con-
gress. He said $25 million MAP was itself less than Indonesia hoped
for and felt it needed.
5. I told Suharto that I monitored our MAP program very closely
and that with amount of money which we hoped to make available
and with prospect of somewhat more in following year I thought we
would be alright. Suharto said our ability to plan a program on a two-
year basis at the $25 million level should be alright.
6. Westmoreland said he also brought assurances from President
Nixon that in connection with his forthcoming trip to Peking there
would be no changes in U.S. policy affecting Indonesia. The President
would keep Suharto informed on results of his trip and on anything
that transpired of interest to or affecting Indonesia. Suharto indicated
his understanding of President Nixon’s purposes and his appreciation
that President Nixon was keeping him informed.
7. Suharto said he would be going to Australia and New Zealand
in next few days on state visit. He hoped to explore with governments
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Indonesia 711

those two countries assessment of common threat of communism in

area and desirability of closer understanding and cooperation among
nations in area facing that threat. Suharto indicated he hoped to de-
velop with Australia and New Zealand, and also with Japan, common
view on how to face threats to peace and security in this area. Suharto
mentioned the saber jet squadron which Australia will be providing
Indonesia, indicating that these planes would be helpful in maintain-
ing Indonesia’s pilot proficiency. Westmoreland indicated that he too
would be going to Australia and New Zealand, though slightly ahead
of Suharto.
Comment: It was apparent that there had been some difficulty in
arranging for Westmoreland’s appointment with Suharto, presumably
because the latter is preparing for his state visits mentioned above and
because he was involved immediately after the meeting in ceremonies
connected with recent weddings his daughter and son. This probably
explains why Suharto did not encourage a broader discussion South-
east Asian problems. There was, however, some indication that Suharto
was aware of extensive discussions Westmoreland had over two-day
period with Army Chief of Staff Umar on other subjects such as West-
moreland’s observations on situation in Indochina.
Galbraith

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department

of State1

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 1130Z.

2499. For The Secretary. Canberra For Assistant Secretary Green.

Subj: Assistant Secretary Green’s Call on President Suharto.
1. Evening March 11, Assistant Secretary Green, accompanied by
John Holdridge and myself, gave President Suharto detailed descrip-
tion of talks, atmospherics and flavor President Nixon’s Peking visit.
Also present were Foreign Minister Malik, Chiefs Palace Secretariat
General Sudharmono, Chief of Protocol Subagio and Presidential In-
terpreter Widodo. Suharto listened closely with evident intense inter-

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Se-
cret; Priority; Exdis.
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712 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

est. Green started by extending to President Suharto President Nixon’s

warmest regards and highest esteem. Green slanted his presentation
toward Indonesian concerns, underlining fact President Nixon had
made no deals concerning other countries, that U.S. planned keep its
commitments and maintain its position in East Asia and that U.S. un-
der no illusions in U.S. approach to China. Green told Suharto that he
and I were authorized to inform him that U.S. would maintain its pres-
ent force levels less those related to Vietnamization, in Western Pacific
in FY 1973. Green offered to go into more detail on these force levels
with Deputy Chief Commander of Armed Forces Panggabean whom
we would be meeting later.
2. In outlining main points and impressions emerging from the
talks, Green included the following:
A. Peking seeks to avoid involvement in war and seems genuinely
to desire a better relationship with U.S. Peking supported North Ko-
rea’s 8-point plans for unification, but also interested in avoiding war
to achieve it. Peking supports 7-point PRG peace plan but seemed less
disposed than previously to have that conflict continue indefinitely
since in its eyes this might serve to strengthen Soviet position in Hanoi.
B. Both sides subscribed to the Bandung principles even though
PRC does not in fact live up to them, but it can now be better called
to account for them.
C. Peking Government say they are concerned about Japanese mil-
itarism, although U.S. does not believe this would be problem so long
as U.S.–Japan security treaty exists. ChiComs can be extension, there-
fore, come to see that maintenance U.S. security treaty with Japan could
serve PRC interests though it would never say so publicly.
D. Taiwan was a most difficult issue but we now have a situation
where, despite continuing U.S. commitments and ties to the ROC, we
have in prospect an expanding dialogue and contact with with the PRC.
Of 8,000 U.S. forces on Taiwan, 6,000 are connected with Vietnamiza-
tion and will be withdrawn when and as that achieved. Other 2,000
will stay on Taiwan until there is peaceful settlement that issue in ac-
cordance with the will of the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.
E. U.S. now reaffirmed that it will keep its commitments and con-
tinue its assistance to its friends and allies.
F. U.S. will continue to be power in Western Pacific.
G. China’s announced position is the removal of all U.S. forces
from sea, but it evidently does not want this done in way that enhances
Soviet influence in sea. (Green summed up true ChiCom attitude as
perhaps being “Yankee go home, but gradually.”)
H. Overshadowing all this and emerging as basic reason for
ChiCom interest in talks is their fundamental fear of Soviets and con-
cern of Soviets extending influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
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Indonesia 713

ChiComs also fearful of revived Japanese militarism (and an unex-

pressed fear of Japanese economic hegomony in EA). Peking seeking
to split Tokyo and Washington especially on Taiwan issue so as to iso-
late GRC all the more and bring Taiwan under PRC control. There were
of course other PRC motives as well, both internal and external.
3. Suharto expressed deep appreciation. He expressed his under-
standing and support for President Nixon’s effort to reduce world ten-
sions and strengthen peace. He thought it salutary that PRC had in
communiqué reiterated its support for Bandung principles, including
non-interference in internal affairs other countries, non-agression, co-
existence and peaceful settlement of disputes. He noted that ChiComs
took public stand they supported suppressed peoples. This meant they
will not only support those who seek independence but those who
sought as national liberation movements to become Communist na-
tions. ChiCom would continue their support for Communist subver-
sion, Suharto said.
4. Green said he agreed with this and that U.S. was not letting its
guard down even while extending hand of conciliation. Green stressed
importance of seizing opportunity of present situation to do what could
be done to enhance peace.
5. Suharto continued by stressing importance of U.S. making clear
it stands behind its friends, and allies. He said neighboring countries
in Southeast Asia need moral support as well as other kinds of assist-
ance. Suharto stressed importance of building national capacity for re-
sistance in Indonesia and neighboring countries. This would be required
to cope with what he was sure would be continued ChiCom support for
supervision. Indonesia had had its bitter experience with Peking.
6. Suharto expressed his special appreciation for Green’s stated in-
tention to talk further with Foreign Minister Adam Malik2 and, in case
of U.S. planned force levels, in more detail with Suharto’s top military
staff.3
Galbraith

2
Telegram 561 from Wellington, March 15, reported Green’s conversation with Ma-
lik. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 554, Country Files, Far East, New
Zealand, Vol. I)
3
Telegram 2498 from Djakarta, March 13, reported Green’s conversation with some
of Suharto’s top military staff. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON)
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714 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

331. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department

of State1

Belgrade, July 7, 1972.

Secto 200/3310. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting with President

Suharto, July 1. Following is approved memorandum of conversation:
1. Summary: Suharto appeared pleased and reassured by Secre-
tary’s presentation, in which Secretary made clear President Nixon had
wanted him to brief Suharto on Peking and Moscow Summits, more
recent Kissinger visit to Peking and implications results these meetings
for East Asia and other areas and for world peace. End summary.
2. Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Chief of Presidential Secretariat
General Sudharmono (who took notes) and Widodo, Suharto’s regular
interpreter, were present on Indonesian side, and Asst. Secretary Green
and Ambassador Galbraith accompanied Secretary.
3. The Secretary said President Nixon had stressed importance of
Secretary’s visit to Indonesia, and his desire that Secretary brief Suharto
fully on summits. Secretary gave Suharto letter from President.2 Sec-
retary said he would speak first generally and then invite Suharto’s
views. Secretary stressed there were no secret agreements with either
Peking or Moscow. President Nixon had made clear to both that we
were continuing unchanged our policies toward, and our relations with
our friends and allies.
4. The Secretary said we believe that talks in Peking and Moscow
had tended to reduce tensions and could lead to further negotiations
and reduction of threats toward independence of countries like In-
donesia. But we had no intention of letting down our guard. We would
base nothing on trust and make no concessions, but we would be pre-
pared to take any reciprocal action to further reduce tensions.
5. In case of China, because there had been no conversations for
22 years, great deal of initial conversation concerned getting to know
each other. Chinese felt it necessary make full statement of their dogma
for the record. Once that was out of the way, talks turned to bilateral
matters and to relationships in Pacific. Two sides agreed to put Taiwan

1
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Sec-
retary’s Trip to SEATO, June 24 to July 12, 1972. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Fred-
erick W. Flott, Special Assistant at the Embassy in Indonesia on July 4; cleared by Eliot
(S/S); approved by David H. Lissy, Special Assistant to Secretary Rogers. Repeated to
Djakarta, Saigon, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Moscow, Canberra, and Wellington. Rogers was
in Belgrade July 7–9 for an official visit.
2
The original letter was delivered by the Secretary to Suharto; telegram Tosec 89/
116168 to Djakarta, June 28, transmitted the text of the letter for information. (Ibid., Cen-
tral Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S)
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Indonesia 715

aside and let that issue take its course. U.S. made clear it would con-
tinue its treaty and diplomatic relationships with Taiwan but would
conduct these in way not hostile to PRC. We agreed have contacts in
Paris, UN, and through special emissaries to Peking. Increased trade
and exchanges are in offing, but they likely to expand gradually. In this
way general improvement relations could ensue without disturbing
U.S. relations with Taiwan. Treaties and relationships in Pacific with
Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and others would also not
be disturbed.
6. Secretary said with respect to Vietnam, U.S. would withdraw
its troops but in process make sure North Vietnam does not overrun
South Vietnam. We believe PRC recognizes that U.S., having reduced
troop strength Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, etc., has no territorial as-
pirations in East Asia. Also PRC recognizes U.S. presence has stabiliz-
ing influence; that if U.S. left vacuum would result and be filled by So-
viet presence or revived Japanese militarism. President Nixon had
emphasized that we would maintain our troops in Pacific and there
would be no change in our relations with our allies.
7. Secretary said that Kissinger had recently followed up on bi-
lateral exchanges, students, athletic teams, scientists, etc. He had dis-
cussed Vietnam with PRC. PRC evidently wants negotiated settlement.
They don’t want Soviet position strengthened in Vietnam. They have
not permitted Soviets to use their ports which has helped make min-
ing North Vietnam harbors so successful. We think Chinese prefer ne-
gotiated settlement Vietnam and will help, but we are not sure how
much influence they can exert.
8. In order avoid PRC suspicions Kissinger reported to PRC on
Moscow visit.
9. Secretary said it is difficult to judge Chinese intentions and it
is possible they might be deceitful and take advantage. He said there
is no one who understands this better than President Nixon who in-
tends to be wary. The U.S. will make no concessions nor base anything
on trust but will be prepared to take any reciprocal action to reduce
tensions.
10. Suharto asked Secretary to advise further on possibilities for
settling Vietnam problem. Secretary said he thought possibilities for
negotiated settlement were good but question was when it might take
place. There are different theories about whether it is more likely to oc-
cur before or after our elections.
11. Suharto noted that in US–PRC communiqué there was refer-
ence to Bandung principles and noninterference in internal affairs of
others. He also noted contradiction between this and PRC’s announced
support for “oppressed peoples” and for “wars of national liberation”.
Secretary noted that Chinese emphasized they don’t want their troops
outside their borders but U.S. recognizes their support for subversion
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716 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

will continue and for this reason we have to be sure that independent
nations are strengthened not only militarily but economically. Secre-
tary expressed pleasure at Indonesian economic progress and in sup-
port U.S. able to give this worthy Indonesian objective.
12. Suharto wondered whether there was possibility that Vietnam
would emerge as communist country something like Yugoslavia. Sec-
retary said he thought South Vietnam growing stronger and has good
chance to survive as independent entity. They were fighting well on
ground where there were no longer U.S. combat troops. All Vietnamese
refugees go south not north, which gives some indication of where
they feel most comfortable. North Vietnam had charged that Govern-
ment South Vietnam were puppets. Once U.S. troops departed they
couldn’t make that argument. We think if there were ceasefire now
South Vietnam would be able to stand and there would be a political
contest over time to see who would prevail. Our judgment is that peo-
ple of South Vietnam would not support communists, Secretary said.
13. Suharto said that within framework U.S. attempts to reduce
tensions and reach settlement with communists, Indonesia sought to
strengthen its resilience against subversion. His visits to Australia, New
Zealand and Japan have been in that context. Secretary said we had
been pleased with Indonesian initiatives and with success of Suharto’s
visits. In our talks with Australians and New Zealanders we had said
we would cooperate in any way we could in support and in context
Indonesian independence and nonalignment.3
14. Before turning to subject of Moscow Summit Secretary said we
had been impressed with Chinese friendliness toward Americans and
had impression that Chinese trust Americans more than they do Rus-
sians. Chinese know we will continue our alliances and support our
friends but don’t look upon U.S. as threat to them as much as they do
Soviets.
15. Secretary said there were two reasons Soviets were anxious
that President make trip to Moscow: (A) concern over improvement of
our relations with PRC (although Soviets did not say so) and (B) eco-
nomic matters. In this latter connection, major security problems on
Chinese/Soviet border as well as on Soviet western frontier had caused
big economic drain. Build up of nuclear power was very costly, and no
matter how much money Soviets spend, they know U.S. would not let
them get ahead. Output of U.S. economy twice that of Soviets, there-
fore Soviets had embarked on detente in Europe to reduce cost and

3
In a separate meeting with Malik on June 30 Secretary Rogers discussed devel-
opments in and observations about Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. Their conver-
sation was reported in telegram 3331 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid., Conference Files,
1966–72: Lot 70 D 387, Box 526)
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Indonesia 717

tensions there and to enable them to focus on Chinese problem. That

they were anxious to improve relations with U.S. was borne out by
their going ahead with summit despite U.S. mining of Haiphong and
bombing North Vietnam. Soviets also feel need for more consumer
goods. They need better production facilities, technology and credit.
16. Secretary said Soviets turned out whole upper echelon of gov-
ernment for talks. As many as twelve members of Politburo were pres-
ent at one time and this was unprecedented. There was elaborate en-
tertainment. President Nixon addressed Russian people on TV before
which his scheduled appearance was advertised and Soviet people
were urged to listen.
17. Seven separate agreements were signed in Moscow. It was
worked out so that Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin all signed some
of them. These included agreements on health, environment, coopera-
tion in space, prevention of incidents at sea (first agreement between
two military establishments since World War II). Most important was
the SALT agreement providing for freeze on offensive and defensive
weapons. Each side is permitted two ABM sites to defend capitals and
one ICBM site each. Without going into details Secretary said both U.S.
and USSR know that neither side can strike other without being de-
stroyed by other. If Soviets decide to strike first there is nothing they
could do to prevent U.S. from destroying Soviet Union and same thing
is true other way around. Thus, unless governments run by crazy peo-
ple the threat of nuclear exchange is ruled out except by misunder-
standing or accidental launch. Procedures have been worked out de-
signed to avoid either of these eventualities. Secretary said we think
result of visit will be better relations with USSR at least for a while. We
expect that this will result in more exchanges of scientists and others
and additional agreements. European Security Conference was dis-
cussed and if it can be well prepared it should help reduce tensions in
Europe.
18. Secretary said he had talked about trade with Kosygin who
did all the talking in the economic field. We expect over time to work
out problems in the economic field. Complication, however, is that
USSR has debt to U.S. and this makes it difficult to extend the credit
USSR seeks for its trade with U.S.
19. Secretary said Soviets indicated willingness to help with ne-
gotiated settlement on Vietnam. Subsequently Podgorny has gone to
Hanoi to present some of the things U.S. talked to Soviets about.
20. Secretary stressed again there were no secret agreements and
nothing discussed with Soviets that would affect nations in this part
of the world.
21. Secretary gave Suharto some atmospherics of Soviet leader-
ship. Although Brezhnev clearly dominates others, one has impression
Politburo works together. Brezhnev cultivated others in public. In meet-
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718 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

ings he did the talking. Kosygin was less active except on economic
issues.
22. On Middle East problems there was not much discussed. Sec-
retary had talked to Podgorny, Gromyko and Kuznetsov and was sat-
isfied Soviets will not promote outbreak of hostilities and want cease-
fire to continue.
23. Suharto expressed concern that because of U.S. and British
withdrawals, vacuums would develop into which Soviets would move
and that because of Soviet/PRC tensions subversion would increase.
Secretary said we would be careful to withdraw in way that would not
create vacuum. Secretary noted that in both communiqué in Peking
and in statement of principles in Moscow, statement was included
about noninterference in affairs other countries. If PRC and Soviets did
this, U.S. could talk to them about violation of these principles. It is
also possible that because of the conflicts between them they would be
less occupied in subverting others. In any event, this was the time for
others to strengthen themselves, as Indonesia was doing.
24. Suharto commented that Indonesian relations with PRC had
not been normalized because PRC continued to interfere in Indonesian
affairs with slander and support for Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). Secretary asked whether their attacks on Indonesia had not been
somewhat reduced lately. Suharto said they were relatively less but
continued. Secretary commented that we, too, hope for continued im-
provement in our relations with PRC.
25. Noting that U.S. doing all it could to encourage American in-
vestors, Secretary inquired about Indonesia’s attitude toward foreign
investment. Suharto said there was no change. He went on to say that
Indonesia had to protect and reserve for domestic capital those fields
where Indonesians had capability. Secretary expressed understanding.
He said it important that whatever done in this field it be successful.
U.S. did not want to encourage any foreign investment that would be-
come an irritant. It was important to work out rules before rather than
after private foreign entrepreneur invested. Suharto said that basic
principles, including foreign investment law, unchanged but that In-
donesia would have to insure that investments were not detrimental
to Indonesia and were really in Indonesia’s interest.
26. Secretary mentioned MAP program and regretted that it had
been reduced slightly in past year. He said we had asked for more this
year and he was sure that President Nixon would work out some way,
over long run, to do what we had said we would do and which we
both agreed we should do.
27. Secretary was pressed by time to leave at this point. Suharto
expressed his thanks and sent best regards to President Nixon.
Rogers
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Indonesia 719

332. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National

Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, November 21, 1972.

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with President Suharto and Foreign Minister Malik

For your meeting with President Suharto and Foreign Minister Ma-
lik,2 the following background information and suggested talking
points may be useful:
U.S.-Indonesian Relations in General
These are very good. The Indonesians are grateful for the military
and economic help which we have given them, and believe that we
can be relied upon to continue this help. They would like increased
military assistance, but have accepted the fact that Congressional cuts
have imposed some restrictions. They welcome American investment
in Indonesia. They do not wish to see a precipitate U.S. withdrawal
from Asia. They are anxious to develop Asian regional military coop-
eration as the U.S. military role diminishes, and would like our help
to this end. The President and President Suharto have established a
warm personal bond between them.
—You may wish to express the President’s highest personal re-
gards to President Suharto. He has sent a message thanking President
Suharto for the warm election congratulations the latter transmitted
via the special channel.3
—The U.S. will continue to do what it can to assist Indonesia in
its developmental programs and in its efforts to improve regional
cooperation.
Rice to Indonesia
Suharto recently wrote the President asking for 150 thousand tons
of PL 480 rice prior to March 1973 (when the Indonesian elections oc-
cur) in order to preserve political stability.4 We did not have the rice,

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro [1 of 2]. Se-
cret; Sensitive; Entirely out of system. Sent for information.
2
No record of this meeting has been found.
3
Not found.
4
Telegram 171337 to Jakarta, September 20, described the delivery, substance, and
discussion of Suharto’s letter to President Nixon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1970–73, INCO RICE INDON) In an October 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Eliot advised
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720 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

or so we thought then, and arranged to provide Indonesia with extra

PL 480 cotton which could be sold and hence provide funds to pur-
chase the rice commercially from countries such as Pakistan or Thai-
land.5 The President responded to Suharto to this effect. When in-
formed of this, Suharto still asked for some actual shipments of rice if
possible. We have now turned up an additional 50 thousand tons of
rice—which will be provided under AID development loans—of which
Indonesia has already been informed.6 We have, through these efforts,
gone extremely far in meeting Suharto’s needs.
—You may also want to sound out Suharto’s reaction to the cot-
ton-for-rice deal, and see if he is satisfied.
U.S. Contributions to the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI)
In Suharto’s letter to the President, he also asked for assurances
that we would continue to provide one-third of the annual IGGI con-
tributions to Indonesian economic development. The President’s reply
in effect agreed; he said that we would keep this very much in mind
and would contribute at a rate no less than we had in preceding years.
At OMB’s request, this response was left somewhat fuzzy to hedge
against a large increase over Indonesia’s request for last year. The In-
donesians have now asked for $750 million, only 3% over that of last
year, and we anticipate no trouble in providing a one-third share.
—You may want to state that, based on the Indonesian request for
$750 million, we foresee no problem in providing one-third of this sum.
—The President believes that Indonesia under Suharto’s leader-
ship is doing a remarkable job of carrying out economic development;
our contribution is money well spent.
Indonesian MAP
We are now operating on a CRA of $588.8 million for MAP world-
wide, down from our request of $819.7 million. All country programs
have been cut, and Indonesia’s now stands at $18 million (the same as
for FY 72). However, we expect to be able to locate at least $5 million
extra from “reimbursements/recoupments” and we hope it will be pos-
sible to move the Indonesian MAP back to around the $25 million level

that the Department recommend that “the Department of Agriculture take immediate
action to begin shipments in October of the 100,000 tons of rice already promised In-
donesia, in addition to other scheduled shipments.” (Ibid.)
5
Telegram 17355 and 17436 from Bangkok, December 9 and 12, respectively, re-
ported the Embassy’s successful efforts to elicit the Thai Government’s promise to ship
250,000 tons of rice to Indonesia over the following 4 months. (Ibid., INCO RICE 17
INDON–THAI)
6
Telegram 211789 to Brussels, November 21, reported this development. (Ibid., POL
7 INDON)
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Indonesia 721

which the President has directed. If the ceasefire in SEA is effective, it

may be possible to go higher, but we do not yet know by how much.
Defense is considering a supplemental for Southeast Asia. (Note:
Suharto may raise the question of U.S. help in financing the Indone-
sian ICCS contingent in Vietnam.)
—Congressional cuts on the worldwide MAP appropriation have
been heavy, but we are doing everything we can to maintain the In-
donesian MAP at least at the existing levels. If we can raise it some-
what, we will do so.
Indonesian Diplomatic Relations with the PRC
Foreign Minister Malik has said it is only a question of time be-
fore Indonesia reestablishes diplomatic relations with the PRC. How-
ever, the Indonesians do not want to move precipitately, and will hold
off until after elections next March. They have apparently slowed down
Malaysia’s drive to establish relations with Peking in order to move in
concert with Malaysia. The Generals remain leary of relations with the
PRC, and will watch developments closely.
—(If Suharto asks.) The U.S. has no objections to Indonesia reestab-
lishing diplomatic relations with Peking. We believe each country must
make this decision on the basis of its own estimates of its national in-
terest and its own political circumstances.
The Nixon Doctrine
The Indonesians still appear apprehensive that the U.S. will pull
out of Asia entirely. This in part accounts for their interest in regional
military and economic cooperation, as noted above.
—You may wish to stress the fact that the Nixon Doctrine is not a
formula for an American withdrawal, but rather a means for assuring
our continued presence, our capability to meet commitments, and our
ability to play a useful balancing role.
—We welcome Indonesia’s efforts to facilitate regional military
and economic cooperation, and regard these efforts as contributory to
our own efforts to preserve peace and stability. We will assist Indone-
sia’s programs when we can, and when our help is useful.
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Index
Note: All references are to document numbers

Abdulgani, 274 Alamsjah, Maj. Gen., 271, 272, 289, 323

Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 272, 279 Visit to Washington, 1970, 296, 299,
Abrams, Gen. Creighton, 4, 64, 67, 86, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307
113, 276 Albania, 128, 272
Abs, Dr., 271, 272, 274 Almendras, Sen., 238
Adenauer Foundation, 227 Anand Panyarachun, 28, 48, 49, 92, 177,
Adevoso, Eleuterio, 202 180, 181
Africa, 180 Anderson, Jack, 1, 163
Agency for International Development Ansbach, Max, 261
(AID): Antimony, 173
East Asia Regional Program, 50 Anti-war movement, 121
Indonesia, 267, 278 Aquino, Benigno S., Jr., 190, 238, 239,
Philippines, 186, 234 249, 252, 257, 260
Thailand, 45, 75, 76 Arab-Israeli conflict, 18
Agnew, Spiro: Asa Sarasin, 153, 158, 165
Malik, meeting with, 279 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 111,
Peace Corps protests against, 43 227, 234, 267, 272, 276, 278
Philippines, 189, 243 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Southeast Asia visit, discussed, 184 (ASEAN):
Thailand visit, Jan., 1970, 39, 42, 43, 44 Cambodia role for, 284, 285
Thailand visit, Sept., 1970, 87 Indonesian role in, 276, 277
Thailand visit, May, 1972, 164, 165, Neutralization proposal for Southeast
167, 168, 181 Asia, 143, 247
Agreements with the United States: Philippines’ claim to Sabah, effect on,
Additional Assistance to Thailand 191, 279
(AAT) agreement, 137, 144, 161, 167 Australia, 82, 98, 267, 271, 279, 298, 329
Bohlen-Serrano Agreement, 249
Mutual Defense Assistance Bangkok Post, 15
Agreement with Philippines, Bangladesh, 180
1953, 217, 221 Barber, Edwin L, 264
Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Barger, Herman H., 101, 114, 234, 261
Treaty, 1952, 191, 194, 217, 226 Barnett, Robert W., 46, 271, 272, 274,
Philippines-U.S. Status of Forces 297, 302
Agreement (SOFA), 207, 209, 211 Beams, Dovey, 233
SALT I, 255, 331 Behr, Col. Robert M., 59
Thai-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement Bekker, Konrad, 114
(SOFA), 18 Belgium, 267
USAF/RTAFF Joint Use and BeLieu, Kenneth, 194
Integrated Air Defense Bennett, Frank C., 244
Operations Agreement, 21 Benson, George, 311
U.S. Military Bases Agreement with Beplat, Tristan, 261
Philippines, 191, 195, 199, 215, Bergesen, Alf E., 151, 161, 177, 180
217, 221 Bergsten, G. Fred, 317
Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 75 Binh, Mme. (Nguyen Thi Binh), 128
Aichi, Kiichi, 274 Birabhongse Kasemsri, 15, 37, 92, 104,
Air Defense Network (U.S. Air Force), 109, 121, 122
21 Black, Eugene, 196

723
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724 Index

Black Leopards, 95, 103 Cambodia:

Black Panthers, 67, 68, 74, 81, 85, 86, 135 ARVN operations in, 126
Blair, Bill, 249 Australian military aid to, 98, 298
Blee, David, 112 Covert operations in, 63, 286
Boonchai Bamrungphong, Gen., 135 DRV policy toward, 291
Boonchu Rojanasathien, 177 Indonesian advisors in, 317
Brandt, William, 74 Indonesian diplomatic aid to, 60
Bray, Charles, 39 Indonesian military aid to, 286, 287,
Brewster, R. C., 318, 319 289, 294, 298, 299, 300, 304, 306,
Brezhnev, Leonid, 271, 331 307, 310, 313
Brezhnev Doctrine, 18 Indonesian policy toward, 272, 295,
Britten, Lt. Col. Gerald H., 59 309, 323
Broe, William, 230 Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 284, 285
Brooks, Angie E., 272 Laos, relations with, 74
Brown, Winthrop G., 96, 151, 188 New Zealand military aid to, 298
Bruce, David K. E., 128 Occupation of Cambodian territory
Budget, U.S. Bureau of, 75 by NVA, 60, 62, 95
Bundy, William, 3, 6, 7, 23 Philippines, relations with, 186
Bunker, Ellsworth, 64, 67, 124 Thai diplomatic and military aid to,
Bunmag, Gen., 94 60, 74, 298
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Thai forces in:
264 Cambodian position, 63, 66, 103,
Burma, 92, 123, 131, 136, 161, 279, 285 124
Butterfield, Alexander P., 211 Thai position, 66, 68, 85, 86, 92,
Buwono, Sir Sultan Hamengku, IX, 323 103, 124
Byroade, Henry A., 200 Thai-U.S. talks on, 74, 87, 91
Aquino, talks with, 238 U.S. position, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 76,
Assassination plots against Marcos, 81, 86, 88, 95, 98, 102, 125
202 Thailand, relations with, 44, 60, 291
Constitutional Convention in Thai security concerns over, 62, 87,
Philippines, 228, 229, 232 104, 144, 151
Foreign policy of Philippines, 255 United States, relations with, 39
Green visit, 247 U.S. military intervention in, 292, 297
IMF loans, 208 U.S. policy and objectives in, 119
Investment climate in Philippines, 262 Canada, 319
Laurel-Langley Agreement, 213, 224 Cao Van Vien, Gen., 4
Martial law, 258 Cargo, William, 195
Military bases agreement, 199, 246 Carson, James L., 122, 152
NPA, 210 Carver, George, 166
On Marcos, 219 Case, Clifford, 122
Philippines’ force withdrawal from Catholic Church, 227, 231
Vietnam, 198 Ceausescu, Nicolai, 18
Philippine view of, 241 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):
Press leaks, 236 Cambodia, 291
Riots in Manila, 222 Covert aid for Thai elections, 3
SOFA, 209, 211 Perspectives on Thailand, 94
Suspension of habeas corpus, 239 Philippines, 187, 188, 236
Symington subcommittee hearings, Thai forces in Cambodia, 76
196, 197 Thai forces in Laos, 93, 147
U.S. force reductions in Philippines, Cernan, Eugene, 44
203, 204, 216, 218, 226 Ceylon, 46, 279
U.S. interference in elections, charges Chairatana Intuputi, Gen., 63, 66
of, 193, 205 Chakri Plan, 103, 104
U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 201 Chamras, Gen., 94
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 725
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Index 725

Chapin, Frank M., 112 Colombia, 28

Charoon, 87 Committee of Three, 92
Charunphan Isarangkun, 151, 153, 155, Congress, U.S. (see also House of
162, 165 Representatives, U.S.; Senate
Chiang Ching-kuo, 153 Foreign Relations Committee):
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, 182 Supplemental funding for FY 1971,
China, People’s Republic of: lack of, 69
Aquino trip, 238 U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 299,
Djakarta Conference, 297 308
DRV, relations with, 153 Congress, U.S., Acts of:
Five principles, 153, 157 Church Amendment, 47, 48, 87
Indonesia, relations with, 331, 332 Cooper Amendment, 28, 87
Indonesian policy toward, 271, 272, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
309, 321 171
Japanese militarism, 153 Fulbright Amendment to Defense
Malaysia, relations with, 332 Procurement Act, 87, 92, 93
Narcotic drug trafficking, 123 Gonzales Amendment, 261
Return of hijacked airplane to Hickenlooper Amendment, 261
Philippines, 121 McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, 8
Road-building toward Thailand by, P.L. 480:
11, 18, 44, 49, 139, 150 Philippine position, 191
Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180, Rice sales:
191, 272, 273 To Indonesia, 46, 101, 104, 105,
Thailand, relations with, 9, 154, 177, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332
180, 181, 182 Thai position, 87, 110, 111, 127
United States, relations with, 43, 121, U.S. position, 114, 130, 132, 164,
127, 169 207, 229, 233
Nixon’s visit, 1972, 139, 151, 153, U.S-Thai talks on, 46, 106, 107,
154, 155, 243, 244, 245, 247, 109, 110, 111, 114, 118
320, 330 To Vietnam Republic, 39
Philippine position, 247 Thai troops in Cambodia funded
U.S. position, 279 by, 75, 76, 98, 125
War, possible, 82 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 28, 48
U.N. membership for, 118, 121, 128, Wolff Amendment, 169
139, 241, 244 Connally, John B., 132, 244, 245, 322,
China, Republic of: 323
Aid for resettlement of KMT Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus
irregulars in Thailand, 173 Disposal (FAO), 46
Indonesian policy toward, 272 Corcoran (EA), 93, 119
U.N. membership for, 118, 121, 128, Corn, 46
244, 323 Cotton, 332
U.S. force reduction in, 247, 330 Court, John, 314
U.S. policy toward, 153, 247 Covert operations:
Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF): In Cambodia, 63, 286
See Kuomintang. In Laos, 56
Chi Peng Fei, 154 In Philippines, 230, 231, 236
Chira, Gen., 43 In Thailand, 3, 120, 129, 131
Chitti, 26 Curran, Robert T., 327
Chou En-lai, 180, 247 Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E., 56, 59,
Church, Frank F., 35, 47, 60 112
Churchill, Malcolm H., 101 Czechoslovakia, 18, 272
Clay, Gen. Lucius, 99
Cole, Ken, 20 Dante, Cmdr., 227
Colebaugh, 121, 162 Davis, Jeanne W., 61, 82, 126, 228
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 726
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726 Index

Dawee Chullasaspyra, Marshal, 18 Drugs—Continued

Contingency plan dispute, 20 Trafficking by Thai officials, charges
Counterinsurgency efforts, 11, 137 of, 162, 163
Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144 U.S. position, 124, 129, 164
Narcotic drug trafficking, 131, 136 Duemling, Mrs., 43, 87, 188, 279
Nixon’s trip to China, 153 Dulles, John Foster, 153, 194
NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159 Dunn, Brig. Gen., 87, 165
Symington subcommittee hearings, 37 Duong Van Minh, Gen., 127
Thai forces in Laos, 135 Durdin, Till, 262
Thai Khmer forces in Cambodia, 63,
66 East Asia Interdepartmental Group, 217
U.S. military aid to Thailand, 4, 11, Easterbrook, Gen. Ernest F., 23
161, 167 Eastern Construction Company, 236
U.S.-Thai relations: Egypt, 18, 109
Agnew visits, 43, 87, 165 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 21, 186, 187,
Green visit, 157 188, 189
Helms visit, 94 Elections:
Hummel visit, 162 Israel, 1969, 274
Kissinger visit, 127 Philippines, 1969, 187, 188, 190, 191,
Laird visit, 104 193, 202, 205
Thai approval for basing of Philippines, 1970, 227, 238
additional U.S. bombers, 108 Thailand, 1969, 1, 2, 3, 5
U.S. defense commitments, 21 Thailand, 1973, 115
Visit to Washington, Apr., 1969, 8 United States, 1970, 91, 224, 308
Ddjajadiningrat, 315 United States, 1972, 258
Defense, U.S. Department of: Vietnam, possible, 91
Philippines, 214, 217 Vietnam Republic, 1971, 127
Symington subcommittee hearings, Eliot, Theodore L., 21, 132, 152, 208,
194 211, 228, 318, 331
Thai forces in Cambodia, 64, 81 Elizalde, Mandy, 238
Thai forces in Laos, 93 Erlichman, John, 196
U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305, Evans, Gen., 161, 163, 165
307, 314 Export-Import Bank, 294, 302
Dempster, Gen., 193
Denham, Elizabeth M., 101 Finch, Robert H., 189
Dexter, John B., 27, 31, 45, 46, 48, 49, 96 Finland, 28
Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92 Five principles, 153, 157
Symington subcommittee hearings, Flanagan, Adm., 76
30 Flott, Frederick W., 331
Thai-U.S. relations, 119 Food and Agriculture Organization
Dhep, Gen., 94 (FAO), 46
Diokno, Jose, 238 Forbes, John D., 238, 257
Di-Puro, Suryo, 272 Ford Foundation, 227
Diskul, Adm. Thep, 155, 165 Foreign Affairs, 153
Djakarta Conference, 86, 91, 92, 295, 40 Committee:
297, 299, 300, 306 Philippines, 228, 230, 232
Doolin, Dennis, 14, 88, 98, 104 Thailand, 77, 78, 112, 120, 129, 131
Drugs: France, 91, 267
KMT irregulars’ involvement with, Freeport Sulphur, 302
131, 136, 138, 152, 164, 173 Freylinghuysen, Peter, Jr., 242
Media publicity over, 163, 164, 165 Froehlke, Robert F., 4, 252
Thai position, 115, 138 Fuji Seminar, 252
Thai-U.S. talks on, 123, 124, 136, 141, Fulbright, J. William:
152, 162, 165 Election prospects for, 91
All references are to document numbers
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Index 727

Fulbright, J. William—Continued Green, Marshall—Continued

Executive-legislative relations, 144, Indonesia—Continued
320 U.S. relations with, 266, 276, 294,
Philippines, 194, 201 296, 330
Project Taksin, 14, 15, 20, 24, 35, 36, West Irian, 274
37 Laos, 52, 56, 59, 88, 90, 93
Southeast Asia, 87 Narcotic drug trafficking, 136, 138
Thai forces in Laos, 122 Nixon’s trip to China, 153, 155
Philippines:
Gaddi, Judge, 239, 246 Assassination plots against Marcos,
Galbraith, Francis J.: 202
Agnew visit to Thailand, 43 Constitutional Convention, 228
Cambodia, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, Marcos visit to Washington, 189
291, 295, 299 U.S. force reductions in, 203, 204,
Indonesian-U.S. relations, 272, 273, 216, 218
279, 321, 323 U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 198
PRC-U.S. relations, 330 U.S. policy toward, 248
Regional cooperation proposal, 312 U.S. relations with, 189, 192, 205,
Soviet military aid to Indonesia, 315, 213
316 Symington subcommittee hearings,
Suharto visit to Washington, 294, 296, 35, 37, 197
302, 304 Thailand:
U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 310 Counterinsurgency efforts in, 97,
Gandhi, Indira, 271 183
Garcia, Carlos P., 219 Covert operations in, 120
Gardner, Paul, 296, 297, 302, 303 Internal vs. external threats to, 89
General Services Administration (GSA), U.S. relations with, 33, 65, 80, 119,
320 158
Geneva Accords 1954, 32 Visits:
Geneva Accords 1962, 29, 32 Indonesia, July, 1969, 271, 272
Germany, Democratic Republic of, 127 Philippines, 1969, 192
Germany, Federal Republic of, 106, 267 Philippines, 1972, 247
Getz, John, 141, 144 Thailand, 1971, 121, 122, 125
Ghazali Shafie, 272 Thailand, 1972, 153, 155, 157, 158
Gideon, Gen., 193, 194 Greene, Jack, 165, 233
Gleysteen, Dirk, 267, 286 Green Revolution, 114, 233
Godley, G. McMurtrie, 2, 6, 9, 124, 188, Gromyko, Andrei A., 28, 92, 331
189 Gross, Nelson G., 136
Thai forces in Laos, 126, 160, 175, 176, Guam Doctrine, 18, 39, 45, 62, 269
178 Guthrie (JCS), 59
Goldwater, Barry M., 91 Guthrie, D. Keith, 88, 98, 112
Goodell, Charles, 91
Gorton, John, 189 Habib, Gen., 321
Grant, Lindsey, 42, 186 Haig, Brig. Gen. Alexander M., Jr., 53,
Green, Marshall, 9, 14, 17, 31, 45, 190, 54, 60, 138, 143, 148, 150, 168, 237,
194, 195, 199, 208, 223, 230, 234, 246 260, 284, 316, 321
Cambodia, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, Indonesia, 304, 309
291, 298, 299 Philippines, 211, 212, 243
Thai forces in, 70, 86, 88, 125 Symington subcommittee hearings,
Indonesia: 196
Soviet military aid to, 315, 316 Thailand, 59, 73, 86, 105, 134, 145, 166
U.S. economic and military aid to, Consultation on Paris peace talks,
288, 302, 304, 305, 306, 310, 184, 185
311, 321 Visit to Southeast Asia, 184
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 728
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728 Index

Haldeman, H.R., 242 Hong Kong, 31, 46, 111, 123

Hankam, 316 Hormats, Robert, 134, 145, 156
Hanket, Col. Arthur P., 65, 71 Houdek, Robert, 87
Hannah, John A., 10, 45, 174, 227, 234 House of Representatives, U.S.:
Hannah, Norman B., 2, 4, 11, 35 Defense Appropriations
Hardin, Clifford M., 132, 277 Subcommittee, 62
Harlow, Bryce, 59 Foreign Affairs Committee, 173
Hartman, Arthur A., 215, 216 Huang Hua, 158
Harvard Development Advisory Hughes, Gen. John, 290
Service, 267 Hughes, Thomas L., 188
Hasnan Habib, Gen., 326 Hukbalahap movement (Huks), 188,
Hawley, James M., 189 227, 233
Heath, Edward, 243 Hummel, Arthur W., 158, 162, 249
Heavner, Theodore J., 327 Humphrey, Hubert H., 87
Hebert, Edward, 175 Hungary, 127
Helms, Richard M.: Huong (Tran Van Huong), 4
NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159
Philippines, 187, 188, 189, 227, 254 India, 46, 92, 191, 308
Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 70, 76, Indigenous people, 1, 149
81, 88, 98 Indonesia (see also Indonesia and
Thai forces in Laos, 36, 88, 93, 98 Indonesian subheadings under other
Thailand, 10, 94, 105, 166, 174 subjects):
U.S. military aid to Laos, 29 Chinese People’s Republic, relations
Henkin, Daniel Z., 104 with, 331, 332
Heroin, 123, 124, 162 Demographics of, 279
Hippies, 162 Economic situation:
Ho Chi Minh, 26, 27 Debt rescheduling, 271, 272, 274,
Ho Chi Minh Trail, 11, 22, 44, 49, 91, 302
102, 126 Five-year plan, 271, 273, 279
Holdridge, John H., 24, 29, 86, 117, 146, Indonesian position, 323
168, 228, 240, 277, 288, 300, 305, 311 U.S. views, 267, 317, 321
Cambodia, 60, 70, 76, 85, 88, 91, 95, Five-year military plan, 317
98, 102, 125, 292 Japanese economic aid to, 278, 301
Indonesia: Japanese sales of rice to, 109
Malik visit, 276 Malaysia, relations with, 266, 268, 273
PRC-U.S. relations, 330 Non-alignment of, 266
Regional cooperation proposal, 312 Pantja Sila, 272, 301
Suharto visit, 296, 302 P.L.–480 rice sales to, 46, 101, 104,
U.S. military aid to, 275, 281, 299, 105, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332
306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314 Regional cooperation proposal, 312
Visit, July, 1969, 270, 271, 272 Singapore, relations with, 268, 279, 294
Philippines, 247 Soviet military aid to, 315, 316
Force withdrawal from Vietnam, 198 Soviet Union, relations with, 266, 274,
Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 294, 302
230 Transmigration, 279
SOFA, 209 United States, relations with, 332
Thailand: Connally visit, 322, 323
Communist insurgency in North PRC-U.S. relations, effect on, 325,
of, 150 330, 331
Forces in Laos, 59, 88, 98, 160 Rogers visit, 271
U.S. forces in, 84, 166 Suharto visit, 266, 272, 292, 294,
U.S. military aid to, 68, 116 295, 296, 297, 301, 302
U.S. relations with, 41, 126, 127, U.S. economic aid to:
128, 155, 182 Indonesian position, 271, 273, 302
All references are to document numbers
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Index 729

Indonesia—Continued International Bank of Reconstruction and

U.S. economic aid to—Continued Development (IBRD)—Continued
U.S. position, 267, 278, 302, 317 Indonesian economic problems, 111,
U.S. loan proposal for Thai rice sales 274, 302
to, 110, 111 Philippines, 222, 227, 234
U.S. military aid to: Thailand, 45, 142
Grant program, 293 International Control Commission
Indonesian request for, 275 (ICC), 32, 60, 300
Letter from Nixon on, 324, 327 International Court of Justice, 28
MAP alternatives for: International Development Agency
Indonesian position, 275, 306 (IDA), 323
Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 294, International Monetary Fund (IMF):
299, 303, 310, 329, 331 Indonesia, 267, 272, 277, 278, 319
Philippine position, 233 Philippines, 207, 208, 222, 229, 233,
Umar visit for discussions on, 305, 234, 247
306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318 Interpol, 124
U.S. position, 280, 283, 306, 307, Iran, 243
311, 318, 332 Irwin, John N., II:
U.S. survey group for, 310, 313, Indonesia, 314, 317, 328
314 Philippines, 248
Military training, 270, 272, 273, 290 Thai forces in Cambodia, 125
M-16 rifles, 313 Visit to Thailand, 1971, 121, 122, 123,
Sumitro talks in U.S. on, 305, 306, 124
307, 308, 309, 310 Islamic separatism:
Transport aircraft, 281, 288 In Philippines, 191
U.S. position, 277, 288, 295, 300, In Thailand, 4, 34
301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 321 Israel, 18, 157, 274, 276
U.S. oil quota for, 276 Italy, 109, 267
U.S. policy toward, 268, 277
U.S. security interests in, 82 Japan. (See also Japan and Japanese
Vietnam Republic, relations with, 279 subheadings under other entries):
Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92 Cambodia role for, 291
West Irian issue, 272, 273, 274 Djakarta Conference, 297
Ingersoll, John, 123, 138 Fuji Seminar, 252
Inouye, Daniel, 256 IGGI member, 267
Interagency Textile Advisory Indonesian debts to, 272
Committee (ITAC), 134 Indonesia purchases of rice from, 109
Inter-Governmental Group on Military role in Asia, 186, 308, 310
Indonesia (IGGI): Military threat from, 153, 320, 330,
Aid requests for 1969, 267 331
Aid requests for 1970, 277, 278 Philippines, relations with, 222
Aid requests for 1971/1972, 317, 319, PRC threat to, 310
323, 326 Regional cooperation, 271
Indonesian view of U.S. role in, 294, Rice purchases from Thailand, 101,
302 106, 114
Japan as member of, 267 Security interests in Asia, 82
Thai views of U.S. actions under, 101, Southeast Asian role of, 121, 169
106, 107, 111, 114 Taiwan policy of the United States,
U.S. contributions to, 101, 332 247
International Bank of Reconstruction Thai view of, 121
and Development (IBRD): United States, relations with, 197
China membership question, 247 Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92
Indonesian aid requests, 267, 272, Jira Vichitsonggram, Gen., 11, 104
277, 278, 295, 317, 319 JOBAR study, 215
All references are to document numbers
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730 Index

Johnson, Lyndon B.: Karamessines, Thomas H.—Continued

Congressional mistrust of, 47 Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 76, 88
Philippines, 187, 194 Thai forces in Laos, 59, 88, 112, 170
Thailand, 23, 32 Karnow, Stanley, 15
Johnson, Vice Adm. Nels C., 29, 52, 61 Kauffman, Adm., 194
Johnson, Peter, 74 Kendall, Donald, 190, 205
Johnson, U. Alexis, 9, 61, 148, 159, 223, Kennedy, David M., 110, 111, 156, 277,
286 321
Cambodia, Thai forces in, 63, 64, 66, Kennedy, John F., 21
70, 76, 86, 98 Kennedy, Col. Richard T., 86, 117, 168,
Laos: 178, 228, 300
Thai forces in, 52, 56, 59, 88, 170 Imelda Marcos visit to Washington,
Thai-Khmer units, 90, 93, 96, 98, 230
112 Thai forces in Cambodia, 76, 88, 95,
U.S. military aid to, 29 98
Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92 Thai forces in Laos, 98, 160, 176
Philippines: U.S. forces in Thailand, 84, 166
CIA contact with Marcos, 188 U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 314
Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, U.S. military aid to Thailand, 125
230 U.S. textile imports from Thailand,
U.S. bases agreement, 215 145
U.S. force reductions, 225 Kennedy Round Food Aid Convention,
Symington subcommittee hearings, 267
30, 35, 37, 194 Keogh, James, 222
Thailand: Khmer (people), 63, 64, 68
Coup, Nov., 1971, 144 Khmer Republic. See Cambodia.
Covert operations in, 120, 129 Kishi, Nobusuke, 186
Economic situation in, 31 Kissinger, Henry A., 4, 54, 62, 100, 117,
Narcotic drug trafficking, 136 146, 240, 277, 286
U.S. forces in: Cambodia:
Increase of, 23, 165 Indonesian military aid to, 300
Reduction of, 65, 69, 71, 73, 80, Thai diplomatic and military aid
84 to, 60
USIS role terminated in, 33 Thai forces in, 63, 70, 76, 81, 85, 86,
U.S. military aid to, 177 88, 91, 95, 98, 102
U.S. relations with, 33, 99 U.S. military intervention in, 292
Dawee meeting with Nixon, 8 Indonesia:
King Rama IX visit, 141 Five-year military plan, 318
Rice sales, 41 Malik visit, 276
U.S. notification about operations Meeting with generals in, 270
from Thai soil, 102 Regional cooperation proposal, 312
Unger visit, 1 Soviet military aid to, 316
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Suharto visit, 292, 295, 300
Laos, 52 U.S. economic aid to, 267, 278, 317,
Philippines, 215, 216 319, 324
Thailand, 52, 62, 65, 69, 79 U.S. military aid to:
Juwono, Gen. Sutopo, 270, 289 Grant program, 293
MAP program, 275, 280, 283, 299,
Kalaris, George T., 238, 257 311
Karamessines, Thomas H., 52, 54, 172, Military training, 293
314 M-16 rifles, 313
Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, Sumitro talks on, 305, 306, 307,
230 308, 309, 310, 326
Narcotic drug trafficking, 136 Survey group on, 314
All references are to document numbers
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Index 731

Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued Kissinger, Henry A.—Continued

Indonesia—Continued Thailand—Continued
U.S. military aid to—Continued U.S. economic aid to, 50, 75, 125
Transport aircraft, 281, 288 U.S. force reductions in, 13, 22, 71,
U.S. position, 304 73, 80, 84
U.S. relations with, 322, 325 USIS role terminated in, 33, 34, 39
Laos: U.S. military aid to, 68, 116, 130,
Thai forces in: 168
Infantry battalions, 55, 56, 57, 58, U.S. program analysis for, 10
59, 61 U.S. relations with:
Performance of irregulars, 147, Agnew visit, 39
160 Laird visit, 105
SGUs, 135 Loosening of alliance, 47
Sierra Romeo artillery unit, 52, Rice sales, 41, 42, 118
55 U.S. defense commitments, 21,
Thai-Khmer units, 88, 90, 91, 93, 24, 27
96, 98, 102, 112 U.S. textile imports from Thailand,
Volunteer program, 170, 178 134, 140, 156
U.S. bombing in, 53 U.S. views of Thanat, 9
U.S. military aid to, 29 Visits:
Nixon’s Asia visit, 1969, 18, 269 China, Feb., 1972, 151
Paris peace talks, 182 Indonesia, July, 1969, 270, 271,
Philippines: 272
Byroade’s assessment of Marcos, Thailand, 126, 127, 128
219 Knowles, Lt. Gen. Richard T., 98, 112,
Constitutional Convention, 228, 230
230, 232 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of,
Force withdrawal from Vietnam, 297, 330
198 Korea, Republic of:
Land Reform Education, 237 Japanese security interests in, 82
Martial law, 260 Philippines, relations with, 256
Riots in Manila, 206, 222 Taiwan policy of the United States,
U.S. force reductions in, 212, 214, 247
218, 225 Thai rice sales to, 46
U.S. interference in elections, U.S. force reductions in, 48, 212, 279
charges of, 193 U.S. payments for forces in Vietnam
U.S. policy toward, 254 from, 38
U.S. relations with, 186 U.S. policy toward, 105, 194
Ferdinand Marcos visit, 189 Korean War, 24, 26
Imelda Marcos visit, 227, 230 Kosygin, Alexei N., 331
Military bases agreement, 195, Kriangsak Chamanan, Lt. Gen.:
215, 217, 221 Agnew visit, 165
Nixon visit, 1969, 192 Coup, Nov., 1971, 142
SOFA, 209, 211 Narcotic drug trafficking, 131, 136,
PRC-U.S. relations, 127, 231 138, 152
Symington subcommittee hearings, Resettlement of Chinese irregulars,
30, 34 173
Thailand: Rogers visit, 104
Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, Thai forces in Cambodia, 66
150 Kris Sivara, Gen., 115
Coup, Nov., 1971, 143 Kuomintang (KMT) irregulars, 104, 131,
Internal vs. external threats to, 89 136, 138, 152, 164, 173
PRC relations with, 154, 181 Kuznetsov, 331
Project Taksin, 23 Kyle, Joseph B., 46
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 732
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732 Index

Lagdameo, 198, 201 Laos—Continued

Laird, Melvin R.: Thai forces in—Continued
Cambodia, 76 U.S. air support for, 25
Indonesia, 268, 280, 283, 310, 322 Volunteer program, 135, 170, 175,
Laos, 175, 176, 178, 179 176, 177, 179
Philippines, 189, 211, 212, 254 Thailand, relations with, 74
Thailand: Thai security concerns over, 1, 11, 20,
Counterinsurgency efforts in, 174 39, 49, 62, 104, 125, 151
U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 62, U.S. bombing of, 22, 53, 58
69, 71, 79 U.S. military aid to, 29
U.S. military aid to, 132, 168 U.S. policy and objectives in, 119
U.S. program analysis for, 10 Vietnam Republic, relations with, 74
U.S. relations with: Laos Working Group, 59
Rice sales, 109 Latif, Gen., 307, 308, 310
U.S. defense commitments, 14, Latimer, Tom, 150
20, 24, 27, 43 Laurel, José, 186, 249, 256
U.S. notification about Lee, Harlan Y. M., 144
operations from Thai soil, Lee Kwan Yew, 276, 279
99, 102 Lennon, James, 274
Visits to Thailand, 4, 104, 105 Levin, Herbert, 314
Lake, Anthony, 18, 270 Licaros, Gregorio S., 261
Laos: Li Mi, Gen., 152
Cambodia, relations with, 74 Lissy, David H., 331
Covert operations in, 56 Li Wen-Huan, Gen., 131, 136, 138, 152,
Japanese economic aid to, 11 173
Lam Son 719 withdrawal, 113 Lloyd, Wingate, 284
Long Tieng defense efforts, 52, 55, 56, Lodge, Henry Cabot, 236
57, 58, 59, 70, 102, 126, 147, 164 Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton
Narcotic drug trafficking in, 123 Textiles (LTA), 134, 140
NVA forces in: Lon Nol:
Call for withdrawal of, 43 Indonesian aid to Cambodia, 284,
Offensive of Feb., 1970, 52 285, 287, 289, 298, 299
Plain of Jars attacks, 147, 148, 164 Popular support for, 87
Strength of, 27, 28 Thai-Cambodian relations, 60
U.S. desire to counter, 57 Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66, 88,
Paris peace talks role for, 16 91, 103
Partition of, possible, 44 U.S.-Cambodian relations, 184
Symington subcommittee hearings, 30 Lopez, Argenio, 233
Thai forces in: Lopez, Fernando, 233
Buildup of, 61 Lord, Winston, 277
Helicopter gunships, 49 Lowenstein, 122, 165
Infantry battalion, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, Lowman, Shepard C., 234, 244, 249, 261
59, 61, 81, 87 Lubis, Abu Bakar, 279
Laotian request for, 18 Lydman, 271, 272, 273
Medevac problems, 126, 135 Lynn, Laurence E., Jr.:
NVA battles with, 147, 148 Indonesia, 308, 310, 314
Performance of irregulars, 147, 160 Thailand, 22, 73, 75, 84
Project Taksin provisions for, 36, 52
Sierra Romeo artillery unit, 29, 33, Macapagal, Diosdado P., 194, 219
51, 52, 55, 59, 64, 96 Maceda, 193
Special Guerrilla Units (SGUs), 122, Macomber, William B., Jr., 14
124, 126, 127, 130, 135, 178, 179 Maestrone, Frank E., 238, 257
Thai Khmer units, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96, Magsaysay, Genaro, 187, 190, 238
102, 105, 112 Magsaysay, Ramon, 186, 188
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 733
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Index 733

Malai Huvanandana, 107, 113, 126 Marcos, Ferdinand—Continued

Malaysia: Press leaks, 236
Australian/New Zealand forces in, Riots in Manila, 205, 206, 208, 222
271 SEATO, 43
Chinese People’s Republic, relations Suspension of habeas corpus, 239
with, 332 U.S. economic aid to Philippines, 227
Dissidents in Thailand, 4 U.S. force reductions, 203, 218, 225,
Djakarta Conference, 297 226
Indonesia, relations with, 266, 268, 273 U.S. military aid to Philippines, 241
Interracial conflict in, 272, 276 U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 201
National Operations Council (NOC), U.S.-Philippines relations, 186, 224,
272 247, 322
Philippine claim to Sabah, 191, 279 Nixon visit, 1969, 191, 192, 269
Thai rice sales to, 46 U.S. interference in elections,
U.S. rubber disposal program, 106 charges of, 193, 205
Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92 Visits to the United States, 186, 187,
Malik, Adam: 188, 189, 224
Cambodia, 284, 285, 287, 291, 297, U.S. views of, 248, 262, 263
298, 299, 300 Marcos, Imelda:
Non-alignment, 266 Possible presidential candidate, 233,
PRC-U.S. relations, 330 257
Southeast Asia peace prospects, 92 Riots in Manila, 205
Soviet military aid to Indonesia, 316 Suspension of habeas corpus, 239
Thai rice sales, 114 U.S.-Philippines relations, 187, 219,
U.S. economic aid to Indonesia, 302, 322
323 Visit to Washington, 1970, 227, 228,
U.S.-Indonesian relations, 271, 272, 229, 230, 232
274, 279, 332 Visit to Washington, 1971, 242, 243,
U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 303, 244, 245
304 Martin, Graham, 3, 23, 36
U.S. views of, 321 Marzuki, Artati, 271, 272
Visit to Washington, 1969, 276 Masters, Edward E., 119, 165, 284, 296,
West Irian issue, 272, 274 297, 298, 302, 303, 304
Malik, Yacov, 297 Mata, 199
Manglapus, Raul S., 227 Mayo, Robert P., 10, 50, 277
Manila Communiqué (1966), 32 McCain, Adm. John, 62, 64, 67, 316
Mansfield, Mike, 144, 320 Indonesia, 275, 290
Mao Tse-tung, 153, 206, 312 Philippines, 193, 247
Marcos, Ferdinand: U.S. force reductions in Thailand, 79
Aquino’s view of, 257 McCarthy, Eugene, 91
Assassination plots against, 202 McClintock, Robert, 36, 194, 196
Attacks on U.S. embassy, 211 McCloskey, Robert, 14
Byroade’s assessment of, 219 McCown, Maj. Gen. Hal D., 4
Communist subversion, 210, 261 McGovern, George, 182, 258
Constitutional Convention, 231, 232 McKee, Capt. Kinnaird, 166
Corruption charges against, 196 McNamara, Robert, 23, 142, 228, 276
Foreign policy of Philippines, 255 Media, 163, 164, 165, 236
Malaysian-Philippines relations, 279 Mekong Valley, 20, 50
Martial law, 207, 233, 256, 257, 258, Melchor, Alex, 199, 201, 247, 261
260 Meo (people), 29, 58, 104
Military bases agreement, 199 Meyer, Charles A., 230
Nixon visit to China, 243, 244, 245 Middle East, 87, 92, 271, 274, 331
Philippines’ force withdrawal from Military Assistance Command Thailand
Vietnam, 198 (MACT), 23
All references are to document numbers
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734 Index

Military Assistance Program (MAP): National Security Council (NSC)—

For Cambodia, 64, 74, 76, 87, 88, 102 Continued
Costs, 32 National Security Study Memoranda
For Indonesia: (NSSM):
Indonesian position, 275, 306 51, 10, 45, 50, 75, 82, 89, 174
Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 294, 299, 61, 268, 277
303, 310, 329, 331 99, 82, 130, 132
Philippine position, 233 155, 254, 260
Umar visit for discussions on, 305, 159, 174
306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318 U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 314
U.S. position, 280, 283, 306, 307, Nehmer, Stanley, 156
311, 318, 332 Nelson, William E., 265
U.S. survey group for, 310, 314 Cambodia, 76, 98, 286
For Philippines, 207, 233, 246 Drug trafficking, 136
For Thailand, 168, 170 Laos, 59, 98, 112, 147
Military Assistance Service Funded Philippines, 188, 230
(MASF), 76, 85, 102, 125, 130, 132 Thailand, 17, 183
Miller, Robert M., 159 Netherlands, 267, 272, 274
Milton, Maj. Gen. Theodore R., 23 Newman, George S., 128, 129, 133
Minh, Gen. (Duong Van Minh), 127 New People’s Army (NPA), 210, 238
Mongolia, 297 New Society, 262
Montelibano, 256 Newsweek, 87
Moore, Jonathan, 48, 49, 76, 194, 201, New York Times, 144, 236
203, 208, 304 New Zealand, 82, 271, 279, 291, 298, 329
Moore, Sgt., 209 Ngo Dinh Diem, 236
Moorer, Adm. Thomas H.: Nguyen Cao Ky, 26, 127, 186
Indonesian military aid to Cambodia, Nguyen Thi Binh, 128
299 Nguyen Thieu, 4, 26, 124, 127
NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159 Nitya Bhanumas, Gen., 131
Thai forces in Cambodia, 70, 76, 88 Nixon, Richard M., 100
Thai forces in Laos, 88, 96, 98, 105, 170 Cambodia, 70, 86, 91, 95, 102, 292
U.S. forces in Thailand, 79, 166 China policy, 121
U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305, Democracy, 242
308, 309, 310, 314 Indonesia:
U.S. notification about operations U.S. economic aid to, 267, 278, 317,
from Thai soil, 99 324, 326
U.S. policy toward Indonesia, 268 U.S. military aid to, 280, 281, 283,
Visit to Thailand, 1971, 104, 105 288, 290, 293, 306, 310
Moose, Richard M., 7, 122, 165, 187 U.S. relations with, 276, 321, 322,
Mosbacher, Emil, 276 325, 331
Muller, George F., 62, 144 Connally visit, 322, 323
Murphy, George, 91 Suharto visit, 1970, 266, 295, 300,
Murphy, Jack, 45 303
Messages:
Narcotics. See Drugs. To Suharto, 322, 327, 329
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 91 To/from Thanom, 13, 16
National Liberation Front (NLF) (Viet NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159
Cong), 4, 186 Philippines:
National Security Council (NSC): Byroade’s assessment of Marcos,
National Security Decision 219
Memoranda (NSDM): Constitutional Convention, 228, 232
77, 84 Investment climate in, 261, 262
89, 125 Land Reform Education, 237
126, 132 Martial law, 233, 258, 260
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 735
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Index 735

Nixon, Richard M.—Continued Nixon, Richard M.—Continued

Philippines—Continued Visits—Continued
Meetings with opposition leaders, Indonesia, 1969, 191, 269, 272, 273
190, 191 Philippines, 1969, 191, 192
Riots in Manila, 206, 222 Thailand, 1969, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,
SOFA, 211 26, 43, 191
U.S. force reductions in, 203, 212, West Irian, 274
214, 218, 225, 226 Withdrawal of foreign forces from
U.S. interference in elections, Vietnam, 12, 18
charges of, 193 Nixon Doctrine:
U.S. relations with, 186 Announcement of, 18, 269
Ferdinand Marcos visits, 189, 224 Force reduction in Taiwan, 247
Imelda Marcos visits, 227, 242, 243 Indonesian position, 289, 296, 301,
Military bases agreement, 195, 308, 312
217, 221 Nixon trip to China and, 153
U.S. views of society in, 235 Philippine position, 203, 210, 254
Re-election of, 184, 185 Thai position, 62, 87, 94, 104, 115, 164
Symington subcommittee hearings, Thai role in, 119
44, 194, 196 U.S. position, 47, 102, 105, 125, 127,
Thai forces in Laos, 52, 93, 148, 175 139, 229, 304, 322, 332
Infantry battalion, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, Non-Aligned Conference, New Delhi,
61 June, 1970, 300
SGUs, 122, 178, 179 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Thailand: (NATO), 212
Chinese People’s Republic, North Borneo, 191
relations with, 181 Nutter, G. Warren, 59, 61, 76, 104
Consultations on Paris peace talks
by, 164, 182, 185 Odeen, Phil, 176
Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, Office of Management and Budget
105, 165 (OMB), 332
Coup, Nov., 1971, 143, 144 Oil, 276
Reappointment of Prime Minister, Okinawa, 197
6, 7 Okun, Herbert S., 48, 49
U.S. economic aid to, 50 Operation Brotherhood, 236
U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 73, Operation Leapfrog, 88
84 Operation Phu Kwang, 162, 163
U.S. military aid to, 43, 168 Operation Prairie Fire, 88
U.S. relations with: Opium, 131, 136, 138, 141, 152, 162, 164,
Green visit, 157 165
Irwin visit, 124 Ortega, Father, 227
King’s visit, invitation for, 110 Ortiz Sanz, Fernando, 272, 274
Loosening of alliance, 47 Osmena, Sergio, 187, 190, 199, 202, 205,
Project Taksin, 20, 23 238
Rice sales, 109, 114 Ott, Maj. Gen. David, 166
U.S. defense commitments, 21,
24, 27, 87 Packard, David:
U.S. textile imports, 140 Imelda Marcos visit to Washington,
U.S. role in Asia, 271 230
U.S. treaty commitments, 157 Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 70, 98
Visits: Thai forces in Laos, 56, 93, 96, 98, 112
China, 1972, 139, 151, 153, 154, 155, U.S. force reductions in Thailand, 65,
320, 330 69, 71, 73, 80, 84
Philippines’ concerns over, 243, U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305,
244, 245, 247 313, 314
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 736
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736 Index

Packard, David—Continued Philippines—Continued

U.S. notification about operations Laurel-Langley Agreement:
from Thai soil, 99 Expiration of, 246, 248, 255
Pahlavi, Shah Reza, 243 Philippine position, 186, 187, 189,
Pakistan, 92, 191 199, 205
Palmby, Clarence D., 75 U.S.-Philippines discussion on, 224
Palmer, Ron, 252 U.S. position, 206, 213, 217, 231
Panggabean, 330 Malaysia, relations with, 191
Pantja Sila, 272, 301 New People’s Army (NPA), 210, 238
Parade, 1 Oligarchy in, 246
Paris Club, 302 Political situation, 219
Paris peace talks: Assassination plots, 202
Indonesian position, 272 Constitutional Conventions, 206,
Philippine position, 186, 191 207, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231,
PRC proposal, 128 232, 243, 256, 257, 259
Thai position, 6, 16, 32, 104, 151, 158, Martial law, 207, 256, 257, 258, 260
164 U.S. position, 233, 264
U.S. position, 43, 121, 126, 182, 185, Plaza Miranda attack, 239
192 Riots in Manila, 205, 206, 208, 222
Parker, Maynard, 87 Return of hijacked airplane by China,
Passman, Otto, 33 121
Pathet Lao, 11, 39, 44, 127 Symington subcommittee hearings,
Patterson, Col., 205 194, 196, 197, 201
Paul, Roland, 21 United States, relations with:
Paul VI, Pope, 227 Aquino criticisms, 249, 252
Peace Corps, 43, 216 Attacks on U.S. embassy, 211
Pederson, 271, 272 Balance-of-payments, 189
Pentagon Papers (Ellsworth), 127, 236 Benefits checks, 189
Percy, Charles, 105 Criminal jurisdiction, 221, 222
Peterson, Pete, 156 Economic agreements negotiations,
Phaithun, Gen., 135 221, 222, 259
Philippine Civil Action Group Filipinization at U.S. bases, 221
(PHILCAG): Lansdale memo, 236
Central Luzon actions of, 210 Military base agreement, 191, 195,
Philippine position, 186, 189, 191 199, 215, 217, 221, 246
U.S. payments to, 198, 201 Nixon meeting with opposition
Philippines: leaders, 190, 191
Cambodia, relations with, 186 Philippine nationalism, 191, 246
CIA contact with Marcos, 188 Press leaks, 236
CIA role in elections in, 187, 188 Rogers visit, 224
Constabulary development for RVN, Science tax, 189
186, 189 SOFA, 207, 209, 211
Covert operations in, 230, 231, 236 Sugar quota, 241, 243, 246, 261
Cuts in U.S. embassy personnel, 225 U.S. economic aid to, 191, 248
Eastern bloc, relations with, 233 Philippine position, 227
Economic situation, 191, 203, 227, P.L. 480 program, 207, 229, 233
245, 261, 262 Rural electrification, 227, 228, 234
Foreign policy of, 255 U.S. force reductions in, 203, 204, 212,
Huk rebellion, 188, 227, 233 214, 215, 216, 218, 225, 226
Islamic separatism, 191 U.S. military aid to:
Japan, relations with, 222 Equipment and training, 210, 241,
Korean Republic, relations with, 243
256 MAP in exchange for bases, 246,
Land Reform Education, 237 248
All references are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 737
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Index 737

Philippines—Continued Praphat Charusathien, Gen.—Continued

U.S. military aid to—Continued Kissinger visit, 126
Payments to PHILCAG, 198, 201 Laird visit, 104
Philippine position, 191, 207, 224 Narcotic drug trafficking, 162, 165
U.S. payments for forces in Vietnam NVA attack on Vietnam Republic,
from, 38, 43 159
U.S. policy toward, 105, 246, 248, 254 Political role of, 5
U.S. views of society in, 235, 246 Rice sales, 107
Pickering, Laurence G., 70, 76, 87, 88, Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66
114, 144, 165 Thai forces in Laos, 88, 90, 96, 102,
Pierson, George K., 45 135, 170
Pincus, Walter, 21 Vietnam conflict, 126
Podgorny, Nikolai V., 331 Prasert, Gen., 66, 141, 144, 162
Poland, 272 Prasit Kanjonawatana, 139, 180
Political parties: Project Lotus, 3, 129
Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) Project Sayavong, 96
(Philippines), 227 Project Taksin (Project 22):
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), Avoidance of publicity around, 35,
137, 150 52, 56, 57
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Background on, 23
271, 273, 295, 331 Senatorial request for content of, 14,
Democrats (Thailand), 5 21, 24, 37
Liberal (Philippines), 202, 205, 206, Thai-U.S. relations as affected by, 15,
231, 238, 262 20, 33, 43
Nationalist (Philippines), 238 U.S. position, 48
Saha Pracha Thai, 2, 5, 120 Pursley, Col. Robert E., 4
Thep (Thailand), 2
Popple, Paul M., 264 Quan, 11
Pote Sarasin: Quezon, Manuel, 219
Agnew visits, 43, 87, 165
Cambodia, 65 Rafferty, James F., 187, 193, 205, 227,
Chinese People’s Republic-Thai 229
relations, 154, 180, 181, 182 Rama IX, King of Thailand:
Connally visit, 139 Agnew visit, 39, 44
Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144 Connally visit, 322
Election, Thailand, 1969, 2, 5 Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143
Irwin visit, 121 Green visit, 155
Japanese role in Southeast Asia, 169 Helms visit, 94
Laird visit, 104 Johnson visit with, 141
Nixon’s trip to China, 153 Nixon’s trip to China, 153
Rice sales, 104, 111 Reappointment of prime minister by,
Thai consultation on Paris peace 5, 6, 7
talks, 182 Rice sales, 109, 110
U.S. views of, 9 U.S. visit proposals, 34, 105, 110
Praphas, 23 Ratliff, Rob Roy, 265
Praphat Charusathien, Gen.: Ravenholt, Al, 205
Agnew visits, 87, 165 Razak, Tun, 272
ARVN withdrawal from Lam Son Refugees:
719, 113 Chinese, 104
Counterinsurgency efforts, 137 Vietnamese, 121, 162, 231
Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144 Renoo, Dr., 87, 111, 130
Green visit, 157 Reyes, Narciso G., 241
Helms visit, 94 Reynders, Thomas, 165
On implementation of U.S. policy, 115 Rhodes Formula, 274
References are to document numbers
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738 Index

Rice: Rogers, William P.—Continued

IR-8 miracle rice, development of, Thailand—Continued
227 U.S. defense commitments to, 21,
Japanese trading in, 101, 106, 109, 114 27, 48, 169
Low prices for, 115 U.S. economic and military aid to,
Proposals for Thai sales to Indonesia 10, 50, 132
of, 101, 110, 111 U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 73,
Sales to Indonesia of, 46, 101, 104, 76, 79, 80, 84
105, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332 U.S. relations with, 16, 20, 102
U.S. P.L. 480 rice sales: U.S. views of Thanat, 9
Thai position, 87, 104, 105, 110, 111, Vietnam military situation, 241
127 Visit to China, Feb., 1972, 151, 153
U.S. position, 39, 114, 130, 132, 164, Visit to Indonesia, July, 1969, 271,
207, 229, 233 272, 274
U.S. rice sales to Vietnam Republic, Visit to Philippines, July, 1970, 224
39, 41, 43 Romania, 18, 127, 191, 269, 272
U.S.-Thai talks on, 46, 106, 107, 109, Romualdez, Benjamin “Kokoi,” 188,
110, 111, 114, 118 193, 205, 247, 261
Richardson, Elliot, 208 Romulo, Carlos, 244
Indonesia, 277, 293, 296, 302 Green visit, 247
Philippines, 190, 195, 214, 215, 218 Military bases agreement, 199, 222
Suharto visit, 292, 297 Press leaks, 236
U.S. secret agreements, 14, 194 Rogers visit, 224
Robinson, Davis R., 14 SOFA, 209, 211
Rockefeller Foundation, 227 Southeast Asia peace prospects, 92
Rogers, William P., 45, 62, 194 Vietnam military situation, 241
Indonesia: Ronodipuro, J., 271
Malik visit, 276 Roxas, Jerry, 190, 219
Suharto meeting in Belgrade, 331 Roy, Jose, 238
U.S. economic and military aid to, Rubber, 106, 110, 115, 320
267, 280, 283, 323 Rush, Kenneth, 159, 166, 170
U.S. policy toward, 268 Rusk, Dean, 21, 23, 24, 36, 48, 75
Nixon’s Asia visit, 1969, 269 Russell, Richard, 76
Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92
Philippines: Sabah, 191, 279
CIA contact with Marcos, 188 Saiyud Kerdphon, Gen., 1
Rural electrification aid, 234 Salonga, Jovito R., 238
U.S. policy toward, 254 Samran Petyakul, Lt. Gen., 149
U.S. relations with, 189, 192 Sanga, Gen., 111, 122
U.S. views of society in, 235 Sani, Anwar, 271, 272, 279, 296, 302
Symington subcommittee hearings, San Juan, Rep., 236
30, 196 Sarit Dhanarajata, Marshal, 23, 144
Thai forces in Cambodia, 74 Savang Vatthana, King of Laos, 56
Thai forces in Laos, 36, 122 Sawaeng Senanarong, Gen.:
Thailand: Agnew visits, 43, 87
Chinese People’s Republic, Connally visit, 139
relations with, 154, 180 Counterinsurgency efforts, 1, 11
Counterinsurgency efforts, 11, 105, Helms visit, 94
174 Kissinger visit, 127
Reappointment of Prime Minister, Laird visit, 104
6, 7 Rice sales, 106, 111
Secret U.S. agreement with, 14 Thai elections, 2
Security concerns over Laos of, 49 Withdrawal of foreign forces from
Southeast Asia role of, 32 Vietnam, 26
References are to document numbers
1255_INDEX 10/18/06 12:21 PM Page 739
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Index 739

Schermerhorn, Lange, 151 Southeast Asia—Continued

Schuman, Robert, 91 Peace prospects for, 92
Security Training Center, 236 PRC policy in, 153
Seith, Maj. Gen. Louis T., 25, 87 Regional cooperation in, 312
Selden, Armistead, 166 Thai role in, 32
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: U.S. security policy in, 1
Indonesian economic and military U.S. Senate review of commitments
development, 301 in, 6
Nixon administration’s views of, 105 U.S. withdrawal from, 87
Review of U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Southeast Asia by, 6 (SEATO):
Symington subcommittee hearings: Article IV, 247
Philippines, 194, 196, 197, 201 Cambodian treaty commitments, 60
Thailand, 20, 24, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, Council Meetings:
37, 43, 44, 97 Bangkok, May, 1969, 7, 9, 11
Thai forces in Laos, 59, 176, 178 Manila, July, 1970, 224
Senior Review Group on Southeast Joint defense commitments, 21, 24, 36
Asia, 81, 132, 174, 254 Laos treaty commitments, 56
Serm Vinicchayakul, 111, 139 Military contingency planning, 15
Shakespeare, Frank, 27, 33 Thai support for, 43
Shakow, Alexander, 101 Treaty provisions, 48
Shultz, George P., 132, 317 U.S. role in Asia, 82
Sierra Romeo, 29, 33, 51, 52, 55, 59, 64, Souvanna Phouma:
96 Agnew visit, 184
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 39, 44, 60, Communist road building, 44
87, 153, 186, 247, 272, 284, 287 Narcotic drug trafficking, 124
Singapore: Negotiation with Pathet Lao, 127
Australian/New Zealand forces in, Thai forces in Laos, 56, 57, 59, 61, 87,
271 96, 135, 148
Diplomatic aid to Cambodia, 60 Soviet Union:
Indonesia, relations with, 268, 279, Djakarta Conference, 297
294 Indonesia, relations with, 266, 271,
Thai rice sales, 46 274, 294, 302
U.S. security interests in, 82 Indonesian views of, 18
Vietnam conflict, 276 Middle East, 274
Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180, 191, Philippines, relations with, 233
272, 273 Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180,
Sirikit, Gen., 126, 127 191, 272, 273
Sison, Jose Maria, 257 Strategic arms limitations talks, 43
Slamat, Air Vice Marshal, 316 Thailand, relations with, 47
Smith, Harold, 261 United States, relations with, 28, 91,
Smith, K. Wayne, 89, 125, 127, 128, 314 169, 245, 331
Smith, Norman L., 114 Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92
Smith, Terence, 16 Spain, 27
Sneider, Richard L., 13, 189, 267 Spear, Moncrieff J., 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17
Soedjatmoko, 272, 274, 276, 287, 292, Spiers, Ronald I., 65, 73, 194, 195
296, 302, 320 Srey Saman, Gen., 63
Soekeng, Col., 307, 308, 310 Stans, Maurice H., 140
Solbert, Peter, 23 Starbird, Linwood, 14, 16
Sompong, Dr., 43 Stempel, John D., 296, 297, 298, 302
Southeast Asia: Stennis, John, 76, 93, 175
Indonesian security role in, 317 Sternberg, Dave, 205, 252
Japanese role in, 121, 169 Stilwell, Brig. Gen. Richard, 23
Neutralization proposal, 143, 247 Straits of Malacca, 82
References are to document numbers
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740 Index

Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Sunthorn Hongladarom—Continued

Defense (STAFD or STFD) Thai consultation on Paris peace
program, 113, 125, 130 talks, 151
Stuart, Richard K., 187 Thai economic situation, 31
Sudardjo Niklani, Gen., 326 U.S.-Thai relations, 27, 43, 46, 48, 101,
Sudharmono, Maj. Gen., 271, 272, 296, 106
302, 323, 330, 331 Supardjo, Brig. Gen., 271, 272
Sudjatmoko, 271, 272, 273 Surakij, Gen., 1, 90, 96, 104, 113, 167
Sudomo, Vice-Adm., 296, 302, 303 Surakit Mayalarp, Gen., 87, 94, 107, 124,
Sugar, 241, 243, 246, 261 165
Suharto: Suryono Darusman, 296, 302
Cambodia, 284, 285, 287, 294, 299, 323 Suthi Nartworathat, 114
On Communism, 266 Sutikno, Gen., 323
Connally visit, 322, 323 Suwoto, 315, 316
IGGI efforts, 319, 323, 324, 326 Swank, Emory C., 90
Messages from Nixon, 322, 327 Sweden, 285
Nixon visit, 1969, 269, 272, 273 Sy, Stephen, 193
PRC-U.S. relations, 330 Symington, Stuart, 21, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37,
Rogers meeting in Belgrade, 331 105, 147, 194, 197
Thai rice sales, 114 Symington subcommittee hearings:
U.S.-Indonesian relations, 325, 332 Philippines, 194, 196, 197, 201
U.S. military aid, 275, 280, 281, 290, Thailand, 20, 24, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
304, 305, 310, 314, 327 43, 44, 97
U.S. views of, 321, 322
Visits: Tanham, George, 1, 89
Australia and New Zealand, 1972, Tasning, Brig. Gen. Her, 271, 272
329 Tatad, Francisco, 201
United States, 1970, 266, 272, 292, Taylor, Curtis H., 197
294, 295, 296, 297, 301, 302, 303 Tea, 173
Westmoreland visit, 329 Terrorism, 153, 180, 238
Suhud, Brig. Gen., 275, 281 Textiles, 134, 140, 145, 156, 161
Sujatmoko, 272, 274, 276, 287, 292, 296, Thailand. (see also Project Taksin;
302, 320 Thailand and Thai subheadings
Sukarno, 267, 272, 276 under other subjects):
Sullivan, William H., 148, 194 Accelerated Rural Development
Counterinsurgency efforts in (ARD) program, 31
Thailand, 11 Cambodia, relations with, 44, 60, 291
Thai forces in Cambodia, 81 Cambodian troop training in, 76
Thai forces in Laos, 147, 194 Chinese irregulars resettled in, 173
U.S. forces in Thailand, 80, 166 Chinese minority in, 142, 144
Visit to Thailand, May, 1971, 121, Chinese People’s Republic, relations
122 with, 9, 119, 154, 177, 180, 181,
Sumitro, Lt. Gen., 271, 272, 312 182
U.S. economic and military aid to CIA perspective on, 94
Indonesia, 270, 281, 299, 301, 311, Communist threat to, 149, 150
314, 324, 326 Corruption in, 162
Visit to the United States, 305, 306, Counterinsurgency efforts:
307, 308, 309, 310 Equipment and support programs
Sumuatmoko, 289 needed for, 1, 11, 110
Sunthorn Hongladarom: In the North, 149, 150
Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92 In the Northeast, 13, 105
Security concerns over Laos, 49 Rural development’s role in, 45
Symington subcommittee hearings, Summary executions of
30, 35, 37 Communists, 183
References are to document numbers
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Index 741

Thailand—Continued Thailand—Continued
Counterinsurgency efforts—Continued Southeast Asia role of, 32
Thai position, 43, 150 Soviet Union, relations with, 47
U.S. position, 115, 137, 164, 174 STAFD program, 113, 125, 130
U.S. role in, 9, 97, 137 Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA)
Covert operations in, 3, 120, 129, 131 request by, 18
DRV, relations with, 124 Symington subcommittee hearings,
Economic situation, 31, 115 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 97
Education and health, 45 Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 64, 66,
Foreign policy of, 115 68
Hill tribes, 1, 149 Tourism in, 111
Hippies banned from, 162 United States, relations with:
Internal vs. external threats to, 89 Agnew visit, 39, 42, 43
Japanese rice purchases, 101, 106, 114 Connally visit, 139
Laos, relations with, 74 Constitutional government
Muslim insurgency, 4, 34 reestablished, 5, 6
Narcotic drug trafficking: Contingency plan dispute, 14, 15, 20
KMT irregulars role in, 131, 136, Economic relations, importance of,
138, 152, 164, 173 82
Media publicity over, 163, 164, 165 Green visit, 153, 155, 157, 158
Thai officials’ role in, charges of, Loosening of alliance, 115
162, 163 Nixon’s trip to China, 153
Thai position, 115, 138 Thai consultation on Paris peace
Thai-U.S. talks on, 123, 124, 136, talks, 151, 158, 164, 182, 184,
141, 152, 162, 165 185
U.S. position, 124, 129, 164 U.S. defense commitments, 14, 21,
Nixon visit (1969), 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 36, 43, 87
26, 43 Congressional attitudes’ effect
Northeast region: on, 47, 48, 165
Communist activity in, 34, 39, 87, USIS termination, 33, 34, 39
115 U.S. payments for Thai forces in
Communist political efforts, 137 Vietnam, 36, 38, 39
Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, U.S. economic aid to:
105 FY 1970 program, 45, 50
Election, 1969, 2 P.L. 480 program for, 75, 76, 87, 98,
NVA training of Thai insurgents, 111, 116, 125, 127, 130, 132, 164
150 Thai-U.S. talks on, 31
Thai view of conflict in, 126, 165 U.S. forces in:
Northern region: Increases in, 162, 164, 166
Chinese support for rebels in, 39, Nixon doctrine role for, 62
87, 150 Reductions in:
Communist insurgency in, 149, 150 Banner Sun, 79, 84
Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13 Planning for, 73
Increase pressure by insurgents in, Scheduling of, 25, 79
113, 165 Thai position, 20
Political situation, 115 U.S. concerns over, 22, 62, 65, 80
Coup, Nov., 1971, 142 U.S.-Thai consultations over, 12,
Elections, 1, 2, 3, 5, 115 13, 16, 27, 28, 69, 71
Reappointment of Prime Minister, Thai approval for additional U.S.
5, 6, 7 bombers, 108
Rubber, 110, 111 U.S. military aid to:
Rural security and development, 45 Ceilings on, 175, 176, 178
Secret U.S. agreement with, charges Equipment and weapons, 43, 68,
of, 14 164, 167, 171
References are to document numbers
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742 Index

Thailand—Continued Thanom Kittikachorn:

U.S. military aid to—Continued Constitutional government, return to,
MAP program, 168, 170 169
MASF program, 76, 85, 102, 125, Counterinsurgency efforts, 1, 11,
130, 132 137
Thai position, 1, 9, 43, 104, 116, 132, Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144
155, 169, 177, 184 Election, Thailand, 1969, 2
U.S. position, 32 Narcotic drug trafficking, 123, 124,
U.S. policy and objectives in, 16, 17, 165
82, 119 NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159
U.S. program analysis for, 10 Pote’s view of, 2
U.S. textile imports from, 134, 140, Reappointment as Prime Minister, 5,
145, 156, 161 6, 7
Vietnam Democratic Republic, Retirement of, 115
relations with, 119 Thai consultation on Paris peace
Vietnam Republic, relations with, 92 talks, 182, 184, 185
Withdrawal of forces from Vietnam: Thai forces in Laos, 29, 105, 122, 127,
Thai position, 16, 18, 40, 43 135, 148
U.S. position, 12, 16, 32 Thai Khmer forces in Cambodia, 63
Thai Patriotic Front, 150 U.S. military aid to Thailand, 116,
Thai People’s Liberation Armed Forces 165, 167
(TPLAF), 115 U.S.-Thai relations:
Thajeb, Ismael, 271, 272 Agnew visits, 39, 43, 44, 87, 165
Thajeb, Sjarif, 323, 324 Connally visit, 139
Thanat Khoman: Green visit, 153, 157, 158
Counterinsurgency efforts in Helms visit, 94
Thailand, 11, 137 Hummel visit, 162
ICJ judgeship candidacy, 28 Irwin visit, 122, 123, 124
Japan, 252 Kissinger visit, 127
Political role of, 5 Laird visit, 104
Replacement of, 151, 177 Nixon messages, 13
Southeast Asia, 1, 32, 92 Nixon trip to China, 153
Symington subcommittee hearings, Nixon visit, 18
35, 37 Rice sales, 106, 111
Thai forces in Cambodia, 74, 91 Thai approval for additional U.S.
Thai forces in Laos, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, bombers, 108
59, 91 U.S. defense commitments, 21, 23
U.S. bombing of Laos, 53 Wheeler visit, 4
U.S. force reductions, 25, 28 Withdrawal of forces from Vietnam,
U.S.-Thai relations: 16, 26
Agnew visit, 43 Thant, U, 274, 285, 297
Connally visit, 139 Three Nation Committee, 297, 300, 305
Contingency plan dispute, 15, 20 303 Committee, 3, 282
Irwin visit, 121, 122, 124 Tin, 111, 115
Kissinger visit, 127, 128 Tito, Josip Broz, 91
Laird visit, 104 Tjakradipura, Gen., 270
Loosening of alliance, 47 Tokyo Conference, 226
Nixon visit to Bangkok, 18 Tomseth, Victor L., 114
Rice sales, 39, 41, 104, 106, 118 Tourism, 111, 224
U.S. defense commitments, 23, 24, Tran Van Huong, 4
27, 36, 48, 75 Troops Contributing (to Vietnam)
U.S. views of, 9 Countries (TCC), 15, 16, 91
Withdrawal of Thai forces from Trudeau, Pierre-Elliot, 233
Vietnam, 40 Trueheart, William, 188
References are to document numbers
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Index 743

Tuan Hsi-Wen, Gen., 131, 136, 138, 152, Unger, Leonard—Continued

173 U.S. military aid to Thailand, 116,
Tunku Abdul Rahman, 272, 279 130, 133, 167
U.S. role in, 13
Ubol, Princess, 133 U.S. views of Thanat, 9
Umar Wirahadikusumah, Gen., 299, Visit to the North, Jan., 1972, 149
305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318, 329 Visit with Amb. Johnson, 1
Underhill, Francis T., 191, 235 Withdrawal of foreign forces from
Unger, Leonard: Vietnam, 12, 26, 40
Cambodia, Thai forces in, 63, 64, 66, United Kingdom, 226, 267, 312
67, 76, 95, 102, 103 United Nations (UN), 124
Chinese road-building, 150 United Nations Development Program
Counterinsurgency efforts in (UNDP), 267
Thailand: United Nations Economic Commission
Equipment and support programs for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE),
needed for, 1, 11, 110 277
Summary executions of United States Information Service
Communists, 183 (USIS), 33, 34, 39
U.S. role in, 97, 137 Usher, Richard, 197, 201, 203, 208, 234,
Withdrawal of U.S. forces from, 13 246
Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144
Covert operations, 120, 131 Vaky, Viron P., 230
Election, Thailand, 1969, 2, 3 Valeriano, Gen., 186
Laos: Vang Pao, 57, 124, 127, 135, 178
Thai forces in, 36, 51, 58, 59 Veliotes, Nicholas A., 122
Thai Khmer regiments, 90, 93, 96 Vicharn Nivatvong, 114
Volunteer program, 135, 175 Vien, Gen. Cao Van, 4
Narcotic drug trafficking, 138, 164 Viet Cong (NLF), 4, 186
Soviet-Thai relations, 47 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (see
Symington subcommittee hearings, also DRV and NVA subheadings
30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 97 under other subjects):
Thai role in Southeast Asia, 32 Djakarta Conference, 297
Thai-U.S. relations: Occupation of Cambodian territory
Agnew visits, 43, 44, 165 by, 60
Contingency plan dispute, 14, 20 In post-Ho era, 26, 27
Green visit, 155 PRC, relations with, 153
Hummel visit, 162 Red Cross repatriation delegation,
Irwin visit, 121, 122 104
Johnson visit, 141 Thailand, relations with, 124
Kissinger visit, 126, 127, 128 U.S. bombing of, 22, 99, 270
Laird visit, 104 Vietnam, Republic of (see also ARVN
Loosening of alliance, 47, 115 and Vietnam and Vietnam Republic
Rice sales, 39, 41, 42, 107, 109, 110, subheadings under other subjects):
111 ARVN withdrawal from Lam Son
Thai consultation on Paris peace 719, 113
talks, 158, 164 Cambodian troop training in, 76
U.S. defense commitments, 21, 48 Communist offensives in, 6
U.S. notification about operations Indonesia, relations with, 279
from Thai soil, 99 Laos, relations with, 74
Wheeler visit, 4 Military situation, 4, 91, 241, 279
U.S. economic aid to Thailand, 75 Narcotic drug trafficking, 124
U.S. forces in Thailand, 25, 62, 71, 73, NVA attack on, 159
79, 80, 84, 166 Philippine forces in, 186, 189, 191,
USIS role terminated in Thailand, 33 198
References are to document numbers
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744 Index

Vietnam, Republic of—Continued Ware, R. A., 79

Thai forces in: Washington Post, 15, 144
Thai position, 32, 40, 43, 85, 91, 126 Washington Special Action Group:
U.S. payments for, 36, 38, 39 Indonesian military aid to Cambodia,
U.S. position, 51, 102, 161 286
Thailand, relations with, 92 NVA attacks in Laos, 147
Thai rice sales to, 46 Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66, 70,
Thai security concerns over, 164 76, 81, 98, 102
U.S. policy toward: Thai forces in Laos, 29, 52, 56, 59, 61,
Continued U.S. military presence, 91, 93, 98, 135, 170
105 U.S. economic aid to Thailand, 75
Need for anti-Communist U.S. forces in Thailand, 80, 84, 166
government, 119 Washington Star, 144
Public opinion on, 48 Wells, William, 88, 93
Revisions to, 45 West, Walter, 46, 101
U.S.-Philippines talks on, 192 West Irian, 272, 273, 274
U.S. rice sales to, 39, 41, 43 Westmoreland, Gen. William, 322, 327,
Viet Cong role in government, 270, 329
271 Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 4, 10, 56, 59, 63
Withdrawal of foreign forces Whipkey, Airman, 239
from: Whitaker, John, 15
Indonesian position, 271, 272, 273, Whitehouse, Charles S., 327
276, 320, 321 Whitten, Leslie, 163
Thai position, 16, 18 Wichian Watanakun, 180
U.S. position, 12, 16, 32, 91, 331 Widjojo Nitisastro, Prof., 271, 272, 296,
Vietnamization: 302
Aircraft provision and pilot training, Widodo, 323, 329, 330, 331
73 Wilkinson, M. J., 126, 127, 128
Funding shortfall for, 69 Williams, G. Mennen, 186
Indonesian position, 295 Williams, Harding, 261
Thai bases, role in, 62 Wilson, James, 88, 93, 98, 119, 194, 234,
Thai position, 26, 87, 91, 104 249
U.S. position, 12, 13, 51 Wolff, Lester, 163, 164, 165
Vietnam Special Study Group, 80 Woods, Rose Mary, 243
Vietnam War protests in the United World Food Organization, 114
States, 43 Wright, Marshall, 188, 190
Virata, 247, 261
Vogt, Lt. Gen. John, 76, 88 Yan, Gen., 199
Voice of the People of Thailand, 150 Yango, Alejandro D., 244
Yem Sambaur, 297, 298
Wales, Bob, 258 Yost, Charles W., 28
Walsh, John P., 187, 190 Yugoslavia, 91
Wandler, Mark, 166
Wanzeck, William T., 152, 165 Zais, Lt. Gen. Melvin, 88
Wardhana, Ali, 323 Ziegler, Ron, 181, 272

References are to document numbers