Deception in Context: Coding Nonverbal

Cues, Situational Variables and Risk of

Detection

Ke Zhang, Lara A. Frumkin, Alex

Stedmon & Glyn Lawson

Journal of Police and Criminal

Psychology
The Official Journal of the Society for
Police and Criminal Psychology

ISSN 0882-0783

J Police Crim Psych

DOI 10.1007/s11896-013-9127-9

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 Author's personal copy
J Police Crim Psych
DOI 10.1007/s11896-013-9127-9

Deception in Context: Coding Nonverbal Cues, Situational

Variables and Risk of Detection
Ke Zhang & Lara A. Frumkin & Alex Stedmon &
Glyn Lawson

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract There are many situations in which deception may Introduction

arise and understanding the behaviors associated with it are
compounded by various contexts in which it may occur. This Behavioral cues related to deception include both verbal and
paper sets out a coding protocol for identifying cues to nonverbal markers (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008)
deception and reports on three studies, in which deception exhibited by deceivers who deliberately conceal their intent
was studied in different contexts. The contexts involved (e.g., Kirchhuebel & Howard, in press; Lawson et al., in
manipulating risks (i.e., probability) of being detected and press). The study of these factors is complex and
reconnaissance, both of which are related to terrorist activi- compounded by the various contexts in which these behav-
ties. Two of the studies examined the impact of changing the iors may occur (Vrij, 2008), as well as individual differences
risks of deception detection, whilst the third investigated (e.g., personality traits) that may influence fundamental psy-
increased cognitive demand of duplex deception tasks in- chological processes of deception (Vrij, 2008) and percep-
cluding reconnaissance and deception. In all three studies, tions of risk of being detected (Rhodes & Pivik, 2011).
cues to deception were analyzed in relation to observable Previous research has revealed three fundamental processes
body movements and subjective impressions given by par- of deception: emotion, cognitive effort, and attempted be-
ticipants. In general, the results indicate a pattern of hand havioral control (Vrij, 2008; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Non-
movement reduction by deceivers, and suggest the notion verbal and verbal deception cues are linked to these psycho-
that raising the risk of detection influences deceivers’ behav- logical processes underlying acts of deception.
iors. Participants in the higher risk condition displayed in- While it has been argued that nonverbal cues are not as
creased negative affect (found in deceivers) and tension stable as some verbal indicators (e.g., Vrij & Granhag, 2012),
(found in both deceivers and truth-tellers) than those in lower cues presented by deceivers are determined to some extent
risk conditions. by the context in which they occur. For example, a terrorist
may not have to speak to anyone when passing through a
Keywords Nonverbal cues . Deception detection . public space, thus only nonverbal cues may be available to
Cognitive load . Reconnaissance be assessed by others. We considered that the contextual
variables such as risk of being detected could not only
K. Zhang (*) influence decisions of deception (Sip et al., 2010), but also
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
alter the cues presented by deceivers. Given the possible
e-mail: chloe.zhang.11@mail.wbs.ac.uk
effect of contextual variables, we conducted three studies
L. A. Frumkin in different deception contexts (see details in section 1.2). In
School of Psychology, The University of East London, London, addition, research in the field of deception cues is still at the
UK
exploratory stage and the current approaches point towards
A. Stedmon research assessing deception cues from different channels
Cultural, Communication & Computing Research Institute, (DePaulo & Bond, 2012; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). With
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK this in mind, it is useful to gain further understanding of
nonverbal cues via the present research that focuses on cues
G. Lawson
Human Factors Research Group, Faculty of Engineering, The that are observable to other people, so as to assess what
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK nonverbal deception cues could be spotted where detailed
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behavioral analyses are not feasible. Such cues should ide- Vrij et al., 2001). In addition, according to Interpersonal
ally be observed from a distance, as it is not always possible Deception Theory (IDT) (Buller & Burgoon, 1996) liars
to approach suspects in public crowded spaces. adjust their behavior and may try to avoid ‘dishonest’ be-
It has been argued that no single cue can reliably identify haviors (Burgoon et al., 1996), which increases the difficulty
deception due to the lack of developed coding schemes that to spot deception cues reliably. The inconsistencies of the
have generated poor results in previous studies (Vrij, 2008). psychological processes involved in deception supports the
Therefore, in the current research, a coding protocol (detailed view that deception cues may vary in different contexts (Vrij,
in section 2) was developed as an elaboration of a previous 2008). Therefore, we consider context as a crucial factor in
scheme related to cues identified across different sections of detecting deception cues. We investigated deceptive behav-
the body (Vrij et al., 1996). Impressions given by deceivers ior in different forms and situations so as to broaden the
based on the fundamental processes of deception (e.g., neg- established understanding of nonverbal deception cues.
ative affect in relation to negative emotions) were also coded Given that context can determine deceivers’ behavior, we
and analyzed. investigated deception-related behaviors in settings that are
relevant in the fields of terrorism prevention, criminal inves-
Psychological Processes Underlying Deception tigation and promotion of public safety. The present research
sought to investigate situations both inside and outside tra-
In the literature, there are many nonverbal cues related to the ditional laboratory settings, where participants usually re-
underlying psychological processes of deception. Some are main seated throughout experiments with an interviewer.
negative emotions such as fear or guilt, whilst others are Three studies were designed to assess deception in different
positive emotions, such as excitement, relief and pride contexts:
(Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Frank, 1993; Porter & ten Brinke,
& Lying in front of peers in a semi public space (a
2008). There are macro negative emotional cues such as
classroom).
reduced hand and arm movements during speech (Vrij,
& Lying during interaction with another person in a private
2008) and positive cues such as smiling (Memon et al.,
space (in a laboratory).
2003).
& Lying and reconnaissance whilst passing through a secu-
The process of lying may require extra cognitive effort as
rity control point in a public space (the corridor of a
liars suppress true information whilst forming lies and re-
building).
membering false information (Langleben et al., 2002;
Spence et al., 2001; Vrij et al., 2008; Walczyk et al., The first goal of the present research was to investigate
2005). Liars also need to monitor their own behavior (Vrij observable nonverbal cues in relation to deception. We did not
& Mann, 2005) and their target’s reactions (Burgoon et al., target specific cues, but tested a number of nonverbal body
2008), which places a high demand on the liar’s cognitive movements across body sections, as observed by people using
processing (Carrión et al., 2010). Visible cues to cognitive the coding protocol, as specified in section 2. This is due to the
effort are, for instance, fewer hand and/or arm movements fact that nonverbal cues are unstable and inconsistent across
(Ekman, 1997; Memon et al., 2003), less blinking (Bagley & contexts. In addition, we investigated impressions given by
Manelis, 1979), more gaze aversion (Ekman, 1997; Doherty- deceivers, based on the fundamental processes of deception.
Sneddon & Phelps, 2005). Attempted behavioral control From the above approach, four general hypotheses
varies at an individual level and can be influenced by emo- assessing nonverbal cues related to deception were pro-
tional demands and cognitive load. However, deliberate be- posed. Hypothesis 1, deceivers will present different
havioral self-regulation can sometimes make a liar’s behav- amounts of observable body movements, as compared to
ior appear contrived, tense, and over-controlled (DePaulo & truth-tellers. Hypothesis 2, impressions related to emotional
Kirkendol, 1989; Vrij, 2008). process of deception (e.g., negative and/or positive affect)
will be presented by deceivers as compared to truth-tellers.
Cues to Deception and Contextual Variables Hypothesis 3, impressions related to cognitive effort of de-
ception will be presented by deceivers as compared to truth-
Cues related to the fundamental processes of emotion, cog- tellers. Hypothesis 4, impressions related to attempted be-
nitive effort, and attempted behavioral control are not con- havioral control processes of deception will be presented by
sistently presented by liars. For example, fewer hand or arm deceivers as compared to truth-tellers.
movements can be an indication of cognitive overload Deception cues can be influenced by contextual variables
(Ekman, 1997; Memon et al., 2003), negative emotions such as the degree of stakes of deception (i.e., the extent of
(Vrij, 2008), or an intention to deceive (Lawson et al., in the positive or negative consequence of deception) (e.g.,
press). Therefore, it is widely believed that no single cue can Hartwig et al., 2006; ten Brinke & Porter, 2012) and task
reliably identify deception (DePaulo et al., 1985; Vrij, 2008; complexity (Lancaster et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2011).
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Contextual variables can introduce variance with regard to nonverbal (Vrij, 2008) and risk taking behavior (Byrnes
specific deception cues. When faced with higher stakes, liars et al., 1999; Rhodes & Pivik, 2011). They are not the focus
tend to illustrate more behavioral reductions and signs of of this study, but they were included as covariates in the data
increased cognitive activity (i.e., they appear to be ‘thinking analysis so as to prevent a significant influence on the results.
hard’) (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010; Vrij & Mann, 2001).
Considering that deceiving is often a risk-taking behavior,
factors that influence it could be related to those that influence A Coding Protocol for Identifying Cues to Deception
risk-taking behavior as well. According to cognitive psychol-
ogists, people who engage in risk-taking behaviors do not Across all three studies, behavior data were collected and
only consider the extent of the negative outcome if they are edited into video clips. There were 337 clips in total (32 clips
detected (in relation to stakes), but also weigh the probability in Study 1, 210 clips in Study 2, and 95 clips in Study 3) that
of being detected (Breakwell, 2007; Sip et al., 2010). The were then assessed using a coding system based on the
probability of deception detection is therefore important as nonverbal cues literature (DePaulo, et al., 2003; Vrij, et al.,
well as the extent of the consequences of deception (i.e., 1996; Vrij, 2008) (Table I). The specific movements coded
stakes). Both of these may influence the involvement of the were slightly different according to study settings (e.g., par-
underlying psychological processes of deception such as fear ticipants were seated in Study 2, but were standing/walking
and cognitive effort. In the present paper, we refer to the risk in Studies 1 and 3). Hand and arm data were scrutinized in
of deception detection in describing the probability of being more detail (Table II).
detected. Therefore, our research manipulated the degree of Three raters (MSc and PhD students in social sciences at a
risk in order to assess how it might influence deception cues. UK university) subjectively coded 10% of the video clips,
In Study 1, this was achieved through the introduction of taken as a random sample, for inter-rater reliability test pur-
evaluated and non-evaluated deception conditions, since in- poses. A selection criterion for inter rater reliability
troducing evaluation of truthfulness increases the possibility (Cronbach’s alpha > .70) was applied across Studies 1, 2
of being detected. In Study 2, the degree of risk was manip- and 3 for each body section and impression category. Since
ulated by altering the evaluators: that is, evaluations adequate values for inter-rater reliability tests were obtained,
performed by security staff were designed to elicit a higher numerical data obtained from the three raters were averaged
level of risk of deception detection, compared to evaluations and combined under each item with the remaining video clips
performed by a lay person. Given the discussion above, we that were then rated by two of the three raters. The raters were
proposed that higher risks might result in a higher extent of blind to the experimental conditions and hypotheses and cod-
involvement of psychological processes. We therefore pro- ed the frequency and duration of movements across the body
pose another two general hypotheses (regardless of specific sections using separate 7-point scales ranging from 1 = exists
cues) in testing the effect of risks of deception detection. (frequency) or brief (duration) to 7 = always (frequency) or
Hypothesis 5, there will be a greater extent of observable whole session (duration).
nonverbal cue(s) (either body movement(s) and/or impres- As introduced in sections 1 and 1.2, detailed categorizations
sion(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is of impressions given by participants were also coded (Table III).
higher, compared to lower risk levels. Hypothesis 6, the In Studies 1 and 2, raters coded impressions elicited by partic-
extent of such observable cues will be positively correlated ipants in the video using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 =
with the level of risk of deception detection; the higher the not at all to 5 = to a great extent. The rating scheme was
risk the more cues will be observed. extended by using a 7-point scale across the same descriptors
Deceiving does not usually happen as a single event but in Study 3 to increase the sensitivity of the data.
often entails multiple deceptions resulting in increased cog- Two filtering steps were performed on the dependent
nitive effort to remember scripts, control behavior and mon- variables before data analyses were conducted:
itor the target’s responses (Vrij, 2008). It has been found that
& In order to filter out movements that seldom occurred in the
increasing cognitive loading can elicit deception cues (e.g.,
participant pool, descriptive statistics were obtained and
Lancaster et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2009). In order to investi-
movement variables that were shown by fewer than 30%
gate this, in Study 3, a duplex lying and reconnaissance task
of the participants were excluded from the data analysis.
was designed to provide higher levels of task difficulty than
& As the cut-off point filtered out different variables across
single deception tasks. From this, a final hypothesis was
the three studies, the common items of dependent vari-
developed. Hypothesis 7, deceivers performing a reconnais-
ables in the three studies were retained.
sance task in addition to lying will display more observable
nonverbal cues than deceivers performing only one task. A series of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) were
Demographic characteristics (age, gender, and cultural conducted within each study for movement and impression
differences) related to individual differences may influence variables. Bonferroni corrections were employed to reduce
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Table I Coding of nonverbal cues - Body sections excluding hand/arm

Body sectionsa Variable namea (movements) Coding Details (frequency/length)

Head Head movement (all studies) All types (e.g. nod, shake, turn, tilt, etc.)
Eye Aversion/shifts (all studies) Brief change of gaze direction
Staring at other places (Study 1 and 2) Fixed gaze direction
Staring at folder (Study 2) Fixed gaze in the direction of the folder
Eye contact aversion (Study 3) Avoiding eye contact with passersby
Eye/eyebrow (all studies) Other eye movements to those above
Trunk Indirect orientation while standing (Study 1) Tilting at waist while being spoken to
Lean towards other people while seated (Study 2) Body moving toward people being talked to
Lean back while seated (Study 2) Body moving away from people being talked to
Position shift (Study 2) Changes to the way of sitting that involve multiple body parts
Sway (Study 3) Waist moving slowly or rhythmically from side to side
Foot/Leg Feet and legs (all studies) Movements of legs and feet together
Foot only (all studies) Movements of feet without moving legs
Leg only (all studies) Movements of legs without moving feet

Note. a Body sections/movements in Bold were included in the analysis (according to the filtering steps stated in section 2).

the chance of Type I errors (Field, 2005) and demographic Apparatus.

information including age, gender, nationality (western and
non-western) were assessed as covariates. The missing The experiment, conducted by three researchers, took place
values in body movement variables were coded as ‘0’, in a University lecture room. An envelope for each partici-
representing the ‘absent’ status of movements. pant contained an instruction sheet, an evaluation sheet, and
a token. The token was a small card with one of nine possible
combinations of its features based on three colors (e.g., red,
Study 1: Lying in Front of Peers blue or yellow) and three shapes (e.g., heart, square or
triangle). A short self-rating manipulation check question-
Method naire assessing e.g., levels of nervousness, perception of
levels of task difficulty and motivation, and a demographic
Participants. information completion sheet (e.g., age, gender and nation-
ality) were included. Two high-definition video cameras
For this study, 34 University students were recruited. Partici- were used to record behaviors. Each participant received a
pants with invalid data (e.g., incomplete/unclear video foot- confectionery reward for completing the study.
ages) were excluded. Valid data from 32 participants (17
males, 15 females, Mage = 22.86 years, SD = 3.89) were Design and procedure.
included in the analyses. To participate, students were required
to have normal, or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, In this study the independent variables of deception and degree
normal ability of body movement and communication. of risks were manipulated in a 2 (veracity) × 2 (risk level)

Table II Coding of nonverbal cues - Hand/arm

Body sectionsa Variable namea (movements) Coding Details (frequency/length)

Hands/arms Hands and arms (all studies) Movement of hands and arms together
Hands only (all studies) Movement of hands without moving arms
Crossing arms (all studies) Arms crossed in front of chest
Hand(s) in pocket(s) (all studies) Gesture of hand(s) in pocket(s)
Hand holding (Study 1 and 2) Two hands hold together in front/behind trunk
Hand hiding and legs (Study 2) Holding hands between knees
Hand and objects (Study 3) Movements of hands holding bag or objects

Note. a Body sections/movements in Bold were included in the analysis (according to the filtering steps stated in section 2).
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Table III Coding of nonverbal cues – Impressions

Three Processes Variable Name (impressions) Coding Details (the degree of impressions)

Emotion Positive affect Being pleased in general throughout the session

Negative affect Being unpleased in general throughout the session
Tensiona Being tense and not being relaxed in general throughout the session
Cognitive effort Thinking hard Being considering carefully while talking (about the card/folder/name)
Attempted behavioral control Attempted control Attempting to manipulate behavior
Rigid Being stiff and rigid while moving
Task-related Looking around (Study 3) Observing the environment

Note. a Tension was calculated by averaging the score of ‘being tense’ and the reverse score of ‘being relaxed.’ All variables listed were included in
data analyses.

between-subjects design and participants were randomly Corrected α = .01). Age, gender and nationality (western/non-
assigned to the four groups. Veracity was manipulated by western) were retained as covariates. Based on the coding of
instructing participants to deceive or tell truth about the color video data, the results of ANCOVAs for the significant depen-
and shape of the token they received. Risk levels were manip- dent variables are presented in Table IV. Inter rater reliability for
ulated by whether or not asking peers of the participants to the significant dependent variables in the overall coding are
evaluate whether the participants were being deceptive about Cronbach’s α = .70 (hand holding); and α = .64 (hand/arm).
the token they had. Upon receiving an envelope containing task By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and
instructions and a token, participants were instructed not to nationality (see details in Table IV), a significant effect of
expose the token during the experiment. Each participant stood veracity emerged for holding of hands: F(1, 21) = 4.75, p <
at the front of the classroom and gave a short presentation to the .05, ηp2 = .18, with Cohen’s d = 0.83. This illustrated that hand
audience, including their student number, name, a curious fact holding was higher for liars (M = 4.74, SE = 1.13) than truth-
about themselves (e.g., “I run five miles every day”) and a tellers (M = 1.36, SE = 1.05). Holding of hands was classified
description of their token containing its color and shape (e.g., “I under hand/arm movements and indicated movement reduc-
have a blue triangle”). The content of the presentation, as tion and moderately tense behavior (Mehrabian, 1968). These
related to participants themselves, was designed with the pur- findings support Hypothesis 1, that deceivers would present
pose of enhancing motivation to perform well by introducing different amounts of observable body movements, when com-
self identity-related tasks (DePaulo et al., 2003). pared to truth-tellers.
The group ‘deceiver & evaluated’ (DE) lied about the There was a trend towards significance for hand/arm move-
token and were evaluated by their peers. Then the group ments for the evaluation variable (risk of detection): F(1, 21) =
‘truth-teller & evaluated’ (TE) performed the task and did 4.29, p = .051, ηp2 = .17, Cohen’s d = −0.80. The evaluation
not lie about the token but were also evaluated by their peers. condition yielded fewer hand/arm movements (M = 2.19, SE =
Participants in these two groups were told that the overall 1.12) than the non-evaluation condition (M = 5.90, SE = 1.39).
group ranking was to be announced later to the class mem- As decreased limb movement is one of the recognized cues to
bers; however, this was designed purely as a mechanism to deception, this finding leads to further consideration of Hy-
manipulate the level of risk involved in the evaluated pre- pothesis 5, that there will be a greater extent of observable
sentations. Groups of ‘deceiver & non-evaluated’ (DN) and nonverbal cue(s) (either body movement(s) and/or impres-
‘truth-teller & non-evaluated’ (TN) participated similarly as sion(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is
DE and TE but were not evaluated by their peers. After higher, compared to lower risk levels. Nonetheless, the finding
their presentations, participants completed the question- of a trend of effect for risk across veracity conditions indicates
naire pack together with the manipulation check ques- that the same magnification effect applies for truth-tellers as
tions and then received their confectionery reward for their well. No covariates were statistically significant in relation to
participation. Behavioral data were recorded using video cam- level of risk.
eras and transferred into numerical data through the coding
processes. Discussion

Results This study revealed that risk (i.e., probability of deception

detection) might have a similar effect as deception in altering
ANCOVAs were conducted for all dependent variables, nonverbal behavior (e.g. a reduction in hand movements).
Bonferroni corrections were performed (six tests ran in total, The finding suggests that not only the stakes (i.e., the extent
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Table IV ANCOVA results for Study 1a

Deception Level of Risks

F df p ηp2 F df p ηp2

Movements and Covariatesa

Hand and arm* 1.14 1, 21 .30 .05 4.29 1, 21 .51 .17
Age 1.58 1, 21 .22 .07 1.58 1, 21 .22 .07
Gender 1.23 1, 21 .28 .06 1.23 1, 21 .28 .06
Western/Non-western 0.63 1, 21 .44 .03 0.63 1, 21 .44 .03
Hand holding** 4.75 1, 21 .04 .18 2.24 1, 21 .15 .10
Age 5.62 1, 21 .03 .21 5.62 1, 21 .03 .21
Gender 6.98 1, 21 .02 .25 6.98 1, 21 .02 .25
Western/Non-western 0.01 1, 21 .94 .00 0.01 1, 21 .94 .00

Note. a Insignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp2 = effect size estimate – partial eta squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05
states in Bold; *trend of significant effect of variables: P < .055 states in Bold.

of consequences of deception) as found in previous studies, and another about deception). The same covariate and ma-
but also risks (i.e., the possibility of being detected) might nipulation check questions were used from Study 1. Two
magnify the effect on deceivers’ behaviors. However, similar high-definition video cameras were used to record behaviors.
to stakes, enhancing risks can lead to misjudgment as to This study was conducted by three researchers, two of whom
whether or not someone is lying, since truth-tellers under took on the roles of confederates (e.g., ‘student’ and ‘security
higher risks can present similar reduced hand movements as guard’). Each participant received a £5 voucher as well as a
deceivers. In addition, it is unknown whether there are indi- confectionery reward for completing the study.
vidual differences in perceiving risk levels of deception
detection. To further understanding these questions, Study Design and Procedure.
2 used a within-subjects design to compare behavior
exhibited by the same person across different conditions of In this study the independent variables of deception and risk
veracity and risks of deception detection. Different levels of were manipulated in a 2 (veracity) × 3 (level of risk) within-
risks (low, moderate, and high) were assessed to investigate subjects design, and the assignment of the six conditions was
if the extent of cues presented by the same individual were counterbalanced. Participants either deceived or told truth
affected by increased risk levels. about the articles they had in each condition. The level of risk
of deception detection was manipulated with the confeder-
ates engaging in face-to-face evaluations regarding the ve-
Study 2: Lying During Interaction with Another Person racity of participant statements about the article. There are
three levels of the risk variable, the lowest, moderate, and
Method highest risk of being detected.
In the deception conditions participants were provided
Participants. with a folder containing two written articles and instructed
to conceal and lie about having the deception article through-
For this study, 40 University students were recruited. Partici- out the tasks. The deception article gave a non-detailed
pants with invalid data (e.g., incomplete/unclear video foot- introduction of deception. It did not include any information
ages) were excluded. Valid data from 35 participants (7 males, about nonverbal cues of deception, in order to prevent
28 females, Mage = 27.40 years, SD = 7.91) were included in influencing participants’ nonverbal behavior. Participants
the analyses. To participate, students were required to have were first left alone in the room to read the articles whilst
normal, or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, normal their behavior was video recorded (condition ‘deceiving &
ability of body movement and communication. alone’ = lowest risk). This condition involved no social
interaction and therefore there was the lowest risk of being
Apparatus. detected amongst the three levels of the risk variable. In this
section, participants’ behavior was analyzed so as to identify
Each participant received a folder containing either one whether they demonstrated any specific cues in relation to
article (about education) or two articles (one about education deception. This was based on previous work (Lawson et al.,
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in press), which indicated that individuals intending to lie time between the sessions ranged from one to two minutes.
would behave differently to those intending to tell the truth. After each set of three conditions participants completed the
Although no statement was involved, deceivers were manipulation check questions. They then completed the
experiencing concealed intention of deceiving whereas covariate battery followed by a debrief session and were
truth-tellers were not. After five minutes, a confederate given a £5 voucher and an extra confectionery reward for
who assumed the appearance of a student entered the room their participation. Behavioral data were recorded using vid-
and interacted with the participant (condition ‘deceiving & eo cameras and transferred into numerical data through the
layperson’ = moderate risk). During this phase of the exper- coding processes.
iment the participant was encouraged to act normally and not
to draw attention to him/herself or raise suspicions of having Results
the deception article. After five minutes the student left and a
‘security guard’ entered the room and conducted a mock Repeated-measures ANCOVAs were conducted for all de-
security interview (condition ‘deceiving & security guard’ = pendent variables, Bonferroni corrections were performed
highest risk). The participants were instructed that the guard (12 tests ran in total, Corrected α = .00). Covariates of age,
was skilled in deception detection and had the authority to gender and nationality (western/non-western) were retained
remove them from the study if they were caught lying. For in the tests. The results of ANCOVAs for the significant
experimental consistency, the guard interviewed all partici- dependent variables are presented in Table V. Inter rater
pants and purposefully ‘failed’ to detect any deceptive cues in reliability for the significant dependent variables in the over-
any participants. all coding are Cronbach’s α = .64 (hand holding); α = .65
In the truth-telling conditions (‘truth-telling & alone’, (negative affect); and α = .81 (tension).
‘truth-telling & layperson’, and ‘truth-telling & security By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and
guard’) the task was identical to the deception conditions nationality the results revealed no significant effects of decep-
except that participants did not have the deception article and tion for either movement or impression variables. Hand hold-
thus did not have to lie about it to the confederates. Since ing movements were significant for risks, F(2, 56) = 3.46, p <
truth-tellers would still be evaluated in two of the sections, .05, ηp2 = .11. The risk level 1(i.e., alone in room) (M = 3.66,
we intentionally removed the deception article from what SE = 0.27), 95% CI [3.10, 4.22] and level 2 (i.e., with layper-
they would be reading so as to prevent the impact of the son) (M = 5.93, SE = 0.71), 95% CI [4.47, 7.38]; and level 3
deception contents on truth-tellers (e.g., the deception con- (i.e., with confederate security guard) (M = 7.23, SE = 0.72),
tents might lead to task-irrelevant nervousness while being 95% CI [5.76, 8.70]. The results showed a significant main
asked about deception during the security interview). The effect of risks on hand holding, where such movements were

Table V ANCOVA results for Study 2a

Deception Level of Risks

F df p ηp2 F df p ηp2

Movements and Covariatesa

Hand holding** 0.10 1, 28 .75 .00 3.46 2, 56 .04 .11
Age 0.60 1, 28 .45 .02 0.44 2, 56 .65 .02
Gender 1.40 1, 28 .25 .05 0.18 2, 56 .84 .01
Western/Non-western 1.15 1, 28 .29 .04 1.83 2, 56 .17 .06
Impressions and Covariatesa
Tension**b 0.52 1, 28 .48 .02 3.92 1.63, 45.52 .04 .12
Age 0.11 1, 28 .74 .00 4.74 1.63, 45.52 .02 .15
Gender 0.38 1, 28 .54 .01 2.31 1.63, 45.52 .12 .08
Western/Non-western 0.00 1, 28 1.00 .00 0.64 1.63, 45.52 .08 .09
Negative affect** 0.91 1, 28 .35 .03 4.24 2, 56 .02 .13
Age 1.67 1, 28 .21 .06 0.18 2, 56 .84 .01
Gender 0.05 1, 28 .82 .00 1.08 2, 56 .35 .04
Western/Non-western 0.00 1, 28 .99 .00 1.10 2, 56 .34 .04

Note. a Insignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp2 = effect size estimate – partial eta squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05
states in Bold. b Greenhouse-Geisser correction figures presented for the condition of level of risks.
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increased in the two conditions with social interactions (level 2 negative affect. In addition, there was also a significant increase
& level 3), compared to the condition when participants were in extent of tension impression in the highest risk condition.
alone (level 1). However, the difference between level 2 and However, both deceivers and truth-tellers were influenced,
level 3 did not reach the significance level, according to suggesting that risk has strong influences on tension impression
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests (paired t-test). regardless of deception. The difference of such nonverbal cues
A significant main effect of risks emerged in the impression of was not significantly different between risk level 1 and level 2.
negative affect (unpleased impression), F(2, 56) = 4.24, p < .05, However, the highest risk of detection (i.e., evaluated by a
ηp2 = .13. There was greater negative affect associated with security confederate) did significantly influence nonverbal cues,
higher risk levels with 95% CI [1.55, 1.85] for level 1 (M = compared to the other two lower risk levels.
1.70, SE = 0.07), 95% CI [1.67, 1.98] for level 2 (M = 1.82, SE = Given the literature suggesting that increased cognitive
0.08), and 95% CI [1.84, 2.21] for level 3 (M = 2.03, SE = 0.09). loading can enhance the detectability of deception indicators
The subsequent Bonferroni corrected post-hoc test showed a (Vrij & Granhag, 2012), Study 3 was designed to assess dual
significant difference of negative affect between level 1 and level deception tasks in order to increase cognitive loading in in-
3, t(34)= −3.10, p < .01; and level 2 and level 3, t(34) = −2.60, dividuals. This was done to investigate if cognitive loading
p = .01. However, such significant difference was only found in can be more effective in magnifying the difference between
deceivers and even then not between level 2 and level 3. The deceivers and truth-tellers than risk of detection. The tasks
impression of tension was mainly influenced by risks as well, took the form of simulating a security identity check as well as
F(1.63, 45.52) = 3.92, p < .05, ηp2 = .12, level 1(M = 2.56, SE = a reconnaissance task that could be conducted by terrorists, in
0.06), 95% CI [2.43, 2.69], level 2 (M = 2.78, SE = 0.10), 95% order to investigate cues that could be observed in such
CI [2.58, 2.97], and level 3 (M = 3.18, SE = 0.06), 95% CI [3.05, contexts.
3.30]. Tension impression was significantly different between
level 1 and level 3, as well as level 2 and level 3. The subsequent
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests showed a significant Study 3: Lying and Reconnaissance Whilst Pasing
difference of tension impression between level 1 and Through a Security Control Point
level 2, t(34) = −3.37, p < .01, in truth-tellers but not in deceivers.
These findings of the main effect of risk partially support Method
Hypothesis 5, that there will be a greater extent of observable
nonverbal cue(s) (either body movement(s) and/or impres- Participants.
sion(s)) exhibited in deceivers when the risk of detection is
higher, compared to lower risk levels. The significant differ- For this study, 100 University students were recruited. Partici-
ence in the extent of nonverbal cues between levels of risks pants with invalid data (e.g., incomplete/unclear video foot-
was not found in all comparisons. Therefore the results did ages) were excluded. Valid data from 94 participants (22 males,
not completely support Hypothesis 6, that the extent of such 72 females, Mage = 26.53 years, SD = 8.66) were included in the
observable cues would be positively correlated with the level analyses. To participate, students were required to have normal,
of risk of deception detection; the higher the risk the more or corrected to normal, vision and hearing, normal ability of
cues that would be observed. Notably, although the findings body movement and communication.
suggest that higher risks can lead to increased nonverbal cues
presented by deceivers than in lower risk conditions, a main Apparatus.
effect of risk combines both deceivers and truth-tellers.
The experiment was conducted in the corridor of a university
Discussion main building. Each participant placed an adhesive label
over their name on their university ID card. The same covar-
Study 2 revealed a main effect of risk that led to reduction in iate and manipulation check questions were used from Study
hand movements (hand holding is categorized as a reduced hand 1 and Study 2. Two high-definition video cameras were used
movement). Hand movements significantly decreased while par- to record behaviors. This study was conducted by three
ticipants engaged in interaction with confederates compared with researchers, one of whom took on the role of a ‘security
when they were alone. However, it is possible that engaging in guard’. Each participant received a £5 voucher as well as a
conversation changed participants’ hand holding movements confectionery reward for completing the study.
irrespective of the risk variable. Study 2 also showed that im-
pressions of negative affect and tension increases under higher Design and Procedure.
risks. Deceivers showed significant increased negative affect in
the highest risk condition, compared with the two lower risk In this study the independent variables of duplex deception
conditions. Truth-tellers did not show a similar pattern of were manipulated in a 2 (deception about identity) × 2
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(reconnaissance) between-subjects design. Participants were The ‘truth-teller & reconnaissance’ group followed the
randomly assigned to one of the four groups. Deception same process but told truth about their names. The ‘truth-
about identity was manipulated by instructing participants teller & no-reconnaissance’ group neither lied about their
to either lie or tell the truth about their name. The reconnais- names nor performed the reconnaissance task. When the
sance task was manipulated by instructing participants to study was completed, the researcher debriefed and rewarded
either covertly memorize objects in the environment (e.g., each of the participants with a £5 voucher and an extra
how many chairs in the room) or not to memorize objects. confectionery for their participation. Behavioral data were
The context of this study aimed to simulate a public security recorded using video cameras and transferred into numerical
checkpoint scenario and typical reconnaissance activities data through the coding processes.
conducted in public spaces.
Participants were asked to pass through a security door set Results
up at the entrance of an office. While monitoring the security
door a confederate security guard asked for and checked ANCOVAs were conducted for all dependent variables, and
each person’s name on the label of their student ID card. Bonferroni corrections were performed (six tests ran in total,
Groups of ‘deceiver & reconnaissance’ and ‘deceiver & no- Corrected α = .01). Age, gender and nationality (western/non-
reconnaissance’ put a fake name on the label of their student western) were retained as covariates in the tests. The results of
ID card and lied about their real names. These groups were ANCOVAs for the significant dependent variables are
informed that they would lose entitlement to an extra reward presented in Table VI. Inter rater reliability for the significant
if they were caught lying; this was not applicable for the truth dependent variables in the overall coding are Cronbach’s
tellers. For experimental consistency, the guard interviewed α = .84 (trunk); α = .94 (hand/arm); α = .88 (positive affect);
all participants and purposefully ‘failed’ to detect deceptive and α = .74 (eye/eye brow).
cues in any participants. The ‘deceiver & reconnaissance’ By controlling for the covariates including age, gender and
group also covertly memorized the notable objects while nationality there was a trend towards significance in deception
passing through the space. After completing the deception with trunk movements: F(1, 85) = 3.82, p = .054, ηp2 = .05,
task, they were required to identify observed objects on a list Cohen’s d = − 0.41, revealing that liars presented fewer trunk
and then complete the questionnaire pack. movements (M = 1.69, SE = 0.25) than truth-tellers (M = 2.40,

Table VI ANCOVA results for Study 3a

Deception Reconnaissance

F df p ηp2 F df p ηp2

Movements and Covariatesa

Eye/eye brow** 0.07 1, 85 .80 .00 5.68 1, 85 .02 .06
Age 2.29 1, 85 .13 .03 2.29 1, 85 .13 .03
Gender 0.08 1, 85 .78 .00 0.08 1, 85 .78 .00
Western/Non-western 0.62 1, 85 .44 .01 0.62 1, 85 .44 .01
Trunk* 3.82 1, 85 .05 .04 3.62 1, 85 .06 .04
Age 0.00 1, 85 .99 .00 0.00 1, 85 .99 .00
Gender 0.03 1, 85 .86 .00 0.03 1, 85 .86 .00
Western/Non-western 1.67 1, 85 .20 .02 1.67 1, 85 .20 .02
Hand and arm* 3.85 1, 85 .05 .04 0.60 1, 85 .44 .01
Age 3.93 1, 85 .05 .04 3.93 1, 85 .05 .04
Gender 4.76 1, 85 .03 .05 4.76 1, 85 .03 .05
Western/Non-western 0.03 1, 85 .87 .00 0.03 1, 85 .87 .00
Impressions and Covariatesa
Positive affect** 5.94 1, 85 .02 .07 0.36 1, 85 .55 .00
Age 1.39 1, 85 .24 .02 1.39 1, 85 .24 .02
Gender 0.44 1, 85 .51 .01 0.44 1, 85 .51 .01
Western/Non-western 0.35 1, 85 .56 .00 0.35 1, 85 .56 .00

Note. a Insignificant dependent variables were not listed. ηp2 = effect size estimate – partial eta squared. **Significant effect of variables: p < .05
states in Bold; *trend of significant effect of variables: P < .055 states in Bold.
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SE = 0.25). A similar trend of decreased hand and arm regular life (Study 1), we simulated deception tasks that
movements emerged, F(1, 85) = 3.85, p = .053, ηp2 = .04, may occur in specific instances and could violate public
Cohen’s d = − 0.41, with fewer such movements for deceivers safety (e.g., deceiving a member of security staff in Study
(M = 2.41, SE = 0.45) than truth-tellers (M = 3.68, SE = 0.45). 2 and the reconnaissance task in Study 3) in order to compare
These findings indicate a trend of decreases in limb move- the findings from such different settings.
ments providing support towards Hypothesis 1, that deceivers The findings (shown as either significant or a trend of
would present different amounts of observable body move- significance) from Studies 1 and 3 in relation to deception
ments, when compared to truth-tellers. Subjective impressions suggest the involvement of the fundamental psychological
of positive affect were significantly influenced by deception, processes related to deception. The trend in trunk and limb
F(1, 85) = 5.94, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, Cohen’s d = 0.51. Liars movement reductions indicates nonverbal cues in relation to
displayed more positive affect (M = 3.01, SE = 0.16) com- negative emotions (Vrij, 2008), cognitive overload (Ekman,
pared to truth-tellers (M = 2.45, SE = 0.16) supporting Hy- 1997; Memon et al., 2003), and behavioral control (Meservy
pothesis 2, that more impressions related to emotional process et al., 2005; Vrij et al., 1997), whereas the increased positive
of deception (either negative and/or positive affect) would be affect observed in liars provides evidence of positive emo-
presented by deceivers than truth-tellers. tions associated with deception (Memon et al., 2003). In
Eye/eyebrow movements were significantly influenced by addition, the present research indicates that the deception
reconnaissance, F(1, 85) = 5.68, p < .05, ηp2 = .06, Cohen’s cue of limb reduction is found for situations under which
d = 0.51. Covert information collection conditions yielded deceivers are standing (in Study 1) or moving around (in
more eye/eyebrow movements (M = 3.79, SE = 0.15) than Study 3) and therefore extends the traditional paradigm of
conditions where there were no reconnaissance activities using seated participants with an interviewer in laboratory
(M = 3.28, SE = 0.15). settings.
The findings in Studies 1 and 2 suggest that reduction in
Discussion hand movements related to the cognitive effort and attempted
behavioral control processes might be magnified when the
The trend for hand movement reduction found in this study level of risks are raised. However, since there is no significant
reflected the similar findings in Studies 1. In addition, pos- difference in Study 1 and across levels of risks in Study 2, this
itive affect was observed as an indicator associated with the needs to be assessed in future studies. Nonetheless, Study 2
underlying emotion process. The replicated trend of hand partially supports our proposition that risks can enhance differ-
movement reduction suggests it might be a consistent cue ences in nonverbal behavior between deceivers and truth-
across the two contexts assessed in Studies 1 and 3. The only tellers. The difference in nonverbal cues was not significant
cue found in relation to reconnaissance was the increased across the three levels of risks, but the extent of impression of
eye/eyebrow movements. However, this is considered a task- tension was greater in the highest risk (security evaluation)
related result since participants looked around as part of the level than the other two lower risk levels. This might be due
reconnaissance activity. This does not support Hypothesis 7, to the fact that higher risks place greater self-regulation de-
that deceivers performing a reconnaissance task in addition mands on a person, subsequently leading to depletion in self-
to lying would display more observable nonverbal cues than regulation. The self-depletion results in one’s failure of regu-
deceivers performing only one task. The failure to find lating such behaviors properly (Carver & Scheier, 1998;
significant cues in relation to the dual deception tasks sug- Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Notably, the cues associated
gests that nonverbal cues we have investigated might not be with induced risks were also presented by truth-tellers,
as sensitive as verbal cues (e.g., as found in Vrij et al., 2011) suggesting a need for future research endeavoring to solve the
in relation to cognitive loading. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not dilemma of discriminating liars from truth-tellers who might
supported by any of the three studies. behave like deceivers (DePaulo, 1992; Ofshe & Leo, 1997).
Similarly, the impression of negative affect was also signifi-
cantly increased in the highest risk level, compared to the other
General Discussion two levels. This trend was only significant in deceivers,
suggesting a possible solution to discriminate deceivers from
The present research consisted of three studies assessing truth-tellers by observing the extent of negative affect across
different deception contexts. The contexts ranged from a risk levels. However, since the results did not show a robust
private space to a public space, involving both manipulations difference across all three levels, further studies are needed for
such as risks of deception detection and reconnaissance, and testing this nonverbal impression. Nonetheless, the findings
contexts that cannot be manipulated (e.g., passersby as an about the significant increase in nonverbal cues in the highest
audience when the deception is conducted in a public space). risk overwhelming the other levels suggest that a security check
In addition to investigating deception that can happen in (as simulated in Study 2) might influence deceivers’ and/or
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truth-tellers’ behavior. We thus suggest this should be brought situations. This work is another step forward in identifying
to the attention of security/public safety practitioners. more clearly the difference between deceivers and truth-
In relation to the controlled covariates, age and gender were tellers in settings other than interview situations. The impli-
found to be significantly related to reduction in hand move- cations of this research could be important for security stake-
ment whilst telling lies. Age also influenced tension impres- holders in many settings as they continually strive to make
sions related to risks. An explanation is that age and gender improvements to methods of deception detection. A focus
can influence nonverbal behavior exhibited by individuals and on observable nonverbal cues could benefit security
in line with evidence of age and cultural influences on non- officials who are not able to directly interact with sus-
verbal behavior (Vrij, 2008; Vrij & Winkel, 1991), our result pect individuals and who do not use detailed behavioral
suggests that the effect of such variables should not be analysis when a judgment of deception is needed im-
neglected in future research and failing to take these into mediately. In addition, the present research provides
account may adversely impact the validity of results. evidence of nonverbal deception cues, and sheds light
This research may have limitations regarding the stakes of on effective manipulations, which may further help to
deception introduced in experiments, which are not as dramatic increase deception detection accuracy.
as those in real life deception situations such as terrorist activ-
ities. However, the risk assessed in this study concerns the Acknowledgments This research was supported by a grant from
probability of being detected. Participants were aware that the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC: EP/
H02302X/1). The authors would also like to thank Ms Christin
confederate they met in the highest risk level was good in
Kirchhuebel for her valuable aid during the data collection process;
detecting lies. This had introduced a higher probability of Dr. Manuchehr Soleimani, and the IT services teams from the Univer-
detection than the other two levels (either no evaluator or no sity of Bath and the University of East London for providing resources
evaluation was performed). A further limitation is that in Study for the experiments.
2, deceivers read an extra article about deception. Although the
article did not include information about nonverbal cues to
deception, it might still have had an effect on the psychological
processes that deceivers experienced and thus might indirectly References
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